Police Officers' Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms in Ontario, Canada

by

Mark Crowell

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Mark Crowell

Abstract

Police services in Canada were historically self-regulating institutions that managed internally their administrative affairs and allegations of professional misconduct. In recent decades, however, there has been an inexorable movement to external review in many Western nations, including Canada, whereby civilians have become increasingly involved in the administrative oversight of policing and the investigation of complaints about alleged misconduct. Research on how police have responded to these developments is sparse and overwhelmingly non-Canadian.

This study examines the attitudes and experiences of police officers pertaining to three types of civilian-led agencies that govern police practices and conduct in Ontario, Canada. To wit:

i) *Police Services Boards*, which provide administrative and financial governance of police services;

ii) *The Special Investigation Unit (SIU)*, which investigates instances where citizens have been seriously harmed, killed or allegedly sexually assaulted while in the care of the police; and

iii) *The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD)*, which reviews and sometimes investigates citizens' complaints about police conduct.

A mixed-methods sequential explanatory research design was utilized in this study. In *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire*, 1593 police officers from a large police service in Ontario responded to an online survey questionnaire that queried them about their experiences and perceptions in relation to the three previously-mentioned agencies and about their own police service's Professional Standards Bureau. In *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews*, 40 interviews were conducted with police officers from the same police service and six interviews were conducted with senior executive representatives from stakeholder organizations in Ontario and across Canada.

Results from both the survey questionnaire and the interviews revealed that most police officers were generally accepting of the need for civilian-led oversight initiatives to uphold accountability and public trust in policing. However, this study found that many police

officers queried the qualifications (i.e., knowledge, skills, training and experience) of the involved civilian investigators and administrators. Respondents also raised concerns about issues of "procedural justice" (e.g., the quality and frequency of communication during investigations; speed of investigations; notification regarding the outcome) during the course of both civilian-led and police-led investigations into alleged misconduct. Although the majority of respondents expressed a preference for alleged misconduct to be investigated by their own Professional Standards Bureau rather than by personnel from the SIU or the OIPRD, evidence was mixed on the extent to which police officers perceived that civilian oversight agencies pose a significant threat or challenge to their status as "professionals." Many respondents opined that police officers are more closely scrutinized than other professional/occupational groups and are held to higher standards of accountability. A number of practical recommendations are proposed related to enhanced communication and education for police services and relevant stakeholders in Ontario, Canada and beyond.

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Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction

This doctoral dissertation examines the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario, Canada. Complaints against the police and allegations of police misconduct were historically investigated and managed by police-led agencies (i.e., "Professional Standards" or "Internal Affairs" bureaus). However, in recent decades, there has been a movement to external review in many Western nations, including Canada, whereby civilians have become increasingly involved in the administrative oversight of policing affairs and both the management and investigation of alleged police misconduct and complaints against the police (e.g., Goldsmith, 1991; Prenzler, 2004; Smith 2009; Porter & Prenzler, 2012). Yet, little is known about how police officers feel about "external" civilian oversight mechanisms scrutinizing their professional conduct. To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian research has systematically examined police officers' attitudes toward civilian-led oversight mechanisms. This is a regrettable omission, as this subject matter is pertinent to sociological and criminological inquiries regarding accountability in policing and policing as a profession. Before elaborating upon the merits of this project, I will first provide a brief overview of the three civilian oversight agencies that will be repeatedly referred to in this study.

In Ontario, there are a number of civilian-led administrative agencies that oversee various aspects of police conduct. These include, but are not limited to:

Police Service Boards: As mandated by the *Police Services Act* (1990), Police Service Boards are jointly-appointed by the provincial government and the municipality.   According to Sossin (2007: 106-107), Police Service Boards "act as a buffer between political direction from the

government on the one hand and the operational control of police investigations by the chief of police on the other." Although these boards are responsible for implementing effective management policies for the police service, they do not dictate "'specific operational decisions' or the 'day-to-day operation of the police force'" (Sossin 2007: 106-107). First implemented in the 1970s, Police Service Boards remain in widespread use across Ontario.

Special Investigations Unit (SIU): The "SIU investigates the circumstances of serious injury or death as well as allegations of sexual assault that may have resulted from criminal offences committed by police officers. The agency has full powers to investigate and charge officers with a criminal offence" (Canada, 2009: 88). The SIU was implemented in Ontario in 1990 and remains in effect across the province.

Office of Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD): Implemented in Ontario in 2009, this police complaints agency is comprised of civilian investigators and administrators who monitor/review, delegate and, on occasion investigate complaints against the police. The OIPRD functions primarily in a monitoring/reviewing capacity; the vast majority of the investigations they oversee are "referred" to the police service in which the complaint originated and are formally investigated by that service's "Professional Standards Bureau." For example, between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, only 10.3 percent of cases that were brought to the attention of the OIPRD were investigated by that agency; 89.4 percent were referred to the originating police service for investigation (OIPRD, 2014: 21).

These three agencies (known henceforth as civilian oversight agencies or mechanisms) each represent a different, but equally significant, role in the oversight and regulation of police conduct: financial administration and strategic management (police services boards); use of force (SIU); and complaints against the police for a wide variety of circumstances (OIPRD). Not unexpectedly, police administrators and others (e.g., social justice agencies; academics) desire to learn more about how police officers perceive these types of civilian-led agencies, since their very existence and the success of their respective oversight mandates rely heavily upon cooperation with the police services and the police officers they oversee.

As *Chapter 3:Literature Review and Hypotheses* reveals, few have investigated police officers'

attitudes toward and opinions of civilian oversight mechanisms. This modest body of research is

largely American, now dated and largely atheoretical. Their findings have been inconsistent and,

to date, there has been a dearth of information on how Canadian police officers feel about this

dramatic encroachment on what was formerly their professional turf: the regulation of

occupational standards. My study seeks to rectify this situation by conducting an evaluation of

police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario that is informed by

multiple methods.

1.2   Purpose and Research Design

My study sought to evaluate police officers' perceptions of the *legitimacy* of civilian oversight

mechanisms. The broad, overarching research question which catalyzed this project was: *What*

are the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian

oversight mechanisms? More specifically, I sought to gain knowledge of:

- Police officers' perceptions of the *suitability* and *capabilities* of civilian agents/agencies involved in the oversight, management and investigation of police conduct (e.g., investigative expertise, knowledge of police work, objectivity);
- Police officers' perceptions of the *legitimacy of investigative processes* (i.e., procedural justice) carried out by civilian agents/agencies (e.g., respectful treatment, fair treatment, investigative efficiency, timely communication);
- Police officers' perceptions of civilian oversight as a possible challenge to their *professionalism* (e.g., professional autonomy and self-regulation of occupational standards).

My research sought to enhance sociological/criminological knowledge of policing and, in doing

so, add to the scholarly literature on police accountability and, more broadly, the sociology of

professions. My research employed a mixed-methods sequential explanatory research design. I

designed and administered a survey questionnaire to police officers from a large police service in

Ontario and conducted semi-structured interviews with police officers and other key

stakeholders.

Specifically, the project addresses the following central research questions:

1. *To what extent do police officers accept the legitimacy of the various civilian oversight agencies in Ontario (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU and the OIPRD)?*

2. *How do police officers feel about the processes involved in having their professional conduct overseen, managed and investigated by civilians in Ontario?*

3. *To what extent does civilian oversight challenge police officers' sense of professionalism (i.e., professional autonomy and self-regulation)?*

Very little previous research has been conducted on police officers' attitudes toward civilian

oversight mechanisms. Only a handful of academic studies have assessed police officers'

attitudes toward civilian involvement in the oversight and management of alleged police

misconduct (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Perez, 1994; Kreisel,

1998; Walker & Herbst, 1999; Weisburd et al., 2000; de Guzman, 2004; De Angelis & Kupchik,

2007; Wells & Schafer, 2007). All but one (i.e., de Guzman, 2004) of these studies were

conducted in the United States and assessed the attitudes of American police officers. There

have also been a handful of studies conducted on the behalf of municipal governments in

Cincinnati, Ohio (Ridgeway et al., 2005), Pasadena, California (Bobb et al., 2006) and Seattle,

Washington (Brody & Lovrich, 2007) that have included evaluations of the attitudes of police

officers in their analysis of civilian oversight mechanisms. Although these studies will be

reviewed more fully in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, this body of literature

indicates that it is common for police officers to express reservations about civilian involvement

in systems that oversee, manage and sometimes investigate allegations of police misconduct and/or criminal wrongdoing.

Generally, previous studies have queried both (1) the legitimacy of civilian agents/agencies scrutinizing their professional conduct and (2) the processes involved in the investigations themselves. For example, Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter (2013: 166) conducted an analysis of studies that have investigated the reactions of police officers to a variety of civilian-led complaint systems around the world, including systems in the United States of America (Boston, Denver, Pasadena, Cincinnati), Australia (Queensland & Victoria), England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Israel, South Korea and the Philippines. In their analysis, they found that while police were generally opposed to "independent (civilian-led) processes…a sizeable proportion of police recognized that internal processing is intrinsically suspect and does not satisfy the criterion of public confidence" (2013: 166; see also Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004). My research attempts to shed light on the reasons *why* police officers may accept, tolerate or reject the involvement of civilians in the oversight of their professional conduct.

Compared to many other self-regulating professions that are governed by internal control mechanisms (e.g., doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, accountants), the professional conduct of police officers is increasingly scrutinized by outside civilian agents/agencies (West, 1991: 383; AMO, 2015: 6). Reports from the Ontario Ombudsman (Ontario, 2008; 2011) suggest that police officers commonly resent civilian oversight (i.e., the SIU). Others discern recent evidence which suggests that there remains considerable antipathy between police officers and civilian oversight agencies in Ontario (e.g., Benzie, 2011; Blizzard, 2011; Spears, 2012; Clairmont, 2012). My study seeks to investigate *why* such tensions exist. It begins with the assumption that police officers' evaluations of police oversight agents/agencies may affect the success of the

mechanisms that are meant to instill public trust and accountability in the police. It is additionally galvanized by my desire to understand why police officers evaluate these agents/agencies positively or negatively.

I queried: On what specific grounds do police officers accept, tolerate or reject the legitimacy of civilian oversight agents/agencies? Do police officers differentiate between civilian oversight agencies and have positive/negative evaluations of some but not others (e.g., police services boards, the SIU, and the OIPRD)? Do the majority of police officers prefer internally-led accountability mechanisms (i.e., those staffed by police personnel) over those accountability mechanisms controlled by civilians? What socio-demographic factors are associated with positive or negative attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms? Are there process-based improvements that could promote police officers' positive assessment of civilian oversight agents/agencies? In investigating these and other important questions, my dissertation seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the sociological/criminological literature on policing and professional regulation.

1.2.1 The Incidence of Police Misconduct in Ontario

"Police misconduct" is an umbrella term for police behaviour that violates the law or brings discredit to the profession (Champion, 2001: 2). Although this term denotes inappropriate behaviour on the part of police officers "that is either illegal or immoral or both" (Champion, 2001: 2), there is limited consensus in previous literature on what constitutes "police misconduct"; this social construct may refer to a wide variety of overlapping categories.[1]

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[1] Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert (1994) identified four types of police deviance:
- *Police crime* (illegal actions by officers, on- or off-duty);
- *Occupational deviance* (both criminal and non-criminal conduct, on-duty);
- *Corruption* (on-duty actions related to economic gain such as theft, bribery, fraud, etc.);

Therefore, it is useful to clarify the types of allegations/investigations that police officers in Ontario face in relation to professional misconduct and identify the organizations which are involved in their resolution.

Table 1-1: 2014-2015 SIU Annual Report: Occurrences by Fiscal Year

Types of Occurrences	2014-2015 totals
Custody Injuries	154 (57.9%)
Sexual Assault Allegations	41 (15.4%)
Vehicular Injuries	38 (14.3%)
Custody Deaths	12 (4.5%)
Firearm Deaths	6 (2.3%)
Vehicular Deaths	6 (2.3%)
Other Injuries/Deaths	6 (2.3%)
Firearm Injuries	3 (1.1%)
TOTAL	266

2014-2015 SIU Annual Report (p. 23): http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/siu_ar_2014_15_ltr_final.pdf

Allegations of criminal behaviour among police officers in Ontario are investigated by the SIU and internal police investigators (i.e., Professional Standards Bureaus). The SIU has the authority to investigate and charge police officers in Ontario with criminal offences pertaining to investigations involving serious injury, death or allegations of sexual assault. Based on statistics from the SIU's 2014-2015 annual report, the top three allegations/investigations stemmed from the following circumstancs: "Custody Injuries" (57.9%); "Sexual Assault Allegations" (15.4%);

- *Abuse of authority* (which may constitute *physical* abuse or excessive force, *verbal* abuse, or *legal* abuse, which are violations of citizens' rights). Carter (1985: 322) defined *abuse of authority* as "any action by a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, tread on human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency."

and "Vehicular Injuries" (14.3%) (See *Table 1-1*). Only 13 (5.1%) of cases of the 253 SIU

investigations processed in the 2014-2015 fiscal year resulted in criminal charges against police

officers (SIU, 2015: 30).

The OIPRD does not investigate, recommend or lay criminal charges (OIPRD, 2014: 9).

However, the OIPRD oversees complaints against police officers in a wide variety of on- and

off-duty situations. As detailed in the 2013-2014 annual report of the OIPRD (OIPRD, 2014: 9),

people can make a complaint if they:

- Have a concern or were offended by something a police officer(s) said or did to them;
- Were a witness to an incident involving a police officer(s) that concerned or offended them;
- Are concerned or distressed as a result of the way a relative or friend has been treated by a police officer(s);…
- Have a complaint that a police department has not provided proper service;
- Have a complaint about a policy of a police department;

Sections 80 and 81 of the *Police Services Act* (1990) set out the categories under which police

officers in Ontario may be found guilty of misconduct; the *Code of Conduct* (Ontario Regulation

268/10) identifies acts which are subject to investigation/discipline (see *Table 1-2*). The OIPRD

organizes the complaints they receive according to these categories. The top three allegations

filed in 2013-2014 were: "Discreditable conduct (46.8%) (which applies to a wide range of on-

and off-duty conduct); "Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority (31.7%); and "Neglect of

Duty" (17%) (OIPRD, 2014: 7; 49). The 2014 OIPRD annual report reveals that wrongdoing by

police was "substantiated" in only a small number of cases between April 1, 2013 and March 31,

2014. Of 2697 allegations, 181 (6.7%) were "substantiated"; 109 were deemed "less serious"

and 72 "serious" (OIPRD, 2014: 27).

Table 1-2: 2013-2014 OIPRD Annual Report: Conduct Allegations

Type of Allegation	2013-2014 totals
Discreditable conduct	1,262 (46.8%)
Unlawful/unnecessary exercise of authority	855 (31.7%)
Neglect of duty	458 (17%)
Deceit	42 (1.6%)
Insubordination	34 (1.3%)
Corrupt practice	29 (1.1%)
Breach of confidence	17 (0.6%)
Consume drugs/ alcohol prejudicial to duty	0
Damage to clothing or equipment	0
Total conduct complaints	2697
2013-2014 OIPRD Annual Report (p 50-51): http://www.oiprd.on.ca/EN/PDFs/Annual-Report-2013-2014_E.pdf	

Individual police services in Ontario are frequently involved in both SIU and OIPRD

investigations, primarily through their respective Professional Standards Bureaus. The vast

majority of cases reviewed and managed by the OIPRD (89.4% of cases between 2013-2014) are

"referred" (back) to the police service in which the complaint originated and are formally

investigated by that service's internal police investigators (OIPRD, 2014: 21). Furthermore,

when police officers are investigated by civilians for alleged criminal wrongdoing, internal

police investigators are tasked with conducting "parallel investigations" on behalf of the police

service in question. Section 11 of the *Police Services Act* (1990; Ontario Reg. 267/10) requires

police services in Ontario to conduct an internal investigation whenever an investigation by the

SIU has not resulted in the laying of criminal charges. In accordance with my research

agreement with the host police service (see *Chapter 4: Methods*), statistics pertaining to internal/SIU/OIPRD investigations involving police officers from the police service I studied are not presented in this study. Instead, I present statistics that cover all police services in Ontario.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework utilized in this study is unique. It evaluates police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms using the following separate but intertwined theoretical concepts: legitimacy, procedural justice and professionalism.

Legitimacy: This study differs from previous research efforts in that it evaluates police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario using the overarching theoretical concept of *legitimacy*. The origins of this concept are commonly traced back to Weber's work on *domination* ("*Herrschaft*"), *legitimacy*, and *legitimate domination* (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 126). Although there are various definitions of this concept, my research proceeds with the understanding of legitimacy as "the right to rule" or "the recognition of the right to govern" (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 124-125; see also Evetts, 2013: 783). As Tyler et al. (2007: 10) observed, "[w]hen people are influenced by an authority or institution not by means of the use of power but because they believe that the decisions made by that authority or institution are in some way 'right' or 'proper' and ought to be followed…then that authority is perceived as legitimate." My research examines police officers' perception of the legitimacy ("right to rule") of civilian oversight agents/agencies. It explores police officers' perceptions of (1) the capabilities of civilian oversight agents/agencies and (2) the quality and fairness of the investigative processes carried out by civilian oversight agents/agencies (i.e., procedural justice).

As discussed in greater detail in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, previous research has found that police officers commonly question the legitimacy of civilian oversight mechanisms and perceive that these agents/agencies lack the appropriate experience and knowledge that are believed necessary to evaluate police conduct. It is also common for police officers to accuse civilian review boards of an anti-police bias and to perceive that these mechanisms favour complainants and disfavour police. In consequence, it is not surprising that police officers often express a preference for (i) alleged police misconduct to be investigated by internal investigators (i.e., police officers) rather than civilian investigators and (ii) "civilian review" rather than "civilian investigation," with greater acceptance of civilians being involved in a "review capacity" of complaints/misconduct rather than in an investigative capacity.

Procedural justice: Building upon the work of De Angelis and Kupchik (2007; 2009), this study examines police officers' perceptions of "procedural justice" in relation to civilian oversight mechanisms. In this context, "***procedural justice"*** refers to perceptions of *fair and respectful treatment* by a person or group in authority during an investigative/administrative process. Previous research has noted that the perception of procedural justice is impacted by factors such as the quality and frequency of communication during an investigation, prompt notification of decisions, the politeness of investigators and an absence of bias (Dailey et al., 2006: 15; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 121).

The application of the procedural justice effect is primarily associated with the writings of Tom Tyler. Tyler has frequently examined citizens' feelings of satisfaction with various agents/agencies of social control such as the police (Tyler, 1990, 2003, 2004; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 2001; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler,

2003). However, to the best of my knowledge, only two studies have systematically applied the concept of procedural justice to the evaluation of police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms (e.g., De Angelis & Kupchik: 2007; 2009). The findings of these studies are included in the literature review which is the subject of *Chapter 3*.

Professionalism: My research is unique in evaluating police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms in the context of "professionalism." Although some have argued that police resistance to civilian oversight is symptomatic of a distinctive police subculture that is characterized by traits such as hostility toward the public, secrecy and strong group solidarity (e.g., Skolnick, 1966; Niederhoffer, 1967; Westley, 1970; Kreisel, 1998), others maintain that there is no pan-cultural and monolithic police culture or subculture and emphasize that police officers have diverse attitudes and opinions on any given subject, including civilian oversight (e.g., Sherman, 1980; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Kreisel, 1998; Paoline, 2003; De Angelis & Kupchik: 2007). My research considers police officers' resistance to civilian oversight within the discourse of "professionalism" and explores police officers' perceptions of *themselves* as "professionals" who deserve the autonomy to regulate their own occupational standards and professional conduct through internal mechanisms.

It is anticipated that some may baulk at my characterization of policing as a "profession." Thus, while some scholars have argued that policing should be considered a "profession" (Carlan & Lewis, 2009: 371; Evetts, 2003; 2006; 2012), others insist that policing is unlike occupations that have long been considered professions (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, accountants) (Potts, 1982; Fournier, 1999; Souryal, 2003; Murphy & McKenna, 2008). However, my study is not mired in the debate over whether policing is or is not a "profession" nor does it delve into the disparate definitions and characteristics attributed to "professionalism" or "professionalization"

(e.g., see Balthazard, 2010). Rather, it takes heed of Evetts' (2006: 134) report that debating the

"definitional precision" of professions is "now regarded more as a time-wasting diversion...it no

longer seems important to draw a hard and fast line between professions and occupations but,

instead, to regard both as similar social forms that share many common characteristics."

Accordingly, this study focuses upon the extent to which police officers accept, tolerate or reject

civilian oversight mechanisms and considers whether their attitudes toward these mechanisms

are grounded in an expressed desire for professional autonomy and the internal regulation that

other self-regulating professionals (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, accountants)

possess (Balthazard, 2010: 8).

Within the sociological discourse of professionalism, there is support for this endeavour. For

instance, Carlan & Lewis (2009: 372) built upon Hall's (1968) hallmarks of professionalism in

studying the police. According to Hall (1968) "professionalism" includes the following features:

> *Belief in self-regulation*...because it evinces the mentality that only colleagues
> possess the intellectual tools and expertise to judge the merits of their work...(and)
> *autonomy*—the freedom to make decisions without interference from others.

Other scholars, such as Friedson (1984: 19) and Blakely (2006: 230), identified professionalism

as including occupational autonomy and the ability to retain regulation over occupation standards.

Moreover, in addressing police discomfort with civilian oversight mechanisms, Porter and Prenzler

(2012: 157; see also Lewis, 1991: 171) implicitly suggested that police may perceive these

mechanisms as corrosive of their professional autonomy:

> Historically, internal (police) investigators have been criticized for a real or
> perceived lack of independence. Indeed, it is these criticisms that have led to
> systems of independent (civilian) oversight. However, it is often argued that not
> allowing police to handle conduct matters themselves removes internal responsibility
> for the professional standards of the organization and encroaches on the job of police,
> as employers, to manage their staff.

Other research, discussed in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, has found that police officers often claim that civilians lack the proper expertise, objectivity and knowledge about police work to be effective in the oversight and investigation of police conduct.

1.4 Methods

As outlined in *Chapter 4: Methods*, this project employs a mixed methods approach to assess police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms, namely through the administration of a survey questionnaire and qualitative interviews with police officers and other key stakeholders.

It extends the literature by comprehensively analyzing police officers' attitudes regarding *multiple* and *co-existing* civilian oversight agencies (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU, and the OIPRD) in a single jurisdiction. Moreover, its Canadian (Ontario) focus would seem useful inasmuch as the vast majority of previous research has been conducted in the United States. Rather than presuming that the attitudes of police officers regarding civilian oversight are identical across jurisdictions, it is anticipated that the attitudes of Canadian police officers could differ from their American counterparts and reveal yet-another "continental divide" (Lipset, 1990). Indeed, this seemed a distinct possibility in light of Landau's (2000: 64) assertion that the "Province of Ontario, Canada, has long been considered a pioneer in the development and implementation of civilian review of public complaints against the police."[2]

In embarking upon this research, I noted that research on the evolution of civilian oversight of policing in Canada has focused on the attitudes and experiences of *civilians rather than police officers* (e.g., Lewis, 1991; Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Schulenberg & Chatterjee, 2013).

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[2] See also Lewis, 1991: 153-175.

Although this research reports that civilians generally believe that police cannot be trusted to "police themselves" (Forcese, 1999: 207; Lewis, 1999; Prenzler, 2004: 86), it is notable that citizens' complaints about the quality of treatment they receive during police investigations of their complaints against the police are markedly similar to those voiced by police officers themselves; both suggest a need to recognize the import of "procedural justice" (Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Watt, 1991; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, 2009).

An assessment of police experiences and perceptions of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian oversight mechanisms may help to improve relationships between police officers and the agencies that scrutinize their conduct. My goal in conducting this research was to strengthen the existing systems that oversee and manage policing accountability in Ontario and, by doing so, strengthen the relationship between the police and the communities they serve.

1.5 Scope of the research project

As outlined in *Chapter 4: Methods*, a mixed methods sequential explanatory research design was employed to assess the experiences and perceptions of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian oversight. This project received formal support from *The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police* (OACP), *The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards* (OAPSB) and *The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation* (CACP-RF).

On October 24, 2013, I entered into a formal research agreement with a large Ontario police service to administer a survey questionnaire to their sworn membership. *The research agreement stipulated that the identity of the host police service and the identities of all participants would not be publically disclosed.* This arrangement was approved by the University of Waterloo's Office of Research Ethics.

1.5.1 Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire

The survey questionnaire was launched on January 6, 2014. It was designed to assess the perceptions and experiences of police officers regarding civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario. It was composed of six sections. Specifically, it sought to ascertain information on:

- Section 1 – Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
- Section 2 – Civilian Oversight: General Questions
- Section 3 – Police Services Boards
- Section 4 – SIU
- Section 5 – OIPRD
- Section 6 – Professional Standards Bureau

The survey was distributed to the entire sworn membership of the host police service through FluidSurveys, a Canadian software/survey company. A recruitment email message (and subsequent reminder message) was sent to every sworn officer with the host police service, inviting them to participate in the survey. On January 8, 2014, an electronic message was posted on the police service's intranet site that verified the legitimacy of the study and reinforced the support provided by senior management and the sponsoring organizations.

The survey questionnaire invitation was sent via email to the work email accounts of 6359 potential respondents (all of whom are currently-serving sworn police officers). There were 285 potential respondents whose invitations were rejected ("bounced back") for a variety of reasons (e.g., full email accounts). As a result, the final sample frame was adjusted to 6074 potential respondents.

After 44 days of availability, the survey closed on February 18, 2014. The response rate was 26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 6074 potential responses). Worldwide, this represents the

largest known sample of survey responses to a survey that has sought information from police

officers on their perceptions of civilian oversight (e.g., Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter, 2013).[3]

1.5.2 Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews

Police Officer Interviews: At the end of the survey questionnaire, participants were invited to

contact the researcher to participate in semi-structured interviews by telephone or in-person on a

voluntary basis. The purpose of these interviews was to conduct a more detailed probe of the

same issues and themes covered in the survey questionnaire. Fifty-one police officers contacted

me to express interest in participating. Between January 6 and May 1, 2014, efforts were made

to coordinate interviews with all interested participants. In total, 40 semi-structured interviews

with police officers from the host service were conducted by telephone. All participants

provided verbal or written consent prior to each interview. These interviews were transcribed

and coded for analysis using NVivo software.

Stakeholder Representative Interviews: Requests were made with all stakeholder agencies to

interview a representative from the organization about their involvement in the oversight of

police officers in Ontario/Canada. My respondents discussed the successes they have enjoyed to

date as well as the challenges they have experienced. During mid-to-late 2014 and early 2015, I

conducted interviews with senior executive representatives from the following six stakeholder

organizations:

- The host police service
- OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police Review Director
- OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police Services Boards
- CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance
- CACP-RF - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation

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[3] This claim is based on the evaluation of all known studies cited in *Chapter 3: Literature Review* and Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter's 2013 study which contains an analysis of research that has specifically assessed police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms worldwide dating back to 1994.

- OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police

The following stakeholder organizations declined to participate in these interviews:

- Police Association representatives from the host police service
- PAO – Police Association of Ontario
- CPA – Canadian Police Association
- SIU – Special Investigations Unit

Further details regarding the planning, administration and findings from this research project are discussed in the following chapters.

1.6   Conclusion of *Chapter 1: Introduction and Background*

The remaining chapters in this dissertation are:

- *Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada*
- *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*
- *Chapter 4: Methods*
- *Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis*
- *Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis*
- *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion*
- *Chapter 8: Recommendations and Conclusions*

In *Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada*, I discuss the events that culminated in creation of the oversight and accountability mechanisms that currently govern police practices in Ontario. This brief history is intended to illuminate the context in which civilian oversight mechanisms have developed in Ontario. The events of the past few decades are, I submit, important in understanding the attitudes that are expressed by the police officers in this study.

Chapter 2
Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada

This chapter provides an overview of the factors and initiatives that have culminated in the creation of the oversight and accountability mechanisms that currently govern police practices in Canada, with particular attention paid to the evolution of oversight mechanisms in Ontario. It reveals that, through a culmination of significant events, governmental inquiries and legislative initiatives, there has been a meandering but inexorable movement towards increased civilian control of police conduct in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada.

2.1 Police accountability and civilian oversight

Goldsmith (1995: 112-113) defined *police accountability* as the "processes whereby the behaviour of police is brought into conformity with requirements of the encapsulating society." He noted that police accountability is an inclusive term that encompasses "every aspect of administration of an agency, including, for example, its operating efficiency, its hiring and promotion practices, and its fiscal management" as well as "responsibility for the conduct of individual employees" (1995: 112-113). Further, Goldsmith (1995: 110) emphasized that the public complaints procedure for a given police service is to be understood as simply one of several formal methods that may be employed to ensure and/or enhance police accountability. For example, other measures may include criminal prosecutions, internal disciplinary proceedings, civil suits, political initiatives and media coverage. However, Goldsmith (1995: 110) asserted that "debates concerning trends in, causes of, and solutions to complaints against police conduct in many respects have come to symbolize the entire question of police accountability" in democratic nations such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia and New Zealand (see also Landau, 2000: 64).

Miller and Merrick (2002: 1) described civilian oversight of police as a process that "involves people from outside the police taking a role in calling the police to account for their actions, policies and organization." Goldsmith (1999: 36) referred specifically to the "involvement of non-police personnel in the reception, investigation, and determination of citizens' complaints about police conduct" in his preferred definition of "civilian oversight." Although there is variation in the types of police complaint systems adopted across provincial, national and international jurisdictions (to be later discussed in this chapter), the most common system in Western nations entails civilians monitoring or supervising police officer-led investigations of alleged misconduct (Goldsmith, 1999: 36).

2.1.1 International context of police oversight and accountability

The management and oversight of alleged misconduct and complaints against the police in Canada has undergone significant changes over the last forty years. Landau (2000) observed that most of the discussion throughout the 1980s and 1990s by police scholars, police reformers and commissions of inquiry pertained to the effectiveness of internal versus external forms of police oversight. However, she remarked that the debate has evolved to the extent that "there is no longer much question as to whether the public should be subject to some sort of external review in their handling of public complaints against the police. Instead, current discussion centres on what *form* that review should take" (Landau, 2000: 63, emphasis added). These sentiments were echoed by Paul Kennedy (Canada, 2009a: x), the chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC); according to Kennedy, "What is at issue today is no longer whether civilian review is desirable, but rather, how civilian involvement in investigations can be most effective."

Kerstetter (1985: 180) summarized succinctly the paradox of citizen oversight: "the review of misconduct allegations is so important that it should use police expertise, but is also too important to be left solely to police administrative discretion." In many respects, "[t]he verdict is still out on whether citizen oversight represents an effective way to ensure police officers and departments provide quality services" (Wells & Schafer, 2007: 21). However, regardless of the actual effectiveness of civilian-led systems, they are ultimately intended to assuage the widely-held perception that the police cannot trusted to police themselves "even when they are perfectly capable of doing so, and even when they make the right decision" (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 224).

Goldsmith (1995: 113-114) observed that in virtually every Western, English-speaking country, "various forms of misconduct have come to constitute a perennial problem for police administrators from a disciplinary as well as public relations perspective." Forcese (1999: 207) noted growing concerns by the public over the police handling of internally-led accountability mechanisms:

> Police misconduct, in all its forms, has precipitated numerous efforts by the public - most of them unsuccessful - to establish more effective control or investigative access to their police services. Characteristically, the police have been allowed to investigate themselves, in the presumption that misconduct is rare, and that the investigative resources necessary for an enquiry require police expertise. The public, however, have frequently mistrusted police self-investigations.

Forcese (1999: 221) observed that since the 1960s, many Western nations have attempted to implement civilian oversight bodies that scrutinize police behaviour. However, he noted that such agencies have had "mixed success, and interrupted lifespans, as they have been disliked and lobbied against by police officers, and deemed costly and inefficient by many politicians" (Forcese, 1999: 221).

As noted earlier, research has found routinely that police officers express a preference for investigations into alleged misconduct to be handled through internal rather than external agencies. Yet, despite police assurances about the integrity of internal systems, many citizens are leery of the fairness of these systems and bristle at their lack of transparency. For instance, Mendes (1999: 24-25) declared that "(t)he system of internal review of police misconduct is clearly designed to be kept at a low profile and work within an existing police collegiality or culture." Successive governments in Canada, at both the federal and provincial level, have confronted increased pressures to enact mechanisms that will simultaneously curb police misconduct and engender greater transparency and accountability in policing practices. This situation is not unique to Canada; it is also discernible in relation to the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia and New Zealand (Smith, 2009: 421; Porter & Prenzler, 2012: 152).

In addition, previous research has noted the development of civilian-oversight initiatives in the Netherlands and Sweden (e.g., McMahon, 1988: 301), South Africa (e.g., Manby, 2000), Israel (e.g., Herzog, 2000), the Philippines (e.g., de Guzman, 2004), Brazil (e.g., Mendes, 1999), and other South American countries (e.g., Neild, 2000)[4]. In an evaluation of different systems around the world, Prenzler (2004: 85) found that "there is now an accelerating trend for civilian agencies to go beyond review to engage directly in investigations and to have much greater input into disciplinary decisions." [5]

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[4] The evolution of police oversight mechanisms in nations outside of Canada is beyond the scope of this study. The Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement has published a collection of links to agencies devoted to civilian oversight of police in the United States (http://www.cacole.ca/resources/links/usL-eng.shtml) and internationally (http://www.cacole.ca/resources/links/interL-eng.shtml).

[5] For a comprehensive description and accounting of civilian oversight mechanisms worldwide, see: Canada, Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. (2009). *Police Investigating Police: Final Public Report*.

Before delving into a brief history of the events and factors that have shaped civilian oversight mechanisms in Canada, I will provide a snapshot of the current status of policing in Canada, with a particular focus on Ontario, followed by an overview of mechanisms that typically govern and control police behaviour in this Canadian province.

2.1.2   The current status of policing in Canada

Policing in Canada: Policing the vast geographical expanse of Canada requires the coordinated efforts of federal, provincial, municipal and First Nations services. In illustration, while "First Nations communities have their own municipal policing" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 5-6), the federal government's First Nations Policing Policy "manages various types of arrangements including self-administered policing and the use of dedicated officers from existing police services such as the RCMP (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 5-6).[6]

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) "provides one-third of all public police officers in Canada (including the RCMP's federal police duties in eight of ten provinces in which the RCMP has contractual arrangements to provide police services)" (Sossin, 2007: 113-114). Although municipal or provincial police (e.g., the Ontario Provincial Police [OPP]; the Sûreté du Québec [SQ]) provide policing in Ontario and Quebec, "residents of western and maritime Canada are policed either by municipal police services or by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Ottawa: Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. Retrieved November 21, 2011: https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/police-investigating-police-final-public-report

[6] Additional information about Aboriginal policing in Canada is available at Public Safety Canada's website: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/brgnl-plcng/index-eng.aspx

through its municipal, provincial, or territorial policing provided under contract" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 5). In Newfoundland and Labrador, there is an absence of municipal police services. The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary polices the major municipalities in this jurisdiction, with the RCMP responsible for rural policing (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 5). Nevertheless, the vast majority of Canadians (approximately two-thirds) reside in locales policed by "stand-alone municipal police services" (e.g., Halifax Regional Police, Ottawa Police Service, Vancouver Police Department) (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 6). "Many, but not all, municipal police services are governed by police commissions or police services boards, established by provincial legislation" (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 84-85). All 254 police services across Canada, including the RCMP, have police unions/associations that represent their officers' interests (MacCharles, 2015).

Policing in Ontario: There are approximately sixty municipal police services in Ontario which range widely in size and jurisdiction (Lesage, 2005: 7). For example, Lesage (2005: 7) reported that the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) is tasked with policing parts of the province that lack municipal police services and additionally "police certain navigable waters, patrol highways, and maintain investigative services to assist municipal forces." He also noted that "(v)ast geographic areas of Ontario are policed neither by the OPP nor by municipal services, but by First Nations police services" (2005: 14). However, in the absence of a treaty agreement, policing on reserves is carried out by the OPP (2005: 14).

2.1.3 Mechanisms of police accountability

There are a wide range of different mechanisms that formally govern police conduct and attempt to instill and enforce accountability. Listed below are some of the most important and obvious mechanisms of police accountability in Canada.

Government, legislation and police services boards

Martin (2007: 261-2) observed that "(d)espite their common-law roots, police services are creatures of statute and both their scope of practice and the modes of accountability are located in the legislation that creates them." For example, in Ontario, the authority for police action stems from the *Police Services Act* (1990) and from the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services, who oversees all police services and police services boards and is also responsible for issuing policy directives and regulations (Martin, 2007: 261-2).

Police services boards "fulfill a major civilian oversight role throughout Ontario" (Lesage, 2005: 10). Sossin (2007: 106-107) noted that police service boards "act as a buffer between political direction from the government on the one hand and the operational control of police investigations by the chief of police on the other." Although police services boards in Ontario are responsible for effective management policies for the police service, they do not dictate "specific operational decisions" nor the "day-to-day operation of the police force" (Sossin, 2007: 106-107).

As mandated by the *Police Services Act*, every municipality that maintains a police service is required to maintain a board. The *Police Services Act* details the requirements for municipal, regional and provincial board appointees, with these requirements based primarily on the population of the involved community. The boards are to represent community interests and are accountable to the Ministry of Community Safety & Correctional Services and the Toronto-

based Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) (Ottawa Police Service, 2015). The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB) and the Canadian Association of Police Governance (CAPG) represent the interests of most municipal police services boards across Ontario and Canada, respectively.

According to the OAPSB (2012: 4), there are three different types of police services boards in Ontario: Section 31 (*Police Services Act*) boards, which act as the employer of municipal police services; Section 10 (*Police Services Act*) boards, which monitor the provision of OPP (Ontario Provincial Police) services in those municipalities with OPP service contracts; and First Nations police services boards. Lesage (2005: 11) identified the mandate of police services boards in Ontario as "one of oversight, general management and the setting of policy." Included among the major responsibilities of police services boards are "the appointment of police officers, the establishment of objectives and priorities for the police service, the establishment of policies for effective management of the police service, and the hiring and evaluation of the police chief and deputy chiefs" (Lesage, 2005: 10).

Section 31(1) of the *Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c. P. 15* specifies that "boards may establish guidelines for dealing with complaints against police, and may review the chief's administration of the complaints system" (OIPRD, 2015a). For those municipalities that have contracted services from the OPP, "the police board's responsibilities regarding public complaints are limited to reviewing the detachment commander's administration of the public complaints system, and receiving regular reports from the detachment commander on the administration of the system" (OIPRD, 2015a).

Internal disciplinary mechanisms (Professional Standards Bureaus)

Individual officers may be subject to internal discipline by the police service to which they belong for a wide range of breaches of internal policies and procedures or other forms of legislation. With few exceptions, officers in Canada are subject to follow all federal, provincial and municipal laws and regulations. Codes of conduct impose standards of professional conduct and create other forms of actionable wrongs. For example, "misconduct," as defined within Ontario's *Police Services Act*, ranges from "quasi-criminal abuse of authority, withholding of services, or the inducement to misconduct of another officer in breach of the code of conduct of a municipal police service to more strictly job-related behavior concerning dress and appearance, firearms, personal property or money, punctuality, and the like" (Martin, 2007: 263). The *Police Services Act* also lays out a range of potential sanctions for misconduct. These sanctions include forfeiture of pay, suspension, demotion, resignation, and dismissal.

Criminal and provincial legal proceedings

Various scholars have noted that in countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, complaints against police officers are rarely substantiated and police officers are rarely charged with criminal offences (e.g., Smith, 2004: 28; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 229; Perez, 1994: 179-181). At the cusp of the new millennium, Prenzler (2000: 662) noted that the "low substantiation rates by civilian review bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent have been described as an 'international phenomenon'." As noted in *Chapter 1*, these findings are consistent with Ontario data; few officers are charged by either the SIU and OIPRD. In 2013/2014, for example, only 11 (3.5 percent) police officers in Ontario were charged in the SIU's probe of 318 incidents (Gillis, 2015a). Similarly, between April 1, 2013 and March 31,

2014, only 181 (6.7 percent) of the 2697 allegations filed with the OIPRD were "substantiated" with 109 deemed "less serious" and 72 adjudged "serious" (OIPRD, 2014: 27).

Martin (2007: 265) remarked that "(h)olding individual police officers accountable through direct criminal charges, especially around the use of force, has proved largely unsuccessful" since, even in the exceptional cases when convictions or guilty pleas occur, the sentences do not "carry the severity of punishment that is usually regarded as serving a deterrent function." [7]

Police officers' actions and decisions are also "scrutinized daily in the justice system, starting with the review of charges performed by a crown attorney" (Martin, 2007: 265). When police officers lay charges and initiate legal proceedings against citizens, their documented accounts are dissected by both crown attorneys and defense counsel. The conduct of individual officers can also be scrutinized and challenged in open court proceedings (Bruser & McLean, 2012; Van Alphen, 2013). Court proceedings and all records (e.g., notes, emails, reports) and documentation produced by the police become matters of public record and can potentially be retrieved through "freedom of information" legislation. More than two decades ago, Stenning (1995: 60) asserted that "freedom of information" legislation is crucial to the "modern public accountability of governments" and is always coupled with "privacy legislation" which works to

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[7] According to Bruser and Henry (2010), former SIU Director, Ian Scott, "noted (in 2004) that police officers accused of using excessive force stood a less than one-in-five chance of facing the same level of justice as civilians accused of similar crimes." Scott wrote in 2004, "(i)t is an ineffective use of state resources to investigate, charge and prosecute cases in which the high probability is...acquittal." Bruser and Henry further reported that Scott proposed that some SIU cases could be more adequately adjudicated by the OCPC, "an independent oversight agency, where they could be fined or fired…(whereby) a commission verdict would act as a 'deterrent' to police misconduct." Scott's proposal was not implemented.

Roberts (2004: 23; see also Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, 2007) reported that public opinion research conducted over recent decades has found that most members of the public in Canada "underestimate the severity of sentencing trends. This is part of a general public perspective on criminal justice that sees the system as more lenient than is in fact the case."

balance "the need for public accountability, on the one hand with the need to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy of the individual citizens, on the other."

Civil suits

Aggrieved citizens may file civil suits against individual "police officers, police authorities, and boards and executive bodies" (Sossin, 2007: 115-116). However, Forcese (1999: 227) has emphasized that "while the police officers have the support very often of their association," the cost of civil proceedings may well be prohibitive for some citizens. He additionally cautioned citizens that "(t)here is also the prospect of counter-charges, and counter-suit, as was apparently being practiced in Toronto for a period by the police force, police association, or the municipal authorities." In observing the infrequency of successful Canadian civil court actions against police officers, Forcese suggested that the unfortunate message conveyed may be "that police are immune from prosecution for negligence and actions arising in the performance of their duty."

Nevertheless, Martin (2007: 266-267) stressed that civil suits against the police can serve as an important "accountability and supervisory function." For example, the case of *Jane Doe v Metropolitan Toronto Police* (1998), addressed the issues of whether there was a private law duty of care or, more specifically, whether the police had a duty to warn the public that there was a serial rapist operating in a particular area of the city and a duty to issue a protective warning to women in the area that the rapist targeted women of a certain profile (Sossin, 2007: 115-116). In this landmark case, the Court held that the police owed a duty of care to the women who had resided in the neighbourhood that the rapist targeted and had failed in their duty to protect these women. In awarding Jane Doe $220,000 in damages (which, with interest, amounted to almost $500,000), the Court held that the police had violated the plaintiff's equality rights and right to security of person and that the police had adduced no evidence to justify these Charter breaches.

Coroner's inquests, investigative units, and media attention

Another form of scrutiny and accountability comes into effect when deaths or serious injuries

occur when individuals are in the custody or care of the police. For example, in Ontario, "the

coroner has a duty to investigate and hold an inquest into all deaths that occur while a person is

'detained by or in the actual custody of a peace officer" and "inquests into police-related deaths

in Ontario have developed into significant opportunities for public scrutiny" (Martin, 2007: 267).

In jurisdictions such as Ontario and Alberta, specialized civilian-led investigative teams (e.g.,

Special Investigations Unit [SIU] & Alberta Serious Incident Response Team [ASIRT]) become

involved when death or serious injury occurs in police presence. These units will be discussed

later in the chapter.

When officers are accused of wrongdoing, they may face any of the above forms of

accountability and scrutiny, singularly or simultaneously. For any of the above interventions,

intense media attention may result. As Martin (2007: 265) pointed out, "[a]ll of these sites of

legal decision making have the potential for generating public attention and may have significant

consequences for the individuals and police services involved." It remains uncertain to what

extent, if any, media attention to acts of wrongdoing by police officers exerts a deterrent effect

upon future acts of misconduct among police officers. However, it is evident that news stories

about alleged police misconduct involving the use of force are accorded prominent positioning in

the print media and news broadcasts. For example, in September 2015, the *Toronto Star* featured

a 4-part series about police officers across Ontario who remain employed despite their

involvement in various forms of "serious misconduct" (e.g., Poisson & McLean, 2015a, 2015b;

McLean & Poisson, 2015a, 2015b).

Several recent high-profile incidents in Canada and the United States have also generated intense media coverage. For example, the 2013 death of Sammy Yatim during an engagement with the Toronto Police Service "sparked national outrage against police use of force after a bystander posted a cellphone video of the shooting to YouTube" (Fatima, 2014). The involved police officer, Constable James Forcillo, was acquitted of second-degree murder but found guilty of attempted murder. At the time of writing, Forcillo's legal counsel has appealed this verdict. This case, among others, has fueled widespread debate in Ontario about police use of force (e.g., firearms, conducted energy weapons) and interactions with persons with mental illness. In 2014, the Honourable Mr. Justice Frank Iacobucci, a retired Supreme Court judge, produced a report for the Toronto Police Service which included among its recommendations: enhanced mental health training and protocols for police; the outfitting of officers with body-worn cameras; and conducted energy weapons for first responders (Mahoney & Hui, 2014).

In the United States, there were several high-profile incidents in 2014-2015 that sparked outrage about the conduct of police. In July, 2014, for example, Eric Garner, an African-American who the police suspected of selling "loosies" (single cigarettes), died after being arrested and placed in a chokehold by officers from the New York City Police Department (Baker, Goodman & Mueller, 2015). Although the Staten Island, New York grand jury decided not to indict the officer who used the chokehold, "Mr. Garner's final words – 'I can't breathe' – repeated 11 times became a national rallying cry" in protests around the country (Goodman, 2015). In August, 2014, the police shooting of an unarmed African-American teenager, Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri sparked international attention and allegations of systemic racism in American policing practices. The shooting prompted protests in the area for weeks and these protests were redoubled by the November 24, 2014 announcement that a grand jury had decided

against indicting the police officer who had shot Brown (Buchanan et al., 2015). These incidents "set off a national debate about police actions in minority communities and racial discrimination in the criminal justice system" (Goodman, 2015).

In April and May, 2015 protests and violent riots erupted in Baltimore, Maryland following the death of a third African-American man, Freddie Gray, "who died after suffering a spinal cord injury in police custody" (Stolberg, 2015). Six police officers who were involved in the arrest of Gray were suspended with pay pending an investigation and were subsequently charged with "second-degree assault, reckless endangerment and misconduct in office"; two officers face manslaughter charges and one officer "faces an additional charge of second-degree murder" (CBC, 2015). Press coverage of this case emphasized repeatedly that Gray's death was best understood "as a national symbol of police mistreatment of black men" in America and stressed that this incident had "renewed long-simmering tensions between residents of (Baltimore)…and a police force with a history of aggressive [and] sometimes brutal behavior" (Stolberg, 2015).

These tragic incidents have captured much media attention in North America and beyond. It would seem likely that the content of this coverage has impacted public perceptions of the police and led at least some to view the police with suspicion and distrust. These negative perceptions may also be bolstered by the content of what appears on the internet. Thus, Whyte (2009) noted that in "the YouTube era, a surfeit of police brutality videos instantly accessible online – a huge number of beatings, and occasional, sensational shootings has cast a growing shadow over police behaviour everywhere" (see also Goldsmith, 2010).

2.2 Landmark events demanding police accountability in Canada

According to Sossin (2007: 107-108), "public inquests, inquiries, reviews, and task forces examining police structures, activities, and/or accountability…[have] arguably become the norm

rather than the exception in Canada in the past generation at all levels of government and even within many policing organizations." Over the past four decades, he observed, inquiries into controversial policing practices have been initiated for a wide variety of reasons: "Some are forward-looking catalysts for policy reform. Some are launched in order to serve political ends by extricating the government from a thorny controversy; other inquiries themselves become thorny controversies for the government." Yet, Sossin asserted that one of the central functions of such reviews, inquests and inquiries is to disentangle "problems relating to individual police officers and leaders from problems relating to structures, arrangements, and systems."

Mendes (1999: 25) noted that many of the high-profile public inquiries in Canada in the 1980s and early 1990s not only led to public demands for "guarantees of effect of police accountability" but they also provided "a catalyst for the establishment of civilian oversight agencies across the country" (see also Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 11). Among the inquiries he credits with such impact are: "*the Marin Commission in 1976*, *the McDonald Commission on the RCMP in 1980*, *the Marshall Inquiry in Nova Scotia in 1989*, (and) *the Harper Inquiry in Manitoba in 1991*" (Mendes, 1999: 25). Mendes directly linked these inquiries and commissions with the emergence of enhanced forms of civilian oversight across Canada.

> Not surprisingly around the same time, the provinces of Manitoba in 1987, British Columbia in 1989 and the province of Québec in 1990 established various forms of civilian oversight of policing. The federal Parliament in an amendment to the RCMP Act in 1986 established the RCMP Public Complaints Commission and the new public complaints process became effective in 1988. In the province of Ontario, the government established a 'pilot' civilian oversight agency in Toronto in 1981 which eventually was replaced by a province-wide police complaints system in 1991 under the jurisdiction of the office of the Public Complaints Commissioner.

These above inquiries and initiatives, among others, will be further discussed throughout this chapter. The following section discusses the impact of some of the most notable inquiries and commissions that addressed police conduct in Canada in recent decades.

Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (hereafter the "McDonald Commission")

Roach (2007: 35) declared that the McDonald Commission (Canada, 1981a, 1981b) "represents Canada's most sustained and considered examination of the proper relationship between the government and the police." The Commission was initiated by the 1976 criminal trial of three RCMP officers who were charged with breaking into a union office to steal documents (Roach, 1995: 277). The officers received an absolute discharge and this ruling, in turn, prompted questions about ministerial knowledge about the RCMP's engagment in the illegal acivity (Roach, 1995: 277). Later reports that the RCMP was engaged in "mail tampering, break-ins, theft and arson in their attention to the separatist movement in Québec" generated intense public criticism and severely tarnished the image of this iconic police agency (Forcese, 1999: 203).

Alberta judge David McDonald chaired the federal public inquiry which began in 1977 and lasted four years (Roach, 1995: 277). Although public attention was focused primarily on the scope of wrongdoing, the bulk of the Commission's report was "devoted to assessing the adequacy of the RCMP's policies and procedures and the legal and organizational framework of its security intelligence activities" (Roach, 1995: 277). The Commission made distinctions between independent acts (and actors) and those activities that were "institutionalized wrongdoings" and "accepted systemic practice" within the RCMP (Roach, 1995: 277). Furthermore, the Commission's investigation of knowledge by government ministers and senior

officials of illegal activities served as a warning to members to abstain from such conduct in the future (Roach, 1995: 277).

In noting that the McDonald Commission "was not bound by legal standards of liability and drew a distinction between unacceptable or improper activities and those 'not authorized by the law'", Roach (1995: 278-9) observed that the scope and mandate of the Commission were subject to criticism:

> The McDonald commission was more successful in assessing the organizational deficiencies of the RCMP than in holding individuals accountable for wrongs. Its organizational focus was criticized for excusing wrongful conduct by focusing on the larger context and making it more difficult to punish individual officers.

However, Roach concluded that the Commission was nevertheless "successful in creating organizational responsibility for wrongdoing and advocating organizational change." According to Forcese (1999: 206), the inquiry alerted Canadians to the importance of ensuring adequate public and government control and responsibility for policing. He identified the major outcome of the Commission as "a recommendation that the RCMP be divested of its security/intelligence functions and that a separate agency be established." In acting on this recommendation, the Government of Canada passed an Act of Parliament in 1984 which gave birth to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (1989) (hereafter the "Marshall Commission")

A public inquiry was initiated in 1986 to examine the wrongful conviction of Donald Marshall Jr., who was convicted of murder in 1971 (Nova Scotia, 1989). Following the reversal of Marshall's conviction in 1983 and legal proceeding against the Sydney (Nova Scotia) police force, three judges from outside Nova Scotia were appointed in 1986 to examine the "police investigation, prosecution, conviction and sentencing of Marshall and such other related matters"

that were deemed relevant to the inquiry (Roach, 1995: 280-284). Although the first part of the

Commission's report focused on the individuals responsible for the miscarriage of justice in

Marshall's wrongful conviction, the second part addressed the institutional and social context of

Marshall's case. The Commission's hearings criticized almost all of the individuals involved in

the processing of this case, including the "police, the prosecutor, the defence counsel, the trial

judge, and the Court of Appeal." The Commission offered a wide range of recommendations for

a multitude of stakeholders regarding the treatment of racial minorities in Nova Scotia.

In addition, the Marshall Commission scrutinized two cases in which Nova Scotia cabinet

ministers were the subject of criminal investigations and probed whether a "two tracked" justice

system existed in Nova Scotia. Their analysis concluded that the RCMP had failed in its

obligation to act independently and impartially of government influence and adjudged their

refusal to proceed with charges against the cabinet ministers without authorization from the

Department of the Attorney General as "'a dereliction of duty' and 'a failure to adhere to the

principle of police independence'" (Roach (2007: 46-47). Roach asserted that this report yielded

"some of the strongest findings ever in Canada about an improper relationship between police

and government."

***Public inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People (1991) (hereafter
"The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry")***
The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry (Manitoba, 1991a, 1991b) focused attention on two

violent events that became "signal crimes" (Innes, 2003) – the heinous rape-murder of a young

Indigenous woman, Helen Betty Osborne and the shooting death of J.J. Harper, an Aboriginal

man, by a Winnipeg police officer. In relation to the former, only one of the four men implicated

was convicted of murder (Roach, 1995: 285); a police investigation of the death of Harper

deemed it an "accidental" shooting. The two judges who chaired the Manitoba Justice Inquiry

were tasked with investigating the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the

administration of criminal justice. They considered the issue of systemic discrimination and

addressed alternative methods of responding to Aboriginal persons in conflict with the law.

These "widely publicized hearings" were "resisted strenuously by the police force and the police

association, as sensational allegations were made that allegedly demoralized the police"

(Forcese, 1999: 225).

Roach (1995: 286-27) claimed that this Commission "was arguably able to hold individuals,

organizations, and society accountable for their roles with respect to the Osborne and Harper

deaths," including individual officers, and the Winnipeg Police Service. He additionally noted

that events that had prompted their work were "portrayed as symptoms of systemic racism

towards (A)boriginal people, and to this extent Canadian society was held accountable for the

way in which its attitudes and actions contributed to the deaths." Winnipeg Police Service

officers were accused of harbouring racist attitudes and the Service was criticized for the conduct

of its officers in relation to Harper's illegal arrest and the investigative methods that were used

during the investigation of his death.

2.2.1   Other notable Canadian inquiries and legislative initiatives

- In 1982, the Québec Police Commission conducted an inquiry into the Trois-Rivières
  police service and "recommended that 39 charges be laid against 20 officers and former
  police officers for offenses such as armed robbery, assault, extortion, intimidation of
  witnesses, fabrication of evidence, theft, forgery, obstruction of justice, and perjury"
  (Forcese, 1999: 202).

- In 1984, the Nova Scotia Police Commission examined allegations of systemic
  misconduct by police in Kentville, Nova Scotia. As a result of this year-long inquiry, one

constable was dismissed, and several others were recommended for demotion or dissmissal, including the chief who was alleged to have tolerated excessive misconduct among numerous officers, including "beatings, racist remarks directed at [B]lacks, entrapment, unnecessary body searches, and [the] unjustified use of mace" (Forcese, 1999: 203).

- In 1992, following a highly publicized incident in which a citizen was shot by an armoured car guard, the government of British Columbia initiated an inquiry to examine all aspects of public policing and private security in the province (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 98). This inquiry, headed by Justice Wallace Oppal (British Columbia, 1994), recommended that the role of a "Police Complaint Commissioner" be created, with its occupant responsible for overseeing complaints about police conduct. This recommendation was acted upon and legislation toward this end was enacted in 1998 (Canada, 2009a: 156).

- *APEC Inquiry, 1997*
  Following the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vancouver, Justice Ted Hughes conducted an inquiry as a member of the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC) (Sossin, 2007: 112). In his 2001 report (Canada, 2001), Hughes concluded that the members of the RCMP who had provided security for the event had "'succumbed to government influence' in (their) efforts to coercively sequester protesters from the view of the summit delegates" (Sossin, 2007: 112).

- *Commission of Inquiry into Matters Related to the Death of Neil Stonechild – Saskatchewan, 2004*
  The Commission of Inquiry Into Matters Relating to the Death of Neil Stonechild (Saskatchewan, 2004) was initiated in 2003 by the Government of Saskatchewan to probe the 1990 death of Neil Stonechild. Stonechild, who was last seen in the custody of Saskatoon police, was found dead in a field outside of Saskatoon (Canada, 2009a: 6). The Commission headed by Justice D.H. Wright, released its report in 2004. The Commission identified "glaring deficiencies" in the investigation of the incident and found widespread

distrust and discord between the police and Aboriginal peoples. This inquiry was influential in the April 2006 creation of a new police oversight body, the Public Complaints Commission.

- *Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007*
  A public inquiry was commissioned by the Ontario Liberal government in 2003 to enquire into the September, 1995 death of Aboriginal protestor Dudley George; George was killed by an OPP officer in Ipperwash Provincial Park during an occupation over disputed land (CBC, 2007). Former Justice Sidney Linden conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances of George's death that lasted for almost four years (Ontario, 2007). His report concluded that "(t)he federal government, the provincial government and the OPP must all assume some responsibility for decisions or failures that increased the risk of violence and made a tragic confrontation more likely" (CBC, 2007). Linden recommended that the disputed land to be returned to the Stoney Point First Nation, with additional compensation. He also made numerous recommendations for future governmental and police handling of land and treaty claims and interactions with First Nations communities.

- *The Taser-related death of Robert Dziekanski, 2007*
  The October, 2007 death of Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski at the hands of four RCMP officers at the Vancouver Airport sparked international attention after amateur videotaped footage of the incident was released on the internet (see Goldsmith, 2010). Intense debate arose over the use of Conducted Energy Weapons (CEW), the actions taken by the involved officers and the RCMP's response to the event. This incident prompted two formal reports by the Chair of the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC). The first, *RCMP Use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW): Final Report* (Canada, 2008), recommended changes in relation to internal policy and procedure. The second, *Report Following a Public Interest Investigation into a Chair-Initiated Complaint Respecting the Death in RCMP Custody of Mr. Robert Dziekanski* (Canada, 2009b), advanced non-binding recommendations and roundly criticized the RCMP officers involved for their conduct both during and after the incident (Bailey, 2009). In addition, the *Braidwood Inquiry* (British Columbia, 2009), conducted by retired Justice Thomas

Braidwood on behalf of the provincial government of British Columbia, probed the use of CEWs in that province. It made recommendations regarding their use and inquired into the circumstances of Dziekanski's death (British Columbia, 2010).

