

A. Schopenhauer and F. Dostoevsky: Some Philosophical and Literary Parallels

by
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MA Thesis Abstract

A. Schopenhauer and F. Dostoevsky: Some Philosophical and Literary Parallels

This thesis juxtaposes the philosophical theories of Arthur Schopenhauer with themes and characters in Fyodor Dostoevsky's major fictional works of the middle post-Siberian period (1863-1871). Of particular interest is the theme of will, which is prominent in both Schopenhauer's philosophy and Dostoevsky's fiction.

The theme of will is discussed firstly, with relation to the notions of will as a thing-in-itself and with relation to the notion of will-to-live. Particular attention is rendered as to how Schopenhauer explains the relationship between will and reason. Then, a portrayal of this relationship, which is similar to Schopenhauer's, is inferred from an examination of Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground. The philosophical argument expressed by the Underground Man, is viewed in the context of the socio-literary debate with Chernyshevsky and in the context of Schopenhauer's explanation of the will-reason relationship. As well, the Schopenhauerian notion of the will-to-live is applied to the analysis of some of the main characters of Dostoevsky's fiction, such as Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Ippolit and Stavrogin.

Chapter I of this thesis, is devoted to exploration in the area of literary history. The purpose of this is to establish the hypothesis that Dostoevsky was acquainted with the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Following this brief survey, Chapters II and III, are devoted to reflections on and explanations of the concepts of will in Schopenhauer's philosophical works

and its presence in Dostoevsky's fiction. The emphasis is on the relationship between will and reason, and the notion of the will-to-live. Chapter IV contains an inquiry into the theme of suicide in both Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky. Such an inquiry reveals another example of thematic affinities between the two. Chapters V, VI and VII, are devoted to an analysis of Dostoevsky's characters with relation to suicide and Schopenhauer's notion of the will-to-live.

The final chapter attempts to draw general conclusions from the evidence which emerges from this examination, as well as to further the thematic parallels between Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky regarding the theme of suffering.

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Dedication.

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Introduction.

Frank Gado in his article, "Toward a Definition of the Philosophical in Literature" writes that "no pair of disciplines in the long history of the academy has found the attraction of each other's territory more irresistible than philosophy and literary criticism."¹ Indeed, philosophy and literary criticism are often united in an analytical consideration of a work of literature.

The following analysis attempts to juxtapose the philosophical theories of Arthur Schopenhauer with themes in Fyodor Dostoevsky's major fictional works of the middle post-Siberian period (1863-1871). The importance and ultimate goal of such an analysis is to reflect upon Dostoevsky's literary text in order to better understand the philosophical basis of his works. Thus, there is established a more profound understanding of Dostoevsky's themes and the characters through whom they are expressed. It also becomes possible to more clearly see the themes Dostoevsky portrayed, which otherwise may not seem apparent, as well as the thematic affinities between the German philosopher and the Russian novelist.

I believe, that the theme of will is prominent in the works of Dostoevsky. With regard to the latter, the theme in question is especially prominent in the novels written during the middle post-Siberian period, such as Notes from Underground(1863), Crime and Punishment(1866), The Idiot(1868), and The Possessed(1871). As far as Schopenhauer is concerned, the notion of will is the cornerstone and the core concept of his entire philosophy. His reflections on the subject of will are to be found in his main work - The World as Will and Representation(1819).

The theme of will shall be discussed firstly, with relation to the notion of will as a thing-in-itself and secondly, with relation to the notion of will-to-live, both of which were

developed by the German philosopher in his The World as Will and Representation. Particular attention will be rendered as to how Schopenhauer explains the relationship between will and reason. It is believed that Dostoevsky, in his Notes from Underground, expresses views similar to Schopenhauer's on the relationship between these two.

The notion of the will-to-live, as developed by Schopenhauer, is also believed to be very prominent in Dostoevsky's major novels and receives its literary embodiment in such characters as Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov from Crime and Punishment, Ippolit from The Idiot, and Stavrogin from The Possessed. Following a definition of Schopenhauer's will-to-live, an attempt is made to compare this notion to that of will-to-live in Dostoevsky's characters through the device of suicide. That is, suicide will be viewed as a reflection of either the will-to-live's presence or absence in a literary character.

Thus, by, firstly, establishing the similarity of views held by Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky on the relationship between will and reason, and, by, secondly, establishing the presence of the notion of will-to-live in Dostoevsky's major novels, the above indicated goals of establishing thematic parallels between Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky will be achieved. This will also allow for yet another critical interpretation of some of Dostoevsky's literary characters.

Structurally, the following analysis will include a chapter devoted to exploration in the area of literary history. The purpose of this is to establish the hypothesis that Dostoevsky was acquainted with the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Following this brief survey, the next two chapters are devoted to reflections on and explanations of the concepts of will in Schopenhauer's philosophical works and its presence in Dostoevsky's fiction. The emphasis will be on the relationship between will and reason, and the notion of the will-to-live. Then follows an inquiry

into the theme of suicide in both Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky. Such an inquiry will reveal another example of thematic affinities between Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer. This writer also believes that a literary character, taken within the framework of the moral dilemma of committing suicide, more strongly expresses will-to-live or its denial, depending on the resolution assigned to this character by the author. Therefore, the aspect of suicide will serve the purpose of determining will-to-live's presence or its absence in the literary character. Thus, the final three chapters are devoted to an analysis of Dostoevsky's characters with relation to suicide and Schopenhauer's notion of the will-to-live.

The final chapter attempts to draw general conclusions from the evidence which emerges from this examination, as well as to further the thematic parallels between Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky with relation to the theme of suffering.

I. Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer: Literary History and Parallels.

If literary parallels between, for instance, Dostoevsky and Schiller are not subject to any doubt, the same can not be said about the literary relationship between Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer. Dostoevsky's acquaintance with the works of the German philosopher remains a hypothesis. This, however, does not prevent a critic from finding a great number of thematic parallels between the philosophical writings of Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky's novels. Schopenhauer's popularity in Russia in the 1860's and his influence on other Russian writers of that period, such as L. Tolstoy and I. Turgenev, in itself justifies the attempt to juxtapose Dostoevsky's themes with those of the German philosopher. It is the philosophical and the literary text that becomes the prime argument in support of the hypothesis. It is the study of the "use of will-language . . . in the great Russian novelists" of which Vernon Bourke speaks in his analysis of will in Western thought, which will present strong support for that argument.²

Prior to the textual analysis, however, it is imperative to examine possible clues that support the assumption that Dostoevsky could have been acquainted with the philosophy of Schopenhauer and might, in fact, have been influenced by it in relation to the themes relevant to the present analysis, such as the theme of will and suffering.

V. Kirpotin, in his analysis of Notes from Underground, alludes to the common mentioning of Schopenhauer's name and his popularity in Russia after the philosopher's death in 1860. He speaks of the interest toward Schopenhauer's philosophy among the Russian intellectuals and writers, and of the influence Schopenhauer had on them. The critic writes:

"Шопенгауэр был хорошо известен в России. Он умер в 1860 году, и смерть его еще оживила интерес и к нему самому, и к его книгам. Шопенгауэр по разному и в разной степени влиял на Тургенева, Фета, Толстого, Страхова и даже Варфоломея Зайцева."³

Indeed, Schopenhauer's influence on Russian writers reflects their general predisposition to Western philosophy. As Anthony Mlikotin comments: "More than any other writers in any other world literature, Russian writers considered philosophy their most cherished fellow-traveller. Well versed in foreign languages and frequent travellers to Europe, they could easily avail themselves of philosophical thoughts of their respective epochs."⁴ With regard to Dostoevsky, it could be said that he knew the French language and spoke it fluently. There is some evidence that Schopenhauer's works were translated in French. Dostoevsky also took a trip to Western Europe in the early 1860's, at the time of the renewed interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy. This experience Dostoevsky promptly recorded in his Winter Notes on Summer Impressions(1863). Thus, the hypothesis of Dostoevsky's exposure to Schopenhauer's philosophy could be followed up in two different ways.

First of all, he could have been exposed to it in Russia, as it was shown by critics and literary historians that Dostoevsky read, and had in his possession, books by the prominent Western philosophers of the time. S. Levitskii, commenting on Dostoevsky's philosophical education, writes that Dostoevsky:

проштудировал атеистическую книгу Фейербаха «Сущность христианства», что в одном из писем брату из Сибири он просит прислать ему «Историю философии» Гегеля, что в его библиотеке имелись «Критика чистого разума» и «Критика практического разума» Канта, что он читал Бокля и Милля и некоторых других

мыслителей того времени.⁵

Dostoevsky, often without citing the sources, used philosophical teachings of the time actively, eventually incorporating them in his novels, the same way Turgenev and Tolstoy adopted Schopenhauer's and many other philosophical teachings and incorporated them in their fiction. As Levitskii notes: "Достоевский умел откликаться на те философские идеи, которые, по его выражению, «носились в воздухе»."⁶

Dostoevsky could also have become acquainted with Schopenhauer's philosophy through reading Tolstoy's or Turgenev's fiction or Fet's poetry, who, unlike Dostoevsky, openly acknowledged their philosophical mentors. In his library, the novelist kept full collections of Turgenev's and Tolstoy's works, both of whom are greatly indebted to Schopenhauer. Leonid Grossman indicates that Dostoevsky had in his library two volumes of A. Fet's poetry. The poet was not only an admirer of Schopenhauer, but also the first translator of his works into Russian. Mark Slonim goes even further in suggesting that "it was under the influence of German idealistic philosophy in the 1840's that Fet was formed as a poet."⁷ It was Fet, who "in 1866-1867, called Tolstoj's attention to Schopenhauer."⁸ Tolstoy was enthusiastic about Schopenhauer and, in a letter to Fet in August 1869, he wrote: "Do you know what this summer has been for me? A continuous ecstasy over Schopenhauer . . . I ordered all his works and have read and am reading them. Reading him I just cannot understand how his name can remain unknown."⁹

The similarity of themes and attitudes toward certain existential questions, such as will, suicide and suffering, as well as the similarity between the overall pessimistic character of Schopenhauer's philosophy and Dostoevsky's tragedy-novels, allows a critic to assume that

Dostoevsky was familiar with Schopenhauer's writings, and, perhaps was influenced by them to a certain degree. His novels could, in a sense, be considered to be artistic expressions of Schopenhauer's philosophical ideas which were flowing through the Russian and European intellectual community of the time. To this, one can add the general inclination of the Russian intellectuals, and writers in particular, toward the philosophy of pessimism, which sprung largely from the political and social disillusionment resulted from the reforms of the 1860's. These reforms (i.e. the abolition of the 1861 serfdom and the more severe stratification of the society that followed), were intended to improve the society rapidly, but, in fact, made the situation only worse. The growing pessimism and skepticism toward the reforms implemented by the Russian Imperial government, paved the way for a more rapid acceptance of the Schopenhauerian philosophy of pessimism, which hereafter found its way to the works of Tolstoy, Turgenev and even Dostoevsky.

For the purpose of the present analysis, it is necessary now, to more closely examine the Schopenhauerian concepts of will as a thing-in-itself and the will-to-live.

II. Schopenhauer and Will.

The Encyclopedia of philosophy, in its definition of will, refers to several subject headings such as determinism, volition, choosing, deciding and doing, each of which is viewed as a separate philosophical problem. Yet, the notion of will, as such, is not clearly defined. It can perhaps be more fully perceived through the philosophical teachings of will. The philosophical idea of voluntarism is one of such teachings. Richard Taylor explains that "Voluntarism" is the term "which applies to any philosophical theory according to which the will is prior to or superior to the intellect or reason."¹⁰ A. Schopenhauer is, perhaps, the most distinguished representative, and one of the founders of this theory. With regard to the Schopenhauerian definition of will, Bourke comments that: "One cannot describe this metaphysical will of Schopenhauer. Will is the ineffable principle of reality."¹¹

In his World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer states that will is "that primary and original force itself, which forms and maintains the animal body, in that it carries out that body's unconscious as well as conscious functions."¹² It is only possible to perceive will in its manifestations. The human being is one of such manifestations. With regard to this, Ivan Lapshin notes in defining Schopenhauer's thoughts: "в человеческих индивидуумах воля находит себе окончательное и полное воплощение."¹³ It is thus the case that will as the thing-in-itself, as the basis of the world, the cosmic energy or God (even though it is not completely knowable), manifests itself in the individual and, therefore, can be perceived through individual actions. With regard to this, Schopenhauer writes:

Everyone knows his *will* only in its successive individual *acts*, not as a whole, in and by itself. Accordingly, the act of will is indeed only the nearest and clearest *phenomenon* of the thing in itself; yet it follows from this that, if all the other phenomena could be known by us just as immediately and intimately, we should be obliged to regard them precisely as that which the will is in us. Therefore in this sense I teach that the inner nature of every thing is *will*, and I call the will the thing-in-itself.¹⁴

On the basis of this definition of will, Schopenhauer explains the world around us, its perception and its representation. It is this definition of will, one that is a part of the overall will as the thing-in itself and one that is seen in human actions, which shall be discussed with relation to Dostoevsky's fiction.

At the same time, the critics of Schopenhauer's philosophy managed to interpret his views and identify some of will's peculiar characteristics, which follow from the definition given by the philosopher himself. Iulii Eichenwald, one of the first translators and editors of Schopenhauer's works into Russian, identifies will as a "blind, unquenchable (неугасимый), unconquerable impulse for life, the eternal hunger for existence, the wild and unbridled monster."¹⁵ This definition, however, presents some of will's characteristics, rather than a complete definition. The same is done by Lapshin, when he identifies some major aspects of Schopenhauer's will:

она алогична, ... бессознательна, ... едина, она представляет нечто..., не поддающийся логически-точному определению *claire-obscurе* в области понятий: слепой стихийный побуд, движение и в то же время стремление к жизни, к бытию в индивидуальных чувственных формах.¹⁶

Both interpretations identify will with life, or desire for life - "longing for life," "hunger for existence." In this sense, it is related to the concept which Schopenhauer identifies as the concept of will-to-live. To show what Schopenhauer identifies as will-to-live and its affirmation and denial, it is imperative to point out that will-to-live is but a variation of the all-powerful will, which is as big as reality.

Justification and, in fact, identification of the concept of the will-to-live constitutes one of the main aspects of Schopenhauer's overall philosophical teachings and is as important as the notion of the primacy of will over intellect (the relationship which, with regard to Dostoevsky's fiction, receives a more detailed examination in the chapter "Dostoevsky's Debate with Chernyshevsky in Light of Schopenhauer's Theory of the Primacy of Will Over Intellect"), and as the notion of will as a thing-in-itself. The philosopher presents his explanation of the notion of the will-to-live, both in Volume I and in Volume II of his main work - The World as Will and Representation. He devotes special sections to the characterization of the will-to-live, its affirmation and its denial with regard to an individual phenomenon.

The main emphasis in this type of will is on life, which is explained by the term itself.

Schopenhauer writes:

Will-to-live is the only true description of the world's innermost nature. Everything presses and pushes toward *existence*, if possible toward *organic existence*, i.e., *life*.

In animal nature, it then becomes obvious that *will-to-live* is the keynote of its being, its only unchangeable and unconditioned quality. Let us consider this universal craving for life, and see the infinite eagerness, ease, and exuberance with which the will-to-live presses impetuously into existence under millions of forms everywhere, greedily grasping for itself every material capable of life."¹⁷

According to Schopenhauer, there can be an "affirmation" and "denial" of the will-to-live.

With regard to the affirmation of the will-to-live, Schopenhauer writes that it is

the persistent willing itself, as it fills the life of man in general. For the body of man is already the objectivity of the will, as it appears at this grade and in this individual and thus his willing that develops in time, is, so to speak, the paraphrase of the body . . . It is another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself of which the body is already the phenomenon. Therefore, instead of affirmation of the will, we can also say affirmation of the body."¹⁸

The denial of the will-to-live occurs in man when "he ceases to will anything, guards against attaching his will to anything, tries to establish firmly in himself the greatest indifference to all things."¹⁹

With regard to Dostoevsky's fiction, the concepts of the affirmation and denial of the will-to-live could be applied to a great number of characters because the motives of self-destruction and self-preservation are greatly magnified in the novelist's work.

The identification of Schopenhauerian will-to-live with the natural instinct for self-preservation is not entirely inappropriate. On the contrary, such an identification is conceivable on the grounds that both notions have an affiliation to the life force. If Schopenhauer's will-to-live is "the universal craving for life" (something similar to the Darwinian universal struggle for life), then the instinct of self-preservation deals with safeguarding the already existing life. Schopenhauer asserts that his will-to-live could act as an impulse for self preservation and that, in turn, would lead to "an affirmation of the individual phenomenon for the span of time of its natural duration."²⁰ In this context, N. Shneidman asserts that "human actions are often determined by two polar and contradictory traits of nature. On the one hand, man is driven by the natural instinct of self - preservation; on the other hand, his actions are often induced by the irrational impulse of self-destruction."²¹ The critic goes on to quote Schopenhauer's definition of will-to-live as "kernel of reality itself" thus drawing a distinctive parallel between Schopenhauer's will-to-live and the instinct of self-preservation.

