

Xenophon's *Hiero*

by

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Author's Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

This study will be a close textual analysis of Xenophon's *Hiero*, contextualized and informed by the author's other writings and the relevant secondary philological and historical scholarship. In addition to critiquing the dominant understanding of the *Hiero* in modern secondary scholarship, it will explore the structure and dramatic context of the dialogue, considering how these support or attenuate its major themes. It will consider and compare these major themes with those of Xenophon's other works, ultimately showing that the *Hiero* makes a unique intellectual contribution to Xenophon's theory of human leadership and his understanding of the impact leadership quality has on the happiness of the leader.

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Introduction

Xenophon's *Hiero* is a dialogue between Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse from 478 to 467 BC, and Simonides of Ceos, the famous epinician poet, concerning the happiness of the tyrant. It is generally dated to the later years of Xenophon's life, between 360 and 355 BC, based on a strong connection with *On Revenues*.¹ Several attempts have been made to associate the text with particular historical events, but the evidence is limited, and this association is generally considered unnecessary.² Though the dialogue was largely neglected by the Romans, it was certainly important during the Renaissance, and it has influenced modern political thinking if only through its profound influence on Machiavelli.³

Xenophon has become one of the most frequently discussed Classical authors in modern scholarship. This fact is explained largely by the radical differences of opinion regarding the quality of his works; this is to say, his quality as both a historian and philosopher have been the object of polarizing debate. Many in antiquity and the modern era have considered Xenophon to be a valuable source for the historical Socrates and Socratic philosophy, and he was said to have actually recorded the conversations and events of Socrates to which he had been witness.⁴ His literary role as a historian served to supplement this belief. Beginning in the late 19th century, however, Xenophon's reputation was damaged by critiques of both his philosophical and

¹ The connection is based on many similar statements, but the strongest is the emphasis on promoting fair trade (*Hiero* 9.9, cf. *On Revenues* 3.3-4). For the fullest discussion of the date and audience, see Aalders (1953).

² The work has been thought to have had as a particular audience the tyrants Dionysius I, Dionysius II, and Jason of Pherae. The first is implausible if the connection with *On Revenues* is accepted, and evidence for a connection with the latter two rulers is slim. Hatzfield (1947: 67) proposes that Dion was the intended audience, but as Aalders (1953: 215) points out, Dion was on his way to overthrow a tyranny, and to write to such a person concerning the pitfalls of adopting (his own) tyranny would have been confusing if not offensive.

³ Marchant (1925: xii) claims it was not read by the Romans; its influence on Machiavelli is discussed in detail by Newell (1988) and briefly by Strauss (1991: 24-25).

⁴ Diogenes Laertius 2.48 confidently declares Xenophon's witness, giving implicit credibility to the *Memorabilia*. Many other scholars have implicitly trusted the accuracy of Xenophon's Socratic writings - see Patzer (2010: 231) for numerous examples.

historical writing. Historical criticism established the fact that Xenophon is not always perfectly reliable, and it was argued that his Socratic writings did not contain philosophy lofty (read: Platonic) enough to justify the manifest influence Socrates had on the history of the discipline.⁵ Ultimately, Xenophon was held against the standards of history and philosophy entrenched by Thucydides and Plato, and was considered inferior.⁶

The objective of the present study is to analyze the *Hiero* closely so as to better understand the thought of its author. It will first discuss the dialogue's literary background, followed by the dominant standing interpretation of the text, followed by my own interpretation. Ultimately, it will be clear that this dialogue does not rely on opaque, specious irony to offer literary or philosophical appeal, but is a thoughtful literary innovation and an important addition to Xenophon's systematic theory of leadership, in which field of thought the author is without precedent. The first chapter, addressing the literary nature of the dialogue, will discuss some of its fundamental interpretive difficulties. The literary quality of the dialogue has traditionally been considered in the manner described above: read as an attempt at writing a philosophic dialogue under the Platonic rubric, it was found quite different and therefore quite deficient.⁷ It will be shown, however, that Xenophon, if nothing else, was a profound literary innovator, and the *Hiero* is not only a Socratic dialogue, but one which deliberately integrates conventions found in

⁵ Schleiermacher (1879) is the first to propose the removal of Xenophon from Socratic research for this reason, that Xenophon's Socrates was not sufficiently innovative in philosophy to justify Socrates' influence. There are two important flaws in the argument: first, the epochal change in philosophic method on which Schleiermacher's point depends cannot be called definitively Socratic, because it is firstly Platonic; second, what can and should be considered proper philosophy was a topic of fair debate in the fifth and fourth centuries, such that no *post hoc* definition of philosophy should be employed to criticize harshly an author's method.

⁶ The most poignant example of Xenophon's historical inaccuracy is *Symposium* 1.1, in which Xenophon claims to have been present at the symposium. The conversation takes place in the year Autolycus had won the pancratium, 422 BC, and Xenophon was born shortly after 430 BC (Anderson 1985: 10); therefore, even if he had been present at the conversation, it is not considered credible that his memory of the event inspired the writing.

⁷ Marchant (1925: xvi) calls the *Hiero* "a naïve little work, not unattractive; in this case, as in that of the *Banquet*, it is unfortunate for our amiable author that Plato has written on the subject with incomparably greater brilliancy."

other types of Greek literature. Further, I will argue that where Socratic elements have differed from the Platonic standard, they do so for reasons that are logical within the dramatic context and which support the apparent intent of the work.

The second chapter will analyze the dominant existing interpretation of the *Hiero*. The denigration of Xenophon's intellectual abilities and historical usefulness has been longstanding, and still continues, but the first strong opponent of this trend was Leo Strauss, who wrote four interpretive works on Xenophon's Socratic writings, all of which will come up in the present study. Strauss (1991: 26), speaking of the comparison of Xenophon with Plato and Thucydides, very aptly pointed out that one could easily "take issue with the views of philosophy and of history which are presupposed in these comparisons." Strauss offered radical interpretations of Xenophon's works based on a unique literary methodology which relied heavily on perceived contradictions and omissions in a text, and his interpretation of the *Hiero* is the only full treatment of the dialogue in modern scholarship. Strauss perceives a tension in the text between the characters' implicit motivations (as he imagines they should be on account of the dramatic context) and their explicit statements, and he therefore reads the explicit statements of the dialogue as ironical. I will first discuss Strauss' methodology, in order that his arguments regarding the *Hiero* can be easily understood, and subsequently, I will show that Strauss' interpretation of the dramatic setting, and its implications, is not believable, and that the explicit statements of the characters do not support it. Though Strauss' interpretations are largely overlooked or rejected in modern scholarship, they nevertheless had a positive impact in creating the impetus to reinvestigate Xenophon's writings, an impetus which carries on today and has caused some to consider Xenophon a source of genuine philosophical, historical, and literary merit.

The final chapter will discuss the dialogue as a piece of political thought. Xenophon's political views have been the topic of considerable scholarly study in the last half-century, and interpretations of his political and social attitudes have been various and contentious. The primary tension concerns the degree to which Xenophon represents, as scholarship has long held, traditional aristocratic values. Modern scholarship has found considerable discrepancies in this interpretation, and, broadly speaking, held that Xenophon was much less socially conservative and much less critical of democracy than previously imagined. Part of the reason for this tension is that Xenophon's political thought is frequently expounded through a discussion not of constitution but of personal leadership; he is less vocal about constitutional form and focusses at great length as to how individuals ought to carry out their own positions of authority. His views, if they could be fairly encapsulated in a single term, would be meritocratic – but they are revealed often in discussions of sole rulers in traditional positions of authority.

I will show that the *Hiero*'s primary focus, as in many of Xenophon's works, is on effective personal leadership. This will include a full discussion of what effective leadership entails, and the philosophical reasons for which this topic is so important to the author. Finally, I will demonstrate that Hiero is to be contradistinguished with some of Xenophon's other characters, such as Ischomachus, Cyrus, and Agesilaus, as a display of the state of a sole ruler who is devoid of leadership skill. Xenophon, through the example of these good leaders, shows that leadership is reciprocal: when a leader gives wealth, freedom, and hard work to those he leads, he gets these things in return. The central message of the *Hiero* is to demonstrate the opposite: when a tyrant attempts to take these things from his subjects, he loses them for himself.

1. Literary Background of the *Hiero*

Two titles are given to this work in the manuscripts, Ἱερῶν ἢ τυραννικός, a fact which helps to introduce one of the foremost interpretive difficulties surrounding the *Hiero*. The two titles imply two different ways of understanding the literary nature of the dialogue. The former follows the standard pattern employed in the cases of other Socratic dialogues, namely that of calling the work after Socrates' primary interlocutor. The latter implies some association with Xenophon's technical writings. While a close association with the technical writings is manifestly untenable, the uncertainty in the given title parallels the difficulties of classifying the text as a Socratic work. The main problem of this dialogue is that its dramatic context, structure, and action do not conform to the ordinary (that is, Platonic) standard of the Socratic dialogue.

There are certainly aspects of the dialogue in which a reader might see room for improvement: in reading the relatively short dialogue, it is possible that one might want considerably more detail in the instructions of Simonides, or might wonder if the shrewd, if defeated, self-awareness of Hiero is an accurate representation of the psyche of a tyrant, or anyone. But it is not accurate to assume Xenophon to be attempting and failing to write in the same manner as Plato. It is evident that Xenophon routinely attempted to deal with a topic or literary form in a manner unique from that of other writers, and in spite of any perceived imperfections, this dialogue is doing precisely that.⁸ It is the purpose of this chapter to explain the dramatic context, structure, and action of the dialogue in order to demonstrate that these elements are used creatively and in a manner which supports the objective of the text.

⁸ Xenophon's *Apology*, *On Horsemanship*, and *Symposium* all contain statements, at their very outsets, declaring Xenophon's knowledge of and intent to differ from previous writings on the topics of these works.

1.1 Structure and Action of the Dialogue

Simonides begins the dialogue by asking Hiero if he can explain how the life of a tyrant and the life of a private individual differ with respect to all possible sources of happiness and sadness. The dialogue is subsequently constructed in two distinct sections: chapters one through seven, in which Hiero, led on by Simonides' questions, proves that tyrants have less happiness and more misery than private individuals; and chapters eight through eleven, in which Simonides offers positive instruction by which Hiero may achieve the happiness he desires. Xenophon, notwithstanding routine declarations of who is talking, speaks only in the dialogue's first sentence: "Σιμωνίδης ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφίκετό ποτε πρὸς Ἱέρωνα τὸν τύραννον." Further, there are only two characterizing statements by the narrator: the first at 1.31 when Simonides is said to be laughing at Hiero's comment on pederasty, and the second at 8.8 when Hiero's rebuttal comes "εὐθὺς." Based on this relative lack of contextualization, the important elements of the dialogue must be inferred from the statements of the characters and their operation within the whole work.

The dialogue's first section addresses three general sources, or types, of happiness which a person can experience: physical pleasures (1), wealth and power to help friends and harm enemies (2-6), and honour and praise (7). The physical pleasures are broken down according to the manner in which they affect the body (1.3-7), but the list, which the interlocutors agree is exhaustive, is not entirely covered: only sights (1.10-13), sounds (1.14-15), food and drink (1.17-25), and sex (1.26-38) are discussed, leaving unaddressed smells and all sensations which appeal to the body as a whole, such as heat and cold, hardness and softness, etc. In each case, Simonides claims that tyrants have the greater happiness (1.8, 1.14, 1.16, and 1.26), and Hiero then disproves his claims at length in a convincing manner. Only one brief counter-argument is attempted by Simonides, who otherwise tacitly accepts his disapproval.

The same pattern is followed in the proceeding chapters dealing with the second form of happiness. Simonides disregards physical pleasures as unimportant (2.1) and claims that the true happiness in tyranny must be wealth and power by which the tyrant can help his friends and harm his enemies (2.2). Hiero addresses each element of this claim: tyrants have the least safety in war and least ability to destroy their enemies (2.7-2.18); they have no trust or friendship with their citizens, and are often murdered by their closest relations (3.1-4.5); they have no true wealth, as wealth is relative to needs and the needs of tyrants are great (4.6-4.11); and finally, tyrants have for enemies the bravest, wisest, and most just of their citizens (5.1-4). Hiero therefore demonstrates that tyrants have little power, no friends, little wealth, and the most unfortunate enemies. In chapter six, Hiero reiterates his previous arguments, but moves from speaking abstractly about tyrants, to a specific, heated, first-person lamentation of his own lack of comradeship and inability to help friends or harm enemies. Simonides' defeat here is even more complete than it was in the first chapter: he offers only one rebuttal in these chapters, which does not address Hiero's concerns, and he again tacitly accepts disapproval at 7.2.