- The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *R. v. McNeil*, 2009 SCC 3, (2009) 1d S.C.R. 66 was a landmark ruling that compels the police and the Crown Attorney to disclose all relevant history of misconduct, "where the police misconduct is either related to the investigation, or the finding of misconduct could reasonably impact on the case against the accused" (at para 15). In other words, when an officer has been found guilty of previous misconduct which may have relevance to matters/charges brought before the court, the officer's disciplinary record must be disclosed and can be scrutinized in open court. On this basis, an individual officer's credibility may be brought into question, thus jeopardizing the credibility of the charges at hand. This ruling means that a finding of guilt for serious misconduct may profoundly affect an officer's ability to bring charges and investigations before the court and may seriously jeopardize their entire career trajectory.

- ***Independent Civilian Review into Matters Relating to the G20 Summit (2012)***

  In June, 2010, Canada hosted the G8 Summit (Huntsville, Ontario) and G20 Summit (Toronto, Ontario). Considered in tandem, these summits have been described as "the largest security event in Canada's history" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41). Unfortunately, they were marred by "[p]roblems of coordination, leadership, and clarity of authority among policing groups" and by "violence, vandalism, excessive use of police force, and mass arrests" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41, 70; see also Morden 2012; McNeilly, 2012; Canada, 2012).

  In 2012, retired Court of Appeal Judge John Morden released an independent review (known widely as "The Morden Report") of policing at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto (Morden, 2012). Morden's report, which was commissioned by the Toronto Police Services Board, examined "everything from the command structure between police forces that weekend to the process behind the controversial decisions to kettle and mass arrest

protesters" (Morrow, 2012). His report criticized "the Toronto Police Services Board for a fundamental misunderstanding of its responsibilities – and incomprehension of the legal means and political levers available to it – for securing well-functioning and democratic policing in the municipality of Toronto" (Kempa, 2012). It charged that members of this board "knew nothing or were only dimly aware of major planning decisions before the G20. In other decisions, they took no part in setting directions" (Morrow, 2012; see also Gee, 2012). These findings sparked ongoing debate among police leaders and civilian oversight/governance leaders across Canada regarding the appropriate role of police services boards in overseeing the operational matters of the police (Kempa, 2012; Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41-42, 63).

Although a comprehensive treatment of events that have impacted public perceptions of police in Canada is well beyond the scope of this thesis, the abbreviated review of key events provided above is nevertheless useful. It underscores that issues, corrosive of public trust, have been discerned in the practices of Canadian police forces. The section which follows provides a brief summary of key events and factors which galvanized civilian oversight of police in Ontario.

2.3 The history of civilian oversight of police in Ontario

2.3.1   Toronto Police Service Reviews: 1970s and 1980s

The origins of civilian review of police conduct in Ontario have been traced to events in Toronto during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, Lesage (2005: 16) observed that the process of filing complaints against the police across the province during this time period was widely regarded as "closed and secretive, and there were major concerns about the lack of documentation." In response, civil libertarian and community groups, as well as politicians and the media, made public demands for greater accountability and oversight of police behaviour (McMahon, 1988: 304-305).

Allegations of misconduct from several minority groups about officers of the Metropolitan

Toronto Police Force (assigned to the area of Rochdale College) prompted a 1974 inquiry into

police complaints in Metropolitan Toronto (Lewis, Linden & Keene, 1986: 117). Justice

Maloney's report (Maloney, 1975) recommended that an independent civilian commissioner of

complaints be appointed (Lewis et al., 1986: 117). His report was followed by several other

inquiries of a similar nature. In illustration:

- In 1976, the Ontario government appointed Justice Donald Morand (Ontario, 1976) "to conduct a Royal Commission of inquiry into Metropolitan Toronto Police practices. His report recommended that the province establish an independent civilian review agency" (Lewis et al., 1986: 117).

- In 1976, the "Marin Commission" (Canada, 1976), a federally-commissioned inquiry led by Judge Rene Marin, "explored discipline, complaint and grievance processes within the RCMP" (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 90). Its recommendations "included the concept of a civilian component in the complaints-handling process" (Lewis et al., 1986: 117).

- In 1977, stemming from concerns regarding policing and race relations that were expressed by organizations representing visible minorities, "The Council of the Corporation of Metropolitan Toronto appointed Walter Pitman to conduct a study of race relations" (Lewis et al., 1986: 117). Pitman's report (1977) also supported "an independent civilian role" in the review of complaints against the police (McMahon, 1988: 305).

- "In 1978, the Solicitor-General asked the Ontario Police Commission [now the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, OCPC, 2009] to make inquiries of Ontario police forces for the purpose of revising procedures for dealing with public complaints against the police" (Lewis et al., 1986: 118).

- In 1978, many local Boards of the Commissioners of Police (the precursor to today's police services boards) voluntarily adopted a new complaint-handling procedure, wherein complaints against police officers were investigated by their respective service and overseen by the chief of that service (Lesage, 2005: 17-18). Dissatisfied complainants could petition the result of the investigation to the Boards of Commissioners or the Ontario Police Commission.

- In 1979, a Cardinal of the Catholic Church (Carter, 1979) conducted a report on "police minority relations" and recommended a civilian role in complaint investigations (McMahon, 1988: 305).

The general conclusion of the above reports and initiatives was that "a civilian component beyond what existed had to be injected into the police complaints procedure" (Lesage, 2005: 17).

In 1977 and 1979, several Bills were introduced that sought, unsuccessfully, to implement a "civilianized" role in the oversight of police complaints (McMahon, 1988: 305). In June 1979, Justice Sidney Linden was appointed by the Attorney-General and Solicitor General of Ontario to study possible means of implementing a civilian component into the handling of police complaints in Ontario (Lewis et al., 1986: 119). After assessing police complaint procedures in other jurisdictions, Linden proposed a system whereby the police would maintain control over the investigation of complaints, "subject to monitoring by a civilian review agency which could, in certain exceptional circumstances, conduct initial investigation" (Lewis, 1991: 156). Lewis (1991: 156) noted that under this proposed model, a civilian body would review the police investigation and disposition when requested by the complainant and "an independent civilian adjudicative body which could impose discipline directly" was also proposed.

2.3.2 Toronto's Police Complaints System, 1981 to 1990

As a result of the above initiatives, the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner was created in Toronto in 1981 (Prenzler, 2004: 90). Following the Ontario government's enactment of the *Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Project Act, 1981*, a new complaint system was launched as a three-year pilot project for Toronto (Lesage, 2005: 18). As Lesage (2005: 18) observed:

> Under the Act, the Toronto Chief of Police was required to set up a Public Complaints Investigation Bureau to receive, record, and investigate complaints and inquiries. A civilian Public Complaints Commissioner would monitor and review the Bureau's investigations. The Commissioner also had independent investigative powers. A Public Complaints Board conducted hearings of matters referred to it by the Toronto Chief of Police or the Commissioner.

Lewis (1991: 155) reported that although many Toronto police officers were dissatisfied with the functioning of their internal complaints system, a large proportion of officers were greatly opposed to civilian involvement in the investigation of complaints. The president of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Association stated publically, "(t)he only good external system is a dead system" (Landau, 2000: 66). Despite such opposition, the initiative was regarded as a "landmark development" (Prenzler, 2004: 90) and its lifespan was lengthened by the province's enactment of the *Metropolitan Toronto Police Force Complaints Act*, *1984*. Nevertheless, Landau (2000: 66) asserted that "(t)he rank and file, however, never accepted the legitimacy of a civilian authority."

2.3.3 Ontario's Police Complaints System, 1990 to 1997

In 1990, under the *Police Services Act*, the "Toronto" police complaints system was expanded to all police services in Ontario (Landau, 2000: 66). "The Public Complaints Commissioner was renamed the Police Complaints Commissioner (PCC) and was given province-wide authority"

(Lesage, 2005: 18-19). According to Landau (2000: 67), this system provided that all public complaints would be initially investigated by the police service whose officer(s) was the subject of the complaint. It also gave the Commissioner limited powers to initiate a complaint or investigation. Most often, however, the Commissioner simply monitored investigations through the review of reports submitted by the police service involved. As Lesage (2005: 22) remarked of this system, which existed between 1991 and 1996, "with regional offices in Toronto, Ottawa, Windsor, Mississauga, Peterborough, Sudbury and Thunder Bay," while "the PCC did have the ability to conduct complaint investigations, that power was used sparingly." Moreover, Landau (2000: 64-65) noted that this system "eliminated both the Commissioner and any effective civilian role in the handling of complaints by the public against the police." It is therefore not surprising that Goldsmith (1997) identified the creation of the delimited role as "the single-most retrograde step for Canada's leadership role in civilian oversight." In like spirit, Justice Oppal described the model employed by the PCC as "the weakest form of oversight" (Landau, 2000: 264).

Landau's (1994, 1996) research noted that two-thirds of citizens who had filed complaints against the police in Toronto in the early 1990s perceived the system to be unfair and were dissatisfied with their experience. However, Landau's (2000: 65-67) more recent research concedes that when compared to earlier decades, with their "virtual 'hands off' approach to policing the police," the 1990s system possessed "significant symbolic, if not material dimensions."

2.3.4   Changes to Ontario's Police Complaints System, 1997

Changing political winds in Ontario led to modifications in the civilian oversight of police across the province. The Progressive Conservative party came to power in 1995, and began close consultations with police officials (Miller and Merrick, 2002: 12). Landau (2000: 70) described this era as characterized by "downsizing, devolution and dismantling of most public services within provincial jurisdiction." Included in these processes were the "(r)estructuring and reform of various aspects of policing." These changes were, perhaps, best exemplified by a commissioned report by Rod McLeod (Ontario, 1996), which recommended that the province devolve responsibility for the oversight of complaints against the police. The thrust of these changes is also evinced by Bill 105, *An Act to Review the Partnership Between the Province, Municipalities and the Police and to Enhance Community Safety* (Bill 105, 1997), which echoed several of McLeod's main themes (Landau, 2000: 70-71). For example, Landau (2000: 71) discerned that Bill 105, which passed into law in November, 1997, signalled a return to an internal handling of complaints by individual police services, the abolition of the Office of the Public Complaints Commissioner and the removal of "the power from any civilian authority to investigate, adjudicate or even review complaints."

In its place, the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) became responsible for ensuring that police services complied with province-wide standards. When required, OCCPS was also charged with other duties, such as "to investigate, inquire into and report on the conduct or performance of officers, including the chief, the administration of a municipal police force, the provision of police services to a municipality and the police needs of a municipality" (Landau, 2000: 73). Landau (2000: 73) observed that, under this scheme a great deal of responsibility remained with the chief, who decided whether a particular complaint was about the

policies or services of the department, and whether a complaint was "frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith." Under this arrangement, the chief was generally charged with overseeing the processing, investigation and adjudication of a complaint with the OCCPS functioning in a delimited capacity (i.e., conducting reviews) in certain circumstances (Landau, 2000: 73-75). This complaints system remained in place until October, 2009.

2.3.5 Ontario, 1990-2009

Amidst the tumultuous changes to the complaint system in Ontario, there were several other important initiatives throughout the province that addressed the issue of police accountability.

2.3.6 Ontario's Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was created and implemented in 1990 under an amendment to the Ontario *Police Services Act*. This agency conducts independent investigations and determines whether criminal charges will be laid against police officers when death, serious injury or sexual assault has occurred in police custody or is related to police action (Mendes, 1999: 27).

According to the Law Commission of Canada (2006: 92), the SIU is designed to act as an efficient "oversight mechanism to ensure accountability to the public and the respect of the police." The *Police Services Act* demands that police officers and police services "co-operate fully" with members of the SIU during their investigations. The SIU Director, who cannot be a serving or former police officer, reports directly to the Attorney General of the province, rather than to the police service involved (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 92; Martin, 2007: 264). Furthermore, SIU investigators who are former police officers cannot be involved in

investigations that involve their former police service (Martin, 2007: 264). According to Landau (2000: 77), the "powers, mandate and jurisdiction" of the SIU "by far exceed those of any complaints mechanisms which Ontario has ever had."

Given the broad mandate of the SIU, it is understandable why considerable tensions have existed between police services and the SIU since its inception. Justice George Adams was commissioned to conduct two reviews (Ontario, 1998, 2003) to ensure that police services were complying with procedural mandates and, for example, making timely notification of incidents to the SIU and cooperating with that agency (Law Commission of Canada, 2006: 92-93). Ontario's Ombudsman, Andre Marin, has also assessed the credibility and effectiveness of the SIU. His 2008 report, *Oversight Unseen* (Ontario, 2008), contained 46 recommendations, including a demand for greater transparency, independence and accountability among the SIU, the Attorney General and the Ontario government (Canada, 2009a: 121).

In addition, the last two decades witnessed the release of several noteworthy reports that specifically addressd the strained relationships that exist between various racialized minority and other community groups and the police:

- In 1989, the report of the *Task Force on Race Relations and Policing* (Ontario, 1989), chaired by Claire Lewis, called for a province-wide standard in addressing alleged misconduct and racial intolerance by the police (Lesage, 2005: 22). In the second volume of this report (Ontario, 1992a), the Task Force advanced recommendations that sought to increase the effectiveness and success of the province-wide complaint system (Lesage, 2005: 22).

- In 1992, Stephen Lewis' *Report of the Advisor on Race Relations to the Premier of Ontario* (Ontario, 1992b), recommended that the PCC perform initial investigations for all public

complaints of racist conduct by police officers and "perform mandatory reviews of chiefs' dispositions of such cases" (Lesage, 2005: 22).

- In 1995, the *Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System* (Ontario, 1995) made recommendations for additional funding that would allow for the OCCPS to both conduct inquiries regarding police conduct and examine systemic issues related to police misconduct (Lesage, 2005: 22).

- In 2003, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) released a report entitled *Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling* (OHRC, 2003). Its recommendations were aimed at strengthening public confidence in the investigation and disposition of complaints against the police (Lesage, 2005: 25).

- In 2002, the *Toronto Star* published a series of articles which suggested that "racial profiling" and discrimination which adversely targeted Black citizens were routine in the Toronto Police Service (Rankin, Quinn, Shephard et al., 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d). The *Star* articles also ignited an intense debate among academics, police representatives, minority groups and local authorities on the validity of the articles' claims (Wortley & Tanner, 2003).

- In 2003, the Kingston Police Service conducted a project with the assistance from the Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto which sought to quantify the racial and/or ethnic origin of all individuals stopped by Kingston police officers in "non-casual" situations (Kingston Police Service, 2005; Closs & McKenna, 2006: 143). The research noted that young Black males were over-represented among those stopped by Kingston police officers - a finding that suggests the existence of a systemic racial/ethnic bias (Closs & McKenna: 150-151). This project was the first voluntary initiative to test for racial bias by a police service in Canada and it generated considerable criticism from police officials across the country (Closs & McKenna: 158).

- Retired judge George Ferguson (2004) conducted a two-year review of the Toronto Police Service drug squad and made recommendations "arising from allegations of police misconduct and corruption on the Toronto police drug squad" (Sossin, 2007: 108).

These above reports and initiatives amply attest to the import of research which seeks to address police accountability and its oversight mechanisms.

2.3.7   Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario, 2005

In 2004, Justice Patrick Lesage, former Chief Justice of Ontario, was commissioned by the provincial government to study the potential of implementing a system of civilian oversight of police complaints. Lesage consulted with a wide range of stakeholders, including community groups, Aboriginal communities, senior police officials, police associations, police services boards, and other public representatives.

Lesage's *Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario*, was completed in 2005 (Lesage, 2005). Lesage recommended that the existing police complaint system required "significant systemic changes" (Doolittle, 2009). Among his 27 recommendations, Lesage proposed that an independent civilian body should administer the public complaints system in Ontario and be responsible for the intake and allocation of the investigation of complaints (Lesage, 2005: 66). According to Lesage's report, this civilian body should assess all complaints received in the province and then assign each complaint for investigation by either the involved police service, another police service, or by investigators belonging to the independent body (p. 66-73). Other significant recommendations included extending the time limit for the filing of a complaint beyond the six month cut-off period and allowing for third-party complaints in some circumstances (p. 67). Lesage also recommended that the new system continue to allow for complaints to be resolved on an informal basis.

2.3.8   Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), 2009

Based largely upon Lesage's 2005 report, the *Independent Police Review Act* (Bill 103) was introduced for first reading on April 19, 2006. It proposed the implementation of a civilian-led system to oversee complaints against the police in Ontario (Martin, 2007: 268). In May, 2007, this Bill became law, and planning began to amend the *Police Services Act* in accordance with its provisions (Doolittle, 2009). On October 19th, 2009, the new system, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), was introduced and incorporated, through amendments, into the *Police Services Act (*1990). It is described as "an independent, neutral arms-length agency of the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General responsible for receiving, managing and overseeing all public complaints about the police in Ontario" and its mandate is "to deal with all public complaints regarding the conduct of a police officer, the policies of a police service or the services provided by the police" (*Raising Awareness*, 2012).

The majority of Lesage's recommendations were implemented in the design of this system. For example, the "OIPRD will categorize complaints, send some back to the concerned force, investigate some on its own and send others to other police forces" (Doolittle, 2009). At any point in the process, the OIPRD may assume responsibility for the investigation and disposition of the complaint. Although anonymous complaints are not accepted, the *Act* allows for any member of the public to file a complaint with the OIPRD in relation to the way in which a police service was delivered, the policy of a police service, or the conduct of an individual police officer or officers (*Police Services Act*, 1990). These complaints can be filed in a variety of formats to a police service or to the OIPRD directly (*Police Services Act*, 1990).

2.3.9 The Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC)

With the 2007 passing of the *Independent Police Review Act* (Bill 103), the Ontario Civilian

Police Commission (OCPC) (formerly OCCPS) assumed responsibility for appeals of

disciplinary hearings (Doolittle, 2009). "In Ontario, police services and police services boards

are ultimately accountable to the public through the OCPC. The OCPC reports to the Attorney

General and its mandate and duties are set out in the *Police Services Act*" ("Ontario Civilian

Police Commission", 2015). The OCPC is an independent quasi-judicial agency "that conducts

inquiries into the conduct of police chiefs and hears appeals on police disciplinary matters"

(Guly, 2015). This agency:

- adjudicates disputes between municipal councils and police service boards involving budget matters;
- conducts hearings into requests for the reduction, abolition, creation or amalgamation of police services;
- conducts investigations and inquiries into the conduct of chiefs of police, police officers and members of police services boards; and carries out general enforcement relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of policing services ("Ontario Civilian Police Commission", 2015).

The following section provides a brief overview and classification of extant civilian oversight

systems in Canada.

2.4 Overview of Canadian Civilian Oversight Mechanisms

In August, 2009, Paul Kennedy, the chair of the Commission for Public Complaints against the

RCMP (CPC), released a report which made several recommendations for the handling of

investigations involving RCMP members (Canada, 2009a).[8] Among these was a

recommendation proposal that all investigations involving RCMP members in an incident of

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[8] Through the enactment of the *Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act* in 2014, the RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) replaced the Commission for Public Complaints (CPC) against the RCMP. See http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=910419

serious injury, death and/or sexual assault be handled by an external police service or provincial

investigative body with oversight by the CPC (Canada, 2009a: VI). This 2009 CPC report

followed several high profile cases that had generated intense criticism of RCMP practices, such

as the 2005 shooting death of Ian Bush and the previously-mentioned Taser-related death of

Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski in 2007 at the Vancouver International Airport (Mason,

2009).

Kennedy's report included a review of both domestic and international civilian oversight systems

(Canada, 2009a) and his categorization of these systems into three models: *dependent,*

interdependent, independent. The first, the *dependent model*, is the traditional type of model in

which police officers investigate the conduct of their own officers or the officers of another

police service (Canada, 2009a: IX-X). In this model, the police service is fully responsible for

the investigation and administration of public complaints and the civilian body acts in a review

capacity (Canada, 2009a: X). Examples of the *dependent model* are discernible across Canada

and include:

- *Québec -* "Québec's oversight system, composed of the Police Ethics Commissioner and the Police Ethics Committee, is chiefly concerned with the potential violations of the *Code of Ethics* pertaining to police officers, special constables and highway controllers" (Canada, 2009a: 76).

- *Ontario -* Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD): "is…responsible for the initial screening of public complaints and may establish rules and guidelines for police chiefs and police boards for complaints made by the public" (Canada, 2009a: 76-77).

- *Manitoba* – the Law Enforcement Review Agency (LERA): acts as the police oversight agency in Manitoba. The agency does not conduct criminal investigations but

investigates allegations of "abuse of authority, false statements and lack of restraint in the use of a firearm" (Canada, 2009a: 77).

- *British Columbia* – British Columbia's Public Complaint Commissioner (PCC): oversees the public complaints of municipal officers in the province and manages external police investigations when serious injury or death of individuals occur in police custody or as a result of police actions (Canada, 2009a: 77-78).

- *Canada-wide* – "In the Canadian context, formal agreements between some local police forces and the RCMP allow an outside police force to handle the investigations of RCMP members...However, the use of an external police force for member investigations remains highly discretionary and inconsistently applied across RCMP divisions" (Canada, 2009a: 78).

The *interdependent model* introduces civilians into the investigations of officer wrongdoing. In this model, a civilian partner works collaboratively with the police in conducting the investigation and may assume an observer-type role or a more active investigative role. Examples of the interdependent model exist in Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon and are also found in other countries, such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia" (Canada, 2009a: 78). More specifically, the *interdependent model* is on display in:

- *Alberta* - The Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT): offers a blended response of civilian, RCMP and municipal police personnel who work together to conduct investigations in cases of serious injury or death (Canada, 2009a: 81).

- *Saskatchewan* - Saskatchewan's Public Complaints Commission (PCC): has the ability to assume the responsibility of the police investigation at any point it feels necessary to do so and in that instance the police service must desist from its investigation and provide all required assistance to the members of the PCC (Canada, 2009a: 82).

The *independent model* is a system in which civilians conduct oversight and investigations of

alleged police wrongdoing, that are totally independent of the police. The Ontario Special

Investigations Unit (SIU) is an example of this type of model (Canada, 2009a: 82). Thus, the

"SIU investigates the circumstances of serious injury or death as well as allegations of sexual

assault that may have resulted from criminal offences committed by police officers. The agency

has full powers to investigate and charge officers with a criminal offence" (Canada, 2009a: 88).

Appendix A identifies civilian oversight agencies which currently operate across Canada,

drawing upon information provided by the Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement (CACOLE, www.cacole.ca). These agencies vary on the basis size, statutory

authority and scope of responsibilities.

According to Mendes (1999: 26), efforts to create sustainable police complaint systems with

civilian oversight in Canada have been marked by purposive attempts to incorporate "the

accountability thesis of the professional model of policing into the civilian oversight model." As

such, most civilian oversight agencies in Canada "acknowledge the professional duty of police

organisations to do the initial investigation of public complaints and, where merited, pose

disciplinary and other measures on its officers" (Mendes, 1999: 26). Mendes (1999; 26) further

asserted that this approach "gives the management and indeed the whole police organisation the

opportunity to show professional responsiveness to the communities they serve" and dampens

the likelihood of an environment in which distrust and resentment can fester. Nevertheless, he

cautioned that the establishment of meaningful public trust in this arrangement is contingent

upon several essential components. Thus, he declared that:

> [t]he Canadian experience has…shown that the transparency of the internal police
> system is critical to public confidence and accountability. The injection of an
> appeal to a civilian oversight system if the citizen or community is not satisfied,

acts as a social capital check on self-imposed accountability and professionalism of police forces. This is further augmented if the civilian oversight agency has the power to initiate complaints and review police practices and procedures for systemic problems and potential systemic solutions (Mendes, 1999: 30).

Allowing police to conduct initial investigations in tandem with civilian oversight and review (as practiced in the *dependent* or *interdependent* models) may also have the practical benefit of obviating the extraordinary cost of funding an entirely independent investigative body that is associated with the *independent* model.

2.5 Success of Civilian Oversight Mechanisms: Effectiveness vs. Symbolic Function

An assessment of the merits of police-led (internal) versus civilian-led (external) investigations of alleged misconduct or complaints is beyond the scope of this research. It is nevertheless fitting to mention briefly the optics involved in the implementation of civilian oversight mechanisms.

Despite the notable "trend to external review" of police conduct in Canada and elsewhere (e.g., Goldsmith, 1991; Prenzler, 2004), the effectiveness of external civilian oversight bodies continues to be debated. For example, Martin (2007: 268) noted that "(m)ost citizen complaint and review schemes have been largely unsuccessful at reducing police misconduct or at increasing public accountability." Prenzler (2000: 662) observed that "low substantiation rates by civilian review bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent have been described as an 'international phenomenon'." Goldsmith (1995: 128) maintained that there was no evidence that external investigations "improve significantly the substantiation rates of complaints investigated." In their assessment of civilian oversight systems in Western nations, Miller and Merrick (2002: 3) found that "(c)ivilian oversight does not guarantee legitimacy, and certainly there are examples

where oversight agencies have not enhanced confidence in the police – for example when oversight is not seen as independent or when it is perceived as ineffectual."

One significant advantage that civilian oversight mechanisms enjoy over their police-run counterpart mechanisms is in the public's perception of their activities and their independence, transparency and objectivity. Thus, Goldsmith (1995: 128) pointed out more than two decades ago that:

> [o]ne clear advantage of external participation is the substance it lends to the perception that investigation of complaints will be impartially carried out, a basis for public confidence which has continued to elude the most determined efforts of internal investigations departments to justify their continued dominance of complaints investigations.

However, as Miller and Merrick (2002: 3) observed laconically, "the *appearance* to the community that complaints are dealt with in a transparent and fair way can be seen as a goal in its own right."

Assessing the "success" of civilian oversight mechanisms is obviously not a simple task. For example, Watt (1991: 358) maintained:

> [I]t is the openness of police handling of such complaints that is essential. While the internal processing of public complaints by police may well be a fair system, it does not intrinsically appear fair. The perception is a poor one, and the injection of a civilian component into the handling of such complaints addresses that perception...It is the transparency of the system which engenders public confidence.

Regardless of the actual integrity and professionalism involved in most police-led internal investigations, the current standards for transparency and accountability would seem rooted in an oft-cited aphorism that stresses the import of perception: "justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done" (as cited in Landau, 1996: 294). However, as Thomas' famous theorem

reminds us, "things that are defined as real are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 572).

Although there are many different factors and mechanisms that control police behaviour in Canada, this chapter has noted that the implementation of civilian oversight systems were most often spurred by some form of judicial review or inquiry into alleged police misconduct. However, Prenzler (2004: 90) maintains that the expansion of civilian oversight in Canada has been "driven less by serious corruption than by breakdowns in police–community relations and dissatisfaction with police handling of complaints."

If public inquiries, reviews, inquests and task forces on various aspects of police conduct have played a catalytic role in the creation of standards of accountability and transparency for Canadian police agencies (Sossin, 2007: 107-108), it bears emphasis that their recommendations are generally non-binding and many are often not fully implemented. Nevertheless, these public inquiries and reviews "can and do provide a pivotal form of oversight for allegations of police misdeeds and have served as the catalyst for significant shifts in police structures and policies" (Sossin, 2007: 121).

2.6 Recent developments pertaining to the scrutiny of policing in Ontario, Canada

Several high profile issues and initiatives attest to the need for research on police accountability and civilian oversight Ontario, Canada that considers these issues in a broad context:

- *Rising policing salaries*– Organizations such as the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB), the Canadian Association of Police Governance (CAPG) and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) have raised concerns about the rising cost of policing, and in particular, the salaries of police officers. The 2015 AMO report noted that "essential service status, the inability to strike, retention pay, and salary benchmarking have resulted in arbitration awards that do not properly account for local

economic circumstances and capacity to pay. The system is not sustainable" (AMO, 2015: 16). Efforts by local governments to rein in such costs, such as coordinated collective bargaining and seeking changes to costing models, remain ongoing (OAPSB, 2014; AMO, 2015: 8).

- *Paid duties* - Casey & Lorigio (2015) reported ongoing tensions between municipal leaders and police leaders about "paid duty" programs that allow police officers to earn overtime wages for work at private events. Concerns have been raised that these programs may foster "the appearance of two-tier policing" and the perception that police services and/or municipalities rely upon these programs as revenue-generating opportunities (Casey & Lorigio, 2015). The Association of Municipalities of Ontario's suggestion that "many current 'paid duty' functions" could be "civilianized" (AMO, 2015: 35) is no less noteworthy for, if acted upon, extant systems may be adequate in their breadth and fail to govern the actions of all actors who perform "policing" roles.

- *Use of force* - In April, 2015, the OIPRD announced that they are undertaking an Ontario-wide "systemic review of use of force, lethal use of force, deescalation techniques and approaches in dealing with people with mental health issues, emotionally disturbed people and people in distress" (OIPRD, 2015b). The review is expected to examine "the relationship between Ontario Police College training and training by police services; the content and use of 'use of force reports'; and the interplay between government, mental health agencies and police services in addressing the needs of persons in distress, while protecting the public" (OIPRD, 2015b).

- Gillis (2015a) reported that there has been "a dramatic increase in complaints about police use of force and a spike in sexual assault allegations against officers" in Ontario in the last decade. He noted that statistics released by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), revealed that the number of incidents investigated by that agency had climbed from 137 incidents in 2004 to more than 300 in 2014. Investigations of "custody injury" also rose significantly, with concussions now recognized as potentially "serious injuries" (Gillis, 2015a).

- *"Carding"* – a practice in which police "stop, question and document people who are not suspected of a crime - has come under intense scrutiny as a damaging and discriminatory

practice" (Gillis, 2015b). According to the *Toronto Star*'s analysis of the practices of the Toronto Police Service, "black and brown men are carded at a disproportionately high rate by Toronto police" (Gillis, 2015b). This issue has caused considerable tension among various community groups, police leaders, and the police services board in Toronto and has raised concerns about "carding" by police leaders and police services boards across the province (Bennett, 2015). In June, 2015, the Ontario Liberal government announced plans to regulate street checks for all police services across Ontario. "The province has since sought input from the public, police associations and community groups, with the aim of implementing a standardized provincial policy" (Gillis, 2015b).

- *Suspension with pay* - The Ontario Liberal government is currently working to reform the *Police Services Act* to allow "police chiefs the power to halt pay for suspended officers, which currently costs municipalities about $6.4-million a year and exacts an incalculable toll on public trust in local law enforcement" (White, 2015). Ontario remains the only province to mandate police services to continue to pay officers facing suspensions, including those facing criminal charges. Currently, "(c)hiefs can revoke a suspended officer's salary only if the officer is sentenced to prison" (White, 2015). This proposed initiative would provide Chiefs with the discretion to suspend police officers without pay. While this initiative is supported by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) and the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB), those who oppose it include the Police Association of Ontario (PAO), the Toronto Police Service Association and Ontario Provincial Police Association. Tom Stamatakis, the president of the Canadian Police Association, has opined that "the decision to suspend without pay should be made only in cases of 'significant misconduct or guilt'" (as quoted in White, 2015). He additionally urged awareness that the suspension of a police officer without pay is "a dramatic step to take" which would predictably have a "huge impact on that officer's family, future job prospects. If you're in that situation, your career is generally over" (White, 2015). The Canadian Police Association reputedly favours "placing ultimate discretion with an independent adjudicator rather than a chief" (White, 2015).

The contents of reports by both the print and broadcast media in Canada record ongoing public debate about the role of the police, expectations for performance and accountability, and the financial sustainability of modern police practices. These issues have also prompted recent forums hosted by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, the Future of Policing Advisory Committee (FPAC) (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and the Economics of Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada).[9]

2.7 Conclusion of *Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario, Canada*

This chapter has provided an overview of the events and initiatives that have shaped the current landscape of civilian oversight of policing in Ontario, Canada. The following chapter provides a review of the research which has examined the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight mechanisms.

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[9] See http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/index-eng.aspx

Chapter 3
Literature Review and Hypotheses

This chapter provides an overview of previous literature pertaining to police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms, followed by discussion about the theoretical concepts/framework explored throughout this study. Finally, this study's anticipated findings are discussed.

3.1 Previous academic literature regarding police officers' attitudes

There is a wide body of research on police officers' attitudes toward varying issues and phenomena. For instance, researchers have assessed police officers' attitudes about various forms of criminal behaviour such as sexual offences (e.g., LeDoux & Hazelwood, 1985; Saunders, 1987; Trute, Adkins & MacDonald, 1992; Brown & King, 1998; Rich, 2005; Johnson, Hughes & Ireland, 2007; Page, 2008), elder abuse (e.g., Dolon & Hendricks, 1989; Payne, Berg & Flanagan, 2001), domestic/family violence (e.g., Buchanan & Perry, 1985; Dolon, Hendricks & Meagher, 1986; Edwards, 1986; Saunders & Size, 1986; Breci, 1989; Logan, Shannon & Walker, 2006), and drinking and driving (e.g., Frank, Fagan & Ayers, 1987).

Researchers have additionally probed police officers' opinions on matters such as victim credibility (e.g., Mulder & Winkel, 1996), crisis situations (e.g., Durand, 1988), capital punishment (e.g., Fagan, 1986), gun control (e.g., Lester, 1983; Kohn, 2005), discretion and arrest procedures (e.g., Blount, Yegidis & Maheux, 1992; Wortley, 2003; Payne, Time & Gainey, 2006; Zalman & Smith, 2007), riot activity (e.g., Kitch, 1970), undercover police work (e.g., Farmer, Beehr & Love, 2003), shiftwork (e.g., Lester, 1986), crime and violence (e.g., Walker, 1982; Wilson, Cullen & Latessa, 1985; Fielding & Fielding, 1991), and police work in

general (e.g., Ferdinand, 1980; Ainsworth, 1981; Crawford, 1993; Brooks, Piquero & Cronin, 1993, 1994; Violanti & Aron, 1995; Alain & Baril, 2005). Social scientists have also conducted attitudinal studies which have examined male police officers' impressions of female police officers and female officers' perceptions of their occupational environment (e.g., Glaser, 1983; Pope & Pope, 1986; Ahmad, 2001; Sims, Scarborough & Ahmad, 2003; Sun & Chu, 2008; Carlan & McMullan, 2009), gays and lesbians (e.g., Bernstein & Kostelac, 2002; Lyons, DeValve & Garner, 2008), alcohol and drug use (e.g., Beck, Kavelak & Summons, 1982; Beck & Summons 1984; van Wijngaarden, Cushing, Kerns, & Dischinger, 1995; Smith, Wiggers & Considine, 2001), persons with disabilities (e.g., Bailey, Barr & Bunting, 2001; Beletsky, Macalino & Burris, 2005), and persons with mental illness (e.g., Kimhi, Barak, Gutman et al., 1998; Patch & Arrigo, 1999; Cotton, 2004; Watson, Corrigan & Ottati, 2004).

Some researchers have examined police officers' attitudes toward various actions that may constitute police misconduct. For instance, Lester (1996) assessed previous research that has surveyed officers' opinions on use of force issues (e.g., Carter, 1985; Corbett et al., 1979, Brodsky & Williamson, 1985). In general, these studies have gauged officers' justifications and rationalizations for the use of force in different situations. Several of these studies have employed hypothetical scenarios in order to assess officers' readiness to use lethal force (e.g., Brown 1983, 1984; Waegel, 1984; Geller, 1985; Hunt, 1985; Dwyer et al., 1990). Other studies have surveyed officers' opinions on a spectrum of misconduct-related behaviour (e.g., Barker, 1983; Hunter, 1999; Micucci & Gomme, 2005) and/or used hypothetical examples of ethical conundrums to assess officers' attitudes toward a variety of acts. For example, Pogarsky and Piquero (2004) tested a theory of "perceptual deterrence" in a short-term study that sought to

measure the relative effectiveness of perceived formal and informal sanctions upon police behaviour.

However, relatively few studies have examined police officers' perceptions of the administrative oversight of police misconduct and the handling of citizens' complaints against the police. More commonly, research on civilian oversight of policing has examined *citizens'* attitudes and experiences in filing complaints against the police and/or charted the evolution of external review mechanisms around the world (e.g., Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Lewis, Linden & Keene, 1986; Maguire, 1991; Maguire & Corbett, 1991; Corbett, 1991; Goldsmith, 1988, 1996). I will now look at studies on officers' attitudes that do exist.

Sviridoff and McElroy (1989) conducted a study on the perceptions and attitudes of New York City Police Department officers toward the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). Using a focus group (N= 22 officers), they obtained officers' views on the legitimacy and fairness of the complaint review system. Their research found that officers generally believed the CCRB to be biased in favour of complainants and ineffective in screening out frivolous complaints. Officers also took issue with the extensive length of the complaint process, with some suggesting that face-to-face interaction between accused officers and complainants could assist in the resolution of complaints (Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 52). Some officers reported that, in response to their perception of bias in the system, they falsified their accounts of encounters that led to complaints. According to De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 654), this finding suggests that systems of citizen oversight which are implemented without concern for the perceptions of officers "may actually increase the likelihood of officer perjury during complaint investigations."

Perez (1994: 80) studied various systems of internal and external review of police misconduct in various areas of the United States (i.e., Oakland, Berkley, Contra Costa County and San Jose,

California; Chicago, Illinois; and Kansas City, Missouri) during 1977 and 1994. This research combined "direct observations of cops in action on the beat, in-depth interviews with randomly selected groups of officers from six jurisdictions, and a written attitudinal survey of 180 officers" (Perez, 1994: 76). Only officers who worked uniform patrol (patrol officers, sergeants, lieutenants and captains) were included within his study.

Perez (1994: 107-108, 143, 237, 247) found that in all of the jurisdictions he examined, officers vastly preferred internal investigations of police misconduct to those conducted by civilian personnel and deemed internal police investigators to be more qualified, experienced and competent than civilian investigators. Furthermore, the vast majority of officers expressed a belief that internal police investigations were more "fair" than "civilian review" investigations (Perez, 1994: 154). Nevertheless, Perez (1994: 247-248) observed that just over a third (35%) of officers believed that the ideal and most effective system of investigating alleged police misconduct would involve a combination of police officer and civilian investigators. In addition, almost two-thirds (62%) believed that "formal hearing boards" should be made up of a combination of "cops and civilians." Although Perez (1994: 248) concluded that "police officers feel that civilian review does *not* abuse them or interfere with police organizations' interests", his research found that African-American officers expressed more support than their white counterparts for both "civilianizing review mechanisms" (45.1% versus 26.3%) and combined civilian-police hearing boards (72.4% versus 64.2%).

Walker and Herbst (1999) reported that police officers in Minneapolis had positive impressions of the Minneapolis Civilian Review Agency (MCRA). Their study was based upon a survey that was mailed to both civilians (N=174) and police officers (N=81) in 1998-1999 who had personal experience with a complaint handled through the MCRA as either a complainant or

subject/witness officer. In this study, the response rate among police officers (26%) was higher than among civilians (17%) (Walker & Herbst, 1999: 3). The vast majority (85-90%) of police officers who responded to the survey assessed the MRA positively. Thus, they reported that they were treated fairly and respectfully and expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the investigations. Nevertheless, it may be noted that these findings derive from a very small survey population with few questions posed.

Kreisel's (1998) doctoral dissertation has been lauded as putatively the "only systematic effort to examine the connection between police officer attitudes and police subcultural attitudes" (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 654). Her study included a comprehensive evaluation of previous research on the "police subculture(s)"; a profile of the changing demographics of American police officers; and a social history of the evolution of internal and external oversight of policing. She administered a survey questionnaire to 814 police officers of the Albuquerque Police Department in New Mexico, with 357 officers (44%) responding. The results were evaluated using univariate, bivariate and multivariate methods, with a socio-demographic analysis of the participants.

Kreisel found that officers who demonstrated strong adherence to police subcultural values were more likely to evaluate negatively external forms of administrative oversight (civilian-led initiatives) and positively evaluate internal forms of accountability (police-led initiatives). In addition, Kreisel (1998: 210) reported that while most officers supported some system of oversight and accountability, they generally preferred internal oversight to external oversight. Nevertheless, she found that not all responding officers were opposed to external forms of oversight, and when officers were well-informed about external oversight mechanisms they were more likely to be more supportive (Kreisel, 1998: 215-216). These findings suggest that the

traditional depiction of a homogeneous police subculture that is strongly opposed to external "meddling" may be overly simplistic and misleading.

Bobb et al. (2006) evaluated both police officer and citizen attitudes on a variety of topics related to policing in Pasadena, California. Their survey for civilians was mailed to over 5000 households throughout Pasadena and the researchers obtained a response rate of "around 20 percent" (2006: 30). Included in this study was a survey of all 241 sworn members of the Pasadena Police Department, which sought to assess their satisfaction with complaint investigations. In total, 171 officers (71%) responded to the survey. At the time of this investigation, the Pasadena Police Department relied solely upon internal investigations of complaints; this system did not involve civilian investigators nor oversight. Among the officers who participated in this study, just over three-quarters (76%) reported that they had been the subject of at least one complaint filed against them during the course of their career. A significant portion of officers who had been the subject of complaints (74%) expressed satisfaction with how the complaints were handled (Bobb et al., 2006: 49). Nevertheless, the majority of respondents expressed the belief that it was too easy for citizens to file complaints against officers (Bobb et al., 2006: 48-49).

Weisburd et al. (2000) conducted a telephone survey of 925 officers from 113 police services across the United States in their attempt to assess police attitudes toward internal and external response mechanisms. The authors surveyed a random national sample of police officers using a multi-stage clustered method to select the participating police departments from a sampling frame of 5042 county or municipal police departments. Included in this sample were large, medium and small police departments from across the United States. The researcher attained an 87.3% response rate. Utilizing a Likert scale, Weisburd et al. (2000:7) determined that the vast

majority of officers (79%) considered internal affairs to be effective in addressing abuses of authority. However, simply 38% viewed citizen review boards as effective in preventing police misconduct and these attitudes were impacted by the "race" of officers, with African-American officers most likely to express this belief (70%), followed by officers from other racialized minorities (41%) and white officers least likely to do so (33%) (Weisburd et al. 2000: 9).

In 1999, the Citizen Complaints Review Committee (CCRC) of the Calgary Police Commission (CPC) reviewed the citizen complaints process of the Calgary Police Service (CPS) (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 1). At the time of their report, citizens' complaints about police conduct were investigated by the Professional Standards Section of the Calgary Police Service and the CPC held an auditing function. As part of their review, 65 police officers who were subjects of complaints between 1996 and 1998 were surveyed by telephone regarding their experience with the complaints resolution process (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84). The majority of these officers felt "that there should be a mechanism to cull or refuse 'frivolous or vexatious' complaints" (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 86, 88). Although many officers reported that they had been treated respectfully and with consideration during their investigative process, almost two-thirds (65%) believed that this process of resolving complaints took too long and "(m)ore than one third of officers perceived the process to be biased in favour of complainants" (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84-85). Moreover, "officers made frequent mention of the lack of communication during the process and delays caused undue stress" (Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 86). Officers who were offered mediation generally accepted it (78%) and reported satisfaction with its outcome (83%).

Finn (2001) conducted an assessment of nine American citizen oversight systems. By examining the systems used in Berkley, Orange County and San Francisco, California; Flint, Michigan;

Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Rochester, New York; Tucson, Arizona,

he was able to investigate civilian oversight systems that varied in terms of their configurations

of citizen/police involvement in the review, investigation, oversight and disposition of

complaints against police officers (Finn, 2001: vii-viii). Finn found that while these systems

differed, they attracted similar criticisms from police/sheriff's department officers and union

leaders. According to his study, these groups commonly argued that (1) citizens should not

interfere with police work; (2) citizens do not understand police work; and (3) the citizen

oversight process is unfair (Finn, 2001: 109). Finn (2001: 107-121) reported that there is

considerable antipathy among police officers to citizen oversight, and he observed that police

union leaders have traditionally encouraged this response. However, he noted that not all

officers within a given department or sheriff's office may agree with their union's stance.

Moreover, he identified burgeoning support for citizen oversight bodies among some American

police organizations. For example, the National Black Police Association, which represents

more than 30,000 African-American law enforcement officers, has voiced strong support for "the

implementation and use of civilian review of police misconduct" (Finn, 2001: 118).

Despite the common assumption that police officers are uniformly opposed to the civilian review

of police misconduct (e.g., Brooks, 1973; Lenzi, 1974; Loveday, 1988; Wagner and Decker,

1993), de Guzman's (2004) review of the literature on this topic finds that police opposition is

primarily based upon a distrust in the abilities of non-police members to carry out fair and

competent investigations of police misconduct (e.g., Lohman & Misner, 1973; Ruchelman, 1973;

Cantor, 1974; Kerstetter, 1985; Caiden & Hahn, 1979; Terrill, 1982; Walker & Bumphus, 1992;

Snow, 1992). In addition, he emphasizes that police attitudes toward civilian review are neither

uniform nor static. For example, he noted that some research has found that officers who are

exposed to civilian review may develop positive attitudes over time, if they perceive the oversight system to be fair, objective and effective (e.g., Halpern, 1974; Perez, 1978 & 1994; Loveday, 1988).

de Guzman's (2004: 365) research incorporated a survey questionnaire that was administered to two groups of police officers from the Philippines: officers with direct personal experience with the "People's Law Enforcement Board" (PLEB) (N= 206 officers) and those who lacked such experience (N= 635 officers). In combining both surveys, de Guzman received a total response rate of 65%. He reported that while officers expressed various perceptions about citizen review, those whose professional conduct had been assessed by the civilian review body held positive perceptions of the system. He concluded that officers' perceptions of the civilian board's "qualities of integrity and legitimacy influence police officers to develop positive perceptions about the board." This finding is consistent with previous research (Halpern, 1974; Knoohuizen, 1973; Kerstetter, 1985; Loveday, 1988; Perez, 1978, 1994) which has noted that officers who lack experience with civilian review boards are more likely to view the operation of these boards with suspicion and express negative opinions of their competency. de Guzman (2001: 374) also determined that "police officers who are satisfied with specific measures tend to be satisfied overall" (e.g., "fairness", "objectivity", and/or "thoroughness" during investigations).

In 2007, the city council of Seattle, Washington commissioned research to assess police officers' attitudes toward the Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) and, more broadly, civilian oversight (Brody & Lovrich, 2007). The researchers distributed a survey questionnaire to officers in coordination with a letter from the Police Chief to encourage participation, with 280 officers out of 1,200 (23%) completing the survey. Approximately half (46%) of these respondents reported that they had been the focus of an OPA-investigated citizen complaint and

more than half expressed dissatisfaction with the agency. Although almost all (90%) believed

that the process failed to weed out frivolous complaints, the "majority" of officers (percentage

not specified by authors) who had experienced an OPA investigation "felt that they were treated

with respect, that their rights were protected, that the investigation was thorough, and that the

findings were fair and appropriate" (Brody and Lovrich, 2007: np). At the same time, however,

two-thirds reported that the investigation of the complaint(s) against them had not been carried

out in a "timely manner" (2007: np). Officers also complained of poor communication between

themselves and the OPA during investigations and insufficient explanations from the OPA

regarding the final disposition of investigations. Almost 80% of all responding officers indicated

they favoured a "system of internal investigations conducted by sworn personnel" (2007: np) and

83% believed that internal investigations "in general are necessary to maintain the public trust"

(2007: np).

In 2005, researchers from the RAND Corporation conducted a technical report for the City of

Cincinnati (Ridgeway et al., 2005) which attempted, in part, to survey citizens and police officers

on their perceptions of the fairness of the complaint process and civilian oversight of the system.

Police officers with experiential knowledge of the complaint systems were also queried on their

perceptions of the fairness of the final disposition of the complaint that had been brought against

them. However, while the researchers employed multiple measures to encourage police

participation in this study (e.g., multiple reminder postcards and phone calls), the response rate

achieved (11%) was ruefully low. This situation is not, unfortunately, anomalous; others have

reported similar difficulties in conducting survey research on police officers (see also Taylor &

Bennell, 2006; Maguire & Dyke, 2011; Duxbury & Higgins, 2012).

De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 651-652) characterized the growth of "police oversight organizations (e.g. citizen review boards, independent monitors, and most recently, police auditors)" as a defensive response to the "crisis in police legitimacy" which has been prompted by high-profile cases of police corruption and violence. This study was undertaken during the implementation of a new civilian-led oversight system in Denver, Colorado. They administered a 6-page survey with 80 items that included a mixture of open and closed questions. The questionnaire adopted some of the questions that Kreisel had posed in her 1998 study, as well as others drawn from earlier research on the police. The response rate in this study was 43%, with 648 officers out of 1500 completing the survey; among those who participated, 373 (58%) reported personal experience with the complaint system. The authors crafted different scales to evaluate officers' perceptions of "quality of treatment"; "timeliness/communication"; "trust in internal affairs"; and "trust in citizen oversight."

Their investigation into police officers' attitudes toward the police complaints system in Denver employed the "procedural justice perspective"; this perspective holds that:

> individuals' satisfaction with confrontations involving institutions of formal social control (such as the police) are influenced more by their belief that the process of control is fair than by the outcome they receive...Thus, the process by which sanctions are imposed (procedural justice) might be as important as, or even more important than, the sanctions themselves (distributive justice) when it comes to shaping individuals' perception of fairness (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 655).

Although the researchers identify their study as the first attempt to apply this perspective to police officers' attitudes toward complaint systems and/or civilian oversight, they acknowledge its repeated use by others who have examined the experience of civilians who have filed complaints against the police (e.g., Kerstetter, 1996; Walker, 1997; see also De Angelis, 2009).

De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 657) hypothesized that officers who perceived that the process was fair and that the "city and police command staff, the Internal Affairs Bureau, and the police oversight body" were legitimate would be satisfied with the complaint investigation process, regardless of the outcome of the complaint. They further hypothesized that officers who avoided "negative evaluation as a result of citizen complaints" would also be satisfied overall with the citizen complaint process. The latter hypothesis, it may be noted, assumed that officers would be more influenced by "distributive justice (getting the outcome they want) than by procedural justice (feeling the adjudicative process was fair) or by perceptions of legitimate authority" (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 657).

De Angelis and Kupchik found that officers' perceptions of fair treatment and trust in the legitimacy of command staff and internal affairs were positively associated with their overall satisfaction with the process. However, they did not find that officers' trust in citizen oversight had any significant or direct effect upon process satisfaction. Furthermore, they found that distributive justice (the final outcome) did matter for officer satisfaction, but only by indirectly influencing trust in administration and perceptions of fairness and equitable treatment. They determined that the best predictors of satisfaction with the process were timeliness and communication within the complaint process and emphasize the import of its perception as "timely, fair and thorough" (2007: 668).

A second article by these investigators (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2009) draws upon the same data set and considers how "race" and ethnicity impacts police officers' perceptions of procedural justice in complaint investigations. Their survey used both open and closed questions to assess officer morale, willingness to comply with commands and trust in command staff and internal affairs. De Angelis and Kupchik reported weak and indirect evidence that ethnicity affects

compliance among police officers; Latino/a officers were found to be both less trusting of internal affairs than Caucasian officers and less likely to comply with decisions by command staff. However, they found that officer morale, perceptions of procedural justice and rank were more powerful predictors of officers' willingness to comply with command decisions than their "race" or ethnicity.

Wells and Schafer (2007) assessed police officers' attitudes toward citizen oversight in Carbondale, Illinois. They administered a pen and paper survey to 90 officers, and attained a response rate of 84%. This study found that officers were generally unsupportive of mechanisms of citizen oversight and did not view them as a viable means for preventing police misconduct. Consistent with Finn's (2001) findings noted earlier, this study reports that officers held negative news of civilian oversight systems and charged that these systems had: "a bias against police personnel"; lacked the expertise necessary to evaluate officer conduct; had an adverse effect on officer conduct; and did not represent a meaningful improvement upon internal systems of processing citizen complaint against the police (Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18). Wells and Schafer (2007: 17) additionally reported that "officers are particularly opposed to aspects of citizen oversight that grant citizens the right to 'second guess' the actions taken by officers." However, they conceded that the results of their study may be atypical and lack generalizability. They acknowledged that they did not analyze how variables such as respondents' rank, education, duty assignment, or years of service may have impacted their attitudes and failed to gather data on these variables.

In their 2011 study of professionalism, ethics and management practices in policing, Maguire and Dyke (2011: 8) surveyed police officers from 31 Canadian Police services; out of 43,660 potential respondents, they received 10,264 completed surveys (a 24% response rate). Their

survey included a number questions pertaining to police officers' perceptions of the impact and performance of Professional Standards branches. About one-third of officers (36%) reported that they "had attended an information session on professional standards but those who did had significantly more positive evaluations of the performance of professional standards" (Maguire & Dyke, 2011: 10). Thus, the authors found that "(o)nly 21% of those not attending an information meeting had positive views of the performance of professional standards while nearly twice as many (41%) of those who attended an information session had positive views (Maguire & Dyke, 2011: 10). The authors concluded that attitudes toward "organizational programs" (e.g., Professional Standards Bureaus) can be improved through educational initiatives (Maguire & Dyke, 2011: 10).

The Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI), an "independent" civilian-led system that has existed since 1998 to investigate complaints against the police in Northern Ireland (PONI, 2015), conducted an online survey in 2014-2015 to assess attitudes among officers who were subject of complaint investigations during this period. "A total of 1,313 officers were emailed the questionnaire and 507 questionnaires were returned. This represents a response rate of 39%" (PONI, 2015: 4). In total, almost half (48%) of respondents expressed satisfaction with "how the Office handled their complaint. A further 27% of officers were dissatisfied and 25% of officers were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" (PONI, 2015: 7). The overwhelming majority of respondents reported that they had been treated respectfully (91%) and fairly (81%) by the Ombudsman staff and found staff members to be knowledgeable (76%) and easy to understand (92%) (PONI, 2015: 7). However, less than a third (30%) were satisfied with the updates they had received about the progress of the investigation and the "overall time taken to resolve the complaint" (31%) (2015: 7).

3.2 Summary of Previous Research Findings: Police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight

Previous research has found that police officers commonly express reservations about civilian oversight agencies and express a preference for internal review mechanisms. Thus,

- Police officers have voiced concerns about the ***legitimacy*** of civilians evaluating their professional conduct and often assert that civilians lack the knowledge, skills and experience necessary to perform this task (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 107-108; 154; 237; 247; Finn, 2001: 109; Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18).

- Police officers also accuse civilian review boards of ***bias***, perceiving these mechanisms as favouring complainants and disfavouring police (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 42-43; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84-85; Wells & Schafer, 2007:18).

- Police officers often express a preference for (1) allegations of misconduct and complaints against the police to be investigated by ***internal affairs*** (i.e., police officers) investigators rather than civilian investigators (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 154; Kreisel, 1998: 210; Weisburd et al., 2000: 7; Brody & Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 665); and (2) "***civilian review" rather than "civilian investigation"***, with greater acceptance of civilians being involved in a "review capacity" of complaints/misconduct rather than in an investigative capacity (e.g., Perez, 1994: 247-248; Walker & Herbst, 1999: 5; Weisburd et al., 2000: 9; Brody & Lovrich, 2007).

- ***"Procedural Justice"*** - Police officers have expressed dissatisfaction with specific aspects of the investigative process conducted by civilians. For example, they have complained about the length of the investigative process and/or the lack of communication provided by civilian investigators (e.g., Sviridoff & McElroy, 1989: 52; Calgary Police Commission, 1999: 84-86; Brody and Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 668; PONI, 2015: 7). However, police officers tend to be more accepting of civilian oversight when they possess personal experientially-based knowledge of these mechanisms (e.g., Kreisel, 1998: 215-216; de Guzman, 2004: 373-374). Furthermore, previous research has found that

through personal experience and education, officers may learn to accept and trust citizen oversight as a viable and legitimate means of processing allegations of police misconduct (Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004). This finding contradicts the stereotype of police culture as insular and hotly resistant to scrutiny by "outsiders."

3.3 Summary of Previous Methods

To date, few have investigated the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight. This scant body of literature is based overwhelmingly on the responses of American officers to survey questionnaires which have employed both open- and closed-questions. The majority of these survey questionnaires were administered directly to police officers at their place of work (via pencil and paper format) with departmental support (e.g., approval and encouragement from the chief of police). These studies have varied in their use of advanced statistical analyses.

Several researchers have reported response rates lower than 30% (e.g., Walker & Herbst, 1999; Ridgeway et al., 2005; Bobb et al., 2006; Maguire & Dyke, 2011).   Furthermore, population samples were often drastically reduced when researchers focused upon police officers with direct experience of their police department's complaint system. These reports suggest the potential utility of employing surveys in combination with other research methods rather than as the sole method of data acquisition.

3.3.1   Timing of Research

The attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight systems are not static; rather, they may be impacted by factors such as the status of a given system's implementation: its origin; the history of its operation and its reputation for the treatment of police officers. As Finn (2001: 4) noted, "(m)ost oversight procedures have come into existence after a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct (usually a shooting or other physical force incident), often involving white

officers and minority suspects." Systems that are assembled hastily in response to a high-profile

incident of police misconduct may exacerbate rather than ameliorate tensions between citizens,

administrators and police (Finn, 2001: 108).

Wells and Schafer (2007) observed that the introduction of new oversight systems can occasion

skepticism and unease and caution that evaluations of officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight

mechanisms that are conducted during a period of transition between an internal oversight

system and an external oversight system may reflect these fears and feelings of trepidation. As

Dailey, Reid, Anderson & Giles (2006: 23) have suggested, "the police must be given time to

adapt to the new systems…Skepticism is normal for any changes in procedures. With more

experience, it is hoped that law enforcement agencies will become more trusting of this type of

system." Given that the OIPRD has been in existence since 2009 and that the SIU, police

services boards and professional standards bureaus in Ontario have all been in existence for

decades, one may anticipate that Ontario police officers will express attitudes toward civilian

oversight systems that are more favourable than those expressed by other officers whose

attitudes toward civilian review systems were probed shortly after implementation.

3.3.2 The role of police unions & police leaders in opposing/supporting civilian oversight

In previous decades, many police unions and police leaders (e.g., chiefs of police) in Canada and

the United States opposed the introduction of civilian oversight mechanisms. More recently,

however, both police unions and police leaders have voiced support of civilian oversight

mechanisms that are perceived to be unbiased and accountable.

According to West (1991: 382) police unions have long maintained that "police officers possess

unique skills, training, and experience" and warned that their professional status is threatened by

civilian investigation of their conduct. In like spirit, Lewis (1991: 171) characterized civilian involvement as "threatening" to "police values" as well as "management control of the force" and emphasized that because of these perceived threats, police would require "considerable time, education, and even consideration, in adapting to civilian review." Miller and Merrick (2002: 11) maintain that the "failures and underperformance" of civilian oversight agencies is attributable, in large measure, to the negative response of police departments, police officers and police unions and emphasize that "a lack of cooperation with a civilian oversight agency by police leaders can undermine its effectiveness and challenge its legitimacy." More recently, Wells and Schafer (2007: 5) highlighted four objections commonly raised by unions and police leaders to civilian oversight: "1) citizen oversight is not needed; 2) citizen involvement in this intimate police matter contradicts police professionalism; 3) citizens are not qualified for oversight responsibilities; and 4) citizen oversight uniquely compromises police work."