Dostoevsky was also well aware of the peculiar dichotomy of human nature --- of the presence of the instinct for self-preservation and self-destruction. Radomsky, in The Idiot, says that, in human beings, the law of self-destruction and the law of self-preservation are equally powerful. It is of particular interest to analyze such characters as Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Ippolit, and Stavrogin, who either contemplated or committed suicide, in relation to the Schopenhauerian notion of the affirmation and denial of the will-to-live. In all of the above

characters, will-to-live manifests itself through the vehicle of suicide. Suicide highlights either will-to-live's affirmation or its denial in the given literary character. It appears, thus, that the reason why Raskolnikov and Ippolit did not kill themselves, is because the instinct for self-preservation or will-to-live, is much stronger in them than that of self-destruction. On the other hand, Svidrigailov's and Stavrogin's tragic ends can be explained as the phenomenal denial of the will-to-live.

III. Dostoevsky's Debate with Chernyshevsky in Light of Schopenhauer's Theory of the Primacy of Will over Intellect.

Questions and problems related to the relationship between will and reason are among the most dominant in Dostoevsky's fiction. Arkadii Dolinin, one of the first Russian literary critics of Dostoevsky's work does, perhaps, best describe the presence of the theme in question, when he says that:

по всему творчеству Достоевского проходит мотив борьбы разума с волей, в связи с проблемой о значимости человеческого хотения вообще. Мотив раздваивается, протекает как бы по двум струям. Одна звучит наиболее сильно, проникает самые глубокие самые ответственные его творения, начиная от «Записок из подполья», через «Преступление и наказание», «Идиота» - в образе Ипполита, «Бесов» - в образе Кириллова и кончая карамазовским «Бунтом», - это признание абсолютности человеческого «я», абсолютной ценности за каждым малейшим проявлением его воли . . . словом, тот культ человеческой свободы, который наиболее элементарно выражен в словах подпольного человека, противопоставляющего идее прогресса в позитивно-социальном его понимании 'свое собственное, вольное и свободное хотение. . . .'²²

Dolinin rightly asserts that the philosophy of the Underground Man contains statements which are related to the theme of will. Moreover, Dostoevsky's polemic with "the utilitarians and the rationalists like Chernyshevsky," expressed by the novelist in Winter Notes on Summer

Impressions (1862) and Notes from Underground (1863), marks the first step in the discussion of the theme of will and the relationship between will and reason, in particular.²³ It is important to bear in mind, however, that the theme of will in this debate constitutes only a small portion of the entire spectrum of issues in question.

The majority of critical reviews concentrate on the comparison between Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground and Chernyshevsky's novel What's to be Done? (1863). It is, perhaps, a justified approach since these two works of literature contain the essence of the polemic issues, which were centered around the general question of individual freedom and dignity versus a utilitarian approach to the definition of human nature. It is also acknowledged by a number of literary critics that Notes from Underground was intended to be Dostoevsky's artistic reply to Chernyshevsky's What's to be Done?. Richard Peace writes: "The chief target of 'Notes from the Underground' is Chernyshevsky - the then acknowledged leader of the younger generation, who the previous year (1863) had published 'What's to be Done?' This work claimed to be more than a novel; it was offered as a 'textbook for life'. In "Notes from Underground", we have Dostoevsky's reply."²⁴

With regard to the relationship between will and reason, however, this polemic had already been initiated much earlier. Chernyshevsky expressed his ideas in "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" (1860), while Dostoevsky elaborated on the subject in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions. These two works could be regarded as blueprints for the discussions carried on in Notes from Underground and What's to be Done? The difference between them is that Notes from Underground and What's to be Done? are works of literature, while Winter Notes on Summer Impressions is a sort of traveler's diary, and "The Anthropological Principle in

Philosophy" can be regarded as a critical paper. These two works also express diametrically opposing points of view in relation to the question of will and reason. Dostoevsky, first in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, then in Notes from Underground, promulgates the view in which will is superior to reason. Such an understanding of this relationship is identical to the one proposed by Schopenhauer in his World as Will and Representation. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, supports the opposite relationship. That is, without totally denying the importance of will, the critic assigns the leading role to reason.

Chernyshevsky wrote his article in 1860, three years prior to Dostoevsky's Winter Notes on Summer Impressions. Among a multitude of questions discussed in the article, Chernyshevsky presents his view of human nature, which he sees to be essentially selfish, self-centered and egoistic. The initial argument springs from the question of self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice, as well as any kind of altruistic activity, is alien to Chernyshevsky who bluntly denies even the possibility of its existence. The selfish, utilitarian outlook on life denies self-sacrifice and elevates reason above everything else. Reason and rationale is to be used for the purpose of self-gain only. Chernyshevsky writes:

каждый человек думает все только о себе самом, заботится о своих выгодах
 больше, нежели о чужих, почти всегда приносит выгоды, честь и жизнь других
 в жертву своему расчету, - словом сказать, каждый из людей видел, что все люди -
 эгоисты. В практических делах все рассудительные люди всегда руководились
 убеждением, что эгоизм - единственное побуждение, управляющее действиями
 каждого.²⁵

From the emphasis on self-oriented profit (выгода) and on the egoistic basis of human nature and human behavior, Chernyshevsky develops his concept of "reasonable egoism" or "разумный эгоизм," in which reason constitutes the basis of the concept. He sees this concept as the ultimate behavioral drive present in man: "В побуждениях человека нет двух различных натур, двух основных законов, а все разнообразие явления в сфере человеческих побуждений к действию, как и во всей человеческой жизни, происходит из одной и той же природы, по одному и тому же закону."²⁶ With regard to human activity which might sometimes seem to be unselfish, Chernyshevsky argues that even in such activity, the thought of personal gain and profit lies at the core. The key word here is "the thought." The reason which produces that thought is the prime drive of human actions. Selfish reason produces selfish thought. Hence, the concept of reasonable egoism. Here, we come very close to Chernyshevsky's explanation of the relationship between reason and will. With regard to this, Joseph Frank states that: "An act of will, according to Chernyshevsky, is only the subjective impression which accompanies in our minds the rise of thoughts or actions from preceding thoughts, actions or external facts."²⁷ Here, Frank correctly interprets the relationship between will and thought (or intellect) as it was understood by Chernyshevsky. In this relationship, will is overpowered by reason.

Chernyshevsky, with rigid pragmatism, reveals in his article, his belief that will (sometimes he calls it "wanting" or "хотение"), is dependant on intellect. The intellect, or the thinking process, is the prime drive, while will is only a secondary element. Chernyshevsky states that:

То явление, которое мы называем волей, само является звеном в ряду явлений и фактов, соединенных причинною связью. Очень часто ближайшею причиною появления в нас воли на известный поступок бывает мысль. Но определенное расположение воли производится также только определенной мыслью: какова мысль, такова и воля; будь мысль не такова, была бы не такова и воля.²⁸

Chernyshevsky's What's to Be Done? is the literary embodiment of his theory of "reasonable egoism." This theory manifests itself in the world vision of the main characters in the novel - the new breed of people (новые люди) - the utilitarians and the rationalists - such as Lopukhov, Kirsanov and Vera Pavlovna. The most vivid illustration of Chernyshevsky's theory in action is, perhaps, to be found in the organization and principles of operation of Vera Pavlovna's seamstress' workshops in What's to Be Done?. The activities of the workshop's participants are based on the principle of personal profit, taught to them by Vera Pavlovna. In her address to the women-workers, she repeats almost exactly, but in a more eloquent manner, Chernyshevsky's ideas on the egoism of human nature expressed by the critic in his "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy." She preaches that people do bad things only because they do not realize their own interests. If people were enlightened as to their true personal interests, they would cease to do evil and become virtuous and noble, because they will realize that their best interests lie in their virtue. She states that no one would act against his best interest.

The essence of this theory is also expressed in Vera Pavlovna's "fourth dream", when she sees the Crystal Palace. The collective nature of both places --- the Crystal Palace and the seamstress' cooperative, along with the incentive to work for the workers' own advantage,

creates a type of new economic relationship which distinguishes socialism as a new form of society. In both places, however, there is very little left in terms of the individuality of each of the participants in such ventures. Individualism is overtaken by collective pragmatism, and individual will is suppressed by the pragmatic collective will. In other words, prosperity based on rational activities replaces the irrational, but independent will.

It is this utopian Crystal Palace, the concept of the "reasonable egoism", the idea of a collectively subdued society and suppressed individual will which Dostoevsky's Underground Man rebels against in his subterranean soliloquy in Part I of Notes from Underground.

Winter Notes on Summer Impressions is just a dress rehearsal for that grotesque rebellion.

In Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, Dostoevsky opposes, first of all, Chernyshevsky's approach to self - sacrifice, which he directly links with the question of subjugated will. The novelist argues that an act of self-sacrifice is the ultimate expression of higher moral qualities and, most importantly, it is the expression of free will. In one of the last chapters of his travel diary, "Опыт о буржуа," Dostoevsky writes: "самовольное, совершенно сознательное и никем не принужденное самопожертвование всего себя в пользу всех есть, по моему признак высочайшего развития личности, высочайшего ее могущества, высочайшего самообладания, высочайшей свободы собственной воли."²⁹ Here, Dostoevsky expresses one of his main moral postulates which was to remain present throughout his entire literary career --- the concept of unforced self - sacrifice for the benefit of others. This theme will be further developed into the idea of the equality of sin and guilt as first expressed in Tikhon's address to Stavrogin in The Possessed : "согрешив, каждый человек уже против всех согрешил и каждый человек хоть чем-нибудь в чужом грехе виноват," and

later in The Brothers Karamazov (1879), when father Zosima says that "everyone is as guilty as everyone else."³⁰

If, in his Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, Dostoevsky portrays will on the conscious, rational level (when he speaks of the conscious self-sacrifice or "совершенно сознательное . . . самопожертвование" which, at the same time is a sign of a high-degree self-control), a few pages later he expresses the idea of will based on the irrational impulse. He writes:

Но тут опять выходит загадка: кажется, уж совершенно гарантируют человека, обещаются кормить, поить его, работу ему доставить и за это требуют с него только самую капельку его личной свободы для общего блага. Нет, не хочет жить человек и на этих расчетах, ему и капелька тяжела. Ему все кажется сдуру, что это острог и что самому по себе лучше, потому - полная воля.³¹

In Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, we see only the rudiments of the Underground Man's manifestation of will. The idea is more fully developed in Notes from Underground. In effect, the irrationality of the Underground Man brings his expression of will close to that of Schopenhauer's. By the same token, the Underground Man's irrationality can best be understood in relation to Schopenhauerian will.

Frank describes Notes from Underground as a "magnificent satirical parody" of Chernyshevsky's What's to be Done? He argues that "whole sections of Dostoevsky's novella were conceived entirely as *parodies* of specific episodes in Chernyshevsky's book."³² This apparent intention of the novelist to lampoon his literary opponent predetermined not only the

general tone of the argument presented by the author of the Notes from Underground, which can be characterized as bitterly sarcastic, but, most importantly, predetermined the character of the Underground Man and the way he defends his postulates. In turn, the unbalanced, negative nature of the Underground Man's character, determined the extremity of his arguments, which at the height of the debate, cross the line between the rational and irrational. Already, in the opening paragraph of the Notes, we learn about the man's character: "Я человек больной... Я злой человек. Непривлекательный я человек."³³ Unattractive and bitter though he may be, he is also sincere and honest in revealing his identity, and consistent in presenting his argument. The passionate and, at times, astonishing presentation of his ideas leads one to conclude that this man truly believes in what he is saying. Already in chapter VII of the first part of the Notes from Underground, the hero presents one of the most consistent and extensive arguments of the entire work, entering the debate on the question of human nature, in which the issue of free will and individuality occupies the central place, and which predetermines the conclusion with regard to the will-reason relationship. He enters the polemic referring directly to Chernyshevsky's What's to be Done? and to the ideas preached by Vera Pavlovna to the female workers. It is as if he is asking her in a sarcastic, indeed, parody-like way: "Кто это первый объявил, кто первый провозгласил, что человек потому только делает пакости, что не знает настоящих своих интересов; а что если б его просветить, открыть ему глаза на его настоящие интересы, то человек тотчас же перестал бы делать пакости?"³⁴ And the Underground Man is answering himself, incidentally, calling Vera Pavlovna (and Chernyshevsky along with her), "a baby!" and "a clean, innocent child", presumably for the naiveté of their ideas. He implies that sometimes human profit consists of wishing something bad upon yourself --- something that is

not ultimately profitable. He says: " А что если так случится, что человеческая выгода иной раз не только может, но даже и должна именно в том состоять, чтоб в ином случае себе худого пожелать, а не выгодного?"³⁵

Here, the Underground Man, for the first time reveals his true irrational streak; who else, but an irrational being would wish him/herself something negative on purpose. In the opening paragraph of Notes, we find immediate proof of the application of his theory to his own life: " если я не лечусь, так это со злости. Печенка болит, так вот пускай же ее еще крепче болит! "³⁶ He willingly wishes himself bad health which appears to be totally unreasonable or irrational. So, on the one hand, the Underground Man is denying reason, by, for instance, wishing himself misery and misfortune (and this is the ultimate expression of his irrationality), while on the other hand, he is promoting will because, after all, he is doing it willingly.

Once the Underground Man formulates this thesis, everything else that follows expresses the same "irrational" idea, but in slightly different ---at times stronger terms. The Underground Man argues the point that man, despite all the advances of science to teach him his real interests, and despite the fact that, with time, he became more civilized and cultured, still has not learned how to behave in accordance with his reason and scientific knowledge. He argues that the new economic policies preached by modern social scientists, which would build the Crystal Palace, deny human will and caprice. He also argues that there is always one thing science does not and can not predict and calculate -- and that is the irrational nature of the human being, who wants, despite all disadvantages and potential misfortunes, to live according to his own will and not to his reason. Here, the Underground Man describes his vision of the ultimate irrational being:

Я нисколько не удивлюсь, если вдруг ни с того ни с сего среди всеобщего будущего благоразумия возникнет какой-нибудь джентельмен с неблагородной или, лучше сказать, с ретроградной и насмешливою физиономией, упрет руки в боки и скажет нам всем: а что, господа, не столкнуть ли нам все это благоразумие с одного разу, ногой, прахом, единственно с тою целью, чтоб все эти логарифмы отправились к черту и чтоб нам опять по своей глупой воле пожить!³⁷

Interestingly enough, this description, given by the Underground Man, matches his own psychological appearance and his "mocking physiognomy," (or the sarcastic tone) of his argument. In this passage, the Underground Man describes himself. But the point is that in propagating his irrational ideas and in presenting his irrational personality, the Underground Man establishes a remarkable relationship between human reason and will. Time and again he states that: , "человек, всегда и везде, кто бы он ни был, любил действовать так, как хотел, а вовсе не так, как повелевали ему разум и выгода; хотеть же можно и против собственной выгоды."³⁸ Thus, with regard to the relationship between will and intellect as it is seen by the Underground Man, will is paramount to intellect and reason.

At this point it becomes apparent that the Underground Man's philosophy regarding will resembles the philosophy of will expressed by Schopenhauer. In his analysis of Notes from Underground, Kirpotin indicates that: "«хотенье подпольного человека восходит к «воле» Шопенгауэра."³⁹ Indeed, the Underground Man's characterization of will parallels the characterization of will that is found in Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Yet, the most striking

similarity between Dostoevsky's "Underground philosophy" and Schopenhauer's "World as Will" is to be found in the writers' explanations of the relationship between will and intellect. Moreover, in both Dostoevsky's literary works and Schopenhauer's philosophical treatise, this question occupies the central role.

As has just been indicated, the Underground Man, during his debate with the utilitarian philosophers, comes to the conclusion that will in the human being is stronger than his reason or intellect. Schopenhauer, as a philosopher, also advocates the idea that will is superior to reason.