The discussion of honour is unique in that Simonides speaks at much greater length of its importance, even claiming that the desire for honour is the most excellent human quality and the happiness which proceeds it is the most divine; for this reason, he assumes that tyranny is worth its trouble for the honour it wins (7.1-7.4). By contrast, Hiero's disproof is much shorter and more concrete than his previous arguments: the honours a tyrant receives are not genuine, and are done only because he is feared (7.5-8). But fear is also the source of the despot's unhappiness, and the reason despotism cannot be relinquished (7.9-13).

The most interesting aspect to note in the first section is that Hiero is the dominant speaker and delivers convincing arguments for his claim that the tyrant is less happy than the

private individual. Given the manifest position of Simonides as the wise man, it would be expected that Hiero would be the victim of disproof.⁹ But Simonides is such a victim, though his ignorance was surely feigned, and Hiero is not the typical Socratic interlocutor who believes himself wise, but a tyrant who has come to recognize the incompatibility between his method of rule and happiness. The veracity of Hiero's arguments is supported both by Simonides' agreement with them and by their close similarity to those expressed elsewhere in Xenophon's works. Hiero claims that moderation brings pleasure from meals, and so his luxury prevents him from enjoyment in eating (1.18-19); both Cyrus and Agesilaus deliberately abstain from overeating so as to enjoy meals (*Cyropaedia* 7.5.80 and *Agesilaus* 9.3-5), and Xenophon explicitly claims that nothing is pleasing to man (or horse) in excess (*On Horsemanship* 10.14). Hiero also believes that only unforced sex brings true pleasure (1.33-36); Ischomachus, the knowledgeable teacher in Xenophon's *Economics*, believes the same (10.10-12). Hiero recognizes that true wealth must consider the net relationship between income and expenses (4.7-9); Socrates and Critobulus also agree on this point (*Economics* 2.4-9). More generally, Hiero summarizes that those who rule as a benefactor are exceedingly happy (7.9-10), but those who rule by force live constantly fearing to die, echoing Ischomachus' dramatic conclusion to the *Economics* (21.12). Therefore, though Hiero's role is somewhat unusual, his statements reflect the message of the dialogue's first section, making a compelling case that a tyrant, as such, cannot be happy.

The purpose of the second section appears quite different. Simonides now takes on the role of primary speaker, and begins with an argument that leaders are capable of winning greater

⁹ Socrates, whom Xenophon holds explicitly as a wise man (*Apology* 34), subjects Euthydemus to disproof at *Memorabilia* 4.2. He also subjects Critobulus to similar systematic questioning at *Economics* 1-2, though in this case, there is less disagreement between the two interlocutors.

honours than private individuals (8.1-7). Hiero rejoins that this is impossible because tyrants must extort money and use mercenaries to compel citizens to guard or fight, and this is done not for equality but for the tyrant's own increase (8.8-10).

Simonides replies to these problems in chapters nine and ten, respectively. After briefly explaining that punishments should be delegated to others (9.1-5), Simonides explains that if prizes are offered at Hiero's own expense for industry, innovation, and fair trading, the revenues for the city at large and Hiero himself will be much greater in the end (9.6-11). With respect to the mercenaries, Simonides suggests they be used not to provide safety to the tyrant, but to the citizens, who, on account of this safety, will be more productive and, most importantly, well-disposed to the ruler; thus, Hiero himself will also be safer, since he will be free from his fear of assassination (10.1-8).

In the final chapter, Simonides explains to Hiero the way in which these two policies will win him the happiness he wants. He will have the greatest honour because he improved his city, and will have the affection and willing obedience of his subjects. Hiero makes only two remarks in the second section, and only the first (8.8-10) makes a meaningful contribution to the discussion; Hiero implicitly admits his own correction, as Simonides had done previously. The roles of the two characters have been reversed, and this reversal of roles imitates the reversal of behaviour ordered by Simonides: where Hiero had extorted money, he is called to offer it freely to citizens, and where he had used his mercenaries to protect himself, he is called to use them to protect others.

In the same way in which the veracity of Hiero's statements was established, so Simonides' positive advice is approved by Hiero's agreement and its similarity with ideas expressed elsewhere by Xenophon. Simonides urges that Hiero implement a system of both

rewards and punishment (9.3-8), an approach Xenophon recommends, whether explicitly (*On Cavalry Command* 1.24-26), through the voices of Socrates and Ischomachus (*Memorabilia* 3.4.5-12; *Economics* 5.14-16), or by the example of Agesilaus (*Agesilaus* 1.25). Hiero is told to carry out these rewards and punishments with a particular interest in promoting fair commerce (9.9), an interest Xenophon focusses on in his economic recommendations to the Athenians (*On Revenues* 3.3). Further, Simonides claims the honour of a ruler comes not from personal success but the success of the ruled (11.2-5); again, Xenophon states the same in his own voice (*On Cavalry Command* 1.22-23; *On Horsemanship* 11.10-12) and in his praise of Agesilaus (*Agesilaus* 11.11).¹⁰ This disposition of servitude on the part of the leader helps to avoid envy between ruler and ruled (11.6-7), a goal which Xenophon claims is central to Lycurgus' excellent reforms (*Constitution of the Spartans* 15.3-8). It will also win him willing obedience and the happiness that comes with it (11.12-15), which is the great goal of all leaders (*Economics* 21.12). The dialogue's second section, then, is designed to demonstrate some ways in which Xenophon believes personal rule can be exercised such that the ruler can be happy.

It is extremely conspicuous, however, that Simonides' instructions do not closely relate to Hiero's complaints in the first section. Simonides' speech at chapter eight does not parallel any argument made previously, and chapters nine and ten relate specifically to Hiero's remarks at 8.8-10. The physical pleasures Hiero brings up are ignored, except for a very brief mention in chapter eleven, where Hiero is told he will be free to see sights (11.10) and will not have to force sexual partners (11.11). The issue of wealth and power to help friends and harm enemies is

¹⁰ Gray (2007: 142) mentions that Hiero is also called by Pindar (*Pythian* 1.88-1.92) to spend lavishly on his citizens, glorifying himself through their success. The similarity between Pindar and Xenophon is undeniable, but given that Xenophon applauds and recommends this approach elsewhere, and that the notion could have easily been conceived by both independently, it cannot be concluded that there is a direct borrowing here.

certainly addressed, but none of the specific examples or complaints in the first section are brought up by Simonides; rather, these issues are addressed in the process of directly answering 8.8-10. Likewise, Simonides shows Hiero how to obtain genuine honour, but he, shockingly, does not address Hiero's point that he will be unable to make up for his previous tyrannical evils. Therefore, the second section seems to address Hiero's own situation only as an afterthought, and operates principally as an abstract exposition of good leadership.

This discussion of the structure of the dialogue and the function of its parts serves to illuminate some of its pressing literary questions. The dialogue clearly contains Socratic elements, particularly the ironical questioning by Simonides, and for this reason, the absence of Socrates and the choice of the present characters is a pertinent issue. Further to this, though one character is clearly wiser than the other, both characters seem to operate Socratically, and this is particularly unusual in the case of Hiero; it stands to be explained why the tyrant is given the lead role in the proof of tyranny's pitfalls and is made to disprove the wise man of the dialogue.

1.2 Literary Elements in the *Hiero*

The absence of Socrates, together with the choice of Simonides, has been one of the most-discussed aspects of the *Hiero*, and several explanations have been proposed for this. Most of the potential explanations have been reasonable but incomplete. To begin, Strauss (1991: 33) points out that Socrates could very well have been put with any contemporary tyrannical figure (Charmides, Critias, Alcibiades), but claims this would have compromised Xenophon's defense of Socrates against corrupting the youth and urging them to be tyrannical. Further, he argues that Simonides was likely the choice given that he was famous for his greed; no explanation is provided for why this would be relevant, but it may be rooted in a perceived self-interest in Simonides' support for Hiero's personal wealth (11.13).

With respect to Socrates, Strauss' argument is open to the objection that Xenophon could easily have used a dialogue featuring these characters precisely to support his defense of Socrates; it is not likely that Xenophon would have been averse to putting Socrates together with such figures, showing him attempting to teach them virtue.¹¹ As for the choice of Simonides, Strauss' explanation is not without merit, but as Marchant points out, Xenophon's Simonides makes several claims for moderation that are altogether inappropriate for a character who has an affection for luxury – though they are appropriate for Xenophon himself.¹²

A simpler explanation for the absence of Socrates has been noted by Gray (2007: 35), that it would have been implausible to put Socrates together with any tyrant because he did not go abroad, and no tyrant ever came to him. This suggestion, however, also does not address the rather easy possibility of placing Socrates with one of his tyrannical former students. Further, it does not bear in mind the enormous literary flexibility that Xenophon displays, a fact of which Gray is certainly not unaware.

Where these historical observations have not quite explained the issue, considerations of the literary implication of Simonides as a choice of character have come closer to the mark. Sevieri (2004) argues that Hiero and Simonides should not be considered so much in a Socratic framework but as a Hero and epinician poet. This study likens Hiero to the heroic figure of a victorious athlete, often the object of epinician poetry. Hiero was certainly the object of epinician material: dedicated to his victories are Pindar's *Pythian* 1, 2, and 3, and *Olympian* 1, as well as

¹¹ Xenophon mentions Socrates' affiliation with these individuals in detail at *Memorabilia* 1.2.12-46, not at all shying away from the accusations made against his teacher.

¹² Marchant cites 1.22 as the claim for moderation, to which I add 2.1. The fact that Simonides is Xenophon's voice on this issue, as well as others, has been discussed, but it can be reiterated briefly that asceticism and moderation were two of Xenophon's most beloved virtues, cf. *Memorabilia* 1.2.1-2, *Economics* 2.1, *Constitution of the Spartans* 1.5, *Apology* 18.

Odes 4 and 5 of Bacchylides, praising the same victories as *Pythian 1* and *Olympian 1*, respectively. These honour his victories in the chariot race, with the exception of *Pythian 3*, which commemorated victories won by Hiero's horse.

There are certainly thematic connections to be found between the epinician tradition and Xenophon's *Hiero*, such as the call to direct resources to the good of the city and to limit personal ambition to win his people's affection.¹³ It is difficult, however, to take this as a primary framework for interpretation, given that the differences seem to outweigh the similarities. Certainly, the dramatic and sincere sadness of Hiero speaks negatively of whatever pride or ambition the tyrant may have, but Simonides' instruction seems not to attempt to limit these but to remove them almost completely, and the element of praise is absent entirely.¹⁴ Further, this perspective does not adequately consider the Socratic elements of the text, which will be discussed below, nor the close connection between the ideas of the *Hiero* and Xenophon's political thought expressed elsewhere. Finally, it is difficult to rationalize Simonides' recommendation that Hiero remove himself from athletic competitions (11.6) with the epinician tradition of honouring personal athletic success. In spite of these issues, Sevieri's study understands the choice of Simonides as being connected with the didactic intent of the work, a connection which is highly sound.

¹³ Gray (2007: 34), Marchant xvi.

¹⁴ It has been noted that Simonides promises Hiero wealth, which might be an indication of this limited self-interest; to Xenophon, however, a ruler should exceed subjects in honours and wealth by only a little (*Constitution of the Spartans* 15.3), in order to avoid envy between these two – precisely the situation which troubles Hiero. Simonides also puts enormous emphasis on the financial well-being of the citizens throughout chapters 9 and 10, and Xenophon elsewhere holds that the fruits of success ought to be shared between ruler and ruled (*On Cavalry Command* 6.3, *Economics* 9.12-13 and 12.5-7). Therefore, the promise of wealth seems better understood as a component of genuinely beneficent leadership, as opposed to limited ambition.