According to Martin (2007: 260), "(p)olice officers believe they are an over-regulated occupation relative to others and thus, by inference, are justified in resisting efforts to strengthen or improve regulation and governance." Nevertheless, recent research suggests that unions have increasingly accepted the implementation of external oversight mechanisms, especially after "large-scale discrediting of police integrity" (Prenzler, 2009: 161). For example, Prenzler (2009: 187) observed that there are "a number of cases" "where union leaders have strongly supported reform measures, including enlarged external oversight" and reported that "[t]his support has been couched in terms of the reputations and welfare of the department and members and, above all, in terms of protecting honest police from dishonest colleagues." An example of such support is found in Ontario, where the Police Association of Ontario published a 2007 position paper on the legislation that would lead to the 2009 enactment of the OIPRD (i.e., *Bill 103, Independent*

Police Review Act) (PAO, 2007). The PAO, an agency that collectively represents the majority

of police associations across the province, declared that they were "on record as supporting

civilian oversight of policing" (PAO, 2007: 2) and described their support for the implementation

of the OIPRD in Ontario. Their position paper additionally advanced constructive suggestions

for improvements to portions of the legislation and addressed issues such as "third party

complaints", "independent adjudication" (by the respective chief of police where the misconduct

is alleged), and the informal resolution of complaints (PAO, 2007:1-23).

Previous research has noted that resistance to civilian oversight may also exist at the highest

level of the police leadership hierarchy. As West (1991: 383) observed in summarizing this

literature:

> Police senior administrators, through the vehicle of the International Association
> of Chiefs of Police (IACP), have long argued that one of the major features of the
> professional status which they desire for their organizations is the autonomy of
> chief officers in disciplinary matters. Consequently, they have sought the types of
> purely internal control mechanisms already exercised by the medical and legal
> professions.

Senior police officials are often involved in the adjudication of police misconduct hearings and

frequently possess direct knowledge and involvement in the investigations of alleged misconduct

within their respective departments. Therefore, they play a central role in creating and sustaining

a localized attitude and approach to the handling of complaints and the regulation of police

misconduct.

Kerstetter (1985: 177) highlighted the dual concerns of police chiefs in addressing issues of

misconduct in their departments. Thus, he emphasized that while a chief's primary need is for "a

review mechanism that does not undermine his [sic] capacity to run the department," police

chiefs additionally have a need "to maintain personal and organizational credibility with the

community at large and its influential parts, such as political and governmental elites." To accomplish these twinned tasks, Kerstetter (1985: 177) asserted that police chiefs must

> know and be able to convince these others that his [sic] officers are not abusing their powers. Counterbalancing this need is a concern that the officers not be unduly hampered in their enforcement activities or demoralized by a review system that unfairly second-guesses them or abuses their rights and self-respect.

However, if police chiefs must address the concerns of both internal and external stakeholders in a difficult balancing act, this task would seem an ever-present demand of their professional role in western democratic countries. In North America, for example, high profile scandals, along with public inquiries and commissions which have addressed a wide variety of police misconduct have propelled the implementation of more stringent accountability and oversight mechanisms (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 651-652). Beare (2007: 356) observed that police executives in many North American jurisdictions have been obliged to accept the implementation of accountability mechanisms as a condition of their financial and political relationship with government.

Reiner (1991) conducted interviews with chief constables in England and Wales and determined that there was mixed support for civilian oversight mechanisms. Reiner (1991: 215) found that 52% rejected the idea of a fully independent system; 30% were supportive; 18% felt there were strong arguments for both systems. Although the chief constables believed that internal police investigators were best positioned to infiltrate police culture during investigations, they recognized that "an independent system was essential to ensure public confidence and remove perceptions of bias" (Prenzler, 2004: 97). These findings are consistent with Bayley's (1991: vii, viii) observation that senior police officials may embrace forms of civilian oversight in pursuit of "community policing" and/or "consumer satisfaction" and as part of their "strategic vision" of creating an aura of accountability and "professionalism."

Landau (2000: 63-64) reported that many senior police officials, including those in Ontario, Canada, now publically support civilian oversight as "an essential mechanism of accountability." For instance, the 2013-2014 OACP president, Chief Paul Cook (North Bay Police Service), issued the following statement: "As police leaders, we strongly support having civilian oversight bodies hold us accountable. We have a duty to hold our officers accountable for their actions" (OACP, 2014). However, while a 2015 report commissioned by the CACP (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police) stated that "(c)ivilian police governance bodies are increasingly recognized as an important form of police oversight, and are being established in many municipalities" it cautioned that the "additional reporting requirements upon police agencies…[are] increasing overall policing costs" (Ahlgren, 2015: 27). Thus, while the CACP recognizes the merits of sound civilian oversight mechanisms, it also urges recognition of their associated costs.

Although police unions and police chiefs have voiced concern that civilian oversight mechanisms may compromise the "professional" status of police officers and diminish the role of police in regulating their professional conduct through internal systems, civilian oversight agencies have become more entrenched in countries such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. At present, both police unions and police leaders commonly express support for civilian oversight mechanisms in their public pronouncement but with the important caveat that these agencies must be objective, fair-minded and transparent in their mandates and practices.

3.4 Summary of Socio-demographic analyses in previous literature

Many of the studies cited in the literature review have incorporated some form of socio-demographic analysis (e.g., Perez, 1994; Kreisel, 1998; Walker & Herbst, 1999; Weisburd et al.,

2000; de Guzman, 2004; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007, 2009). The most commonly assessed variables are: age, sex, "race"/ethnicity, education, rank, and policing experience. A summary of their findings is provided below.

Sex – To date, no study has found sex to be a reliable indicator of positive or negative attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Kreisel, 1998: 211; Weisburd et al., 2000: 10; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 659). However, several recommended that future studies pursue possible attitudinal differences among male and female police officers in relation to internal/external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 1994: 203; Walker & Herbst, 1999: 6; Weisburd et al., 2000:10).

Age and educational level – To date, no study has identified officer age or educational level as a reliable predictor of attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 1994: 202; Kreisel, 1998: 207-219; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 669). Nevertheless, in that these variables may be associated with police officers' rank and amount of policing experience, it would seem important to consider these variables.

Rank and Policing experience – Research on the relationship between police officers' rank and/or amount of policing experience and attitudes toward internal/external oversight mechanisms yields mixed results. De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663) determined that those who held the rank of "patrol officer" (i.e., constable) had less trust in internal affairs investigations than higher ranking officers. They also found that "job tenure" was not a statistically significant variable in relation to attitudes toward oversight mechanisms (2007: 669). However, Kreisel (1998: 212-213) found evidence that more seasoned police officers were more accepting of external accountability mechanisms than those with lesser years of experience.

In addition, there is evidence that a police officer's rank may affect the likelihood that they will be the subject of a complaint. Thus, de Guzman (2004: 368-369) found that "lower-ranking officers seemed more prone to receive complaints than higher-ranking ones" and Perez (1994: 203) determined that police "officers generate the greatest majority of their complaints in their first years on the job." Research which examined the complaint-related data of a large northeastern American police department over 15-year period (1987-2001) (Harris, 2006, 2009) found that while almost 80% of officers were the subject of at least one complaint of alleged misconduct, the majority received their first complaint within the first three years of their career.

Race/Ethnicity - Several researchers have reported a statistically significant relationship between officer "race"/ethnicity and attitudes toward internal/external systems of police oversight. For instance, Weisburd et al. (2009: 9) found that African-American police officers as well as officers from other racialized minority groups were more supportive of civilian review boards than their white counterparts. Perez (1994: 204) reported that in Oakland and Berkley, California, African-American officers expressed more support than their Caucasian counterparts for "civilianizing review mechanisms" and for combined civilian-police hearing boards. De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663; see also 2009) found that Latino/a police officers reported "higher levels of trust in citizen oversight than officers of other races/ethnicities" and that "being Latino/a also significantly decreases officers' satisfaction with how they feel they were treated" by internal affairs investigators.

Knowledge and Experience with Civilian oversight – There is some evidence that police officers' experience with a civilian-led oversight system or enhanced knowledge/understanding of their operations may improve their attitudes and perceptions toward these systems. Both Kreisel (1998: 219) and de Guzman (2004: 374) found that police officers who identified themselves as

well-informed about civilian review mechanisms were more accepting of these agencies than others.

3.5 Practical Importance and Theoretical Framework

My research takes heed of the strengths and weaknesses of the body of literature reviewed and attempts to enhance it in a meaningful way. Within my study, three separate but intertwined theoretical concepts are accorded focal attention: legitimacy, procedural justice and professionalism.

3.5.1 Perceived Legitimacy of Civilian Oversight

Police officers' perceptions of the legitimacy of civilian oversight is central to the core functioning and efficacy of civilian oversight of policing. As Wells and Schafer (2007: 3) noted succinctly, "(c)itizen oversight *must* have legitimacy in the eyes of police officers or it will fail" (emphasis added; see also de Guzman, 2004; Perez, 1994). Although police officers who intentionally obstruct any internal/external investigation confront potentially severe penalties, they may refrain from cooperating fully with these investigations if they perceive the goals, mechanisms and/or administration of the oversight system to be illegitimate. As Perez (1994: 15) emphasized:

> Any formalized process can be subverted, cheated, and abused by the population policed. In the case of policing the police, the subjects of the regulatory mechanism who might be moved to subvert it are themselves expert in the application of such systems. Presumably their subversion efforts will be quite effective. Thus such formal regulatory mechanisms are of limited utility when applied to expert regulators.

A later section of this chapter (section *3.6.3 Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU*) notes allegations which charge that police officers and entire police services across Ontario have willfully failed to comply with what is required of them during SIU investigations (Ontario,

2011: 2-3; Benzie, 2011; Blizzard, 2011). My research seeks, in part, to identify whether police

officers object to specific features of civilian oversight systems or wholly reject the notion that

civilian oversight, or any form of bureaucratic oversight, can be effective in managing police

misconduct (De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 656). This endeavour is consistent with de Guzman's

(2004: 359) exhortations for research that moves beyond simply "trusting-not trusting or like-

dislike" dichotomies. Moreover, observing that "(t)he degree to which police officers support or

oppose specific aspects of citizen oversight remains largely unknown," (Wells & Schafer, 2007:

7), I sought to provide a nuanced evaluation of officers' opinions on the legitimacy of multiple

civilian oversight models that currently exist in Ontario.

In *Chapter 1*, I noted that "legitimacy" has been defined as "the right to rule" or "the recognition

of the right to govern" (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 124-125; see also Evetts, 2013: 783). The

ongoing utility of Weber's writings on legitimacy are acknowledged by Tyler and Fagan (2008:

239) who argue that in contemporary times, authorities continue to derive benefits

> when they are able to obtain cooperation from the people with whom they deal
> beyond the cooperation which they can obtain via their control of the power to
> shape behavior through the use of sanctions and incentives. It is desirable to also
> be able to secure cooperation through the manner in which they exercise their
> authority. In other words, they want to be able to call upon deference to authority
> that is 'legitimized' in noninstrumental ways, such as via the procedures by which
> it is exercised.

These insights are helpful in understanding the attitudes of police officers toward civilian

oversight in Ontario. Thus, civilian oversight agents/agencies are subject to evaluation by police

officers on two fronts: *who* they are (i.e., perceived capabilities, in comparison to internal police

investigators) and *how* they function (i.e., procedural justice). The following sections discuss the

perceived legitimacy ("right to rule") of civilian oversight agents/agencies based upon those

criteria.

3.5.1.1 Perceived Capabilities of Civilian Investigators and Preference for Internal Affairs

Although previous research has noted the preference of police officers for internal, rather than external, investigations of complaints and alleged misconduct, I thought this finding demanded fuller exploration. While this expressed preference could be construed as evidence of an insular and fiercely territorial police culture, it is equally tenable that police officers view themselves as "professionals" and believe that they possess the qualifications, capabilities, competence and integrity to regulate their own professional conduct. As such, this study probed police officers' opinions about internal investigators (Professional Standards Bureau) and sought to develop comprehensive understanding of the attitudes that police officers hold in relation to the issues of oversight and accountability of police behaviour.

Perez (1994: 88-89) has observed that, "(a)lthough most cops do not like internal affairs, nevertheless, they defend its operations as necessary. They argue that civilian review is unfair because it is operated by individuals unfamiliar with police work." According to Dailey et al. (2006: 15), police officers often take umbrage with the scrutiny of their conduct by those who may lack experientially-based knowledge of the demands of the profession. Similarly, Maguire and Corbett (1991) have stressed that:

> Police deal with people when they are at their worst…and most citizens are unaware of the procedures police are trained in to address such situations. Consequently, police officers consider themselves professionals with a certain expertise and believe it is inappropriate for external parties (i.e., outgroups) to judge their decisions.

Previous research has revealed that police officers frequently maintain that internal police investigators bring an "insider perspective" to their work that is crucial to understanding and evaluating police conduct. For example, Thomassen (2002: 202) reported that internal police

investigators are credited by police officers with the possession of "necessary cultural

knowledge" and they are accorded "legitimacy within the police force."

In like fashion, Perez (1994: 105) found that police officers often perceive internal police

investigators to be uniquely well-equipped to conduct thorough and effective investigations.

Thus, they commonly viewed these officers as

> particularly knowledgeable about police subcultural norms, the nuances of how
> departmental regulations are applied over time, individual beat problems,
> citywide geography and demographics, crime patterns, supervisorial techniques,
> and the executive management styles of their particular police organization and
> municipalities...Such information can be of great significance in understanding
> situations as they are presented in the form of complaints. It can also facilitate
> obtaining information from police officers who are reluctant to cooperate with the
> investigative process.

In contrast, police officers perceived civilian investigators to be naïve, ill-informed about the

realities of policing, vulnerable to being "snowed" or "conned" by those under investigation, and

less "capable of cutting to the core" of issues that could involve complex police procedures

(Kerstetter, 1985: 149-182; Perez, 1994: 108).

The importance of evaluating police officers' attitudes regarding internal police investigators is

underscored by the architecture of current policing practices in Ontario, which intertwines

systems with civilian oversight investigations. As previously noted, the vast majority of all cases

reviewed and managed by the OIPRD (89.4% of cases between 2013-2014) are "referred"

(back) to the police service in which the complaint originated and are formally investigated by

that service's "Internal Affairs" or "Professional Standards Bureau" (OIPRD, 2014: 21).

Furthermore, when police officers are investigated by civilians for alleged criminal wrongdoing,

internal police investigators are tasked with conducting "parallel investigations" on behalf of the

police service in question. Indeed, Section 11 of the *Police Services Act* (1990; Ontario Reg.

267/10) requires police services in Ontario to conduct an internal investigation whenever an investigation by the SIU has not resulted in the laying of criminal charges. These "parallel investigations" are intended to enhance investigative/administrative scrutiny of alleged wrongdoing by police. Thus, internal police investigators warrant attention in this study since their labours complement the activities of their civilian counterparts.

3.5.2 Procedural Justice

Dailey et al. (2006: 15; see also Strudwick, 2003) observed that police officers' concern for procedural justice echoes those of civilians: both object to "delays in being notified about receiving a complaint, inadequate updates about the progress of the investigation, and a lack of information regarding the outcome of the case. In sum, officers too felt excluded and alienated from the process." Yet, there is a dearth of research on the quality (actual and perceived) of investigations conducted by civilians and how these perceptions impact relationships between police officers and civilian agents/agencies (Murphy & McKenna: 2008).

Geller and Toch (1996: 320) emphasized that tending to issues of procedural justice in police complaints systems may yield many potential benefits:

> The potential inherent in procedural justice approaches is to significantly increase citizen satisfaction and officer satisfaction with the police complaint review systems (which neither audience generally holds in very high regard), regardless of which party prevails in the adjudicative process. The ripple effect of trust and satisfaction or distrust and hostility spreading from citizen and officer disputants throughout communities and the department deserves attention from police administrators and local government officials. A procedural justice variation on current approaches may help, even if indirectly, to increase citizen trust and the willingness to collaborate with police against neighborhood crime problems.

Thus, there are larger issues at stake when considering issues of procedural justice than simple gripes and groans about inept or inefficient bureaucratic processes. The real and perceived treatment of citizens and police officers during misconduct investigations can have profound

"ripple effects" well beyond the initial source of conflict and can have lasting effects on relationships between the police and the communities they serve.

De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 668) have argued that identifying grievances about process-issues is beneficial for both citizens and police officers since elements of the complaint/investigative/adjudicative process can potentially be improved. Towards this end, this study offers practical recommendations to improve real and perceived problems and inefficiencies in extant accountability mechanisms.

3.5.3 Literature regarding police professionalism and professionalization

Although "the developing nature of police professionalism continues to be a source of major debate among both police practitioners and academics" (Fyfe, 2013: 408), my study will not participate in the debate on whether policing is best categorized as an occupation or a profession (Evetts, 2003: 134). Rather, I will limit myself to pointing out some of the more interesting points that these debates have raised.

In examining various models of police reform and police professionalism in the United States throughout the last century (e.g., predictive policing, intelligence led policing, community policing, new police professionalism), Sklansky (2011: 13) noted that: "[t]he rhetoric of police professionalism raises questions" such as: What does it mean to be a 'professional'? In what ways would it make sense for police officers to be like doctors, lawyers, engineers?" According to Carlan and Lewis (2009: 43-44), "most academic queries question whether police officers truly understand (or desire) the responsibilities associated with becoming a bona fide profession." In addition, they reported that "(m)ost academic queries regarding police professional status are inconclusive, but some studies do conclude that policing does not align

with common professional standards" or traditional definitions of professionals and professions (Carlan & Lewis, 2009: 43).

While Evetts (2003: 397) declared that "policing clearly fits those definitions which emphasize that professions are the 'structural, occupational and institutional arrangements for dealing with work associated with uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies,'" Fyfe (2013: 408) countered this claim and noted that when "measured against definitions of professions which emphasize the importance of a period spent in higher or further education, policing…does not fit the model nor does it have, like many professions, an established code of ethics." As Neyroud (2008: 674) observed, "the desire of the police service to be an independent profession working to high ethical standards deploying a recognized body of professional knowledge is an aspiration that remains to be achieved" since policing does not possess a universal "code of police ethics, there is not a well-established culture of life-long learning and reaccreditation, and policing is not currently a graduate profession." Stone and Travis (2011: 17) exhort investments in educational and training standards among police officers in North America, maintaining that: "[t]he pace of innovation and knowledge development today is simply too fast for police organizations to rely on recruit training and occasional specialized courses" and insisting that "police departments need to *become* learning organizations of professionals" (emphasis added).

However, if these scholars suggest that this need is a recent development, their comments are markedly consistent with comments voiced by Carl Klockars (1985: 114) decades earlier:

> If police are to be true professionals…it must begin with a long period of education in an accredited, academic professional school at the college or postgraduate level, include or continue through a period of supervised internship and conclude with the granting of a licence without which one cannot practice that profession. No true profession – neither medicine nor law, engineering, accounting, teaching – has ever reached genuine professional status in any other way.

Stone and Travis (2011: 17) additionally point to the absence of national standards among

policing organizations in the United States in relation to, for example, a code of ethics;

educational requirements and accreditation and insist that "[a]chieving national coherence in this

radically decentralized business" would help to achieve greater "accountability for crime, cost,

and conduct; public legitimacy across social divisions and continuous innovation and learning at

every rank would mark a watershed in policing." They argue that the same goal is equally

worthy of pursuit in Canada. However, achieving this "coherence" may be difficult in Canada,

which has a "mixed model" of policing organizations spread across a patchwork of national,

provincial/territorial, regional, municipal and Aboriginal jurisdictions (Stone & Travis, 2011:

18). As earlier noted in *Chapter 2: Civilian Oversight in Ontario Canada*, there are ongoing

initiatives to better coordinate approaches to policing in Canada (e.g., efficiencies within

policing services; new models of community safety) through the Future of Policing Advisory

Committee (FPAC) (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and

the Economics of Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada).[10]

Cawthray et al., (2013: 187) explored efforts by the International Association of Chiefs of Police

(IACP) and the United Nations (U.N.) to create global/universal codes of police conduct. The

authors found that governments in many countries around the world have introduced a range of

measures in recent decades that seek to bolster police accountability, such as independent

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[10] See http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/ndx/snpss-eng.aspx?n=3

Efficiencies within police services: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/ndx/srchrslts-eng.aspx?gb=p&p=1

New Models of Community Safety: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/plcng/cnmcs-plcng/ndx/srchrslts-eng.aspx?gb=p&p=2

civilian oversight and ethics training. However, they also observe that "[c]odes of conduct for law enforcement arose as part of a professionalization trend within policing in the twentieth century, and they have come to play an important role in making clear what standard of behavior is expected of law enforcement personnel" (Cawthray et al., 2013: 189). Thus, they emphasize that while codes of conduct are "associated with desires for greater accountability through the establishment of rule-based behavior norms that echo democratic ideals," "[s]elf-regulating behavior through establishing codes of conduct is an integral part of the professionalization process for any profession, including the police."

Carlan and Lewis (2009) examined police professionalism by utilizing Hall's 1968 professionalism scale[11]; this scale includes the following dimensions: *organizational referent*, *belief in public service*, *belief in self-regulation*, *a sense of calling* and *belief in autonomy*. Their mail survey to 16 police departments in the United States received a total of 1114 responses (57% response rate) and found that the majority of police officers viewed themselves as professionals deserving of *autonomy* (i.e., the ability "to make decisions without interference from outsiders (outsiders and even employing organizations)" and *self-regulation* (Carlan & Lewis, 2009: 41-42).

According to Stone & Travis (2011:1), police leaders in the United States are increasingly committing themselves to a form of "new professionalism", which is grounded in four key principles: *accountability*, *legitimacy*, *innovation* and *national coherence*. They observe that police leaders are now accountable to multiple internal and external stakeholders, including "civilian review boards, city councils and county commissioners, state legislatures, inspectors

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[11] Hall's professionalism scale was applied to police officers and police chiefs in previous studies with mixed results (see Regoli et al., 1987, 1989; Crank, 1990; Crank et al., 1993).

general, government auditors and courts" (Stone and Travis, 2011: 2) as well as citizens, journalists, resident associations, chambers of commerce and various community-based organizations. "[T]he legitimacy of policing under the new professionalism," they conclude, recognizes that "legitimacy is both conferred by law and democratic politics and earned by adhering to professional standards and winning the trust and confidence of the people policed" (Stone & Travis, 2011: 14).

Several scholars observe that the professional autonomy and independence of the police has been challenged in Western nations. For example, Smith (2009: 423) observed that the "internationally recognized principle that law enforcement officers should be accountable to the law" also functions as "protection against external interference in their affairs," in countries such as England and Wales. Smith (2009: 423) noted "the convention of constabulary independence" additionally "consolidates police autonomy and sustains police opposition to the introduction of accountability and regulatory reforms." However, the "trend to external review" in Western nations has weakened the mechanisms that traditionally buffered the police and provided them with "protection against external interference" (Goldsmith, 1991; see also Prenzler, 2004; Porter & Prenzler, 2012).

Moreover, if the "appeal to professionalism is a strong current in the development of police organizations and is typically based on claims to exclusive ownership of an area of expertise and knowledge" (Fyfe, 2013: 408), changes in police policy may be perceived as status-eroding. In illustration, Rowe (2007) reports that many police officers in the United Kingdom viewed the implementation of a "positive arrest policy" for domestic violence incidents as a measure that not only limited their use of discretion in applying the law but one that also "served to undermine their professionalism" (Rowe, 2007: 293).

Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf's (2013: 225) analysis of Dutch police leaders as a professional group also finds that these high-ranking officers perceive that their occupational autonomy is now increasingly delimited. Thus, if "[t]he main question that appears to drive the quest for professional control is 'who controls the police?'" the officers in their study perceived that "police organizations are regulated by outside stakeholders, and this can be used to *literally* seize occupational control" (Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf, 2013: 225).

The above discussion illustrates that occupational autonomy, legitimacy, discretion, expertise, internal/external regulation and accountability mechanisms are central issues pertaining to the professional status and professionalization of contemporary police officers and police leaders. The next section highlights the context in which challenges and changes to the professional status of police are rooted.

3.5.3.1 Police Professionalism in the context of New Public Management (NPM)

Several scholars have argued that in many Western nations, efforts to bolster the legitimacy and accountability of the police are related to "New Public Management" (NPM) initiatives. According to Den Hayer (2011: 419)

> The new public management (NPM) philosophy has been described as a move towards a governance approach that places emphasis on transparency, performance management and accountability of public sector employees and managers….Modern NPM was introduced to a number of western nations during the 1980s and formed the basis of police reform initiatives that were introduced in the 1990s. These early reforms and the increasing influence of globalisation since the 1980s have had a compounding effect on the management of the public sector and in particular the police.

Key features of NPM include "implementing accountability, external controls and a performance management system" (Den Hayer, 2011: 428). According to Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf (2013: 224), police forces are increasingly disciplined by management techniques, quality

models and accountability systems, coming from the New Public Management." Citizen-led oversight mechanisms, such as those examined in this study, stand as clear examples of such accountability structures.

Fyfe (2013: 411) notes that while police accountability structures were "largely understood in terms of responsibility for the professional misconduct by individual officers" "the notion of police accountability now has a much broader organizational resonance." In detailing how NPM reforms have fueled changes to the way policing is organized and managed, Fyfe (2013: 411) observed that NPM's redefinition of "professionalism" "around a managerial culture…has been facilitated in policing by the requirement for police performance frameworks monitoring a range of indicators, from response times to detection rates, as a way of distinguishing strong from poorly performing police forces and holding them to account." For example, in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, increased accountability mechanisms have broadened to include the implementation of performance management measures; these measures seek to ensure the efficient and economical delivery of services and include citizen-led programs that are thought to bolster relations between police agencies and the communities they serve (Fyfe, 2013: 411; see also Evetts, 2011: 415). The "commitment to community policing initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic also includes a strong emphasis on ensuring that police can be called to account by local citizens" (Fyfe, 2013: 411).

Understanding the impact of NPM related initiatives provides some important context in assessing police officers' attitudes toward civilian-led oversight, since such initiatives challenge the autonomy and control of police officers of all ranks. As Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf (2013: 225) emphasized,

> There are multiple dependencies when it comes to organizing police work and police management, and these dependencies…tighten collective regulative control. Police work and management are clearly *embedded* within state-based systems of work control as well as systems and standards for democratic control.

In Ontario, the primary civilian-led oversight agencies that hold police officers and police services accountable (e.g., Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD) have all been formed in the past few decades, and they are matched by parallel agencies across the country. Not surprisingly, the introduction of each "regulative control" mechanism has been accompanied by police resistance; the mandate of each respective agency poses a direct challenge to the autonomy and authority of the police to regulate, organize, and manage their own professional conduct and practices.

3.5.3.2 Police Professionalism: Current and future trends

More than a decade ago, Julia Evetts (2003: 398) encouraged academics to move beyond the problematic definition of profession and "consider the appeal of the concepts of 'profession' and particularly of 'professionalism'" (2003: 398). She further noted that the police, along with "pharmacists, social workers, care assistants, librarians, computing experts,…and the armed forces are claiming to be professions and to demonstrate professionalism in their occupational work." "The expansion of the service sector and knowledge work in the developed world and the growth or re-emergence of professions in both developing and transitional societies," Evetts (2003: 398) reported, also furnish evidence of "the appeal of the concept of 'professionalism' as well as the strength and persistence of 'professions' as an occupational form."

While Evetts (2013: 778) acknowledged that the sociological analysis of professional work has traditionally "differentiated professionalism as a special means of organizing work and controlling workers and in contrast to the hierarchical, bureaucratic and managerial controls of

industrial and commercial organizations," she argued that the nature of professional work is changing:

> [I]ncreasingly professionals (such as doctors, nurses, teachers, social workers) now work in employing organizations; lawyers and accountants in large professional service firms (PSFs) and sometimes in international and commercial organizations; pharmacists in national (retailing) companies; and engineers, journalists, performing artists, the armed forces and police find occupational control of their work and discretionary decision-making increasingly difficult to maintain and sustain.

She additionally discerns that the focus of academic inquiries has "shifted away from the concepts of *profession* (as a distinct and generic category of occupational work) and *professionalization* (as the process to pursue, develop and maintain the closure of the occupational group) and towards the concept of *professionalism*" (Evetts, 2013: 783-784).[12] Although she noted that "concept of professionalism has an appeal to and for practitioners, employees and managers in the development and maintenance of work identities, career decisions and senses of self," she argued that "the discourse of professionalism" that is "embodied in managerial literature, training materials, occupational recruitment campaigns and company mission statements" advances a narrative in which "occupational regulation and control (both internal and external forms) are now explained and justified as means to improve professionalism in work" (2013: 783-784).

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[12] Definitions of "professions," "professionalization," "professionalism," "professional groups" and "professionals" abound in the scholarly literature. However, for the sake of clarity, those deployed by Regoli et al. (1989: 47), which are grounded in the work of Vollmer and Mills (1966: vii-viii), outline that "*Professions* refers to an ideal type of occupational organization that provides the model for the form of the occupational organization which would result if any occupational group became professionalized. *Professionalization* is the process whereby occupations change characteristics in the direction of a profession. *Professionalism* refers to an ideology (set of attitudes) and a set of related activities that can be found in diverse occupational groups where members seek professional status. As an ideology, professionalism may induce members to strive to become professional; yet although professionalism may be a component of professionalization, professionalism in itself is not a sufficient cause for professionalization. *Professional groups* are associations of colleagues in an occupation where a relatively high degree of professionalization has taken place. *Professionals* are those considered by their colleagues to be members of professional groups."

This discourse is clearly discernable in policing in Ontario, where the combined impact of new and enhanced external controls (e.g., police services boards, SIU, OIPRD) and the continued "trend to external review" (Goldsmith, 1991) have fundamentally altered the way in which police officers and leaders think about professional accountability mechanisms and "who controls the police" (Van der Meulen & Noordegraaf, 2013: 225). However, it is evident that police elsewhere confront similar challenges. Thus, Fyfe (2013: 418) reported that policing is generally marked by an "increasing tension between a commitment to *organisational professionalism* with its emphasis on hierarchical structures of authority, accountability and target-setting, and a more traditional *occupational professionalism,* which emphasis discretionary decision-making, codes of ethics, and trust in practitioners." Nevertheless, Evetts (2013: 790) contends that these tensions are not unique to police and are found in many contemporary occupational contexts, where professionalism is being imposed "from above" as "a normative value" and used "as an ideological instrument and a mechanisms to promote occupational change." She observed that, "[i]n effect, professionalism is being used to convince, cajole and persuade employees, practitioners and other workers to perform and behave in ways which the organization or institution deem to be appropriate, effective and efficient" (Evetts, 2013: 790).

Three recent studies document efforts to "professionalize" contemporary policing in Ontario. The first, a research project conducted by the Ontario Police College (Ontario, 2013: 3) investigated "ways of modernizing the policing profession in Ontario" through an examination of the educational requirements of police recruits in Ontario. The study examined "the benefits and risks of increasing the education prerequisite for people seeking to become police officers" and also "the value and functions of a self-governing body for the policing profession" (Ontario, 2013: 3) through an examination of literature and best practices. The study reported both

positive and negative impacts for increasing educational standards for police recruits and also for the establishment of a new self-regulating governance model for policing in Ontario that was similar to those who govern the conduct of groups such as doctors, teachers, nurses and lawyers. The research garnered from this study will inform a second project phase in coordination with a multi-stakeholder working group and Future of Policing Advisory Committee (Ontario, 2013: 29).

A second endeavour was chaired by Justice Stephen Goudge and solicited the view of academic experts on the future of public policing models in Canada (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014). According to this report, "[t]he future of successful Canadian policing requires increased professionalization of police practice, with standardized qualification and training, consistent evidence-based policing, and continuous effort to improve that practice" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 111). It argued that enhanced and expanded civilian-led oversight mechanisms are central to bolstering the accountability and legitimacy of police practices in Canada. The report recognized that there is renewed interest and incentive to increase the professionalization of the police in both an international and Canadian context. According to this report, the enhancement of police professionalization demands: the development of common qualifications for recruits; education and training procedures that employ evidence-based approaches; "continuous professional development linked to accreditation and reward, which provides a parallel route to traditional promotion systems; and renewed emphasis on leadership and management development" (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 113).

A third study, prepared by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO, 2015), contained various recommendations to modernize policing organizations in Ontario. Among those identified as deserving of priority were: 1) changing the current arbitration system; 2) improving

the quality of existing governance and civilian oversight system; and 3) enabling the transfer of some specific police functions to civilians or security providers (AMO, 2015: 4). The report also recommended that the training and education of officers be enhanced and urged "establishment of a centralized regulatory body for the policing profession" that "could assist in managing applicant qualifications, ongoing training, and licensing of officers" and would be similar to those regulatory bodies "that exist for physicians, lawyers, nurses, and other professionals in Ontario" (AMO, 2015: 6). Thus, in distinguishing the proposed college from the Ontario Police College, the AMO outlined that the college that is envisaged would have "the mandate to license, partially-govern, and regulate the professional practice of policing by individuals" and could additionally "manage professional development and investigate some forms of officer misconduct" (AMO, 2015: 39).

All three of these studies attest to a perceived need to modernize and "professionalize" policing in Ontario. In addition, each attests to the import of perceptions and, by extension, suggest the potential utility of the current study. In the final section of this chapter, I identify my anticipated findings.

3.6 Anticipated Findings

In developing the research proposal for this project, I outlined a series of anticipated findings that were based upon my review of the extant literature. These anticipated findings are summarized below.

3.6.1 Anticipated Findings - General

I relied primarily upon findings from American studies pertaining to my central theoretical concepts (legitimacy, procedural justice, professionalism) to construct my hypotheses concerning general attitudes toward civilian oversight (See *3.2 - Summary of Previous Research Findings: Police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight*). I anticipated that my respondents would not have uniform perceptions of the desirability of civilian involvement in the oversight of police work. Moreover, I hypothesized that the majority of police officers would express an overall preference for internal police-led investigations (Professional Standards Bureau) over civilian-review systems and would indicate a preference for the involvement of civilians to be limited to "reviewing" investigatory actions rather than engaging in these actions. Thus, I thought it likely that the majority of respondents would indicate either negative or neutral attitudes toward the involvement of civilians in overseeing police conduct. Nevertheless, I also anticipated that there would be a significant proportion of officers who would express either toleration or acceptance of civilian-involvement in at least some instances.

The literature review revealed that previous studies have found few socio-demographic factors to be strong determinants of attitudes toward internal and external oversight mechanisms (see *3.4 - Summary of Socio-demographic analyses in previous literature*). Authors in previous research studies have offered few explanations for these null findings. As such, I speculated that officers' attitudes might be primarily influenced by personal and/or witnessed experience with oversight mechanisms (i.e., procedural justice issues), thereby superseding the influence of most socio-demographic factors. I therefore hypothesized that police officers who reported personal experience with civilian oversight mechanisms would express more positive attitudes than those who lacked such experience.

Previous studies have not found sex or educational level to be significant determinants of attitudes toward internal and external oversight mechanisms, however some evidence from previous research has found minority "race"/ethnicity to be associated with supportive attitudes toward internal/external systems of police oversight. Thus, in following both hypotheses and findings from previous studies, I anticipated that Ontario police officers who were female, visible minorities, and those with university education would express more positive attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms than males, non-visible minorities and those without university education. These hypotheses were based upon speculation that females, visible minorities and those with university education would be more receptive to mechanisms that are intended to thwart systemic bias and discrimination through the promotion of objective investigations and oversight.

Although no previous studies have found age to be a significant determinant of attitudes toward internal and external oversight mechanisms, this factor is directly connected directly to length of career service and rank. I anticipated that younger, lower-ranking police officers and those with less police experience would express less positive attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms than older, higher-ranking, more experienced police officers. As suggested in previous research, it is speculated that non-supervisors (constables) would have more frequent interaction with the public during calls for service, thus making them more prone to complaints and/or interactions (e.g., use of force) that might bring scrutiny from oversight mechanisms.

As noted earlier, alongside the abstract concept of general acceptance/tolerance of civilian oversight, attitudes can be assessed for each of the various oversight agencies in Ontario: police services boards, SIU, OIPRD and the Professional Standards Bureau.

3.6.2 Anticipated attitudes toward Police Services Boards

To the best of my knowledge, no previous research has examined police officers' attitudes toward police services boards. Police services boards in Ontario are largely detached from the day-to-day functioning of police operations. As such, the majority of police officers have very little, if any, direct contact with members of the police services boards during their careers. Police services boards are most frequently in contact with senior police personnel and consult with these upper level officers about large-scale budgetary and administrative oversight. Given that most police services boards have been in existence in Ontario for several decades, I hypothesized that their legitimacy would be accepted by the majority of respondents and that officers would express either neutrality or tolerance of the oversight provided by police services boards. However, my research proposal also emphasized the need to contextualize the attitudes that police officers express toward police services boards and take heed of co-present events.

At the time that I wrote my research proposal, I was aware that a number of highly-politicized issues had profoundly impacted relationships between police services boards and police services across Ontario. As such, I anticipated that the attitudes of my respondents toward police services boards might be influenced by contemporaneous events. For example, due to budgetary constraints across all public services in Ontario, police services are under increasing pressure to trim their costs and justify both their expenditures and hiring practices. Regions and municipalities that are experiencing population growth are grappling with the ever-increasing costs of policing; the overwhelming majority of these costs (approximately 90%) derive from expenditures on employee wages and benefits (e.g., Grant, 2012). Simultaneously, police services face pressures to provide expanded service to the growing communities they serve with resources that are often stretched to capacity.

Negotiations between police associations and police services boards in relation to collective

agreements for both uniform and civilian personnel have reflected these tensions. There has also

been recurring speculation in recent years that wage and benefit freezes could be implemented

for police officers in Ontario (D'Amato, 2012), with organizations such as the Association of

Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) voicing support for coordinated bargaining efforts that thwart

rising police salaries across the province (AMO, 2015: 8). I recognized that these and other

events could impact the attitudes of my respondents in fateful ways.

3.6.3   Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU

When the SIU was implemented in 1990, there was a formidable degree of hostility and

resistance among police officers and police associations; both bitterly resented the fact that

civilians would be conducting criminal investigations into the conduct of police officers. The

Ontario Ombudsman (and former SIU Director between 1996 and 1998), Andre Marin, has noted

that the SIU "faced aggressive resistance from the police community" during the 1990s (Ontario,

2008: 12; see also Ontario, 2011: 5). Although the level of hostility would seem to have

somewhat abated over the passage of time, Marin's 2011 report (Ontario, 2011: 42) observed

that considerable resistance remained:

> Given the checkered history of the relationship between the SIU and police interests,
> and the ongoing problems related to non-compliance with the SIU's authority, I
> made recommendations in *Oversight Unseen* (2008) to reinforce the integrity of the
> SIU oversight through the creation of enforcement mechanisms. I continue to
> believe that additional incentive is necessary to ensure that the effectiveness and
> credibility of the SIU is reinforced through police compliance with regulatory
> requirements. Given the entrenched culture of resistance to SIU oversight, relying on
> the heads of police services alone to encourage cooperation is insufficient. Blatant
> non-co-operation continues to this day, and it is clear that, in at least some instances,
> police officials up the chain of command are complicit.

However, despite Marin's identification of an "entrenched culture of resistance to SIU

oversight," I hypothesized that the majority of police officers would express general tolerance of

the SIU's mandate and acknowledge its legitimacy. In short, I believed that police officers have become accustomed to the requirement of having a civilian-led organization conduct an investigation in incidents resulting in serious injury, death and allegations of police-perpetrated sexual assaults. This assumption was based primarily on finding of an investigation conducted by two journalists with the *Toronto Star* and informed an article that was published by that newspaper on October 28, 2010 (Bruser and Henry, 2010). This analysis of the (then) 20-year history of the SIU determined that police officers in Ontario were rarely charged with criminal wrongdoing; between 1990 and 2010, the SIU laid criminal charges in only 95 cases out of 3400 investigations (2.8% of cases). These figures indicate that the SIU rarely finds police officers in Ontario to be criminally responsible for injury, death or allegations of sexual assault. This report also noted that merely 16 officers were subsequently convicted of a crime and only three officers were incarcerated.[13] In addition, this investigative report pointed out that 47 out of their 54 full- and part-time investigators (87%) are former police officers.[14]

I thought that both the SIU's low charge rate as well as the backgrounds of its investigators might encourage at least some police officers to view this agency with lesser degrees of suspicion. Thus, I anticipated that some police officers, who might otherwise be resistant to civilian oversight, would view the SIU favourably inasmuch as it is staffed, in the main, by former police officers. Indeed, Marin's report suggested that having such a large contingent of former police officers within the SIU may encourage onlookers, including police officers, to perceive the SIU as having a "pro-police bias" (Ontario, 2008: 88-89).

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[13] A more recent report by Gillis (2015a) has confirmed the continuation of these trends.

[14] A written request was sent to the SIU on June 21, 2014 seeking to verify the number of former police officers they employ. I did not receive a response to this query and the request for an interview with a SIU representative was ultimately declined.

In relation to the procedural aspects of SIU investigations, I hypothesized that police officers with personal experience of an investigation conducted by the SIU (whether as a subject or a witness) would express dissatisfaction with requirements to comply with certain features of the investigative process. This prediction was additionally influenced by Marin's 2011 report (Ontario, 2011: 2-3; 35-36) and its discussion of a high-profile feud between the SIU and police services in Ontario over the legal requirement that tasks subject and witness officers to immediately disclose their notes (pertaining to an incident under investigation) to the SIU. Marin (Ontario, 2011: 2-3) noted that until recently, some police officers in Ontario routinely withheld their notes from the SIU until they were vetted by legal counsel and that this practice contributed to a tumultuous relationship between the SIU and Ontario police officers/services. However, as the result of the Ontario Court of Appeal's 2011 on *Schaeffer v. Wood* (2011 ONCA 716) police officers involved in a SIU investigation must submit their notes to the SIU at the end of their work shift, with or without consultation with legal counsel. Furthermore, this ruling dictated that "subject officers" and "witness officers" involved in the same investigation cannot share the same legal counsel (Spears, 2012; McKay & Brannagan, 2014).

In another widely publicized event, SIU Director Ian Scott (retired October, 2013), sent 227 letters to Ontario police chiefs between 2008 and 2011 which noted the (alleged) lack of cooperation that had occurred between police services and the SIU during this period; reportedly, the "Toronto police service, the OPP and the Niagara, Peel, Ottawa and York police services were the most persistent culprits" in ignoring such requests from the SIU. Scott received simply thirty-two responses to his letters and among these replies, only twenty contained "substantive comments" (Ontario, 2011: 36; Benzie, 2011). News articles on the lack of response to Scott's letters may have further inflamed the thorny public relationship that exists between the SIU and

police services in Ontario and/or encouraged each side to adopt an adversarial stance toward the other (e.g., Spears, 2012; Clairmont, 2012; Blizzard, 2011).

In addition, long and reputedly "unprecedented" delays in the SIU's investigation of cases represent a point of frustration for stakeholders across the province (Crosier, 2015; Gallant, 2015). The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards, the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police and various police services have called upon the SIU to expedite investigations and, by doing so, to reduce the levels of stress that these investigations impose upon citizens and police officers across the province (Crosier, 2015; Gallant, 2015).

In penning my research proposal, I found it difficult to predict how these types of high-level and highly-politicized quarrels would impact the attitudes and opinions of the officers who participated in my research and the questions that my questionnaire posed in relation to the SIU. However, I anticipated that the majority of police officers would express dissatisfaction with the investigative processes carried out by the SIU, while expressing tolerance or acceptance of that organization's overall mandate and legitimacy.

3.6.4   Anticipated attitudes toward the OIPRD

Given the recent implementation of the OIPRD (2009), I anticipated that few of my respondents would be familiar with the agency and its practices and that the majority would lack experientially-based knowledge of this agency. Although the OIPRD employs eleven full-time investigators; six of whom have a background in policing (OIPRD, 2014: 41), "[t]he OIPRD does not have jurisdiction over RCMP officers, TTC Special Constables, GO Transit police, First Nations police officers, court officers, campus police, provincial offences officers or special constables…(the OIPRD) cannot investigate, recommend or lay criminal charges" (OIPRD, 2014: 9).

Moreover, as previously noted, the OIPRD functions primarily in a monitoring/reviewing capacity as the vast majority of investigations they oversee are "referred" back to the police service where the complaint originated and are investigated by that service's Professional Standards branch. For example, of the 3114 complaints received between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014, the OIPRD "screened in" (i.e., deemed worthy of investigation by the OIPRD Director) 1297 complaints for investigation; during this time period, there were also 27 screened in complaints carried over from 2012-2013 (OIPRD, 2015: 19). Among those complaints that were screened in, 1209 complaints involved matters of police conduct, 22 complaints referred to police policies and 66 complaints raised issues about service (OIPRD, 2014: 19). The remaining complaints were screened out by the OIPRD for a variety of reasons (e.g., "not in the public interest", "better dealt with under another act/law", "frivolous", "over six months and other criteria not met") (OIPRD: 2015: 16). Of the 1324 complaints "sent for investigation" during this time period, 89.4% (1183) were referred to police services for investigation (1094 complaints about conduct; 89 complaints regarding policy and service) (OIPRD, 2014: 21). The OIPRD retained 136 (10.3%) conduct complaints for investigation and 5 complaints were referred to police services boards (OIPRD, 2014: 21).

The 2011 OIPRD report (OIPRD, 2011: 21) sheds some light on how investigations are handled once they are "referred" to a police service:

> When a police service investigates a conduct complaint, the investigating officer liaises with the complainant and the OIPRD. The OIPRD's case management, investigations and legal services work together to manage and oversee referred complaints. Case coordinators track the referred investigation as it progresses and coordinate with police service liaison officers as well as complainants to ensure that all directions, timelines and notice requirements are met.

The 2014 OIPRD Annual Report documented that wrongdoing by police was "substantiated" in only a small number of cases between April 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014: 2516 of 2697 allegations (93.3%) were unsubstantiated and 181 (6.7%) were "substantiated"; this finding coincides with Prenzler's (2000: 662) assertion that "low substantiation rates by civilian review bodies of between 2 and 8 per cent have been described as an 'international phenomenon.'" In addition, the 2014 OIPRD annual report noted that among the 181 cases that were substantiated, 109 were deemed "less serious" and 72 were adjudged "serious") (OIPRD, 2014: 27). It also outlined that the former type of complaint "may be resolved informally if everyone agrees or, if Informal Resolution fails, the chief can resolve the matter through a disposition without a hearing"; in contrast, in cases of "serious" conduct matters, the chief must hold a disciplinary hearing (OIPRD, 2014: 27).

Aware that the vast majority of investigations remain in the hands of the Professional Standards branches of police services, I anticipated that many officers would express general tolerance and/or acceptance of the overall legitimacy and mandate of the OIPRD. Further, I hypothesized that respondents with experiential knowledge of an OIPRD investigation would express dissatisfaction with the speed of the investigative process. My hypothesis was supported by De Angelis and Kupchik's (2007) report that found that officer satisfaction with the complaint process was strongly influenced by its "timeliness." Thus, I interpolated that the increases in the time allotted for the resolution of cases by the OIPRD would be reflected in officer reports of dissatisfaction with the speed of the investigative process. According to the 2011 OIPRD report (OIPRD, 2011: 23), the time allotted to screen, assign, investigate and resolve all complaints increased from 90 days to 120 days. This report additionally acknowledged that while the OIPRD aims to notify officers of a (disciplinary) hearing within six months, "(m)ore complex

investigations take longer and as a result time extensions are often requested" (OIPRD, 2011: 23). The 2014 annual report specified that the OIPRD has made more concerted efforts in recent years to organize their investigations through stringent performance management tools (OIPRD, 2014: 38-39).

3.6.5 Anticipated attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau

My purpose in evaluating police officers' attitudes regarding Professional Standards officers was multifaceted. Although previous research has noted repeatedly that officers prefer internal versus external investigations of complaints and alleged misconduct, I thought it important to re-assess this finding in a systematic manner by directly asking police officers their opinions about the performance and treatment issued by internal investigators. As previously noted, internal police investigations are often closely intertwined with civilian-led investigations of complaints and alleged misconduct. For example, police services in Ontario are required to conduct "parallel investigations" when the SIU has invoked their mandate and no charges have been laid. Further, since the majority of complaints and allegations of misconduct are referred back to police services by the OIPRD for investigation and resolution, I recognized that most police officers who have faced an investigation of their conduct will have had contact/interaction with their own Professional Standards personnel rather than the OIPRD. Moreover, given that prior to 2009, Professional Standards officers were almost exclusively responsible in Ontario for the investigation of complaints and allegations of misconduct that did not meet the mandate of the SIU, I anticipated that many of the experiences that my respondents would report would address their interactions with Professional Standards officers.

I additionally anticipated that the majority of my respondents would indicate a general tolerance and/or acceptance of the work carried out by their service's Professional Standards Bureau. This

belief was based on the assumption that most police officers recognize that the processing and resolution of complaints and allegations of misconduct is an ineluctable feature of modern policing. While I expected that most police officers would express dissatisfaction with facets of the investigative process (e.g., timeliness, communication, notification of resolution), I hypothesized that respondents would express greater levels of satisfaction with the investigative process carried out by Professional Standards as compared to the SIU or OIPRD, since internal investigations pose fewer physical and/or bureaucratic barriers than those conducted and/or overseen by an outside agency.

3.7 Conclusion of *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*

My review of the literature stressed the potential utility of research which examines the attitudes of Ontario police officers toward civilian oversight mechanisms. In the following chapter, I provide an overview of the research methods that I employed in my investigation of this topic.

Chapter 4

Methods

This chapter provides an overview of the research methods utilized in this study. The discussion centers around the planning and implementation of the chosen research design - a mixed methods sequential explanatory design – and includes details about both the administration of *Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire* and *Phase 2 – Semi-Structured interviews*.

4.1 Mixed Methods Research

My perception of shortcomings in the research which has addressed my topic led me to seek a comprehensive approach that would allow a better understanding of police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms. More specifically, I noted that the majority of these studies focused exclusively on a single "police complaints system" and only one (Perez, 1994: 80) had employed a combination of attitudinal surveys, interviews and direct observation.

I utilized a mixed methods research approach, which "involves the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data" that are "mixed, or combined in some way" in a single study or series of studies (Punch, 2014: 302; see also Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 5; Lanier and Briggs, 2014: 192). Creswell & Plano Clark (2011: 5) pointed out,

> Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases of the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone.

Punch (2014: 302-303) noted that a variety of terms have been used to describe mixed methods research, such as 'multimethod', 'integrated', 'blended', 'combined', 'multitrait-multimethod research', 'methodological triangulation', 'multimethodological research' and 'mixed model research'. Today, "mixed methods" is widely recognized as "an umbrella term to cover multifaceted procedures of combining, integrating and linking the different types of methods and data" (Punch, 2014: 302-303).

Broadly speaking, the attraction of mixed methods research is that it provides the researcher with an opportunity to embrace "the best of both worlds" (Lanier & Briggs, 2014: 189). As Punch (2014: 303) observed, "(t)he fundamental rationale behind mixed methods research is that we can often learn more about our research topic if we can combine the strengths of qualitative research with the strengths of quantitative research while compensating at the same time for the weakness of each method" (see also Creswell et al., 2003: 211). He noted that while quantitative analysis is invaluable in "conceptualizing variables, profiling dimensions, tracing trends and relationships, formalizing comparisons and using large and perhaps representative samples," qualitative analysis is equally invaluable in furnishing "sensitivity to meaning and to context, local groundedness, the in-depth study of smaller samples, and great methodological flexibility which enhances the ability to study process and change" (Punch, 2014: 304).

Notwithstanding the positive features associated with mixed methods research, there has been historical opposition and skepticism about this research approach (see Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Denzin's (2010) examination of the evolution of mixed methods research over the past half-century observed that this approach has received waves of support and opposition. According to Denzin (2010; see also Punch, 2014: 303-304) "the current war between evidence-based methodologists and the mixed methods, interpretive, and critical theory schools" is simply

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the latest "paradigm war between quantitative (QUAN) and qualitative (QUAL) methodologies and was prefigured by the "postpositivist war against positivism (1970-1990)" and the 1990-2005 "wars between competing postpositivist, constructivist, and critical theory paradigms." [15]

However, if methodological purists on both sides of the qualitative-quantitative spectrum insist that the axiological, ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions associated with quantitative and qualitative research are incompatible and incommensurable and that it is folly to suppose these methods can be married, Denzin (2010: 419) describes some evidence of "mixed methods advocacy" (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 14). For example, he noted that mixed methods research is now described in handbooks and textbooks as a viable research approach endorsed by major professional societies in the social sciences and featured in journals such as the *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* (JMMR).

According to Punch (2014: 304), the gradual acceptance of mixed methods research in recent decades has required "the field of research methods to move past the either/or methodological thinking of the paradigm wars period" and necessitated a "willingness to embrace multiple paradigms" and "the subsequent emergence of pragmatism as the underlying philosophical approach, with stress on the idea that the methods used in research should be determined by the questions asked" (Punch, 2014: 304). Punch identifies "the essential idea of pragmatism" in this context as the ability to "to reject the either/or choices and the metaphysical concepts associated with the paradigm wars, and to focus instead on 'what works' in getting research questions answered." In other words, the choice of which methods are used (quantitative, qualitative or

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[15] Further discussion about the philosophical underpinnings of these "paradigm wars" exceeds the scope of this study and will be limited here (see Blaikie, 1991; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; 2003; Denzin, 2010 for fuller treatments of this issue).

mixed methods) should be entirely driven by the specific research question(s) being asked (Punch, 2014: 304; see also Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003: 7; Denzin, 2010: 422; Wheeldon: 2010; Feilzer, 2010; David & Sutton, 2011: 294). Although some suggest that researchers are unlikely to attain equal proficiency in both qualitative and quantitative methods, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003: 44-45) have suggested this problem may be addressed through "a team approach or with a model that presumes minimal competency in both quantitative and qualitative design."

Despite the growth and gradual acceptance of mixed methods research, caution remains around the purpose, design and execution studies employing this approach. For instance, in Bryman's (2006; 2008) analysis of 232 journal articles that utilized mixed methods research (published between 1996 and 2003), "the most common rationale for using mixed methods was enhancement to augment the research findings though collecting qualitative or quantitative data" (David & Sutton, 2011: 297). In summarizing his findings, Bryman (2008: 96-99) noted that researchers did not always clearly identify why mixed methods is useful nor describe it in consistent ways. Indeed, Bryman reported a lack of understanding of how mixed methods research should be done and a notable absence of exemplars. In addition, Hesse-Biber (2010: 213) cautioned that the publication of mixed methods research may continue to be stifled by ongoing concerns about incommensurable philosophical barriers or by disciplinary barriers (e.g., an absence of training in these methods or a favouring of research that is methodologically "pure" by funding agencies). Nevertheless, Hesse-Biber (2010: 210-213) concluded that, despite the challenges and criticisms, mixed methods can strengthen research in the social sciences.

4.1.1 Research Design: Mixed Methods Sequential Explanatory Design

In seeking to provide a detailed and comprehensive evaluation of police officers' attitudes and experiences regarding civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario, I followed a mixed methods research design called *Sequential Explanatory Design* (see Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006 for a discussion of how to prioritize, implement and integrate methods using this approach). Punch (2014: 310) detailed that this "is a two-phase mixed methods design, where the researcher uses qualitative data to explain, or to build upon, initial quantitative results. The first phase is quantitative, the second phase is qualitative." This approach is often used when "qualitative data are needed to explain significant (or non-significant) results, outlier results or surprising results" (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007: 71-2 as quoted in Punch, 2014: 310). In surveying previous literature that has employed this research design, Ivankova, Creswell & Stick (2006: 5) found that its commonly-reported advantages "include straightforwardness and opportunities for the exploration of the quantitative results in more detail" with its disadvantages noted to be the "lengthy time" and significant expenditure of resources that this type of research may require researchers to invest in gathering and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data.

In adopting this approach, my study was divided into two distinct phases. During *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire,* I administered an internet survey questionnaire to a large single data source (police service). During *Phase 2 – Semi-Structured interviews*, I conducted semi-structured interviews with police officers and other stakeholders to enhance my understanding of the complicated network of civilian oversight mechanisms that exist in Ontario and how police officers respond to this network. Below I detail each phase of research.

4.1.2 Research Agreement and Stakeholder Support

Prior to the project's launch, I solicited support/endorsement from a variety of stakeholders across Ontario and Canada. Between May and October, 2013, I sought formal support from the agencies listed below in *Table 4-3*. I sent a letter to each agency outlining the research project and requesting their consideration. In approaching these agencies, I sought to obtain a formal declaration of support for my study and/or the opportunity to interview a representative from each agency in the second phase of my research project. This endeavour was often time-consuming and necessitated multiple rounds of correspondence.

My quest for stakeholder support for this project was primarily motivated by my desire to conduct a fair-minded and non-partisan study. I believed that the objectivity of my project would be enhanced by seeking the involvement of all stakeholder agencies and obtaining their input and insights. Given that the survey tasked its participants with evaluating the performance of Ontario's multiple civilian-led oversight agencies (Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD), I thought it only fair to provide these agencies with an opportunity to participate in the study and contribute meaningfully to the discussion of the topics of inquiry. Second, I anticipated that stakeholder support might encourage potential respondents to participate in the questionnaire and, in doing so, to respond to the questions it posed in a thoughtful and considered way. This assumption derived from previous research which has noted that official sponsorship from stakeholder agencies may increase response rates and encourage survey participation. For example, Dillman et al. (2014: 29) determined that sponsors can affect the decision of respondents to respond to the survey "by making it more rewarding to do so and by lending legitimacy to the survey and inducing trust."

Although I was able to obtain formal declarations of support from the *Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police* (*OACP*), the *Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation* (*CACP-RF*), and the *Ontario Association of Police Services Boards* (*OAPSB*), I was less successful in obtaining support from other agencies (see *Table 4-3*). Although the OIPRD and the CAPG (Canadian Association of Police Governance) declined to provide formal letters of support/endorsement, both allowed me to interview a senior executive representative.

Table 4-3: Stakeholder Support and Participation

Stakeholder agency	Requested to provide a formal declaration of support	Requested to provide a representative for *Phase 2* interviews
Host police service	Research agreement obtained	Participated
Host police service Association	Declined	Declined
PAO – Police Association of Ontario	Declined	Declined
CPA – Canadian Police Association	Declined	Declined
OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police	Letter of support provided	Participated
CACP – Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation	Letter of support provided	Participated
SIU – Special Investigations Unit	Declined	Declined
OIPRD – Office of the Police Review Director	Declined	Participated
OAPSB - Ontario Association of Police Services Boards	Declaration of support provided	Participated
CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance	Declined	Participated
CACOLE - Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement	Declined	Declined

4.2 Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire

An internet-based survey questionnaire was the primary quantitative methodological tool employed during this study. According to Dillman et al. (2014: 301), "[s]urveys that are completely electronic, relying only on e-mail contacts to obtain internet responses, are the fastest growing form of surveying occurring in the United States, as well as throughout most of the world." Web survey questionnaire responses allow data to be gathered from "large numbers of people in a very short amount of time", usually at a very low cost, "especially when e-mail is the only form of communication with sample members" (Dillman et al., 2014: 301; see also Furlan & Martone, 2012: 91; Stopher, 2012: 385; Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 47). With web survey questionnaires, typical variable costs associated with mail and telephone and in-person surveys are absent. Thus, by employing a web survey, I did not have the burden of paying for questionnaire printing, postage costs, delivery, return and data entry, call centre personnel and administration, the remuneration of interviewers and so on (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 91-92; Stopher, 2012: 385).[16]

The "fast data capture turnaround" (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 94) of web surveys reduces the lag time between "the moment the respondent returns the questionnaire and the moment it is received" and ready for analysis (Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 45). In addition, this quick turnaround time allows researchers to flexibly adapt the survey's administration: "Response rates can be monitored over time. Action can be undertaken if the response is lower than expected" (Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 45-46).