Schopenhauer begins his analysis by pointing out the mistake that philosophers, especially Christian philosophers before him, made. According to Schopenhauer, the mistake was that, in comparing man with beasts, they would identify that the difference between them lay in the difference between their intellects, and not in the difference between their wills. Thus, Schopenhauer concludes that "there arouses unconsciously within them an inclination to make the intellect the essential and principle thing, and even to explain volition as a mere function of the intellect."⁴⁰ The entire body of Schopenhauer's philosophy states the opposite, and he claims to be the first philosopher who placed "the true being of man not in the consciousness, but in will."⁴¹ In Chapter XIX, "On the Primacy of the Will in Self-Consciousness" of his World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer explains the relationship between will and intellect. He claims that, keeping his postulate in mind, we can do more "for the knowledge of the inner man than is to be found in many systematic psychologies."⁴²

The core idea of Schopenhauer's philosophy of will is will's primacy over intellect. The intellect, according to Schopenhauer, is, therefore, the "secondary phenomenon; the will is metaphysical, the intellect physical; - the intellect, like its objects, is merely phenomenal

appearance; the will alone is the thing in itself."⁴³ Moreover, in a metaphorical way, Schopenhauer describes the relationship between will and intellect as follows: "the will is the substance of man" while the intellect is only "the accident; the will is the matter, the intellect is the form."⁴⁴ With regard to this, Bryan Magee explains that there are "physical substances and bodies, a small number of which then develop minds as a subsidiary by product" of will.⁴⁵

Magee based this conclusion on Schopenhauer's hypothesis that the phenomenal world essentially consists of several levels of the objectification of will, where human bodies (as well as animal bodies) are the highest grades of will's objectification. Thus, first we have will's objectification in a physical body, and then this body develops its mind and character. This, in turn, shows that "will is decidedly not a function of mind."⁴⁶ Since will is superior to intellect, the former is in the position of controlling the latter. Time and again he argues that, "clearly the master here is the will, the servant the intellect for, in the last instance the will always keeps the upper hand, and therefore constitutes the true core, the inner being of man."⁴⁷ But in ascribing the leading role to the will, Schopenhauer does not diminish the meaning of intellect, even though it does come second in import. In fact, he indicates that intellect's most important function concerns itself with supplying motives to the will. Motives thus, "are the affair of the intellect."⁴⁸

The Underground Man's assertion that will in the human being is superior to reason, which remarkably coincides with the assertion of a similar nature made by Schopenhauer, can explain the irrationality of human nature, which is also promulgated and practiced by him. The irrationality of human nature, expressed by the Underground Man, is predetermined by the will's superior position with relation to reason. Time and again, the Underground Man declares that

people prefer to act in accordance with their will and not according to their reason, even though the outcome of such activity might harm them. This, in turn, could be explained by the irrational qualities of Schopenhauer's will and its primacy over reason. Schopenhauer's will is illogical, wild, unpredictable and most importantly, it manifests itself in the human being prior to reason. Thus, the irrationality of any person, as well as that of the Underground Man, could be explained from this point of view. We assume that the Underground Man was irrational and unreasonable *a priori* to his introduction into the novel and prior to his argument in defense of this point of view. By presenting such an argument, the Underground Man (and ultimately Dostoevsky as his creator) reaches an incredible depth of knowledge of human nature as well as paramount knowledge of himself as a phenomenon of irrational will's objectification.

Thus, Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky's similar manner of explaining the relationship between will and reason enables one to better understand the irrational nature of the Underground Man as well as the applicability of such a notion to the field of human psychology. It also establishes the similarity of approach toward certain philosophical issues as well as similarity of themes between Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer.

Moreover, thematic parallels between Schopenhauer's philosophy of will and Dostoevsky's fiction is not limited only to a similar explanation of the relationship between will and intellect. It is as strong and prominent in the discussion and expression of the theme of will-to-live as in the case discussed previously. As it has been stated previously, the aspect of suicide will serve the purpose of determining will-to-live's affirmation or denial in the literary character. Thus, prior to a discussion of the notion of the will-to-live in Dostoevsky's novels, it is

necessary to examine the aspect of suicide in both Dostoevsky's fiction and Schopenhauer's philosophical system.

IV. The Theme of Suicide in Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation and in Dostoevsky's Fictional Works.

The theme of suicide is prominent in both Schopenhauer's philosophy and Dostoevsky's fiction. Schopenhauer's reflections on the theme of suicide are consistent with his overall teaching about will. Moreover, the phenomenon of suicide receives an interesting explanation in relation to the notion of the will-to-live and life circumstances. Schopenhauer believes that a person who wants to commit suicide deep down really wants to live, in fact he wills life, but is tormented by great suffering caused by his life circumstances. Suffering from the unfavorable circumstances of life teaches him about voluntary self-denial.

The underlying principle of Schopenhauer's views on the nature of suicide has been developed and expressed by the philosopher prior to his discussion of the subject of suicide as such. We have already seen that, according to Schopenhauer, will as a thing in itself --- as reality itself, finds its ultimate objectification in physical bodies. Within these bodies, will assumes primacy over intellect. It is also within the physical body that will can undergo a drastic transformation. If the human body is indeed the objectification of the will, the voluntary denial of one's self (which could take the form of suicide), could lead to the denial of the will-to-live. With regard to this, the philosopher states:

Now if we consider the will-to-live as a whole and objectively, we have to think of it . . . as involved in a delusion. To return from this and hence, to deny its whole present endeavor, is what religions describe as self-denial and self renunciation, *abnegatio*

sui ipsius (the denial of one's own self); for the real self is the will-to-live. The moral virtues, hence justice and philanthropy . . . spring . . . from the fact that the will-to-live . . . recognizes itself again in all its phenomena; accordingly they are primarily a sign, a symptom, that the appearing will is no longer firmly held in that delusion, but the disillusionment already occurs. Thus it might be said figuratively that the will already flaps its wings in order to fly away from it "⁴⁹

With relation to this, special attention should be given to the emphasis Schopenhauer attributes to the role of the life circumstances of the suicidal person. Time and again, the philosopher points out that the suicidal person "wills life, wills the unchecked existence and affirmation of the body; but the combination of circumstances does not allow for these, and the result for him is great suffering."⁵⁰ Then, again the philosopher states that the suicidal person "wills life, and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on which it has come to him."⁵¹ Desperate life circumstances pull the person to the brink of the tragedy of self-destruction.

The theme of self-denial or denial of will-to-live through suicide can be discussed in relation to Dostoevsky's fictional characters. It is especially true because the theme of suicide is one of the most prominent themes in his fiction of the post-Siberian period. Moreover, Dostoevsky is considered to be a master of life circumstances' descriptions of desperate people, many of whom do, indeed, end up killing themselves.

Shneidman suggests that Dostoevsky uses suicide for the purpose of: "rendering a philosophical or ethical message and keeping the readers' attention on the subject of the narrative."⁵² Without totally denying this assertion, it seems to this writer, however, that

suicide as a literary device used by Dostoevsky in his novels is motivated by the basic tragic nature of his narrative. Early Dostoevsky critics such as Lev Shestov, Vyacheslav Ivanov and Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, have already pointed to the tragic nature of Dostoevsky's major novels. Merezhkovskii, for instance, state that: "главные произведения Достоевского, в сущности, вовсе не романы, не эпос, а трагедии."⁵³ This enabled later Dostoevsky critics to analyze his novels within the framework of the common tragedy-narrative, allowing for a new definition of Dostoevsky's novels as novel-tragedies. Konstantin Mochulsky is, perhaps, the champion of this analysis. In his extensive examination of Dostoevsky's fiction, Mochulsky writes: "The novel-tragedy is saturated with dramatic energy, contains countless potential for struggle and conflict. Not only is the whole tragic, but also each of its cells. All the dramatis personae, who take part in the common tragedy, simultaneously experience their own personal tragedies."⁵⁴

Suicide can easily become an integral part of the tragic narrative. Suicide intensifies the tragic effect the narrative is attempting to achieve; in fact, suicide, to a certain degree, predetermines the tragic nature of the narrative. On that basis, Mochulsky analyzes for instance, the "spiritual tragedy" of Stavrogin and the "religious tragedy" of Kirillov in The Possessed.⁵⁵ In both cases suicide is viewed by the critic as the inevitable and necessary conclusion to the narrative. Speaking of Stavrogin's tragedy, for instance, Mochulsky indicates that suicide is its final and inevitable act. The critic illustrates Stavrogin's feeble efforts at saving his life. The latter endeavors to do so by means of "heroic exploits" and intolerable burdens, each of which turns out to be a disaster. In this context Mochulsky states that: "The four "exploits" --- the four misdeeds (the first one being suffering from insults made by Shatov; the second is Stavrogin's misguided intention to announce his marriage to the cripple; the third exploit - he fires into the

air during his duel with Gaganov, leading to the insult of the latter; the fourth - his pompous intention to publish his confession) --- are the four acts of the mangod's tragedy. The fifth act is his suicide."⁵⁶ Very illustrative in this instance is the tragedy of Svidrigailov from Crime and Punishment. Svidrigailov, that "man who has outraged the inviolability of Mother-Earth and severed his ties with the human family", is a tragic personage from his very entry into the narrative.⁵⁷ He never experiences happiness, neither in his single life nor in his married life. His marriage turns into a nightmare due to the conditions under which it was arranged. His wife practically buys his body in return for his soul. This episode ends on a tragic note and there is great suspicion that Svidrigailov is to blame for her early departure. He is tormented by the gruesome crimes he committed in the past --- the servant Philip, who committed suicide after a confrontation with Svidrigailov, and about whom he tells Raskolnikov during their brief encounters, and the little girl of fourteen who committed suicide after an encounter with Svidrigailov, and who comes to Svidrigailov in his dream the night before his own death. It is as though the dead seek revenge on him; they keep reminding him of their destinies which resulted from his sick psyche. Remarkable is the fact that Svidrigailov kills himself just as some of his victims ended life on their own accord --- Philip hung himself, while the little girl from Svidrigailov's morbid dream drowned herself. The approach of Svidrigailov's tragic end is felt especially strongly the night before his death. Here, Dostoevsky uses the descriptive power of his "mystical realism" to create an atmosphere of tragic denouement. The final stroke is laid when Svidrigailov pulls the trigger. With the death of night comes the death of the dark person.

Moreover, suicide in Dostoevsky's fiction is directly connected to the theme of will.

Suicide serves the purpose of a device through which the dramatis personae manifest their

will-to-live or deny it. Ippolit from The Idiot, for instance, declares his free will which will also find its affirmation through suicide as his right to choose between life and death. Even though he is very limited in such choices by the very force of all powerful nature, he still can affirm his right to live for another three weeks or choose to die right away by means of suicide. This idea is very similar to the one expressed by Schopenhauer in his essay on suicide: "there is nothing in the world to which every man has a more unassailable title than to his own life and person."⁵⁸

No matter who commits suicide in Dostoevsky's fiction -- be it a man of some social prominence and financial security like Svidrigailov or Stavrogin, or a representative of the lower strata of Russian society, like "the meek one" (whose primary reason for suicide is the unhappy family life) -- all of them find themselves in great contradiction with the normal flow of life. Or, in Schopenhauer's words, they will live, but are "dissatisfied merely with the conditions on which it has come" to them.⁵⁹ Of course, the term "life conditions" is a broad one and might include a variety of factors which could be applicable only to a particular instance, such as desperate economic and social conditions (as in Raskolnikov's case), moral torment caused by a guilty conscience (as in Svidrigailov's and Stavrogin's respective cases), or a fatal disease and the loss of faith (as in Ippolit's case). It is, therefore, necessary to look at each case individually in order to be able to determine particulars of one's difficult life circumstances and conditions which might have tilted the decision between life and death.

V. The Analysis of Two Suicides in Crime and Punishment in Relation to Schopenhauer's Theory of the Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-live.

There are two major suicide cases in Crime and Punishment -- the contemplated suicide by Raskolnikov and the successful suicide by Svidrigailov. The fates of these two characters are closely intertwined in the narrative structure of the novel, which is especially evident as the novel approaches its conclusion. Svidrigailov thinks that there is a great number of similarities between him and Raskolnikov, when he tells him that they are "одного поля ягоды."⁶⁰ Mochulsky also identifies Svidrigailov as Raskolnikov's "double." The uniting force between these two characters is their past life: they have both committed crimes in the past, and from the moment Svidrigailov appears in the doorway of Raskolnikov's dwelling at the end of the third part, we learn a great deal about events that took place in the past. The lives of both of these characters are troubled by the recollections of recent events, and they both experience a great deal of moral torment due to their crimes. There is, however, a great difference between the two men, despite the fact that they are both criminals. This difference is in the nature of their crimes. Raskolnikov commits his crime out of intellectual conviction, or as Porfirii Petrovich labels it "according to a theory" -- "убил, двух убил, по теории."⁶¹ Svidrigailov, however, commits his crimes (about which we can only guess since he was not formally indicted or convicted) because of his perverted and idle character of which he is fully aware and he even admits it to Raskolnikov when he says: "Действительно, я человек развратный и праздный."⁶² His wife's death, which Raskolnikov and his sister Dunya accuse him of, is the last one of his presumed crimes before he puts an end to his own life. It is believed that Raskolnikov's contemplation of

suicide, as well as Svidrigailov's suicide, result from the moral lacerations and psychological torment experienced by both characters after the crimes they committed. Due to the differing natures of the crimes, predetermined by the difference in the life circumstances of Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, it is necessary to look at these two characters and their life circumstances immediately preceding the crime, separately .

The story of Svidrigailov's marriage and life in the countryside of which he tells Raskolnikov during one of their encounters, is of great importance with regard to the assessment of his crime and with regard to the understanding of the motives for his subsequent suicide. With regard to Raskolnikov's crime, which is disclosed to the reader in the opening chapters of the novel, it is important to analyze his theory of "superior" and "inferior" people, his vision of himself (in light of this theory) before and after the crime, and his character and moral lacerations after the crime, to be able to determine the motives which prompted him to a suicidal solution as well as the motives which prevented him from committing suicide. The determination of the motives of Raskolnikov's and Svidrigailov's suicides will, in turn, facilitate a conclusion regarding the nature of the two suicides in relation to the characters' will-to-live. The fundamental questions to answer will thus be -- Why does Raskolnikov not end his unbearable life voluntarily to avoid suffering, but does instead choose exile and suffering? Could it be that will-to-live overpowered his destructive impulse? And why did Svidrigailov shoot himself, even though he had better chances to survive than his "double" Raskolnikov? Does it make Svidrigailov a strong or a weak person, being that he had the strength, on his own accord, to cross the threshold between life and death? Or was it simply the strength of his weakness?

In Crime and Punishment, the crime, as such, is used by the novelist as a pretext to the discussion of the main theme -- the punishment. N. Natova suggests that the addition of the word "punishment" to the title of the novel, enables the novelist to explore not the criminal matters of the narrative, but the psychological state of mind of the person who committed that crime. With regard to this, Natova comments that: "там, где обычно опускается занавес детективной истории, Достоевский открывает новую перспективу и прослеживает отношение преступника к своему преступлению - существует ли для него раскаяние, сожалеет ли он о происшедшем, откроется ли перед ним путь к нравственному обновлению."⁶³

If, in Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky only modestly touches upon the complex problems of human nature, then with Crime and Punishment, "a new era begins --- that of "psychology."⁶⁴ Here, Dostoevsky very methodically explores the dark sides of human nature. The guinea-pig in this case is a young student of law from Petersburg. The novelist presents a full and complex psychological portrait of Raskolnikov. He briefly outlines his appearance in the opening passages of the novel only to return to it later, after the crime has been committed. The main focus is, therefore, on Raskolnikov's post-crime personality, even though some of his character traits are attributed to his personality before the crime. Thus, along with Raskolnikov's mother and sister, we learn from his only friend, Razumikhin, that Rodion:

угрюм, мрачен, надменен и горд; в последнее время (а может гораздо прежде) мнителен и ипохондрик. Велокодушен и добр. Чувств своих не любит высказывать и скорей жестокость сделает, чем словами выскажет сердце. Иногда . . . просто холоден и бесчувствен до бесчеловечия, право, точно в нем два противоположные

характера поочередно сменяются. Ужасно высоко себя ценит и, кажется, не без некоторого права на то.⁶⁵

Porfirii Petrovich boasts that he has explored Raskolnikov's character in minute detail and adds that the latter is a proud, powerful and impatient individual, emphasizing the adjective "impatient."⁶⁶ Raskolnikov's own mother, even though she doubts Razumikhin's assessment, does not have anything positive to add to her son's character assessment. On the contrary, she says that she could never trust his character, even when he was still a young boy of fifteen: "Его характеру я никогда не могла довериться, даже когда ему было только пятнадцать лет. Я уверена, что он и теперь вдруг что-нибудь может сделать с собой такое, чего не один человек никогда и не подумает сделать."⁶⁷ In fact, he does something to himself that nobody would even think of doing. He commits a senseless crime and his character, perhaps, had a lot to do not only with its theoretical justification, but also with its practical implementation. In this sense, his character, according to Schopenhauer, was a "necessary ... factor" of his action.⁶⁸ But his character alone, no matter how nasty or daring it can be, or how much it can effect his will, can not be blamed for the multitude of his misfortunes. In his frantic rage in front of Sonya Marmeladov, Raskolnikov opens up and reveals to her and to the reader, the moral and physical atmosphere of his life in the last two or three years, during which, incidentally, he perhaps acquired some of the negative traits of his character. It is this environment which can be considered to have contributed to both his theory about ordinary and extraordinary people, and the murder.