The choice of Simonides is best explained by Gray (1986), who positions the *Hiero* in the longstanding Greek literary tradition of uniting a wise man and tyrant. Iterations of this union are many, and Gray's study argues conclusively that this dialogue would have recognizably carried on such a tradition.¹⁵ It also adequately explains the absence of Socrates, above and beyond the explanation for the choice of Simonides and Hiero. The dialogue clearly contains elements that are Socratic, and it might still be asked why Xenophon bothered at all to mix these newer Socratic elements with an established literary convention. While there can be no definite proof, Gray argues that this is explained by Xenophon's demonstrable propensity for literary innovation and amalgamation: that Xenophon produced at least three works with no direct or single literary precedent (*Memorabilia*, *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*) is ample reason to believe the *Hiero* represents another attempt at mixing literary styles.¹⁶

While the atypical choice of characters for this Socratic dialogue is congruous with its literary conception, the primary Socratic element in the work, the *elenchus*, is unusual and requires explanation. Ordinarily, and to put it briefly, the Socratic Method would involve the questioning, by Socrates, of an interlocutor who believed himself wise so as to bring him to *aporia*; if any positive advice were planned, it would occur after this point. But the *Hiero* does not immediately appear to have any character in *aporia*, and, as was noted in the previous section, the *elenchus* is reversed, such that Socrates' substitute seems to be the victim of a genuine disproof.¹⁷ After the question of the absence of Socrates, the most pressing literary

¹⁵ For examples of such iterations, see especially Gray (1986: 119-121).

¹⁶ Why Gray (2007) has added an additional perspective on the absence of Socrates when Gray (1986) proposes one already very compelling is a mystery, but I felt both potential perspectives ought to be addressed.

¹⁷ Morrison (2010) gives a full account of the Socratic Method as it is found in Xenophon, and reconciles it, to some extent, with Plato's version. His argument for their compatibility is based on the claim that both authors present the same philosophical elements, but emphasize them differently: Xenophon's *elenchus* and *aporia* tend to be more brief, with the focus of the text on positive advice; Plato's *elenchus* and *aporia* tend to be the focus of the text, and positive advice is either brief or given only by implication.

question of the dialogue is why the principle Socratic element is given to Hiero, who is not Socrates' replacement.

One potential answer to this question becomes clear when one considers that the conversation dwells not on the justice or efficacy of tyranny but on the happiness of the tyrant; the dialogue's first section is not about knowledge or definition, but perception and emotion. It would have been difficult to have Simonides prove Hiero's unhappiness with tyranny in a compelling way if Hiero himself disagrees, as the discussion would concern Hiero's subjective state of mind. A demonstration of the relationship between happiness and a given state is likely to be more rhetorically compelling if it comes from someone in that state. Therefore, in having Hiero, a tyrant, disprove Simonides' ironic support for the superior happiness of the tyrant, that is, the common view of tyranny, in Socratic fashion, that disproof is made all the stronger.¹⁸ Therefore, having Hiero play the role of Socrates in the first section was a very reasonable literary adaptation, given the specific question of the dialogue.¹⁹

But Hiero is only in this role in the first section, as he is also brought to a sort of *aporia*. His final claim of the first section reveals this: though it is not Simonides' questions that bring Hiero to ignorance in a typical Socratic *elenchus*, the first section of the dialogue is an exposition of Hiero's ignorance of how to rule or achieve happiness; that is, he does not come to realize his unhappiness, but he is made to reveal it. The language with which Simonides describes Hiero's condition is precisely that with which Xenophon describes the state of Euthydemus once

¹⁸ As will be discussed fully in the following chapter, the dominant existing interpretation of the *Hiero* is that of Strauss, which he calls 'ironical'. Strauss' use of this term, however, is unusual, and here I describe an irony from Simonides which is entirely transparent to the reader: given that Simonides, in the final chapters of the dialogue, confidently posits the means by which a ruler can be happy by giving up tyrannical rule, it becomes painfully obvious that he did not truly believe tyrants were happier than private citizens, though his questions implied this.

¹⁹ It should also be noted that the importance of experience, and the structure of having Socrates subjected to long didactic speeches, is paralleled in the *Economics*.

Socrates has brought the boy to *aporia*.²⁰ Therefore, the fact that the typical Socratic role has been reversed in the first section of the dialogue results in a clever contrast: in the moment of having successfully completed his convincing disproof, Hiero also expresses his complete ignorance.

Xenophon's Socrates is not simply one who reduces his interlocutor to ignorance, but also provides meaningful positive advice.²¹ This, of course, is precisely what Simonides does in the second section. In addition to this, Simonides is clearly a Socratic figure in his benevolent irony: it is absolutely clear that Simonides believes, from the outset, that tyranny leads to unhappiness. Evidence of this transparent irony rests in Simonides' advice. Having incited Hiero to declare the primary means by which he loses friendship with his citizens, and thus his happiness, at 8.8-10, Simonides contrasts these behaviours with those he suggests win this friendship and happiness; if Simonides has a firm opinion and concrete advice as to what sort of leadership wins happiness, and this leadership is contrasted with tyranny, then he must have known from the outset that tyranny brings unhappiness.²²

Both characters, therefore, play the role of Socrates, both in a very believable and honest way, in their own respective sections of the dialogue. Both also voice opinions and arguments Xenophon elsewhere endorses. But it has been mentioned that there is a certain discord between the dialogue's two sections. Simonides does not adequately address Hiero's final issue; even if Hiero carries out all Simonides' instructions, there is no reasonable way this beneficence could

²⁰ *Hiero* 8.1: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν νῦν, ὃ ἱέρων, ἀθύμως ἔχειν σε πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα...; *Memorabilia* 4.2.23: νῦν δὲ πῶς οἶμι με ἀθύμως ἔχειν ὀρῶντα ἑμαυτὸν διὰ μὲν τὰ προπεποιημένα οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι δυνάμενον...

²¹ See note 17 just above.

²² The full discussion of this contrast between tyranny and Simonides' principles of governance follows in the final chapter.

indemnify him for the harm he had already done. Simonides' instructions respond in a serious way only to those tyrannical behaviours Hiero describes at 8.8-10, with Hiero's previous concerns largely overlooked. Therefore, although the dialogue is unified insofar as it is continuously concerned with the relationship between a ruler's behaviour and his happiness, it seems that it is intended to convey two discrete but related ideas: the first section serves to address a common philosophical question, refuting the view that tyrants can be happier than ordinary citizens; the second serves to propagate kingly qualities, demonstrating to potential rulers how to do so in a manner which will ensure happiness for themselves and the city. It is now clear that the Socratic elements of the text, which lend authority to both characters, are tailored specifically to these two objectives.²³

The *Hiero*, then, unites elements of the Socratic dialogue with the motif of the wise man and tyrant. The adaptations Xenophon makes to accommodate this combination, particularly the characters chosen, are consistent with the theme of the dialogue. He has here demonstrated the literary ingenuity for which he deserves much credit; he has not simply tried to emulate Plato and failed.²⁴ Though Simonides' response to Hiero does not address some of Hiero's points, if the dialogue is understood as having two separate foci, then it relates two intelligent and coherent points of view on the happiness of the tyrant and the qualities of a good ruler.

²³ I am not the first to have seen the dialogue's two sections as operating somewhat distinctly from one another, based on the relative incompleteness of Simonides' advice. Marchant (1925: xiii) claims a distinctly twofold purpose, stated very briefly but in line with what is here. Luccioni (1947: 21-28) suggests that the first section is designed to deter potential tyrants, the second to reform current ones - his interpretation, however, does not address Hiero's final concern, and unjustifiably presumes that Xenophon's dialogue would have made it into the hands of many tyrants. The twofold intent of the dialogue is also supported by the terminology employed by Simonides after chapter 8, but this will be discussed in the final chapter.

²⁴ See Patzer (2010) for the latest iteration of such a claim, and reference to many others. This study investigates the *Memorabilia*, but Patzer's claims regarding Xenophon's attempted emulation of Plato in the dialogue form could well be applied here.

2. The Ironic Interpretation of the *Hiero*

With the literary character of the dialogue in mind, the present chapter will examine the dominant interpretation of the *Hiero*. As has been mentioned, only two exhaustive analyses have yet been produced on the dialogue. The first was that of Strauss, *On Tyranny* (1991, originally published 1947), which presents the ironic interpretation to be discussed in the present chapter; the second is Mango Meier's *Ancient Thoughts on Tyranny: A Reading of Xenophon's Hiero* (2005), which is so entirely guided by Strauss' interpretation that it, too, will be addressed here.²⁵ Strauss' influence on Xenophon scholarship has been enormous, though it has always been and remains controversial amongst scholars. Nearly every piece of scholarship on Xenophon is touched in some way by the controversy of Straussian methodology. Some research explicitly declares devotion to this approach; other studies simply take Strauss' interpretation for granted and seek to make further comment; others make unconscious but easily notable use of Strauss' method, if not interpretation; finally, some research simply feels burdened to address proactively a Straussian interpretation of one of Xenophon's texts, even if this should not otherwise be necessary.²⁶ This influence centers on a method of reading which detects subtle errors or contradictions in a text which subvert its explicit claims and point to hidden meaning, and Strauss calls the texts or its explicit passages "ironical" because they do not coincide with the

²⁵ Meier: "In working through the *Hiero*, I have had Strauss' *On Tyranny* always at my elbow...Consequently, I believe that a dissertation written on the *Hiero* after the appearance of Strauss's book must in some sense be also a dissertation on that book" (14). Meier's analysis accepts all of Strauss' most important assumptions and highlights the important points, in particular the dramatic context/setting and Simonides' perceived rhetorical skill. Meier is quite right, however, in suggesting that this book must, by its lack of adequate competition and significant influence on subsequent scholarship, be an important part of any writing on the *Hiero*.

²⁶ For the first form, see note 1 above, as well as Gelenczey-Mihálcz (2000, especially 114); for the second sort, see in particular Newell (2009) and Glenn (1989), which take for granted, without comment, Strauss' overall interpretation of the *Hiero*'s teaching; Danzig (2003) is the best example of the third sort, the valuable insights of which, by implicit evidence and the author's own admission (62-63 and 63 n. 14), are heavily influenced by Strauss' methodology; Gray (2011b) is a pointed example of the final situation, a study which found itself "ambushed" by the need to discuss the proper method of interpreting Xenophon's texts (69).

perceived hidden meaning. While this is an appropriate use of this term “irony” in its broadest sense, that of meaning something other than what one says, Strauss detects irony which is opaque and points to esoteric interpretations, where irony is ordinarily designed to be “almost painfully explicit” (Gray 2011: 335).²⁷

Strauss, on account of his unique methodology, is an extremely polarizing figure among scholars. For instance, Carlier (2010: 333 n.12) calls Strauss’ methodology the “only legitimate one.” Gelenczey-Mihálcz (2000: 114) says of the *Hiero* that “...Strauss, one of our century’s most outstanding political philosophers, proves in his brilliant work *On Tyranny* that this dialogue is one of the most outstanding monuments of Greek political philosophy.” Positive opinions of Strauss’ method and writings are plentiful, but, as is unfortunately common, they do not critically examine the methodology in the way that a negative reviewer might. For instance, Myles Burnyeat takes very serious issue with Strauss’ method, and he cites one of Strauss’ students, who says: “Not the least remarkable of a number of suggestions – or commands – which Leo Strauss produced that day was that we simply must begin with the assumption that Hobbes’ teaching was true – not relatively true, not true for his time, but simply true.” Burnyeat, on account of this and other arguments, “[submits] in all seriousness that surrender of the critical intellect is the price of initiation into the world of Leo Strauss’ ideas.” Gray (1986: 116 n.4) has a similarly negative opinion, and says that “L. Strauss, *Xenophon On Tyranny*...is as perverse as one could be.”

It is an unfortunate reality that Xenophon was viewed very negatively throughout the late 19th right up to the late 20th centuries, and that it was only through Strauss’ ironic interpretations

²⁷ For the full discussion of Socratic irony, and the meaning of irony more broadly, see Vlastos (1987) (though this article is not directly concerned with Xenophon).

of his works that he was redeemed; for this reason David Johnson quite accurately claims that Straussian irony is “one of those issues one cannot avoid taking a stand on” (2). He also, with equal accuracy, warns that “readers may bring irony to Xenophon rather than finding it in his text” (1).²⁸ It is my objective in the first section of this chapter to provide a critical analysis of Strauss’ reading method, in order that, in the subsequent section, I might be able to elucidate clearly his interpretation of the *Hiero*. In particular, I hope to show that the premises which guide Strauss’ reading are difficult to accept on their own grounds, and that, when applied, they produce a very tenuous reading of Xenophon.