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[16] Furlan & Martone (2012: 92) note the fixed costs of a web survey typically include: "hardware (servers and researchers' terminals); data collection and management software; internet connection and bandwidth; scripting and analysis team; web community or panel management (when available)."

Another positive feature of web surveys that proved to be immensely beneficial in this study derives from its ability to affordably cover a population that is dispersed across a wide geographical area. Assuming equality in internet access, this feature "positively affects the representativeness of the sample, as rural respondents have theoretically the same probability of being selected for the interview as urban respondents" (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 95; see also Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 47). Similar to mail surveys, web surveys also allow respondents to complete the survey at a time that is convenient to them and eliminates the need to coordinate the schedules of respondents and investigators (Furlan & Martone, 2012: 95; see also Stopher, 2012: 385). Web surveys also allow for complex skip patterns to be embodied in the questionnaire design/layout and "hidden completely from the respondent" (Stopher, 2012: 385). This was especially useful for my purposes.

Bethlehem & Biffignandi (2012: 42) enthused that web surveys which are administered to targeted and "closed" populations have the potential for great success:

> If the target population is a closed population (employees of a company, or students at university), there is often a sampling frame containing the email addresses of all members of the population. In such situations, there is no difference between the target population and the sampling frame. There are no coverage problems. This is the ideal case for a web survey.

However, a potential drawback of web-based surveys is low response rates (Stopher, 2012: 385). Noting that the response on web-based surveys is lower than that of postal surveys, some recommend the use of mixed mode survey delivery (e.g., web, mail, telephone, in-person) as an alternative method of contact and survey administration (e.g., Dillman et al., 2014; Bethlehem & Biffignandi, 2012: 51). This was not an option for my project due to the organization/population being researched.

Throughout all stages of planning, constructing and administering the survey questionnaire for this study, I employed a "tailored design" strategy. As recommended by Dillman et al. (2014: 16), "tailored design"

> refers to customizing survey procedures for each survey situation based upon knowledge about the topic and sponsor of the survey, the types of people who will be asked to complete the survey, the resources available, and the time frame for reporting results. Tailored design is a strategy that can be applied in the development of all aspects of a survey to reduce total survey error to acceptable levels and motivate all types of sample members to respond within resource and time constraints.

In seeking to reduce the four sources of survey error (coverage, sampling, nonresponse and measurement), this approach seeks to "build positive social exchange and encourage response by taking into consideration elements such as survey sponsorship, the nature of the survey population and variations within it, and the content of the survey questions, among other things" (Dillman et al., 2014: 16). The "*social exchange* perspective," which lies at the heart of the tailored design approach, "assumes that the likelihood of responding to a questionnaire, and doing so accurately, is greater when the person trusts that the expected rewards for responding to a survey will still outweigh the anticipated costs of responding" (Dillman et al., 2014: 17).

I utilized FluidSurveys, an online Canadian survey company, to create and administer the survey. Among the many benefits of this software, it contains a feature that allows for the seamless transfer of the data collected to an SPSS/PASW file for analysis. During September and October, 2013, the survey questionnaire was pre-tested (i.e., cognitive interviews) with five police officers to work out formatting issues and optimal question wording (see Dillman et al., 2014: 241-249).

Appendix C contains a copy of the survey questionnaire. Below is an overview of the survey

sections:

- Section 1 – Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
- Section 2 – Civilian Oversight: General Questions
- Section 3 – Police Services Boards
- Section 4 – SIU
- Section 5 – OIPRD
- Section 6 – Professional Standards Bureau

Since few police officers have direct interaction with the Ontario Civilian Police Commission

(OCPC) (as compared to the other civilian oversight agencies featured in this study), I elected to

not assess police officers' attitudes toward the OCPC and focus solely on the central civilian

oversight agencies in Ontario.

Efforts to minimize survey error were considered throughout the design, administration and

analysis of the survey questionnaire. According to Dillman et al. (2014: 3), "survey error can be

thought of as the difference between an estimate that is produced using survey data and the true

value of the variables in the population that one hopes to describe." In expanding upon this

topic, Dillman et al. (2014: 9) observed:

> Reducing total survey error involves careful survey planning, sample selection,
> questionnaire design, implementation, and data analysis. It is about
> simultaneously controlling all four sources of error to the extent practical and
> possible, within the time, cost, and other constraints of the survey. Survey error
> cannot be completely eliminated, but with diligence to all four types it can be kept
> to reasonable levels.

All efforts were made to reduce the four typical sources of survey error: coverage, sampling,

nonresponse, and measurement (Dillman et al., 2014: 3-10; see also Groves, 1989; and Nicolini

Dalla Valle, 2012).[17] The impact of these four errors is discussed throughout the subsequent section.

4.2.1 Data Source

It was determined that the ideal data source would derive from a single large police service in Ontario in order to maximize the sample frame and facilitate comparison to extant studies. In May, 2013, I presented my research proposal to the police service that would ultimately host my survey and a formal research agreement with that service was reached on October 24, 2013. The research agreement stipulated that the *identity of the participating police service would not be publically disclosed, nor would the identity of the involved participants*. This arrangement was also supported and approved by the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.

As a result, I was able to distribute my survey questionnaire to the sworn membership (police officers) of the host police service and invite these individuals to further participate in interviews. Formal data gathering, *Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire*, began early in 2014. The sample frame of potential respondents that was initially provided was 6359 sworn police officers

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[17] As Dillman et al. (2014: 3-4) explicated:

1. *Coverage Error* "occurs when the list from which sample members are drawn does not accurately represent the population on the characteristics(s) one wants to estimate with the survey data…A high quality survey sample requires that every member of the population has a known, nonzero probability of being sampled, meaning they have to be accurately represented on the list from which the sample will be drawn. Coverage error is the difference between the estimate produced when the list is inaccurate and what would have been produced with an accurate list";
2. *Sampling Error* "is the difference between the estimate produced when only a sample of units on the frame is surveyed and the estimate produced when every unit on the list is surveyed. Sampling error exists anytime we decide to survey only some, rather than all, members of the sample frame";
3. *Nonresponse Error* "is the difference between the estimate produced when only some of the sampled units respond compared to when all of them respond. It occurs when those who do not respond are different from those who do not respond in a way that influences the estimate";
4. *Measurement Error* "is the difference between the estimate produced and the true value because respondents gave inaccurate answers to survey questions. It occurs when respondents are unable or unwilling to provide accurate answers, which can be due to poor question design, survey mode effects, interviewer and respondent behaviour, or data collection mistakes."

who were actively serving in Ontario. No civilians from the host police service participated in this study.

One significant drawback of maintaining the anonymity of the police service that participated in my study is that I cannot discuss this police service's organizational structure and culture. In addition, under the terms of my agreement with the police service that agreed to host my study by providing me with access to their sworn members, I cannot furnish my reader with statistics on the numbers of alleged misconduct/complaints/charges processed by the SIU or the OIPRD in relation to this service or the number of internal investigations that were launched by the host police service's Professional Standards Bureau. Nevertheless, I appreciated greatly the police service's willingness to assist me with my research and thought their stipulations reasonable. I did not seek participation from my own police service, the Waterloo Regional Police Service (N= 777 sworn officers; December, 2015), to avoid any real or perceived conflict of interest.

Obtaining access to a sample frame of thousands was a formidable achievement; as noted earlier, previous research on the attitudes of police officers toward civilian oversight have based on much smaller sample frames. For example, Kreisel (1998), obtained 357 completed pen/paper surveys from a potential pool of 814 police officers (a 44% response rate) in Albuquerque, New Mexico; De Angelis and Kupchik (2007) achieved a 43% response in their mail survey of police officers in Denver, Colorado with 648 of a possible 1500 completing their survey. Most recently, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) used an emailed survey questionnaire and obtained 507 completed surveys from 1,313 officers (a 39% response rate) (PONI, 2015: 4).

While designing the research project, I recognized that obtaining a high rate of response from the target population would likely be challenging. I was aware that internet-based surveys have

lower response rates than those conducted by other methods. Although well-administered mail

and telephone surveys typically garner response rates of 50% to 70% (Dillman et al., 2009: 236;

440-457), the response rates obtained in internet based surveys are typically lower. For example,

Maguire and Dyke (2011:8) surveyed police officers regarding issues of ethics and

professionalism using an internet-based questionnaire and received 10,264 completed surveys

from 43,660 potential respondents across 31 participating police services (a 24% response rate).

Duxbury and Higgins (2012: 2) surveyed police officers and civilians regarding work-life

conflict and employee wellness and received 7091 completed surveys across 25 participating

police services. Although these researchers did not report their response rate, it would seem

likely that it was relatively modest. Nevertheless, I decided that conducting an online survey

questionnaire was the most appropriate manner in which to conduct my survey, given the large

sample frame of potential respondents.

4.2.2   Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire – Data Collection

Formal data collection began in January, 2014. Based upon the conditions outlined in the

research agreement, the survey questionnaire was administered solely by the participating police

service. I had no direct access to the survey during its period of administration (January 6, 2014

to February 18, 2014). *Table 4-4* outlines significant dates in the data collection process.

Throughout the design and administration of the survey, I sought to reduce both *sampling error*

and *nonresponse error*. However, as described below, inasmuch as the participating police

service controlled the administration of the survey questionnaire, there were several factors

which inhibited my ability to mitigate the probability of unnecessary *sampling* and *nonresponse*

error.

The survey questionnaire was launched on January 6, 2014 when the hosting police service sent out a recruitment email to all sworn police officers. *Appendix B* contains a copy of the recruitment letter. This recruitment email introduced the project and invited police officers to click on an internet link which brought them to the survey questionnaire. The cover page for the survey questionnaire acted as a formal information and consent letter. No material incentives for participation were offered to potential respondents (see Dillman et al., 2014: 30-31, 330). The survey questionnaire invitation was sent to the work email accounts of 6359 potential respondents (all currently serving sworn police officers). There were 285 potential respondents whose invitations were rejected ("bounced back") for a variety of reasons (e.g., full email accounts, leave of absence for a variety of circumstances). As a result, the final sample frame was downsized to 6074 potential respondents.

Table 4-4: Survey Questionnaire – Data collection

Date	Survey Questionnaire activity	Comments	Survey responses
January 6, 2014	Date of survey launch: 1st recruitment message sent by email to all potential respondents.	Sample frame of 6359 downsized to 6074 to account for rejected ("bounced back") invitations.	N/A
January 8, 2014	Date of internal intranet posting.	N/A	N/A
January 27, 2014	Date of 1st reminder message sent by email to all potential respondents.	The hosting police service agreed to send only one reminder message.	Interim N=1100
February 18, 2014	Date of survey closing.	The survey was open for a total of 44 days.	Final N=1593

In calculating an estimated *coverage error*, 4.5% (285 police officers) of the entire population (original sample frame: 6359 police officers) did not receive an invitation to complete the survey. Considering the exclusive access I obtained to this "difficult to reach" population, this estimated coverage error is relatively low. Furthermore, as described in *4.3 - Phase 2: Semi-Structured Interviews: Police Officers*, all of the respondents in the downsized sample frame (6074) had an equal opportunity to participate in both *Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire* and *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews*. Those who declined to participate in the survey questionnaire were automatically directed to the last page of the survey, which contained the advertisement for *Phase 2.*

On January 8, 2014, the hosting police service posted a message on their intranet to verify the legitimacy of the study and to reinforce the support provided by senior management and the sponsoring organizations. The hosting police service agreed to send one reminder message to those police officers who had not accessed/completed the survey. The single reminder message was sent on January 27th, 2014. The contents of the reminder message largely mirrored those in the first email recruitment message. Although I asked that additional reminder messages be sent, this request was declined; the hosting police service informed me that due to their concern with "survey burnout," their practice was to send out only a single reminder. In consequence, while Dillman et al. (2014: 331-336) recommend that internet survey researchers send out several reminder messages that vary slightly in their wording and tone, I was unable to act on their advice.

In order to maximize the likelihood that police officers would participate in the survey, the questionnaire purposely excluded any tracking features. I thought it important that all respondents knew that their identity and responses would be anonymous and my "tailored design

method" (Dillman et al., 2009; 2014) was geared toward this end. I appreciated that my potential respondents might ordinarily be wary of completing a survey that was made available through their employer's email system and which queried them on topics that could be perceived as personally and/or politically sensitive. As a result, I did not incorporate some of the recruitment techniques that Dillman et al. (2009; 2014) recommend (e.g., personalized correspondence; the use of tracking numbers as a facilitator of targeted follow up "reminder messages"). The survey was open for 44 days (i.e., January 6, 2014 to February 18, 2014); the hosting police service provided me with the de-identified data after this period had elapsed. The response rate was 26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 6074 potential responses).[18] Although the response rate is not stellar, my study can legitimately boast of a sample size that, to date, is the largest ever collected worldwide (e.g., Prenzler, Mihinjac & Porter, 2013) among studies that have surveyed police officers on their attitudes toward civilian oversight. Moreover, in light of the restrictions highlighted above (e.g., a single reminder message; the absence of material inducement for participation) and the unique nature of this study and target population, the *sampling error* and *nonresponse error* were deemed to be acceptable. Nevertheless, *Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis* acknowledges minor concerns in relation to the over/underrepresentation among older and younger police officers.

In regards to *measurement error*, I made proactive efforts during the development phase to create a clear, concise and user-friendly survey questionnaire. In doing so, I followed best practice guidelines for question format, organization and layout (e.g., Couper, 2009; Tourangeau et al., 2013; Dillman et al., 2009; 2014). As noted earlier, the survey questionnaire was also pre-

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[18] This response rate is similar to that found in research referenced earlier: Walker and Herbst (1999) (26%); Brody & Lovrich (2007) (23%); and Maguire and Dyke (2011) (24%).

tested with five individuals prior to its implementation in order to address formatting issues (see Dillman et al., 2014: 342-345).

The survey was constructed to: (1) allow comparison across categories and (2) distinguish general from specific perceptions and experiences regarding the various oversight agencies. Skip logic functions (also known as "conditional branching" or "branch logic") were incorporated into the survey design in order to allow respondents to record general perceptions about a given oversight agency and, if applicable/desired, describe their personal experience with a given agency. The total duration of an individual respondent's experience in completing the survey was variable and reflected each individual's decision to elaborate upon their comments and/or disclose their involvement with the various agencies. Respondents had as much time as they wanted to complete the survey.

In the analysis of the survey questionnaire results, there was not any significant evidence of response bias (a type of *measurement error* "in which estimates are systematically shifted one way or another" [Dillman et al., 2014: 7]). There were no major or recurring irregularities, anomalies or outliers that signified that survey respondents were confused or challenged by any of the question organization or wording. *Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis* contains a thorough discussion of missing data. Although it is not a direct measure of *measurement error*, a missing value analysis in SPSS confirmed that item-non response data was MCAR (Missing Completely At Random) and largely negligible per survey section, ranging from 0.0 to 1.7%. This demonstrates, albeit with a crude measure, that very few respondents skipped questions and that questions were skipped on a random basis.

4.2.3   Open-Ended Survey Questions

Each section of the survey concluded with an invitation to "please include any additional comments"; this feature allowed respondents to provide unstructured commentary about the topic addressed in that section (e.g., *Civilian Oversight: General Questions, Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau*). In total, survey respondents provided 1550 responses to these open-ended questions. The number and length of responses varied per section and respondents provided an assortment of interesting and insightful comments. *Table 4-5* provides a summary of the number of comments per section and the number of corresponding themes/codes that were developed.

Table 4-5: Summary of open-ended commentary from Phase 1 – Survey Questionnaire

Questionnaire Section	Sub-Section	Number of responses		Number of themes/codes created
General – Civilian Oversight	General Attitudes toward Civilian Oversight		385 total	31
Police Services Boards	Respondents governed by a police services board	110	217 total	21
	Respondents NOT governed by a police services board	107		13
SIU	General Questions about the SIU	249	378 total	26
	Respondents with SIU experience	129		17
OIPRD	General Questions about the OIPRD	157	252 total	23
	Respondents with OIPRD experience	95		15
Professional Standards Bureau	General Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau	159	318 total	26
	Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau experience	159		27
			1550 total	199 total

I utilized an approach known as "themeing the data" (Saldana, 2013: 175-183) in analyzing the comments of my respondents. As Saldana (2013: 175) outlined, a theme is "an *extended phrase* or *sentence* that identifies what a unit of data is *about* and/or what it *means*" and "an *outcome* of coding, categorization, and analytic reflection, not something that is, in itself, coded." Thus, "(l)ike coding, thematic analysis or the search for themes in the data is a strategic choice as a part of the research design that includes the primary questions, goals, conceptual framework and literature review" (Saldana, 2013: 177).

Saldana (2013: 177) has suggested that themeing the data is "more applicable to interviews and participant-generated documents and artifacts, rather than researcher-generated field notes." This approach is not intended to be "an expedient method of qualitative analysis. It is just as intensive as coding and requires comparable reflection on participant meanings and outcomes" (Saldana, 2013: 177). As Saldana (2013: 180) described, this approach may be employed with or without the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). He highlighted an approach used by Smith and Osborn (2008) that closely mirrors the method I employed, which includes cutting and pasting the survey questionnaire commentary into a three column table in a word processor (Microsoft Word). In this method, "the center column of a page contains the interview transcript data; the left column provides working space for initial notes, key words and shorter codes; while the right column contains the final themes for analysis" (Saldana, 2013: 180).

Whenever a sentence or passage contained multiple themes, I utilized a traditional coding method called "simultaneous coding," which is "the application of two or more different codes to a single qualitative datum, or the overlapped occurrence of two or more codes applied to sequential units of qualitative data" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81; see also Saldana,

2013: 81). In combination with the above method, I also created "analytic memos" to keep track

of those passages/quotations that were instructive or important to capture for future use, as well

as observations and insights about the study (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2013: 96).

In *Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis*, the predominant themes that emerged

from the open-ended responses are presented in each respective section, with examples of

verbatim quotations displayed to demonstrate the general thrust of the theme to the reader. As

Tourangeau et al. (2013: 120) stressed, "open questions in Web surveys can add richness to

closed questions and yield answers that were not anticipated by the researchers (see also Dillman

et al., 2014: 128-134). Researchers such as O'Cathain & Thomas (2004) and Burg et al. (2015)

have also discussed the value of analyzing these sources of data in mixed methods research with

some form of systematic coding strategy and careful attention to non-response bias. Aside from

being generally interesting and informative, the themes that emerged from these open-ended

questionnaire responses served to alert me to police officers' wide range of experiences and

perceptions and informed the content of the interviews I conducted during the second phase of

my research. Some survey respondents expressed strong feelings in recounting their experiences

with and perceptions of various civilian oversight mechanisms (e.g., stress, resentment,

frustration); the question format allowed me to capture these intense emotions. These body of

data also provided useful in my development of a "provisional 'start list'" for coding the semi-

structured interviews with police officers and stakeholders (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013:

81-82).

4.3 Phase 2: Semi-Structured Interviews: Police Officers

Semi-structured interviews were the second research method used in this project. In total, I conducted 40 interviews with police officers by telephone. In following the mixed methods sequential explanatory design model, the semi-structured interviews occurred *after* respondents had an opportunity to complete the survey questionnaire. As Lanier and Briggs (2014: 191) pointed out, semi-structured interviews are "often chosen when the researcher has some knowledge of the topic (at least enough to prepare questions in advance), but wants to allow flexibility to probe for clarification on responses and diverge from the present questions." Additionally, Punch (2014: 144) observed, interviews provide "a very good way of accessing people's perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality. It is also one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others."

I anticipated that interviews would provide a source of rich detail and introspection that would not otherwise be obtained through the survey questionnaire responses alone. Given that my project sought to identify the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario toward civilian oversight mechanisms, I thought that interviews were an important method of data collection.

Although the topical areas and questions were planned in advance, the flexibility intrinsic to this interviewing format allowed me to change the sequencing of questions and also to eliminate those that were made redundant by the early-expressed response of my interviewees.[19] This approach facilitated an easy flow of conversation and a lively and engaging dialogue. This was expected inasmuch as semi-structured interviews allow interviewers to expand upon the

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[19] *Appendix* D contains a copy of the semi-structured interview questions/script that I employed during my interview with police officers

questions they pose and/or seek clarification from those they interview (Lanier and Briggs, 2014: 191).

Given that I had no direct access to the individual work email addresses for the sample frame of potential survey respondents, I had to develop a strategy for soliciting participation for *Phase 2* during the administration of the survey questionnaire. Towards this end, the final page of the survey questionnaire invited police officers to participate in "in-person or telephone interviews" about the topics that the questionnaire raised and provided my contact information (both telephone and email address). Active consent allowed my respondents to exercise agency and decide for themselves, without any form of pressure or inducement, whether they wished to participate in an interview.

Not all interview participants were required to fill out a survey questionnaire. Those who declined to participate in the survey questionnaire were automatically directed to the last page of the survey, which contained the advertisement for *Phase 2*. Between January 6, 2014 and February 18, 2014, a total of 51 police officers contacted me and expressed interest in being interviewed. As the volunteers trickled in, I kept a registry of all volunteer contact information. Although I considered developing a strategy to interview a quota sample of these officers, I ultimately decided to pursue interviews with *all* of the police officers who had contacted me and furnish all of these individuals with the Information and Consent form for *Phase 2*. Between January 6, 2014 and April 29, 2014, I released recurring waves of available dates/times for interviews in order to accommodate the assorted shift schedules of those who contacted me.

Forty police officers from the host police service were interviewed in total. Eleven of the individuals who had originally expressed interest in being interviewed later declined to participate. I sent all participants a Participant Feedback Letter to thank them for their

participation and to inform them of the progress of my research. All of the interviews with

police officers were conducted by telephone and were audio-recorded, with the permission of

each interviewee, for accuracy and transcription. The average length of the telephone interview

was 25.35 minutes, with the shortest 17 minutes and the longest 45 minutes. *Table 4-6* contains

a summary profile of those who participated in *Phase 2* and *Table 4-7* provides a tally of the

results obtained.

Table 4-6: Summary of interviewee profiles for Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers

Interviewee Id	Sex	Years Experience	Rank	Age	Education	Length in minutes
OFF #1	Female	23	Sergeant	50	Some University	36
OFF #2	Male	33	Senior Officer	54	High School Graduate	43
OFF #3	Male	9	Constable	32	University Graduate	45
OFF #4	Male	33	Staff Sergeant	54	Some University	19
OFF #5	Male	20	Staff Sergeant	47	University Graduate	19
OFF #6	Male	15	Detective Constable	38	University Graduate	24
OFF #7	Male	12	Constable	41	University Graduate	25
OFF #8	Male	26	Staff Sergeant	45	High School Graduate	21
OFF #9	Male	26	Staff Sergeant	47	University Graduate	26
OFF #10	Male	12	Constable	37	College Graduate	23
OFF #11	Male	10	Detective Constable	43	University Graduate	24
OFF #12	Male	15	Constable	49	College Graduate	22
OFF #13	Male	26	Staff Sergeant	52	Advanced Degree	18
OFF #14	Male	24	Detective Constable	47	College Graduate	22
OFF #15	Male	3	Constable	25	College Graduate	24
OFF #16	Male	14	Constable	37	University Graduate	24
OFF #17	Female	19	Sergeant	48	Some University	19
OFF #18	Female	19	Staff Sergeant	45	University Graduate	34
OFF #19	Female	27	Constable	53	University Graduate	26

OFF #20	Male	34	Constable	55	High School Graduate	27
OFF #21	Male	10	Constable	52	College Graduate	18
OFF #22	Male	15	Sergeant	43	College Graduate	28
OFF #23	Male	17	Constable	60	University Graduate	36
OFF #24	Male	22	Sergeant	47	Some College	21
OFF #25	Male	10	Constable	34	College Graduate	30
OFF #26	Male	29	Constable	50	College Graduate	17
OFF #27	Female	28	Sergeant	49	College Graduate	26
OFF #28	Female	21	Senior Officer	50	College Graduate	18
OFF #29	Male	20	Constable	41	College Graduate	21
OFF #30	Female	18	Constable	48	Advanced Degree	25
OFF #31	Male	16	Detective Constable	44	University Graduate	22
OFF #32	Male	28 (+4) 32	Staff Sergeant	53	High School Graduate	19
OFF #33	Male	27	Staff Sergeant	50	University Graduate	35
OFF#34	Male	13	Constable	39	Some University	26
OFF #35	Male	10	Constable	34	Some University	26
OFF #36	Male	25	Constable	46	College Graduate	30
OFF #37	Male	30	Sergeant	54	University Graduate	28
OFF #38	Male	24	Sergeant	45	University Graduate	20
OFF #39	Male	14	Constable	44	College Graduate	25
OFF #40	Male	20	Detective Constable	38	Advanced Degree	22

The semi-structured interview script was designed to follow the general topics and themes addressed in the survey questionnaire (e.g., attitudes and perceptions of civilian oversight in general, followed by questions pertaining to the various oversight agencies). It employed the following headings: *Preamble; socio-demographic profile questions; general questions about civilian oversight; questions about police services boards; questions about the SIU, OIPRD,* and *Professional Standards Bureau; general concluding questions. Appendix* D contains a copy of the semi-structured interview questions/script for police officers. In *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion*, I discuss interview-derived findings and their import.

Table 4-7: Breakdown of respondent profiles from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers

Sex of Interviewees	Male	33
	Female	7
Highest Level of Education	High School Graduate	4
	Some College	1
	College Graduate	13
	Some University	5
	University Graduate	14
	Advanced Degree	3
Rank of Interviewees	Constable	18
	Detective Constable	5
	Sergeant	7
	Staff Sergeant	8
	Senior Officer	2
Average Years of Experience	20	
Average Age	45.5	
Average Length of recorded interview	25.35 mins	

Although all police officer interviewees were offered the option of conducting in-person or telephone interviews, all elected to be interviewed by telephone. This method of interviewing was both efficient and cost-effective. As Shuy (2003: 175-193) reported, the benefits of telephone interviews include reduced interviewer effects, increased uniformity and standardization in questioning, enhanced researcher safety and cost-efficiency. Palys (2003:155-159) identified some additional benefits, such as reduced travel costs over a potentially wide geographic area and providing a controlled environment (e.g., volume and quality). However,

both Palys (2003: 157-159) and Shuy (2003: 175-193) acknowledged that telephone-based interviews cannot furnish interviewers with visual cues of their respondents' reactions and may be less conducive than face-to-face interviews to the development of rapport between interviewers and their respondents.

4.3.1 Inductive & Deductive Coding Strategy for Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews: Police Officers

I utilized a blend of inductive (analysis without pre-determined ideas) and deductive (analysis with pre-determined ideas) strategies in coding and analyzing the interview data. Punch (2014: 170) described the benefits of this approach:

> In the search of regularities in the social world, induction is central. Concepts are developed inductively from the data and raised to a higher level of abstraction and their interrelationships are then traced out. But while induction is central, deduction is needed also, since…theory generation involves theory verification as well. This sort of qualitative analysis is a series of alternating inductive and deductive steps, whereby data-driven inductive hypothesis generation is followed by deductive hypothesis examination, for the purpose of verification.

Based upon the clear themes that emerged from the literature review and the results from the survey questionnaire (including open-ended commentary), I utilized a deductive approach in my initial assessment of the interview data from police officers.

A "provisional 'start list'" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81-82) emerged from several sources. To wit:

- The conceptual framework for this project that was developed during my research design and proposal stages;
- My familiarity with the interview material, since I was the interview facilitator and I personally transcribed each interview;
- The semi-structured interview script, which provided a sound basis from which to separate and organize the various overarching topical areas (e.g., the various oversight agencies). This format additionally imposed a consistent template for each interview, while allowing for flexibility;

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- My experience in coding and analyzing the open-ended commentary from the survey questionnaire also allowed me to discern patterns in the comments of my respondents.

With a robust "provisional 'start list'" of core topical categories in hand, I transitioned to more of an inductive approach, whereby I developed codes/nodes as they emerged from the data.

The analysis of *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews* involved the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). I employed the NVivo10 computer program utilizing both First and Second Cycle coding techniques listed below (e.g., Saldana, 2009). "NVivo is the most widely used software in most social sciences disciplines" (Punch, 2014:199).

The level of coding detail varied between words, sentences and small paragraphs. Simultaneous Coding was used whenever applicable (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81, 85-86). *Table 4-8* provides a list of the First Cycle coding techniques that I utilized throughout this study and a brief description of each of coding method which draws upon the writings of Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2013: 75-81) and Saldana (2013: 69-144).

I also utilized the memoing feature in NVivo whenever a particular idea, sentence or passage struck me as particularly useful or illuminating. A "memo", as defined by Glaser (1978: 83-84) is "the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding" and may be "a sentence, a paragraph or a few pages"; nevertheless, "it exhausts the analyst's momentary ideation based on data with perhaps a little conceptual elaboration" (as quoted in Punch, 2014: 177). The memoing feature in NVivo allowed me to keep track of important passages/quotations, as well as general and specific thoughts, observations and insights about the study. As Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013: 96) observed, "Analytic memos can also go well beyond codes and their relationships to any aspect of the study –

personal, methodological, and substantive. They are one of the most useful and powerful sense-

making tools at hand."

Table 4-8: First Cycle Coding Techniques

Exploratory Methods	**Holistic Coding**: "applies a single code to a large unit of data in the corpus, rather than line-by-line coding, to capture a sense of the overall contents and the possible categories that may develop"; "most applicable when the researcher has a general idea of what to investigate in the data" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 77; see also Saldana, 2013: 142).
	Provisional Coding: "begins with a 'start list' of researcher-generated codes, based on what preparatory investigation suggests might appear in the data before they are collected and analyzed"; "can be revised, modified, deleted or expanded to include new codes" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 77; see also Saldana, 2013: 144).
Grammatical Methods	**Attribute**: "the notation of basic descriptive information such as the fieldwork setting, participant characteristics or demographics, data format, and other variables of interest for qualitative and some applications of quantitative analysis" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 79; see also Saldana, 2013: 69).
	Subcoding: "a second-order tag assigned after a primary code to detail or enrich the entry" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 80; see also Saldana, 2013: 77).
	Simultaneous Coding: "the application of two or more different codes to a single qualitative datum, or the overlapped occurrence of two or more codes applied to sequential units of qualitative data" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81; see also Saldana, 2013: 81).
Affective Methods	**Emotion Coding** - "this method labels the emotions recalled and/or experienced by the participant or inferred by the researcher about the participant…It also provides insight into the participants' perspectives, worldviews, and life conditions" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 75; see also Saldana, 2013: 105).
	Values Coding: "the application of three different types of related codes into qualitative data that reflect a participant's values, attitudes and beliefs representing his or her perspective or worldview. A value (V:) is the importance we attribute to ourselves, another person, thing or idea. An attitude (A:) is the way we think and feel about oneself, another person, thing or idea. A belief (B:) is part of a system that includes values and attitudes, plus personal knowledge, experiences, opinions, prejudices, morals and other interpretive perceptions of the social world" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 75; see also Saldana, 2013: 110).
	Evaluation Coding: "applies primarily nonquantitative codes into qualitative data that assign judgments about merit, worth or significance of programs or policy"; "appropriate for policy, critical, action, organizational and evaluation studies, particularly across multiple cases and extended periods of time" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 76; see also Saldana, 2013: 119).

After completing First Cycle coding on all 40 interviews, it was evident that the structured

format of the interviews provided a sound platform to introduce Pattern Coding as a Second

Cycle technique. Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2013: 86) have explained the link between First

and Second Cycle coding methods (see also Miles, Huberman, 1994: 69; Saldana, 2013: 209-

213):

> First Cycle coding is a way to initially summarize segments of data. Pattern
> coding, as a Second Cycle method, is a way of grouping those summaries into a
> smaller number of categories, themes, or constructs…Pattern codes are
> explanatory or inferential codes, ones that identify an emergent theme,
> configuration, or explanation. They pull together a lot of material from First
> Cycle coding into more meaningful and parsimonious units of analysis. They are
> a sort of meta code.

Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2013: 86) highlighted several of the important functions of Pattern

Coding, such as condensing large amounts of data into a smaller number of analytic units and

laying the groundwork for cross-case analysis by surfacing common themes and directional

processes. *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion* presents the

culminated results of this coding analysis.

4.4   Phase 2: Semi-Structured Interviews: Stakeholder Representatives

Following the completion of the interviews with police officers, I contacted all of the relevant

stakeholders and requested of each that I be allowed to conduct semi-structured interviews with a

senior representative from their organization. These interviews were intended to provide a

counterbalance to the information gleaned from police officers about their attitudes, perceptions

and experiences pertaining to civilian oversight mechanisms. These interviews were all

conducted *after* the police officer interviews were completed to allow me to incorporate some

preliminary findings throughout each respective conversation. The interview script varied for

each interview, as attempts were made to tailor the questions and dialogue as carefully as

possible to the stakeholder agency/representative, including the knowledge gained from *Phase 1*
and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers.

I interviewed six individuals in total during this phase. One interview was conducted in-person,
four interviews were conducted by telephone and one interview was a written Question/Answer
format, followed by an unrecorded telephone conversation. *Table 4-9* summarizes the
organizations that participated by providing me with access to a senior executive representative
as well as the interview method used, whether or not the interview was recorded and the length
of the interview. Although the majority of these interviews were conducted in the summer of
2014, one was conducted in early 2015.

**Table 4-9: Summary of results from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder
Representatives**

Agency	Method	Length of recorded interview
The participating police service (Senior Executive police leader)	In-person; recorded	72 mins
OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone; recorded	47 mins
OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone; recorded	50 mins
CACP-RF - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone; recorded	33 mins
CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone; recorded	35 mins
OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police Review Director (Senior Executive Representative)	Declined formal interview but provided written responses to a written version of the interview script and consented to a non-recorded telephone conversation.	

I transcribed the totality of the recorded interviews. I analyzed the six stakeholder interviews
using the coding/themeing strategy that was outlined earlier in section *4.2.3 Open-Ended Survey*

Questions. I thought doing so appropriate inasmuch as the purpose of these interviews was to explore findings and themes that derived from the survey. I employed NVivo software as an aid to the organization and analysis of this body of data. The five predominant themes of my interviews with stakeholder representatives are presented in *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion.*

4.5 Ethics Approval

I received formal clearance to carry out the project from the University of Waterloo's Office of Research Ethics (ORE) on September 24, 2013. I encountered no significant barriers in obtaining ethics approval for this project, since the pool of involved participants consisted of adult professionals who were free to decide whether they wished to participate in my study and whether their participation would be limited to answering questions from a survey questionnaire or also include answering questions in a semi-structured interviews.

Throughout the course of the project, respondents were free to abstain from participation, to withdraw at any time and to decline answering any question. The anticipated risk of harm to participants was deemed to be low. However, cognizant that the topics addressed in the questionnaire and interviews might evoke feelings of stress and/or distress in some of my respondents, I ensured that the information/consent letter that was provided to all respondents made reference to counselling services that are available to all members of the host police service through its Employee Assistance Program.

4.6 Reflections on "Insider Status"

Unlike others who have conducted research on this topic, I am an active police officer. This status impacted my research design in a number of ways. In advance of contacting any stakeholder agencies to seek support, I informed the Chief of the Waterloo Regional Police

Service and the President of the Waterloo Regional Police Association about my planned project. I anticipated that some stakeholders would seek to verify my professional status and reputation and later learned that this, in fact, had been the case.

In approaching potential participants and agencies, I identified myself as both an officer with the Waterloo Regional Police Service and a PhD Candidate at the University of Waterloo. My frank disclosure of my dual status stemmed from my desire to be forthright with my respondents. I believe that my ability to enter into a research agreement with the police service that hosted my study and obtain endorsements from several stakeholders may have been eased by my "insider status." I think it equally possible that my standing as an active police officer may have served to discourage the participation of other stakeholders. While I can only speculate as to why some may have refrained from participating, it is possible that these agencies may have doubted my ability to be objective. However, this is simply speculative and I am unable to comment knowledgeably on the reasons why, for example, all three police association organizations (local, Police Association of Ontario, Canadian Police Association) decided against participating in this project. Moreover, I wish to stress that regardless of their decision, all of the stakeholder agencies responded to my requests in a way that was courteous and cordial.

In contemplating how my dual roles may have impacted the quality of the data I collected, I believe that my status as a police officer may have eased my ability to establish rapport with the 40 police officers I interviewed. In virtually all of these interviews, the conversational tone was relaxed and casual. I further believe that our shared knowledge facilitated discussions that were linear and covered much terrain in a relatively short amount of time.

4.7   Conclusion of *Chapter 4: Methods*

This chapter has provided an overview of the research methods employed throughout this study.

Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis provides a detailed overview of the

results from the survey questionnaire.

Chapter 5

Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis

This chapter provides a profile of the officers who answered my survey and provides a first look at their attitudes and cognitions about civilian oversight. The next chapter deals with index construction and provides the multivariate analysis.

5.1 Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The first section of the survey questionnaire asked respondents about themselves and their policing career. *Table 5-10* provides a summary of the respondents' socio-demographic details. Some provincial and national sample-population data are presented below in illustration of the representativeness of the sample frame from the host police service.

Sex: Males accounted for approximately four-fifths (79.8%) of the survey sample with females accounting for the remaining fifth. The percentage of female representatives is close to the average percentage of active female police officers in police services across Ontario (18.7%) and across Canada (19.9%) (Statistics Canada, 2012: 28).

Age: The sample frame was generally reflective of police services in Canada. The vast majority of respondents (80.7%) were between 34-54 years old. When compared to available national data, this sample is slightly underrepresented by police officers under 35 years of age. Thus, according to Statistics Canada (2012: 13):

> Across Canada, police officers aged 60 years and over accounted for less than 1%
> of all police officers, while those between 50 and 60 years of age represented 15%
> ...The largest cohorts were officers aged 30 to 40 years (35%) and those aged 40
> to 50 years (35%). Officers aged between 20 and 30 years represented 14% of all
> officers, while less than 1% of officers were under 20 years of age.

Education: 41.6% of respondents identified themselves as college graduates and roughly a third (30.7%) said they were university graduates. In addition, roughly a fifth reported their completion of either "some college" (9.1%) or "some university" (11.2%) coursework. These findings are generally consistent with data from a study conducted by the Ontario Police College (Ontario, 2013) which investigated the educational attainments of all police officer recruits between 1996 and 2012 and found that "36.0% of all OPP and municipal police service recruits completed a university degree prior to attending OPC; 46.8% completed a college diploma; and 17.2% completed neither" (Ontario, 2013: 10). These figures can also be compared with data from Statistics Canada's 2011 National Household Survey, which found that 28.9% of Ontarians, 25-64 years old, have a university degree and 23.6% have a college diploma (Ontario, 2013: 10). These findings suggest that the educational attainment of the police officers in my sample is slightly higher than that of the average Ontarian.

Policing experience: Only 18.2% of respondents said they had less than 10 years of police experience, with 3.7% having less had than 5 years of service and 14.5% possessing between 5 and 9 years of experience. Almost half (49.5%) of respondents had between 10 and 24 years of experience. Meanwhile, more than a quarter (25.4%) had between 25 and 29 years of experience, which suggests that the survey may slightly underrepresent newer police officers and slightly overrepresent officers with considerable career experience.

Rank: Almost two-thirds (63.9%) of my respondents were at the "Constable" rank (63.9% total); 47.4% were Constables and 16.5% were Detective Constables. Sergeants accounted for 22.9% of my respondents, with the remainder consisting of Staff Sergeants (7.1%) and Senior Officers (5.9%).

Community size: Over a quarter (27.8%) serve communities with less than 25,000 people.

Slightly more than a third (36.5%) reported that they serve communities of 25,000 to 100,000

inhabitants and 17.7% work in larger communities (i.e., more 100,000 people). The remaining

17.9% selected "Don't Know / Not Applicable"; their choice of this option suggests that these

officers may work in a centralized or specialized capacity.

Community composition: Almost two-thirds of respondents (59.9%) described the community

they serve as "A mix of rural and urban" while 23.3% work in a "Mostly rural" setting. Only

6.1% of respondents described working in a "Mostly urban" setting, and 10.6% selected "Don't

know / Not Applicable" with the latter again suggesting that they served in a centralized or

specialized role.

Police Association support: The vast majority of respondents (89.1%) reported supporting their

police association. However, roughly the same proportion (84%) indicated they do not regularly

attend police association meetings.

Table 5-10: Socio-demographic details

		N	Percentage
Sex	Male	1219	79.8
	Female	309	20.2
	Total	1528	100.0
Age	18-24	2	.1
	25-34	201	13.1
	35-44	546	35.6
	45-54	691	45.1
	55-64	87	5.7
	65 or over	6	.4
	Total	1533	100.0

Highest Level of Education	High School graduate	73	4.8
	Some College	139	9.1
	College graduate	637	41.6
	Some University	172	11.2
	University graduate	469	30.7
	Advanced Degree completed (e.g., Masters, PhD)	29	1.9
	Other	11	.7
	Total	1530	100.0
Length of Service	1 - 4 years	57	3.7
	5 - 9 years	222	14.5
	10 - 14 years	259	16.9
	15 - 19 years	259	16.9
	20 - 24 years	240	15.7
	25 - 29 years	389	25.4
	30 years or more	105	6.9
	Total	1531	100.0
Rank	Police Constable	724	47.4
	Detective Constable	252	16.5
	Sergeant	350	22.9
	Staff Sergeant	108	7.1
	Senior Officer	90	5.9
	Other	4	.3
	Total	1528	100.0
Approximate size of population served by respondent's police detachment	Less than 5,000	62	4.0
	5,001 - 25,000	365	23.8
	25,001 - 50,000	259	16.9
	50,001 - 75,000	181	11.8
	75,001 - 100,000	119	7.8
	100,001 - 200,000	77	5.0
	More than 200,000	195	12.7
	Don't Know / Not Applicable	274	17.9
	Total	1532	100.0
Description of community	Mostly rural	356	23.3
	A mix of rural and urban	914	59.9
	Mostly urban	93	6.1

served by respondent	Don't Know / Not Applicable	162	10.6
	Total	1525	100.0
Support for police association	Yes	1361	89.1
	No	93	6.1
	I don't know	74	4.8
	Total	1528	100.0
Regularly attends association meetings	Yes	237	15.5
	No	1285	84.0
	I don't know	7	.5
	Total	1529	100.0

Ethnic/Cultural Origins variable

Respondents were asked *"What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors?"* In posing this query, I intentionally used an open-ended question rather than a checklist, recognizing that some might self-identify with multiple groups. I also followed the wording used by Statistics Canada in their 2002 *Ethnic Diversity Survey* (see also Statistics Canada, 2003; Reitz et al., 2009: 24-25). As *Table 5-11* illustrates, respondents could answer this question in novel ways. A coding strategy was therefore developed to identify the first, second and third ethnicity listed by respondents; since respondents rarely identified more than three ethnicities, the ethnicity references beyond the third were infrequent and were not coded. *Table 5-55* (see *Appendix E*) displays fifteen examples of combinations chosen by my respondents and includes their corresponding codes.

In total, 17 different codes were established, with some references only mentioned once or twice (e.g., New Zealand, South Africa). All references to origins typically associated with the United Kingdom or "Anglo Saxon" status were combined under a single code "British" (English, Irish, Scottish, "Anglo Saxon"), which proved to be the most frequently chosen ethnic identity. References to all other (non-British) European countries were coded as "All other European",

which was the second most cited ethnicity. The third most popular was French/French Canadian origins.

Table 5-11: Cultural Origins Variable

Cultural Origin	First reference (frequency)	%	Second reference (frequency)	%	Third reference (frequency)	%
British (English, Irish, Scottish, "Anglo Saxon")	601	37.8	157	9.9	15	.9
All other European	339	21.3	142	8.9	21	1.3
Not Specified	221	13.8	1118	70.1	1502	94.3
French/French Canadian	144	9.1	88	5.5	15	.9
Canadian	112	7.0	26	1.6	12	.8
Caucasian ("White")	86	5.4	8	.5	*	*
First Nation/Aboriginal (incl. Metis)	33	2.1	25	1.6	22	1.4
"African" (incl. "Black", African Canadian, etc.)	13	.8	2	.1	*	*
Caribbean	12	.8	4	.3	*	*
Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean)	12	.8	1	.1	*	*
South Asian (Indian, Pakistani)	7	.4	*	*	1	.1
South American	4	.3	*	*	*	*
Christian (Anglican, Protestant, Catholic)	4	.3	13	.8	3	.2
Middle Eastern (incl. "Arabic")	3	.2	1	.1	1	.1
American	2	.1	5	.3	1	.1
South African	*	*	2	.1	*	*
New Zealand	*	*	1	.1	*	*
Total	1593	100.0	1593	100.0	1593	100.0
* No reference provided						

To summarize this sprawl of ethnic identities, I constructed the variable "Visible Minority Status" based upon a respondent self-identifying as: South American, First Nation/Aboriginal (incl. Metis), Middle Eastern (incl. "Arabic"), Caribbean, Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean), "African" (incl. "Black", African Canadian) or South Asian (Indian, Pakistani). Using this recoding, 8.7% of respondents were deemed to be visible minorities and 91.3% were therefore identified as non-visible minorities (see *Table 5-56* in *Appendix E*).

In comparison, the 2006 Canadian Census reported that visible minorities in Canada make up 16% of the total national population and 22.8% of the Ontario population (Statistics Canada, 2006); it should be noted that the Canadian Census does *not* include Aboriginal peoples in their definition of "visible minorities." My findings can also be compared with the 2012 Police Administration Survey (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15) which found that 9% reported being a member of a non-Aboriginal visible minority group and 5% reported being an Aboriginal person" (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15).[20] However, in this study, one-third of individual police officers or police services did not disclose ethnic/racial status (Statistics Canada, 2012: 15).

5.2 General Questions about Civilian Oversight

The second section of the survey asked respondents questions about civilian oversight in general terms. *Figure 5-1* (and *Table 5-57* in *Appendix E*) provides a summary of the responses regarding "General Questions about Civilian Oversight." The survey revealed positive attitudes toward civilian oversight in general terms among a majority of respondents. For example,

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[20] According to Statistics Canada's 2011 National Household Survey, the largest contingent of Aboriginal people in Canada reside in Ontario (21%; 301,425), which represents 2.4 % of the total population in Ontario: https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/2011001/tbl/tbl02-eng.cfm

- 63% of respondents agreed that civilian oversight helps to ensure accountability of policing (19.5% disagreed).
- 61.8% of respondents reported that they believe civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing (17.9% disagreed).

These were among the most general questions posed in the survey about civilian oversight and the results suggest that the majority of respondents support oversight by non-police personnel in broad terms.

Figure 5-1: General Questions about Civilian Oversight

Several of the survey questions in this section sought to determine the degree to which respondents perceive civilian oversight to be biased against the police, or to what extent civilian oversight challenges police officers' sense of professionalism/professional autonomy. The findings below suggest there to be tacit support for the involvement of civilians in the oversight of policing.

- 57.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement that civilians should be kept "out of police oversight." Only 17.9% agreed with that statement.
- Only 34.7% of respondents agreed that "Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers"; 40.8% disagreed with that statement.
- Furthermore, only 25.7% of respondents agreed with the statement, "Civilians are biased against police officers"; 37% of respondents disagreed with that statement.
- 44% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers." Only 24.6% of respondents agreed with that statement.

These results illustrate support for civilian oversight in general terms. Furthermore, the results do not suggest widespread concern regarding bias against police, nor widespread concern that civilian oversight poses challenges to police officers' sense of professionalism/professional autonomy.

However, this battery of questions does reveal some concerns about the perceived capabilities of civilians involved in the investigation of police officers. For example:

- 54.9% of respondents indicated that they do not believe that civilians possess the skills necessary to investigate alleged police misconduct. Only 15.2% of respondents felt that civilians do possess such skills.
- Respondents were split on their assessment of the capability of civilians to "understand police work": 34.8% indicated they do not feel civilians understand police work, while 37.1% disagreed with that statement.

These responses are consistent with the findings of past research which has found that police officers commonly believe that civilian investigators are ill-equipped to grasp the complicated nuances of police work (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 107-108, 154, 237, 247; Finn, 2001: 109; Wells & Schafer, 2007: 18).

Previous research has noted that most police officers would prefer civilians to be involved in a "review capacity" rather than an "investigative capacity" (e.g., Perez, 1994: 247-248; Walker & Herbst, 1999: 5; Weisburd et al., 2000: 9; Brody & Lovrich, 2007). These studies have additionally found that most police officers would prefer that police officers (rather than civilians) investigate alleged police misconduct (e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993: 226; Perez, 1994: 154; Kreisel, 1998: 210; Weisburd et al., 2000: 7; Brody & Lovrich, 2007; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 665). These preferences were echoed by my respondents. For example:

- 46.6% of respondents reported that they would prefer that civilians only "review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate)"; less than a third (30.1%) disagreed.
- 48.7% of respondents agreed that they would prefer that their "police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct"; 27.8% of respondents disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of respondents were accepting of oversight investigations involving former police officers: 61.5% of respondents agreed that if civilian investigators were former police officers, they would not mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct (12% disagreed). This question, in particular, suggests that police officers may be more accepting of civilian-led investigation and oversight if they are aware of the professional accomplishments of these investigators and made aware that their investigative skills were honed in policing. As discussed in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, six of the eleven investigators employed by the OIPRD are former police officers (OIPRD, 2014: 41) and this is also true of more than four-fifths of SIU investigators (Bruser & Henry, 2010).

At the end of this block of questions, the questionnaire prompted, "please include any additional comments." This invitation was taken up by 385 respondents whose comments were examined

and coded for common themes. In total, 31 different themes/codes were developed for this block

of responses. *Table 5-12* provides examples of the most commonly cited themes.

Table 5-12: Example open-ended commentary: General Attitudes toward Civilian Oversight

Most common themes (from 385 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Questions about civilian investigators' training (N=89, 23.1% of all comments voiced)	*"Properly trained investigators (civilian) are capable of investigating police involved incidents however the real problem is finding civilians with enough experience investigating serious incidents. Training is a basis for investigating however as a 29 year member, having received copious amounts of training, my real expertise was truly developed over time investigating thousands of cases. Also it should be a combination police/civilian investigatory body...not one or the other."*	*"The issue is, where do trained investigators into criminal misconduct gain their experience and skills? Good investigators take years to train. How do you hire a civilian and trust they are going to be competent? My experience is most are not competent. It really shines through during interviews. I want the best investigator. Police, civilian I don't care."*
2. Questions about civilians' qualifications (N=86, 22.3%)	*"Investigators must have previous police experience in order to understand the situations police officers are put in and the decisions they have to make sometimes in seconds that later take months to investigate."*	*"My concern would be how much experience does a civilian have to complete a thorough investigation. A course at OPC* (Ontario Police College) *does not make an investigator, experience does."*
3. Expressions of support for civilian oversight (N=74, 19.2%)	*"I do not care who investigates misconduct as long as the individual has the ability and knowledge to do so effectively. Civilian oversight is extremely important as we are not living in a police state. Regardless of how well misconduct is investigated, if there's no civilian oversight there will always be room for criticism which ultimately brings the public's opinion of police actions into question. The policing community cannot live in its own bubble."*	*"I do believe that civilian oversight is necessary and that it only benefits police and police services in maintaining public confidence."*

4.	Expressions that investigative qualification is subjective and varies for both civilians and police (N=70, 18.2%)	*"I believe investigators, be they uniform or civilian, need to be open minded unbiased individuals who possess a good knowledge of the law, common sense, a strong degree of integrity, honesty, values and impartiality and who are willing to do the right thing for the right reason. We need to be professional in our conduct and the public should not expect or be offered anything less. We need public trust and respect to effectively do our jobs."*	*"Some civilians (much like police officers) have more common sense than others, so therefore it's hard to paint them all with the same brush."*
5.	Previous police/investigative background experience is essential (N=31, 8.1%)	*"Investigations need to be completed by trained investigators, period. Retired or seconded police officers with extensive experience and training would be the most credible investigators. If police knew that investigations would be done fairly, without bias, they would have no issue with civilian investigators, in my opinion."*	*"I feel it is all about education. To be involved as an investigator, the person should have a suitable insight to the background about what they are investigating. There are many different angles to be considered and there needs to be extensive training."* *"Investigators are not bred in classrooms, they acquire their skills through years of actually doing the task. Qualified and respected investigators are essential to the outcome of the investigation."*
6.	Support for a combination of police and civilian oversight (N=30, 7.8%)	*"I believe it should be a combination of civilian and police officers that investigate misconduct. You would have the impartiality of the civilian but the expertise/experience/knowledge of an active police officer."*	*"It should be a combined effort between police and civilian. They could do one investigation or two separate, then combine them to form a final agreement. If you have done your job properly, you should have nothing to fear from a group of people looking into it. A combined police and civilian team would give the proper balance, in that the police know what and how things are to be done. The civilian provides the check and should have final say as to the outcome. As I believe it should be slightly bias[sic] to the*

			civilian side to show more openness."
7.	Expressions that civilians don't understand police work (N=28, 7.3%)	*"I think non-police personnel, not including former police officers, do not understand police subculture. I think one needs to experience policing to understand this subculture. This understanding would aid in police oversight investigations."*	*"Civilians are incapable to [sic] understanding the mindset of a Police officer. The tactics and training that we rely on to make our decisions, can't be explained to anyone unless they have been through the same training. I wouldn't call a guy off the street to investigate why my lights aren't working in my house...I would call an electrician or someone that used to be an electrician."*

Concluding comments and summary: General Questions about Civilian Oversight

It should be noted that for many questions in this section, significant numbers of respondents selected the "neither agree nor disagree" category. Nevertheless, while the above findings are generally consistent with the patterns reported by earlier researchers (and reviewed in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*), my respondents had a slightly more positive view of civilian involvement in oversight/investigative roles than one might have expected from previous research.

Despite these positive evaluations, many respondents expressed reservations about civilians' investigative qualifications and capabilities. Furthermore, consistent with the findings of previous research, outlined in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, the majority of my respondents indicated a preference for civilians acting in a "review capacity" rather than investigative role. They also preferred that investigations into alleged officer misconduct be conducted by former or currently serving police officers. The subsequent sections on individual

civilian oversight agencies help to cross-validate and elucidate these findings with greater precision.

5.3 Police Services Boards

The third section of the survey asked respondents various questions about police services boards. Almost two thirds (59.8%) of respondents reported that they were currently governed by a police services board (see *Table 5-58* in *Appendix E*). The remaining 35.2% indicated they were not currently governed by a police services board and 5% of respondents selected "I don't know." These respondents were re-directed to questions covered in *Table 5-61* and *Table 5-62* in *Appendix E* (Respondents *NOT* governed by a police services board).

5.3.1   Respondents governed by a police services board

Figure 5-2 provides a summary of responses from respondents currently governed by a police services board (59.8% of total respondents; see *Table 5-59* and *Table 5-60* in *Appendix E*). The major findings of these materials are summarized below**.**

General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of police services boards
A majority of respondents who were governed by a police services board reported that they understood (78.2%) and respected (65.1%) the mandate of these boards and believed them necessary (57.2%).

Perceived impact of police services boards
When queried about the impact of police services boards, almost half of my respondents (49.3%) perceived that police services boards did not affect them very much (27.2% disagreed). However, while a quarter (24.6 percent) perceived the oversight provided by their police services board as "mostly political window dressing," more than a third (35.6%) believed otherwise.

When asked if these boards "infringe on the professional status of police officers," 10.7% agreed and almost half (47%) disagreed.

Perceived performance of police services boards

Respondents were slightly more critical of the performance of their respective police services board (and their individual members) in a variety of circumstances. For example, approximately a third agreed that their police services board is effective in their oversight role (33.9% agreed; 24.4% disagreed); is trustworthy (32% agreed; 19.9% disagreed); and responsive to the concerns of their detachment (34% agreed; 20.5% disagreed). However, fewer respondents (19.4%) agreed that police services board members are qualified to carry out oversight of their detachment (31.1% disagreed).

Figure 5-2: Respondents governed by a police services board: General questions

Respondents governed by a police services board: General questions

Responses by percentage

- I RESPECT THE MANDATE OF MY POLICE SERVICES BOARD
- THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD IS NECESSARY
- MY POLICE SERVICES BOARD DOESN'T AFFECT ME MUCH
- POLICE SERVICES BOARD'S OVERSIGHT IS WINDOW...
- MEMBER OF THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD LISTEN TO...
- THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD IS EFFECTIVE
- I TRUST THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD
- MEMBERS OF THE POLICE SERVICES BOARD ARE...
- POLICE SERVICES BOARDS INFRINGE ON PROFESSIONAL...

Legend: ■ Agree ■ Neither Agree nor Disagree ■ Disagree ■ Don't Know

At the end of this block of questions, respondents received an invitation to "please include any additional comments." This invitation yielded 110 total responses, all of which were coded for distinguishing themes. In total, 21 different themes/codes were developed for this block of responses. *Table 5-13* displays examples of the leading themes.

Table 5-13: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents governed by a police services board

Most common themes (from 110 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Police Services Board members don't understand police work (N=25, 22.7% of all comments voiced)	*"I have attended Police Services Boards (meetings) for my detachment and have been both shocked and dismayed by the complete lack of knowledge on the part of the board members in relation to policing. I have had board members ask me quite a number of basic questions that have demonstrated that they certainly are not in tune with what policing entails or how the work is carried out."*	*"There should be mandatory training set up for Police Services Boards. In theory they're a good idea but without the members truly knowing what their role and authorities are they can become useless and just do the chief's bidding."*
2. Police Services Board members are more worried about fiscal accountability than police work (N=16, 14.5%)	*"In today's financial accountability it is difficult to deal with Police Boards. They have limited power and/or not interested in addressing the real issues they should be addressing on policing such as staffing, buildings and community relations. They want to keep policing at a cheap rate and taxes down even if they made bad choices in town development or economic development. They often interfere with the day to day operations of the police service and do not have a great public connection with the citizen of the town. They are for show and very little for the police officer or the citizen they serve. They need to get more involved in the service delivery at the contract level and not be the town watchdog for taxes.....They need to be there for*	*"The police service board here concerns itself more with budgetary decisions."* *"The police service board protects the tax payers and is necessary to ensure the area is getting the service it pays for. I personally don't know who is on my police service board nor does that affect me, I'm sure it does effect some of the reasons why we do certain things."*

		the public safety aspect and the wellbeing of the officers serving their communities.”	
3.	Police Services Board members need better training about police work (N=16, 14.5%)	*“The PSB are not trained. I spend a large portion of my time educating them on both their roles and our issues. Filling the PSB with members who are trained and have skills and experience would make their oversight better. I ask for their input on issues within the community and the police but they do not provide any due to the lack of understanding. The members are satisfied to have me produce a report and do not ask the serious hard questions. They have become much more involved recently with the billing reform but not the daily business of policing their communities.”*	*“They may know ABOUT our jobs, but they often do not KNOW the details of the work we do. If these organizations are responsible for overseeing the police detachment, they ought to be closely familiar with what our work involves.”*
4.	I have no contact with Police Services Board members (N=15, 13.6%)	*“I've been in the same detachment area for 8 years. I've never met a member of the police services board nor have I been at a meeting.”*	*“I am not aware of what my Police Services Board does at my detachment. No one has ever talked to me about it and I have never asked.”*
5.	Police Services Boards support/reflect/connect community and police (N=14, 12.7%)	*“I am lucky to work in a detachment that has an excellent relationship with our Police Services Board. We are extremely well supported. Although the members of the Board do not necessarily always understand the workings of the detachment, there is always good and open conversation and consultation. Decisions are made to ensure positive results for our officers and the community.”*	*“The police services board, for the most part, is made up of people who are interested in the safety of their community. Their hearts are in the right place and they are supportive of our service.”* *“The police service board does not affect the day to day operation of the detachment. It is more there to bring up concerns of the community and to make police aware of issue from the public regarding crime in certain areas etc.”*

5.3.2 Respondents *NOT* governed by a police services board

Respondents who were not governed by a police services board (35.2% of total respondents) were directed to a sub-set of general questions about police services boards. *Figure 5-3* provides summaries of the responses from this section (see *Table 5-61* and *Table 5-62* in *Appendix E*).