Raskolnikov's theory of superior and inferior people developed along with his desperation, strife and ever-increasing hatred toward people in the dark cell of his dwelling,

which looked more like a cupboard than a room -- "Каморка его находилась под самую кровлей высокого пятиэтажного дома и походила более на шкаф, чем на квартиру."⁶⁹ As Mochulsky aptly comments: "The violent idea of the crime could be born only in a narrow, low garret such as this."⁷⁰ Raskolnikov confesses to Sonya Marmeladov: "Да я озлился... Именно озлился (это слово хорошее!). Я тогда, как паук, к себе в угол забился. Ты ведь была в моей конуре, видела... А знаешь ли, Соня, что низкие потолки и тесные комнаты душу и ум теснят!"⁷¹ But, before mental strife, there was financial desperation and need because the question is --- if the immediate physical environment of his dwelling had such a negative influence on his psyche --- why would he stay in this room if he was not financially needy. The first thing we learn about Raskolnikov in the opening paragraph of the novel is that he is extremely poor. In only one phrase, Dostoevsky conveys to the reader the state of Raskolnikov's financial affairs -- "Он был раздавлен бедностью."⁷² He was so impoverished that he was not even paying any attention to his poverty anymore. But, the extreme poverty which happened to coincide with Raskolnikov's inquisitive intellect, eventually produced a monster. Nevertheless, Raskolnikov, first and foremost, is a victim of his environment. This assumption is given some legitimate support by the novelist himself through the words of Porfirii Petrovich, when the latter comments that: "«среда» многое в преступлении значит."⁷³ Porfirii Petrovich, more than anybody else in the novel, understands this problem and it deters him from implementing the regular treatment for Raskolnikov as a murder suspect and prompts him to offer the young man the best option he can in his position as the official state investigator, namely to voluntarily confess and thus redeem himself. Porfirii Petrovich urges Raskolnikov to accept suffering, which will be suffering leading the way to a new life. Mochulsky points out that already, in the

early drafts of the novel, Porfirii Petrovich was designated to preach "the philosophy of life," in which preference is given to life, even though it might be life in suffering.⁷⁴ Undoubtedly, this philosophy of life had a tremendous impact on the young man's fate.

Morally and physically down-trodden by his life circumstances, Raskolnikov is profoundly "dissatisfied with the conditions" (using Schopenhauer' parlance) on which life has come to him. He thinks up a theory and contemplates murder as an immediate solution to his financial strife and as a fast improvement to his situation. Even though in his conversation with Sonya he rejects his financial need as a prime crime motive, it can not be totally ruled out. During his trial, Raskolnikov confesses that one of the reasons for the murder was his "скверное положение, его нищета и беспомощность, желание упрочить первые шаги своей жизненной карьеры с помощью трех тысяч рублей, которые он рассчитывал найти у убитой."⁷⁵

Raskolnikov was dissatisfied with his life before the crime and he became even more dissatisfied with it afterwards. Speaking about Raskolnikov's meditations on planning a murder, Mochulsky points out one extraordinary detail about Raskolnikov being a "theorist." The critic writes: "He dreams of a practical deed though he is a theorist."⁷⁶ And, being only a theorist, Raskolnikov could not possibly foresee all practical consequences of the crime. He certainly could not foresee the tremendous moral lacerations which he would experience after the murder. Perhaps he would not have experienced such profound guilt and fear if it were not for the killing of the second sister -- Lizaveta, whom he was not planning to kill, but had to, in order not to be caught. There is so much regret and guilt in his words when he tells Sonya that he did not want to kill Lizaveta: "Он Лизавету эту... убить не хотел... Он ее... убил нечаянно... Он старуху

убить хотел... когда она была одна... и пришел... А тут вошла Лизавета... Он тут... и ее убил."⁷⁷

After Lizaveta's murder, Raskolnikov can not regain his composure because he realizes that he has killed an innocent person. If the old and wicked lady, Alyona, was the quintessence of all evil in the world in Raskolnikov's mind, and he identified her as the prime cause of his misfortune, then Lizaveta was quite the opposite. As Peace comments: "Even in the penal settlement he . . . maintains that it was no crime to kill Alyona; no mention is made of Elizaveta."⁷⁸ On the surface, Raskolnikov seems to be in total control, but in his heart and conscience, there is chaos and havoc caused by the tremendous impact Lizaveta's murder has on him. The feeling of guilt haunts him from the time he recovers from the initial shock a week after the murder. As Shneidman points out: "Although Raskolnikov appears to have no pangs of conscience for his crime on the rational level, subconsciously he is profoundly guilt-ridden."⁷⁹ His human nature does not feel the same way his mind does. Porfirii Petrovich very profoundly expresses what Raskolnikov did not want to admit to himself -- that his nature (*натура*) does not agree with his mind; his conscience does not agree with his theory and what came out of it -- "действительность и натура, сударь вы мой, есть важная вещь, и уж как иногда самый прозорливейший расчет подсекают! . . . солгал он бесподобно; а натуру-то и не сумел рассчитать."⁸⁰

In addition to the existing misfortunes, Raskolnikov comes to the realization that he failed to achieve what he was hoping to with his theory. This theory was the intellectual motive for the crime. Raskolnikov admits to Sonya Marmeladov that he went to kill not as an amateur, but as a learned person -- "И неужель ты думаешь, что я как дурак пошел, очертя голову? Я пошел

как умник, и это-то меня и сгубило!"⁸¹ He tells her that he knew exactly what he was doing, and that he was doing it also for the purpose of determining to what category of people he belonged -- superior or inferior, extraordinary or ordinary: "Мне надо было узнать тогда, и поскорей узнать, вошь ли я, как все, или человек? Смогу ли я переступить или не смогу?"⁸²

According to Raskolnikov's theory, all mankind is divided into people of exceptional values and rights - the movers of this world, and people of lower strata, whose only function is to sustain human reproduction. In the conversation skillfully orchestrated by Porfirii Petrovich, Raskolnikov conveys that: "«необыкновенный» человек имеет право . . . то есть не официальное право, а сам имеет право разрешить своей совести перешагнуть . . . через иные препятствия, и единственно в том только случае, если исполнение его идеи (иногда спасительной, может быть для всего человечества) того потребует."⁸³

To kill Alyona and thus, to cross that threshold and become a superior being, is Raskolnikov's goal and he fails to achieve it. In his conversation with Sonya, he finally admits to himself that he does not qualify for the position of a superior being and that he experiences profound regret as to what he has done: "Я хотел тебе только одно доказать: что черт-то меня тогда потащил, а уж после того мне объяснил, что не имел я права туда ходить, потому что я такая же точно вошь, как и все."⁸⁴

Morally and physically down-trodden by life circumstances, which are further aggravated by the murder and the subsequent realization of the failure to achieve the goals he hoped to, Raskolnikov, for a moment, cannot cope with the multitude of pressing problems and contemplates suicide. It is at this moment that we find him standing on the bridge, staring at Neva's water: "Взойдя на мост, он остановился у перил и стал смотреть в воду."⁸⁵ Later on,

Raskolnikov confesses to his sister Dunya that he wanted to jump into the river to avoid the shame which would fall upon him once the true identity of the murderer was revealed. He emphatically exclaims: "Да, чтоб избежать этого стыда, я и хотел утопиться, Дуня, но подумал уже стоя над водой, что если я считал себя до сих пор сильным, то пусть же я и стыда теперь не убоюсь."⁸⁶ He contemplates death, yet chooses life. Almost immediately, a profound change occurs within him. Standing on the same bridge where he witnessed Afrosinyushka's suicidal attempt, Raskolnikov casts aside all his doubts and emphatically exclaims: "Есть жизнь! Разве я сейчас не жил? Не умерла еще моя жизнь вместе с старую старухой! Царство ей небесное и - довольно, матушка, пора на покой! Царство рассудка и света теперь и... и воли, и силы."⁸⁷ Raskolnikov thus, makes a willful decision and excludes death as a solution to his problems. Schopenhauer's metaphysical will thus, does not find its affirmation in Raskolnikov's suicide, but it finds it in his ever strong "will-to-live." Schopenhauer writes that: "*will-to-live* is the only true description of the world's innermost nature. Everything presses and pushes toward *existence*, if possible toward *organic existence*, i.e. *life*. In animal nature, it then becomes obvious that *will-to-live* is the keynote of its being, --- its only unchangeable and unconditioned quality."⁸⁸ Schopenhauerian will-to-live finds its embodiment in Raskolnikov's decision not to kill himself.

Of course, in Raskolnikov's case it does not happen as easily as it would in some other person's circumstance. Raskolnikov goes through a profound change in his life before he finally comes to a positive resolution of his problems. First, after the murder, it is fear of prosecution for the crime that haunts him. He feels that his life is now threatened by the possibility of severe punishment which will be assigned by the authorities for committing a grave crime, which, in

turn may result in the death penalty or death in exile . Raskolnikov's realization of such a prospect is enhanced by his knowledge of law. Schopenhauer aptly expresses a psychological condition similar to Raskolnikov's when he states: "the entire inner nature of a living being thus threatened is at once transformed into the most desperate struggle against, and resistance to death."⁸⁹ The pressure of moral guilt, however, overpowers the fear of physical punishment. Yet, both factors contribute to his ephemeral idea to kill himself. By the same token, the fear of immediate death through suicide is stronger in Raskolnikov than the fear of criminal conviction and its repercussions. Thus, this fear of immediate death translates into affirmation of the instinct for self-preservation or the will-to-live. By choosing life, even though it would be life in suffering, Raskolnikov finds the true affirmation of the will-to-live, for life and "the body of man is already the objectivity of the will, as it appears at this grade and in this individual."⁹⁰ The instinct for self-preservation is much stronger in Raskolnikov than that of self-destruction.

Shneidman suggests that "it is probably his inner craving for life and his desire to survive at any price that save our hero from self-destruction."⁹¹ It appears, however, that any probability or uncertainty about the manifestation of the will-to-live in the human being or animal's nature, of which Raskolnikov is a good example, should be eliminated because, again, "*will-to-live* is the only true description of the world's innermost nature," and therefore human nature.⁹² Kirpotin's conclusion, in this writer's opinion, more aptly reflects the true nature of Raskolnikov's choice of life, and is closer to the expression of Schopenhauer's concept of will-to-live in the character of Raskolnikov. Kirpotin writes that: "Raskolnikov lives not for death, but for life, even more so for an idea, i.e., for life in general. Raskolnikov will not kill himself because he knows: death stops all relationship between existence and generations Raskolnikov does not consider

death as a final solution precisely because other people and their problems remain - life goes on."⁹³ Raskolnikov, so to speak, adopts Schopenhauerian reasoning with relation to life and death through suicide and deems suicide a useless and "a quite futile and foolish act."⁹⁴ It is remarkable that the first manifestation of the will-to-live is seen in Raskolnikov right after the incident with Marmeladov, who is run over by a horse. Raskolnikov witnesses the scene and assists his dying companion in being transported to his apartment. After Marmeladov passes away a few minutes later, Raskolnikov offers his wife, Katerina Ivanovna, twenty five rubles - all the money he has, to help her with the immediate expenses for the funeral services. And, as he is leaving Marmeladov's apartment, he suddenly experiences an influx of emotions, as if he has been given a new life: " Он сходил тихо, не торопясь, весь в лихорадке и, не сознавая того, полный одного, нового, необъяснимого ощущения вдруг прихлынувшей полной и могучей жизни. Это ощущение могло походить на ощущение проговоренного к смертной казни, которому вдруг и неожиданно объявляют прощение."⁹⁵

Explaining this sudden metamorphosis in Raskolnikov, the novelist asks the question: "Что же, однако, случилось такого особенного, что так перевернуло его? Да он и сам не знал; ему, как хватавшемуся за соломинку, вдруг показалось, что и ему 'можно жить, что есть еще жизнь, что не умерла его жизнь вместе с старою старухой'."⁹⁶ It is very likely that Raskolnikov felt good about himself because he did a good thing by helping the desperate Marmeladovs. But most of all, he felt useful again, and that gave him tremendous motivation for staying alive. It is as though Raskolnikov realizes that salvation is possible, and the possibility of it lies in being useful to others. Schopenhauer would perhaps describe Raskolnikov's emotional state of mind at this moment as "the boundless rejoicing after he has been saved."⁹⁷

By the same token, his first encounter with Sonya Marmeladov in the Marmeladovs' apartment shortly after the incident with Marmeladov-senior, gives Raskolnikov another unconscious impulse for life. Ellen Chances remarks that: "Raskolnikov, after rushing to Katerina Ivanóvna's aid when, incidentally, he encounters Sonya for the first time, senses life surging through his veins."⁹⁸ Thus, it is immediately after he leaves Marmeladov's apartment that he, once and for all, chooses life - "Есть жизнь! Разве я сейчас не жил?" - he emphatically exclaims, standing on the same bridge from which he saw a young woman plunging into the muddy waters of the Neva.⁹⁹ Twice since the murder, he confronts death -- first when he sees Efrosynushka's desperate attempt to kill herself, and then again when he sees the dying Marmeladov. But, paradoxically enough, the confrontation with death seems to have awakened in him the will-to-live. The duality of his personality indicated, for instance, by Peace, had perhaps, a lot to do with the affirmation of his will-to-live as well. We see only negative traits of his character in the analysis of his crime. But he is not entirely evil, precisely because there is a lot of good in him. Razumikhin, in his characterization of Raskolnikov's behavior, points out that he feels as if there are two opposing characters inside Raskolnikov alternating with one another. During Raskolnikov's trial, the positive side of his personality becomes more apparent, and it is his friend Razumikhin who confirms this by presenting to the court information and proof of how Raskolnikov was helping his poor friend who was dying of consumption during his stay at the University and how, after his friend's death, he was taking care of the latter's old parent. Raskolnikov's landlady, Madame Zarnitsina, also testifies how Raskolnikov, risking his life, saved two infants from a burning building.

On the other hand, another person who commits suicide in the novel (Svidrigailov) has no such will-to-live. In fact, he seems to be trying to flee life. His arrival to St. Petersburg serves as a metaphor for his escapist tendencies. As Shneidman points out: "the idea of escaping reality haunts him from the very first appearance on the pages of the novel."¹⁰⁰ Svidrigailov comes from a different social background and, therefore, the circumstances of his life are quite different from those of Raskolnikov. Svidrigailov and Raskolnikov, however, find themselves in a similar situation that of being murder suspects. Porfiry Petrovich suspects Raskolnikov of killing the two sisters, while Luzhin, Dunya and Raskolnikov suspect Svidrigailov of causing the death of his wife. But his wife was not his only victim. Shneidman points out that "Svidrigailov's act of violent self-destruction is preceded by the suicides of his alleged victims."¹⁰¹ It is these victims who haunt him from the very moment of his first appearance in the novel when he introduces himself to Raskolnikov. His wife's death leaves such a profound impression on him, that he becomes mentally ill. Even though there are no direct allegations of him being mentally ill, it is strongly implied. Raskolnikov notices it right away during their first encounter in the student's room: "' Это помешанный', - подумал Раскольников."¹⁰²

Svidrigailov is psychologically disturbed and he sees apparitions. His wife comes to him and talks to him about "some insignificant things." He tells Raskolnikov that his dead servant Fil'ka came around once. But, most importantly, the night before he kills himself, Svidrigailov sees a little girl who is perhaps the same girl that, according to Luzhin, Svidrigailov abused and drove to suicide. Svidrigailov's crime is so ignominious and despicable that the narrator can not refrain from interfering in order to prove Svidrigailov's guilt:

Свидригаилов знал эту девочку. Эта девочка была самоубийца - утопленница, ей было только четырнадцать лет, но это было уже разбитое сердце, и оно погубило себя, оскорбленное обидой, ужаснувшее и удивившее это молодое, детское сознание, залившее незаслуженным стыдом ее ангельски чистую душу и вырвавшее последний крик отчаяния, не услышанный, а нагло поруганный в темную ночь, во мраке, в холоде.¹⁰³

The entire night preceding Svidrigailov's suicide is very characteristic of his attempts to escape reality. He plunges into the underworld of debauchery and perversion, drinking heavily himself, and giving drinks to others: "Весь этот вечер он провел по разным трактирам и клоакам, переходя из одного в другой."¹⁰⁴ He was indeed a man lost from life, and he had a vivid understanding of this himself. Raskolnikov senses the same determination and purpose which Svidrigailov reveals during their first conversation: "Раскольникову явно было, что это на что-то твердо решившийся человек и себе на уме."¹⁰⁵ Svidrigailov has only one hope that would make it possible for him to survive, and that hope rests with Raskolnikov's sister Dunya. Peace suggests that Svidrigailov is in love with Dunya and "is determined to pursue her through all the means within his power. He attempts bribery, blackmail, and in a last resort, violence."¹⁰⁶ Dunya, who was at first sympathetic with "the lost man" Svidrigailov, in the end rejects his advances because she realizes that she may have been the indirect reason for Svidrigailov's wife's death. It may have occurred to Dunya that Svidrigailov facilitated his wife's death only to free himself and thus become available for her. Once rejected by Dunya during their violent encounter, in the course of which she tries to shoot him, Svidrigailov seems to be "a changed

man."¹⁰⁷ Having lost his last hope in life, Svidrigailov grows quite conscious about his self-worthlessness. Life becomes totally meaningless to him while he becomes totally meaningless to life. He does not make any visible attempts to cling to life because he evidently "no longer takes any interest in his individual phenomenon."¹⁰⁸

Even though Svidrigailov is totally indifferent to his own life, he, at the same time, is not entirely indifferent to the lives of other people. It is especially evident before his suicide. The paradox of Svidrigailov's indifferent attitude toward other people can also be explained with relation to Schopenhauer's notion of the disappearing will-to-live. Schopenhauer identifies moral virtues, such as justice and philanthropy, as symptoms of the disappearance of the will-to-live in individual phenomenon. The philosopher writes:

The moral virtues, hence justice and philanthropy . . . spring . . . from the fact that the will-to-live . . . recognizes itself again in all its phenomena; accordingly they are primarily a sign, a symptom, that the appearing will is no longer firmly held in that delusion, but the disillusionment already occurs. Thus it might be said figuratively that the will already flaps its wings in order to fly away from it. ¹⁰⁹

This remarkable provision is certainly true with relation to Svidrigailov. Dostoevsky clearly shows the latter's altruistic tendencies which are equal to those moral virtues that are identified by Schopenhauer. In effect, Svidrigailov is both just and reveals a great deal of philanthropy which he shows through the uncharacteristic good deeds he manages to perform before his suicide. In this context Jesse Clardy notes: "Svidrigailov does possess within himself, especially toward the end of his life, that quality of appreciative perception or understanding of

another human being that makes his existence not at all superfluous."¹¹⁰ Indeed, Svidrigailov is oftentimes kind toward people around him. His philanthropic intentions result in helping the children of the Marmeladov family by financially securing their upbringing. He also has the intention of helping Dunya Raskolnikov by again, offering her a substantial sum of money. But the feeling that the reader gets from these deeds is similar to what one feels when a person gives away everything before he endeavors a final step --- be it a trip abroad with no prospects of returning back or the choice of voluntary death. So, in fact, Svidrigailov's final step is preceded by his philanthropic deeds, which only testifies to the disappearance of his will-to-live.