2.1 Strauss’ Methodology

Strauss’ reading method must be understood generally before his interpretation of the *Hiero* will become comprehensible, simply because he does not describe his method in explicit detail in *On Tyranny*. It is in his essay “Persecution and the Art of Writing” (1941) that he describes his approach.²⁹ In short, Strauss believes that good authors, when under the fear of persecution, will hide their primary messages and write ‘between the lines’; this is done for two possible reasons: to protect the philosopher from persecution, and to protect the city, to which a particular idea might be harmful. The most important premises on which a Straussian

²⁸ While Strauss receives some mention in nearly all scholarship on Xenophon, few have discussed his methodology directly. Other than Johnson, Vivienne Gray and Louis-André Dorion have also addressed Strauss’ approach. Dorion (2010) has produced a critique of his method, focusing on his reading of *Memorabilia* 4.4; Gray, while never having produced a publication dedicated exclusively to this matter, addresses Straussian irony in the *Hiero* dismissively in Appendix I of *Xenophon on Government*.

²⁹ In addition to the two works listed above, Strauss produced two interpretive monographs and one article. The monographs dealt with the *Economics* and the *Memorabilia*, and the article, which will be discussed in the present chapter, offered an analysis of *The Constitution of the Spartans*. As has been mentioned, Dorion (2010) gives a rebuttal for Strauss’ approach to the *Memorabilia*. As to the *Economics*, the most comprehensive alternative analysis is to be found in Pomeroy (1994).

interpretation is based are that an author must fear persecution and that there must be hints for esoteric meaning manifested as deliberate errors, ambiguous statements, and contradictions.

The first premise, in the case of Xenophon, is addressed rather easily. Strauss states:

“If it is true that there is a necessary correlation between persecution and writing between the lines, then there is a necessary negative criterion: that the book in question must have been composed in an era of persecution, that is, at a time when some political or other orthodoxy was enforced by law or custom.” (*Persecution* 498)

If this negative criterion is true, which it certainly is, then the interpreter is burdened with demonstrating whether or not an author feared persecution in the first place. But there is no evidence that Xenophon feared persecution, or had cause to fear it. The only potential fact which might imply he feared persecution would be the death of Socrates, but the evidence does not support this: Xenophon and Plato both give Socrates unapologetic and significant adulation, and further, if Xenophon thought so highly of Socrates, and the latter did not hide his views to prevent death, then it is not logical to suggest Xenophon would do so.³⁰ Finally, while an exact chronology of Xenophon’s works is difficult, he certainly wrote many of them in Scillus, not knowing if he would ever be able to return to Athens, and it is very unlikely that he would have feared persecution here due to geopolitical circumstances.³¹ For this reason, Strauss’ methodology is poorly suited as a basis for understanding Xenophon.

³⁰ The *Apologies* of both authors are the best proof for this adulation, and with respect to Xenophon, the *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* provide support in nearly every passage.

³¹ Anderson (1974: 198): Xenophon entered retirement in Scillus in 386, but his banishment from Athens was not repealed until 371/370, and he died in 356/355. It is generally granted, due to chronological reasons, that Xenophon wrote many of his works in Scillus, whether in part or whole.

The second premise is somewhat more complex, but equally important for the purpose of understanding Strauss' claims about the *Hiero*. In *On Tyranny*, Strauss identifies the process of communicating a thought in an "indirect or oblique way" as 'Socratic rhetoric', and he claims the function of Socratic rhetoric is to "lead potential philosophers to philosophy both by training them and liberating them from the charms which obstruct philosophic effort, as well as to prevent access to philosophy of those who are not fit for it" (27). Socratic rhetoric recognizes that "not all truths are harmless" (27). Therefore, one has to pay the greatest possible attention "especially to unthematic details" (27) and "intentional blunders" (*Persecution* 497). Strauss' interpretations of Xenophon's works, and the interpretations of those influenced by him, are based on the perception of some inadequacy or contradiction within the text being discussed and a complex interpretation of the work's true intent which rationalizes the error.

The issue here is that, having read all of Strauss' interpretations of Xenophon, the textual evidence does not provide a convincing case either that such an inadequacy actually exists or that, if the inadequacy is granted, it ought to be taken to imply a hidden meaning, since simpler explanations better satisfy the issue. It will be shown in the following section of this chapter that Strauss finds a structural contradiction in the *Hiero* which is simply not tenable, and for this reason, it is important to have an idea how Strauss and his followers find errors and draw conclusions from them. Therefore, two examples from Strauss and two from other Straussian interpretations follow.

Strauss interprets *The Constitution of the Spartans* as an insult to both Spartan culture and the emulation of said culture amongst 4th-century Athenian aristocrats. To support this interpretation, he discovers two main subtle hints, the first a deliberate omission and the second a structural clumsiness. In the first chapter of this work, Xenophon juxtaposes the women of

Sparta with those of the other Greek cities, saying that while the latter are fed meagre amounts of food and urged to be sedentary, the former are urged to be physically active. Strauss picks up on the fact that Xenophon does not mention the diets of Spartan women; this, to Strauss, is an articulate silence, a subtle and quite deliberate mistake. From this, Strauss understands Xenophon's primary, esoteric intent as being to insult Spartan women for their lack of restraint in eating – this amongst a sea of positive explicit statements about Spartan culture. Later, in discussing how the work is a satire of Athenian aristocrats and the Spartan constitution, he claims that Xenophon's placement of Chapter 14 is quite clumsy, but that:

...if in a given case he apparently happens to do a bad job as a writer, or as a thinker, he actually does it deliberately and for very good reasons... That is to say first that, by hiding his censure of contemporary Sparta clumsily, Xenophon gives us to understand that he hides certain much more important views of his in an extremely able manner... ("The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon" 503)

To address the first 'hint', the silence regarding the eating habits of Spartan women, it is important to recognize that Xenophon is an author who writes persistently on the same *τόποι*; Noreen Humble (2004: 226) very accurately remarks "much of the difficulty in understanding the *Lakedaimoniôn Politeia* has arisen because of the general tendency to regard each of Xenophon's works in isolation instead of taking them together as a coherent and ongoing dissemination of his own political and philosophical ideas." A simpler and evidence-based explanation for this articulate silence takes into account Xenophon's other works, and it becomes clear that Xenophon understood a sound exercise program to naturally include adequate nutrition: thus, to say that Spartan women are urged to exercise is to say that they are fed in proportion to this activity. Lycurgus' order to the elders of the gymnasia ratifies this, as do

Cyrus' fitness and nutrition habits, and so, too, even the opinions of Socrates and Ischomachus.³² To address the second 'hint', the clumsy placement of chapter 14, it will suffice to say that there is nothing clumsy in its placement at all. Chapters 1-13 detail the ancestral Lycurgan constitution, chapter 14 discusses how modern Spartans no longer honour this constitution, and chapter 15 brings up the sole exceptional case in which Spartans do still honour the constitution; the order is perfectly logical.³³ It is clear that the errors on which Strauss relies to argue that the text is ironical are not convincingly called errors: the omission of the eating habits of Spartan women is not fairly an omission, and if it is, it is an innocuous one, and the placement of chapter 14 is not clumsy.

With respect to the *Cyropaedia*, Carlier (2010: 331-332) describes what he perceives as the work's main inadequacy:

“It seems rather strange that Xenophon wrote a detailed biography in eight books in order to give his readers a series of sensible maxims that he could very well have presented in a few pages. If this was so, Xenophon would merit the reproach that is often made of him by modern commentators of being superficial and feeble.”

³² *Constitution of the Spartans* at 5.8-9: “Lycurgus observed that, given the same food, those who worked actively were healthy in flesh, colour, and vitality, while those who were inactive appeared fat, ugly, and weak. He did not ignore this, and, believing that whosoever works hard by his own intent appears to have a strong body, he ordered that the eldest in each gymnasium always ensure that the exercise there was not less than rations demanded.” Cyrus' moderate habits are described at *Economics* 4.24; Socrates' opinion is that “It is a shameful thing for a man to grow old and weak through neglect, without ever having known how beautiful and powerful he might have been in his body” (*Memorabilia* 3.12.8). Ischomachus expresses a similar opinion at *Economics* 11.11-12. Other iterations of this opinion include: *On Hunting* chapters 12 and 13, *Economics* 10.10-13 (for the importance of exercise amongst women as well as men), and *Apology* 6 (for the loss of happiness that attenuates loss of physical ability).

³³ Gray (2007: Appendix 3) and Farrell (2012) make similar arguments. Both of these studies outline the previous attitudes toward the chapter, and illustrate in a manner I consider conclusive that there was, in fact, never any clumsiness to be found. To illustrate the profound influence of Strauss, however, it will be useful to mention that many scholars have actually questioned the authenticity of chapter 14, or suggested it be moved, on account of Strauss' interpretation.

The issue is immediately apparent that any didactic work, and indeed probably any philosophic work, could easily be shortened to a few maxims, and Carlier has clearly not fully considered this inadequacy. He goes on to say "...it is useful to be sure that the *Cyropaedia* is not inspired by other intentions that the author thought best to conceal..." The other intentions Xenophon conceals are that he wants to condemn the imperialistic ambitions of the Athenian state, an opinion which Xenophon makes absolutely no effort to conceal in *On Revenues* (1.1), published while he was living in Athens. As with Strauss, Carlier has used an unconvincing inadequacy and proposed that it is explained through a hidden message, even if Xenophon had no interest in hiding the exact same message elsewhere. Carlier's thesis about Xenophon's opinion is almost certainly true, based on *On Revenues* and other evidence, but he has not provided a compelling reason to believe there is any error in the work, nor that there should be any hidden meaning.

Danzig (2003) produces a similar example in his treatment of the *Economics*, which he understands to be, in part, a demonstration of the various irritations that wealthy Athenian citizens face and an attempt to demonstrate that ethical matters are more important than financial success. Danzig takes the introduction of Socrates as the text's inadequacy: why has Socrates, a relatively impoverished philosopher, been introduced at all in a dialogue about financial management, only to pass the conversation on to a didactic monologue (for the most part) by Ischomachus, a wealthy citizen? His solution is that hidden in Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus is a condemnation of the latter's concern for wealth and responsibility. But the introduction of Socrates into such a dialogue is certainly no mistake, given that, where Socrates is the primary speaker, the conversation is mainly philosophical, and when Ischomachus takes the lead, the conversation turns to practical advice. Therefore, the lead speaker logically reflects the nature of the dialogue in each of its sections. Nor are the characters of Socrates or

Ischomachus necessarily to be contradistinguished, in spite of their differences: it is reasonable to assume that Xenophon could not possibly have believed a life of leisure and discussion was suitable to all citizens at all times, least of all to farmers, since this would result in a noticeable lack of food. And Xenophon did not think financial concern and hard work were contrary to virtuous living, unless the entirety of his corpus, including explicit statements of his own, is to be taken ironically.³⁴

The process of Strauss' approach should now be clear: the interpreter hunts for a subtle error, contradiction, or imperfection, and creates an interpretation which renders the explicit message of a text ironical, a cover for a hidden message designed for the intellectual elite. But if the message is hidden, evidence for it will be generally slim, and the interpreter's argument unconvincing. For the sake of a fair analysis, however, there is one philosophical defense of Strauss' methodology which ought to be mentioned. Strauss' claim is not that authors who have hidden their meaning do so needing to provide proof of their intentions, but only to present an idea to be recognized by the perceptive reader; the author's intention is not to make the reader capable of proving the author's intention, but to force the reader to consider a complex perspective. He recognizes that his premises do not yield conclusive results:

For the burden of proof rests with the censor, as such. It is he, or the public prosecutor, who must prove that the author holds or has uttered heterodox views. In order to do so he must show that certain literary deficiencies of the work are not due to chance, but that the

³⁴ In the case of financial concern, *On Revenues* is dedicated entirely to financial policy, and is, in many parts, ingenuous in its observations; it also recognizes the potential for luxury and the desire for wealth to cripple state finances (1.1-2). Agesilaus recognizes the importance of revenue to the state (*Agesilaus* 2.25), works diligently to supply his army (1.17-22), but also sees that strong desire for wealth can lead to injustice and weakness (8.7-8; 9.3-5). With respect to the importance of hard work and responsibility, this will be discussed, with considerable textual evidence, in the following chapter.

author used a given ambiguous expression deliberately, or that he constructed a certain sentence badly on purpose. That is to say, the censor must prove not only that the author is intelligent and a good writer in general, for a man who intentionally blunders in writing must possess the art of writing, but above all that he was on the usual level of his intellectual abilities when writing the incriminating words. But how can that be proved, if even Homer nods from time to time? (*Persecution* 492).