A solid majority of respondents (76.4%) indicated that they understood the mandate of police services boards in Ontario and believed these boards were necessary (58.2%). Nevertheless, just over half (52.3%) agreed that police services boards promote accountability of policing and only 8.2% agreed that "Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work," with almost half (48.7%) disagreeing with this statement. However, while 14.8% perceived that "Police Services Boards infringe on the professional status of police officers," more than a third (38.8%) of the respondents who were not governed by a police services board expressed disagreement with this statement.

Figure 5-3: Respondents NOT governed by a Police Services Board: General Questions

164

At the end of this block of questions, respondents were directed to "please include any additional comments" they saw fit to make. This invitation resulted in 107 responses, all of which were examined and coded by common themes. In total, 13 different themes/codes were identified for this block of responses. *Table 5-14* displays examples of the most common themes.

Table 5-14: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents NOT governed by a police services board

Most common themes (from 107 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Police Services Board members have little police knowledge/experience (N=21, 19.6% of all comments voiced)	*"Police services boards are composed of people who know nothing about the intricacies of policing and have no beneficial input into the accountability process of police. They are important though to assist the police in understanding the unique problems within a community and assist with strategies to correct social problems which may not be police problems."* *"I believe that it is very difficult for a person with no policing and or security background to judge a police officer's action months after the incident occurred. Police are required to make split second decisions...boards take months to make the same decision."*	*"Police must be accountable to the public that they serve. Police Services Boards are a necessary public mechanism integral to ensuring police accountability. They are a valuable asset to ensuring overall accountability to the public, setting strategic direction, ensuring fiscal responsibility, and providing effective oversight. Having said this, it must be clearly understood that they are comprised of elected and appointed civilians whom do not possess the requisite skills and knowledge to effectively direct the operations of a police force. In addition, it is not uncommon for board members to have political aspirations/agendas that are not consistent with the effective day-to-day operations of a police service."*
2. Police Services Board members don't understand police work (N=19, 17.8%)	*"Police service boards are comprised of civilians, who for the most part don't understand what it's like to work the street. I don't see a board of non-doctors telling doctors how to do their job."*	*"As little or no training is provided to Police Service Board members, they cannot possibly have an accurate concept of how police policies apply to incidents and individuals."*
3. Police Services Boards are too political (N=19, 17.8%)	*"Many are just local officials with no background in policing and some have little background in local politics and make decisions based on what is financially good for their*	*"I find that these positions are more political appointments and not really community members engaged in the community with a goal to ensure adequate and*

	municipality. Some even have grudges against policing.”	*effective delivery of policing services.”* *“Police Service Boards are a necessary check and balance for police services/detachments. However, the system is hampered by a political appointment system that doesn't always recruit the best candidates for the positions.”*
4. Police Services Boards should not be involved in police operations (N=14, 13.1%)	*“Police Service Boards are necessary to provide guidance to our management teams on what they feel are the community priorities and to assist in the setting of financial decisions. They must truly understand that they cannot direct the day to day activities of the police of jurisdiction.”*	*“PSBs do not oversee operational matters, only administrative. They are qualified to perform this function.”* *“Police Services boards are an essential link between the community and the Police agency of jurisdiction. They should not dictate policy or SOPs (*Standard Operating Procedures*) within the Police Service.”*
5. Civilian oversight is necessary (N=13, 12.1%)	*“They are very IMPORTANT and INTEGRAL part of Criminal Justice System as they provide checks and balances in routine policing.”* *“Another ‘must have’ in modern policing.”*	*“PSB or similar board is necessary to have community input into policing service delivery.”*

Concluding comments and summary: Police Services Boards

It is noteworthy that among both sub-sets of respondents (i.e., those with or without Police

Services Boards), significant proportions of respondents selected the “neither agree nor disagree”

category. This finding indicates that among many respondents, these boards did not evoke

strong positive or negative emotions.

The findings reflect general (and somewhat passive) acceptance of the role and mandate of

police services boards in Ontario; in comparison to the SIU and OIPRD, police services boards

are long-established oversight institutions in Ontario. Despite many written comments which

opined that police services boards should absent themselves from the "day to day"/"operational"

functioning of policing, the overall findings suggest that police officers did not perceive police

services boards as a major threat to their sense of themselves as professionals or to their

professional autonomy. I anticipated these results with the reasoning that police officers would

find them unobtrusive inasmuch as police services boards only rarely have personal interaction

with individual police officers and most often provide macro-level governance and oversight.

However, my findings also indicate that many respondents do have significant concerns about

the qualifications of police services board members or, more specifically, the lack thereof and

question the efficacy of the oversight they provide. For example, many respondents perceived

that board members lacked substantive training/knowledge/experience.

5.4 Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

The fourth section of the survey asked respondents various questions about the SIU. *Table 5-15*

(and *Table 5-63* in *Appendix E*) provide summaries of general questions that were posed about

the mandate and general functioning of the SIU.

Questions about the SIU's mandate and general practices

Several questions sought to determine respondents' general knowledge about the SIU. The

results reveal that many officers do not have a clear understanding of the background of SIU

investigators. Although the vast majority of my respondents (98.1%) reported that they

understood the mandate of the SIU, a significant percentage reported that they were uncertain of

the qualifications possessed by its members. For example, the majority did not know how many

SIU investigators are former police officers or provided estimates that were inaccurate. More

than a third (37.4%) responded that they simply did not know the answer to this question.

In addition, while the majority of respondents gave accurate estimates of the SIU's "clearance by criminal charge rate" (less than 20% of SIU investigations), 15.1% of respondents were inaccurate in their approximations and 27.4% acknowledged frankly their lack of knowledge and selected "don't know." Although the SIU has published clearance by charge rates below 5% in all their Annual Reports since 2001, 42.5% my respondents were unaware of these trends.

Almost two-thirds of respondents (64.8%) felt that their organization had provided them with adequate information about the composition of the SIU and its workings. Nevertheless, it would seem that police officers in Ontario might derive benefit from receiving additional education about the composition of the SIU and its workings.

Table 5-15: General Knowledge about the SIU

Regarding the SIU, to the best of your knowledge...	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)
What proportion of SIU investigators are former police officers?	69	158	271	241	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 187	553	1479
	4.7%	10.7%	18.3%	16.3%	12.6%	37.4%	
What proportion of SIU investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 838	79	21	25	97	401	1461
	57.4%	5.4%	1.4%	1.7%	6.6%	27.4%	

5.4.1 General Questions about the SIU

Figure 5-4 summarizes various general questions that were posed about the SIU (see *Table 5-64* in *Appendix E* for exact wordings). Below are summaries of some highlights from this section.

Many responses in this section were positioned in the neutral "neither agree nor disagree" category.

General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of SIU

A majority of respondents said that they support the mandate and purpose of the SIU. Although about a quarter of my respondents perceived that the SIU is "biased against the police," almost 40% of respondents expressed some degree of wariness. More specifically:

- 77.6% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the SIU (only 8.4% disagreed).
- 64.3% agreed that the SIU helps to ensure accountability (16.5% disagreed).
- 47% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "I trust the SIU" (20.2% agreed).
- 38.8% disagreed with the statement, "The SIU is biased against the police" (23.6% agreed).

Perceived impact of SIU

Results were mixed for respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of the SIU, with responses divided almost in equal thirds (including the neutral category). Less than a fifth of respondents perceived that the SIU encroaches upon the professional status of police officers.

- 37.7% of respondents agreed that the "SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario" (29.1% disagreed).
- 45.8% of respondents disagreed that the "SIU infringes on the professional status of police officers" (18% agreed).

Perceived qualifications of SIU investigators

Results were again split with roughly similar percentages of officers perceiving that SIU investigators are objective when they conduct investigations (29.3%), 25.8% disagreeing and the remainder neutral. Just over a third of officers (35.2%) agreed that "SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" with the majority neutral (45.5%) and 19.3% disagreeing with this statement.

Organizational Support for SIU

A majority of respondents perceived that their organization and police association generally

supports the work of the SIU.

- 64.8% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about the SIU
  (20.9% disagreed).
- 71.8% agreed that their police organization supports the work of the SIU (only 3%
  disagreed).
- 41% agreed that their police association supports the work of the SIU (only 14.4%
  disagreed).

Figure 5-4: General questions about the SIU

At the end of this block of questions, respondents once again had the option to "include any

additional comments" and 249 respondents did so. In total, 26 different themes/codes were

developed for this block of responses. *Table 5-16* displays examples of the most common

themes.

Table 5-16 : Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the SIU

Most common themes (from 249 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. SIU investigations are politically influenced (N=71, 28.5% of all comments voiced)	*"I believe the SIU caves into public pressure. An officer should never be charged with murder when using lethal force when he or she believes that he or she is using that force to protect his or her life. The officer may be criminally responsible for a death, but murder should never come into the equation unless there is evidence to prove the officer intentionally set out to take someone's life."*	*"I support oversight as long as the investigators are competent, impartial and treat everyone fairly. I do not support the SIU when they support public smear campaigns for political gain. I also do not support an SIU that appears to have a political mandate. I would support an SIU who completes a fair unbiased investigation void of political interference."*
2. Comment about SIU Director (N=42, 16.9%)	*"Ian SCOTT is definitely biased against the police and has shown his dislike for police over and over in investigations. His position is that police officers have less rights than citizens under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has now resulted in police not being afforded the right to speak to a lawyer prior to completion of duty notes. Every citizen in Canada, police or not, should be entitled to consult with a lawyer if they are being investigated criminally (which is SIU's mandate to see if criminal charges are warranted)."*	*"The former head of SIU created a very negative image for officers and policing in general. The controversy over officer making notes after speaking to legal counsel became a point of contention for me as a police officer and hearing his remarks in the media caused my respect for the SIU to decrease greatly."*
3. I accept the SIU (N=33, 13.3%)	*"The SIU has a mandate to ensure that police are held accountable for any abuse of their authorities. A better understanding of the skills, training, and background of the investigators, could potentially improve the relationship between front line officers and the SIU."*	*"I have no issue with the SIU. I just wish they'd stand up for Officers. The reason why the SIU doesn't lay many charges is because the Officers do the right thing most of the time. Why can't they stand up to the public and media and say that so the public doesn't have some impression that there's always some kind of cover-up?"*
4. SIU helps maintain accountability (N=24, 9.6%)	*"I have twice been the subject officer in an SIU investigation. On both occasions I found the*	*"SIU is there to justify to the public that police took the right actions in those*

		investigators to be capable and the investigation done in a fair and frank manner. "	*situations and to hold police responsible if they didn't."*
5.	Questions about qualifications of SIU investigators (N=23, 9.2%)	*"I have extremely high concerns with the training of SIU investigators. I have seen first-hand many negligent evidence gathering techniques. I take issue with these people criticizing and dissecting over the course of weeks and months the decision an officer has only seconds to make.* "	*"I was a full time criminal investigator for 8 years and have first-hand experience working in conjunction with SIU on criminal investigations. I have attended their offices with regards to meetings and the transfer of physical evidence, etc. I can honestly say I was sorely disappointed in the quality of their investigators and investigative techniques (ie. visible lack of continuity/security of evidence, poor investigative techniques and methodologies, etc.). The experience did nothing to boost my confidence in this system which is clearly here to stay, for better or worse.* "
6.	SIU requires competent investigators to be trusted (N=21, 8.4%)	*"The mandate of the SIU is important. Police need to have oversight to ensure and maintain public trust but you have to have competent investigators to ensure that is happening.* "	*"Again it comes down to competent people which promotes trust."*
7.	SIU investigations challenge police officers' rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (N=20, 8%)	*"I believe in the SIU and the work they do. I do not believe that police officers should have some of their rights taken away from them just because they are police officers. (Legal counsel before making notebook statements) Police officers are still Canadians and should be given the same rights anyone else is. 'Police are the people and the people are the Police'."*	*"With the recent Supreme Court decision about officers completing notes after speaking with a lawyer being struck down, I believe this was mostly the SIU pushing that case. I disagree that police officers should not be afforded the same rights as anyone else in this country. Civilians can talk to a lawyer before providing a statement, so police should be able to speak to a lawyer before providing a statement (aka; notebook entries)."*

Determining level of personal experience with the SIU

As detailed in *Table 5-65* (see *Appendix E*), almost half of my respondents (46.6%) reported that they had personal experience with the SIU as either a witness and/or subject officer. These respondents were invited to answer a series of questions about these experiences (see *Table 5-66* in *Appendix E*). Those who lacked such experiences (53.4%) were re-directed to the next section in the survey questionnaire.

Respondents with personal experience with the SIU were divisible into the following strata: *subject* officers (15.1%); *witness* officers (58.1%); both *subject* and *witness* officers (26.8%).

5.4.2   Respondents with personal experience with the SIU

Figure 5-5 summarizes my respondents' reported experiences with the SIU (46.6% of total respondents; see *Table 5-66* in *Appendix E*). Below are some highlights from this section.

Perceived treatment by SIU staff

A majority of respondents said they were satisfied with their treatment by SIU staff. More specifically, more than three in five (61.7%) were satisfied with the level of courtesy that they received from the SIU's staff (17.4% were dissatisfied) and more than half (54.3%) perceived the questions that they had been asked had been fair-minded; only a minority of officers reported dissatisfaction on those bases (14.2%).

Perceived quality of SIU investigation/investigators

A majority of respondents were also satisfied with the impartiality shown by SIU staff: 49% of respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the SIU investigator(s) (19.8% were dissatisfied); and 49.3% were satisfied that the SIU investigation was unbiased (18.7% were dissatisfied).

Perceptions of the quality of communication during SIU investigation

A majority of respondents were satisfied with the quality of communication at the outset of the

SIU investigation. However, respondents were far less satisfied with the level of communication

that occurred during the course of the investigation and at its conclusion. For example,

- 68.9% of respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the SIU investigation (17.3% were dissatisfied).
- 53.7% were satisfied that the SIU investigative process was explained to them (30.7% were dissatisfied).
- 59% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied).
- 43.2% were dissatisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the investigation (37% were satisfied).

Perceptions of features of the SIU investigative process

Although a majority of respondents were satisfied with the timing of their initial SIU interview,

many respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the speed and overall length of the SIU

investigation. Thus,

- 52.9% were satisfied that they were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated (21.7% were dissatisfied).
- 40.6% were dissatisfied with the speed of the SIU investigative process (38.5% were satisfied).
- 46.4% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the SIU investigation (28.3% were satisfied).

Figure 5-5: Personal experience with SIU: Satisfaction matrix results

One hundred and twenty-nine respondents accepted the invitation to "include any additional comments" and twenty-six different themes/codes emerged from these responses. *Table 5-17* furnishes examples of the most common themes.

Table 5-17: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with SIU experience

Most common themes (from 129 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Poor communication by SIU (N=36, 28% of all comments voiced)	*"If I had not had the support of detachment members I would have fallen apart. The SIU never made contact with me at all. I had to constantly ask what was happening to my supervisor who also did not get any communication. It was the worst experience I have ever had in my life. I got the impression that I was a statistic. It was devastating."*	*"During one investigation I was not contacted after I had been cleared of any charges for months and only found out when I contacted them."*
2. SIU investigation/resolution took too long (N=33, 25.6%)	*"One matter took SIU 2.5 years to complete and clear my*	*"The former police officers conducted a professional*

	partner and I. This was unjust. I cooperated fully in this matter.”	*investigation, but it took way too long and once interviews were conducted there was a black hole of time, information, and communication between SIU and officers.”*
3. Not notified of resolution (N=21, 16.3%)	*“Was switched from a Witness officer to a Subject without notification. Read the news article stating that I was a Subject officer and the outcome in the same article before I was notified by the SIU or my Supervisors. When asked if anything can be done to assist this from happening in the future I was advised that it was my association's issue (????).”*	*“Found out I was cleared by the SIU from an article in the local paper and later by my S/Sgt. Never contacted by the SIU upon completion so I called them and asked for documentation I was cleared and the case closed. Was advised they don't provide that and the case is never "closed" in case further information is later received. More than a little disheartening and stress inducing.”*
4. Poor communication by SIU – no updates (N=21, 16.3%)	*“You can have the best investigators in the world on a file, but if it's not conducted in a timely fashion the impact it has on those involved is not pleasant. Further, the SIU allows for the initial press release, albeit minimal content at best, which is front page news. "Police Shoot Man after Police Pursuit" captures the headlines with a closure that the police are being investigated. Then nothing is released for months and months. Finally, a release goes out buried on page 12 that SIU clear police of any wrongdoing. Point is public opinion has already been carved out regardless of the outcome.”*	*“In my situation, the SIU never attended the scene. They requested and received my notes through my service, without my knowledge or consent, never spoke to me about the investigation, never interviewed me and took about 6 months to inform me that I did nothing wrong.”* *“I have yet to have been told of the results of any of the SIU investigations that I have been involved in. All of those have been as a witness officer.”*
5. SIU investigator was biased (N=15, 11.6%)	*“I don't feel that their investigation, questions or understanding of the event was very thorough. I felt in some instances that their mind was made up and they had limited understanding of the area of investigation (they did not have a local understanding). I felt*	*“I learned the outcome through the media. I did not provide an interview because my lawyer felt that the investigator had already made up his mind of what happened.”*

	that they have invoked their mandate and proceeded criminally with charges that were provincial offences at best."	

Concluding comments and summary: SIU

Given that the SIU has been existence since 1990, it is readily understandable why the vast

majority of my respondents (98.1%) would report that they both understood its role and mandate

and accepted its role in promoting police accountability in Ontario. A majority of respondents

that they generally accept the mandate of the SIU and its role in attempting to ensure

accountability of policing in Ontario. Furthermore, most respondents reported satisfaction with

the level of objectivity, professionalism and fairness shown by SIU investigators. Nevertheless,

respondents also reported a variety of concerns and, at times, expressed these concerns with

vehemence. In particular, they perceived inefficiencies in relation to the speed and length of

investigation and inadequate communication, both during the investigation and in informing

officers of the SIU's decision.

5.5 Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD)

The survey asked respondents various questions about the OIPRD. *Table 5-18* provides

summaries of the answers obtained to the general questions posed about the mandate and general

functioning of the OIPRD (see also *Table 5-67* in *Appendix E*).

Questions about the OIPRD's mandate and general practices

Of the various oversight agencies, my respondents were most likely to report that they lacked

understanding of mandate and general practices of the OIPRD. Approximately two thirds of

respondents said that they understood the mandate of the OIPRD; 23.1% indicated they did not

and 8.5% selected "don't know." When compared to the other oversight agencies, this was the lowest reported score for this question.

When asked about the general mandate and practices of the OIPRD, a large proportion of respondents indicated they know very little about the oversight agency. For instance,

- 69.5% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD investigators are former police officers (the correct response is 41% to 60%: OIPRD, 2011: 38; OIPRD, 2014: 41)
- 59.6% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by criminal charge (35.2% of respondents selected the correct category, "Less than 20%").
- 60.5% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by Police Service Act charge (25.6% of respondents selected the correct category, "Less than 20%").

These findings demonstrate a lack of general knowledge about the practices of the OIPRD, especially when compared to the reported knowledge of the other oversight agencies.

Table 5-18: General Knowledge about the OIPRD

Regarding the OIPRD, to the best of your knowledge...	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)
What proportion of OIPRD investigators are former police officers?	226 *15.6%*	121 *8.3%*	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 67 *4.6%*	25 *1.7%*	4 *0.3%*	1010 *69.5%*	1453
What proportion of OIPRD investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 511 *35.2%*	40 *2.8%*	11 *0.8%*	9 *0.6%*	16 *1.1%*	866 *59.6%*	1453
What proportion of OIPRD investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charge?	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 372 *25.6%*	126 *8.7%*	46 *3.2%*	14 *1.0%*	16 *1.1%*	881 *60.5%*	1455

5.5.1 General Questions about the OIPRD

Figure 5-6 provides a summary of respondents' answers to the general questions that were posed about the OIPRD (see *Table 5-68* in *Appendix E*). Although many officers selected "neither agree nor disagree" and "don't know" to the questions posed, this section yielded some noteworthy findings which are summarized below.

General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of OIPRD

Two-fifths of respondents said that they both respected the OIPRD'S mandate and roughly one-third recognized its role in holding police officers accountable. Although only a minority of respondents expressed trust in the OIPRD, few perceived this agency as biased against the police. More specifically:

- 41.9% of respondents said they respect the mandate of the OIPRD (14.9% disagreed and 24.4% selected "don't know").
- 36.5% agreed that the OIPRD helps to ensure accountability (18.9% disagreed and 24% selected "don't know").
- 28.8% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "I trust the OIPRD" (16.8% agreed and 24.8% selected "don't know").
- 25.8% disagreed with the statement, "The OIPRD is biased against the police" (14% agreed and 28.4% selected "don't know").

Perceived impact of OIPRD

Almost half of respondents perceived that the OIPRD was either ineffective in their oversight of policing in Ontario (23.5%) or felt that they lacked information on its efficiency (29.3%) and simply "don't know." Meanwhile, only 12.9% of respondents felt that the OIPRD infringes on the professional status of police officers (27% selected "don't know").

Perceived qualifications of OIPRD investigators

A small majority of respondents indicated they are unsure about the objectivity and

qualifications of OIPRD investigators. More specifically:

- 32.2% reported that they "don't know" if the OIPRD is objective when they conduct investigations (19.2% agreed and 16.1% disagreed).
- 41.9% of respondents reported that they "don't know" if "OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" (17.3% disagreed and only 11.2% agreed).

Organizational Support for OIPRD

A small majority of respondents said that they felt sufficiently educated about the OIPRD and

also that their police service and association supports the work of the OIPRD.

- 37.2% of respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about the OIPRD (35.3% disagreed).
- 50.4% agreed that their police organization supports the work of the OIPRD (29.7% selected "don't know" and only 2.6% disagreed).
- 36.5% of respondents reported they "don't know" when asked if their police association supports the work of the OIPRD (29.8% agreed and only 6.2% disagreed).

Figure 5-6: General questions about the OIPRD

Table 5-19 shows the common themes to the "include any additional comments" probe. Twenty-three themes/codes were developed for this block of responses.

Table 5-19: Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the OIPRD

Most common themes (from 157 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. I don't know much about the OIPRD (N=27, 17.2% of all comments voiced)	*"I don't know anything about OIPRD."* *"Heard of them, but do not recall their mandate or involvement with my organization."*	*"I know absolutely nothing about the OIPRD."* *"I know little about OIPRD, only that this is another area where the public can go to further their complaint when they are not happy. The appeal process for OIPRD for the public seems to be never ending which results in stressors on the officer for a very*

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			long time even in minor complaints.”
2.	Too many frivolous complaints (N=17, 10.8%)	*“OIPRD makes it easier for the public to make false, minor or vindictive complaints against officers. The public is able to hide behind the ease of reporting to a distant OIPRD rather than directly against the officer and his service.”*	*“It seems that frivolous investigations are increasing with respect to the OIPRD. It may be due to the ease that civilians can enter complaints and/or an improper review of cases; cases that go forward are sometimes a waste of everyone's time.”*
3.	OIPRD provides oversight, rarely investigation (N=16, 10.2%)	*“OIPRD oversees our Professional Standards Bureau investigation when investigation is required. I am not aware of anyone from OIPRD investigating misconduct beyond the initial assessment stage.”* *“It is my opinion that the work of the OIPRD could or is done by the Internal Professional Standards investigators. I do not believe that this group has had any significant impact, other than public perception, on police misconduct.”*	*“OIPRD seems to be a bit of a farce. They oversee the investigations but conduct very few of them. I feel they should be conducting the investigations that they receive complaints about - not picking and choosing which ones they want to do. Their process largely continues with ‘police investigating police’.”*
4.	I have never heard of the OIPRD (N=11, 7%)	*“I have never heard of this organization.”* *“I have no idea who OIPRD are.”* *“I have no idea what the acronym OIPRD is or what this organization even is.”* *“I have no knowledge of the OIPRD'S mandate or who they are made up of.”*	*“I have never even heard of the ‘Office of the Independent Police Review Director’.”* *“I do not know what the OIPRD is.”* *“No idea what this body is or what it does.”* *“Never heard of this organization.”*
5.	There are too many oversight bodies (N=10, 6.4%)	*“At what point, does the civilian oversight become duplicitous? OIPRD, SIU, OCCOPS. In addition to that, police officers are subject to the professional standards of their service. What other profession has that level of oversight?”* *“I understand the concept of an independent group that will*	*“How many layers of 'oversight' do we need? A person can answer shop until they get the result they want. There should be oversight but I hardly think we need all these different agencies in addition to professional standards. It starts to get ridiculous when there are all these different bodies to answer to and then someone needs to do*

| | assist an individual who may have been mistreated by the police, I am not sure of the credentials of the investigators with this organization, and I believe that another independent body to oversee complaints coupled with the SIU and a services on PSB, undermines the professional status of police." | a PhD study to figure out if/why the cops are disillusioned with civilian oversight!"

"With the OIPRD we've reached a redundant degree of civilian oversight. How many organizations are required to second and third-guess each other?" |
| --- | --- | --- |

Determining level of personal experience with OIPRD

Table 5-20 provides a breakdown of respondents with/without personal experience with the OIPRD. Approximately one quarter (27.3%) of respondents said that they had personal experience with the OIPRD as either a witness or subject officer (or both). These respondents were invited to answer a series of questions about their experience with the OIPRD (*Table 5-69*). The remaining 72.7% of respondents were re-directed to the next section in the survey questionnaire.

The 27.3% of respondents who indicated they had personal experience with the OIPRD were divided in the following strata: *subject* officers (51%); *witness* officers (20.1%); both *subject* and *witness* officers (28.9%).

About one third (30.5%) of respondents said that OIPRD investigators were the primary investigators for their case(s). In turn, investigators from the respondents' own Professional Standards Bureau served as primary investigators in 69.5% of cases.

Table 5-20: Personal Experience with the OIPRD

Have you ever been a *subject* or a *witness* in an OIPRD investigation?		During your OIPRD investigation(s) were you…		The primary investigators on my OIPRD investigation were:	
	Total responses (N)		Total responses (N)		Total responses (N)
Yes	399 *27.3%*	A *subject*	208 *51.0%*	OIPRD investigators	124 *30.5%*
No	1063 *72.7%*	A *witness*	82 *20.1%*	Police investigators (e.g., my police service's Professional Standards Bureau)	283 *69.5%*
Total	1462 *100%*	I have been both a *subject* and a *witness*.	118 *28.9%*	Total	407 *100%*
		Total	408 100%		

5.5.2   Respondents with personal experience with the OIPRD

Figure 5-7 provides a summary of the answers elicited by questions about respondents' personal experience with the OIPRD (27.3% of total respondents) (see *Table 5-69* in *Appendix E*). Below I summarize some highlights from this section.

Perceived treatment by OIPRD staff

A majority of respondents reported courteous treatment and satisfaction with the fairness of the investigators' questions.

- 37.9% were satisfied that they were treated courteously by the OIPRD staff (14% were dissatisfied).
- 43.5% were satisfied with how fair the investigators' questions were (14.3% were dissatisfied).

Perceived quality of OIPRD investigation/investigators

A majority of respondents reported satisfaction with the objectivity of the involved investigators and the investigation itself.

- 44.1% of respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the investigator(s) (19.1% were dissatisfied).
- 45% were satisfied that the investigation was unbiased (20.1% were dissatisfied).

Perceptions of the quality of communication during OIPRD investigation

The majority of respondents were satisfied with the initial notification of the investigation and notification of its ultimate outcome. However, some were dissatisfied with the information that they received about the investigative process. Almost half of respondents were dissatisfied with the level of communication provided throughout the investigation.

- 55.1% of respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the OIPRD investigation (25.3% were dissatisfied).
- 39.6% were dissatisfied with the way in which the OIPRD investigative process was explained to them (38.9% were satisfied).
- 48.8% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the OIPRD investigation (27.2% were satisfied).
- 50.2% were satisfied with the way in which they were informed of the results of the OIPRD investigation (30.5% were dissatisfied). Note: This compares to 59% of respondents who were *dissatisfied* with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied).

Perceptions of features of the OIPRD investigative process

A slight majority of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with elements related to the timing and speed of the investigative process. Only a third (33.6%) were satisfied that they had been interviewed soon after the OIPRD investigation commenced and 34.3% were dissatisfied with its timing. In comparison, 52.9% who were involved in SIU investigations were satisfied that they

were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated and simply 21.7% were dissatisfied.

Similarly, simply 35.9% percent were satisfied with the speed of the OIPRD's investigative

process (with 39.2% dissatisfied) and 30.9% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to

complete the investigation (with 43.8% dissatisfied).

Figure 5-7: Personal experience with OIPRD: Satisfaction matrix results

At the end of this block of questions, respondents were again invited to "include any additional

comments", with 95 respondents doing so. Fifteen different themes/codes were developed for

this block of responses. *Table 5-21* presents exemplars of the most common themes.

Table 5-21: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with OIPRD experience

Most common themes (from 95 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Poor communication by OIPRD (N=29, 30.5% of all comments voiced)	*"The OIPRD doesn't communicate whatsoever with officers. I continuously needed to contact the PSB to find out the status of my investigation. It's unacceptable to allow unreasonable delays in these types of investigations. It is stressful for all involved officers. It took several months to review the complainants appeal."*	*"Investigation took 8 months to finish and I had to call them to find out the status of the investigation."*
2. Frivolous complaint (N=28, 29.5%)	*"An investigation was conducted and the claim was found to be unfounded. The complainant didn't like that and went to the OIPRD. The OIPRD accepted the complaint and I have still not heard what they are doing with it. That was a year ago!"*	*"A complete waste of time. It was a clear attempt to avoid a traffic ticket and was not even filed by the complainant. It was a feel good investigation to make the complainant feel like they got me in trouble."*
3. Notified of complaint after it was resolved (N=17, 17.9%)	*"Didn't even know I was being investigated until I received the notice from the OIPRD that I was cleared and the complaint unsubstantiated."*	*"I did not know about the investigation until after the fact when everything was done and decided on, even though I was the only involved officer."*
4. Exonerated (N=17, 17.9%)	*"I was not informed until after the investigation was completed and deemed unfounded. I was never informed or interviewed and later received correspondence with the investigations results."*	*"I was cleared of any wrongdoing at every occasion however the long delays between steps added a lot of pressure on both my professional and personal life."*
5. Slow investigation (N=16, 16.8%)	*"Took a very long time to complete the investigation."* *"These investigations start with notification, then nothing. They just hang over your head and little is said about what's happening, until a request for a Duty Report is sent then nothing again, then a letter telling you that it is done."*	*"Again, the amount of time it takes to process these complaints is not fair to any of the parties involved. If my investigations took as long I would certainly be questioned by my superiors."*

Concluding comments and summary: OIPRD

For many questions in this section, significant proportions of respondents selected the "neither agree nor disagree" and "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" categories. There were also a large number of respondents who selected the "don't know" category for knowledge-related questions and general questions about the OIPRD. A significant number of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with elements of the investigative process (e.g., speed, length, poor communication).

Only a small proportion of respondents (27.3%) reported personal experience with the OIPRD, and among those respondents, 69.5% reported that their principal investigators were from their own Professional Standards Bureau. These findings signify limited exposure to OIPRD investigators among most police officers in this study (N=124).

Given that the OIPRD has only been in existence since 2009, it is understandable why respondents would be less familiar with the mandate and practices of the OIPRD than the SIU and police services boards. My findings suggest a need for police officers to receive enhanced education about the OIPRD and its practices.

5.6 Professional Standards Bureau

The final section of the survey asked respondents various questions about their police service's Professional Standards Bureau. *Table 5-22* (and *Table 5-70*) provide summaries of the answers received to the general questions that were posed about the mandate and general functioning of the Professional Standards Bureau.

Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau's mandate and general practices

Almost all my respondents (96.5%) perceived themselves to be knowledgeable about the
mandate of the Professional Standards Bureau. However, a lesser percentage possessed accurate
information on how many investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charges and criminal
charges.

- Only 53.8% of respondents were aware that that less than 20% of their Professional
  Standards Bureau's investigations are cleared by criminal charge or charges under the
  Police Services Act. Meanwhile, 35.2% indicated that they "don't know."
- 31.6% of respondents correctly perceived that less than 20% of their Professional Standards
  Bureau's investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charge. 37.6% said that they
  "don't know."

Table 5-22: General Knowledge about the Professional Standards Bureau

Regarding your police service's Professional Standards Bureau, to the best of your knowledge...	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)
What proportion of your police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 775 *53.8%*	73 *5.1%*	19 *1.3%*	14 *1.0%*	53 *3.7%*	507 *35.2%*	1441
What proportion of your police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigations are cleared by Police Services Act charge?	*CORRECT RESPONSE* 455 *31.6%*	253 *17.6%*	107 *7.4%*	47 *3.3%*	36 *2.5%*	541 *37.6%*	1439

5.6.1 General Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau

Figure 5-8 provides a summary of the answers respondents provided to the general questions posed about the Professional Standards Bureau (see *Table 5-71* in *Appendix E*). Among this section's major findings were:

General acceptance / perceived legitimacy of the Professional Standards Bureau
A significant majority of respondents indicated strong confidence in the mandate and purpose of their Professional Standards Bureau.

- 86.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of their Professional Standards Bureau (only 3.2% disagreed).
- 83% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability (only 6% disagreed).
- 52.8% of respondents agreed with the statement, "I trust my police service's Professional Standards Bureau" (21.1% disagreed).
- 61.1% disagreed with the statement, "My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is biased against the police" (only 12.4% agreed).

Perceived impact of the Professional Standards Bureau
A significant proportion of respondents perceived the Professional Standards Bureau as effective and non-threatening to the professional status of police officers.

- 71.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, "My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization" (only 9.2% disagreed).
- 63.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "My police service's Professional Standards Bureau infringes on the professional status of police officers" (only 10.1% agreed).

Perceived qualifications of the Professional Standards Bureau investigators

A substantial proportion of respondents indicated approval of the qualifications and objectivity of Professional Standards Bureau investigators.

- 56.9% of respondents agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau is objective when they conduct investigations (only 14.3% disagreed).
- 74% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau investigators are "qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" (only 6.5% disagreed).

Organizational Support for the Professional Standards Bureau

The vast majority of respondents perceived that their organization and police association are generally supportive of work of the Professional Standards Bureau.

- 72.7% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about their Professional Standards Bureau (only 14.3% disagreed).
- 85% agreed that their police organization supports the work of their Professional Standards Bureau (only 1.2% disagreed).
- 62.9% agreed that their police association supports the work of their Professional Standards Bureau (only 7.2% disagreed)

Figure 5-8: General questions about the Professional Standards Bureau

General questions about the Professional Standards Bureau

Responses by percentage

| | Agree | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Disagree | Don't Know |

191

When invited to "include any additional comments" about the Professional Standards Bureau,

159 respondents took the opportunity to do so. Their responses were examined and coded by

themes and 26 different themes/codes were developed for this block of responses. *Table 5-23*

displays examples of the most common themes.

Table 5-23: Example open-ended commentary: General Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau

Most common themes (from 159 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Competent investigators are needed in Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) for accountability (N=25, 15.7% of all comments voiced)	*"PSB investigators come from CIB (Criminal Investigations Bureau) and they know all the angles when it comes to cops misbehaving. They are able to easily investigate criminal behaviour and know the right questions to ask and what evidence to look for. They are easily able to establish motive or the lack of it and determine when officers are genuinely doing their jobs."*	*"It has been my experience that the investigators are qualified. They are experienced and skilled investigators. I have found them to be impartial yet at times heavy handed. I have the impression we are harder on our own then a civilian oversight would be. We spend far more on resources to ensure a far more thorough investigation is completed than we would do on a civilian. We want to ensure that the investigation will withstand public scrutiny and civil litigations. We have greater depth in resources than OIPRD and SIU. We have far better investigators who have access to the resources including surveillance, forensics, interviewing etc."*
2. PSB investigators are politically influenced (N=18, 11.3%)	*"PSB is the lesser of two evils, however, they appear to conduct politically motivated investigations at the whim of management. I was investigated in such a manner and have no trust for PSB."*	*"Politics play a role in any internal investigation. Who you know and how you are connected."*
3. Officers vying for promotion go to PSB (N=16, 10.1%)	*"PSB investigators are officers seeking a promotion or detective designation. They cannot be trusted and are in the role for themselves and their careers."*	*"Regardless of a member's position in the organization, sometimes their work outcomes are directed by their career development plans, which can affect proper and fair decision making."*

	"PSB is a stepping stone for promotion."	
4. PSB investigators biased (N=10) / Some PSB investigators biased (N=6) (10.1%)	*"As with anything some PSB investigators are good, fair and others are biased against police. I have noticed that some higher ranking officers who have come out of PSB are blatantly biased towards road officers."*	*"Not that I have experienced it, but I've heard of officers who were investigated and felt that the investigator was biased against them as the investigator was a former co-worker whom they didn't get along with. Also, with people wanting to be promoted I think there is a need to show that they've held people accountable and a need to show their KSAs (Knowledge, Skills & Abilities)."*
5. I respect PSB investigators (N=10, 6.3%)	*"I know a great deal of these investigators. I have been a subject officer as well as conducted the investigations myself and I have a great deal of time and respect for most of these investigators."*	*"I know many of the investigators and they are all well respected within our organization."* *"PSB comprised of competent investigators whose primary objective is to hold officers accountable for their actions ensuring a professional police image."*

Determining level of personal experience with the Professional Standards Bureau

Table 5-72 (see *Appendix E*) provides a breakdown of respondents with/without personal experience with the Professional Standards Bureau. 71.2% of respondents reported personal experience with their Professional Standards Bureau as either a witness, subject officer or both – the highest proportion of respondent involvement with an oversight agency in this study (59.8% for Police Services Boards; 46.6% for SIU; 27.3% for OIPRD). These respondents were invited to answer a series of questions about their experience with the Professional Standards Bureau (see *Table 5-73* in *Appendix E*) with those who lacked such experience (28.8%) were re-directed to the next section in the survey questionnaire (conclusion).

Respondents who reported personal experience (71.2%) with their Professional Standards Bureau were divided into the following strata: *subject* officers (23.1%); *witness* officers (23.4%); both *subject* and *witness* officers (53.5%).

5.6.2 Respondents with personal experience with the Professional Standards Bureau

Figure 5-9 summarizes the answers that respondents provided to questions about their experience with their police service's Professional Standards Bureau (see *Table 5-73* in *Appendix E*). Some highlights from this section appear below.

Perceived treatment by Professional Standards Bureau staff

The majority of respondents were satisfied with their treatment by Professional Standards Bureau staff, reporting that it was courteous (71.2%) and that the questions that the Professional Standards Bureau's investigators had posed were fair (64%). Only a minority expressed dissatisfaction with the level of courtesy they had received (16.5%) or the fairness of the questions asked 15.9%).

Perceived quality of Professional Standards Bureau investigation/investigators

A majority of respondents were satisfied with the objectivity of the Professional Standard Bureau's investigators (62.6%; with 20.2% dissatisfied) and perceived it to be unbiased (61.6%; with 21% expressing dissatisfaction).

Perceptions of the quality of communication during Professional Standards Bureau investigation

Although a slight majority of respondents were dissatisfied with the level of communication during investigations, a majority of respondents were satisfied with the quality of communication at both its outset and conclusion. Thus,

- 69.6% of respondents were satisfied that they had received prompt notification of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (18.1% were dissatisfied).
- 59.8% were satisfied that the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process was explained to them (24.1% were dissatisfied).
- 42.3% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (38.6% were satisfied).
- 55.2% were satisfied with the way in which they were informed of the results of the investigation (30.1% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from SIU finding).

Figure 5-9: Personal experience with Professional Standards Bureau: Satisfaction matrix results

Perceptions of features of the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process

A slight majority of respondents expressed satisfaction with elements related to the timing and speed of the investigative process.

- 57.4% were satisfied that they were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated (23.4% were dissatisfied).

- 48.3% were satisfied with the speed of the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process (32.6% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from SIU & OIPRD findings).
- 42.2% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (36.9% were dissatisfied) (Note: this differs from both SIU & OIPRD findings).

Respondents were again invited to "include any additional comments" and 159 did so. Twenty-seven different themes/codes were developed for this block of responses, with *Table 5-24* furnishing examples of the most common themes.

Table 5-24: Example open-ended commentary: Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau experience

Most common themes (from 159 responses)	Exemplar quotations	
1. Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) investigations need better communication (N=32, 20.1% of all comments voiced)	*"Last investigation seemed to take forever to hear the results, during this time is added stress on us. The quicker the result, the better to relieve stress, whether it is being cleared or disciplined."*	*"Very slow process. Very little information provided to me regarding the progress of investigation. Only notice received was a letter at the end."*
2. Negative experience with PSB (N=26, 16.4%)	*"It should be noted that in my PSB-related case, I was cleared of any wrong-doing. My negative responses are not rooted in being charged or convicted. I was a new officer at the time and I was treated poorly and unfairly."*	*"As a witness officer I was treated like a subject officer."* *"I do not trust the PSB as a result of being 'railroaded'. Police officers are big, easy targets. Some are certainly guilty of wrongdoings, some are not. Just because someone says you did it, doesn't mean you did."*
3. Officers not notified of status/outcomes in PSB investigations (N=23, 14.5%)	*"I have only been asked for duty reports from PSB through email. It would be nice to actually receive a phone call and be kept informed of the status of the investigation, most importantly the outcome."* *"I was not contacted by anyone in person to discuss the results."*	*"As a witness officer, I have been asked several times to submit my notes to the PSB investigators regarding occurrences. I have never been interviewed and never been informed of the outcomes of those investigations."*

4. PSB investigation took too long (N=19, 11.9%)	*"With the workload of the PSB, investigations do take time to complete. They are very thorough in their process and need to be. The challenge here is that subject officers are left waiting and wondering. The subject officer is stressed over the incident regardless and this does take a toll on the member."*	*"For the most part I have no complaints regarding my involvement with the PSB. My only complaint was with one instance where it took 1.5yrs for them to come back and tell me that the complainant didn't have a basis for a complaint against me."*
5. PSB necessary (N=16, 10.1%)	*"I have no issues with PSB - they are very good at what they do and I trust them completely."* *"I have no issue with respect to the job that PSB does. It is a necessary evil in any professional group and they do their difficult jobs very well."*	*"Our Professional Standards Officers are very competent investigators. I have no issue with the process and I do not feel that the system is Biased against our officers whether they are a witness or a subject officer."*

Concluding comments and summary: Professional Standards Bureau

Overall, a majority of the officers provided favourable evaluations of the mandate and core practices of the Professional Standards Bureau. Among all oversight agencies examined in this study, perceptions of the Professional Standards Bureau were, across the board, the most positive. This finding was anticipated and consistent with findings reported in previous research. However, while officers from the host police service have largely positive perceptions of their organization's Professional Standards Bureau, they did perceive room for improvement re: providing officers with timely and regular updates about the status of an investigation.

5.6.3 Concluding comments for descriptive results from the survey questionnaire

The descriptive results presented above are encouraging for they suggest that the majority of respondents accept civilian oversight. Nevertheless, a majority of respondents reported a preference for police-led misconduct/complaint investigations (e.g., Professional Standards Bureau) and many raised concerns about the qualifications of those who are tasked with the oversight and investigation of police. Respondents additionally perceived inefficiencies,

redundancies and process-related issues with each individual oversight agency (Police Services

Boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau).

5.7 Conclusion of *Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis*

This chapter provided a profile of officers who answered my survey questionnaire and provided

an overview of their attitudes toward civilian oversight. The following chapter, *Chapter 6:*

Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis, engages in a more detailed statistical analysis of

the survey questionnaire data.

Chapter 6
Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis

In this chapter the focus shifts to a multivariate analysis. Factor analysis was used to examine relationships between variables in the survey questionnaire, followed by binary logistic regression and linear regression. A final multivariate linear regression model is presented at the end of the chapter. I shall begin with the treatment of missing data to explain complexities in the data set that shaped decisions regarding analysis techniques.

6.1 Missing Data

I took a multifaceted approach to handle three different types of missing data in the data sample: respondent breakoffs, user-defined/non-eligible responses, and item-non-response.

6.1.1 Respondent breakoffs

There was a gradual drop-off in the base of respondents who completed the survey questionnaire in its entirety. Breakoffs ranged from a low of 60 near the beginning of the survey to a high of 145 toward its end. This reflects a 9.1% total drop from the original respondent base of 1593 who first accessed the survey. *Table 6-25* summarizes how the breakoffs gradually accumulated. This breakoff rate is not unusual, especially among web-based survey questionnaires that offer no incentives for their completion. For example, Peytchev (2009:75), reports that meta-analysis of large web surveys reveal median breakoff rates of 16% and 34% (Musch & Reips, 2000; Lozar-Manfreda & Vehovar, 2002).[21]

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[21] Peytchev (2009: 75) noted that breakoff in survey questionnaires has received little attention in scholarly literature.

6.1.2   User-defined/non-eligible missing data

The design of the survey questionnaire created user-defined/non-eligible missing data. For
example, when survey respondents said that they lacked personal experience with a particular
oversight agency (i.e., Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD, and the Professional Standards
Bureau), automatic skip logic functions moved them along to the next block of pertinent survey
questions. Although this feature worked well as a funneling device, it left large portions of data
blank across the entire dataset; *Table 6-25* summarizes non-eligible responses throughout the
data sample.

It was important to distinguish such user-defined/non-eligible missing values from the other
forms of missing data (breakoffs or item nonresponse) and find a suitable treatment for this form
of missing data. I was cognizant that listwise deletion would otherwise reduce the working data
set below 300 cases (since SPSS would only retain cases from the minority of respondents
[17.5%] who reported experience with all oversight agencies). Had this occurred, the result
would be an artificial and limiting re-definition of the study population.

I used the *dummy variable adjustment method* described by Cohen & Cohen (1985). "This
method involves creating two variables that correspond with the variable that is missing data: a
binary dummy variable and a variable that replicates the observed values with a constant"
(McKnight, P. et al., 2007: 170). This procedure retains cases that would otherwise be dropped
through listwise deletion. For example, a binary indicator was created and coded 1 for
respondents who *did not* have experience with the SIU, and coded 0 for those who did. Next,
respondents with missing values (no SIU experience) were assigned an arbitrary value (999). As
Acock (2005: 1017) noted, "(w)hen the model is estimated, the regression estimates will be the

same as they were using listwise deletion, and the indicator variable will represent how much

those with missing values differ on the mean of the outcome variable." This process was

repeated with the sections that addressed the other agencies.

Although some charge that this method produces biased parameter estimates (e.g., Jones, 1996;

Allison, 2002, Acock, 2005: 1017; McKnight, P. et al., 2007: 170), others (e.g., Williams, 2015:

5; Allison, 2002: 87; Allison 2010: 639) argue compellingly that its use is appropriate in specific

circumstances, such as the one that I encountered (i.e., with non-eligible data throughout a data

sample). For example, Allison (2002: 87) emphasized that while:

> the dummy variable adjustment method is clearly unacceptable when data are
> truly missing, it may still be appropriate in cases where the unobserved value
> simply does not exist. For example, married respondents may be asked to rate the
> quality of their marriage, but that question has no meaning for unmarried
> respondents. Suppose we assume that there is one linear equation for married
> couples and another equation for unmarried couples. The married equation is
> identical to the unmarried equation except that it has (a) a term that corresponds to
> the effect of marital quality on the dependent variable and (b) a different intercept.
> It is easy to show that the dummy variable adjustment method produces optimal
> estimates in this situation.

6.1.3   Item non-response missing data

Item non-response missing data was only a minor problem in my dataset. A *missing value*

analysis in SPSS confirmed that such item-non response data was MCAR (Missing Completely

At Random) and largely negligible, ranging from 0.0% to 1.7%. *Table 6-25* provides a summary

of such missing data. The relevant literature commonly commends that imputation methods such

as "multiple imputation or expectation maximization" provide "the best results" (e.g., Stopher,

2012: 460, see also Little & Rubin, 2002). Although I considered and utilized multiple

imputation (MI) procedures in an exploratory analysis, this method proved cumbersome and ill-

suited to the complicated structure of the dataset (e.g., user-defined missing data; skip logic

issues). Expectation maximization (EM) proved to be a suitable method to impute the small amount of item non-response missing data.

Acock (2005: 1018) described EM as an approach that creates a new data set in which all missing values are imputed with "maximum likelihood values" and noted that this approach "injects a degree of random error to reflect uncertainty of imputation." As outlined by Grace-Martin (2015), EM imputation, which uses the expectation-maximization algorithm, is an iterative procedure which "uses other variables to impute a value (expectation), then checks whether that is the value most likely (maximization). If not, it re-imputes a more likely value. This goes on until it reaches the most likely value." Although Grace-Martin (2015) cautioned that this approach is only suitable when the percentage of missing data is less than 5%, she suggested that EM imputations are ideal when factor analysis or regression techniques are going to be used because they preserve the relationship with the other variables.

In identifying EM as a modern "third generation" approach to resolving missing data issues in survey research, Karanja, Zaveri & Ahmed (2013: 748) asserted that EM serves to "resolve the issue of missing data by either eliminating variables with missing data or 'filling-in' the missing items in a process that reduces the variability of the sample space - an essential trait in complete and random sample spaces." According to these researchers, one of the key strengths of this approach is that it is "geared toward alleviating or minimizing the effects of lack of variability in the imputed data set" (Karanja, Zaveri & Ahmed, 2013: 748-749).

I utilized the SPSS MVA (missing value analysis) module to impute missing values using the EM method across the data set. Once all missing data were adequately processed, I then proceeded to statistical analyses.

Table 6-25: Types of missing data found in data sample

Survey Sections	Respondent Break Offs	Item non-response missing data	User-defined missing data
Section 1 - Socio-Demographic Questions	68 cases	0.3% to 0.7%	N/A
Section 2 - General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight	86 cases	0.0% to .6%	N/A
Section 3 - Police Services Boards – Respondents with Experience	100 cases	0.0% to .6%	893 had experience (599 declared no experience or "I Don't Know)
Police Services Boards – Respondents WITHOUT Experience	100 cases	0.1% to 0.2%	599 declared no experience (893 declared experience)
Section 4 - General Attitudes Toward SIU	114 cases	0.1% to 0.9%	N/A
Respondents with SIU Experience	114 cases	0.6% to 1.2%	789 declared no experience (688 declared experience)
Section 5 - General Attitudes Toward OIPRD	131 cases	0.1% to 1.1%	N/A
Respondents with OIPRD Experience	131 cases	0.3% to 1.0%	1061 declared no experience (399 declared experience)
Section 6 - General Attitudes Toward Professional Standards Bureau	145 cases	0.1% to 0.6%	N/A
Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience	145 cases	0.6% to 1.7%	416 declared no experience (1030 declared experience)

6.2 Factor Analysis

I early thought that questions pertaining to "General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight" (e.g.,

"Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability"; "Civilian oversight maintains

public trust in policing", etc.) were linked to attitudes toward the specific oversight agencies and could potentially serve as dependent variables in higher order statistical analyses. Therefore, exploratory factor analysis was used to examine the relationships within the various blocks of questions and to assess prospects for further analysis.

As Davis (2013: 138) observed, the point of factor analysis is to "take several correlations and reduce a bulky conglomeration of variables into hopefully meaningful components, or factors." The purpose in doing so is to "find a structure in the relationships between variables, reducing the number of variables into a smaller number of components" (Davis, 2013: 138). Similarly, Buckingham and Saunders (2004: 5F) emphasized that "[f]actor analysis allows us to see whether a number of different observed variables appear to be linked through a common association with one or more underlying factors."

As Kent (2001: 129-130) explained, factor analysis "recognises that when many variables are being measured some of them may be measuring different aspects of the same phenomenon and hence will be inter-related." Factor analysis reviews the correlation between each variable involved in the analysis and all the other variables and "groups together those that are highly inter-correlated with one another, and not correlated with variables in another group. The groups identify 'factors' that are in effect 'higher order' variables" (Kent, 2001: 129-130). This technique serves to reduce or eliminate redundancy when two or more variables are measuring the same construct. As Kent (2001: 129-130) observed, "(t)he factors themselves are not directly observable, but each has a 'factor loading' which is the correlation between the variable and the factor with which it is most closely associated." This process is advantageous because it reduces a large number of variables into a more manageable set of factors that can be further analyzed.

Following Field (2009: 639-672) and Davis (2013: 138-149), I analyzed each block of questions in SPSS using the following selections: Principal components analysis, KMO and Bartlett's test of sphericity, correlation matrix, scree plot, unrotated analysis followed by rotated analysis (direct oblimin). Cases were excluded by listwise deletion, sorted by size with a suppression of small coefficients (< 0.4). The component matrix was the primary source of interpretation for this analysis.

Enhanced interpretability of factors is possible through a technique called rotation, which is intended to clarify factor structure. According to Field (2005: 3), "(r)otation maximizes the loading of each variable on one of the extracted factors whilst minimizing the loading on all other factors. Rotation works through changing the absolute values of the variables whilst keeping their different values constant." SPSS offers a variety of rotation options. Field (2009: 644) has suggested that direct oblimin should be selected when there are theoretical grounds to suppose that factors might correlate. Although I consistently ran both unrotated and rotated analyses, only rotated results (direct oblimin) are reported in this chapter.

I conducted exploratory work to examine the strength of each attitudinal scale:

- General Questions about Civilian Oversight: General Attitudes
- Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board: General Attitudes
    - Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards: General Attitudes
- SIU – General Attitudes
    - Respondents with SIU Experience (Satisfaction)
- OIPRD – General Attitudes
    - Respondents with OIPRD Experience (Satisfaction)
- Professional Standards Bureau: General Attitudes
    - Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience (Satisfaction)

I computed the Cronbach alpha score for each scale to estimate the internal consistency of associated scale items and to determine if it was justifiable to interpret the scores that were

aggregated together (Field, 2009: 674-676). As an aid to analysis, I also inverted some individual scale items according to positive/negative wording.

I conducted factor analysis for the various attitudinal blocks from the survey questionnaire (Sections *6.2.1* through to *6.2.9). Table 6-35* presents a summary of the factor analysis results for all sections.

6.2.1   Factor Analysis: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes

For this scale, I recoded eight variables to align the entire scale in the same positive direction (see *Table 6-74* in *Appendix F*). The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.793) revealed that the original eleven items fit together well. However, this procedure suggested that the Cronbach alpha score may be improved by the deletion of two conditional items: *"I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate)"; "If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct."* "Conditional items" are variables which posed an option or condition for respondents' consideration and/or acceptance (e.g., "I would prefer…", "If…I wouldn't mind…").

I began with an unrotated factor analysis using the full 11-item scale, followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale: *Table 6-75* in *Appendix F*). I next removed the two conditional items from the scale, which raised the Cronbach alpha score to .815. I then applied a rotated factor analysis using the 9-item scale using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below).

Table 6-26: Component Matrix: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes

	Component	
Variable	**1**	**2**
Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability.	.718	.472
Civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing.	.601	.558
RECODE Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.	.659	
RECODE We should keep civilians out of police oversight.	.768	
Civilians have the necessary skills to investigate police wrongdoing.		.593
RECODE Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.	.663	
RECODE Civilians are biased against police officers.	.652	
RECODE I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct	.576	
RECODE Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	.741	
	3.742 Eigenvalue; 41.578 % of variance explained	1.229 Eigenvalue; 13.657 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.		
2 components extracted.		

As *Table 6-26* shows, *Factor 1* explains 41.578 % of variance and I interpreted it to represent

"General attitudes toward civilian oversight." Factor 2 (13.657 % of variance explained) is

interpreted to represent *"Conditional attitudes toward civilian oversight"*; relevant items for this

factor pertain primarily to the perceived investigative skills possessed by civilian investigators and the perceived significance of civilian-led oversight mechanisms (i.e., public trust and accountability).

The dependent variable used in later multivariate analysis emerged from this analysis: the primary factor analysis score for "*General attitudes toward civilian oversight.*" *Figure 6-1* is a histogram of the distribution for this variable.

Figure 6-1: Histogram of Dependent Variable: Factor Analysis score for General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight

6.2.2   Factor Analysis: Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board - General Questions

For this scale, I recoded three variables to align the entire scale in the same direction (see *Table 6-76* in *Appendix F*). The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this 9-item scale (.878) revealed that these items fit well together. However, it also suggested that the Cronbach alpha score could be improved by the deletion of one item: *"My detachment's Police Services*

Board doesn't affect me very much." The removal of this item produced a slightly higher score

(.893), verifying the reliability and internal consistency of this reconfigured 8-item scale.

Table 6-27: Component Matrix: Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board - General Questions

Variable	Component 1
I respect the mandate of my Police Services Board.	.656
The Police Services Board is necessary.	.738
The Police Services Board is effective in their oversight of my detachment.	.819
I trust the Police Services Board.	.819
Members of the Police Services Board are qualified to carry out their oversight of my detachment.	.816
Members of the Police Services Board listen to the concerns of my detachment.	.752
RECODE_PSBs Infringe On Professional Status of Police	.707
RECODE_PSB_Mostly Window Dressing	.751
	4.612 Eigenvalue; 57.652 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.	
1 component extracted.	

I first undertook an unrotated factor analysis using the 8-item scale, and then a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale*: Table 6-27*). Explaining 57.652 % of variance, I interpreted it to represent *"General attitudes toward police services boards"* (among those respondents governed by police services boards).

6.2.3 Factor Analysis: Respondents *Not* Governed by Police Services Boards – General Attitudes

Before conducting factor analysis, one scale item for *Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards* was recoded to align the scale items in the same direction (see *Table 6-77* in *Appendix F*). The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.816) reveals that these items fit together well. My unrotated factor analysis used the full 4-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-28*). Explaining 65.027% of variance, I interpreted it to represent *"General attitudes toward police services boards"* (among those *not* governed by police services boards).

Table 6-28: Component Matrix: Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards

Variable	Component 1
Police Services Boards are necessary in Ontario.	.862
Police Services Boards help to ensure accountability in policing.	.893
Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work.	.787

RECODE_NON PSB Infringement on Profess Status of Police	.370
	2.601 Eigenvalue; 65.027 % of variance explained

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

1   component extracted.

6.2.4   Factor Analysis: SIU – General Attitudes

Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for *SIU – General Attitudes* were recoded to align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (See *Table 6-78* in *Appendix F*). The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.836) reveals that these items fit together well. However, this procedure suggested that the Cronbach alpha score could be improved by the deletion of several items which pertained to organizational/association support for SIU. To wit: *"My organization has sufficiently educated me about the SIU"; "My organization supports the work of the SIU" and "My police association supports the work of the SIU."*

The elimination of these three items from the scale improved the Cronbach alpha score (.860) and simplified and improved the factor analysis score. The unrotated factor analysis used the 8-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-29*). The factor explains 51.208 % of variance and is interpreted to represent *"General attitudes toward SIU."*

Table 6-29: Component Matrix: SIU – General Attitudes

Variable	Component 1
I respect the mandate of the SIU.	.650
The SIU helps to ensure accountability.	.729
The SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	.808
I trust the SIU.	.795
RECODE_SIU is Biased Against Police	.696
The SIU is objective when they conduct investigations.	.772
SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	.653
RECODE_SIU infringes On Professional Status of Police	.592
	4.097 Eigenvalue; 51.208 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.	
1 components extracted.	