Vladimir Chizh suggests that for Svidrigailov, "there are no desires, no interests, nothing in the future."¹¹¹ The critic concludes that the only possible solution to an idle person like Svidrigailov, whose life does not have any meaning, is suicide. The will-to-live has been dealt a severe blow in Svidrigailov's instance, or, as Schopenhauer expresses it: "in him knowledge has, so to speak, burnt up and consumed the will, so that there is no longer any will, any keen desire for individual existence, left in him."¹¹²

In conclusion, it is possible to suggest that the impulse for self-destruction and self-harm was an intrinsic facet of Svidrigailov's character. His whole life, or at least what is known about his life from the narrative, seems to be one long streak of self-victimization, starting with his post-jail marriage, and culminating in his suicide. It is perhaps not surprising then, that Peace comes to the paradoxical conclusion that Svidrigailov was "*both* monster and victim, *both* oppressor and oppressed."¹¹³ Indeed, Svidrigailov did cause a lot of suffering to the people that surrounded him. Yet, he too suffered tremendously. This is one of the facets of the dichotomy of his personality.

Dostoevsky clearly shows that Svidrigailov does not feel a will to live when he was on the verge of suicide (as it was certainly apparent in Raskolnikov's case). In fact, by presenting Svidrigailov's dual personality of being "both monster and victim" and by revealing the complex circumstances of his existence, Dostoevsky portrays the latter's strong dissatisfaction with his life, which indeed caused him great suffering and led him to a suicidal solution and self-denial.

VI. Ippolit's Attempted Suicide in The Idiot as a Manifestation of Will-to-live.

Even though there are plenty of fatal incidents in The Idiot, Ippolit's attempted suicide is, perhaps, one of the most interesting and philosophically challenging. Indeed, Ippolit Terent'ev presents a rather extraordinary case that had not yet been encountered in Dostoevsky's fiction. Philosophically, Ippolit's character can be compared to that of the Underground Man and Raskolnikov. It is especially evident from his "Explanation," where he is portrayed as a thinking type, a man who casts himself away in his room where, while looking at the "Meyer's wall", he contemplates life and death, good and evil. Peace points out that the similarities between Ippolit and the Underground Man are apparent in the "confessional style" of Ippolit's "Explanation" and of Notes from Underground.¹¹⁴ But more importantly, the critic writes that both Ippolit and the Underground Man "are rebels; both rail against the laws of nature; both refuse to submit."¹¹⁵

Yet, Ippolit is very different from the Underground Man and Raskolnikov because he is a very sick man; he is a person condemned by consumption, who is given hardly more than three weeks to live. This fact not only contrasts Ippolit with other Dostoevsky characters, but more importantly, gives his philosophical views a new dimension and a profound depth with relation to the questions of human psychology. Structurally, his entire literary image is built by the novelist around the circumstance of his incurable and fatal disease. If the premise of his illness were to be taken away, then along with it would go the authenticity of his situation and the snide and precise nature of his judgments. That, in turn, would diminish the relevance of his role in terms of the definition of the main protagonist in the novel - prince Myshkin. Moreover, it

appears that Ippolit's illness is the prime reason for his suicide attempt, and by the same token, it, again, is his illness that makes him, more than ever before, cling to life.

In his "Explanation," with the peculiar epigraph, "Après moi le déluge," Ippolit indicates that he decided to part with life not as a result of a logical conclusion, but because of what he calls his "final conviction" or "последнее убеждение."¹¹⁶ He decipheres the meaning of his final conviction after a long elucidation of how he has arrived at it in the first place. The core idea of his final conviction is that he grew to abhor his life in the form that it was presented to him during the last several months of it. He despises his life and, (again using Schopenhauerian parlance) can not accept "the conditions on which it has come to him."¹¹⁷ He acknowledges: "Если бы я имел власть не родиться, то наверно не принял бы существования на таких насмешливых условиях."¹¹⁸ Ippolit testifies to all the people who gather for prince Myshkin's birthday:

Вот этот особенный случай, который я так подробно описал, и был причиной, что я совершенно «решился». Окончательному решению способствовала, стало быть, не логика, не логическое убеждение, а отвращение. Нельзя оставаться в жизни, которая принимает такие странные, обижающие меня формы. Это привидение меня унизило. Я не в силах подчиняться темной силе, принимающей вид тарангула.¹¹⁹

Ippolit, apparently, feels offended and degraded by the apparition he sees in his half-real, half-delusional dream. He refers to the "special case" which triggered his decision to kill himself.

This "special case" is actually a series of events which Ippolit describes in his testimony -- the picture of the dead Christ in Rogozhin's cemetery-like house, the dream about the tarantula, and the apparition of Rogozhin himself. In this connection, Mochulsky points out that: "Ippolit's thoughts about death are inspired by Rogozhin. In *his* house he sees Holbein's picture; *his* phantom compelled the consumptive to decide to commit suicide."¹²⁰ Similarly, Shneidman writes that: "the picture of Christ at Rogozhin's and the symbolic dreams of the scorpion and the tarantula merge into one and cause Ippolit to finally make up his mind."¹²¹ But it appears that the three incidents were only the initial causes for his contempt toward his life because it is ultimately his life, which assumes such grotesque, strange and at the same time offensive shapes, that he is angry with. It is his diseased life which he despises and blames for his decisive step toward death. The night visions play, metaphorically speaking, the role of the final straw, yet his dissatisfaction with life and inclination toward its termination are evident much earlier, before he sees Holbein's picture, the monstrous tarantula and the ghost of Rogozhin. Particularly, the episode of Ippolit's night rendezvous with his friend Bakhmutov comes to mind. After a long conversation on the subject of "a single donation," Bakhmutov, with characteristic straightforwardness, reminds Ippolit of his life which is corrupted by consumption. Standing on a bridge, leaning on the rail and looking in the water of the Neva River, Ippolit immediately responds in a mysterious way (as if some thought has come to his mind): "А знаете ли, что мне пришло в голову, - сказал я, нагнувшись еще более над перилами. - Неужто броситься в воду? - вскричал Бахмутов чуть не в испуге. Может быть он прочел мою мысль в моем лице."¹²² Ippolit contemplates jumping into the river, but for the moment, gives up this idea.

Yet, this incident clearly shows his suicidal inclinations which have a direct relationship to his illness.

Ippolit's contempt for his consumptive life turns into the detestation of nature and its laws, because Ippolit considers himself to be "condemned by nature."¹²³ He despises nature not only because he has three weeks of life left - after all, he got used to living with a fatal disease - but he can not accept the humiliation caused by nature in the form of his disease, which becomes more and more grotesque. He can not submit to his inability to fight back against that "huge devise of modern design" --- nature, and does not reconcile with the fact that nature deprives him of the chance to die in peace. This is the essence of his rebellion. His apparitions and nightmares cause him a great deal of mental pain; while at the same time, his illness causes him tremendous physical suffering. He, however, would not mind all the physical pain in the world, poverty, or any kind of suffering if only he were healthy. Ippolit confesses:

О, как я мечтал тогда, как желал, как нарочно желал, чтобы меня, восемнадцатилетнего, едва одетого, едва прикрытого, выгнали вдруг на улицу и оставили совершенно одного, без квартиры, без работы, без куска хлеба, без родственников, без единого знакомого человека в огромнейшем городе, голодного, прибитого (тем лучше!), но здорового, и тут-то бы я показал¹²⁴

Ippolit is angry at people who have so much life in them, and, at the same time, do not know how to live it properly; who do not appreciate life and do not treasure it. He emphatically exclaims: "Я не понимал, например, как эти люди, имея столько жизни, не умеют сделаться богачами. Я знал одного бедняка, про которого мне потом рассказывали, что он умер с голоду, и, помню, это вывело меня из себя: если бы можно было этого бедняка оживить, я

бы, кажется, казнил его."¹²⁵ This remark of Ippolit's instantaneously reminds one of Netochka Nezvanova's father, Egorov, who not only has a healthy life given to him, but also talent, and whose death and inability to live is solely of his own doing. Ippolit is enraged with this type of person because he, himself, is "acutely aware of the value of time - the value of life itself."¹²⁶ Ippolit is outraged by the fact that he is denied life, that he is excluded from that "endless feast" of life - "Этот пир, которому нет конца, начал с того, что одного меня счел за лишнего."¹²⁷ But, paradoxically, regardless of how much life is left for him (sixty years or three weeks), Ippolit recognizes his ultimate right to life. He has the right to choose, even with very few options, how to manage his life; that is, either to continue to live for however long is left for him, or to die on his own accord, instantaneously. This can, perhaps, be explained in terms of what Peace calls the "theory of the triumph of rights," (with which, according to Mrs. Yepanchin, the younger people like Ippolit and Burdovsky are obsessed, and according to which everyone looks only for his own right), which is first introduced by the novelist in the second part of the novel with the appearance of "a company of extortionists" - Burdovsky, Keller and Ippolit Terent'ev.¹²⁸ Peace's assumption with regard to that "theory of the triumph of rights," of course, is very legitimate. It appears, however, that the approach (introduced by Schopenhauer in his essay on suicide), according to which "there is nothing in the world to which every man has a more unassailable title than to his own life and person," would better express person's inalienable right to his or her life.¹²⁹ Ippolit's right to his life, which he claims through an act of self-annihilation, could, therefore, be explained in a similar fashion. Ippolit expresses this in a manner similar to Schopenhauer's, when he says: "Я еще понимаю, что если б я в цвете здоровья и сил посягнул на мою жизнь, которая могла бы быть полезна моему ближнему".

. то нравственность могла бы еще упрекнуть меня, по старой рутине, за то , что я распорядился моею жизнью без спросу Но теперь. . . когда мне уже прочитан срок приговора?"¹³⁰

In his "Explanation," Ippolit elucidates on the subject of life and particularly life in humility as it is preached by the Christian faith. It appears that he addresses his plea to the guests gathered around on the deck of Prince Myshkin's summer house. But at the same time, it feels as if he has another invisible listener, whom he does not dare to obliterate completely, even though he does not truly believe in His existence either. At any rate, Ippolit openly confronts the Divine, and with his quasi-naive intonation, asks: "Неужели там и в самом деле кто-нибудь обидится тем, что я не хочу подождать двух недель? Не верю я этому."¹³¹ This question, if it were rephrased into a statement, would express Ippolit's right to his own life, at least in its earthly form, and would sound like this: "I do not want to wait another two weeks, but I want to stop my life now, because I have the right to do what I want with my life, even if somebody out there would be displeased with my decision." That is why he sees the act of suicide as an act of free will --- of will with its psychological overtones of being a function of the human psyche which is able to control and direct one's behavior, or will as volition that "involves setting up a conscious aim and working toward this goal by purposive activity."¹³² Because ultimately, in Ippolit's situation, it comes down to the question of the control of his actions and conscious decision-making, both of which are slowly being taken away from him by his illness.

By the same token, his free will, which Ippolit wants to express through an act of self-annihilation, is not necessarily free. According to Schopenhauer's theory of free will, and in this

case, Ippolit's free will, is restricted by his character, as well as by his motives, which are the thoughts that every man "carries around in his head."¹³³

Ippolit's thoughts at the moment he enters the novel are concentrated on the subject of his health and approaching demise. He is naturally preoccupied with them because there is little else for a person in his position think about. From that preoccupation comes the realization that his premature death though unfair, is inevitable, and this, in turn gives way to his bitterness toward everything that possesses some form of life. Dostoevsky metaphorically describes life as the "carnival" (карнавал) of nature, in which there is no longer any place for Ippolit.¹³⁴ Therefore, Ippolit's decision to kill himself also comes from thoughts about his rapidly approaching end. By the same token, in the end, Ippolit's inability to commit suicide can be explained by the fact that his free will to carry out the act of self-destruction is restricted by the motivation for self-preservation, thus making it impossible for him to perform the act.

Ippolit's extraordinary assertion of his right to live another three or four weeks or to die by means of suicide, comes as a part of his overall rebellion against nature and the Divine. By the same token, his disbelief in religion is also part of his rebellion. Mochulsky defines Ippolit's religious credo as follows: "Ippolit is not an atheist; however, his faith is not Christian, but *philosophical*."¹³⁵ His philosophical faith could bring his religious credo close to that of an agnostic, or a person who believes that "the existence of any ultimate reality (as God) is unknown and probably unknowable."¹³⁶ For Ippolit, the world of God is the world of "higher will" and providence, and he acknowledges that, perhaps, the present world was created in accordance with the dictate of that "higher will." At the same time, he acknowledges that a human being is not destined to perceive providence and everything that goes with it. Due to his

disease, Ippolit actually despises this world created by the higher will, and is extremely jealous of it and its creations. The narrator explains Ippolit's state of mind at the moment of the reading of his "Explanation" as follows: "Есть в крайних случаях та степень последней цинической откровенности, когда нервный человек, раздраженный и выведенный из себя, не боится уже ничего и готов хоть на всякий скандал, даже рад ему; бросается на людей."¹³⁷ It is with the same cynical sincerity that Ippolit addresses and, at the same time rejects the world of God. He thinks of God's world, where people are sacrificed for the sake of the overall harmony, as impossible and unfair. Thus, Ippolit refuses to sacrifice his own life. He emphatically exclaims that: "Как хотите, но все это невозможно и несправедливо."¹³⁸

This world is not fair to him just as it was not fair even to "the greatest and most priceless being" - Christ.¹³⁹ This is the conclusion that Ippolit draws after seeing Holbein's picture at Rogozhin's. He says in his "Explanation": "Картиной этою как будто именно выражается это понятие о темной, наглой, и бессмысленно-вечной силе, которой все подчинено, ... которая бессмысленно захватила, раздробила и поглотила в себя, глухо и бесчувственно, великое и бесценное существо."¹⁴⁰ Ippolit's agnostic faith is similar to that of Ivan Karamazov, who "does not reject God but refuses to accept God's world."¹⁴¹

Ippolit can no longer endure the mental and physical suffering caused by the disease (with all of its implications --- the offence he takes from his grotesque dreams, which he has no way of controlling; the desperation of a sick person) and, for the second time, contemplates suicide. This time, however, he is more determined than ever before. He is a nervous wreck, irritated and outraged, not afraid of anything any longer and ready for any sort of scandal, even a publicly committed suicide. In this sense, Ippolit's state of mind at the time of the reading of his

"Explanation," and his attempt to kill himself immediately after the reading, is reminiscent to that of Raskolnikov during the latter's last meeting with Porfirii. The latter, with his characteristic psychological perceptiveness, tells the former: "Негодование в вас уж очень сильно кипит-с, благородное-с, от полученных обид, сперва от судьбы, а потом от квартальных, вот вы и мечетесь туда и сюда, чтобы так сказать, поскорее заговорить всех заставить . . . потому что надоели вам эти глупости . . ." ¹⁴² Ippolit, like Raskolnikov, is also outraged by the unfairness of his situation; he is offended by "fate" and the people around him (perhaps simply because he is fatally ill and they are not). He also wants to talk to people to share his thoughts and to have human contact, which he, in fact, did so loquaciously in his "Explanation." He is also, like Raskolnikov, "sick of all that nonsense" that is life in which both of them encounter a lot of suffering. Interestingly enough, Ippolit, for a moment, also contemplates a murder - "что если бы мне вдруг вздумалось теперь убить кого угодно, хоть десять человек разом, или сделать что-нибудь самое ужасное, что только считается самым ужасным на этом свете." ¹⁴³ But instead he prefers to kill himself.