He goes on to say that modern historical research will only accept a view of an author if it is “ultimately borne out by his own explicit statements” and says that “If an author does not tire of asserting explicitly on every page of his book that *a* is *b*, but indicates between the lines that *a* is not *b*, the modern historian will still demand explicit evidence showing that the author believed *a* to not be *b*.” (*Persecution* 493).

But this defense is not entirely reasonable, since Strauss and those who emulate him do claim to be describing the author’s intentions, though with an approach relying not on explicit evidence but on perceived discrepancies. It should be clear from the examples above that Strauss’ methodology is zealously fixated on discovering some inadequacy in a text and offering complex rationalizations for them, so much so that Xenophon’s works are unfairly scrutinized and simple explanations are ignored. The methodology is not critical enough of its own solutions and assumptions (such as Xenophon’s fear of persecution) – and this is why the method has been called the “surrender of the critical intellect.” The description is not entirely fair, since Strauss, if anything, is too discerning in certain areas, namely in his perception of errors in the text. Nevertheless, it is worth speculating why the approach of discovering thematic errors and deeply-hidden meanings might have appeal. If the brilliant philosophers of the past hid their intentions, then the interpreter who discovers these implicitly enters their ranks; there is a distinct

allure in being sufficiently brilliant to unearth an esoteric message through discreet hints. I would suggest that any interpretive methodology which conspicuously places the interpreter amongst an exclusive intellectual elite, lofty philosophers who write in love for their puppy-philosophers, by whom he wants to be loved in turn, should be viewed with the most cautious critical intellect of all.³⁵

2.2 The Ironic Reading of the *Hiero*

After a brief introduction, mostly concerned with his animosity for modern historical methodology and modern political science more broadly, Strauss begins his discussion of the *Hiero* with “The Problem,” a brief preamble which describes what Strauss identifies as the major contradiction in the text and the primary indication of irony therein:

But even if we assume that Simonides is simply the mouthpiece of Xenophon, great difficulties remain, for Simonides’ thesis is ambiguous. It is addressed to a tyrant who is out of heart with tyranny, who has just declared that a tyrant can hardly do better than to hang himself. Does it not serve the purpose of comforting the sad tyrant, and does not the intention to comfort detract from the sincerity of the speech? Is any speech addressed to a tyrant by a man who is in the tyrant’s power likely to be a sincere speech? (*On Tyranny* 30)

Strauss sees a contradiction between the explicit statements of the dialogue’s characters, which are amicable and blunt (they readily disagree with one another), and the intuitive relationship these characters would have if the dramatic setting were real. He therefore concludes that the

³⁵ *Persecution* 504: “All books of that kind [those with esoteric meaning] owe their existence to the love of the mature philosopher for the puppies of his race, by whom he wants to be loved in turn: all esoteric books are ‘written speeches caused by love.’”

explicit statements are ironical, relying on his interpretation of the dramatic setting as the greater interpretive reality. He even calls the setting the “most important of ‘facts’” in the dialogue, over and against the statements of the characters (*On Tyranny* 47). Strauss’ fixation with the dramatic context endures throughout his monograph and is the primary reason its interpretation is so striking.³⁶

The dramatic setting of the dialogue, as Strauss interprets it, is as follows. He argues that both Simonides and Hiero are being insincere: Simonides, speaking to a tyrant in the tyrant’s home, misleads Hiero in order to gain his trust and give him advice to help him maintain power; Hiero is dealing with a reputed wise man, and because tyrants fear the wise as men capable of contriving to depose a despot (according to Hiero’s own claim at 5.1), all of Hiero’s statements are lies meant to dissuade Simonides from doing exactly this. Detailing this argument manifests the bulk of *On Tyranny*.

But there is simply no compelling evidence that these characters actually do have any animosity which would cause them to dissemble. The main passage on which Strauss relies to assume that this animosity exists is 5.1. First, 5.1 is a statement from Hiero, not Simonides, and none of Simonides’ explicit statements imply he is afraid of repercussions from the tyrant. But even with respect to Hiero’s opinion of Simonides, the passage could easily be taken to display Hiero’s trust of the poet: if tyrants fear the wise, but Hiero is comfortable saying this to Simonides (whom Hiero declared wise at 1.1), could this not be a sign of trust? Hiero also, if it is granted that he is admitting a genuine fear, may be attempting to make Simonides fearful for his

³⁶ In *Xenophon on Government*, Gray, in the very short dismissal of the ironic interpretation of the *Hiero*, says that Strauss “exploits the lack of stated motivation for the characters, the openness of the dialogue form and the possibility of enmity in the relationship to read...” This is the only sentence in which she states Strauss’ approach, and, as is clear, she points out that his exploitation centers on aspects of the dramatic context.

own safety (this would be the logical reaction, if a powerful tyrant just mentioned that he was averse to his listener), thus ending the conversation. Therefore, no explicit statements in the dialogue provide sufficient reason to think the characters fear one another.

The alternative interpretations of 5.1 I have mentioned highlight the difficulties in making assumptions about how the dramatic setting might affect characters, assumptions which form the bulk of Strauss' argument. It is certainly true that the dramatic context of a work can be important, even central, to its interpretation. It can also, however, be entirely unimportant – and as was shown in the first chapter of this study, Xenophon makes no attempt to contextualize the conversation or characterize the speakers, who otherwise reflect the author's own views. Strauss, however, conceptualizes the characters in this dialogue in a manner that is nearly anthropomorphic, endowing the characters with a level of cognition and interpersonal subtlety which real humans would find difficult to attain. For instance, he says that “the fact that Simonides is called “wise” by Hiero does not prove anything, since we do not know what Xenophon thought of Hiero's competence” (*On Tyranny* 30); later he says of Simonides “While Simonides is thus shown to be wiser than Hiero, it is by no means certain that Xenophon considered him simply wise” (38). These are only two of an enormous number of statements which speak of the characters of the dialogue in a manner that is quite puzzling, speculating on the inner machinations of Simonides' mind, the wild fears and uncertainties in Hiero's, the complex way in which they navigate the implications of one another's statements, and how Xenophon might have thought about these two and their conversation.

While it is true that both Simonides and Hiero have historical backgrounds, and that these historical backgrounds are briefly mentioned in the dialogue, this does not negate the reality that these are fictional characters. To speculate at length on the potential inner thoughts and emotions

of fictional characters, not recorded by the author, is to miss what the author actually did think important – or, at least, what one could reasonably argue was thought important, because it is present in the text. To speak of Xenophon having any opinion of these characters personally, of their qualities, is tenable in only the loosest and most metaphorical way, since he himself made them, and they are not real. According to Strauss, “no reader however careful of the speeches of Hiero can possibly know anything of the expression on Hiero’s face, of his gestures, and of the inflections of his voice” (46). This statement is misguided to the point of sheer bafflement, because all readers implicitly and precisely know the character of these expressions, gestures, and inflections: nonexistent.

Considering this, it can be seen on closer analysis that the dramatic setting is not even necessarily at odds with the amicable relationship explicitly apparent between these characters; the dramatic setting, if anything, implies that the two must have a close relationship. This is evident because, if the characters are assumed to be in enmity, the dramatic setting is no longer reasonable. With respect to Hiero this is particularly evident: why is this despot, who fears the wise for reasons he doesn’t understand, even speaking with the wise man at all? How did these circumstances arise in the very first place? There is no reasonable and satisfactory answer: if this tyrant truly feared to lose his power to this wise man, this dialogue would simply not occur. And with respect to Simonides, there is no clear gain to be had from the conversation, and there is tremendous risk: even if Simonides has manipulative conversational skill, given that he is dealing with a tyrant, he must know that Hiero is under no obligation to be reasonable, and could kill Simonides at the first subjective, whimsical suspicion. Again, there is no reasonable or satisfactory impetus for Simonides to seek out this conversation. But the two are conversing, and

actively disagreeing without confrontation. Therefore, the dramatic setting does not subvert the positive relationship between the characters, but proves it.

But if Strauss' perceived contradiction is granted, and the characters are at odds with one another, great difficulties remain. Hiero's objective is to dishearten Simonides' ambition; Simonides' is to gain Hiero's trust and give advice, for reasons neither the text nor Strauss clarify. Their behaviours, however, are manifestly not congruous with these ends. Hiero's approach is to convince Simonides that tyranny is something undesirable, but in doing so, he specifically declares that he personally is miserable because of tyranny, so much so that "if it is profitable to another man to hang himself...I find that this is profitable most of all to a tyrant" (7.13).³⁷ It could not be lost on anyone that this could be a clear invitation to a potential usurper to take further action, to whom Hiero's ruse may not have been convincing enough to discredit the "vulgar view" of tyranny as a happier way of life. Simonides' allegedly mandatory approach to gaining the tyrant's trust is to "present himself...as an utterly unscrupulous man," who is thus in a position to give the tyrant meaningful advice (*On Tyranny* 56). The finishing touch of this proof of trust is when Simonides "could kill the tyrant without lifting a finger" but chooses not to do so (*On Tyranny* 58-59). Overlooking the absurdity of the proposal that Hiero would actually have hung himself at Simonides' command, it is still highly questionable how proving oneself an unscrupulous man demonstrates that one is not a threat to a tyrant, since only an unscrupulous man is fit to be tyrant in the first place. Hiero would all the more likely see Simonides as a rival

³⁷ The Greek here is: ἀλλ' εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, ὃ Σιμωνίδῃ, λυσιτελεῖ ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι τυράννῳ ἔγωγε εὐρίσκω μάλιστα τοῦτο λυσιτελοῦν ποιῆσαι. There is some significance in the use of τῷ ἄλλῳ. Marchant and Strauss render this "any man," but strictly speaking, it is "a different man," as Doty, and myself here, have implied by rendering the word as "another". While ἄλλῳ is certainly generalizing, this is not a definite case, and it could very well be that Hiero is speaking of this in a detached, hypothetical, non-personal way. This would provide a coherent explanation for Simonides' otherwise lackluster response: "...ἀθύμως ἔχειν σε πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα οὐ θαυμάζω..."

for his position, no more to be trusted than the brave or just who desire law and freedom. Under the assumption of animosity in their relationship, the characters do not behave reasonably, and therefore, their rhetorical dissimulation, which Strauss attempts to expound, is simply not believable.

Similar to what was seen in the examples in the previous section of this chapter, Strauss' interpretation in *On Tyranny* relies on an unconvincing inadequacy in the text and an overly complex solution to this problem. The inadequacy of the *Hiero*, namely, the contradiction between the implications Strauss assumes from the dramatic setting and the apparently positive relationship of the characters, is not real: both of these demand that Hiero and Simonides are being cooperative and honest with one another. But even if the contradiction were assumed, and the dramatic setting demanded the characters be hostile with one another, the rhetorical manner in which Strauss proposes the characters navigate this enmity leads to further contradictions between their motivations and behaviours. The simplest and most coherent explanation as to why these two have come to converse is that the work is a literary exercise, designed to discuss a point of Xenophon's interest; the simplest and most coherent explanation for the utterances of the characters is that they are designed to propound Xenophon's ideas on that point. What this point of Xenophon's interest is, and his ideas on the point will all be detailed in the following chapter. Xenophon praised Socrates for his ability to teach needful information to others in a clear, plain, and understandable way, and in this Xenophon emulates his teacher.³⁸

2.3 Moving Beyond Irony

³⁸ *Memorabilia* 4.2.40 and 4.7.1.

The prevailing scholarly feeling toward the topic of Straussian irony is exasperation, both amongst its supporters and detractors. This is primarily because the issue has ended up more tendentious than strictly necessary. This reality was stated perfectly by Melina Tamiolaki in *Virtue and Leadership in Xenophon*:

Another trap I will try to avoid is the (pseudo-)dilemma between ironical and non-ironical reading of Xenophon. Leo Strauss' approach is certainly important for the illumination of 'irony' and has greatly contributed to a deeper understanding of Xenophon. Nevertheless, the various reactions to it have led to a categorization of scholars, who tend to be divided into those who offer ironical readings and those who prefer to take Xenophon more at face value. This dichotomy prevents us from seeing that there might also be a middle way of reading Xenophon: without dismissing his subtlety or even ambiguity, one should not always interpret it as ironical. If we liberate ourselves from the irony obsession, perhaps more interesting perspectives will open up a better understanding of Xenophon's thought and intentions.