6.2.5 Factor Analysis: Respondents with SIU Experience

The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.908) revealed that these items fit together well. None needed to be deleted. I therefore conducted an unrotated factor analysis using the 11-item scale, followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-30*).

Factor 1 explains 52.080 % of variance and is interpreted to represent *"Satisfaction with SIU."* This analysis produced two additional factors of lesser consequence (*Factor 2*: 12.541 % of variance explained; *Factor 3*: 9.862 % of variance explained). Although these factor scores

pertain to matters of procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of communication and efficacy during

SIU investigations), they both ultimately proved too difficult to apply clear and meaningful

interpretations.

Table 6-30: Component Matrix: Respondents with SIU Experience

Variable	Component		
	1	**2**	**3**
That you were promptly notified of the SIU investigation?	.618		.611
That the SIU investigation process was explained to you?	.657		.584
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	.699		
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the SIU?	.777		
With the objectivity of the SIU investigator(s)?	.807		
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	.720	-.410	
That the investigation was unbiased?	.760		
With the speed of the investigative process?	.739	.452	
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	.748	.499	
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	.727	.510	
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	.662		
	5.770 Eigenvalue; 52.080 % of variance explained	1.367 Eigenvalue; 12.541 % of variance explained	1.067 Eigenvalue; 9.862 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.			
3 components extracted.			

6.2.6 Factor Analysis: OIPRD – General Attitudes

Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for *OIPRD – General Attitudes* were recoded

to align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (See *Table 6-79* in *Appendix F*). Although

the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale (.948) revealed that these items fit together well,

the results suggested that deletion of a single item – "*My organization has sufficiently educated*

me about the OIPRD" – would improve the Chronbach alpha score.

Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha analysis furnished justification for the removal of two

additional items which also pertained to organizational/association support for OIPRD: "*My*

organization supports the work of the OIPRD"; "*My police association supports the work of the*

OIPRD."

The reduced 8-item scale improved the Cronbach alpha score to .957 and simplified/improved

the factor analysis score. I then conducted sequentially an unrotated factor analysis and a rotated

factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-31*). *Factor 1*,

77.109% of variance explained, is interpreted to represent *"General attitudes toward OIPRD."*

Table 6-31: Component Matrix: OIPRD – General Attitudes

Variable	Component 1
I respect the mandate of the OIPRD.	.869
The OIPRD helps to ensure accountability.	.895
The OIPRD is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	.916
I trust the OIPRD.	.912
RECODE_OIPRD is biased against police	.874

The OIPRD is objective when they conduct investigations.	.883
OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	.802
RECODE_OIPRD infringes on Professional Status of Police	.870
	6.169 Eigenvalue; 77.109% of variance explained

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

1 components extracted.

6.2.7 Factor Analysis: Respondents with OIPRD Experience

The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.925) indicated that these items fit together well and therefore none were deleted. The unrotated factor analysis used the 11-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-32*).

Factor 1 (57.344 % of variance explained) is interpreted to represent *"Satisfaction with OIPRD."* A second factor score of lesser consequence was also produced (*Factor 2*: 12.904 % of variance explained). Although this second factor score pertains to procedural justice issues (e.g., perceptions of communication and impartiality during OIPRD investigations), assigning a clear and meaningful interpretation to this factor proved too challenging.

Table 6-32: Component Matrix: Respondents with OIPRD Experience

	Component	
Variable	**1**	**2**
That you were promptly notified of the OIPRD investigation?	.639	.458
That the OIPRD investigation process was explained to you?	.623	.576
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	.779	
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the OIPRD?	.723	
With the objectivity of the investigator(s)?	.812	-.416
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	.775	-.484
That the investigation was unbiased?	.776	
With the speed of the investigative process?	.831	
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	.774	
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	.831	
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	.737	
	6.308 Eigenvalue; 57.344 % of variance explained	1.419 Eigenvalue; 12.904 % of variance explained

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

2 components extracted.

6.2.8 Factor Analysis: Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes

Before conducting factor analysis, two scale items for *Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes* were recoded to align the entire 11-item scale in the same direction (see

Table 6-80 in *Appendix F*). The results from the Cronbach alpha score analysis of this scale

(.885) indicated that these items fit together well but suggested that the Cronbach alpha score

would be improved by the deletion of one item: "*My organization has sufficiently educated me*

about our Professional Standards Bureau."

Factor analysis and Cronbach alpha analysis supported the removal of two additional items from

the scale: "*My organization supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau"; "My*

police association supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau." These eliminations

improved the Cronbach alpha score (.890) and simplified/improved the factor analysis score. An

unrotated factor analysis was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see

component matrix scale below: *Table 6-33*). *Factor 1*, explaining 57.288 % of variance, is

interpreted to represent *"General attitudes toward Professional Standards Bureau."*

Table 6-33: Component Matrix: Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes

Variable	Component 1
I respect the mandate of my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	.717
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability.	.801
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization.	.821
I trust my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	.825
RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Biased Against Police	.677
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is objective when they conduct investigations.	.817

My police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	.726
RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Infringes Profess Status Police	.648
	4.583 Eigenvalue; 57.288 % of variance explained

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

1 components extracted.

6.2.9   Factor Analysis: Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience

The results from the Cronbach alpha analysis of this 11-item scale (.932) confirmed that these items fit well together and therefore none were deleted. The unrotated factor analysis employed the 11-item scale and was followed by a rotated factor analysis using direct oblimin (see component matrix scale below: *Table 6-34*).

Factor 1 (59.620 % of variance explained) is interpreted to represent *"Satisfaction with Professional Standards Bureau."* A second factor score of lesser consequence was also produced (*Factor 2*: 11.090 % of variance explained). Although this factor score pertained to procedural justice issues (e.g., perceptions of efficiency and impartiality during investigations), applying a coherent interpretation to this factor proved difficult.

Table 6-34: Component Matrix: Respondents with Professional Standards Bureau Experience

	Component	
Variable	**1**	**2**
That you were promptly notified of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation?	.767	
That the Professional Standards Bureau investigation process was explained to you?	.746	
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	.756	
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the Professional Standards Bureau?	.793	
With the objectivity of investigators from the Professional Standards Bureau?	.827	-.418
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	.781	-.425
That the investigation was unbiased?	.772	
With the speed of the investigative process?	.773	.414
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	.780	.413
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	.773	.441
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	.721	
	6.558 Eigenvalue ; 59.620 % of variance explained	1.220 Eigenvalue; 11.090 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.		
2 components extracted.		

Table 6-35 provides a summary of results of factor analysis.

Table 6-35: Summary of Factor Analysis Results

Group Of Survey Questions Assessed	Factor Analysis Results
General Questions About Civilian Oversight	*Factor 1* – explains 41.578% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight"* *Factor 2* – explains 13.657% of the variance among this group of variables – *"Conditional Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight*"
POLICE SERVICES BOARDS	
Respondents Governed By Police Services Boards	*Factor 1* – explains 57.652% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward Police Services Boards*"
Respondents Not Governed By Police Services Boards	*Factor 1* – explains 65.027% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward Police Services Boards"*
SIU – SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT	
SIU - General Attitudes	*Factor 1* – explains 51.208% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward SIU"*
SIU – Respondents With SIU Experience	*Factor 1* – explains 52.080% of the variance among this group of variables – *"Satisfaction With SIU"* *Factor 2* – explains 12.541% of the variance among this group of variables – no clear meaning *Factor 3* – explains 9.862% of the variance among this group of variables – no clear meaning
OIPRD – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR	
OIPRD – General Attitudes	*Factor 1* – explains 77.109% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward OIPRD"*
OIPRD – Respondents With OIPRD Experience	*Factor 1* – explains 57.344% of the variance among this group of variables – *"Satisfaction With OIPRD"*

	Factor 2 – explains 12.904% of the variance among this group of variables – no clear meaning
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU	
Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes	*Factor 1* – explains 57.288% of the variance among this group of variables – *"General Attitudes Toward Professional Standards Bureau"*
Professional Standards Bureau – Respondents With PSB Experience	*Factor 1* – explains 59.620% of the variance among this group of variables – *"Satisfaction With Professional Standards Bureau"* *Factor 2* – explains 11.090% of the variance among this group of variables – no clear meaning

6.3 Binary Logistic Regression and Linear Regression Analysis

Following the factor analysis for each survey section, and in preparation for a final multivariate

linear regression model, I next conducted binary logistic regression and linear regression analysis

(for binary and continuously distributed dependent variables, respectively) to determine the

associations between the socio-demographic variables and attitudinal variables for each of the

various oversight agencies.

As an aid to analysis/interpretation, the socio-demographic variables were recoded into binary

dummy variables. *Table 6-36* provides a summary of these recoded variables and their binary

configurations. These variables would later serve as independent variables in the final

multivariate linear regression model. As noted earlier in *6.1.2 - User-defined/non-eligible*

missing data, the *dummy variable adjustment method* (Cohen and Cohen, 1985) was used in

order to retain an adequate number of cases for analysis.

Table 6-36: Recoded Dummy Variables for Regression Analysis

Recoded Variable	0	1
Sex	Male	Female
Visible Minority Status	Non-visible minority	Visible minority
Age	Under 45	Over 45
Education	No University	University Education
Years of policing experience	Under 20 years	Over 20 years
Rank	Constable	Rank higher than Constable
Community Size	Under 100,000	Over 100,000 or N/A
Community Composition	Rural	Mixed or Urban
Support Police Association	Yes	No
Regularly Attend Police Association meetings	Yes	No

The results of the linear regression and binary logistic regression analysis of the socio-demographic variables for each oversight agency are provided below.[22]

Regression Analysis: Police Services Boards

Table 6-37 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated experience with police services boards (D.V.: Police Services Board Experience Binary).

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[22] Within these tables, only the statistically significant variables are presented in each respective summary table.

Education and community size were significant predictors, signifying that university education and working in larger communities (or in a specialized/centralized role) correspond with a heightened likelihood that respondents worked under the structure of a police services board. The remaining predictors were not significant predictors in this model.

Table 6-37: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with Experience with Police Services Boards

Model 1 - Binary Logistic Regression						
					95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
Model Coefficients	**B**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**	**Lower**	**Upper**
Constant	-1.017	.200	.000	.362		
University Education	.237	.118	.044	1.268	1.006	1.598
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	1.478	.127	.000	4.385	3.419	5.623
Model Summary	**-2 Log likelihood**	**Cox & Snell R Square**	**Nagelkerke R Square**			
	1768.240	.133	.179			
N: 893						

I ran two linear regression models pertaining to police services boards. *Table 6-38* displays results for respondents who indicated experience with police services boards (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes – Police Services Boards - Experience), wherein officers who ranked above constable and those who served in communities with populations over 100,000 were slightly more favourable to police services boards, but the effect is slight (R^2 = .038). Community Composition (Mixed or Urban) was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent variable. *Model 2* (not displayed) pertained to respondents who indicated non-experience with police services boards (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes Police Services Boards Non-Experience; N: 599).

This model produced a negligible R² = .020, with no significant predictors (p<.05) for the

dependent variable.

Table 6-38: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Police Services Boards: Respondents With Experience

Model 1 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**T**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	.081	.119		.684	.494
Rank – Above Constable	.161	.073	.081	2.211	.027
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.170	.086	.070	1.974	.049
Community Composition – Mixed/Urban	-.219	.079	-.096	-2.783	.006
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
N: 893	.194	.038	.026	.98423007	

Regression Analysis: SIU

Table 6-39 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated

experience with the SIU (D.V.: SIU Experience Binary). In this model, sex and community size

were significant predictors, thus being female and working in a larger community or in a

specialized/central role increased the likelihood that an officer had experience with the SIU. The

remaining predictors were not significant predictors of experience with SIU.

Table 6-39: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with SIU Experience

Model 1 – Binary Logistic Regression						
					95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
Model Coefficients	**B**	**S.E.**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**	**Lower**	**Upper**
Constant	-.115	.187	.539	.892		
Sex - Female	.679	.139	.000	1.972	1.500	2.592
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.283	.122	.020	1.327	1.045	1.685
Model Summary	**-2 Log likelihood**	**Cox & Snell R Square**	**Nagelkerke R Square**			
	1959.466	.027	.036			
N: 688						

Table 6-40 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the SIU. *Model 1* (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes - SIU) produced R² = .027, meaning that the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 2.7% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score for general attitudes toward the SIU. Sex (Females) and rank (non-Constables) were significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable.

Similarly, the model summary for *Model 2* (D.V.: Satisfaction - SIU) produced R² = .026, meaning that the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 2.6% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - SIU. Sex (Females) and rank (non-Constables) were significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable.

Table 6-40: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward SIU

Model 1 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	-.200	.092		-2.163	.031
Sex - Female	.273	.067	.109	4.085	.000
Rank – Above Constable	.234	.058	.117	4.035	.000
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
	.163	.027	.020	.99406958	
N: 1477					

Model 2 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	-.022	.137		-.161	.872
Sex - Female	.285	.113	.100	2.522	.012
Rank – Above Constable	.175	.085	.088	2.060	.040
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
N: 688	.162	.026	.011	.99472550	

Regression Analysis: OIPRD

Table 6-41 displays the logistic regression results for respondents who indicated experience with the OIPRD (D.V.: OIPRD Experience Binary). In this model sex, rank and community size were significant predictors. Simply put, this indicates that being female, a police supervisor and working in a larger community (or in a specialized/centralized role) increased the likelihood that an officer would have experientially-based knowledge of the OIPRD. The remaining predictors were not significant predictors of experience with OIPRD.

Table 6-41: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with OIPRD Experience

Model 1 – Logistic Regression						
					95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
Model Coefficients	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Constant	.630	.211	.003	1.877		
Sex – Female	.757	.174	.000	2.133	1.515	3.002
Rank – Above Constable	.351	.132	.008	1.421	1.096	1.842
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.587	.145	.000	1.798	1.355	2.388
Model Summary	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square			
	.186	.034	.024			
N: 399						

Table 6-42 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the OIPRD.

Model 1 (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes - OIPRD) produced R^2 = .030, meaning that the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 3.0% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score for general attitudes toward the OIPRD. Sex (Females) and Visible Minority Status were significant predictors ($p<.05$) of an increase for the dependent variable.

The model summary for *Model 2* (D.V.: Satisfaction - OIPRD) produced R^2 = .049, meaning that the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 4.9% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - OIPRD. Rank (non-Constables) was a significant predictor ($p<.05$) of an increase for the dependent variable, while Age (respondents over 45 years old) was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent variable.

Table 6-42: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward OIPRD

Model 1 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	-.168	.093		-1.802	.072
Sex - Female	.366	.067	.147	5.464	.000
Visible Minority Status	.242	.091	.071	2.645	.008
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
	.174	.030	.023	.98781961	
N: 1460					

Model 2 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	-.095	.173		-.546	.585
Age – Over 45	-.312	.139	-.155	-2.246	.025
Rank – Above Constable	.383	.109	.190	3.503	.001
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
	.221	.049	.023	.98953330	
N: 399					

Regression Analysis: Professional Standards Bureau

Table 6-43 displays the logistic regression analysis results for respondents who indicated experience with the Professional Standards Bureau (D.V.: Professional Standards Bureau Binary). Sex, rank, community composition and non-attendance at police association meetings were significant predictors. Accordingly, being female and infrequent attendance at police association meetings corresponded to increasing odds that they would have experience with the Professional Standards Bureau. Meanwhile, police supervisors and respondents who worked in mixed or urban communities correspond to decreasing odds that they would have experience

with the Professional Standards Bureau. The remaining predictors were not significant

predictors of experience in this model.

Table 6-43: Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Respondents with Experience with the Professional Standards Bureau

Model 1 – Binary Logistic Regression						
					95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
Model Coefficients	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Constant	-.752	.212	.000	.471		
Sex - Female	.747	.142	.000	2.111	1.598	2.787
Rank – Above Constable	-.381	.131	.004	.683	.528	.884
Community Composition – Mixed/Urban	-.295	.143	.040	.745	.562	.986
Do not regularly attend police association meetings	.389	.178	.029	1.475	1.040	2.092
Model 1 Summary	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square			
	1631.434[a]	.051	.073			
N: 1030						

Table 6-44 displays the linear regression analysis results for attitudes toward the Professional

Standards Bureau. The model summary for *Model 1* (D.V.: Gen. Attitudes – Professional

Standards Bureau) produced R^2 = .058, which indicates that the socio-demographic variables

accounted for 5.8% of the variance for this dependent variable, the primary factor analysis score

for general attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau. Rank (non-Constables) was a

significant predictor (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable and non-support for the

police association was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent variable.

Model 2 (D.V.: Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau) produced R^2 = .034, indicating that

the socio-demographic variables only accounted for 3.4% of the variance for this dependent

variable, the primary factor analysis score for Satisfaction - Professional Standards Bureau. Sex

(Females) and rank (non-Constables) were significant predictors (p<.05) of an increase for the dependent variable, while non-support for the police association was a significant predictor of a decrease for the dependent variable.

Table 6-44: Linear Regression Analysis of Attitudes Toward Professional Standards Bureau

Model 1 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
(Constant)	-.166	.092		-1.813	.070
Rank – Above Constables	.410	.058	.204	7.120	.000
Non-Support for Police Association	-.364	.086	-.113	-4.230	.000
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
	.242	.058	.051	.97766533	
N: 1446					

Model 2 – Linear Regression					
Model Coefficients	**Unstandardized B**	**Coefficients Std. Error**	**Standardized Coefficients Beta**	**t**	**Sig. (p < .050)**
Constant	-.092	.111		-.831	.406
Sex - Female	.174	.086	.065	2.012	.045
Rank – Above Constable	.245	.070	.121	3.519	.000
Non-Support for Police Association	-.374	.102	-.118	-3.662	.000
Model Summary	**R**	**R Square**	**Adjusted R Square**	**Std. Error of the Estimate**	
	.186	.034	.024	.98655959	
N: 1030					

Summary of Binary Logistic Regression and Linear Regression Analysis

Throughout this sub-section, the R Square and Nagelkerke R Square scores were more or less negligible, indicating that the socio-demographic variables did not have much of an impact for the selected dependent variables. These findings are consistent with previous research

(presented in *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*). The most common predictor variables were Sex (Females) and Rank (non-Constables). The variables were associated with positive attitudes toward civilian oversight in relation to each of the agencies examined. However, it bears emphasis that these results do not enhance our understanding of the role that socio-demographic factors play in the assessment of attitudes toward the various oversight agencies.

6.4 Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight

Following the regression analyses above, a final multivariate linear regression model was created in order to determine which variables were significant predictors for respondents' overall attitudes toward civilian oversight. The dependent variable in this analysis was the primary factor analysis score for General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight (*Table 6-26*; see page 220-222). *Figure 6-1* displays a histogram of the distribution for this variable (see page 222).

Independent variables in this analysis included all socio-demographic variables, primary factor analysis variables for each oversight agency and primary factor analysis variables for satisfaction with oversight agencies based on personal experience, including the affiliated binary variable to carry out the aforementioned *dummy variable adjustment method*. As previously explained, this procedure allowed for the retention of cases that would otherwise be dropped through listwise deletion. Many of the variables were recoded into binary dummy variables to assist with analysis and interpretation (see *Table 6-36)*.

Before settling on a final model with all relevant variables included simultaneously, variables were grouped and entered in stages (hierarchically). *Table 6-45* shows how the 18 variables were grouped (Models 1-8). In *Table 6-46* the coefficient results for each model are displayed

(see *Table 6-81* in *Appendix F* for an alternative, more reader-friendly, version of this table). For

each model, the unstandardized coefficient column displays the B value and standard error in

parenthesis; the standardized coefficient column displays the beta (β) value. In assessing the

model summary results for the various stages (Models 1-8), *Table 6-45* illustrates strikingly that

the most significant contribution to the R^2 scores occurred in Model 3 with the introduction of

the primary factor analysis variable for General Attitudes toward the SIU (R^2 .253). Thereafter,

variables entered in models 4-8 provided very little additional strength to the R^2 score. In short,

this illustrates that the primary factor variable for General Attitudes Toward the SIU was the

most impactful variable in this multivariate regression analysis. The model summary for Model

8 produced $R^2 = .264$, $F (18, 1285) = 25.256$, $p < .001$, therefore accounting for 26.4% of the

variance for the dependent variable.

Table 6-45: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Development of Final Multivariate Regression Model

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.285	.081	.076	.956
2	.287	.082	.076	.956
3	.503	.253	.247	.863
4	.504	.254	.247	.863
5	.508	.259	.251	.861
6	.511	.261	.253	.860
7	.513	.263	.254	.859
8	.514	.264	.254	.859

Model 1 introduced the socio-demographic variables that were incorporated in all eight of the

regression models. Three socio-demographic variables were ultimately removed from the

analysis as they were consistently found to be statistically insignificant across all models: visible

minority status, mixed/urban community composition, and non-support for police association.

Although the variable for community size (over 100,000) was not statistically significant in any of the eight models, it was retained as it provided a small contribution to the R² scores. As outlined in *Chapter 5*, 8.7% of survey respondents were identified as possessing visible minority status and several American studies have reported statistically significant relationships between officer "race"/ethnicity and attitudes toward internal/external systems of police oversight (Weisburd et al., 2009; Perez, 1994; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007; 2009). Thus, my hypothesis that respondents with visible minority status would serve as a predictor for positive acceptance of civilian oversight was not realized.

Two of the socio-demographic variables were consistent predictors of a decrease for the dependent variable (positive attitudes toward civilian oversight): females and respondents who did not regularly attend police association meetings. Considering that the vast majority of survey respondents (84%) reported that they do not regularly attend association meetings, the interpretation of this finding is unclear. In Models 3-8, female respondents were a significant predictor of a decrease in support for civilian oversight. This finding is contrary to previous research wherein no known studies have found sex to be a predictor of attitudes toward civilian oversight of policing. Nevertheless, I incorrectly hypothesized that female police officers, who accounted for 20.2% of the respondent pool, would express more positive attitudes than their male counterparts. There are no previous findings or known theoretical foundations to explain why female police officers would serve as predictors of less tolerant attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms.

Table 6-46: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model

*p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
N=1285 for all models

	Model 1 B / Std Error	Model 1 β	Model 2 B / Std Error	Model 2 β	Model 3 B / Std Error	Model 3 β	Model 4 B / Std Error	Model 4 β	Model 5 B / Std Error	Model 5 β	Model 6 B / Std Error	Model 6 β	Model 7 B / Std Error	Model 7 β	Model 8 B / Std Error	Model 8 β
Constant	-.298 (.081)		-.292 (.082)		-.196 (.074)		-.178 (.079)		-.165 (.079)		-.157 (.087)		-.166 (.087)		-.156 (.087)	
Sex – Female	-.075 (.066)	-.031	-.074 (.066)	-.030	-.192 (.060)	-.079**	-.185 (.061)	-.076**	-.204 (.061)	-.084**	-.198 (.061)	-.081**	-.198 (.061)	-.081**	-.194 (.061)	-.080**
Age – Over 45	.181 (.078)	.091*	.181 (.078)	.091*	.125 (.070)	.063	.124 (.070)	.062	.116 (.070)	.058	.112 (.070)	.056	.105 (.070)	.053	.104 (.070)	.052
University Education	.225 (.055)	.112***	.223 (.055)	.111***	.209 (.050)	.104***	.207 (.050)	.104***	.213 (.050)	.107***	.213 (.050)	.106***	.216 (.050)	.108***	.216 (.050)	.108***
Career Experience – Over 20 years	.153 (.079)	.077	.154 (.080)	.077	.192 (.072)	.097**	.191 (.072)	.096**	.194 (.072)	.097**	.198 (.072)	.100**	.204 (.072)	.102**	.200 (.072)	.101**
Rank – Above Constable	.291 (.058)	.146***	.293 (.058)	.147***	.205 (.052)	.103***	.205 (.052)	.103***	.214 (.052)	.107***	.218 (.052)	.109***	.234 (.053)	.117***	.227 (.054)	.114***
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.069 (.059)	.033	.073 (.062)	.035	.101 (.056)	.048	.104 (.057)	.050	.095 (.056)	.046	.091 (.057)	.043	.093 (.057)	.044	.092 (.057)	.044
Do not regularly attend police association meetings	-.152 (.074)	-.056*	-.152 (.074)	-.056*	-.159 (.066)	-.058*	-.159 (.066)	-.058*	-.162 (.066)	-.059*	-.167 (.066)	-.061*	-.169 (.066)	-.062*	-.165 (.066)	-.060*
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards			.000 (.000)	-.125	.000 (.000)	-.083	.000 (.000)	-.086	.000 (.000)	-.083	.000 (.000)	-.082	-.000 (.000)	-.079	.000 (.000)	-.078
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards BINARY			.238 (.237)	.117	.129 (.214)	.064	.135 (.214)	.066	.136 (.214)	.067	.136 (.213)	.067	.136 (.213)	.067	.135 (.213)	.066
Gen. Attitudes – SIU					.418 (.024)	.419***	.421 (.025)	.422***	.398 (.026)	.400***	.399 (.026)	.401***	.415 (.027)	.416***	.415 (.027)	.416***
Satisfaction – SIU							.000 (.000)	.072	.000 (.000)	.063	.000 (.000)	.066	.000 (.000)	.075	.000 (.000)	.078
Satisfaction – SIU BINARY							-.180 (.243)	-.090	-.184 (.242)	-.092	-.189 (.242)	-.095	-.205 (.242)	-.103	-.207 (.244)	-.104
Gen. Attitudes – OIPRD									.075 (.026)	.075**	.077 (.027)	.077**	.083 (.027)	.083**	.084 (.027)	.084**
Satisfaction – OIPRD											.001 (.000)	.315*	.001 (.000)	.321*	.001 (.000)	.318*
Satisfaction – OIPRD – BINARY											-.720 (.327)	-.323*	-.736 (.327)	-.330*	-.725 (.327)	-.325*
Gen. Attitudes – Professional Standards Bureau													-.050 (.027)	-.050	-.049 (.027)	-.049
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau															.000 (.000)	-.055
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau – BINARY															.073 (.171)	.033
R / R² / Std. Error of Est.	.285 / .081 / .956		.287 / .082 / .956		.503 / .253 / .863		.504 / .254 / .863		.508 / .259 / .861		.511 / .261 / .860		.513 / .263 / .859		.514 / .264 / .859	

Career experience over 20 years was a significant predictor of positive attitudes toward civilian oversight across all models but the first two. Across all eight models, rank higher than constable (sergeants, staff sergeants, senior officers) and university education were also significant predictors of positive evaluations of civilian oversight. These findings were consistent with my hypotheses that police officers with more career experience, higher educational attainment and senior rank would perceive civilian oversight favourably. The variable for older respondents (over 45) only remained statistically significant in the first two models. Although no previous research has identified officer age as a reliable predictor of attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms, age clearly played some role in positive evaluations of civilian oversight in this study, since it is evident that many respondents with senior rank and career experience beyond 20 years would be older individuals.

Model 2 displays the introduction of the variable for attitudes toward police services boards (held by respondents with personal experience). This variable did not serve as a predictor for general attitudes toward civilian oversight as it was statistically insignificant across Models 2-8.

Model 3 shows the introduction of the variable for positive attitudes toward the SIU. By far, this proved to be the most impactful variable across all models in predicting positive attitudes toward civilian oversight. As highlighted above, this marks a dramatic jump in the R^2 score which is also is sustained in subsequent models. It is also noted that the variables for females and respondents with career experience over 20 years became statistically significant in this and subsequent models. In Model 4, the variable assessing satisfaction with the SIU among respondents with experience was introduced. This variable was statistically insignificant in this and later models.

Model 5 displays the introduction of the variable for attitudes toward the OIPRD, which proved

to predict positive evaluations of civilian oversight in this and subsequent models. Model 6

introduced the variable for satisfaction with the OIPRD based on personal experience, which was

also a very weak significant predictor of positive evaluations of civilian oversight in this and

later models. Although very feeble, this finding was consistent with my hypothesis, based

primarily on previous research (Kreisel, 1998; de Guzman, 2004), that police officers who

reported personal experience with civilian oversight mechanisms would express more positive

attitudes than those who lacked such experience. Note, however, that this finding did not surface

for either the SIU or Professional Standards Bureau.

In Model 7, the variable for attitudes toward the Professional Standards Bureau was introduced,

followed by the variable for personal satisfaction with this investigative body (Model 8). Both of

these variables proved to be statistically insignificant predictors of attitudes toward civilian

oversight.

Model 8 displays the final model with all 18 variables combined. Although the final multivariate

regression analysis model did not produce overwhelmingly impactful results (R^2 = .264; 26.4%

variance explained), the results are nevertheless enlightening and summon important insight into

the distinction between attitudes toward the SIU and the other oversight agencies. In this final

model, attitudes toward police services boards and the Professional Standards Bureau were not

predictors of positive evaluations of civilian oversight overall. Females and respondents who did

not regularly attend association meetings remained significant predictors of decreased support

for civilian oversight. In short, police officers' overall positive evaluations of civilian oversight

were primarily driven by their positive assessment of the SIU, and to a lesser extent, their rank, education, length of career service and attitudes toward the OIPRD.

6.4.1 Summary of Multivariate Regression Analysis results

Several enlightening and encouraging findings emerged from the final multivariate linear regression model. Apart from a very minor finding involving police officers' satisfaction/experience with the OIPRD, this analysis revealed that officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight were not considerably influenced by personal experience with oversight agencies (i.e., procedural justice) as I anticipated.

To date, no known previous research has directly identified educational level as a reliable predictor of attitudes toward internal or external oversight mechanisms (e.g., Perez, 1994: 202; Kreisel, 1998: 207-219; De Angelis & Kupchik, 2007: 669). As such, the findings in this study are promising, since a growing number of police officer recruits in Ontario possess university or college credentials (Ontario, 2013: 13; 50)[23]. De Lint (1998) noted that a four year university degree has been touted as a prerequisite for police work in Ontario, with "a liberal arts education…understood to impart" increased sensitivity to the import of "liberal freedoms" and "the rule of law." It is possible that police officers with university education may be more receptive to civilian-led accountability mechanisms based on such ideals, or their more positive attitudes may be attributed to a broader knowledge about the inner-workings of oversight agencies (e.g., low clearance rates, many former police officers involved). Although the current

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[23] 30.7% of respondents in this study were university graduates; 11.2% had "some university" coursework completed (41.9% combined). According to the Ontario Police College (Ontario, 2013: 10), 36% of all OPP and municipal police service recruits completed a university degree prior to attending OPC between 1996 and 2012.

minimum educational requirement for constables in Ontario remains a high school diploma, the vast majority of present-day police officer recruits in Ontario possess post-secondary education and there is mounting evidence that officers with university education have advantages in promotional processes across the province (Ontario, 2013: 22; 60-63).

It was also encouraging to learn that more experienced officers and those with rank were found to be more accepting of civilian oversight overall. These findings are generally supported in previous research, wherein De Angelis and Kupchik (2007: 663) found that the rank of "patrol officer" (i.e., constable) had less trust in internal affairs investigations than higher ranking officers and Kreisel (1998: 212-213) found evidence that more seasoned police officers were more accepting of external accountability mechanisms than those with lesser years of experience. One explanation for this finding that is supported in previous research (de Guzman, 2004: 368-369; Perez, 1994: 203; Harris 2006, 2009) is that higher ranking officers (supervisors) receive fewer complaints against them than non-supervisors (constables), therefore they would face less scrutiny of their professional conduct from oversight mechanisms. This finding again highlights the need to bolster education and awareness among new recruits and front-line officers about the personnel and practices related to civilian oversight mechanisms in order to de-mystify concerns and reduce unnecessary anxiety (e.g., provide information about low clearance/charge rates, employment of former police officers, intense involvement of Professional Standards Bureau).

More experienced police officers and supervisors (sergeants, staff sergeants, senior officers) have the potential to play a key role, both formally and informally, in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of civilian oversight mechanisms among their peers and subordinates. In Ontario, police supervisors are responsible for both the intake of public complaints about police conduct

and for ensuring that the appropriate agency is notified (e.g., Professional Standards Bureau, SIU or the OIPRD). Thus, supervisors play a crucial role in the initial management of complaints and also the management of employees who are subjects/witnesses in internal/external investigations. Given that the vast majority of public complaints and SIU investigations are ultimately cleared or resolved without charge or penalty, it is possible that supervisors' first-hand knowledge of the typical outcome of these investigations serves to buoy their positive evaluation of both the SIU and OIPRD.

Furthermore, it's likely that many experienced officers and those with rank above constable would be aware that the vast majority of SIU investigators are former police officers, which may further ease their comfort with this agency. Considering that most police officers with long tenure (more than 20 years) would have started around the time of the SIU's implementation in Ontario (1990), many would have witnessed the positive evolution of this agency over the last couple decades. As previously outlined in *Chapter 3*, although there was initially negative opposition toward the SIU during its initial inception, it is believed that much of that strong hostility has lessened over time. This interpretation is also supported by the content of the interviews I conducted. While these interviews are discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, it is noteworthy that the harshest criticisms of the SIU were voiced by interviewees who referenced investigations that had occurred in the first decade of the SIU's existence (1990-2000).

As noted earlier, relationships between Ontario's police officers/services and the SIU have been often tension-filled and this was especially true in the early- to mid-1990s. Although tensions still persist and there remain significant concerns related to procedural justice issues, this study's

finding suggests that many officers have grown to accept the legitimacy of the SIU's mandate to investigate the most serious allegations against police officers (instances of bodily harm/death and allegations of sexual assault) with the most serious consequences (e.g., serious criminal and Police Service Act charges, significant career and reputational ramifications) in order to satisfy the public's demand for transparency and accountability.

Lastly, the finding that positive attitudes toward the OIPRD help to predict overall positive evaluations of civilian oversight is also encouraging. Considering that many officers in this study and previous research have expressed greater comfort for complaint investigations to be handled by internal investigators, these findings may be partially explained by the fact that the vast majority of complaint investigations remain in the hands of Professional Standards Bureau investigators. Similar to the above comments regarding the SIU, it is conceivable that more experienced police officers and supervisors would be aware of the inner-workings of this agency and the fact that the vast majority of complaint allegations are cleared as unsubstantiated or are resolved informally.

6.5 Conclusion of *Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis*
The next chapter, *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion* directs focal attention to the semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 40 police officers from the participating police service and 6 senior executive representatives from various stakeholder agencies.

Chapter 7

Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion

This chapter provides analysis and discussion of the semi-structured interviews that were conducted with 40 police officers from the participating police service, followed by analysis and discussion of the semi-structured interviews conducted with 6 senior executive representatives from various stakeholder agencies.

7.1   Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers

As outlined in *Chapter 4: Methods*, a total of 40 police officers from the host police service were interviewed by telephone between January 6, 2014 and April 29, 2014. Interview participants were encouraged, but not in any way compelled, to discuss their personal experience(s) (if any) with the various oversight agencies. The semi-structured format worked well, providing each interview with a basic organization and simultaneously affording flexibility. To avoid redundancy and ease the flow of the dialogue, planned questions were modified, repositioned or eliminated as necessary.

Chapter 4: Methods also provided an overview of the coding procedures utilized in this section. As noted therein, I utilized *NVivo* software to analyze and code the interviews using a number of First Cycle coding techniques (holistic, provisional, attribute, subcoding, simultaneous, emotion, values, and evaluation coding), followed by Second Cycle coding (pattern coding) (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013; Saldana, 2013). The major themes that emerged from *Phase 2* interviews with police officers are presented below: *acceptance of civilian oversight; professionalism; procedural justice*; and *specific oversight agency issues*.

7.1.1 Theme 1: Acceptance of Civilian Oversight

The most prominent theme to emerge from *Phase 2* was an overall acceptance of the need for civilian-led oversight initiatives. While a number of respondents specifically referred to civilian oversight as a "necessary evil", several remarked that civilian-led oversight mechanisms rarely evoke criticisms among their peer group. As many interviewee responses suggest, civilian-led oversight mechanisms have become entrenched features of contemporary policing. For instance, one officer explained,

> *Honestly, I don't think officers even think about it until they are faced with a complaint or a colleague that they know of is faced with a complaint. I think that they don't really understand the process until they are either involved in it or they know somebody that's directly involved in it.* (Officer #27)

As another officer expressed, "people don't typically talk about it" as long as "it is done fairly" (Officer #11). Others described civilian oversight as "something that we are kind of getting used to" or "just the way it is" (Officer #18).

Although respondents raised a variety of constructive criticisms about general or specific aspects of oversight/investigation by non-police personnel during the course of their interviews, virtually all almost invariably indicated their overall acceptance of civilian-led scrutiny in some form and acknowledged the need to satisfy the communities they served by providing transparent and accountable police practices. These findings confirm those established in *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire*, where a majority of survey respondents indicated overall acceptance of civilian oversight initiatives.

In particular, interviewees perceived that civilian oversight initiatives were necessary and that the public did not trust the police to police themselves through internal oversight mechanisms alone. Civilian oversight demonstrates accountability to the public in part to "escape the

perception" that police officers will simply "cover up" for one another (Officer # 24). As Officer #9 explained (a Staff Sergeant with 26 years of experience), a robust and collaborative commitment to maintaining accountability is essential in present-day policing:

> *Who is going to police the police? People think that they are above it when they are wearing the uniform or when they are doing the job. I am huge, huge, huge on accountability. I think you need a good cross section of civilians and officers and your peers and everybody but accountability, if you don't have accountability, that's where you get into problems in life in general. It has become bigger than any issue itself. It's one of those necessary evils, if you will. Who is going to police the police? Ourselves as well as civilian agencies and a cross section thereof.*

Some interviewees also argued that an "outside view" may help to challenge the negative impressions that members of the public may develop through interactions with the police during the course of their regular duties (e.g., arrests, violation tickets).

> *I think it is necessary for it to work. The police are already going to be on the negative by impression of the public because when we deal with them more times than not it's on a negative basis. In order to support public confidence and public belief in what the police are doing there, especially for the silent majority, you need to have that outside view.* (Officer #11)

As these quotations above demonstrate, many interviewees perceived that civilian oversight initiatives were necessary, citing the public's lack of trust in the police to police themselves through internal oversight mechanisms alone.

7.1.1.1 Concerns about civilians' qualifications and their understanding of police work

Many respondents expressed acceptance of civilian oversight mechanisms with an important caveat: that these individuals be qualified to perform an investigatory role and objective. As Officer #14 explained (a Detective Constable with 24 years of experience), he is "okay with it as long as they have the proper training." Similarly, the following officer outlined the conditions by which he would find civilian oversight acceptable:

I certainly don't disagree with it in principle. I think it really depends on who the people are…and what kind of understanding, insight or background they may have with regard to police activity, police structure, police politics, those kinds of things…With the civilians being involved, I am okay with, however, if they are provided with the proper training and tools to understand the complexity of our job. (Officer #34)

Several other interviewees raised concerns about civilians' understanding of police work and

their qualifications to scrutinize police conduct. Although the vast majority of interviewees

indicated acceptance of the need for outside scrutiny, many raised concerns that civilians don't

understand "how our world is from our perspective" (Officer #17).

As the following officer noted, civilian investigators may also not have appropriate training or

experience dealing with a "traumatic situation":

I think sometimes they might not fully understand what the officer is going through as far as a traumatic situation, or just kind of the training we have... Like firearms training, just for example. You know you are there for a split second and you have to determine whether you are going to shoot or whether you are not going to shoot. Courts go over it a million times with a fine tooth comb and they don't understand. I don't know each individual investigator, like civilian investigator, but I don't know how much training they have and I don't think they would have enough as far as understanding just the physics behind it. The action verses reaction. You hear people say "Why don't you just shoot them in the arm?" or "Why don't you shoot them in the leg?", "Why did you have to shoot them 'X' amount of times?" You know it's the fight or flight response, your auditory exclusion and all that going on. They don't always fully understand. It seems that, all of these things are going on physiologically with you, that there are many reasons why you can't necessarily just shoot the gun out of the hand because it's not the movies. (Officer #35)

Similarly, another officer argued that "you have to have the right 'KSAs" to understand

the "dynamics" of what officers face:

You have to be open-minded, you have to have the right KSAs; knowledge, skills and abilities…I'm not saying that everybody could, but I personally feel that it should be someone with a policing background to understand the dynamics of what we face, to understand the pressure that is mounting from the public side from everything from what we get paid, to what makes front page news, to news videos that are usually one-sided. I don't think I'm completely opposed to it could

never be a civilian, I just really feel we should be focusing on people that have policing in their background. (Officer #18)

These excerpts reflect a commonly-expressed perception that "outsiders" who are charged with scrutinizing and evaluating decisions made by police officers do not and cannot ever fully understand the role of a police officer and the culmination of their job-specific training, knowledge and experience.

This skepticism surfaced frequently in interviews, as many interviewees emphasized the need for "set standards" to ensure civilian investigators are doing "the proper job" (Officer #36). The following excerpt from Officer #27 (a Sergeant with 30 years of experience) is representative of the concern which many interviewees raised:

> *Well, I guess in fairness, my concerns are because I think as a police officer, I have a sense of what…a conventional investigation should involve and I also think I have a sense of, for example, a police officer having been someone who has learned over a period of time with progressively more difficult investigations, to be a good investigator. And I guess what I am getting at there is that I think that both the SIU and the OIPRD are ultimately tasked with some fairly complicated investigations and because they haven't progressively learned to investigate, in my estimation, they can run into some difficulties.* (Officer #37)

This statement reflects the commonly-held perception that police officers are best equipped to handle complex and serious investigations due to the "KSAs" they acquire through their training and years of experience. Thus, many interviewees opined that investigations of police conduct should emulate the same standards that police demand of themselves in their investigations (e.g., training; adherence to best practices and rules of evidence).

Many respondents emphasized that a police-specific background and/or police-specific training were essential prerequisites of a competent civilian investigator (such as that offered at the Ontario Police College or equivalent). In illustration, Officer #7, a Constable with 12 years of experience, stated:

> *There should be some type of mandated prior experience or educational program that someone has to pass if they want to start running criminal investigations against a police officer. Square number 1, you are an ex-police officer, okay, you know how to run a criminal investigation and so on and so forth. If they are hiring a civilian who comes from a non-criminal-investigative background, what on earth is the qualification and training at SIU to achieve that level of being able to lay criminal charges against a police officer who has committed an offense in the course of their duties? That obviously boggles my mind, that somebody can run a criminal investigation without having a criminal investigative background.* (Officer #7)

As the above excerpts demonstrate, many interviewees expressed serious concerns about civilians holding powerful oversight/investigative roles without possession of police-specific experience or training. These concerns frequently seemed to be grounded in a fear that civilian overseers would neither understand nor accept the reasoning that police employed in arriving at the decisions they made, and that this would be especially true in relation to use of force situations (e.g., shootings, injuries caused during arrests).

On occasion, interviewees would point to the former occupation of the SIU/OIPRD civilian investigators in emphasizing their supposed unsuitability or direct my attention to the diverse backgrounds of those who occupied these roles. For instance, interviewees identified civilian investigators as a former department store security guard, housewife, Special Constable at Canada's Wonderland, mechanic, Brinks security guard, and investigator in a government ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour, and Ministry of Immigration). These references were often made in a pointedly dismissive fashion, casting such previous career experience as inadequate preparation for conducting serious investigations involving police officers.

It was also suggested that the application of common sense alone should result in a preference for seasoned police officers over those with lesser degrees of investigative experience. As a

Constable with 34 years of experience emphasized:

> *Hey, I don't care what police service, anywhere in Canada, the States, any frigging country, you go in and say, "Okay. Here's your special investigator," and he's got five year experience as a security guard doing loss prevention at Wal-Mart, or you've got two investigators come through the door that have 20 years experience with the Toronto homicide squad. Where's your feeling on who's going to do the most thorough investigation?* (Officer #20)

Consistent with the findings of my survey, interviewees commonly perceived that oversight agencies, such as the SIU and OIPRD, would be most suitably staffed by former police officers with substantial investigative skills. Again, Officer #20 urged attention to how the SIU has evolved over the years:

> *I think they've realized that they've taken on retired police officers for a reason, because there is a skill set there…You have to be an investigator…I think they realize that, and I don't know if they're still hiring former police officers, but even the ones they have there, if they can pass on what they've learned over the years to the new guys that aren't police officers, it may help. You cannot get away from experience, from actually doing the job.* (Officer #20)

Another officer pronounced the hiring of former officers by these agencies as "an excellent thing" and maintained that

> *Out of all the civilians you are going to have, I believe that [employing] former police officers is a good thing, because they do have that training, they have some of the same experiences. They can relate to that somewhat.* (Officer #35)

These officers, along with many others, perceived that former or retired police officers possess the "KSAs" and experience necessary to make sound evaluations of the conduct of police officers.

However, this perception was not uniformly endorsed by my interviewees and several emphasized that former police officers should have been thoroughly vetted before they were hired by an oversight agency in order to ensure that each possessed the requisite skills and experience. Thus, one interviewee stressed that overseeing agencies must "*review what the*

officers' histories were with the police services" and, in elaboration noted:

> *I know a couple officers complained about some of the SIU were officers that were completely dysfunctional on the job and there they are doing the SIU thing. (Officer #39)*

Another, in discussing an investigator with one of Ontario's oversight agencies,

remarked:

> *He used to be a sergeant up in ***, and to be perfectly blunt…the guy was fuckin' incompetent…He wouldn't know how to investigate his way out of a paper bag…I think they really need to put an effort into recruiting experienced homicide investigators, major sexual assault investigators, people who have actually done that work previously, rather than taking sort of the first guy who shows up at the door. I'm sure he did very well in the interview. I'm sure he presented himself very professionally, and they looked at his career path and said, 'Well, he's a retired sergeant, that must mean something.'…He may be a very good administrator, but it doesn't necessarily mean that he knows how to investigate a homicide. (Officer #1)*

The comments of my interviewees suggested consistently that police officers have very high expectations of those who are scrutinizing their professional conduct. Although those individuals with police-specific training and experience are often favoured, the vast majority of police officers stressed above all that those tasked with examining alleged misconduct must be highly capable and highly trained investigators who possess the equivalent knowledge, skills and abilities as active police professionals. Such findings are entirely consistent the findings of previous research reviewed earlier in *Chapter 3*.

As *Phase* 1 revealed, knowledge about the staffing and performance (clearance by charge rates) of the SIU and OIPRD was lacking among many survey respondents. A majority of survey respondents indicated that they felt sufficiently educated about the SIU and OIPRD by their police service, yet many were uncertain about how many former police officers worked at these agencies and there was limited knowledge by many respondents about the general trends in clearance by charge rates for each agency.

These findings suggest a need to educate police officers about the specifics of each civilian oversight agency. For instance, it may be beneficial to provide officers with information on the training courses that SIU and OIPRD investigators receive, especially if they are similar to the investigative training courses that police officers take at the Ontario Police College or elsewhere. It would seem equally beneficial for officers to know precisely how many former police officers work for the SIU and OIPRD and the percentage of investigations by these agencies which result in criminal or *Police Services Act* charges. Possession of this knowledge could serve to dispel misperceptions of the staffing and functioning of these oversight agencies and promote trust in those who conduct investigations that may impact fatefully upon the careers of police officers.

7.1.2 Theme 2: Professionalism

The themes of professionalism and professional status arose frequently in *Phase 2* interviews with police officers. Many interviewees perceived that police officers are held to a higher standard than those in many other occupations and professions. As one officer stated, "I don't know of any other profession that gets examined the way that we are - publicly, internally and externally" (Officer #18). As the following officer explained, police officers are "treated differently" because of the "nature of what we do":

> *We stand sort of apart from all other professions because of the nature of what we do…All police officers are held to a higher standard by the public…so the expectation is set very high, and as a recruit it's explained to you this is why we have civilian oversight, and this is why you will be treated differently than a member of the public if you do something wrong.* (Officer #1)

Police officers also perceived their occupational role as unique, challenging and multifaceted and suggested that the high standards the public demands of police officers in relation to both their personal and professional conduct implicitly recognizes the multiple important services they

provide (e.g., emergency response, public safety, law enforcement, crime prevention and investigation). For example, one interviewee who thought police oversight important described policing as "a unique career" and emphasized that "what we do is different. There is no other real job that does the kind of things that we do, that sees the kind of things that we do." (Officer #35).

Others detailed their perceptions of what makes policing unique and, in doing so, directed attention to the powers that police officers possess. As one officer described, "I don't think there's any other profession that gets examined internally and externally the way policing does…We are a different occupation…We also have the powers and the weapons that, I guess, justify that accountability" (Officer #20). Another officer acknowledged the incredible, yet justified, scrutiny that officers face in carrying out their day-to-day duties:

> *I have yet to come across any other individuals from any other walk of life who experience the same scrutiny that we do in policing. And I don't for a second suggest that it is necessarily inappropriate…You know, certainly as a police officer you are king of the hill. There is nobody more powerful than you on the street. And that's bar none. You have the right to take people's liberty away from them at a moment's notice.* (Officer #37)

Similarly, another officer boldly acknowledged the necessity for civilian oversight in consideration of the enormous power held by police officers, which includes the potential use of lethal force:

> *You know what? I think we should be held to a higher standard. We are based and entrusted through laws enacted by the members of this country and members of the public to take a life if necessary, and that's not something that should be taken lightly. I think there is a definite need for oversight. (Officer #8)*

Many expressed similar views and, in noting the substantial power and privilege police officers possess in their complex occupational roles, regarded civilian oversight as both necessary and desirable.

Yet, while many interviewees commonly acknowledged the need for high levels of accountability and scrutiny, some expressed resentment and frustration, opining that police officers faced greater scrutiny than other occupational groups. A perception of expectations from the public and the media's appetite for scandal-mongering sensationalism could fuel feelings of resentment. As one officer put it, "cops are more under the gun than a lot of other groups" in describing that members of other publically-funded occupations are not "nearly on the hot seat as much as we are" (Officer #30). Another officer described that police officers are "held to an impossible standard" by the public, the media and both internal and external oversight mechanisms (Officer #40). A Staff Sergeant with 20 years of experience further elaborated on these concerns:

> *I think it's one of the toughest professions just because of the accountability that comes with the job. I think that's even more so because we've become the service of last resort for everyone, as other services get cut, I think police officers were always over the years expected to be many different things. Social worker, paramedic, all that kind of stuff to a small degree. But now I think that comes in even more play because there's other government agencies that have been cut back for whatever reason, and now the police officer is expected to be able to be all those things. Always professional. Always making the right decision, and the scrutiny is so high. Again, not to say that's a bad thing, it's just a reality that there's cameras and stuff everywhere so scrutiny is extremely high. A lot of times we're judged in the media unfairly based on what people get to see over and over again, and not actually being in the situation and make a decision with information had at the time. So I think that makes it a truly unique profession because, take a doctor for example, that makes a mistake. It's usually not as public unless it's some kind of a horrendous mistake, and then they're not really thrust into the media over it like we are. We sell papers because of the mistakes we make on a daily basis.* (Officer #5)

Police officers in Canada, like many public/governmental sector occupations across the country, have encountered ever-increasing demands for accountability, transparency, financial sustainability and improved performance standards in recent decades (see *Chapter 2*). These

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increased demands have made many officers feel that their conduct is increasingly scrutinized and susceptible to intense and sometimes unduly harsh criticism.

A handful of interviewees opined that police officers face higher levels of both internal and external scrutiny than other occupational groups and pointed to the internal mechanisms that regulate other professionals. For instance, one interviewee expressed frustration that other professions investigate "their own" (e.g., doctors, nurses, teachers), yet, in "policing we are professional investigators, yet we can't do investigations":

> *I feel that needs to be brought up and how it's just so frustrating that we can't investigate ourselves. Yet that's what we do our whole lives. They'll trust me to investigate or go to a crime scene where three people have been murdered and they trust me to do that impartially. Yet as soon as a police officer is being investigated for sexual assault, all of the sudden we're useless investigators.*
> (Officer #39)

Despite the frustrations and challenges cited above, the vast majority of interviewees expressed overall acceptance of the need for civilian oversight mechanisms and believed them necessary to satisfy public demands for accountability.

7.1.3   Theme 3: Procedural Justice

Throughout *Phase 2*, issues of procedural justice (e.g., perceptions of fair and respectful treatment, investigative efficiency, timely communication about the status/outcome of investigations) surfaced fairly frequently with interviewees providing a host of criticisms about their experiences with each oversight agency. However, a macro-analysis of the interviews with police officers makes it clear that one antagonism is particularly bothersome for interviewees: inadequate communication about the status of SIU, OIPRD and Professionals Standards Bureau investigations.

This finding is consistent with the results from *Phase 1*, where a series of questions probed a variety of procedural justice issues for all oversight agencies (e.g., prompt notification of the investigation; explanation of the investigative process; timely investigation; courteous treatment; objectivity and fair treatment by investigators; speed and length of the investigation; updates about status/outcome of investigation). That analysis revealed that one commonality shared among survey respondents with personal experience with the SIU, the OIPRD and the Professional Standards Bureau is that a majority were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the status of their investigation.

It is important to clarify that the impact of poor communication should be viewed on a continuum. To illustrate, two interview excerpts are provided below. The first excerpt stems from a police officer's annoyance that his own Professional Standards Bureau failed to update him on their investigation of a low-level complaint. The second records the reflection of a police officer who was involved in a fatal shooting investigated by the SIU and his belief that the poor communication practices of this agency caused the victim's family additional anguish:

> *Yeah. I think they could do a better job of keeping people up to date with what's going on. I also understand that you don't need to Chicken Little all this stuff either. Okay, the investigation is ongoing. When it's done we'll tell you...I can understand process and that it just takes a while.* (Officer #4)

> *It* [communication] *was kind of sporadic. At the beginning it was all rush, rush, rush and then it was pretty much nothing for quite some time. What was going on with them internally, I don't know. Just thinking of it from the perspective of the family of the person that I shot and killed, it's so unfair to them as well because here they don't have a person in their family anymore, even though they disowned this particular person because of mental health problems. He tried to kill his wife and stuff before. It's so unfair for that family as well because they don't know. They're not given an update and how they get closure until they're told what happened, right?* (Officer #38)

My interviewees commonly perceived that, regardless of the severity of the act or incident under investigation, those under investigation should receive regular updates on the status and

anticipated outcome of the investigation. Several remarked on multiple occasions that this standard should also apply equally to investigations by police, with those involved in an incident informed of its progress.

The following excerpt from an interview transcript is included as a quintessential example of how police officers can have confidence in the quality, speed and length of an investigation conducted by an oversight agency, yet remain dissatisfied with the frequency of communication that this body provides. In this case, the interviewee commented upon a Professional Standards Bureau investigation:

> *Interviewee: Police officers investigating police officers, they know what it's about. They understand. They went and did the interviews. You know, there was an issue involving handcuffing. They went through the protocol for handcuffing, they went through, you know, your block training. This is what's taught for handcuffing.*
>
> *Facilitator: Yeah. You were treated well then?*
>
> *Interviewee: I was, yeah.*
>
> *Facilitator: Okay. What was your impression of the quality of the investigations or the investigators themselves?*
>
> *Interviewee: I thought they were all well-done…Yep. I was never dissatisfied with any of them.*
>
> *Facilitator: Okay. Then what about the level of communication while one of these investigations are going on? You mentioned that they take too long. Is there anything you could recommend for change in internal PSB investigations?*
>
> *Interviewee: I think that if it's something that's going to take some time, then I really don't know if it's too much to ask for a monthly update. You know, for every 30 days or something that's more appropriate than going 4 months between your notification and your interview. I think that that's probably too long myself. Because you have placed that officer into a stressful position. They know that there's an investigation taking place. They know, in general, terms of what it's about. At that same time, they don't know what's going on with it. I think that if we were a member of the public and the police were investigating something we were involved in, if we were a victim, or whatever the case may be, I think the public expects a little bit more than, you know, not hearing from the officer in four months.* (Officer #6)

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This example demonstrates the stress that may be caused by the "fear of the unknown" during the course of an investigation. Notwithstanding the positive aspects of the investigation or the skillfulness of its investigators, the failure to regularly communicate the status of investigations may causes stress and unnecessary aggravation for those who are otherwise satisfied with other aspects of the process.

Police officers' feelings of frustration and annoyance may be compounded if they perceive the quality of communication to be lacking and/or if they perceive that those in charge of their case (investigators or administrators) are indifferent or insensitive to their situation as the subject of a complaint. The following interview excerpts highlight the reaction of two officers to investigations conducted by the OIPRD:

> Facilitator: Now, can you tell me about the process of communication.

> Interviewee: There wasn't any.

> Facilitator: There wasn't any? How long did it take to be resolved, or?

> Interviewee: I was found ... I'm trying to think of the words they used. [The other officer] found out way before I did…So, I called up the OIPRD…I said, "Here's the problem, what's going on?" I said, "[The other officer] was found not guilty." He goes, "well it was unsubstantiated." I go, "No no no, he's not guilty. Let's be honest, he is not guilty of anything here." I said, "Unsubstantiated means nothing, he is not guilty of any wrongdoing." He said, "Oh, yeah, no, you're … you're clear too." I said, "Well thanks for getting a hold of me." Then I asked him, I said, "What recourse do we as police officers have?" I said, "You know if I do something wrong, I'll take the hit…Totally take hit, I got no problem. I said, "But when something like this happens," and the guy's got my file in front of him. He's looking at it, I said, "What recourse do we have as police officers when this frivolous complaint comes in, and I have to go through eight months of garbage? Stress on me, stress on my family." Right? I said, "Sleepless nights." I said, "What recourse do we have?" (Officer #5)

> I had an investigation with OPRID...And it was just regarding a traffic stop. A general traffic stop and the person accusing me of being racist and discriminatory and it was unfounded. But the tone of the letter when I finally got it from them was that of ... The way I felt the tone of the letter was ... It wasn't like, "No, it's unfounded officer. Keep up the good work." It was more of a tone, "You're lucky.

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This time. Because we know you did something wrong, we just couldn't prove
it."...The tone of the letter…it just angered me. I was so angered about the way
the tone is and maybe it's me looking into it and I feel that people are out to get
you, but the tone was ... And other officers I've talked to said the same thing when
they've been investigated. They just felt it was the tone of things was, "Well,
you're lucky. We just couldn't get the evidence. But we will next time." (Officer
#39)

The issues of procedural justice that surfaced throughout *Phase 2* confirm that regular and timely

communication stands as a cornerstone for effective oversight investigations. As De Angelis and

Kupchik (2007: 668) emphasized, these issues of procedural justice must be recognized as

worthy of exploration: they are the primary feature of a complaint-related inquiry that can be

reasonably altered and improved.