With all his reasoning and determination to end his life, expressed by him in his "Explanation" and in post-"Explanation" frantic conversations with the people at Prince Myshkin's summer house, Ippolit does not die. The official resolution of his suicide attempt, orchestrated by the novelist, causes much controversy among those present at the scene because they ask themselves --- why Ippolit forgot to load a firing cap in his pistol, and thus mismanaged his suicide attempt and turned it into a "painful farce?" ¹⁴⁴ Prince Myshkin, in his conversation with Aglaya Epanchin, suggests that there was no trick on Ippolit's part, and that he really wanted to kill himself. Ippolit also tries to convince the audience that it happened by accident--- that he

"совсем печаянно," or unintentionally, forgot to load the firing cap.¹⁴⁵ His friends do, perhaps, believe him, but the same can not be said about his enemies. Regardless of the reasons for it, the failure to kill himself suggests one thing -- that Ippolit does not really want to die. Indeed, he is afraid of death. As Aleksander Zweers points out ". . . fear of death is the real cause of Ippolit's forgetfulness."¹⁴⁶ Ippolit will not die no matter what, at least not by his own accord. Even being fatally ill, he "still clings to life;" he indeed wills life, the same way Schopenhauer's suicidal being desperately wills life.¹⁴⁷ Ippolit, like Raskolnikov, would agree to live regardless of the circumstances, even if he had to do it on a tiny inch of space -- "на аршинное пространства."¹⁴⁸ To cling to life, to will life is thus only a natural way of affirming Schopenhauer's will-to-live which is, in this instance, manifested even in a sickly individual like Ippolit.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that Ippolit's desire for self-destruction was defeated by his enormous instinct to live or, possibly, by his fear of death. It appears that his very illness has a lot to do with it. It is his rapidly progressing tuberculosis that makes him "press and push towards existence, if possible toward *organic existence*, i.e. *life*."¹⁴⁹ Throughout his "Explanation," Ippolit makes it clear that he does not accept God's world, even though he does not totally deny providence and life after death. He is also extremely critical of Myshkin's philosophy of salvation "through the ecstatic love of life."¹⁵⁰ At any rate, Ippolit's spiritual or religious existence, i.e. the belief in life after death or, for that matter, any kind of strong religious belief, is highly improbable, which leaves him with only what he loves the most -- that is, organic existence -- life on earth. At the beginning of his "Explanation," the first thing mentioned by Ippolit is his desire to live. He is already at the stage when he knows that his illness

is incurable, and that he will die in a couple of weeks. But, the more he realizes that fact, the more hungry for life he becomes. He says: " Я положительно знал, что у меня чахотка, и неизлечимая; я не обманывал себя и понимал дело ясно. Но чем яснее я его понимал, тем судорожнее мне хотелось жить; я цеплялся за жизнь и хотел жить во что бы то ни стало. . . я действительно начинал жить, зная, что мне уже нельзя начинать."¹⁵¹

Mochulsky, suggesting that Ippolit passionately loves life, identifies his existential credo, which consists in his belief that what really matters in this life for any person, and for Ippolit in particular, is first and only life itself - "Дело в жизни, в одной жизни, - в открывании ее, непрерывном и вечном, а совсем не в открытии."¹⁵² Similarly to Raskolnikov, Ippolit manifests his will-to-live first through the denial of the suicidal solution and second, through the assertion of his right to life.

VII. Stavrogin's Suicide in The Possessed .

Without any doubt, The Possessed is one of the most profound of Dostoevsky's novel-tragedies. Even The Brothers Karamazov can hardly surpass it in terms of the intensity and multitude of the tragic destinies of the people involved in the action portrayed by the novelist.

Originally intended to be a "pamphlet novel" directed against the revolutionaries" of the time, The Possessed, in its final version, is for the most part, devoted to the portrayal of a personal tragedy.¹⁵³ Edward Wasiolek denies that Dostoevsky was a "political *ingénue*," yet is of the opinion that the novelist was indifferent and sometimes ignorant as far as the diversity of political theories and views in Russia at the time were concerned.¹⁵⁴ The critic describes The Possessed as a novel "with a biased political point of view, an unfair assessment of the political and social movements of the sixties and seventies" and as a novel that "has its share of ignorance, spite, and cruelty."¹⁵⁵ But at the same time, it is "one of the world's great novels," primarily due to the presence of such protagonists as Kirillov, Stavrogin, Stepan Verkhovensky and others.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, Dostoevsky's reputation as a political commentator yields to that of a great psychologist.

According to some accounts, Dostoevsky "anticipated the methodology which would come to be known as "psycho-analysis."¹⁵⁷ Small wonder then, that Freud himself devoted considerable attention to the study of Dostoevsky's fiction with relation to the psychological explorations performed by the Russian novelist. The Possessed , thus, is a remarkable novel not only in relation to the portrayal of tragic figures or tragic occurrences, but most importantly, because of the portrayal of the psychology of personal tragedy. By and large, it is the inner

world of the dramatis personae that Dostoevsky focuses on. Hence, it is always people who are on the forefront of his narration and not events. Descriptions of events and places are oftentimes very marginal and play only a secondary role. Descriptions of that nature are used by the novelist for the purpose of a more detailed and complete portrayal of the hero's personality. As Mochulsky remarks: "He (Dostoevsky) knows only man, his world and his fate. The hero's personality appears as the axis of composition: around it the dramatis personae are distributed and the plot is constructed."¹⁵⁸

With regard to The Possessed, it is undoubtedly the character of Nicholas Stavrogin which occupies the central role in the novel. In the preliminary drafts for his new novel, Dostoevsky writes: "ВЫХОДИТ так, что главный герой романа КНЯЗЬ."¹⁵⁹ Stavrogin's demonic presence carries not only structural significance as far as the development of the narrative's plot is concerned, but, most importantly because of the presentation of the singularly interesting psychological portrait. As Mochulsky comments: "the whole novel is the fate of Stavrogin alone, everything is about him and everything is for him."¹⁶⁰ However, the tragic fate of Stavrogin can hardly be perceived in its entirety without rendering some attention to the minor characters, such as Kirillov, Shatov, Verkhovensky, Darya and many others. These characters provide valuable information as to the circumstances of Stavrogin's lifestyle, his unusual personality, and behavior. For the purpose of this analysis, it will be necessary to take into consideration Stavrogin's relationship with Darya Shatov (Shatov's sister and a former student of Stepan Verkhovensky, who lives with Stavrogin's mother as her favorite ward), and especially his last letter to her shortly before his suicide.

It also appears that, with relation to the unfortunate denouement of Stavrogin's life --- his suicide, the chapter, "At Tikhon's," which was initially omitted by the novelist from the main body of the novel, is of utmost importance. This chapter, by virtue of Stavrogin's confession which is incorporated in it, single-handedly provides a great deal of material related to the hero's past, from which we learn about his personality, relationships and his preposterous crimes.

Literary critics are divided as to the importance of the excluded chapter in the development of the plot. Some argue that if it had been included in the novel from the very beginning, it would have altered the development of the plot, and eventually would have made Stavrogin's suicide redundant. Shneidman, for instance, writes: ". . . had Dostoevsky been permitted to include the chapter, "At Tikhon's" in the serial publication of the novel, the future development of the plot could have been considerably different to what we have now."¹⁶¹ This, however, is a surprising attitude which treats the chapter in question as non-existent, as if it had never been written. It should be noted that Dostoevsky excluded this chapter from the main body of the novel not because he thought that it did not belong to the novel thematically. The exclusion occurred due to his publisher's fear of a possible confrontation with censors.

On the other hand, Peace's treatment of this problem seems to be more realistic; he argues that the exclusion of the chapter, "At Tikhon's", "not only disturbs the balance of the novel, it also withholds essential information about Stavrogin."¹⁶² By way of thought-reverser, this chapter also contains a lot of information about Stavrogin, especially with relation to his crimes and moral suffering. Moreover, the mystery of his personality which is only apparent to a limited extent in the main body of the text, is taken away from him by means of his confession, revealing his true and frightening nature. Mochulsky, who does not even question the importance

of the omitted chapter to the understanding of Stavrogin's personality, comments: "Tikhon has torn from the pretender (Stavrogin) the pompous mantle of Ivan the Tsarevich, the mask of demonic beauty."¹⁶³ The exclusion of this chapter from analytical consideration thus, would substantially diminish the wealth of Stavrogin's psychological profile and the understanding of the reasons for his suicide. In effect, this chapter presents a logical link between his suicide and his crimes.

Therefore, an analysis of Stavrogin's enigmatic personality serves to outline the internal reasons for his criminal tendencies and his suicide. At the same time, his crimes, some of which are mentioned in the confession as well as in the main text of the novel, and the psychological effect they have on Stavrogin, provide a further understanding of the internal causes of his tragic end. Therefore, traits of Stavrogin's personality will be examined from the moment he is introduced in the novel by the chronicler of the events in Chapter Two, "Prince Harry. Engagement." Here, such elements of Stavrogin's character as indifference, weariness of life, and boredom, will be taken into account. Then, it will be necessary to refer to the chapter, "At Tikhon's," in order to increase the understanding of Stavrogin's personality, and to make specific references to the feeling of guilt and remorse for his crimes that he shows during the reading of his confession. It will be argued that his feelings of guilt, combined with the peculiarity of his moral character, his religious disbelief, loss of national identity, and loss of purpose in life, have substantially contributed to his self-annihilation, self-denial and the denial of the will-to-live.

Shneidman points to the fact that "Stavrogin has come into *The Possessed* from the drafts of *The Life of a Great Sinner*."¹⁶⁴ In his letter to Maikov, Dostoevsky presents a brief outline of

the main protagonist of his future novel: "13-летний мальчик, участвовавший в совершении уголовного преступления, развитой и развращенный (я этот тип знаю), будущий герой всего романа, посажен в монастырь родителями... для обучения."¹⁶⁵ Thus, Stavrogin's first appearance in *The Possessed* occurs at approximately the same age --- he was actually eight when Stepan Verkhovensky was first appointed to be his tutor. Needless to say, Stavrogin comes from a moneyed stratum of Russian society. He is a real aristocrat or "ужасный аристократ" as Pyotr Verkhovensky enviously labels him.¹⁶⁶ It appears that Stepan Verkhovensky is the first male figure to have a profound and largely negative influence on young Stavrogin. The narrator points out the presence of a significant trait in Stavrogin's forming personality -- that of weariness -- when he talks about Verkhovensky's influence on the young aristocrat:

Надо думать, что педагог несколько расстроил нервы своего воспитанника.

Когда его, по шестнадцатому году, повезли в лицей, то он был тщедушен и бледен, странно тих и задумчив. Степан Трофимович сумел дотронуться в сердце своего друга до глубочайших струн и вызвать в нем первое, еще неопределенное ощущение той вековечной, священной тоски, которую иная избранная душа, раз вкусив и познав, уже не променяет никогда на дешевое удовлетворение.¹⁶⁷

Stavrogin's youthful *Weltschmerz*, or weariness of life and melancholy pessimism, is, later on, to develop into a more distinctive and disturbing personality trait - boredom, which appears to have largely contributed to his overall fantastic behavior and is the primary drive for his demonic activities. It is remarkable that boredom was not an ephemeral phenomenon, but an intrinsic quality of the young man's nature. In his early manhood, Stavrogin is seen as a fully

developed, spoiled and mentally perverted individual. Dostoevsky thus follows up on his original intention to make a corrupted young person the main focus of his new novel, which was a radical change from his intention to portray an absolutely positive hero in his previous major novel, The Idiot.

Shortly after graduation from college, Stavrogin, following his mother's request, enrolls in one of the most prestigious infantry regiments. As a young officer, Stavrogin leads a rather frivolous lifestyle, similar to that of Svidrigailov during the latter's early manhood, or Nekhludov from Tolstoy's Resurrection. But in Stavrogin's case, it is not just the abuse of alcohol and sexual promiscuity which are abnormal, as they were, for instance, in Nekhludov's case before the latter's spiritual and moral regeneration. There is something about Stavrogin that is "слишком уж откровенно грязное."¹⁶⁸ Moreover, there are rumors about his "дикой разнузданности, о задавленных рысаками людях, о зверском поступке с одной дамой хорошего общества, с которой он был в связи, а потом оскорбил ее публично. Прибавляли сверх того, что он . . . привязывается и оскорбляет из удовольствия оскорбить."¹⁶⁹

Following this, there are two duels of which he is the sole instigator and, after which, he is degraded to the ranks for killing one and crippling another of his opponents. After his resignation from the military, he again leads a rather unacceptable (for a man of his stature) lifestyle, "жизнь, так сказать, насмешливую," (as Pyotr Verkhovensky eloquently describes it), mingling with the lower classes of Petersburg's society and abusing alcohol. Stavrogin's confession to Tikhon is concerned primarily with his "Petersburg" period, which chronologically follows immediately after his resignation from the military and before his arrival to his mother's estate of Skvoreshniki.

In his confession, Stavrogin reveals the essence of his obscene behavior, and at the same time, the abnormality of his psychological build. He finds a certain malicious satisfaction in doing wrong or hurting other people (even himself). In this respect, he is very close to the Underground Man and reminiscent of the latter's masochistic tendencies. Stavrogin writes:

Всякое чрезвычайно позорное, без меры унижительное, подлое и, главное, смешное положение, в каковых мне случалось бывать в моей жизни, всегда возбуждало во мне, рядом с безмерным гневом, невероятное наслаждение.

Точно так же и в минуты преступлений, и в минуты опасности жизни. Но если сдержат при этом гнев, то наслаждение превысит все, что можно вообразить.¹⁷⁰

Stavrogin feels pleasure when he challenges life through his unlawful behavior --- whether it is the petty theft of money from his neighbour's pocket, a childish pinching of a respected man's nose in front of a gathering or the dangerous enterprise of dueling. His drive to challenge life comes from that intrinsic sense of boredom and indifference which Pyotr Verkhovensky calls an "aristocratic sensation." Stavrogin even thinks of killing himself, since no one else can kill him, hoping to spare himself from the awful burden of an indifferent, purposeless and meaningless life. At one point, he says in his confession: "Я около того времени хотел убить себя от болезни равнодушия."¹⁷¹ Stavrogin is unable to achieve anything in life, because any kind of striving on his part would turn into nothingness. His death is, perhaps, the only act that he is ultimately able to achieve. Moreover, perhaps death is the real aim of his life. And for that the Schopenhauerian conclusion that dying is life's only logical purpose can convincingly be applied to Stavrogin's existence. Schopenhauer writes:

Dying is certainly to be regarded as the real aim of life; at the moment of dying, everything is decided which through the whole course of life was only prepared and introduced. Death is the result, the *resume*, of life, or the total sum expressing at one stroke all the instruction given by life in detail and piecemeal, namely that the whole striving, the phenomenon of which is life, was a vain, fruitless, and self-contradictory effort, to have returned from which is deliverance.¹⁷²

Shneidman suggests, that Stavrogin's suicide is "an escape and also a confession that life without meaning is an awful burden."¹⁷³ It is necessary however, to mention that Stavrogin's suicide was the last attempt to escape reality in a long chain of other attempts, such as trips abroad, confessions, debauchery, abuse of alcohol, etc. At any rate, his suicide undoubtedly puts Stavrogin in a close literary relationship with Svidrigailov, for whom life also had nothing much to offer anymore and who also committed suicide with the hope of escaping reality, preceding his final destruction by way of a chain of unsuccessful attempts to sink into oblivion by some other means than self-annihilation (as was also the case with Stavrogin).