This comment picks up on a longstanding but still incomplete movement to rescue Xenophon's works from the dichotomy between irony and naivety. In spite of this movements, nearly all studies on Xenophon will address Strauss' irony, in one of two ways: either he will be relegated to a footnote or short passage politely praising but ultimately rejecting his method, or he will be the object of an entire study devoted to his understanding of a single passage or key point.³⁹ This devotion to the topic comes as a result of Strauss' immense influence in Xenophon scholarship; the explanation for the radical difference between these treatments lies in the nature

³⁹ For examples of the former, there is Tamiolaki (2013) cited above, Danzig (2003), who claims to use Strauss' method but to reject its more radical manifestations, and Gray (2007 – Appendix I); for the latter, see Johnson (2012) and Dorion (2010).

of the difference in methodology between Strauss and most scholars. As should be clear from the discussion above, Strauss' approach differs from the norm at a very fundamental, theoretical level. For this reason, if one feels obliged to touch upon the irony question, it must be in a way that either disregards the issue or one that devotes great attention to it. This is an unfortunate reality, given the broad support for what was said above – namely, that if freed from the question, better perspectives on Xenophon's thought will arise. While I have disagreed with Strauss on most points, we both agree in hoping “that the time will again come when Xenophon's art will be understood by a generation which, properly trained in their youth, will no longer need cumbersome introductions like [*On Tyranny*]” (28).

3. The *Hiero* on Leadership and Government

As was made clear in the preceding chapters, both Simonides and Hiero function to expound Xenophon's views about the happiness of tyrants and the nature of a good and happy ruler. For this reason, the dialogue, in spite of receiving relatively little scholarly attention, can contribute to our understanding of Xenophon's political views, which, as was mentioned in the introduction, have been the object of lively scholarly study in the latter half of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, Xenophon was nearly universally considered a stock Athenian aristocrat, a view which demands that he considered leadership and government as proper to a traditionally wealthy class of individuals. This is most thoroughly represented in modern scholarship by Luccioni (1947). Anderson (1974) assumes that Xenophon's ancestors were amongst the equestrian class as outlined by Solon and continued under Cleisthenes, and, based ostensibly on this fact alone, claims that Xenophon's political views represent inherited aristocratic ideals (40).⁴⁰ This attitude towards Xenophon's background and views has remained prevalent since: Loraux (1982), Johnstone (1994), and Azoulay (2004) are all studies which have taken this fact for granted as the basis of specialist research.

But the acceptance of Xenophon's aristocratic background is what generates the assumption of an aristocratic political view, often by unfairly dismissing sentiments which seem democratic as insincere pandering. For instance, Anderson discusses one of the allegations

⁴⁰ Oddly, Anderson's chapter on Xenophon's political views provides very little detail as to what these views might actually have been; what little he does say is taken from the *Constitution of the Athenians*, known by the author not to have been written by Xenophon. He then applies this text's anti-democratic position to Xenophon on the grounds that he and others of "his social background" were raised with these ideals. Although not stated by Anderson, the inference to be made is that Xenophon's knowledge of cavalry command and horsemanship, as demonstrated by his writings on these topics, indicate his social position. This is reasonable, especially given the quality of these writings; however, it should be kept in mind first that Xenophon's background is not known with certainty (our chief source for this is Diogenes Laertius, who is hardly reliable), and second, that, even if this background is granted, it cannot be assumed that Xenophon has views perfectly in accordance with those of his class.

against Socrates which Xenophon addresses at *Memorabilia* 1.2.58-59. Socrates had appeared to espouse a very negative view of the common and poor people. Xenophon, however, quickly points out that this would have been impossible, as Socrates would have been denigrating himself; he claims that Socrates was saying that those who are useless in time of need should be silenced “κἄν πάνυ πλούσιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες.” Anderson dismisses this “saving clause,” and says, without explanation, that “we may suppose that it was usually the poor whom Xenophon and his friends regarded as ‘useless’” (45). Johnstone (1994) follows this same pattern in discussing the *Economics*. He interprets its exhortations to persistent hard work and personal leadership as a deceptive attempt to justify inherited authority and wealth. Luccioni (1947: 15) dismisses Xenophon’s approving characterization of the democratic Thrasybulus on account of the latter’s association with the Spartans. In all these cases, as in others, there is little reason to doubt Xenophon’s literal word, specifically because, as will be shown, he promotes these same un-aristocratic views so commonly elsewhere. Clearly, claims that Xenophon had classist or aristocratic political views are the result of a biased analysis of the evidence available.⁴¹

Following this reasoning, some recent scholarship has provided more detailed criticism of the accepted view of Xenophon’s political ideals. For instance, Gray (2000) claims that Xenophon’s Socrates was largely democratic, and his anti-democratic opinions were limited to particular policies, such as the ballot for offices; Badian (2004) points out that Xenophon never actually says anything negative about Athens; Kroeker (2009) notes that he had no interest in changing the Athenian democratic constitution; Gauthier (2010) notes the support for the democracy in *On Revenues*; Gray (2011a) suggests that his Socratic works are commensurate

⁴¹ Farrell 2012 provides many more concrete examples of such circular thinking in the interpretation of Xenophon’s works, demonstrating the manner in which the assumption of his aristocratic position has led to a deliberate focus and particular interpretation of phrases and sections that could be taken as aristocratic.

with a typical Athenian democrat; Farrell (2012) and Humble (2004 and 2014) both claim his ‘philolaconian’ works can easily be read as general moral treatises, written with the intent of improving the Athenians. Together, these studies suggest that Xenophon’s political opinions may not represent an aristocratic point of view, and the common observation between them is that Xenophon’s political views appear to be neither anti-Athenian nor anti-democratic.

Several points of primary evidence form a shared support for their arguments: It is clear Xenophon intended to live in the democracy, even after having become enamoured with Spartan traditions (*Anabasis* 7.7.57); he was very critical of the oligarchy of Critias (*Hellenica* 2.3.11-18; 2.4.1); he considered dialectic and mutual understanding, a key facet of the democracy, very important (*Memorabilia* 4.6.1); finally, his speech of Thrasybulus (*Hellenica* 2.4.40-42) gives voice to incredible support for the Athenian democracy. His philolaconian position, a worldview well-associated with the aristocracy in Xenophon’s time, is questionable given the fact that he opposes Spartan interests on several occasions to his own danger (*Anabasis* 4.6.13-15; 7.3.3-6), and is more than willing to criticize the Spartans (*Constitution of the Spartans* 14).

Although progress has been made in criticizing the view that Xenophon was a stock fourth-century aristocrat, it is still difficult to make definite statements about his political views. As was mentioned in the introduction, the main reason for this difficulty is the persistent connection Xenophon makes between government and a generalized system of leadership. The concept of good leadership, a skill which permeates every sphere of human activity, is perhaps the only thread that binds together nearly every single one of Xenophon’s otherwise thematically and formally disparate works.⁴² It is clearly central to his understanding of why good government is good. In spite of this, relatively little scholarship has dealt with this topic in detail.

⁴² Examples of the application of one theory of leadership to many aspects of human life are plentiful: *Memorabilia* 1.1.16, 2.2-10, and 3.4.6-12; *Economics* 13.5 and 21.2; *Constitution of the Spartans* 8.3; *On Cavalry Command* 9.2.

While many studies mention the significance of Xenophon's universal leadership theory, only two studies have dealt with it exclusively: Wood (1964) and Stoll (2012). The former emphasizes the ingenuity and continued relevance of Xenophon's systematic theory of leadership, while the latter looks specifically at *On Cavalry Command* and interprets it as an attempt to produce good military leaders for the Athens. These are both excellent studies, but they are short and specific in scope: both focus almost exclusively on the military applications of the theory, and the latter deals primarily with only one text.

More particularly, neither fully discusses the unique manner in which the *Hiero* contributes to our understanding of Xenophon's political thought. Stoll does not mention the *Hiero* at all. Wood focusses largely on the *Hiero* in his study's final section, where he outlines, as I do below, the relationship between leadership performance and legitimate authority (60-65). This discussion, however, falls short of a complete analysis, and does not consider the particular theme of the *Hiero*, namely, the relationship between leadership performance and the happiness of the leader. But it is through this theme that the *Hiero* makes a unique contribution to Xenophon's theory of leadership and political thought, a contribution which is the purpose of the dialogue. Therefore, the subsequent sections of this chapter will explore why Xenophon's theory of leadership relates so closely to his political views, what this concept of good leadership entails, and what the *Hiero* communicates about it.

3.1 Xenophon's Theory of Leadership

Xenophon's attachment to any particular constitutional form was less strong than his interest in the quality of state leaders. This point of view is most explicitly stated in the proem of *On Revenues*: “ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεὶ ποτε νομίζω, ὅποιοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ᾤσι, τοιαύτας καὶ

τὰς πολιτείας γίνεσθαι.” It is also quite evident in the proem of the *Cyropaedia*, which comments on how readily and easily a constitution can be changed:

ἔννοιά ποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐγένετο ὅσαι δημοκρατίαι κατελύθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλως πῶς
βουλομένων πολιτεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν δημοκρατία, ὅσαι τ’ αὖ μοναρχίαι, ὅσαι τε
ὀλιγαρχίαι ἀνήρηνται ἤδη ὑπὸ δήμων, καὶ ὅσοι τυραννεῖν ἐπιχειρήσαντες οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν
καὶ ταχὺ πάμπαν κατελύθησαν, οἱ δὲ κἂν ὅποσονοῦν χρόνον ἄρχοντες διαγένωνται,
θαυμάζονται ὡς σοφοί τε καὶ εὐτυχεῖς ἄνδρες γεγενημένοι.

His attitude toward Law supports this view further. He felt laws were meant to be instructors, punishing and rewarding so as to make citizens more virtuous (*Memorabilia* 1.2.42; *Cyropaedia* 1.2.3; *Oeconomicus* 14.4-7); he was very critical of reliance solely on written laws, which could not fully punish the evil and reward the good, as a skilled ruler could (*Cyropaedia* 1.3.16-17, 3.1.31, 8.1.24). Justice and legality were not distinguishable to him (*Memorabilia* 4.4; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.27) and certain laws were so natural that they need not be written and incur automatic penalty (*Memorabilia* 4.4.19-25). All of this shows Xenophon attached greater importance to the moral quality of leading citizens than he did to the basic shape of the constitution.

This should not suggest that Xenophon did not have opinions on the quality of constitutions, but rather, his definitions of constitutional forms relied on an analysis of leadership quality. Xenophon presents Socrates’ identification of various constitutions at *Memorabilia* 4.6.12:

βασίλειαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὁ ἄρχων βούλοιτο,

τυραννίδα. Καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

The views of Socrates, of course, cannot be identified with those of Xenophon without justification; such justification is easily found, however, given the frequent explicit praise Xenophon renders to Socrates, especially with respect to the latter's wisdom. This praise is unconditional, and little reason exists for it to be considered insincere.⁴³ The quote above illustrates that Xenophon does have political leanings, as kingship seems simply and clearly superior to tyranny. It is also clear, however, that the difference between these two types of government was not in form, since they are both systems of one-man governance, but in how the ruler exercises his power and whether this power is exercised with the consent of the citizens. In like manner, it is probable that Xenophon's aristocracy and plutocracy would both have been oligarchic in form, with the difference between the two being that the former selects officials according to legal requirements, the latter according to wealth alone.⁴⁴ The critical difference between constitutions of a given form, then, is the nature of who leads government. In the case of tyranny and kingship, the measure which discriminates between rulers is, as said, whether power is exercised legally and with consent. But legality and consent are both related to the ability to

⁴³ *Memorabilia* 1.1-2 and *Apology* 34 are the clearest examples, but such praise permeates the entirety of these two works.

⁴⁴ In support of this, Xenophon lists constitutions at *Agésilas* 1.4, where only democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, and kingship appear – plutocracy and aristocracy appear to be combined as oligarchy.

persuade citizens to obey, that is, they are the result of good leadership.⁴⁵ This helps to explain why leadership quality pervades nearly all of Xenophon's writings, particularly those concerned with political theory.

This aspect of Xenophon's theory of leadership, the act of winning consent to rule, is of primary importance, especially since it is with the opposite condition of this, that of ruling over unwilling subjects, that the *Hiero* is primarily concerned.⁴⁶ This aspect is discussed abundantly in Xenophon's works, and the *Hiero* is both echoing points reiterated throughout them and making a further, unique contribution. The importance of the willingness of the led is most dramatically stated at the end of the *Economics*:

οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὄλον τουτὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν: <ὁ> σαφῶς δίδεται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς σωφροσύνη τετελεσμένοις: τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδόασιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὓς ἂν ἠγῶνται ἀξιούς εἶναι βιοτευεῖν ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν Ἄιδου λέγεται τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διατρίβειν φοβούμενος μὴ δις ἀποθάνῃ.