7.1.3.1 Stress faced while under investigation

Another notable theme that surfaced, which is also directly related to procedural justice,

pertained to the stress which some police officers experience while under investigation by the

various oversight agencies. This theme was also noted by the officers in their open-ended

written commentaries (*Chapter 5*). Interviewees frequently mentioned that the prolonged period

of being under investigation by the SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau had been

stress-inducing and caused them to worry about the fate of their career and the erosion of their

personal and professional reputation. Officer #3, a constable with nine years of experience,

highlighted the effects of such stress:

I think from the very nature of what we do, we're sent out there to fail. You only
get called into the collision after it's happened. You only get called to the
domestic after it's happened. You only get called … I can go on and on and
on…Inevitably, somebody's going to be displeased with what you do…You're just
going to be critiqued about what you do and then that goes to a justice official
who then puts you under a microscope over a period of days or that civilian
oversight body that puts you under the microscope for months and they critically
comb through your conduct. I think you have high pressure situations, proud

people who are looking to do good things. I think it's inevitable that emotions overflow too and so I think when you end up pushing down and pushing down and pushing down on these people, the pressure cooker gets to the point where people end up breaking and that's where we end up with stress injuries. (Officer #3)

Similarly, Officer #34, a constable with 13 years of experience, described how the stress of oversight investigations may cause officers to "second guess" themselves:

I was made to feel that by this investigator that I had done something wrong. So you are now turning someone who is a professional who is trying to protect society, you know, and turn the tables on them and tell them that they are now the criminal. It is a very bad situation to be in. It is not like a police officer who is off duty and decides to go steal candy from a store, or steal things, you know what I mean? It's a police officer who is doing their job and trying to keep society safe, and in the interim, the tables are now being turned on them and so what you have is officers second-guessing themselves all the time now as to what they can and cannot do, and it is not good. (Officer #34)

These remarks hint powerfully at the intense pressure and stress that some police officers experience while under investigation for incidents that occur while on duty. Typically, police officers' decisions that are made in the "heat of the moment" are scrutinized over weeks and months by supervisors, oversight agencies, courts and the media. This dynamic serves as a source of stress and resentment for some police officers who feel unfairly scrutinized by others who dissect their actions and evaluate them with the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of prolonged contemplation.

Several interviewees recounted episodes of stress that they had endured and/or witnessed in relation to SIU investigations of the use of lethal force (shooting) investigations. In addition to the stress that these violent encounters provoked in and of themselves, interviewees discussed how the stressfulness of these incidents was exacerbated by an investigative process that could sprawl over lengthy periods of time. The following two excerpts highlight these views:

Oh, I think it's a major stressor. It's probably one of the biggest stressors that comes with this job, is dealing with the civilian oversight. I've seen officers get so nervous,

officers that are seasoned, and then they become subject to an SIU investigation. They just turn into different people. They get nervous, and they just turn into different people. It's a major stressor, a huge stressor and something that teachers, doctors, they just don't have that level of second guessing. (Officer #31)

I don't expect it to be perfect, and I don't expect that every officer is going to love whatever body they put in place that's going to have that oversight. There's always going to be issues to a certain degree and in certain cases, but I really think effort needs to be made to improve upon it the way it is today, because I don't think you'd find an officer out there who really has a lot of faith that if they were involved in a shooting incident and the SIU comes in, honest to God, those are about the scariest moments in anyone's career. Sitting there, "Oh my God, what are they going to do to me? What's going to happen to me now?" You know? (Officer #1)

These remarks highlight the "fear of the unknown" that may arise during the course of prolonged SIU investigations, where police officers' uncertainties about their career role, career trajectory and personal and professional reputations are scrutinized and stand in potential jeopardy. This is especially true during SIU investigations when the potential career and financial consequences are profoundly serious (e.g., criminal charges, incarceration, Police Services Act charges, civil litigation).

Media sensationalism also surfaced as a recurring source of stress among interviewees. About a quarter of my respondents reported that the media's treatment of police actions induced feelings of frustration and served as a source of stress. The following two quotations illustrate these sentiments:

The vast majority of articles they report on the news, newspaper, social media, whatever about police, what are they? Negative because that's what interests public. They don't hear about the other 99 incidents that day that the police did right. Again, that skewed perception anytime they see something on the TV. "Oh, yeah. The cops screwed up again. Oh, yeah. Cops screwed up again" versus, "Okay. You didn't hear about the baby's life that we saved today, the person that was in a burning car that we pulled out of that car today or just the every-day things. We stopped that person from speeding today who may have went down the road and crashed into a car carrying your daughter to school and killed her." You don't hear about that. It doesn't sell papers. It doesn't have an impact. (Officer #8)

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> *I think a lot of the times with the public, we run into knee jerk reactions, trial by YouTube, and they allow emotions to run their critical thinking.* (Officer #3)

As illustrated by these observations, police officers recognize both traditional media and social media sources as having a powerful impact in shaping public perceptions of police and police-related events. Most interviewees indicated a general acceptance of public interest in police-related events and also recognized public demand for the greater accountability and transparency of police actions.

However, it was also evident that they felt beleaguered by media portrayals which framed complex events in overly simple and misleading ways. Thus, interviewees noted that high profile events that trigger an SIU investigation (e.g., most incidents involving serious injury or the use of lethal force) routinely thrust police officers/services into the glare of the media's (negative) spotlight.

> *Yeah, how about not making us guilty before we're actually found guilty. How about let the process take care of itself, and go from there. If the guy did something wrong then go ahead.* (Officer #12)

> *I would like to see a little more control over what the paper gets before officers get...hung out to dry before the investigation's complete…Then, when the investigation's complete and the officer is exonerated, there's a three line blurb on page 23…. We all know that the good news doesn't sell and bad news sells.* (Officer #17)

The above statements convey the feelings of powerlessness and frustration that officers may experience over their inability to mitigate the negativity which imbues the media's coverage of tragic events. These feelings can be especially intense when an investigation of an incident by an oversight agency clears an officer of any wrongdoing but media interest in the incident has long passed.

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It is noteworthy that once the SIU investigative mandate is been invoked, police services in

Ontario are restricted from making public comments about an ongoing SIU investigation and can

only acknowledge the involvement of the SIU and provide a skeletal report on the incident.

These restrictions frustrate many stakeholders, including police officers, who may be required to

endure months of imposed silence before the SIU provides a public statement on the incident:

> *If that initial media release had some basic details out there in the public right away it seems to me it would take away a lot of this scrutiny or perceived bias that the SIU is not charging people and stuff like that. If they just put it out there in the media right away that the gentleman was armed, the officers were assaulted, they responded with lethal force as is legal and justified, and then let the chips fall where they may. Let the SIU run their investigations. But by not saying anything this tight-lippedness that I see at the higher levels seems to tarnish things and lets the media run wild with it for a while.* (Officer #7)

Several interviewees recounted their personal experience of facing intense media scrutiny as the

subject officer in police shootings, and emphasized how the frustration they experienced was

compounded by the fact that they could not counter the one-sided, and often speculative,

narrative if the incident that was disseminated by the media. For example, the following excerpt

illustrates one interviewee's stressful experience after a high-profile fatal shooting:

> *It's nice that they're looking at PTSD but they're only looking at the tip of the iceberg. The trauma isn't always from looking at these terrible scenes…In my personal situation, the media's slagged me like crazy every day, coming to the house, interviewing your neighbours, bothering your neighbours. They're publishing inaccurate information and you have no recourse.* (Officer #3)

Although the majority of police officers accepted the need for independent investigations to be

conducted by the SIU, many recounted feelings of isolation and frustration that were catalyzed

by the media's skewed report of an incident and prolonged by a lengthy SIU investigation.

7.1.4 Theme 4: Specific oversight agency issues

Interviewees provided feedback about particular features and practices of each of the oversight

agencies focused upon in this study. The commentary was generally reflective of the insights

garnered in *Phase 1*, which again served to reinforce the specific role and mandate that each respective agency plays in the overarching oversight system in Ontario.

7.1.4.1   Special Investigations Unit

The SIU was mentioned more frequently than the other oversight agencies and discussions about SIU investigations generated the most impassioned dialogue among interviewees. As previously discussed, this is likely attributable to the fact that SIU investigations are triggered by already dramatic situations (e.g., the use of force causing serious injury and sometimes death) and also because the potential consequences of an SIU investigation are the most impactful for officers' careers and reputations. This is consistent with the findings from *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire*, where attitudes toward the SIU were identified as the most impactful factor that contributed to police officers' overall attitudes toward civilian oversight.

Interviewee comments about the SIU most frequently referenced negative experiences with investigations by this oversight agency. The following quotations reflect these sentiments:

> *I've had a few experiences with SIU where I've just found their whole investigative process to be shoddy, and this just again, directly related to situations we've been in in my unit with…all we do is collision reconstruction…On a couple of events where they've been involved it's just been several glaring issues where I'm thinking I was quite surprised that they treated their investigation the way they did and that was how they did day-to-day stuff. I just thought it was very poor quality…Some of the equipment that they are using is very outdated…Talking with my peers and whatnot, it always seems to be common threads. To me, if they were investigating me, I'd be very concerned that things might be overlooked and I wouldn't have a whole lot of confidence that things were being done right.* (Officer #24)

> *I don't know if it's a lack of resources or a lack of their ability to recognize or having not been subject to cross examination and exclusion of those pieces* (of evidence). *I just see overall that they don't subscribe to the same standards as what I think we're held to.* (Officer #25)

The most common criticisms that interviewees made of the SIU alleged: disorderly investigative

techniques; poor evidence gathering and retention; and the employment of underqualified

investigators. The harshest criticisms stemmed from interviewees who recounted investigations

that occurred in the first decade of the SIU's existence (1990-2000). Many interviewees

conceded that SIU investigations have, for the most part, improved over recent years, with

improved investigative techniques, streamlined internal processes and the employment of more

highly-qualified investigators (who are often former police officers).

Nevertheless, a fair number of interviewees expressed disappointment with the quality of SIU

communication in relation to the status of investigations. Similar concerns also surfaced in

Phase 1, where a majority of survey respondents complained that they were not provided with

frequent updates about the status of their SIU investigation and some maintained that they were

never directly informed of the ultimate resolution of their case. The comments of my

interviewees echoed these complaints:

> *Before the three and a half, four months that they chose to allow their investigation to run before they sent a letter. That's three and a half, four months of stress, but it was unneeded in my opinion. So story goes on. Our PSB won't clear you until SIU clear you. So I do three and a half, four months before SIU clears me, another month and a half before PSB phones me and says, "Yeah, we're clearing you as well." And then six months later I get a letter saying that, "You've received a commendation for lifesaving" – because we lifted the car off the guy who had rolled it and saved his life. So that was my take on them. They all take their sweet time to clear and there's really no reason for it.* (Officer #25)

> *I think it's a lot of second guessing. It's the worry about the second guessing that gets them all upset. A lot of them have done the right things. They're just worried because everything goes dark. When the SIU becomes involved everything becomes silent and dark and super secretive. That's what sends the officers getting upset. There's no information flow coming from SIU or any of the people that are superiors at the time.* (Officer #31)

Although the vast majority of SIU investigations do not result in criminal or *Police Services Act* charges against officers, it is apparent that the process of being the subject of an ongoing investigation is a stressful experience for many officers. It was clear that most interviewees did not understand the reasons why SIU investigations could entail extraordinary delays or result in the cessation of "information flow." As one interviewee commented in exasperation, *"I don't know whether reports sit on somebody's desk waiting for the final approval, or what the deal is there, but I think that the length of time is too long"* (Officer #27). According to many interviewees, such stress could be reduced with more regular updates on the status of investigations and their anticipated resolution.

Despite the above criticisms, however, a fair number of interviewees recounted positive experiences with SIU investigations and SIU investigators. For example:

> *The way I was treated from the SIU was quite respectful. No issues with them investigating… I understand the process and I actually agree with the process. It's fine.* (Officer #24)

> *My understanding now is pretty much most of the individuals who are providing the service to the SIU are former police officers with excellent credentials who are very well experienced in violent crime and the investigation in violent crime. I have no question about their level of expertise. On any one particular perspective, you may disagree with them but there are forums for that in terms of airing that and addressing those. That could be looked after.* (Officer #2)

The above comments were voiced by interviewees who were satisfied with their respective experiences with the SIU (quality of investigators, the investigation itself and the quality of communication) and their respect for the mandate of the SIU overall. More generally, interviewees who reported overall satisfaction with the SIU praised its investigators as accomplished and competent. In these situations, interviewees described what seemed to be a solid working relationship between the SIU and the SIU liaison officers from their respective police service which ensured that lines of communication flowed effectively.

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7.1.4.2 Police Services Boards

In contrast to perceptions of the SIU, feedback regarding police services boards was generally positive. Similar to the response-base in *Phase 1*, a majority of interviewees reported that they had worked, currently or previously, under the command of a police services board and accepted them, reasoning that these boards represented the community and communicated its interests. These sentiments are reflected in the comments of two of my interviewees:

> *Well, again, all I would say is that I have never been opposed publicly to having the community involved in any aspect of policing and I think in some respects, they are the customers and I'm not a big fan of that model of us being kind of a business. I've never seen us that way given the way we are a service provider. But, at the same time, I've never been opposed to having input from, again, whether it be local politicians or representatives of the community for that matter. I don't think it is a negative. It's necessary, we have to accept it.* (Officer #37)

> *To me, it's all about advocacy. In all reality, if you're not involved in your own community that you're policing, you have problems in the first place.* (Officer #6)

These findings are generally consistent with those garnered in *Phase 1*, wherein a majority of respondents deemed police services boards to be necessary and expressed an overall respect for the mandate of police services boards.

Most interviewees were quite vague in describing their perceptions of the qualities and qualifications that police services board members should ideally possess. Thus, while some emphasized that police services board members should be well-informed about police practices, others simply voiced a preference for persons who were "good", "qualified", "professional" or simply "the right people" (Officer #9). Nevertheless, their comments did make clear that the "right people" was an expansively-defined category which included all who were well-educated, thoughtful and fair-minded:

> *I think it is a good buffer and filter from the general public and other outside agencies to service…if they are properly educated and understand our responsibilities….Where I am currently now, my division now, I do see the police*

services board and know what their concerns and expectations are, and if utilized properly, they can be a very good tool. However, you have to have a good group of people in there or else it can be a complete waste of resources and dysfunctional. (Officer #34)

If they're a professional...If they're in there for the right reasons and they have a truly strong desire to be part of it, I think it's a good arrangement because it allows us to see what the civilians feel. Because sometimes what we think is important, might not be important to them. So I feel as long as they don't have vested interests, that it is a good thing. (Officer #39)

My interviewees commonly perceived less-than-ideal police services board members as persons who sought to advance their own personal or political agenda instead of demonstrating a genuine commitment to the provision of sound oversight and accountability.

Many interviewees described the relationship between police services boards and police officers as one where priorities and expectations were in a constant process of negotiation. For the most part, this relationship was described as positive and constructive, tempered by mutual recognition and respect for the roles and responsibilities of both parties. The following excerpts describe this ebb and flow of communication:

They want to know what the police are up to, because their tax money is going towards us. They want to bring concerns to us. They may want to have what they deem as priorities addressed by us. So that seems to me like a normal community relationship between the police and the community. I mean, unless they started having unrealistic expectations, but hopefully, they would be set straight by the people who represent the police in those meetings. I haven't had the sense that the police services board groups have been unreasonable or unrealistic. (Officer #30)

I have no issues about the police service board. We get along very well. We have good interaction. We have good feedback. They ask for certain information. I give it to them. They ask questions about certain things or they may want to do some things, and I explain to them, "Okay. You can do this, or you can't do this, but we could do this to maybe, further to the goal that you're looking towards." I think the input from them, I find it valuable. (Officer #8)

In general, interviewees described the relationship between police services boards and police services as positive, healthy and viable. Nevertheless, some perceived police services

boards/members as overly-politicized or thought police services boards irrelevant and perceived

that they had little impact on the working lives of police officers. Although many interviewees

reported that they welcomed the questions, input and recommendations of police services boards,

they felt that these agencies should not dictate or direct operational decisions.

7.1.4.3 Office of the Independent Police Review Director

Of all the oversight agencies mentioned by interviewees in *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews:*

Police Officers, the OIPRD attracted the least commentary. When referred to by my

respondents, mention of the OIPRD was most commonly made in the context of relaying

negative experiences during OIPRD investigations. For example, the following two officers

characterized the skills of civilian investigators as lacking:

> *The two people that were here, that interviewed me in regards to my incident, were from the Ministry of Health – two females that just came from the Ministry of Health. They have no idea. I brought the president of my branch with the association here, because I was the detachment rep at the time for my detachment. I had him come and when they left he said, "Oh my God, they have no clue what they are doing." I said, "No." It was two and a half hours of just nonsense, and asking the same question over and over again. They just…they have no idea. Like I said Ministry of Health. What the hell do they know about what we do?* (Officer #12)

> *You know what, they tried their best. The one guy was a retired Hamilton cop and he was a retired guy doing his best. The other guy was on the military police, I think he said. They did their best. Sometimes your best isn't good enough. I put that down to openness and willingness. They need to have accountability too. There needs to be an open dialogue with these people. I have been on the other side. I have been an investigator for PSB and investigating other officers. It is not fun. It is not the place you want to be. You don't make any friends and no matter how hard you try or no matter what you do, it's just not going to be a good thing. Where I sympathize with them, they tried the best they could.* (Officer #9)

While the comments of the first interviewee provided above are brusquely dismissive of the

qualifications of OIPRD investigators and the second more empathetic, both serve to illustrate

the tensions that can arise between police officers and civilians who investigate and oversee allegations of misconduct.

A second recurring issue raised in relation to the OIPRD pertains to complaints of inadequate communication during the course of complaint investigations. The first of the following two excerpts record an interviewee's perception that OIPRD investigators were unskilled in conducting interviews and were uninterested in acquiring the full facts of an event; the second interviewee directs attention to a communication void that persisted throughout an investigation and left the officer involved "in the dark":

> *I'm trying to explain to them what had happened. You're walking them through everything, and they're not interested at all about what I have to say, it's all about the complaint. It's all about the complaint, and when they said, "Oh, do you have any questions or anything?" I said, "Well, there's two and half hours of my life I'll never get back." I said, "That was a waste of my time." I said, "You're still not interested in what I had to say." I said, "That's fine." I said, "Maybe next time you can try and act like you really care."* (Officer #12)

> *None, I wasn't notified about anything. I wasn't updated. It was in the dark. Last second, they had to meet all their last second deadlines. It was exceedingly poorly done. That was probably the biggest fire point for me.* (Officer #9)

These examples highlight the conflict that can arise during the course of investigations when police officers feel that their perspective does not hold equal weight to that of the complainant, and also the tension that can arise when police officers feel they are not kept sufficiently informed about the status of their investigation.

However, other interviewees were far more positive in their evaluation of the OIPRD. There were several references that were complimentary of the OIPRD Director's thoughtful approach and commitment to seeking effective resolutions:

> *I know Mr. McNeilly's philosophy. He wants a resolution. Nobody wins at the end of hearing. He wants an amenable resolution whether that was what was asked*

for in the first place or something else that anybody can live with, that's the goal.
(Officer #2)

A second interviewee voiced appreciation for an innovative online tracking mechanism that permitted individuals who were involved in an OIPRD complaint/investigation (citizens and police officers) check on its status:

I think that OIPRD is pretty good with that because they assign a number to it; you can go on-line anytime, put the number in, it'll tell you where the investigation's at…I find that actually speaking directly to somebody there is difficult. As far as tracking your complaint, it's set up online…It doesn't tell you much, it just tells you that it's being reviewed or a file been closed. If they decide not to investigate, then you have to wait for the letter that comes; then they tell you why it's been closed or whatever the case is. (Officer #27)

Another interviewee (Officer #29) spoke positively of his email exchanges with the OIPRD and his ability to obtain information in this way about the status of an investigation in which he was involved. Although Officer #16 also reported the use of email for the same purpose, this interviewee noted the difficulties that he had experienced in doing so due to confusion over which agency (the OIPRD or Professional Standards Bureau) was ultimately responsible for the investigation.

A fair number of interviewees were aware that the vast majority of OIPRD investigations are referred back to the originating police service's Professional Standards Bureau for investigation. The following excerpts illustrate the inherent paradox of this dynamic:

I get frustrated that these people are doing it from arm's length. They don't see how it really works in the field. To me, I'm sorry. It's all about smoke and mirrors. Let's face it, OIPRD in the end, when a complaint comes in they just send it to our Professional Standards Branch and they look at it anyways. (Officer #33)

I've had no issues there because quite frankly, OIPRD, when they get a complaint, they send it back to our PSB to investigate. I don't think the public realizes that. We're still investigating ourselves…Quite frankly, I think it covers two things off from my perspective…you've got trustworthy, dedicated investigators to deal with

these things who have a good perspective on things to do the investigation properly, and you've got the civilian oversight on the other side. (Officer #8)

Although the majority of police officers in this study indicated a preference for investigations to be handled by internal police investigators (See 5.2 - General Questions about Civilian Oversight), the desired-for situation may have paradoxical effects. Thus, while knowledge of the fact that "OIPRD investigations" are generally conducted by the referring agency may bolster officer confidence in internal oversight mechanisms, it may also lead to dismissive assessments of the OIPRD, with that agency perceived of as politicized "window dressing" and merely a civilian-led facade for police-led investigations.

7.1.4.4   Professional Standards Bureau

Consistent with findings from *Phase 1*, a majority of interviewees from *Phase 2* expressed satisfaction with the quality of investigators/investigations affiliated with their Professional Standards Bureau. For example, the following two excerpts illustrate officers' perceptions that they were treated fairly and in a forthright manner by professional investigators:

> *My personal dealings with them have been professional and I've never felt railroaded or anything negative. They've done their jobs and in cases where I've been under investigation, [I was] exonerated. I had confidence, because it shows that they actually did a thorough investigation, as opposed to taking something at face value and saying "OK, guilty because this civilian says something was done." But through investigation, it actually came out, so I have a degree of confidence with our PSB, I feel comfortable with them.* (Officer #36)

> *I've been treated fairly well by our professional standards. I've been investigated by them a couple of times. I never really had any issue with what they were doing.* (Officer #40)

These comments above reflect the views held by many interviewees who expressed comfort and confidence with the work of the Professional Standards Bureau.

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There were a handful of interviewees, however, who voiced negative comments about this oversight mechanism and maintained that its investigations were, for example, driven by internal politics or were overly-critical or excessively harsh or slow or failed to provide officers with timely status updates. Nevertheless, the vast majority of interviewees praised the quality of investigations conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau and lauded the host police service for its efforts to improve the quality of the Professional Standards Bureau's investigators and investigations. For example:

> *One comment I'm going to make about our Professional Standards Bureau is that we have really raised the bar, I would say, in the last ten years. It used to be a dumping ground for wayward officers, I don't know if your police service was the same, but now, I find it's very different. They're taking in lots of high-fliers. They're taking people with crime backgrounds. It is as it should be. It is, because, if you were to be investigated, you want the most capable police officer just as we would want the most capable people in SIU, OIPRD or the police services boards.* (Officer #28)

> *I've dealt with Professional Standards Bureau and I have had no issues whatsoever with regards to the way I've been treated by them. They've always been very professional. They're there to do the right thing. I know from years ago there was a perception among people that they were just out to get people, much like the SIU is, right? I don't think that those perceptions are correct.* (Officer #38)

Most interviewees perceived the Professional Standards Bureau to be comprised of qualified, competent and professional investigators who, in the main, conduct timely and efficient investigations and provide officers with timely communication and feedback.

In comparison to the comments that respondents voiced about the other oversight agencies, most interviewees expressed a greater level of respect for Professional Standards Bureau investigators. They generally esteemed these investigators and praised the manner in which they conducted themselves and carried out their investigations. For example:

> *These guys were as professional as they can get, and especially after I had given them my duty notes and my explanation of what was done, when and why. When I*

did receive feedback from them or contact for clarification, there was no antagonism, no nothing. It was straight, professional, almost even pleasant speaking with them. (Officer #23)

Yeah, I'm quite satisfied with our PSB investigations. I was just talking to our prosecutor today and he was saying that they're up at about 97% are resolved in one way or another before it ever goes to trial. And I think that's positive because there's some agreement with everybody going on there at that point. It's less confrontational and more cooperative. (Officer #13)

These perceptions are consistent with the findings of my survey as well as surveys conducted with others; both record that police officers often perceive internal police investigators as competent and well-qualified to carry out their tasks efficiently.

Given that the Professional Standards Bureau plays a crucial role in the operation of civilian-led oversight mechanisms, the positive perceptions that officers have of this body must be considered an encouraging sign. Professional Standards Bureaus serve as vital links between police services and all civilian-led oversight mechanisms across Ontario. For example, they perform the following functions:

- Frequent liaison with civilian-led agencies such as SIU, OIPRD and OCPC to filter the flow of investigations, status updates and resolutions.
- Parallel investigations to SIU investigations, and the majority of referrals from the OIPRD.
- Independent investigations on behalf of other police services.
- With the assistance of the Professional Standards Bureau, many "customer service contacts" are diffused or mediated locally without ever evolving into official public complaints that are referred to the OIPRD.

As a critical linchpin in the network of civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario, it is essential that Policing Standards Bureaus across the province maintain a high level of trust and accountability among both their own police officers and the various oversight agencies. This will allow for the effective balance of internal discipline and public trust.

7.1.5   Conclusions from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers

Most of the prominent themes that emerged from police officers' interviews in *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Police Officers* were consistent with the results from *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire*.

The vast majority of police interviewees perceived that civilian-led oversight mechanisms promoted public trust in the police and heightened perceptions of police accountability to the communities they serve. However, many interviewees expressed concerns about the knowledge, skills and abilities ("KSAs") of civilian investigators and administrators and doubted their capacity to understand police work without police-specific experience, training and education. Although these concerns were voiced in relation to all civilian-led oversight agencies, they were most often expressed in relation to the SIU. Respondents recognized that SIU investigations were fateful and stressed that the consequentiality of these investigations made it imperative that they were conducted impeccably by investigators of the highest calibre.

The most significant source of frustration for interviewees related to poor communication by all oversight agencies (SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau). In particular, police officers lamented the lack of status updates they received during the course of investigations. A majority of interviewees expressed acceptance of the role of police services boards in representing the interests of the community. However, they believed that these boards should be composed of persons who were well-educated and fair-minded. Many interviewees recounted negative perceptions and experiences with the OIPRD and its affiliated investigators. Lastly, the vast majority of interviewees who referenced Professional Standards Bureau recounted extremely positive perceptions and experiences regarding the effectiveness of the affiliated investigators and investigations. These findings were, by and large, consistent with results from *Phase 1*.

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Some of the themes that emerged strongly during the interviews with police officers were not directly captured in the quantified portion of *Phase 1*, but did surface in the open-ended commentary sections. For instance, a number of interviewees opined that police officers are held to a higher standard than members of other occupational groups and professions. Nevertheless, the majority acknowledged a need for this high level of scrutiny and accountability. Police officers additionally noted the stress experienced by officers whose conduct is scrutinized by investigators and recognized the fatefulness of these investigations. They also identified the negative depictions of police actions that are disseminated by traditional and social media forums as an additional source of stress. On various occasions, officers noted frustration that while events that exposed officers to stigma were construed as wildly "newsworthy," an officer's exoneration was considered far less deserving of media coverage.

7.2 Phase 2: Semi-structured Interviews: Stakeholder Representatives

In total, six individuals, all senior executives, participated in *Phase 2*. *Table 7-47* provides summary of the involved representatives.

Table 7-47: Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder Representatives

Agency	Method
The participating police service (Senior Executive Representative)	In-person
OACP – Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone
OAPSB – Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone
CACP-RF - Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police – Research Foundation (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone
CAPG – Canadian Association of Police Governance (Senior Executive Representative)	Phone
OIPRD – Office of the Independent Police Review Director (Senior Executive Representative)	Written Q&A and unrecorded telephone conversation

As noted in *Chapter 4: Methods*, while all six stakeholder representative interviews were transcribed and analyzed, my coding strategy with these interview was far less rigorous than the method I used in coding the responses of police officers. Using *NVivo* software, I employed an approach called "themeing the data" (Saldana, 2013: 175-183) and simultaneous coding (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013: 81, 85-86) to analyze the interviews for confirming and disconfirming evidence. The following five major themes emerged from this analysis.

7.2.1   Theme 1: Relationships between police leaders and civilian-led oversight agencies

Largely mirroring the findings from *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers, senior representatives from the CACP-RF, OACP and the host police service accepted that to fully satisfy the public's demand for transparency and accountability, civilian-led oversight and investigative agencies were necessary. However, these interviewees made it clear that police acceptance of civilian-led oversight mechanisms and trust in the ability of these agencies to fulfill their important oversight roles are contingent upon the staffing of these agencies with highly qualified personnel:

> *We've always been very supportive of the need and the importance of civilian governance and oversight. The caveat for that of course is that there needs to be a couple of principles that would go along with that. For instance, a clear definition of the governance body's purpose and outcomes, well-defined functions and responsibilities. There needs to be an appropriate corporate culture. There should be transparent decision-making. That governance team needs to be a strong one, and there needs to be accountability to the stakeholders, which is the community.* (OACP representative)

> *I don't have a particular concern with it. I think it is the fundamental basis of our policing ability is the trust of our community and that provides a very clear mechanism to allow that trust to be tested and measured. I do have concerns sometimes however if they have the prerequisite background to adequately review it, but as a concept I am totally in favor of it.* (CACP-RF representative)

Senior representatives from the OIPRD, OAPSB and CAPG reported that relations between the policing community and oversight agencies have generally improved and been strengthened over recent decades and that most police officers' attitudes have grown more positive and accepting of scrutiny by external agencies.

However, several remarked that, despite the overall positive acceptance of civilian-led oversight, some police officers in Ontario, including those who are senior police leaders, resist this development:

> *My attitude has changed quite a bit as a senior executive in (our service). We value our relationship with both organizations, the OIPRD, SIU, and it's really important for us to have an effective relationship with them….I see a lot of change in our younger members, too, and I give that credit to the Ontario Police College and the training that's done, recruit training with our members...the importance of conduct, the importance of behavior, the importance of the legislation that we were operate under…I still see some negative attitudes toward both in policing and at the executive level. The eyes are shut, the ears are shut and the reluctance to accept the role and responsibility of the SIU and OIPRD is there. I think the majority are, I think most are in favour, the majority support the need for such independent oversight in investigation but there are a minority of officers that just don't accept it at all, at the senior executive level.* (Host police service representative)

Stakeholder representatives reported that friction points between some police leaders and the civilian-led investigative agencies primarily surround issues of process, mandate and scope of responsibility, while conflicts with police services boards and their umbrella organizations (e.g., OAPSB, CAPG) typically revolve around financial issues and political maneuvering.

The senior representative from the CAPG observed that the quality of relationships between police leaders and the various oversight agencies often reflect the willingness and capability of leaders on both sides to foster and maintain open lines of communications and commitment to resolving conflict.

I think, again, that varies tremendously depending on the individuals involved, and the tone that's often set. Like so many things in life, it's about relationships, and how people put in a certain position of power and authority choose to set out to exercise their mandate, and what kinds of relationship building they set out to do...I think that a big key is that relationship piece, and I think where you have individuals, say police leadership from the service point of view, along with an oversight body leadership that's very attuned to the importance of that relationship, being cordial and respectful, and open communication, you see things run as smoothly as they can. But there always going to be blips along the way. When you have certain severe situations, or extreme situations, or difficult situations, where a great deal of tension has been created, things can go sideways fairly easily, I think by virtue of the importance of assumptions, and the nature of the decision making authority. (CAPG representative)

These insights aptly reflect several high profile public disputes among oversight agency leaders and police leaders in Ontario[24] as well as ongoing conflicts that arise about financial and administrative issues that periodically arise with police services boards across the province.

7.2.2   Theme 2: Recognition of the unique nature of police work as compared to other occupations/professions.

Almost all stakeholder representatives perceived policing as a unique profession and, in doing so, singled out the abilities of police to use lethal force and to restrict personal liberties:

First of all, I think there's very good reason why policing needs to be held accountable differently than some of those other professions. That is police are the only ones that can have the authority and the protections under the [Criminal] Code for taking the ultimate citizen rights, in terms of use of force and use of deadly force. Happily, that's only in very unique cases and small in number in the big picture of things, but they have to be held to that accountability. (OACP representative)

It all comes back to the uniqueness about police…The right to suspend your Charter rights and freedoms and use force in the process, right? That's the whole premise for having a more robust oversight system. It's complicated by police not having the right to strike as well, and other rights are suspended - like the police are compelled to give testimony. Nobody else is. (OAPSB representative)

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[24] See *Chapter 3: Literature Review* (3.8.4. Anticipated attitudes toward the SIU) for discussion about recurrent tensions between the SIU Director and police leaders in Ontario.

The perception that police are held to a "higher standard" than other occupational groups accorded with findings from both *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers.

Representatives from the OACP, CACP-RF and the host police service generally accepted that intense scrutiny was and would continue to be a staple of contemporary policing. However, they also perceived that the demands placed upon police officers were expanding continuously. Nevertheless, if these demands could occasion frustration, several stakeholder representatives saw civilian oversight initiatives as both a mirror of broad societal values and as responsive to the public's demand that those in positions of power and/or authority be held accountable for their actions:

> *A police officer is the most powerful person in Canada. We are the only ones in Canada that have the ability to take another person's life if need be. We are the only persons that have the ability to arbitrarily detain and take someone's freedom away. We have a huge amount of power to wield, so it makes perfect sense that there should be a civilian oversight…Our power is based on legislation but it is also based on trust.* (CACP-RF representative)

> *I think that as Canadians, we are a very, for the most part, thoughtful, law-abiding, respectful, balanced society. For the most part, I think that most individuals…would view the roles of the police, very, very seriously and respectfully, while at the same time, being very mindful of the level of power and authority. Because of the nature of our society, we put checks and balances in place, that are fairly consistent to our values. I think it's tough. I think people are recognizing more and more, the profession of policing is very complex. The level of training, the resources that need to be invested in training, hiring, recruiting the best. Continuing to support individuals in those roles is critical. And, at the same time, we need to keep a watch on how things are going.* (CAPG representative)

These excerpts attest to a somber awareness that policing, and most public sector resources across Ontario and across Canada more generally, face ever-increasing demands for accountability and transparency. These findings are also consistent with those expressed in both *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers, wherein the majority of survey respondents

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and interviewees recognized the necessity of civilian oversight and its import in promoting the public trust in policing.

7.2.3   Theme 3: Police Services Boards: Tensions and transitions

Issues pertaining to the role and functioning of police services boards surfaced quite regularly throughout these stakeholder interviews. There was a general consensus that the processes related to training and appointing police services board members require serious attention. The representatives from the OAPSB and CAPG both acknowledged that the composition of police services boards varies greatly across Canadian provinces (e.g., size, qualifications of members, appointment process), and noted that the training provided to board members was equally varied:

> *One of the key areas that we need to provide greater support to our membership, is around governance training…concern around qualifications and selection process…Typically, again the model varies from province to province, some police forces and commissions have a mix of provincial and municipal appointees, some have members of council on the boards of commissions…All those different models create different kinds of issues and perspectives. But when it comes to the specifics and participation in the selection process, that really is a municipal and/or provincial responsibility to ensure that there is a rigorous and thorough recruitment process, training process, and selection process….The bigger municipalities have the benefit of having fairly sophisticated HR machinery that kicks into place with credible processes, etc., or these things have been outsourced to external recruitment firms, those kinds of things. For smaller organizations, it's a little bit more difficult. And then when you move towards training, that's an area that we really want as an organization to expand again.* (CAPG representative)

> *I wholeheartedly agree with professionalizing police board membership. There's lots of obstacles to it at the moment, but basically recruiting for excellence, compensation for excellence, training for excellence, resourcing for excellence and legislating for excellence. We are not doing any of those things right now…The model* [at present] *is based on representation, not necessarily even on competence.* (OAPSB representative)

The above excerpts are powerful statements from agencies that prioritize and coordinate issues

on behalf of police services boards across Ontario and across Canada. Both perceived that

inconsistencies in governance practices (e.g., appointment, recruitment, training) result in

differing levels of sophistication in the oversight provided in communities across the province

and across the country. Both also predicted that there will be changes in the methods by which

police services board members are trained, educated and appointed (e.g., municipal, regional and

provincial appointments) to remedy such irregularities.

Police leaders from the host police service, the OACP and the CACP-RF also expressed

concerns over the inconsistent qualifications of police services board members and opined that

some police services board members may lack the requisite knowledge and expertise to be truly

effective in their role as overseers of police:

> *I'd like to see a qualifying process to sit on a police service board based on either competency-based or a KSA based approach, rather than an appointment…I don't know how the province appoints people to police service boards…but regionally and municipally, I know it's generally based upon who's elected to council and who's elected to a body of governance of some sort and then one person at large perhaps in the community…At my level I'm still unaware of whether there's a qualifying level of knowledge or experience that a person is to have….Managing the finances of a police service and the governance of that is at a board of director level, as I'd equate them to, is very important. Board of directors are generally selected based on their experience, based on their success or in their own industry, what they're doing and I don't see that at police service boards and I think that's part of the problem.* (Host police service representative)*

> *Where there seems to be friction and tension at boards, it's when individual board members enter into a discussion at a board meeting, from the point of view of trying to apply business perspective to policing. Policing is not a business, it's a public service. The other tension point is when it's a political thing that is coming through in the board discussions, as opposed to what's the appropriate policing for their community.* (OACP representative)*

> *Our board here has actually identified that themselves saying in a lot of cases they are taking a look over things and in some cases rubber stamping as opposed to actually taking that active interaction with the community, bridging the community and the police service. I think that there is probably some work to be*

done but at the same time I think that there is also a danger that if they become too involved then without the prerequisite background it can cause a lot of angst for a lot of chiefs. (CACP-RF representative)

Although the concerns expressed by these police leaders come from a different vantage point, their views about the inconsistent qualifications and the impact of appointment processes are generally in-line with those expressed by representatives from the OAPSB and CAPG.

The above issues converge on the appropriate role of police services boards in relation to the operations of their respective police service. An oft-cited report by Justice Morden (Morden, 2012) has brought these issues to the forefront. This report raised questions and criticisms about the Toronto Police Services Board's role in the planning of the G20 Summit in Toronto (2010). Known widely as "The Morden Report," this document catalyzed debates about how involved police services boards across Canada should be in the planning and decision-making processes of police service operations. The two interview excerpts which follow attest to the vibrancy of this ongoing debate:

> *I think Morden's actually a direction on which police services boards will go. I think Morden's pretty clear on the fact that police service boards themselves need to assume a greater role and responsibility in the direction of their police services and he doesn't get into the operational questions: The who, what, where, why, and when of what you're doing. Morden gets into more or less into the concept in regards to the actions of, what our actions are, what the preparations, planning, and actions of our police service are going to be.* (Host police service representative)

> *The biggest single issue is that, and then this is one where, say, the chiefs and the boards are in disagreement over, and I don't mean just along those dividing lines, there's disagreement amongst the chiefs, there's disagreement amongst the boards, and that is all about the boards' role vis-à-vis operations. I'm sure you're familiar with that tome written by Justice Morden.* (OAPSB representative)

The "Morden Report" and its discussion of the appropriate role of police services boards in relation to police operations surfaced in all stakeholder interviews. The contours of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of police services boards in relation to police operations remain unresolved among police leaders and many in the civilian oversight and policing communities across Canada (Kempa, 2012; Council of Canadian Academies, 2014: 41-42, 63).

7.2.4 Theme 4: Acknowledgement of poor/infrequent communication during SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau investigations

Results from *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers made clear that many police officers were dissatisfied with the practices of oversight agencies in relation to their conveyance of status updates and the results of investigations. These issues were also raised during *Phase 2* stakeholder interviews. For example:

> *The only thing that I would comment on is we are having some issues with the length of time to get decisions and so just using the same principles as the criminal court about swift access to justice and not having too much time and all, I think those are the same principles that should be applied under policing pieces. We have one particular file here that we have been waiting, I think it is four years for a decision. That is just not right.* (CACP-RF representative)

Although the senior representative from the OIPRD described some investigative delays as "unavoidable," he acknowledged that his agency had received complaints which alleged undue delays in the completion of investigations. The OIPRD representative additionally expressed frustration with the delays (and multiple rounds of requests) that can occur when arranging interviews between OIPRD investigators, the involved officers and their respective legal counsel and/or association representative(s).

The senior representative from the host police service acknowledged police officers' concerns over the stress and frustration caused by investigative delays and sparse/sporadic

communication, but simultaneously emphasized that the process was inherently time-consuming and could not be rushed:

> *Members under investigation want it over with quick and now. They fail to remember that when we do investigations, we take just as long as SIU…if not longer sometimes. They fail to understand that even at the end of the investigation, the court process, if there is a court process, it could take as long... It's a frequent complaint, how long it takes for the SIU to complete their tasks and complete their investigations but they fail to quite often remember it takes us under similar circumstances just as long to complete investigations.* (Host police service representative)

The senior representative from the host police service also noted that their police service waits for the SIU to complete their own parallel investigation (otherwise known as a "Section 11" investigation, *Ontario Reg. 267/10*), a feature which undoubtedly prolongs the overall process and likely compounds police officers' sense of stress and frustration. Thus, this stakeholder representative provided context to the investigative delays and "poor communication" that many police officers complained of in *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers.

7.2.5   Theme 5: Current and future trends pertaining to civilian oversight initiatives

Stakeholder representatives provided a number of thoughtful observations on the system of civilian-led oversight of policing as it exists in Canada and Ontario in particular and on how both are likely to evolve. Their remarks stressed the higher principles that civilian oversight initiatives are designed to fulfill. The following excerpts highlight their perspectives:

> *This sounds corny to a lot of people but if we truly believe in the preamble in the Police Services Act about representing our communities -"the people are the police, the police are the people" - if we believe in that, one of the founding principles behind modern day policing in North America, it really leads us to believe that we're here for our constituents which is the public and why should they not have oversight over us?* (Host police service representative)

> *The OIPRD's mandate promotes and encourages the "professional" status of police officers. Civilian oversight for the policing profession in an accountable and transparent manner recognizes the significant and important role and*

contribution that police officers provide the public. It is pivotal to our democratic society and reflects the dynamic and interdependent relationship in the policing profession. The public needs the police and the police needs the public. (OIPRD representative)

Despite an assortment of constructive criticisms offered by each respective stakeholder representative, there was a general consensus that the scope of the current network of civilian-led agencies offers an essential provision to our society in maintaining accountability and public trust regarding the services provided by the police. Such findings are generally consistent with the views of the majority of police officers in *Phase 1* and *Phase 2*.

In looking to the future of civilian oversight, several interviewees commented on the recent provincial and national initiatives that seek to tackle issues of economic sustainability and efficient police service delivery, such as FPAC (Future of Policing Advisory Committee) (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) and the Economics of Policing summits (e.g., Public Safety Canada). These types of initiatives have opened the door to redefining the role of police officers and police services in the modern era. The following excerpts highlight my respondents' perception that the time is ripe to alter and enhance modern policing services:

> *I think we're in a time of real flux and change…What we're seeing is an evolution in our society of the way public services, in general, are delivered. As we look generally at, affordability of our health care system, our community services, our policing, our education systems, I think we're in the part of a major societal kind of change…I think the majority of people on the CAPG and probably the majority of our membership would say, "Integrated service delivery is where we're going, it's got to be where we're going." That's not to say, that there aren't certain key policing functions that we still need to train for, respect, and maintain…I think we're moving so fast that, I think people feel generally…open to new ways of doing business. They have to be.* (CAPG representative)

> *I've been exposed to police and paramilitary police from around the world and we have got great cops in Ontario. I don't see anybody's oversight system as*

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robust as ours, I agree with you there, although there probably are some that would rival it in different ways. We have put a lot of focus on the future of policing, but…the oversight system…there's a ton of room for improvement. The opportunity is now. The citizenry deserve it. We can have a way better system. If we change the oversight and public safety system, we don't have to do it overnight, but we bring those into the 21st century, we will have far safer communities, even though they are now, we'll have healthier communities, and I think overall it can cost us less. Not sure if it will, but it can. (OAPSB representative)

Given the widespread concerns about the sustainability of the current funding models for policing in Ontario (and beyond), there are serious ongoing discussions at the provincial and national level about the core functions that police officers provide to their respective communities and to community health and safety as a whole. As reflected above, systems of governance, accountability and civilian-led oversight are central to such discussions.

7.2.6   Conclusions from Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews: Stakeholder Representatives

The stakeholder representative interviews in *Phase 2* were an invaluable component of this research. Although the absence of representatives from the SIU and the various police association agencies left some gaps in the overall dialogue, the assemblage of stakeholder representatives was wide-ranging and provided some crucial perspectives from persons positioned in the senior executive level of policing in Ontario.

Throughout these six interviews, police leaders and oversight agency representatives made clear that, like the officers who participated in the survey, they also desired to deliver efficient and accountable police services to the public. However, historically speaking, the relationships between police officers and oversight agencies has been often defined by tension and constant negotiation. It surfaced in these interviews, (and also throughout *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers) that the senior executive leaders hold tremendous sway in setting the tone for

their respective organization, which in turn greatly determines the quality of cooperation and communication between agencies.

The majority of stakeholder representatives acknowledged the complicated and unique nature of police work and the immense challenges inherent in ensuing accountability through oversight while simultaneously respecting the operational autonomy of police leaders. This healthy tension was especially obvious during discussions about the role and functioning of police services boards. There was widespread recognition among the majority of interviewees that the ways in which individuals are appointed to police services boards across the province warrants examination. Several stakeholder representatives also acknowledged the harmful impact that poor communication (e.g., infrequent status updates) can have upon police officers during the course of prolonged oversight investigations. Finally, the current and future status of civilian-led oversight of policing was discussed within the context of the delivery of efficient, sustainable and accountable public services.

7.3   Conclusion of *Chapter 7: Semi-Structured Interviews: Findings and Discussion*

The findings from this section both complemented and largely confirmed the majority of findings from *Phase 1* and *Phase 2* interviews with police officers, with added senior executive perspective on the functioning of civilian-led oversight mechanisms in Ontario. The final chapter concludes and advances a series of recommendations that are intended to strengthen Ontario's system of civilian oversight.

Chapter 8
Conclusions and Recommendations

This concluding chapter provides a summary of this study's key accomplishments. It is followed by a discussion of its findings, followed by a re-examination of the research questions and the theoretical framework. Recommendations for stakeholders are also provided, followed by a discussion of limitations and considerations for future research.

8.1   Summary of Key Findings & Contributions

Before revisiting this study's research questions and theoretical foundations, the key findings and significant research contributions will be briefly discussed.

Mixed Methods approach – This study has made a unique and meaningful contribution to the body of existing literature by utilizing a *mixed methods sequential explanatory design* to investigate police officers' attitudes to issues of civilian oversight. It employed a survey questionnaire as well as interviews with police officers and key stakeholders. As demonstrated throughout *Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire* and *Phase 2: Semi-structured interviews*, this methodological approach provided a wealth of information on the topic of interest. The survey questionnaire was quite successful in garnering responses across a wide spectrum and the semi-structured interviews added depth and richness to the insights gained from the survey questionnaire.

Historically, police officers have been a difficult population for academic researchers to access, which may explain the relative dearth of research on the topic under investigation. In *Phase 1*, the online survey questionnaire received a response rate of 26.2% (1593 survey responses out of 6074 potential responses). To the best of my knowledge, my survey of attitudes of police officers toward issues of civilian oversight is based upon a sample that is larger than samples

amassed by any other survey, worldwide, that has been conducted on my topic to date. In *Phase 2*, 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers from the participating service by telephone. In addition, I conducted interviews with senior executive representatives from 6 key stakeholder organizations.

Expansion of research into a Canadian context – This research endeavour was the first to explore the issue under inquiry in a Canadian context. It is hoped that others will augment my efforts with energies directed to exploring the issues involved along municipal, regional, provincial/state, national, and international lines. Given that Ontario is considered a global leader in the civilian oversight of police officers (Landau, 2000: 64), these investigations may be of interest to persons and organizations at both a national and international level. This project both complements and expands upon previous research efforts and, in doing so, contributes to sociological/criminological research on policing, the regulation of police conduct and the sociology of professions. While previous researchers have focused narrowly on a single police complaints system/agency, my research assessed police officers' attitudes toward *multiple* civilian oversight agencies. I believed that this particular feature of my research design may promote an enhanced and nuanced understanding of the attitudes of police officers in Ontario and it may also serve as a launching point for future research.

Socio-demographic variables – The linear regression and binary logistic regression analyses revealed that the various socio-demographic variables utilized in this study had, with just a few exceptions, very little impact on attitudes toward the various oversight agencies. However, the final multivariate regression analysis revealed some interesting and encouraging results. Unexpectedly, females and officers who did not regularly attend police association meetings were associated with less favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight. Meanwhile, officers

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with supervisory rank, long-tenure (i.e., more than 20 years) and university education were associated with more favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight.

Civilian Oversight - General - The majority of police officers in this study indicated acceptance of civilian-led oversight mechanisms in order to maintain the public's expectation of transparency and accountability. However, I established that this acceptance is not unqualified and officers emphasized a need for oversight agencies to be staffed by competent and capable investigators and administrators with sufficient knowledge, training and experience. These findings were generally consistent throughout *Phase 1* and *Phase 2*. However, these results were slightly more positive than findings reported in previous research and they counter the stereotype of police as resistant to all forms of civilian oversight. The final multivariate regression analysis revealed that police officers' overall positive evaluations of civilian oversight were primarily driven by their positive assessment of the SIU, and to a lesser extent, their rank, education, length of career service and attitudes toward the OIPRD.

Police Services Boards – The finding that the topic of police services boards did not evoke strong sentiments among survey respondents suggests a general (and somewhat passive) acceptance of their role and mandate among police officers in Ontario. However, many police officers expressed significant concerns about the qualifications of police services board members and the efficiency of the oversight they provide. Both police officers and stakeholder representatives noted the inconsistent ways in which police services board members are trained, educated and appointed (e.g., municipal, regional and provincial appointments). Stakeholder representatives also recognized the ongoing debate on the most appropriate role of police services boards in relation to the operations of their respective police service as well as ongoing tensions related to the financial sustainability of policing in Ontario and across Canada.

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Special Investigations Unit – A majority of survey respondents indicated that they generally accept the mandate of the SIU and its role in attempting to ensure accountability of policing in Ontario. Furthermore, a majority of respondents reported satisfaction with the level of objectivity, professionalism and fairness shown by SIU investigators. However, my respondents also perceived investigative inefficiencies in relation to the speed and length of investigations and in regards to the communication of developments and the outcome of investigations and the same concerns were reiterated in the semi-structured interviews.

The use of multivariate regression analysis led to the identification that respondents' positive attitudes toward the SIU served as the most impactful factor that contributed to respondents' positive attitudes toward civilian oversight. This finding makes both practical and intuitive sense since the most serious matters (e.g., instances of bodily harm/death and allegations of sexual assault) with the most serious consequences (e.g., serious criminal and Police Service Act charges, significant career ramifications) fall under the scope of the SIU's mandate.

Office of the Independent Police Review Director – The vast majority of survey respondents indicated that they know very little about the practices of the OIPRD. Among those respondents who reported personal experience with an OIPRD investigation, a significant number expressed dissatisfaction with elements of the investigative process (e.g., speed, length, poor communication). These comments were echoed in the semi-structured interviews, as were negative evaluations by police officers regarding the skills of civilian investigators and negative interactions that occurred during the course of their respective investigations. In the final multivariate regression analysis, positive attitudes toward the OIPRD were also found to be a factor that contributed to officers' positive attitudes toward civilian oversight in general.

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Professional Standards Bureau – A majority of respondents provided favourable evaluations of the mandate and most practices of the Professional Standards Bureau. Across the board, the responses were more positive than for any of the civilian-led oversight agencies examined in this study (Police Services Boards, SIU, OIPRD). The only significant topic of dissatisfaction related to this oversight body pertained to inadequate updates about the status of investigations. A significant majority of police officers in this study also expressed respect for the quality of investigators in their Professional Standards Bureau and satisfaction with the investigations they conduct.

8.1.1 Revisiting Anticipated Findings

In *Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses*, I outlined a series of anticipated findings that were developed during my research proposal phase and based primarily on the findings of previous research. I was generally correct in anticipating that the majority of respondents would indicate a high level of comfort with the mandate and practices of their own Professional Standards Bureau. However, I underestimated how many police officers would indicate a positive acceptance of civilian oversight overall.

Consistent with the findings of previous research, my research found that most socio-demographic variables were not strong predictors of positive or negative attitudes toward the various oversight agencies. Female respondents and supervisors (non-constables) did, as anticipated, exhibit slightly more positive attitudes for most of the varying oversight agencies in the linear and logistic regression analyses. In the final multivariate regression analysis, I did not anticipate that non-regular attendance at police association meetings and being female would emerge as predictors of less favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight in general. Neither of these findings are explained by the extant literature and both merit exploration in future research.

However, I did anticipate that university education, supervisory rank and long career tenure (more than 20 years of experience) would serve as predictors of more favourable attitudes toward civilian oversight.

I was correct in anticipating that the majority of respondents would not dispute the legitimacy of police services boards and that a majority of respondents would express either neutrality or tolerance of the oversight that police services boards provide. I was also generally accurate in anticipating that the majority of respondents would acknowledge the legitimacy of the SIU and indicate acceptance of its mandate. Further, I was correct in anticipating that the majority of respondents would express dissatisfaction with many of the investigative practices carried out by the SIU.

In relation to the OIPRD, I was correct in anticipating that many respondents would be mostly unfamiliar with the agency's mandate and practices. However, I underestimated the extent to which police officers would hold negative views about the OIPRD's investigative practices, especially considering that the vast majority of cases are investigated by the host police service's Professional Standards Bureau. Lastly, I was correct in anticipating that the majority of police officers would express acceptance of the legitimacy and mandate of the Professional Standards Bureau. Thus, I accurately predicted that respondents would express dissatisfaction with some facets of the investigative process (e.g., timeliness, communication, notification of resolution), but would nevertheless regard the Professional Standards Bureau more positively than either the SIU or OIPRD.

8.2   Revisiting the Research Questions and Key Theoretical Concepts

This section re-examines the study's central research questions and elaborates upon key findings within the context of this study's theoretical framework.

The broad and overarching research question of this project was: *What are the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian oversight mechanisms?* This question was answered through the three specific research questions related to the central theoretical concepts explored throughout this study: legitimacy, procedural justice and professionalism.

8.2.1   Legitimacy

> *To what extent do police officers accept the legitimacy of the various civilian oversight agencies in Ontario (e.g., Police Service Boards, the SIU and the OIPRD)?*

The findings of my study indicate that the vast majority of police officers *do* accept that civilian-led oversight agents and agencies possess "the right to rule" in principle. However, this acceptance is largely conditional upon oversight agencies being staffed by qualified and capable investigators and administrators with sufficient knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, my respondents' perceptions of the various oversight agencies varied, with the Professional Standards Bureau the most highly regarded (see *Table 8-48*).

Table 8-48: Summary of General Acceptance of Civilian Oversight Agencies (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight	• 63% of respondents agreed that civilian oversight helps to ensure accountability of policing (19.5% disagreed). • 61.8% of respondents reported that they believe civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing (17.9% disagreed).
Police Services Boards	*Respondents WITH Police Services Boards:* • 65.1% of respondents reported that they respect the mandate of their police services board (only 4.6% disagreed). • 57.2% agreed that their police services board is necessary (16.6% disagreed). *Respondents WITHOUT Police Services Boards:* • 58.2% of respondents agreed that police services boards are necessary in Ontario (only 12.9% disagreed). • 52.3% of respondents agreed that police services boards help ensure accountability of policing (21.1% disagreed).
SIU	• 77.6% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the SIU (only 8.4% disagreed). • 64.3% agreed that the SIU helps to ensure accountability (16.5% disagreed).
OIPRD	• 41.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of the OIPRD (14.9% disagreed and 24.4% selected "don't know"). • 36.5% agreed that the OIPRD helps to ensure accountability (18.9% disagreed and 24% selected "don't know").
Professional Standards Bureau	• 86.9% of respondents indicated they respect the mandate of their Professional Standards Bureau (only 3.2% disagreed). • 83% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability (only 6% disagreed).

The findings in *Table 8-48* may be usefully contemplated in tandem with *Table 8-49*. The latter, which provides a summary of survey responses from *Phase 1*, reveals that that while the majority of respondents (74%) perceive police investigators from the Professional Standards Bureau to be

qualified to scrutinize alleged police misconduct, their perceptions of civilian investigators and administrators from the SIU and OIPRD are less positive.

Table 8-49: Summary of survey respondents' impressions of civilian administrator/investigator skills and qualifications (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight	• 54.9% of respondents indicated that they don't deem civilians to have the necessary skills to investigate alleged police misconduct. Only 15.2% of respondents agreed that civilians possess such necessary skills.
Police Services Boards	*Respondents WITH Police Services Boards:* • Only 19.4% agreed that police services board members are qualified to carry out oversight of their detachment (31.1% disagreed). *Respondents WITHOUT Police Services Boards:* • 49.7% disagreed that "Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work (only 8.2% agreed).
SIU	• 35.2% agreed that "SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" (19.3% disagreed).
OIPRD	• 41.9% of respondents reported that they "don't know" if "OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" (17.3% disagreed and only 11.2% agreed).
Professional Standards Bureau	• 74% agreed that their Professional Standards Bureau investigators are "qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct" (only 6.5% disagreed).

Simply put, while the majority of my respondents accepted civilian-led oversight in principle, many were skeptical of civilians' abilities to oversee, scrutinize and investigate police conduct. These concerns also impacted survey participants' perceptions of the effectiveness of each respective agency. As the results in *Table 8-50* illustrate, while the Professional Standards Bureau was positively evaluated, many survey respondents doubted the effectiveness of the other civilian-led agencies.

Table 8-50: Summary of survey respondents' perceptions of civilian oversight agency effectiveness (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire):

Police Services Boards	• 33.9% agreed that their police services board is effective in their oversight role (24.4% disagreed).
SIU	• 37.7% of respondents agreed that the "SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario" (29.1% disagreed).
OIPRD	• 29.3% reported that they "don't know" if "the OIPRD is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario" (20.1% agreed and 23.5% disagreed).
Professional Standards Bureau	• 71.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, "My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization" (only 9.2% disagreed).

This study revealed that police officers can lack accurate knowledge of the qualifications of those who staff civilian oversight agencies and the most common outcomes of their investigators. As indicated by *Table 8-51*, when survey respondents were asked a series of questions about the SIU, OIPRD and the Professional Standards Bureau, their responses revealed that while most were reasonably knowledgeable about the mandate and practices of their Professional Standards Bureau, many lacked knowledge about the staffing and practices of the SIU and, most especially, the OIPRD.

Table 8-51: Summary of respondents' knowledge about oversight agency mandate and performance (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

SIU	64.8% of survey respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about the SIU (20.9% disagreed).
	Almost all respondents (98.1%) indicated they understand the mandate of the SIU, however the majority of respondents reported they didn't know how many SIU investigators are former police officers; 37.4% indicated they "don't know", and the remaining respondents provided varying responses to this question. Bruser and Henry (2010) determined that approximately 87% of SIU investigators are former police officers.
	A majority of respondents correctly identified the SIU's approximate "clearance-by-criminal-charge rate": 57.4% of respondents indicated that they believe that less than 20% of SIU investigations are cleared by criminal charge. However, the remaining 42.5% selected different responses, including 27.4% who selected "don't know."

	Since 2001, the SIU has published clearance-by-charge rates below 5% in all their Annual Reports.
OIPRD	Only 37.2% of respondents agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about the OIPRD (35.3% disagreed). 64.8% indicated that they understand the mandate of the OIPRD. However, a large proportion of respondents indicated they know very little about the oversight agency. For instance: • 69.5% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD investigators are former police officers (the correct response is 41% to 60%: OIPRD, 2011: 38; OIPRD, 2014: 41). • 59.6% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by criminal charge (35.2% of respondents selected the correct category, "Less than 20%"). • 60.5% reported that they "don't know" what proportion of OIPRD charges are cleared by Police Service Act charge (25.6% of respondents selected the correct category, "Less than 20%"). These findings demonstrate a lack of general knowledge about the practices of the OIPRD, especially when compared to the reported knowledge of the other oversight agencies.
Professional Standards Bureau	72.6% agreed that their police organization has sufficiently educated them about their Professional Standards Bureau (only 14.3% disagreed). Almost all respondents (96.5%) indicated they understand the mandate of the Professional Standards Bureau, however results varied for respondents' knowledge about how many investigations are cleared by Police Service Act and criminal charges: • 53.8% of respondents reported that they believe that less than 20% of their Professional Standards Bureau's investigations are cleared by criminal charge. 35.2% indicated that they "don't know." • 31.6% of respondents reported they believe that less than 20% of their Professional Standards Bureau's investigations are cleared by Police Service Act charge. 37.6% indicated that they "don't know."