Moreover, the essence of the two protagonists' drive to escape reality is very much alike and can be formulated by the concept of guilty conscience. Just like Svidrigailov, Stavrogin experiences a profound feeling of guilt for one of his crimes, which is also very similar to that of Svidrigailov. In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov once mentions to Svidrigailov that Luzhin was accusing the latter of a child's death. At that time, Svidrigailov denies the allegation. Yet, the night of his suicide he has a dream in which he sees that nameless young girl of fourteen who

committed suicide shortly after an implied encounter with Svidrigailov. The accusation against Svidrigailov is supported not only by the narrator's meddling in this matter (the narrator blatantly establishes the fact that Svidrigailov, no doubt, knew that girl and that this girl is the one who committed suicide due to her acquaintance with Svidrigailov), but also by Svidrigailov's generally perverted nature and confused sexual responsibilities. Upon his release from the debt prison, for instance, he tells his future wife that he cannot be faithful, even to her. In fact, he has an agreement with his wife that he may become involved with the servant girls. In this respect, Stavrogin is also very similar to Svidrigailov because he is also unable to make a definite, positive commitment to a woman. Every woman who is involved in some relationship with Stavrogin throughout the course of the novel gets deceived and hurt in one way or another. As Mochulsky remarks: "The stages of the wanderer Stavrogin's life are marked by women's names; his ideational trials are symbolized by his amorous deceptions."¹⁷⁴

Stavrogin's idleness and his "gift" of "animal voluptuousness" or "звериное сладострастие, которым одарен и которое всегда вызывал," lead him to commit his most ignominious crime - the molestation of a young girl, Matresha, who was the same age as the young girl in Svidrigailov's nightmare.¹⁷⁵ Matresha was fourteen years of age and, according to Stavrogin's account, looked like a child. The circumstances of the event, more than any other occurrence that Stavrogin might have found himself in throughout the novel, explain the viciousness of his personality. It appears that Stavrogin's "exploit" was a premeditated action, a willful action --- in fact, an action that, perhaps, took a lot of will-power to achieve. He had been planning it since the idea first came to his mind and, like Raskolnikov, had been calculating the right time to take action on it in order to avoid undesirable witnesses and, therefore, be in the

room alone with the girl. He experiences a sudden influx of fear from the unexpected response that Matresha gives him at the very beginning of their encounter. Here, his will-power in terms of self-control comes in handy, and he overcomes his feeling of fear and stays. The novelist loquaciously shows Stavrogin's hesitation and inner struggle which takes place immediately before the event. Stavrogin asks himself a conscious question: "я и задал себе вопрос, могу ли я бросить и уйти от замышленного намерения, и я тотчас почувствовал, что могу, могу во всякое время и сию минуту."¹⁷⁶ This confrontation between Stavrogin's good and his demonic will shows the basic dichotomy of his personality and can also be translated into a symbolic struggle between good and evil in man. In Stavrogin, good will is defeated by ill will, and the boundless potential of his personality grows into an impotent and destructive existence without purpose or meaning. It is, indeed, "the agony of the superman," the spiritual demise of a person who possesses great potential and is "destined for a lofty vacation," but who once betrays "his holy-of-holies" and renounces God," and who gradually sinks into physical oblivion unable to cope with his spiritual death.¹⁷⁷

Matresha, unable to cope with the damage, commits suicide by hanging herself shortly after her encounter with Stavrogin, while Svidrigailov's victim in Crime and Punishment kills herself by drowning. It is not clearly specified in Crime and Punishment how long before Raskolnikov's crime Svidrigailov commits the offense. It is, thus, not readily apparent how long Svidrigailov has to live with his guilt. In the case of Stavrogin, the time-frame is more precise, and we learn that by the time of Stavrogin's suicide, at least four years have passed. His revelations at Tikhon's, make it clear that immediately after Matresha's death, Stavrogin is constantly haunted by her image. As Peace points out: "The figure of Matresha refuses to leave

Stavrogin's imagination; the vision of the little girl raising her fist to him haunts him daily."¹⁷⁸

Stavrogin speaks of it in the frantic, desperate way of a man condemned to eternal moral torture:

Нет - мне невыносим только один этот образ, и именно на пороге, с своим поднятым и грозящим мне кулачком, один только ее тогдашний вид, только одна тогдашняя минута, только это кивание головой. Вот чего я не могу выносить, потому что с тех пор представляется мне почти каждый день. Не сам представляется, а я его сам вызываю и не могу не вызывать, хотя и не могу с этим жить.¹⁷⁹

The suicidal resolution of Svidrigailov's young victim's fate in Crime and Punishment, as well as Matresha's tragic end in The Possessed, are used by the novelist as a technical device which intensifies the moral impact of both events on Svidrigailov and Stavrogin respectively. By the same token, this tremendous moral impact results in an unprecedented (for these two characters) feeling of self-blame and remorse --- a feeling that neither one of them can display *a priori* to their involvement with children, and subsequently, a feeling that neither one of them can live with *a posteriori* and which contributes not only to their suffering, but to their eventual self-denial. Both Svidrigailov and Stavrogin make feeble attempts to escape from the feeling of guilt (which perhaps, they did not even anticipate experiencing), but fail to do so. To somehow redeem himself in his own eyes, and possibly to blot out the burning sense of guilt, Stavrogin looks for a physical "burden," or an occasion to ruin his life in some dishonourable and despicable way, which would ease his moral burden and help him to escape his boring, weary and meaningless existence. At first he, again, wants to shoot himself, but instead he marries

Marya Lebyadkin -- "хромоую... тогда еще не помешанную, но просто восторженную идиотку, без ума влюбленную в меня втайне."¹⁸⁰ Stavrogin testifies:

Мне и вообще тогда скучно было жить, до одури. В это же время, но вовсе не почему-нибудь, пришла мне идея искалечить как-нибудь жизнь, но только как можно противнее. Я уже с год назад помышлял застрелиться; представилось нечто получше. Раз, смотря на хромоую Марью Тимофеевну Лебядкину, я решился вдруг на ней жениться.¹⁸¹

Even though Stavrogin was motivated in his decision to marry Marya Lebyadkin by a need to repay himself for being such a "low coward" during the affair with Matresha, it is quite obvious that his marriage to a cripple was "an attempt to cripple his own life because of Matresha," and he indeed wished "to take on a burden to assuage some vague, unformulated sense of guilt."¹⁸² At the same time, Pyotr Verkhovensky's and Kirillov's assessments of Stavrogin's marriage to Marya Lebyadkin as nothing more than "баловство, фантазия преждевременно уставшего человека. . . новый этюд пресыщенного человека с целью узнать, до чего можно довести сумасшедшую калеку," are also of some value.¹⁸³ They truly express yet another side of Stavrogin's split personality -- that of vanity and self-indulgence.

But even that radical and snide act of presumable self-destruction, but at the same time of self-indulgence, does not spare him from the torments of memory. The next thing he does is to leave Russia and go abroad. He goes to the East, he visits Egypt and lives in Switzerland. When his fantastic marriage fails to provide a "cure" for his guilty conscience, he tries yet another unsuccessful remedy --- that of a trip abroad. This trip abroad also can be seen as a symbol of his attempt to escape from his guilt. Yet, even in foreign lands, he can not escape from himself, and

on one occasion, in Frankfurt, passing by a stationary kiosk, he sees a photograph of a young girl who looks like Matresha. This photograph instantly reminds Stavrogin of what he is running away from. On another occasion, again in Germany, he has a dream, similar to the last dream of Svidrigailov. Stavrogin's scintillating dream about the Golden Age is interrupted by his sudden awakening; then the dream comes back, but not as pleasant as before. First, he sees a little red spider on a geranium leaf. This is the same little red spider that he sees at Matresha's apartment minutes before her death. The little red spider, the symbol of Stavrogin's wickedness, triggers another image -- that of Matresha:

Что-то как будто вонзилось в меня, я приподнялся и сел на постель . . . Я увидел перед собою (о, не наяву! если бы, если бы это было настоящее видение!), я увидел Матрешу, исхудавшую и с лихорадочными глазами, точь-в-точь как тогда, когда она стояла у меня на пороге и, кивая мне головой, подняла на меня свой крошечный кулочонок. И никогда ничего не являлось мне столь мучительным! Жалкое отчаяние беспомощного десятилетнего существа с несложившимся рассудком, мне грозившего (чем? что могло оно мне сделать?). Никогда еще ничего подобного со мной не было. Я просидел до ночи, не двигаясь и забыв время. Это ли называется угрызением совести или раскаянием? ¹⁸⁴

At the height of his confession at Tikhon's, Stavrogin evidently experiences unprecedented compunction for his deed and appears to be well on his way to repentance. Yet, repentance is not a way out for a man like him. He is introduced to us by the chronicler in the novel as a man of considerable physical strength. But he is a very weak person as far as his moral

strength is concerned. In his 1870-1872 hand-written sketches and outlines of ideas for new works, Dostoevsky identifies one of the themes that he would like to follow up on -- "Пысрота души нынешнего самоубийцы."¹⁸⁵ In Stavrogin's psychological profile, Dostoevsky manages to express to what depth the emptiness of the human soul can plunge. Stavrogin's soul is indeed "in a state of total narcosis. His spirit is dead."¹⁸⁶ Dead in spirit and in soul, saturated by an amalgamation of social idleness and boredom, with the addition of total indifference to his own life and to the lives of other people, Stavrogin carries out his act and fulfills the role of "murderer," designated to him when he is introduced in the novel for the first time. With relation to himself, Stavrogin is methodically suppressing his will-to-live. With relation to other people, Stavrogin's reputation as "murderer" is also justifiable.

Being far from a conventional blood-thirsty criminal with recidivistic tendencies, Stavrogin, nevertheless, spreads destruction and death around him, sparing neither friend, nor enemy. Apart from participating personally in the destruction of others, such as killing two opponents in duels, Stavrogin is often the indirect cause of someone's death. In this sense, his inactivity and indifference to the fates of people is as murderous as his direct involvement. Apart from Matresha's death, of which Stavrogin is an indirect, but prime cause, he is also involved in a second (only to Matresha's) incident --- the demise of his mocking wife, Marya Lebyadkin. In this instance, Stavrogin is again reminiscent of Svidrigailov from Crime and Punishment, and Ivan Karamazov from The Brothers Karamazov.

Different in circumstance and the level of brutality, the murder of Stavrogin's wife, reminds one of the death of Svidrigailov's wife, Marfa Petrovna. Moreover, Svidrigailov never acknowledges his fault, while Stavrogin actually admits that he was morally responsible for

Marya Lebyadkin's death. In this connection, his last letter to Darya becomes an important document. He writes: "Кстати подтверждаю, что совестью я виноват в смерти жены. Я с вами не виделся после того, а потому подтверждаю."¹⁸⁷ Marya Lebyadkin's murder is solely based on Stavrogin's encouragement of the act. Even though the actual executioner is a thief (Fed'ka), the mastermind of the murder is Stavrogin himself. It is he who "unties" Fed'ka's hands when he says: "Режь еще, обокради еще."¹⁸⁸ Later on, in his conversation with Darya, Stavrogin acknowledges that he even paid Fed'ka in advance to perform the murder. He tells Darya:

Один бесенок предлагал мне вчера на мосту зарезать Лебядкина и Марию Тимофеевну, чтобы порешить с моим законным браком, и концы чтобы в воду. Задатку просил три целковых, но дал ясно знать, что вся операция стоить будет не меньше как полторы тысячи . . . Я отдал ему все мои деньги из портмоне, и он теперь совершенно уверен, что я ему выдал задаток.¹⁸⁹

The question of moral responsibility for a crime unites Stavrogin with Ivan Karamazov, who was also indirectly responsible for his father's murder committed by his half-brother, Smerdyakov. "Убил отца он, а не брат. Он убил, а я его научил убить" - says Ivan Karamazov to the court and the jury.¹⁹⁰ This revelation is similar to the one Stavrogin expresses in his letter to Darya. This external similarity in the statements of the two heroes is closely related to Stavrogin's and Ivan Karamazov's lack of faith. Ivan, as it has been stated previously, does not deny God completely, but at the same time does not accept God's world either. His theory is based on the denial of eternal life, which, if it existed would sustain a person's love for his fellow human being. Upon this love and the belief in eternal life, law and order would be

built. However, since Ivan does not believe in eternal life or in God, "everything is permitted." That is to say, if there is no God, then there is no moral law, and for a person who does not believe in God, everything is permitted:

для . . . лица . . . не верующего ни в Бога, ни в бессмертие свое, нравственный закон природы должен немедленно измениться в полную противоположность прежнему, религиозному, и что эгоизм даже до злодейства не только должен быть дозволен человеку, но даже признан необходимым, самым разумным . . . исходом в его положении.¹⁹¹

If Ivan Karamazov is more of a philosopher-atheist, then Stavrogin is, so to speak, the atheist-practitioner. The philosophy of unlimited action by virtue of disbelief in God, developed by Ivan Karamazov, finds its practical application in Stavrogin's actions. Mochulsky notes that Stavrogin's struggle with faith and disbelief "grows through the duration of the whole novel."¹⁹² In the chapter, "At Tikhon's," this struggle reaches its pinnacle. Stavrogin tells Tikhon that he believes in the devil and does not believe in God: "Я вам серьезно и нагло скажу: я верую в беса, верую канонически, в личного, не в аллегорико."¹⁹³ When a person does not believe in God (but, on the contrary, canonically believes in the devil) in his own activities, thus is driven by devilish instincts. Then there are no limits to his evil actions; then, "everything is permitted." This could, perhaps, serve as an additional explanation for Stavrogin's criminal behavior and his extraordinary ability to harm people. By the same token, his confused religious priorities reinforce the overall imbalance of his personality and partially contribute to his tragic denouement.

Yet, it is hard to positively aver that a person of a spiritual disposition similar or identical to that of Stavrogin or Ivan Karamazov could hold and practice such beliefs, and remain sane at the same time. In fact, both Stavrogin and Ivan Karamazov are psychologically ill people. Both of them see apparitions of the devil, and both of them consider the devil to be a part of themselves. Stavrogin says about his devil that: "Это я сам в разных видах, и больше ничего," and admits that he has to go and see the doctor.¹⁹⁴ The theme of the devilish double is more fully developed in The Brothers Karamazov, in the chapter, "Devils. Ivan's Nightmare." Ivan is deeply psychologically moved by the events of the recent past -- by the murder of his father, and especially by his conversation with Smerdyakov, who is the first one to directly accuse Ivan of being the real murderer of his father. Upon his realisation of the correctness of Smerdyakov's accusations, Ivan experiences compunction and a profound feeling of guilt. These psychologically intense events tilt the mental balance of his sanity. He becomes ill and, upon his arrival to his apartment, he sees the devil. At times, Ivan regains his sanity and acknowledges, like Stavrogin, that the devil is only a by-product of his sick health, and that in reality he is talking only to himself. He cries emphatically: "Ни одной минуты не принимаю тебя за реальную правду... Ты ложь, ты болезнь моя, ты призрак... Ты моя галлюцинация. Ты воплощение меня самого, только одной, впрочем, моей стороны... моих мыслей и чувств, только самых гадких и глупых."¹⁹⁵ Similarly, Stavrogin is deeply moved by his profound sense of guilt and remorse for his crimes, which, perhaps, are the cause of his reappearing mental imbalance. He confesses to Tikhon that he is prepared to suffer because he is unable to carry the burden of guilt (which materializes in the visions of Matresha) any longer: "Я знаю, что только тогда исчезнет видение. Вот почему я и ищу страдания безмерного, сам ищу его."¹⁹⁶

Unable to find the vital "cure" for his guilt at Tikhon's, and unable to reach reconciliation with his conscience --- left solely to himself to deal with the haunting image of Matresha, while at the same time experiencing the damaging psychological metamorphoses, Stavrogin makes his final attempt to escape reality and plans to flee Russia. In his last letter to Darya, he discloses his plan to go to Switzerland where he, like Herzen, gained a new citizenship a few years earlier. There he buys a small house with the hope of living there "eternally," and perhaps of curing himself of the tormenting hallucinations and images. Thus, from the spiritual treatment which he was hoping to receive for his confession at Tikhon's, Stavrogin turns to the physical treatment provided by Swiss nature and a separation from his native land. It seems that, by the physical relocation of his body, Stavrogin is hoping to obtain some sort of moral relief and even physical recovery. Yet, a few lines down in his letter, Stavrogin contradicts himself with regard to his hopes and says that he does not hope to achieve anything from his move to Uri: "Я ничего от Ури не надеюсь; я просто еду."¹⁹⁷ He, perhaps, realizes that he is doomed and that his life is worthless no matter where his body is. He truthfully acknowledges his uselessness to Darya: "Я пробовал везде мою силу. На пробах для себя и для показу, как и прежде во всю мою жизнь, она оказывалась беспредельною. Но к чему приложить эту силу - вот чего никогда не видел, не вижу и теперь."¹⁹⁸

Moreover, in this letter to Darya, Stavrogin expresses another idea which could serve as an additional reason for his eventual self-denial and weakening of the will-to-live --- his alienation from his native land. From the preliminary notes for The Possessed (dated March 15, 1870), it is evident that Dostoevsky intended to incorporate the idea of national rootlessness and alienation from the native soil into the overall image of the main hero of his new novel. In his

description of the "final image of the Prince," Dostoevsky notes: "Мысль же автора: выставить человека, который сознал, что ему недостает почвы."¹⁹⁹ At another point in the preliminary sketches, Dostoevsky, writing about the Prince's loathing of modern man, notes that it comes from a realization of his alienation from the soil: "У него одно только отвращение к современным людям, с которыми он решил порвать. Одно непосредственное отвращение, потому что он уже постиг свою оторванность от почвы."²⁰⁰ In the final version of the novel, Dostoevsky not only attributes this idea to Stavrogin's personality, but also explains the significance of such alienation. It is perhaps, one of the main reasons for Stavrogin's tragedy, because alienation from one's native soil gives birth to a loss of faith which, in turn, results not only in Stavrogin's transgressions of moral laws, but also in the loss of any purpose in life. Stavrogin writes: "В России я ничем не связан - в ней мне все так же чужое, как и везде. Правда, я в ней более, чем в другом месте, не любил жить. Ваш брат (Шатов) говорил мне, что тот, кто теряет связи с своею землей, тот теряет и богов своих, то есть все свои цели."²⁰¹ It is significant that Stavrogin connects the loss of purpose in life with the loss of one's land and one's faith. They are intertwined for him and therefore by losing one, he automatically loses the other. This conclusion, drawn by Stavrogin, enables the reader to better understand yet another underlying reason for his suicide.