The process by which a leader wins the consent of the led, however, is very difficult, and there are several qualities found throughout Xenophon's writings which are necessary to this end. The

⁴⁵ Xenophon's perspective on legality has been the topic of considerable scholarship, particularly because of certain statements by the author which might appear contradictory. For instance, in *Memorabilia* 4.4, Xenophon's Socrates appears to endorse an absolute legal positivism; at other points, however, Xenophon clearly lays out stipulations for legitimate lawmaking, as seen above, where the tyrant, the illegitimate version of one-man rule, rules however he likes. Most interpreters (see Morrison, Dorion, and Mosquera (2004) and Wood (1964:60-65)) simply understand Xenophon's legal positivism as being a call to discipline and obedience to legitimate authority, or to universal laws such as respect for the gods, though Strauss (1972) reads this as a contradiction indicating hidden meaning. As stated above, it appears as though to Xenophon legality, rule according to law, was nearly synonymous with ruling by consent, as opposed to ruling by force; see *Memorabilia* 1.2.41-45 and *Cyropaedia* 1.6.20-21, where Xenophon draws this distinction explicitly.

⁴⁶ In spite of the importance of voluntary obedience to Xenophon's theory of leadership, discussions on the topic in existing scholarship are relatively limited. Stoll (2012) does not mention it, while Wood (1964: 52) mentions it only in passing, as a stepping stone to his discussion of Xenophon's emphasis on the logistical diligence of leaders; he does, however, give the topic its due credit by calling it the "true test" of a leader. Gray (2007: 7-8) discusses this, recognizing that it is the outcome of good leadership. The fullest discussion of the topic is found in Morrison, Dorion, and Mosquera (2004: 182-186), where the *Hiero* is also discussed in detail. The authors arrive at similar conclusions to those found in the present chapter, that Simonides' instructions are designed to teach Hiero to win consent to rule, which confers legitimacy and represents a primary difference between kingship and tyranny.

most important qualities are self-control with respect to physical impulses, knowledge, the use of both punishments and rewards, hard work, personal example, and a spirit of benevolence towards subjects.⁴⁷

Socrates sets out that only those who have self-control have the right to lead (*Memorabilia* 2.1.7), and such personal discipline is both the reason for Sparta's excellence (and hegemony), and the cause of its decline.⁴⁸ Knowledge is required in order to win followers because a leader must be perceived as the best in a given task. On a farm a farmer is obeyed, in sickness a doctor, because “ἐν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτοις μάλιστα ἐθέλουσι πείθεσθαι οἷς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι” (*Memorabilia* 3.3.9). In the *Economics*, Socrates very quickly points out that even money is only useful, whether morally or pragmatically, to the person with the knowledge of how to use it (1.12); how leaders spend money is of central importance to Xenophon, as is illustrated by the fact that his *On Revenues* is devoted entirely to this topic, in a specific Athenian context.⁴⁹ Further, a good leader utilizes both punishments and rewards, for the disobedient and obedient, respectively; Cyrus father describes this as the most important act in winning followers (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.20).⁵⁰

The necessity of active personal effort is also very important in Xenophon's theory of leadership. Xenophon has Socrates claim that strenuous effort leads to noble action. Socrates

⁴⁷ This list attempts to identify the most fundamental and recurrent qualities, but cannot be exhaustive. At a minimum, proper religion, controlled oratory, good order, delegation, and comportment have all been overlooked for the sake of scope.

⁴⁸ *The Constitution of the Spartans* 14.1-3 describes how the Spartans have been corrupted on account of immoderation, particular with respect to money; 3.2 states that Spartans are given the highest workloads during puberty, in order to keep them from excesses of pleasure. For further examples of the importance of moderation, see also *Cyropaedia* 7.5.78-82, *Memorabilia* 1.2.1-2, *Economics* 7.5-6.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Cyropaedia* 1.6.8 and *On Cavalry Command* 6.4-6.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Economics* 4.7-11 and *Memorabilia* 3.4.8. It is important to note that Xenophon is not only stating that both of these, independently, are good things, but rather that the two together are necessary for obedience: see *Anabasis* 2.6.9-14 together with 2.6.20 for examples of negative consequences when either of these are missing.

then quotes Hesiod, who says “τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροισεν ἔθηκον ἀθάνατοι.”⁵¹ He also relates Prodicus’ tale of Heracles’ choice between Virtue and Vice, which claims Vice wins its rewards specifically through the work of others, where Virtue gives her gifts through toil and sweat (*Memorabilia* 2.1.20-28). Hard work is related to personal example, another key component of winning obedience. Cyrus, on the heels of a strong affirmation that military victory is no excuse for immoral leadership, asks: “αἰσχρὸν δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη, εἰ δι’ ἄλλους μὲν δορυφόρους τῆς σωτηρίας οἰησόμεθα χρῆναι τυγχάνειν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐ δορυφορήσομεν (*Cyropaedia* 7.5.83-84).⁵² Benevolence to others is also an important characteristic in a leader. Those who toil on behalf of their city and friends will be praised and envied by others (*Memorabilia* 2.1.19). Cyrus’ father tells him that those whom a leader expects to follow him will, in turn, expect that the leader work meticulously on their behalf (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.42). Chapter thirteen of the *Cynegeticus* establishes the work’s educational purpose, and specifically directs its fruits towards the good of the city and of friends. Hunters are juxtaposed with wealthy, self-seeking Sophists, who “τάς τε γὰρ τῶν ιδιωτῶν οὐσίας ἀφαιρούμενοι καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὰς κοινὰς σωτηρίας ἀνωφελέστεροί εἰσι τῶν ιδιωτῶν” (13.11).

It is clear, then, that Xenophon believed leadership ought to proceed from merit, manifested in the qualities above. It is also worth adding that leadership was not to be justified on the grounds of pre-existing status. Xenophon’s devotion to merit-based leadership was so

⁵¹ Works and Days 285.

⁵² Johnstone 1994 cites *Cyropaedia* 7.5.72-85 as an example of elite lordship being justified by stylized moral behaviour, following his analysis of the *Economics* discussed in the first section of this chapter. Cyrus’ repeated interest in maintaining power is compelling in favour of Johnstone’s reading; however, in light of the fact that similar morality is espoused when no such gain in political power is easily found, it is hardly an obligatory reading. Furthermore, no inference as to Cyrus’ justification of power is necessary, since he himself provides it, saying that they rightfully rule by virtue of having conquered against aggressors (see especially 73 and 77). Finally, there is a clear contradiction in risking one’s his own life for the purpose of justifying and perpetuating wealth and power, and so this interpretation is difficult to imagine. Cyrus’ speech is likely intended as genuine moral exhortation reflecting Xenophon’s view of leadership.

great that its application could eliminate even the most rigid ancient class structures: a wife is capable of excelling and leading her husband (*Oeconomicus* 7.42), and an established, wealthy aristocrat is better off a slave if it means his moral improvement (*Oeconomicus* 1.16-23).⁵³

Effective leadership, therefore, being an integral part of good government, is primarily the ability to win consent to rule. Given this, there are several noteworthy differences between what wins willing obedience in the *Hiero*, and what is mentioned by Xenophon to this end elsewhere. It serves, therefore, to examine which elements of leadership are or are not present in the *Hiero*, which are or are not possessed by Hiero himself, and the effect of their absence or presence on the interpretation on the dialogue. These data will illuminate what the *Hiero* says about Xenophon's theory of leadership and government, especially as it relates to tyranny.

3.2 Leadership and Government in the *Hiero*

Rule over consenting subjects, the mark of a king, is mentioned specifically only once in the *Hiero*, somewhat less dramatically than in the *Economics*. The mention falls at the very end of the dialogue, when Simonides claims that this will be the result if Hiero carries out his recommendations (11.12). Hiero is in a condition in which he must use force to maintain his rule (8.10), and to Xenophon, the use of force gains unconsented rule, where persuasion, by means of effective leadership, gains willing obedience.⁵⁴ Since consented rule is the mark of a good leader,

⁵³ The aristocrat here is a εὐπατρίδης, and the person to whom he would hypothetically be a slave for the purpose of moral improvement is a καλὸς κάγαθός. This is significant for two reasons: First, it gives strong support that wealth and traditional social status give no right to leadership; second, some have interpreted the καλὸς κάγαθός as a type of aristocrat, but, in this passage, it is clearly distinguished as a type of person characterized purely by virtue.

⁵⁴ *Cyropaedia* 1.6.21: “καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν γε τὸ ἀνάγκη ἔπεισθαι αὕτη, ὧ παῖ, ἡ ὁδὸς ἐστίν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον τούτου πολὺ τὸ ἐκόντας πείθεσθαι, ἄλλη ἐστὶ συντομωτέρα.” This is a particularly useful example given the terminology used here, which is paralleled elsewhere. Πείθεσθαι is often rendered “to obey,” but that may not be the best choice in English to represent the verb as Xenophon uses it; obedience, in English, tends to connote something compulsory, something forced, which is precisely the opposite of the connotation it has here. Rather, the willing subjects here are being persuaded – and not persuaded in a deceptive way, but an honest one.

and Hiero does not have it, it stands to reason that the tyrant is being characterized as one deficient in the leadership skills outlined above.

Simonides' instructions to Hiero are: (9.3-5) to delegate punishment to others, but to give rewards himself; (9.6-11) to promote competitions so as to further progress and revenue; (10.2-8) to use a standing force to deter evil actions and afford safety and leisure to good citizens; and finally, (11.1-7) to use his own resources to develop the city as a whole, measuring his own success by the success of the city. While all of these do fit neatly into Xenophon's theory of leadership, Hiero is left considerably more aloof from the everyday dealings of the city, and does not play the same diligent, hardworking role which has been seen elsewhere. He also remains in power and grows wealthier (11.13-15).

While I do not consider this difference to be significant, let alone contradictory, others have seen these missing qualities as implying a fundamental self-interest on the part of Simonides' instructions. It is still possible to interpret these leadership characteristics (knowledge, hard work, devotion to the common good, personal investment in the city, etc.) as means of justifying one's power; the fundamental question becomes whether Xenophon is describing the qualities of a person who would be the best leader, or is instructing illegitimate leaders in the art of affirming their superiority. Though I would hold that Xenophon's statements on giving leadership to the most competent, the assumption of personal danger and responsibility on the part of the leader, and the overwhelming focus on the common good, all make the latter interpretation tenuous, this question is answered directly elsewhere. In 14.5 of the *Constitution of the Spartans*, Xenophon speaks very critically of modern-day Spartans, saying: “καὶ ἦν μὲν ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο ὅπως ἄξιοι εἶεν ἡγεῖσθαι: νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ ὅπως ἄξιοι τούτων ἔσονται.” Clearly, Xenophon's attitude is that leadership ought to require

virtue, and not that virtue ought to be a tool for the support of existing leaders.⁵⁵ To Xenophon, a ruler is not someone who happens to be in a position of authority, but a person with knowledge of how to rule (*Memorabilia* 3.9.10-11); legitimate government is identical with consented leadership. For this reason, although Hiero does maintain his power (if he does as Simonides' tells him), he is neither a deluder of his subjects nor a 'good tyrant': if a tyrant is good enough to win the consent of his subjects, he is not a tyrant at all, but a king.⁵⁶

Marchant exemplifies this misunderstanding in saying that "the gist of Xenophon's counsel to despots is that a despot should endeavour to rule like a good king" (1925: xvi). He does not see the tyrant cease being a tyrant, but behave like a good king while remaining a despot. One potential reason for this subtle but important confusion, this false distinction between king and good tyrant, is that βασιλεία and its cognates are conspicuously absent from the *Hiero*, which could be taken to imply that Hiero will not have become a king in spite of kingly policies.

But it must be borne in mind first that the dialogue is concerned with the question of a tyrant's happiness, and second that constitutionality, as seen above, is based largely on the quality of the leader. Given this, although the *Hiero* has been said to weigh the benefit of monarchy against the pitfalls of tyranny, and this is certainly true, the constitutional form may be

⁵⁵ The authenticity of chapter 14 of the *Constitution of the Spartans* has been questioned, as mentioned earlier, but this does not weigh heavily on the above interpretation. Modern scholars suggest that chapter 14 limits the praise of the work, in one way or another (Humble 2004, Kroeker 2009, Farrell 2012), while ironic interpreters rely on this chapter being a piece of literal honesty in a satirical whole (Strauss 1939); in either case, this particular chapter's honesty is not questioned.

⁵⁶ The 'good tyrant' is Aristotle's (*Politics*, 1310b-1315b). Aristotle saw legitimacy, intent, and behaviour as separately contributing to the distinction between king and tyrant, which allowed him to conceive of an illegitimate and self-interested tyrant who nevertheless behaved well. Xenophon, however, does not have the same distinction between these qualities: intent makes no meaningful appearance, and legitimacy is directly related to behaviour, as is shown in this chapter.

less significant to the dialogue than its points on the proper relationship between subjects and government and the influence this has on the happiness of a ruler.⁵⁷

More specifically, Simonides teaches Hiero that tyranny is not capable of amounting to successful leadership, and that this is the cause of his unhappiness. He says directly that he is going to teach the art of leading, over and against Hiero's previous tyranny:

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν νῦν, ὦ Ἱέρων, ἀθύμως ἔχειν σε πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα οὐ θαυμάζω, ἐπεὶ περ ἐπιθυμῶν φιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐμποδῶν σοι τούτου νομίζεις αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μέντοι ἔχειν μοι δοκῶ διδάξαι σε ὡς τὸ ἄρχειν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεονεκτεῖ γε τῆς ιδιωτείας. (8.1)

Both Gray (2007) and Sevieri (2004) have pointed out that the language of the dialogue moves away from τυραννίς and its cognates and toward the use of ἄρχων, a more ambivalent term for a leader. Gray recognizes the shift in language, but adds that the use of τυραννίς persists, and does not seem to believe the shift carries significant thematic weight; Sevieri more boldly states that ἄρχων is preferred from chapter 8 onward, arguing that tyranny is being subtly dismissed. But the above quote makes it particularly clear that a sharp distinction is being made between τὸ ἄρχειν and the actions (just thoroughly explained by Hiero, in the first seven books of the dialogue) of a τυραννίς. Every use of τύραννος and its cognates by Simonides is negative, and in most cases, is immediately juxtaposed with some positive use of the term ἄρχων, as was just seen. At 8.2, Simonides introduces a thought experiment investigating whether a τύραννος or ιδιώτης will win greater popularity by performing the same actions; however, at the mention of the first popular action (8.3), Xenophon switches to a comparison between ἄρχων and ιδιώτης. The switch is highly conspicuous. It is equally marked at 8.6, where Simonides says that boys,

⁵⁷ Gray 2007, 30

on whose account Hiero had hated his τυραννίδα, find least fault with negative qualities when found in an ἄρχοντος. At 8.9 Hiero exclaims that it is necessary for an ἄνηρ τύραννος to hire mercenaries; after a brief preamble, Simonides' response at 9.3 is that it is for an ἄνηρ ἄρχων to arrange punishments for others, while keeping reward-giving for himself.

Later, on the same topic, where Hiero had kept mercenaries as a guard for himself specifically, the ἄρχων is to arrange for them to aid all citizens (10.1-4). At 11.1, Simonides says that it is far better to spend money εἰς τὴν πόλιν rather than εἰς τὸ ἴδιον ἀνδρὶ τυράννῳ. He adds that it is not becoming for an ἄνηρ τύραννος to compete with private citizens: winning, he inspires only envy and hatred, having drawn expenses from all households for his sole gain; losing, he is a laughingstock to all (11.6). And finally, as the most powerful encapsulation of the good things that can be accomplished by the ἄρχων, Simonides says at 8.5:

ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐκ θεῶν τιμὴ τις καὶ χάρις συμπαρέπεσθαι ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι. μὴ γὰρ ὅτι καλλίονα ποιεῖ ἄνδρα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἥδιον θεώμεθά τε ὅταν ἄρχῃ ἢ ὅταν ιδιωτεύῃ, διαλεγόμενοι τε ἀγαλλόμεθα τοῖς προτετιμημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῖν οὔσι.

All of these points illustrate that, in the context of this dialogue, and particularly from chapter eight onward, there is a clear contradistinction in the uses of ἄρχων and τύραννος; it is not simply that the former becomes a preferred term, but rather, it is distinguished specifically against the latter.⁵⁸

Simonides instructions correlate well with the qualities central to Xenophon's theory of leadership, described in the previous section. Hard work and personal example might seem

⁵⁸ To clarify, this distinction is firmly being made in the context of this dialogue only. ἄρχων is a general term for governance (to Xenophon, synonymous with leadership) used to move Hiero away from thinking of himself as a τύραννος; it is not always used by Xenophon in a positive light and can be qualified otherwise. For instance, Socrates at *Memorabilia* 4.6.12 calls tyranny an ἄρχη.

subdued here, but it can be said that his competition to have the best city, and the dedication of his resources to accomplish this, amount to a near equivalent of the meticulous diligence and direction shown by Ischomachus and Cyrus. Hiero is overtly called to utilize punishment and rewards to win obedience. Genuine benevolence is absolutely guaranteed, as Hiero is called to enrich his friends and love the city as though it were his own family (11.13-15). Knowledge of statecraft is embodied by the specific instructions underlying the general qualities above: Hiero is to win allies for the city, invest in research by promoting and rewarding competition, use mercenaries to protect farmers and their produce, delegate punishments, etc.⁵⁹

Simonides also urges Hiero to be more self-disciplined with respect to physical pleasures, though the urging is subtle and clever. Hiero knows well that the presence of physical luxuries in his life are not only unsatisfying, but produce all the more desire: Simonides does not need to teach him this important fact. But Hiero nonetheless makes use of these luxuries, and so it is a strong disdain for these things that must be taught, in order not to partake of them in the first place. Simonides teaches exactly that: what Hiero had spoken of at great length Simonides dismisses with a sentence, stating that many good men deliberately avoid excesses in such pleasures (2.1). Simonides' brevity could not help but exemplify his claim that physical pleasures are mere trifles, and juxtaposes Hiero with these good men; the tyrant is left with the order to think little of physical luxuries.

It is clear, then, that Simonides' instructions are designed carefully to teach Hiero good leadership, which earns Hiero the consent of his subjects for his rule, making him no longer a tyrant. These instructions on good leadership, however, make up only a very small part of the

⁵⁹ With respect to the notion of winning allies, it is interesting to note that the importance of leadership of the willing applies not only within a city, but between cities; this is to say that Xenophon is considered to have been firmly opposed to imperialism, particularly Athenian imperialism. The proem of *On Revenues* declares this, and see also Nadon (2001) and Tuplin (1993).

dialogue. This fact helps to tease out in what way the message of leadership in the *Hiero* is unique and significant relative to what is found elsewhere in Xenophon's corpus. Both Hiero and Simonides believe that tyranny leaves the tyrant unhappy – chapters one through seven, and some sections thereafter, centre entirely on this point. The bulk of the text does not discuss good leadership, but the consequences of bad leadership, a theme which is generally muted in Xenophon's other works. Hiero knows quite well that the ruler should be a benefactor to the people, in order to win their affection and alleviate his own sadness (7.9) – his problem is simply that he does not know how to accomplish the relationship with his subjects needed to put him in this condition (7.12-13). He comes off very much as a tyrant who regrets his decision ever to have become one. And the specificity of Simonides' instructions matches the agreement between the two parties: he does not instruct him to have an altruistic attitude toward the citizens and state, but gives him specific policies which enable him to accomplish the relationship with his subjects that he had always wanted. Therefore, although good leadership is important to the text, the primary theme is Hiero's unavoidable unhappiness.

Xenophon wrote many works and passages dedicated to establishing and teaching what good leadership is, and the many good ways in which this is reflected in a state, army, personal estate, or other institution: in brief, good leadership produces happiness and prosperity in any such group. Cyrus produced a happy and successful army and kingdom, as did Agesilaus, and Ischomachus produced a prosperous household. But none of these make a case for the contrary point, detailing why or how a bad leader might make himself and his organization unhappy and unprosperous. The *Hiero*, however, dedicates seven of its eleven chapters to this point; the discussion of what Hiero should or should not do is secondary to the discussion of his (un)happiness and how his leadership influences this. Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Ischomachus show

Xenophon's reader why leadership is important for the led; Hiero shows the reader why it is important for the leader himself. And while it is true that Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Ischomachus are superficially said to be happy, only in the *Hiero* does Xenophon fully make his case that the relationship between leader and led is wholly reciprocal. Xenophon's good leaders work to give happiness and wealth to their subjects, and happiness and wealth come to them; Hiero, Xenophon's bad leader, extorts money and uses mercenaries to intimidate his subjects – and finds himself with overwhelming expenses and fear for his life. This component of Xenophon's theory is extremely significant and insightful, and, in light of the *Hiero*, the reader of Xenophon will understand not only how to win consent to rule, but why this is such a crucial component for a leader's happiness.

Conclusion

We are now in a position to affirm what was claimed at the outset of this study, that the *Hiero* is a writing of significant political thought, representative of an author who is neither ingenuous nor reliant on sophistic irony. While some excellent and discerning scholarship exists concerning this dialogue, two significant outstanding problems have been addressed here: first, the dominant interpretation of the *Hiero* is highly tenuous and not likely to reflect the author's thought; second, the *Hiero* has not hitherto contributed to our understanding of Xenophon's literary ability and political philosophy, in particular his unprecedented generalized theory of leadership, to the degree to which it could. Xenophon is an author who deserves to be better appreciated and more widely read by students and the public, and my purpose here, through a discussion of the *Hiero* and its place in Xenophon's thought, has been to show why.⁶⁰

With respect to the dominant interpretation of the text, it should now be clear that the Straussian interpretation is built upon tenuous assumptions about the dramatic setting which are not consistent with the evidence available. Further, it should also be evident that the *Hiero* is a work of unique literary quality. Drawing on two existing literary conventions, the Socratic Dialogue and the meeting of a wise man and tyrant, Xenophon has adapted these forms to create a work that is both philosophical and didactic; its combination of two disparate genres is a display of the literary ingenuity which is Xenophon's greatest credit as a classical author. And the dialogue's central political idea, its understanding of the reciprocal relationship between ruler and ruled, and the necessary unhappiness of one who rules by force, is both a further

⁶⁰ I developed this laudatory opinion during and after reading all of Xenophon's works; I have borrowed the wording here from Wood (1964: 33) because it so perfectly reflected my thoughts: "Xenophon deserves to be better known and more widely appreciated by students, scholars, and the reading public. The purpose of this essay is to indicate something of the intellectual originality of the ancient Greek soldier and country squire."

development of Xenophon's theory of generalized leadership and a genuine insight into a common philosophical question, the happiness of a tyrant. The *Hiero* is hardly a "naïve little work."

It will have been made clear through the course of this study that modern scholarship has made tremendous advances in a genuine understanding of Xenophon's ideas and literary style. In spite of this, there is still considerable room for further study on the topics to which this dialogue is pertinent, namely Xenophon's propensity for literary adaptation and his theory of leadership, together with his political thought more broadly. This is particularly true for the latter of these two: Luccioni (1947) is the most recent full, intertextual analysis of Xenophon's social and political views, and the ideas found in this study have been the object of much criticism. For this reason, a similar intertextual discussion of his political views is wanting. Xenophon's theory of leadership, specifically, is an even more fertile topic. As has been discussed, while many commentators mention this in passing, Wood (1964) is its only dedicated treatment, and this study deals only with the military elements of the theory, is a shorter treatment than the topic warrants, and does not consider as many of Xenophon's works as it could - the minor works, except for the *Hiero*, are almost entirely neglected. Xenophon's literary innovation has received considerably more attention, particularly in scholarship of the *Cyropaedia*, *Anabasis*, and *Memorabilia*, but again, the minor works receive less fruitful attention. Hopefully, as scholarship moves forward on these issues, Xenophon can continue to recover the rank he held in antiquity.⁶¹

⁶¹ Pontier (2014: back matter): "recouvrant le rang qui était le sien dans l'Antiquité et jusqu'à l'époque moderne."

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The text I have used for the *Hiero* is that of Gray (2007), which, according to the editor, has followed the Oxford Classical Text of Marchant (1920). All translations found in this thesis are the author's own.

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