It appears that in Svidrigailov's case in Crime and Punishment, the meaninglessness and purposelessness of life play a minor role in comparison with the pangs of guilty conscience, which, on the other hand, is, perhaps, the stronger reason for his suicide. With Stavrogin, the situation is reversed. On purely technical grounds, Stavrogin is a bigger criminal than

Svidrigailov --- he is the cause of the demise of a greater number of people, and he definitely lacks that reappearing altruistic streak which Svidrigailov shows just before his suicide

It would, of course, contradict the present analysis to say that Stavrogin did not experience moral lacerations for his crimes as he well did. But it seems that the narrative subtly suggests that the meaninglessness of Stavrogin's life is, perhaps, a more significant reason for his self-denial than his guilty conscience.

These characteristics of Stavrogin's personality, obviously, explain his loss of purpose in life and his loss of religious faith, which in turn result from his loss of national identity and ties with the native Russian land, and is, indeed, in perfect accord with Dostoevsky's philosophy of "pochvennichestvo," which he promulgated throughout his entire literary career. In effect, Stavrogin could undoubtedly be placed in the category of "superfluous man," which was initially developed by Pushkin and, later on, modified by a number of prominent Russian novelists such as Goncharov, Turgenev and Tolstoy. Yet, Dostoevsky's superfluous man, and particularly Stavrogin, does not quite fit within the confines of the traditional definition.

It had become customary to portray a superfluous man as "an ineffectual aristocrat at odds with society . . . as "dreamy, useless" --- as an "intellectual incapable of action," an ineffective idealist," "a hero who is sensitive to social and ethical problems, but who fails to act, partly because of personal weakness."²⁰² Another definition suggests that superfluous men "endure purposeless lives and are unable to find meaning in human activity or even in life."²⁰³ All these characteristics are, to some extent, incorporated in Dostoevsky's portrayal of that type of man. Yet, Dostoevsky adds another crucial element to that definition, which makes his heroes stand out from the uniform characterization of the superfluous type --- that is, the previously

mentioned detachment from the native soil. Chances argues that: "under Dostoevsky's pen, the idea of superfluity was resurrected as that of the intelligentsia cut off from the 'people' ('narod')." ²⁰⁴ This also presupposes the loss of Christian faith, which is primarily to be found among the simple people, who are identified with the land.

The amalgamation of the fatal events -- Matresha's suicide, the murder of Marya Lebyadkin and captain Lebyadkin, the suicide of Kirillov (for which Stavrogin was also partially responsible), the murder of Shatov by members of Pyotr Verkhovensky's gang (which Stavrogin could have prevented but chose not to), and the death of Liza Tushin, all lies as an unbearable burden on Stavrogin's conscience. Yet, it is not the type of "burden" he is looking for. He is actually seeking physical suffering, the quintessential vision of which, to him, is exile to Siberia. He tells Tikhon that he is even prepared to march to Siberia, if this is the path to follow to redeem himself. But the "burden" that he bears is of a purely moral variety. Thus, it is moral suffering, externally and internally determined by his own personality, as well as his social life, which underlies his decision to commit suicide.

Therefore, Stavrogin's moral lacerations and remorse for the crimes he commits (especially with relation to the death of Matresha), as well as his inborn Weltschmerz and internal boredom, which result from them and the loss of national identity and ties with the native land (or any land for that matter), with subsequent loss of purpose in life and loss of faith, serve only to thwart the natural human will-to-live that is given to Stavrogin through birth, but brought to an end by his self-destruction. Only such a fantastic personality make-up as Stavrogin's, with its unprecedented combination of physical, psychological and spiritual traits, could have canceled the natural striving for life - the will-to-live.

For a moment it appears, however, that Stavrogin is not strong enough to kill himself. In his letter to Darya, he admits that he is afraid of doing so, even though he realizes that a being such as he is does not have a place on earth. He says: "Никогда, никогда я не могу застрелиться! Я знаю, что мне надо бы убить себя, смести себя с земли, как подлое насекомое; но я боюсь самоубийства" ²⁰⁵ Was he unable to kill himself because of the moral weakness he displayed earlier or, perhaps, was it the last gasp of Schopenhauerian will-to-live --- the last gasp of the instinct of self-preservation which subtly manifests itself in Stavrogin's consciousness?

Stavrogin, nevertheless, kills himself --- not by shooting, but by hanging. It may well be, after all, that Stavrogin kills himself because the fear of death overwhelms him less at that point than the fear and horror of life. In this connection, Shneidman aptly remarks that man is more inclined to commit suicide when it appears that "the complete exhaustion of love of life sets in. Man is ready to kill himself when life loses its meaning to him --- when all illusions are gone and when he is unable to bridge the gap between himself and his own life." ²⁰⁶ In this respect, Stavrogin greatly differs from the consumptive youth, Ippolit, who, like no one else, penetrates the knowledge and understanding of the value and meaning of life. Yet, Stavrogin is reminiscent of his literary predecessor, Svidrigailov and, like the latter, realizes that his life does not have any value for himself or for others. Indeed, Stavrogin no longer takes any interest in his life and gradually suppresses the life force within himself thus approaching the acme point of self-denial. Furthermore, his religious disbelief and belief in the devil facilitate his final decision. Stavrogin (using Schopenhauer's language) is "least afraid of becoming nothing in death" because he recognizes that "he is already nothing now," and because he "no longer takes any interest in his

individual phenomenon since, in him knowledge has, so to speak, burnt up and consumed the will, so that there is no longer any will, any keen desire for individual existence, left in him."²⁰⁷

In effect, Stavrogin's unsuccessful attempt to escape to Switzerland, as well as his inability to take "positive action" (which has been previously indicated in this analysis), serve as a metaphor for the total atrophy of his will-to-live, and as a sign of his failure to employ his will even in matters concerning his own organic life and death. It is as if "the decay of the body. . ." and in Stavrogin's case it is preceded by the decay of his morals, ". . . coincides with that of the will."²⁰⁸

The self-denial or the denial of the will-to-live thus occurs in Stavrogin according to Schopenhauer's formula, where man "ceases to will anything, guards against attaching his will to anything, tries to establish firmly in himself the greatest indifference to all things."²⁰⁹ Stavrogin's indifference to the lives and fates of other people is ultimately displayed in relation to his own life. In his life there is no attachment, no commitment, no positive impact of his will, nor any interest toward his own life. One, therefore, can not but agree with Mochulsky's eloquent remark about Stavrogin's tragic end, when the critic writes about the latter: "The "living corpse" sunders his illusory existence. The powerful spirit of negation, the metaphysically sterile will, the great strength without application returns to nonbeing."²¹⁰

Conclusion.

This thesis' attempt at establishing the overall affinity between the philosophical teaching of A. Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky's major post-Siberian fiction was conducted by means of a juxtaposition of the philosophical concepts, developed by the German philosopher, with the ideas expressed in Dostoevsky's literary works. First, the concept of will, and particularly the relationship between will and reason, is presented as being the first parallel between Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky. Second, the concept of the will-to-live is applied to an analysis of some of Dostoevsky's main characters, such as Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Ippolit and Stavrogin.

Through the examination of Schopenhauer's understanding of the relationship between will and reason, as well as through the examination of this relationship in Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, it was inferred by this writer that Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky do, indeed, similarly express the understanding of the relationship in question. Both Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer adhere to the point of view according to which will in man is primary to reason. Such a perception of human nature is applied to the analysis of one of Dostoevsky's literary characters - the Underground Man. This makes it possible not only to better understand the philosophical basis of the Underground Man's argument in defense of will, and will's prevalence over reason, but most of all to enhance the understanding of his irrational nature. The Underground Man's irrationality is based not on illogical or unreasonable argumentation (quite on the contrary, his argument is very logical and paradoxically is a product of his highly potent intellect). His irrationality is based on the promulgation of will's prime position in relation to reason.

Thus, with regard to the relationship between will and intellect, several conclusions may be drawn from the comparison between Schopenhauer's philosophy of will and the philosophy of the Underground Man expressed by Dostoevsky in Notes from Underground. First of all, on purely technical ground, such comparison clearly shows the similarity of understanding and expression of such a relationship, thus indicating the affinity between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Dostoevsky's fiction. Second, if Dostoevsky was, indeed, familiar with the essentials of Schopenhauer's metaphysics, then the main character of the Notes from Underground -- the Underground Man -- could be regarded as the literary embodiment of Schopenhauer's voluntaristic teaching, the same way "new people" of Chernyshevsky's What's to be Done? are viewed as the literary embodiment of *his* utopian world view. In this case, the understanding of the Underground Man's character and his irrational reasoning, along with the knowledge of his "inner man," is enhanced to a great degree by the mainstream ideas of the German philosopher.

If it were the case that Dostoevsky was not familiar with Schopenhauer's philosophical teaching about the will in general and about the will - intellect relationship in particular, this would make him an authentic Russian philosopher of will, thus expanding his overall reputation as a philosopher. This could be the case, given the fact that the evidence of the novelist's acquaintance with the works of the German philosopher is scarce. If this were indeed the case, Dostoevsky's artistic reply to Chernyshevsky unintentionally gave birth to an unprecedented and independent philosophy of will.

As far as the notion of the will-to-live is concerned, it is believed that Schopenhauer was its original *auteur*. It is hardly the case that Dostoevsky was trying to incorporate Schopenhauer's philosophical concept in the portrayal of his characters. It is, perhaps, the existential property of

the concept of the will-to-live that enables one to draw thematic parallels between Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer. It appears that Schopenhauer presents the will-to-live's philosophical justification, while Dostoevsky, perhaps quite independently, presents its literary embodiment in some of his main characters, such as Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Ippolit and Stavrogin. Thus, the analysis of these characters has been undertaken with regard to Schopenhauer's concept of the will-to-live, as well as its affirmation and denial.

The will-to-live is identified by Schopenhauer as having the essential property of the life force. Within nature, it is reasoned, everything is pressing toward life by means of the will-to-live, which is the primary drive to organic existence. Thus, by means of willing life, the affirmation of the will-to-live occurs. With relation to Raskolnikov and Ippolit, the analysis of their life circumstances and reasons for voluntary self-destruction show that both characters display a great deal of the will-to-live. It is inferred from this analysis that both Raskolnikov and Ippolit have sufficient reasons for suicide, yet by a willful decision choose to live. This choice between life and death (in the case when the ultimate decision of whether to choose life or terminate it, lies in the hands of the hero) shows the manifestation of the will-to-live. On the other hand, it seems that with regard to Svidrigailov and Stavrogin, the will-to-live encounters constant and persistent denial. Both heroes' suicides as well as the life circumstances immediately preceding their self-destruction reveal the mechanism of self-denial.

The affinity between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Dostoevsky's fiction is not limited only to the theme of will. The theme of suffering is also prominent in both writer's works. In Dostoevsky's fiction, it is the tragic element which testifies to its presence. With regard to Schopenhauer, it is the basic pessimistic orientation of his philosophy which recognizes suffering

as life's real essence. It is believed that Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky held similar views with regard to suffering. Furthermore, ideas about suffering, expressed by the German thinker in Parerga and Paralipomena, could be compared to the subtheme of suffering in Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground.

In the chapter "Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering in the World" from Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer states that suffering constitutes an intrinsic element of human life. Infinite pain, which abounds everywhere in the world, springs from want and misery, and is essential to life. The philosopher writes: "If suffering is not the first and immediate object of our life, then our existence is the most inexpedient and inappropriate thing in the world."²¹¹ With relation to man, Schopenhauer recognizes a certain need for suffering in human being. This artificial suffering is needed to prevent him from getting bored, because boredom could lead him to even greater suffering. Schopenhauer writes: "At all times, everyone indeed needs a certain amount of care, anxiety, pain, or trouble, just as a ship requires ballast in order to proceed on a straight and steady course."²¹²

Dostoevsky's Underground Man, in his irrational rebellion, goes to the same extreme, recognizing suffering as something that is desired by man. He poses to his silent opponent a question that derives directly from his conception of the irrational nature of man. It has been stated previously by the Underground Man that sometimes a person wants to act not according to his reason, but according to his will, even though such an act would be to his disadvantage and pain. He asks again: "Быть может человек любит не одно благоденствие? Может быть, он ровно настолько же любит страдание? Может быть страдание-то ему ровно настолько же и выгодно, как благоденствие. А человек иногда ужасно любит страдание, до страсти, и это

факт . . . Я уверен, что человек от настоящего страдания никогда не откажется. Страдание - да ведь это единственная причина сознания."²¹³

Both Dostoevsky and Schopenhauer recognize suffering as an essential element of human existence and as being related to boredom. To illustrate their respective views, both Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky choose the example of Utopian society and the human races' hypothetical presence in such a utopian society. If Schopenhauer, in his argument, refers to a hypothetical Utopian society, then the Underground man refers to the socialist Utopia projected by Chernyshevsky in his What's to be Done? Schopenhauer predicts that in such a Utopia, where human happiness is achieved, there would be a lot of room for boredom, which in turn would produce even greater suffering than existed previously. The philosopher argues: "Suppose the human race were removed to Utopia, where everything grew automatically and pigeons flew about ready roasted . . ." if in such a society "the presence of want, hardship, disappointment and the frustration of effort were removed from the lives of men . . . if all the desires were fulfilled as soon as they arose, how then would people occupy their lives and spend their time?"²¹⁴ The answer is that in such a society "people would die of boredom, or hang themselves; or else they would fight, throttle, and murder one another and so cause themselves more suffering than is now laid upon them by nature."²¹⁵

Similarly, the Underground Man's arguments against the Utopian society based on reason and mathematical calculation, stress the same concern --- that in such a society there would be no guarantee that people would not get bored and that from that boredom people could become quite elaborate in inflicting suffering on one another. The Underground Man illustrates his argument with an example from Greek mythology - that Cleopatra used to stick golden pins into

her female slaves' breasts precisely out of boredom. At this point it appropriate to quote from Notes from Underground to illustrate the amazingly similar views on suffering between Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky. The Underground Man argues:

Тогда -то . . . настанут новые экономические отношения, совсем уж готовые и тоже вычисленные с математической точностью, так что в один миг исчезнут всевозможные вопросы собственно потому, что на них получатся всевозможные ответы. Тогда выстроится хрустальный дворец . . . Конечно никак нельзя гарантировать, что тогда не будет ужасно скучно (потому что что ж делать-то, когда все будет рассчитано по табличке) зато все будет чрезвычайно благоразумно. Конечно от скуки чего не выдумаешь! Ведь и золотые булавки от скуки втыкаются.²¹⁶

What Dostoevsky seems to express is the same as Schopenhauer --- that boredom would produce even more suffering than there was before, whether it is slaying people in war on a massive scale or sticking them with pins.

Moreover, both Schopenhauer and Dostoevsky see the world of God as an imperfect place, primarily due to the suffering that exists in that world. Schopenhauer states that a view of the world as a happy place, as the "successful work of an all-wise, all-benevolent, and moreover almighty Being is too flagrantly contradicted by the misery and wretchedness that fill the world on the one hand, and by the obvious imperfection and even burlesque distortion of the most perfect of its phenomena on the other; I refer to the human phenomena. Here is to be found a dissonance that could never be resolved."²¹⁷ The resolution of this dissonance is an essential part

of Dostoevsky's search for the religious "truth," for God. V. Zenkovsky states that " Dostoevsky never doubted God's existence, but he was always troubled by the problem . . . of what God's existence entails for the world- for man and man's historical activities."²¹⁸ The traces of this search mark the pages of his most significant novels. I believe that Ippolit's and Ivan Karamazov's rejection of God's world has its origins in the same dilemma identified by Schopenhauer and perceived by Dostoevsky.

By and large, the theme of suffering, as well as the concepts of will and will-to-live are threads that one can not deny tie Dostoevsky's fiction with Schopenhauer's philosophy. Whether explicit or implicit, the link that seems to exist, based on the observations presented here, prove to be an interesting, thought - provoking and challenging aspect to the study of Dostoevsky's fiction and particularly to the nature of his characters and his expression of these themes in his novels.

Endnotes.

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(The second "current" (струя), identified by A. Dolinin, is most prominent in The Brother's Karamazov and deals with the question of human freedom, and thus remains beyond the scope of the present analysis)

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²⁷ Joseph Frank, "Nihilism and "Notes from Underground," Sewanee Review (Winter 1961): 7-8.

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³⁶ Dostoevskii 5, 99.

³⁷ Dostoevskii, 5, 113.

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³⁹ Kirpotin 497.

⁴⁰ Schopenhauer, The World as Will vol.2, 409.

⁴¹ Schopenhauer, The World as Will vol.2, 410.

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⁵⁹ Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will vol.2, 398.

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⁷³ Dostoevskii 6, 197.

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⁷⁶ Mochulsky 292.

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⁸⁴ Dostoevskii 6, 322.

⁸⁵ Dostoevskii 6, 374.

⁸⁶ Dostoevskii 6, 399.

⁸⁷ Dostoevskii 6, 147.

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