These findings suggest that there may be an "education and knowledge gap" and that many police officers are not well-informed about the staffing, performance and practices of the various oversight bodies (e.g., the considerably low clearance by *PSA* charge or Criminal Code charge for the SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau, province-wide). Increasing and enhancing the education that is provided to police officers about these oversight agencies may

improve police officers' perceptions of their import and strengthen their trust and confidence in the efficacy and legitimacy of these agencies.

8.2.2 Procedural Justice

How do police officers feel about the processes involved in having their professional conduct overseen, managed and investigated by civilians in Ontario?

The majority of survey respondents indicated that they perceived that they were treated courteously, fairly and objectively by investigators from the SIU, OIPRD and their Professional Standards Bureau. These are encouraging findings, as they speak to the professional demeanor of the staff members of these agencies. Furthermore, for the SIU and Professional Standards Bureau, a majority of survey respondents were satisfied that they were promptly notified of the investigation and that the investigative process was explained to them.

The major process-related sticking points for survey respondents pertained to the following four issues: being kept informed of the progress of the investigation; being told what happened as a result of investigation; the speed of the investigative process; and the amount of time taken to complete the investigation. *Table 8-52* provides a summary of survey respondents' concerns pertaining to these four areas.

Table 8-52: Summary of survey respondents' concerns about oversight investigation process-related issues (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

SIU	59% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the SIU investigation (20.6% were satisfied). 43.2% were dissatisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the investigation (37% were satisfied). 40.6% were dissatisfied with the speed of the SIU investigative process (38.5% were satisfied). 46.4% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the SIU investigation (28.3% were satisfied).

OIPRD	• 48.8% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the OIPRD investigation (27.2% were satisfied).
	• 50.2% were satisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the investigation (30.5% were dissatisfied).
	• 39.2% were dissatisfied with the speed of the investigative process (35.9% were satisfied).
	• 43.8% were dissatisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the investigation (30.9% were satisfied).
Professional Standards Bureau	• 42.3% were dissatisfied with the extent to which they were kept informed of the progress of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (38.6% were satisfied).
	• 55.2% were satisfied that they were told what happened as a result of the investigation (30.1% were dissatisfied).
	• 48.3% were satisfied with the speed of the Professional Standards Bureau investigative process (32.6% were dissatisfied).
	• 42.2% were satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the Professional Standards Bureau investigation (36.9% were dissatisfied).

The above table reveals that many respondents were largely dissatisfied with the process-related practices the SIU and OIPRD, while attitudes regarding the Professional Standards Bureau were mostly positive. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the factors that impact police officers' sense of trust and confidence in oversight mechanisms.

Procedural justice issues essentially boil down to perceptions of respectful communication. In short, how police officers are treated and how they perceive they are treated during investigations cannot be ignored. When these issues are not properly attended to, the void creates a breeding ground for mistrust and resentment. As one of my interviewees observed, this may also be universally true of all persons involved with oversight *and* police-related investigations:

> *I think the same with anything, communication could always be better but I think that's where we all fall down. As managers, or even investigators, to let people who really need to know what's going on because sometimes we hold stuff too close. I would put that as a general recommendation for all of us.* (Officer #5)

There are many reasons why police officers under investigation by the various oversight agencies may receive very little or infrequent communication (e.g., a lack of progress to report; a need to respect the integrity of the investigation; competing demands upon investigators; a simple lack of time). Nevertheless, these findings suggest that oversight agency investigators should strive to improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers who undergo oversight investigations.

8.2.3   Professionalism

> *To what extent does civilian oversight challenge police officers' sense of professionalism (i.e., professional autonomy and self-regulation)?*

In *Chapter 1: Introduction and Background*, I noted that my study would seek to explore officers' resistance to civilian oversight within the discourse of "professionalism" and consider the extent to which police officers accept, tolerate or reject civilian oversight mechanisms on the basis that they inhibit the professional autonomy and internal regulation of occupational standards enjoyed by other self-regulating professionals. The findings presented in *Chapters 5-7* demonstrated that this was a worthwhile pursuit.

The results from *Phase 1* revealed that efforts to directly probe respondents' perceptions about police "professionalism" were not entirely straightforward. For example, *Table 8-53* provides a summary of results from *Phase 1* pertaining to perceptions about oversight agencies' infringement on police officers' "professional status." In isolation, these results suggest that most respondents, by and large, accept that civilian-led oversight mechanisms do not pose a significant threat to the "professional status" of police officers.

Table 8-53: Summary of respondents' impressions of oversight agency infringement on police officers' professional status (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

General Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight	• 44% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers." Only 24.6% of respondents agreed.
Police Services Boards	*Respondents WITH Police Services Boards:* • 47% disagreed that police services boards "infringe on the professional status of police officers" (only 10.7% agreed). *Respondents WITH Police Services Boards:* • 38.8% of respondents disagreed that "Police Services Boards infringe on the professional status of police officers" (only 14.8% agreed).
SIU	• 45.8% of respondents disagreed that the "SIU infringes on the professional status of police officers" (18% agreed).
OIPRD	• 31.2% disagreed with the statement "The OIPRD infringes upon the professional status of police officers." 27% selected "don't know" and only 12.9% agreed.
Professional Standards Bureau	• 63.1% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "My police service's Professional Standards Bureau infringes on the professional status of police officers" (only 10.1% agreed).

However, a more nuanced picture emerged when respondents were asked a series of conditional/preferential questions. For instance, a significant proportion of respondents indicated that they would prefer that civilians "review" rather than investigate police conduct, or alternatively, that Professional Standards assume responsibility for such investigations entirely:

- 46.6% of respondents reported that they would prefer that civilians only "review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate)." Comparatively, 30.1% of respondents disagreed.
- 48.7% of respondents agreed that they would prefer that their "police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct", versus 27.8% of respondents who disagreed.

These results suggest that many respondents were uncomfortable at the prospect of being evaluated and scrutinized by "outsiders." This discomfort was also evinced by officer preference

for internal police-led investigations. However, consistent with the findings of previous research, 61.5% of respondents reported that if civilian investigators were former police officers, they would not object to "civilian" investigations of their alleged misconduct.

As indicated by *Table 8-54*, although many police officers do not "trust" civilian oversight agencies, a significant number of respondents perceive their own Professional Standards Bureau as trustworthy. *Table 8-54* below summarizes these results.

Table 8-54: Summary of respondents' reported trust for oversight agencies (Phase 1: Survey Questionnaire)

Police Services Boards	• 32% agreed with the statement, "I trust the Police Services Board" (19.6% disagreed).
SIU	• 47% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "I trust the SIU" (20.2% agreed).
OIPRD	• 28.8% of respondents disagreed with the statement, "I trust the OIPRD" (16.8% agreed and 24.8% selected "don't know").
Professional Standards Bureau	• 52.8% of respondents agreed with the statement, "I trust my police service's Professional Standards Bureau" (21.1% disagreed).

The insights that were shared by police officers in the semi-structured interviews in *Phase 2* of my research were helpful in understanding why police officers may perceive that civilian oversight mechanisms impacts their "professional status." For example, interviewees noted the scrutiny that police officers face on a daily basis from a variety of sources (e.g., internal and external oversight, the "general public", courts and other legal mechanisms, traditional media and social media forums) and suggested how this relentless scrutiny, coupled by the media's equation of "bad news" with newsworthiness, could catalyze feelings of resentment, defensiveness, frustration or defeat. Many interviewees also emphasized the immense stress that they experienced while facing parallel investigations and multiple layers of scrutiny. This stress is often compounded when the investigations of civilian-led oversight agencies and an officer's

Professional Standards Bureau are prolonged and fail to provide the officer with updates on the status of these investigations.

Many interviewees perceived that civilian-led accountability mechanisms hold police officers to a "higher standard" than those imposed on other occupational/professional groups. However, many thought that the imposition of a higher standard was legitimate, inasmuch as police hold extraordinary powers to use force and restrict civil liberties. They believed that the police's possession of these powers made them unique among professions/occupations and as setting them apart from those with self-regulating conduct and internal disciplinary mechanisms.

The most predominant theme from *Phase 2* was police officers' overall acceptance of the necessity to partially relinquish control of their accountability mechanisms in order to appease the public's desire for transparency and accountability. To borrow a phrase that appeared in both the written survey comments and during several interviews, many police officers perceived civilian oversight as a "necessary evil" which serves to satisfy a public perception that police are not trusted to hold themselves accountable through internal oversight mechanisms alone. However, their acceptance of external oversight agencies was conditional upon their staffing by competent, qualified, experienced and well-trained individuals.

Recognizing that police officers perceived themselves to be "professionals" aids in understanding their responses to civilian oversight mechanisms. However, it is recommended that future research endeavors continue to develop this theoretical area with more precision and rigour.

8.2.4   Conclusion of Theoretical Evaluation

Throughout this study, three separate but intertwined theoretical concepts were explored: legitimacy, procedural justice, and professionalism. These concepts were immensely valuable in evaluating the attitudes and perceptions of police officers from several key vantage points. An individual police officer's attitudes and perceptions about civilian oversight are informed by many factors, including their career experience and the randomness of their encounters (personal and/or witnessed) with civilian oversight mechanisms. Throughout the course of a given career, individual attitudes and perspectives will evolve, as will the mandates and practices of the oversight agencies/mechanisms. Yet, efforts to expand the base of knowledge about the interactions and relationships between police officers and the various oversight agencies in Canada has been largely neglected in contemporary academic research. Hence, continuous research efforts are needed to gauge how police officers and police services collectively respond to the evolution of civilian oversight mechanisms in Ontario and beyond.

This study presents a theoretical framework that may be useful to future researchers who wish to further probe police officers' attitudes, perceptions and experiences in this regard. This framework proposes that police officers' attitudes toward civilian oversight mechanisms are mediated by some of the following intertwined factors: socio-demographic and life/career experiences; perceptions about the mandate and effectiveness of civilian-led oversight mechanisms; perceptions about the qualifications (e.g., knowledge, skills and abilities [KSAs]) of civilian investigators/administrators; perceptions related to procedural justice issues; and, perceptions about the role of appropriateness of civilians scrutinizing the "professional" conduct of police officers. The findings presented throughout this study have demonstrated that this theoretical framework is worthy of continued exploration and development.

8.3 Recommendations for Stakeholders

The following recommendations for stakeholders emerged directly from the results garnered

throughout this project.

8.3.1 Recommendations for police officers, police services and police associations

Individual Police Officers

- This study revealed that many police officers lack knowledge on the various oversight bodies that scrutinize their professional conduct. In combination with the education-related recommendations below, it is recommended that individual police officers act to educate themselves about the staffing and performance of the various oversight agencies across the province. Such information is readily available through oversight agency websites and annual reports. These materials furnish information on a wide variety of issues including clearance-by-charge rates among the SIU and the OIPRD and staffing members. Acquiring basic knowledge about the practices and structures of these organizations will likely help to separate myth from reality, alleviate unnecessary stresses and promote trust between police and oversight agencies.

- Many respondents from this study remarked that they waited for weeks and months without hearing any updates about the status of their respective investigation. When appropriate, it is recommended that police officers under investigation serve as their own advocates in requesting frequent and ongoing status updates with the various oversight agencies, both individually and with the assistance of liaisons/leadership from their own police service.

Police Services (and Police Associations)

- In comments written by survey respondents and/or voiced by interviewees, police officers praised the host police service for their ongoing efforts to develop an effective and responsive Professional Standards Bureau. With the incorporation of highly skilled investigators with criminal investigation experience, it would appear that these investments have paid dividends: respondents expressed a high level of esteem and respect for the work of the Professional Standards Bureau. Since Professional Standards Bureau investigators

are crucial liaisons between civilian-led oversight agencies and police officers who face conduct/complaint investigations, it is recommended that police services in Ontario continue to invest considerable efforts and resources into developing the most expert, robust and effective internal investigative bodies possible, as their respective effectiveness will largely determine the success of relations between individual officers and civilian-led agencies.

- It is recommended that police services improve training and education about the mandate, staffing and performance of all oversight agencies discussed in this study (police services boards, SIU, OIPRD, Professional Standards Bureau). This notion is supported by Maguire and Dyke (2011: 10) who concluded that attitudes toward "organizational programs" (e.g., Professional Standards Bureaus) can be improved through educational initiatives. With the addition of local statistics and trends regarding the resolution of complaints and allegations of misconduct, such information can be incorporated in a variety of training and educational forums such as in-service training, online training tools (e.g., Canadian Police Knowledge Network [CPKN] courses), and in OPC courses that are delivered "in house" (e.g., supplements to Basic Constable Training [BCT], Advanced Patrol Training [APT], Coach Officer Training, Front Line Supervisor course, and executive-level courses). Such training opportunities could provide reinforcement of the *Police Services Act (PSA)/Ontario Regulation 268/10 "Code of Conduct"* and those internal policies and procedures that are the source of frequent investigation by the various oversight bodies. Such enhanced training and pro-active education can serve to promote positive action by police and deter negative actions by police.

- Whenever suitable and appropriate, it is recommended that police services should make materials available internally that are modelled upon those contained in reports of provincial human rights boards and provide brief summaries of resolved complaints/investigations involving their own police service members. This would allow for meaningful and relatable examples to be shared throughout the organization about the processes involved in resolving complaints/investigations (e.g., timelines, interview/investigative processes, correspondence, resolutions). When suitable examples arise, permission should be obtained from involved members to disclose general details at

briefings, training days, and in e-learning and internal website postings for educative purposes. Through this proactive educational vehicle, service members could learn through the experiences of their peers (e.g., mistakes, successes, stresses, positive and negative interactions with oversight agencies, positive and negative resolutions). Often, such results are published in other forums (e.g., SIU, OIPRD, OCPC websites and annual reports, traditional media outlets and social media). However, the purpose of this initiative is to create a culture of risk management, complaint-avoidance and resilience. As a related reference point, other professional organizations such as the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT), the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO), the College of Nurses of Ontario (CNO), Law Society of Upper Canada/Law Society Tribunal (LSUC) also publish the results of their internal disciplinary matters.

- While respecting the integrity and sensitivity involved in investigating complaints and allegations of wrongdoing (and parallel investigations), it is recommended that police services seek to improve the quality and frequency of communication on behalf of members involved in SIU, OIPRD and Professional Standards Bureau investigations. Police services have dedicated liaisons with each agency that can seek to ensure members are notified immediately regarding investigative status updates or outcomes. Whenever possible, police services should seek to avoid investigative delays or should pro-actively seek out status updates on behalf of members when timelines are breached or information about the status/outcome of SIU, OIPRD or Professional Standards Bureau investigations is not forthcoming.

- Many officers who participated in this study reported significant stress when facing both external and internal investigations. It is incumbent upon police supervisors and police associations to ensure that officers are offered appropriate peer support or counselling through their respective employee assistance programs (EAP) and/or Peer Support/Critical Incident Stress Management programs. To reduce the perceived stigma that may be associated with the use of counselling services, it is recommended that such referrals be incorporated into policy and practice for *all* complaint and misconduct investigations and not simply reserved for "high profile" incidents or traumatic events. Additional referrals

for counselling should be made on a recurring basis for those investigations that stretch over months and sometimes years.

8.3.2 Recommendations for civilian-led oversight agencies

Police Services Boards and Police Governance bodies (e.g., CAPG, OAPSB)

- Continue to develop and deliver standardized training and educational opportunities for police services board members across Ontario. Although there are a variety of police services board mandates across the province (e.g., Section 31, Section 10, First Nations police services boards) basic training/educational curricula should be mandatory for all police service board members and can likely be delivered through a combination of in-class and e-learning modules.[25]

- Where provincial, regional or local appointments to police services boards are not legislated/mandated, develop common qualification standards among police services board members to ensure consistency across the province for those who fulfill these roles.

- Develop best-practice guidelines to ensure police services board members are adequately familiarized with the day-to-day roles of officers/services they oversee. Such initiatives may include mandating and tracking an hourly commitment (on an annual basis) to active participation/observation with police officers from their respective police service. For example, police services board members could become well-immersed in police practices by spending 10-20 hours annually on "ride-alongs", attendance at platoon briefings, training days, specialized branches, special events, and so on.

Special Investigations Unit (SIU)

- Improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers involved in SIU investigations. Ensure police officers/police services are notified ASAP regarding investigative status updates or outcomes. At the time of publication, it is estimated that

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[25] The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (2015: 20) and the OAPSB have made recommendations about the enhanced delivery of standardized and comprehensive training for police services board members across Ontario. For example, see http://www.oapsb.ca/police_and_police_governance_reforms/ and http://www.oapsb.ca/advocacy_postions/2012/03/20/qpd2012_-_governance_training_-_final1.pdf

many SIU investigations take upwards of nine months to complete, which results in considerable stress for all parties involved (Gallant, 2015).[26]

- Improve coordination with police service liaisons to ensure that subject and witness officers are notified about the outcome of investigations, especially before a public media release occurs.

- Continue to improve outreach and educational opportunities with police services/police officers:
  - This study demonstrated that many police officers are largely (but not universally) accepting of investigators who have a background in policing. If not published, police services should be made aware of how many current SIU investigators have police backgrounds so that such information can be shared during training.

  - It is further recommended that police services/officers be informed about the specialized investigative training that SIU investigators possess/receive on an annual basis.

Office of the Independent Review Director (OIPRD)

- Improve the quality and frequency of communication with police officers involved in OIPRD investigations:
  - Ensure police officers/police services are notified ASAP regarding investigative status updates or outcomes. Alert involved police officers if the OIPRD website/online tracking system has been updated.
  - Ensure that subject officers/police services are notified about the outcome of investigations before a public media release occurs.

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[26] In June, 2015, the OACP (Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police) asserted that it takes an average of nine months for the SIU to complete an investigation and for the SIU Director to issue his closing report (see Gallant, 2015: http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/07/15/special-investigations-unit-urged-to-pick-up-the-pace.html). The SIU published an average clearance rate of 78.3 days per case in their 2014-2015 Annual Report. However, this figure factors in a "stop-restart" calculation (p. 30: http://www.siu.on.ca/pdfs/siu_ar_2014_15_ltr_final.pdf). The SIU has set a performance standard of closing 65% of cases within 30 business days. In 2014-2015, 33% were closed within this period. In July-September, 2014 I had several rounds of email correspondence with the SIU. Ultimately, an interview was not granted and discrepancies between the OACP's position and the SIU's official statistics were not clarified.

- Continue to improve outreach and educational opportunities with police services/police officers:
  - Continue to publish and disclose the number of OIPRD investigators have police-related backgrounds.

  - It is further recommended that police services/officers be made aware of the specialized investigative training that OIPRD investigators possess/receive on an annual basis.

  - Continue to improve and develop outreach/educational opportunities with police services/police officers regarding the mandate and practices of the OIPRD (e.g., in recent years, OIPRD Director Gerry McNeilly has made repeated addresses with the Basic Constable Training (BCT) program at the Ontario Police College).

8.3.3 Recommendations for the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Ontario Police College)

- Ensure that the Basic Constable Training (BCT) program (for new police constable recruits) includes thorough education about the mandate and practices of civilian-led oversight agencies, such as police services boards, the SIU and the OIPRD.

- Consider implementing the same educational components cited above in curriculum for intermediate and senior officers as well (e.g., Advanced Patrol Training (APT), Coach Officer Training, Front Line Supervisor course, executive police leadership training, promotional examinations).

- In training developed for Professional Standards Bureau investigators (i.e., the "Police Services Act, Police Complaints Resolution & Human Resources Management" course), incorporate dialogue about methods to mitigate stress faced by police officers who undergo investigations related to police complaints and allegations of wrongdoing (e.g., internal and OIPRD/SIU investigations). The procedural justice issues highlighted in this study should be incorporated into such dialogue.

8.4   Limitations and Considerations for Future Research

This project revealed a number of limitations which may provide directions for future research.

Although my research addressed the three primary civilian oversight organizations in Ontario (police services boards, SIU, OIPRD), it did not include all of the civilian-led oversight agencies across the province and the variety of means by which the performance of police officers is scrutinized. There are several other civilian-led organizations that oversee various aspects of police conduct or complaints against the police, such as the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO). Furthermore, judicial bodies such as the Ontario Court of Justice, the Superior Court of Justice, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada regularly assess the conduct and performance of police officers as their respective cases move through the judicial system.

Legal scrutiny may also come from government lawyers (e.g., Crown Attorneys), defence attorneys, paralegals, and individual citizens who file civil lawsuits against police officers. Future researchers might find it fruitful to analyze issues such as police officer testimony, the success rate of charges/court cases based upon the performance of police officers, as well as case law precedent initiated by police actions (e.g., powers of detention, arrest, and search and seizure) (e.g., Daly, 2011). Some researchers may wish to consider the ways in which police services and individual police officers are held to account by traditional media outlets, social media, and through citizen-led activist organizations. Future research may examine the manner by which police behaviour is regulated by the use of technology, such as cell phone cameras, closed circuit television (CCTV), "dashboard" vehicle cameras and body-worn cameras and other forms of imbedded technology (e.g., cameras on conducted energy weapons, GPS in police vehicles). As the Council of Canadian Academies (2014: 61) has noted, "[i]ncreasingly, cameras

used both by police and the public are serving as another layer of individual accountability" (see also Goldsmith, 2010).

Assessing attitudes and experience from members of a single police service arguably restricted the scope of the study. I recommend that future studies consider assessing national, provincial/state, regional and municipal police services in order to determine if there are varying attitudes and experiences among police officers from police services of varying composition. The possibilities for comparative research would seem limitless.

Future researchers may seek to forge a research agreement that allows for the name of the host police service to be published. The ability to openly analyze trends and statistics related to oversight and accountability mechanisms for the sample frame (e.g., SIU/OIPRD/Professional Standards Bureau complaints, investigations, resolutions, etc.) would allow for a deeper and more nuanced discussion and understanding about the experiences of police officers. In addition, while this study did not focus upon the wide spectrum of behaviours and activities that might constitute complaints against the police or fall under the umbrella of alleged "police misconduct," future studies may tend to the wide variety of complaints that fall under the *Police Services Act (PSA)/Ontario Regulation 268/10 "Code of Conduct"* (e.g., Discreditable conduct, Neglect of duty, Deceit, Corrupt practice, Unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority), or the spectrum of police actions that might trigger an investigation by the SIU (e.g., use of force resulting in serious injury or death, sexual assault).

This study did not linger upon the many ways in which complaints about police conduct are lodged, processed, mediated and resolved informally; however, doing so may prove to be an interesting and rewarding pursuit (e.g. Porter and Prenzler, 2012; Prenzler et al., 2013). Moreover, while this study noted that a portion of my respondents possessed personal experience

with an oversight agency as an involved officer, it did not provide information on the types of conduct or incident that resulted in the situation (e.g., minor complaints versus serious allegations of misconduct) nor probe how the outcomes (positive or negative) of these investigations impact police officers' attitudes and perceptions toward civilian oversight agencies. Hopefully, future research will recognize the merits of doing so and pursue these types of inquiries.

Future researchers might also profitably make the experiences of citizens who file complaints against the police the focus of their inquiries and seek to assess their perceptions of oversight bodies (e.g., Landau, 1994, 1996, 2000; Schulenberg & Chatterjee, 2013; Prenzler et al., 2013). Research which focuses on the experiences of complainants and police officers in relation to complaints about police conduct would predictably allow for a more comprehensive treatment of procedural justice issues. Furthermore, researchers might consider incorporating the attitudes and experiences of civilian oversight agents/investigators themselves and, by doing so, add another dimension to this research.

The methods employed in this study (mixed method sequential explanatory design) worked very well to obtain a reasonable sample frame for the survey questionnaire and a healthy pool of interview participants. Future researchers may choose to replicate or alter this research design (e.g., mailed or hand-delivered survey questionnaires, in-person interviews), or they may seek to incorporate another method such as direct observation or focus groups.

Finally, another area of fruitful research is consideration of the trend towards the "civilianization" of police roles that is occurring in countries such as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Stone and Travis (2011: 13) noted this growing trend in the United Kingdom as a means to reduce the swelling costs related to policing:

> To decrease costs, police departments will likely accelerate the shifting of work to nonsworn, and therefore less expensive, specialist personnel, especially in crime investigation units...A range of new specialists, including crime scene technicians, data analysts and victim liaisons, might well replace one half or more of today's detectives. A wide range of civilian roles could emerge, boosting the prominence of civilian police careers in much the same way that nurses and technicians have taken on many of the roles traditionally played by doctors within the medical profession.

Similar trends are observable in Ontario, Canada. For instance, it is noteworthy that the 2015 report of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario identifies the following among their primary recommendations: "Make legislative changes to permit the greater transfer of specific functions to civilians or other security providers where appropriate" (AMO, 2015: 4). The increased "civilianization" of police services has also been highlighted by the Council of Canadian Academies (2014) and Ahlgren (2015). One may consider the potential ramification of this development and profitably ponder how the civilianization of police roles may impact ongoing efforts to police the police and ensure their accountability to the communities they serve. Thus, if these trends directly challenge and threaten the autonomy and expertise of sworn police personnel, they also invite consideration of what type of agency is best suited to regulate these new para-policing professionals.

8.5 Concluding remarks

The merits of this academic pursuit have been re-affirmed throughout the dissertation. The literature review confirmed that previous research on this topic is dated and sparse and is almost entirely limited to the United States. As the first study of its kind in Canada, this project has provided a sound platform from which to conduct comparison in future research along municipal, regional, provincial, national and international lines. This study both complements and expands upon previous research efforts spanning over several decades while making meaningful and fresh contributions to sociological/criminological research on policing, the

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regulation of police conduct as well as the sociology of professions. In the broadest sense, this study has highlighted how fascinatingly complicated the accountability mechanisms of contemporary policing have become.

In utilizing a mixed methods approach and concentrating on police officers' attitudes regarding *multiple* civilian oversight agencies, rather than one single police complaints system/agency, this study has provided a comprehensive, enhanced and nuanced understanding of the attitudes of police officers in Ontario. In doing so, it has provided a launching point for future researchers who may elect to expand upon or replicate this research with individual civilian oversight agencies or a combination of police services boards, complaint oversight agencies (e.g., OIPRD), or specialized investigative agencies related to police officers' use of force (e.g., SIU).

At the heart of this project is a desire to breathe new life into the academic dialogue about civilian oversight of policing. The voices of police officers have been almost entirely absent from this dialogue in recent decades, yet the development of multi-tiered civilian-led oversight mechanisms has fundamentally transformed the career of policing in many respects. This study has sought to help rectify this omission as it is believed that valuable insight has been lost about the mechanisms that are purported to uphold the standards of accountability and professionalism among police officers. In this pursuit, knowledge has been gained that may improve relationships between police officers and the oversight agents/agencies that scrutinize their professional conduct in Ontario and beyond.

The primary purpose of civilian-led oversight of policing is to instill public confidence that the police are accountable and answerable for their actions. By and large, most police officers in this study expressed acceptance of the necessity for civilian-led oversight on this premise. The

public demands the highest level of accountability and transparency, and increasingly police officers and police services are demanding it of themselves.

The host of proposals and recommendations for all involved stakeholders are put forth with the expectation that some healthy tension will inevitably remain between police officers and those who are responsible for overseeing and scrutinizing their professional conduct. Such tension stands as an eternal central feature of the "currency" of police work; conflict and the mediation thereof.

Broadly, this study has sought to better understand what level of trust police officers hold for the mechanisms that oversee and scrutinize their professional conduct. The findings from this project suggest that as civilian-led oversight institutions have evolved, police officers have grown more accustomed and more accepting of the role that civilians play in ensuring their professional accountability. Peter Tinsley (2009: 1), former President of the Canadian Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (CACOLE), remarked that the attitude of the police towards independent oversight has improved in recent years:

> It is fair to say that historically the attitude towards the reception of oversight was one of resentment and even active resistance by both police leaders and front line officers. With some that continues to be the case, but, overall it is also fair to say that such oversight is now generally accepted with a far higher degree of cooperation and recognized as a necessary part of police professionalism and the maintenance of community confidence.

Tinsley's statement might very well be true, but prior to this academic inquiry, there has been a lack of sufficient evidence to support claims that police officers in countries such as Canada have grown more accepting of civilian-led oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, this study has clearly demonstrated that police officers' views about civilian oversight are complicated and context-specific.

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This study's findings also reveal that more concerted efforts are required by police services and civilian-led oversight agencies to improve levels of cooperation, communication, training and education on many levels. Ultimately, the shared pursuit and fulfillment of such enhancements will serve to strengthen civilian-led oversight mechanisms in Ontario and beyond and, in turn, will hopefully improve the collective trust in one of our society's most crucial public services. All affected stakeholders deserve police services and multi-layered accountability mechanisms that fulfill their respective mandates and which function at their greatest potential.

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Appendix A

Civilian oversight mechanisms in Canada

Province	Agency
Alberta	- Law Enforcement and Oversight Branch, Alberta Government - Law Enforcement Review Board - Alberta Serious Integrated Response Team
British Columbia	- Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner - Independent Investigations Office
Manitoba	- Manitoba Police Commission - Law Enforcement Review Agency - Manitoba Independent Investigations Unit
New Brunswick	New Brunswick Police Commission
Newfoundland	Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission
Nova Scotia	- Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner - Serious Incident Response Team
Ontario	- Special Investigations Unit - Office of the Independent Police Review Director - Ontario Civilian Police Commission
Prince Edward Island	Office of the Police Commissioner
Quebec	- Police Ethics Commissioner - Police Ethics Committee - Ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec
Saskatchewan	Saskatchewan Public Complaints Commission
First Nations	Six Nations Police Commission
Federal	- Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP - Military Police Complaints Commission
Source: http://www.cacole.ca/resources/links/civilLin-lien-eng.shtml	

Appendix B

Survey Questionnaire Recruitment Letter

2014 Ontario Police Officer Satisfaction Survey

You are invited to participate in a study entitled *Police Officers' Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms in Ontario, Canada*.

This study seeks to understand how police officers feel about the following civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario:

- **Police Services Boards;**

- **The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and**

- **The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD)**

This email is being sent on behalf of PhD Candidate Mark Crowell from the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the **University of Waterloo**, who is conducting this study under the supervision of Dr. E.D. Nelson. Mark Crowell is also a Sergeant with the **Waterloo Regional Police Service**.

Below is a link to a **survey questionnaire** that asks police officers from Ontario about their perceptions and experiences regarding civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario.

The purpose of this study is to learn more about the extent to which police officers are satisfied with the practices of the existing civilian-led oversight agencies. With your participation, it is hoped that this study will generate practical recommendations that will lead to improved relations between police officers and civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario, Canada and beyond.

This study has received formal support from the following organizations:

- *The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP)*
- *The Ontario Association of Police Services Boards (OAPSB)*
- *The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police - Research Foundation (CACP-RF)*

If you are interested in this study, please follow the link below to the survey questionnaire. This survey will take approximately **10 to 15 minutes** to complete.

Please click on the **SURVEY LINK** below:

SURVEY LINK

This link is uniquely tied to this survey and your email address. Please do not forward this message.

Your participation in this survey is **VOLUNTARY** and **CONFIDENTIAL**.

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.

Questions, comments or concerns should be directed to researcher, **Mark Crowell, PhD Candidate at the University of Waterloo, Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at EMAIL or by phone at PHONE #**.

I hope that you will participate in this important research project. Many thanks for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Mark Crowell
Department of Sociology & Legal Studies
University of Waterloo

Survey Questionnaire

Ontario Police Officer Satisfaction Survey

INTRODUCTION and CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE

You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by **Mark Crowell**, PhD Candidate in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the **University of Waterloo**, under the supervision of Dr. E.D. Nelson.

Mark Crowell is also a Sergeant with the **Waterloo Regional Police Service.**

The goal of this survey is to learn about how police officers feel about civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario:

• **Police Services Boards;**

• **The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and**

• **The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD)**

The purpose of this study is to learn more about the extent to which police officers are satisfied with the practices of the existing civilian-led oversight agencies. With your participation, it is hoped that this study will generate practical recommendations that will lead to improved relations between police officers and civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario, Canada and beyond.

If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to complete a **10 to 15 minute online survey** that is completed **anonymously**. You are not asked for your name or any identifying information. Survey questions focus on police officers' perceptions and experiences regarding civilian-led oversight agencies in Ontario.

Participation in this study is voluntary. You can withdraw your participation at any time.

This study has received formal support from the following organizations:

There are no known or anticipated risks from participating in this study. Should you wish to seek counseling as a result of any impact raised by this study, you are encouraged to seek assistance from your police service's Employee Assistance Program (EAP), for which contact information is available at your local detachment.

It is important for you to know that any information that you provide will be **confidential**. Only summarized/group data will be presented. No individual will be identifiable from these summarized results. The data, with no personal identifiers, collected from this study will be maintained on a password-protected computer database in a restricted access area of the university.

Should you have any questions about the study, or if you would like a copy of the results, please contact Mark Crowell (m2crowell@uwaterloo.ca , 519-502-6004) or Faculty Supervisor Dr. E.D. Nelson (eds@uwaterloo.ca , (519) 888-4567, ext.35190).

I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin in the Office of Research Ethics at 1-519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.

Thank you for your participation in this important study.

I agree to participate

○ Yes

○ No

SECTION A - BACKGROUND

I'd like to begin by finding out a little about your background in police work.

Is your age between...

○ 18-24

○ 25-34

○ 35-44

○ 45-54

○ 55-64

○ 65 or over

Are you...

○ Male

○ Female

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

○ High School graduate

○ Some College

○ College graduate

○ Some University

○ University graduate

○ Advanced Degree completed (e.g., Masters, PhD)

○ Other

What were the ethnic or cultural origins of your ancestors?

How long have you been a police officer?

○ Less than 1 year

○ 1 - 4 years

○ 5 - 9 years

○ 10 - 14 years

○ 15 - 19 years

○ 20 - 24 years

○ 25 - 29 years

○ 30 years or more

What is your rank?

○ Probationary Police Constable

○ Police Constable

○ Detective Constable

○ Sergeant

○ Staff Sergeant

○ Senior Officer

○ Other

What is the approximate size of the population that your detachment serves?

○ Less than 5,000

○ 5,001 - 25,000

○ 25,001 - 50,000

○ 50,001 - 75,000

○ 75,001 - 100,000

○ 100,001 - 200,000

○ More than 200,000

○ Don't Know / Not Applicable

How would you best describe the community your detachment serves?

○ Mostly rural

○ A mix of rural and urban

○ Mostly urban

○ Don't Know / Not Applicable

I support my police association.

○ Yes

○ No

○ I don't know

I regularly attend police association meetings.

○ Yes

○ No

○ I don't know

SECTION B - GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.	○	○	○	○	○	○
We should keep civilians out of police oversight.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Civilians have the necessary skills to investigate police wrongdoing.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Civilians are biased against police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).	○	○	○	○	○	○
Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

[ ]

SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS

Is your police detachment governed by a Police Services Board?

○ Yes

○ No

○ I Don't Know

SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS

I understand the mandate of my Police Services Board.

○ Yes

○ No

○ I Don't Know / Not Applicable

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
I respect the mandate of my Police Services Board.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My detachment's Police Services Board doesn't affect me very much.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The Police Services Board is necessary.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The Police Services Board is effective in their	○	○	○	○	○	○

oversight of my detachment.

I trust the Police Services Board.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Members of the Police Services Board are qualified to carry out their oversight of my detachment.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Members of the Police Services Board listen to the concerns of my detachment.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The Police Services Board's oversight of my detachment is mostly political "window dressing."	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

SECTION C - POLICE SERVICES BOARDS

I understand the mandate of Police Services Boards in Ontario.

○ Yes

○ No

○ I Don't Know / Not Applicable

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
Police Services Boards are necessary in Ontario.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Police Services Boards help to ensure accountability in policing.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

SECTION D - SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU)

I understand the mandate of the SIU.

○ Yes

○ No

○ Don't know / Not applicable

Regarding the SIU, to the best of your knowledge...

	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable
What proportion of SIU investigators are former police officers?	○	○	○	○	○	○
What proportion of SIU investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
I respect the mandate of the SIU.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has sufficiently educated me about the SIU.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The SIU helps to ensure accountability.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I trust the SIU.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The SIU is biased against the police.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The SIU is objective when they conduct investigations.	○	○	○	○	○	○
SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The SIU infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○

My organization supports the work of the SIU.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police association supports the work of the SIU.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

[   ]

Have you ever been a subject or a witness in a SIU investigation?

○ Yes

○ No

SECTION D - SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU)

During your SIU Investigation(s), were you...

○ A subject.

○ A witness.

○ I have been both a subject and a witness.

As a subject and/or witness officer in a SIU investigation, how satisfied were you:

	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know / Not Applicable
That you were promptly notified of the SIU investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That the SIU investigation process was explained to you?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the SIU?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the objectivity of the SIU investigator(s)?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	○	○	○	○	○	○

That the investigation was unbiased?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the speed of the investigative process?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

[   ]

SECTION E - OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR (OIPRD)

I understand the mandate of the OIPRD.

○   Yes

○   No

○   Don't know / Not applicable

Regarding the OIPRD, to the best of your knowledge...

	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable
What proportion of OIPRD investigators are former police officers?	○	○	○	○	○	○
What proportion of OIPRD investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	○	○	○	○	○	○
What proportion of OIPRD investigations are cleared by Police Services Act charge?	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
I respect the mandate of the OIPRD.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has sufficiently educated me about the OIPRD.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The OIPRD helps to ensure accountability.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The OIPRD is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I trust the OIPRD.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The OIPRD is biased against the police.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The OIPRD is objective when they conduct investigations.	○	○	○	○	○	○
OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	○	○	○	○	○	○

The OIPRD infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization supports the work of the OIPRD.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police association supports the work of the OIPRD.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

[   ]

Have you ever been a subject or a witness in an OIPRD investigation?

○ Yes

○ No

SECTION E - OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR (OIPRD)

During your OIPRD Investigation(s), were you...

○ A subject.

○ A witness.

○ I have been both a subject and a witness.

The primary investigators on my OIPRD investigation were:

○ OIPRD investigators

○ Police investigators (e.g., my police service's Professional Standards Bureau)

As a subject and/or witness officer in a OIPRD investigation, how satisfied were you:

	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know / Not Applicable
That you were promptly notified of the OIPRD investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That the OIPRD investigation process was explained to you?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the OIPRD?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the objectivity of the investigator(s)?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That the investigation was unbiased?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the speed of the investigative process?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○

| That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation? | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Please include any additional comments:

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SECTION F - YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU

I understand the mandate of my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.

○ Yes

○ No

○ Don't Know / Not Applicable

Regarding your police service's Professional Standards Bureau, to the best of your knowledge...

	Less than 20%	20% to 40%	41% to 60%	61% to 80%	More than 80%	Don't Know / Not Applicable
What proportion of your police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigations are cleared by criminal charge?	○	○	○	○	○	○
What proportion of your police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigations are cleared by Police Services Act charge?	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please answer the following:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know / Not Applicable
I respect the mandate of my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My organization has sufficiently educated me about our Professional Standards Bureau.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I trust my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is biased against the police.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is objective when they conduct investigations.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	○	○	○	○	○	○

My organization supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My police association supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Please include any additional comments:

┌─────────────────┐
│   │
└─────────────────┘

Have you ever been a subject or a witness in an investigation conducted by your police service's Professional Standards Bureau?

○ Yes

○ No

SECTION F - YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU

During your Professional Standards Bureau investigation(s), were you...

○ A subject.

○ A witness.

○ I have been both a subject and a witness.

As a subject and/or witness officer, how satisfied were you:

	Very Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know / Not Applicable
That you were promptly notified of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That the Professional Standards Bureau investigation process was explained to you?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the Professional Standards Bureau?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the objectivity of investigators from the Professional Standards Bureau?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That the investigation was unbiased?	○	○	○	○	○	○
With the speed of the investigative process?	○	○	○	○	○	○
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	○	○	○	○	○	○

| With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation? | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation? | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Please include any additional comments:

The survey is completed.   Thank you for your participation!

*** PLEASE READ ***

You are invited to participate in **Phase 2** of this study, which will involve **in-person or telephone interviews** to discuss relationships between civilian oversight agencies and police officers/services in Ontario in further detail.

If you are interested in committing to an **in-person** or **telephone interview** (approximately 20 minutes long), please contact the researcher:

Mark Crowell

EMAIL

or   PHONE #

Mark Crowell is also a Sergeant with the **Waterloo Regional Police Service**

An interview will be set-up at a time & location convenient for **you** (in-person or by phone)

Your participation will be **VOLUNTARY** and your responses will remain completely **CONFIDENTIAL**. This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

Please include any additional comments:

Appendix D

Interview script for police officers

PhD Dissertation project
Mark Crowell
University of Waterloo
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies

Police Officers' Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight Mechanisms in Ontario

Participant ID: _____

Participant Agency: _____

Date: _____

Start Time: _____

End time: _____

Interview location: _____

PREAMBLE

This study examines the attitudes and experiences of police officers in Ontario regarding civilian-led oversight agencies, such as

- Police Services Boards;
- The Special Investigations Unit (SIU); and
- The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD)

As compared to other professional groups (such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, accountants, etc.), policing appears to be unique in the respect that so much of its professional conduct and accountability standards are overseen and managed by "outside" civilian agents/agencies (West, 1991: 383).

However, very little is known about the positive and negative impacts of this unique arrangement, especially from the point of view of police officers.

Throughout our interview I will be asking questions about these civilian-led agencies, both in general and specific terms.

Please keep in mind that, regardless of your personal and professional background, knowledge and experience, I will be attempting to ask the same core group of questions for everyone I interview. Therefore, some questions might not necessarily apply to you.

You can skip any questions you wish.

Are you okay to get started?

To begin, can you tell me a bit about yourself?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. MALE _____ FEMALE _____ (determined by researcher)

2. How long have you been a police officer?

3. What's your current rank?

4. How old are you?

5. What's your highest level education?

6. What did you do before policing?

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT – OVERALL

7. Prior to this interview, had you ever given much thought to the role that civilians play in the oversight of policing in Ontario?

8. What is your understanding of the history of having civilians involved in the oversight of policing? That is, why these types of agencies were developed in Ontario and elsewhere?

9. How do you personally feel about civilians being involved in the oversight of policing and investigation of alleged misconduct?

   - *Where do you think your views fall in line with those of your peers?*

10. Do you think that civilian oversight agencies, like police services boards, the SIU and the OIPRD, are necessary to ensure accountability of policing in Ontario?

    - *Where do you think your views fall in line with those of your peers?*

11. Do you think that civilians are qualified to oversee and review the work of police officers (e.g., PSBs provide administrative oversight, the OIPRD reviews a lot of public complaints)? Why or why not?

12. Do you think that civilians are qualified to conduct investigations into alleged police misconduct (e.g., SIU, OIPRD)? Why or why not?

13. What do you feel are some advantages and disadvantages of having civilians involved in the oversight of police conduct?

- Advantages ?
- Disadvantages?

14. Do you have any concerns that civilians (either administrators or investigators) might hold some bias against the police?

- If yes, in what way?
- Could anything be improved in this regard?

15. How do you feel about former police officers being involved in these agencies?

16. As I said in the preamble, *As compared to other professional groups (such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, accountants, etc.), policing appears to be unique in the respect that so much of its professional conduct and accountability standards are overseen and managed by "outside" civilian agents/agencies.*

In that light, do you think that having civilians involved in the oversight of policing has a positive or negative impact on the professional status of police officers? That is, how we see ourselves as "professionals"?

POLICE SERVICES BOARDS

17. During your career have you worked under the structure where there has been a police services board in place?

18. What do you think about the oversight provided by police services boards?

19. Do you think that anything should change about the oversight that police services boards provide?

Issues to probe, if applicable:

- Quality of oversight;

- Qualifications of police services board members;
- Mandate of police services boards;
- Level of involvement of police services board members

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE – SIU / OIPRD / PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU

20. Have you had any personal experience with an investigation conducted by

- The SIU?   _____?
- The OIPRD? _____?
- Your police service's Professional Standards Bureau?   _____?

Are you interested in talking about any of your experiences?

IF APPLICABLE, MOVE TO APPROPRIATE SECTION

SIU – THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT

21. Can you provide some insight into your experience of being investigated by THE SIU?

- Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation?
- e.g., Were you a subject officer? Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness officer?

22. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by THE SIU?

- e.g. - How you were treated?
- e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself?
- e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation? What was the level of communication?

23. Is there anything you would change about the process of being investigated by THE SIU?

OIPRD – OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW DIRECTOR

24. Can you provide some insight into your experience of being investigated by THE OIPRD?

- Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation?
- e.g., Were you a subject officer? Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness officer?
- Was your investigation conducted *exclusively* by OIPRD investigators (or were local police investigators involved)?

25. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by THE OIPRD?

- e.g. - How you were treated?
- e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself?
- e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation? What was the level of communication?

26. Is there anything you would change about the process of being investigated by THE OIPRD?

YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU

27. Can you provide some insight into your experience of being investigated by YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU?

- Do you mind telling me some basic details about what was under investigation?
- e.g., Were you a subject officer? Were you a witness officer? Both a subject and witness officer?

28. Can you tell me about the process of being investigated by YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU?

- e.g. - How you were treated?
- e.g. - Your impression of the quality of the investigators or the investigation itself?
- e.g. - Were you kept up to date about the progress or the outcome of the investigation? What was the level of communication?

29. Is there anything you would change about the process of being investigated by YOUR POLICE SERVICE'S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU?

CONCLUSION

30. Do you have any recommendations to improve relationships between police officers and civilians involved in oversight of policing?

- e.g. - Is there anything POLICE SERVICES/POLICE OFFICERS could do better?
- e.g. - Is there anything CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AGENCIES could do better?

31. Is there anything else you would like to add or discuss that we didn't cover?

We're done! I really want to thank you for your time. I sincerely appreciate your help. Once this study is completed, you'll be contacted in order to receive a copy of the results. I am going to end the interview now.

End time _____

Appendix E

Items from *Chapter 5: Survey Questionnaire: Descriptive Analysis*

Table 5-55: Examples of Ethnic/Cultural Origins Identified by survey respondents

1. Hungarian, Irish and Native Cree (2, 1, 6)
2. English and French (1, 4)
3. Scotch/Irish/Czechoslovakian (1, 2)
4. French, Aboriginal, English (4, 6, 1)
5. Russian, French, First Nations and English (2, 4, 6) (only first three were coded, 4th excluded)
6. British/ Scottish/ Irish (1)
7. Canadian - English - Dutch/Belgium ancestors (3, 1, 2)
8. Canadian/Italian (3, 2)
9. Hungarian, German (2)
10. Ukrainian/French/First Nation (2,4,6)
11. English, French and Hungarian (1,4,2)
12. Caucasian, English/Irish, French (7, 1, 4)
13. French, Irish, Native Canadian (4, 1, 6)
14. French, Irish, English, Metis, Polish (4, 1, 6) (only first three were coded, 4th excluded)
15. Canadian, British (3, 1)

Table 5-56: "Visible Minority" Status

	Frequency	Percentage
NON Visible Minority Status	1455	91.3
Visible Minority Status	138	8.7
Total	1593	100.0

The Visible Minority variable is comprised of the following references from Cultural Origins variables:
- South American
- First Nation/Aboriginal (incl. Metis)
- Middle Eastern (incl. "Arabic")
- Caribbean
- Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean)
- "African" (incl. "Black", African Canadian, etc.)
- South Asian (Indian, Pakistani)

Table 5-57: General Questions about Civilian Oversight

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability.	60 4.0%	233 15.5%	254 16.9%	761 50.5%	189 12.5%	10 0.7%	1507	3.54
Civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing.	45 3.0%	225 14.9%	291 19.3%	742 49.2%	190 12.6%	14 0.9%	1507	3.56
Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.	48 3.2%	473 31.6%	420 28.0%	350 23.4%	205 13.7%	2 0.1%	1498	3.13
We should keep civilians out of police oversight.	115 7.7%	743 49.4%	370 24.6%	200 13.3%	69 4.6%	6 0.4%	1503	2.59
Civilians have the necessary skills to investigate police wrongdoing.	230 15.3%	596 39.6%	422 28.0%	199 13.2%	30 2.0%	28 1.9%	1505	2.53
Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.	49 3.3%	563 37.5%	357 23.8%	378 25.1%	144 9.6%	12 0.8%	1503	3.03
Civilians are biased against police officers.	60 4.0%	496 33.0%	546 36.4%	271 18.1%	114 7.6%	14 0.9%	1501	2.95
I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct.	52 3.5%	365 24.3%	336 22.4%	569 37.9%	162 10.8%	17 1.1%	1501	3.32
I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).	77 5.1%	375 25.0%	328 21.9%	558 37.2%	141 9.4%	20 1.3%	1499	3.25
Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	65 4.3%	597 39.7%	454 30.2%	277 18.4%	93 6.2%	18 1.2%	1504	2.86

If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct.	23 *1.5%*	157 *10.5%*	387 *25.8%*	730 *48.6%*	194 *12.9%*	10 *0.7%*	1501	3.63

Table 5-58: Police Services Boards

Is your police detachment governed by a Police Services Board?	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	895 *59.8%*
No	527 *35.2%*
I don't know	75 *5.0%*
Total	1497 *100%*

Table 5-59: Respondents governed by a Police Services Board

I understand the mandate of my Police Services Board	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	700 *78.2%*
No	96 *10.7%*
I Don't Know / *Not Applicable*	99 *11.1%*
Total	895 *100%*

Table 5-60: Respondents governed by a Police Services Board: General Questions

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
I respect the mandate of my Police Services Board.	11 _1.2%_	30 _3.4%_	203 _22.8%_	525 _58.9%_	55 _6.2%_	68 _7.6%_	892	3.88
My detachment's Police Services Board doesn't affect me very much.	17 _1.9%_	225 _25.3%_	163 _18.3%_	393 _44.2%_	45 _5.1%_	46 _5.2%_	889	3.41
The Police Services Board is necessary.	26 _2.9%_	121 _13.7%_	184 _20.8%_	436 _49.2%_	71 _8.0%_	48 _5.4%_	886	3.62
The Police Services Board is effective in their oversight of my detachment.	40 _4.5%_	176 _19.9%_	290 _32.8%_	272 _30.8%_	27 _3.1%_	78 _8.8%_	883	3.34
I trust the Police Services Board.	51 _5.8%_	122 _13.8%_	373 _42.3%_	250 _28.3%_	33 _3.7%_	53 _6.0%_	882	3.28
Members of the Police Services Board are qualified to carry out their oversight of my detachment.	65 _7.3%_	211 _23.8%_	343 _38.7%_	157 _17.7%_	15 _1.7%_	96 _10.8%_	887	3.15
Members of the Police Services Board listen to the concerns of my detachment.	39 _4.4%_	142 _16.1%_	287 _32.5%_	265 _30.0%_	35 _4.0%_	115 _13.0%_	883	3.52

Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	32 *3.6%*	383 *43.4%*	317 *35.9%*	78 *8.8%*	17 *1.9%*	55 *6.2%*	882	2.81
The Police Services Board's oversight of my detachment is mostly political "window dressing."	17 *1.9%*	200 *22.7%*	272 *30.9%*	234 *26.6%*	79 *9.0%*	79 *9.0%*	881	3.45

Table 5-61: Respondents NOT governed by a Police Services Board

I understand the mandate of Police Services Boards in Ontario.	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	456 *76.4%*
No	54 *9.0%*
I Don't Know / Not Applicable	87 *14.6%*
Total	597 *100%*

Table 5-62: Respondents NOT governed by a Police Services Board: General Questions

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
Police Services Boards are necessary in Ontario.	11 1.8%	66 11.1%	141 23.6%	306 51.3%	41 6.9%	32 5.4%	597	3.66
Police Services Boards help to ensure accountability in policing.	14 2.3%	112 18.8%	128 21.4%	281 47.1%	31 5.2%	31 5.2%	597	3.50
Members of Police Services Boards are qualified to oversee police work.	73 12.2%	224 37.5%	210 35.2%	48 8.0%	1 0.2%	41 6.9%	597	2.67
Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	16 2.7%	215 36.1%	234 39.3%	70 11.8%	18 3.0%	42 7.1%	595	2.97

Table 5-63: SIU Mandate

I understand the mandate of the SIU.	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	1446 98.1%
No	19 1.3%
Don't know / Not applicable	9 0.6%
Total	1474 100%

Table 5-64: General Questions about the SIU

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
I respect the mandate of the SIU.	45 *3.0%*	80 *5.4%*	192 *13.0%*	982 *66.4%*	166 *11.2%*	13 *0.9%*	1478	3.80
My organization has sufficiently educated me about the SIU.	49 *3.3%*	260 *17.6%*	204 *13.8%*	798 *54.0%*	159 *10.8%*	8 *0.5%*	1478	3.53
The SIU helps to ensure accountability.	58 *3.9%*	186 *12.6%*	270 *18.3%*	836 *56.7%*	112 *7.6%*	13 *0.9%*	1475	3.54
The SIU is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	94 *6.4%*	335 *22.7%*	439 *29.7%*	506 *34.3%*	50 *3.4%*	52 *3.5%*	1476	3.16
I trust the SIU.	300 *20.4%*	390 *26.6%*	457 *31.1%*	262 *17.8%*	35 *2.4%*	24 *1.6%*	1468	2.60
The SIU is biased against the police.	55 *3.7%*	516 *35.1%*	507 *34.4%*	223 *15.1%*	125 *8.5%*	46 *3.1%*	1472	2.99
The SIU is objective when they conduct investigations.	110 *7.5%*	269 *18.3%*	569 *38.8%*	400 *27.3%*	30 *2.0%*	88 *6.0%*	1466	3.16
SIU investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	74 *5.0%*	210 *14.3%*	503 *34.1%*	474 *32.2%*	44 *3.0%*	168 *11.4%*	1473	3.48
The SIU infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	55 *3.7%*	620 *42.1%*	479 *32.5%*	179 *12.1%*	87 *5.9%*	54 *3.7%*	1474	2.85
My organization supports the work of the SIU.	8 *0.5%*	37 *2.5%*	257 *17.5%*	861 *58.5%*	196 *13.3%*	113 *7.7%*	1472	4.05
My police association supports the work of the SIU.	42 *2.9%*	169 *11.5%*	478 *32.5%*	543 *36.9%*	61 *4.1%*	179 *12.2%*	1472	3.64

Table 5-65: Personal Experience with the SIU

Have you ever been a *subject* or a *witness* in a SIU investigation?		During your SIU investigation(s) were you…	
	Total responses (N)		Total responses (N)
Yes	689 *46.6%*	A *subject*	105 *15.1%*
No	790 *53.4%*	A *witness*	405 *58.1%*
Total	1479 *100%*	I have been both a *subject* and a *witness*.	187 *26.8%*
		Total	697 *100%*

Table 5-66: Personal Experience with the SIU: Satisfaction Matrix

As a subject and/or witness officer in a SIU investigation, how satisfied were you:								
	Very Dissatisfied (1)	Dissatisfied (2)	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied (3)	Satisfied (4)	Very Satisfied (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
That you were promptly notified of the SIU investigation?	41 *5.9%*	79 *11.4%*	89 *12.9%*	407 *59.0%*	68 *9.9%*	6 *0.9%*	690	3.58
That the SIU investigation process was explained to you?	45 *6.5%*	168 *24.2%*	102 *14.7%*	329 *47.5%*	43 *6.2%*	6 *0.9%*	693	3.25
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	45 *6.5%*	105 *15.2%*	125 *18.1%*	332 *48.0%*	34 *4.9%*	50 *7.2%*	691	3.51
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the SIU?	49 *7.1%*	71 *10.3%*	109 *15.8%*	354 *51.5%*	70 *10.2%*	35 *5.1%*	688	3.63
With the objectivity of the SIU investigator(s)?	42 *6.1%*	94 *13.7%*	185 *26.9%*	289 *42.0%*	48 *7.0%*	30 *4.4%*	688	3.43
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	23 *3.3%*	75 *10.9%*	158 *23.0%*	323 *46.9%*	51 *7.4%*	58 *8.4%*	688	3.69

							Total (N)	Mean
That the investigation was unbiased?	35 *5.1%*	93 *13.6%*	188 *27.4%*	295 *43.0%*	43 *6.3%*	32 *4.7%*	686	3.46
With the speed of the investigative process?	120 *17.5%*	158 *23.1%*	127 *18.6%*	225 *32.9%*	38 *5.6%*	16 *2.3%*	684	2.93
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	148 *21.6%*	256 *37.4%*	127 *18.6%*	115 *16.8%*	26 *3.8%*	12 *1.8%*	684	2.49
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	137 *20.0%*	181 *26.4%*	155 *22.6%*	172 *25.1%*	22 *3.2%*	19 *2.8%*	686	2.73
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	117 *17.1%*	179 *26.1%*	121 *17.6%*	226 *32.9%*	28 *4.1%*	15 *2.2%*	686	2.87

Table 5-67: OIPRD Mandate

I understand the mandate of the OIPRD.	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	994 *68.4%*
No	336 *23.1%*
Don't know / Not applicable	123 *8.5%*
Total	1453 *100%*

Table 5-68: General Questions about the OIPRD

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
I respect the mandate of the OIPRD.	76 *5.2%*	141 *9.7%*	273 *18.8%*	543 *37.4%*	65 *4.5%*	355 *24.4%*	1453	3.99
My organization has sufficiently educated me about the OIPRD.	150 *10.3%*	364 *25.0%*	169 *11.6%*	460 *31.6%*	81 *5.6%*	231 *15.9%*	1455	3.45
The OIPRD helps to ensure accountability.	79 *5.4%*	196 *13.5%*	298 *20.5%*	473 *32.6%*	57 *3.9%*	348 *24.0%*	1451	3.88
The OIPRD is effective in their oversight of policing in Ontario.	97 *6.7%*	244 *16.8%*	393 *27.1%*	256 *17.6%*	36 *2.5%*	425 *29.3%*	1451	3.80
I trust the OIPRD.	178 *12.4%*	236 *16.4%*	426 *9.6%*	215 *14.9%*	28 *1.9%*	357 *24.8%*	1440	3.52
The OIPRD is biased against the police.	41 *2.8%*	334 *23.0%*	462 *31.8%*	120 *8.3%*	82 *5.7%*	412 *28.4%*	1451	3.76
The OIPRD is objective when they conduct investigations.	75 *5.2%*	158 *10.9%*	469 *32.5%*	256 *17.7%*	22 *1.5%*	465 *32.2%*	1445	3.96
OIPRD investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	80 *5.5%*	171 *11.8%*	430 *29.6%*	157 *10.8%*	6 *0.4%*	608 *41.9%*	1452	4.14
The OIPRD infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	39 *2.7%*	414 *28.5%*	422 *29.0%*	112 *7.7%*	75 *5.2%*	392 *27.0%*	1454	3.65
My organization supports the work of the OIPRD.	10 *0.7%*	28 *1.9%*	248 *17.2%*	603 *41.8%*	124 *8.6%*	428 *29.7%*	1441	4.45
My police association supports the work of the OIPRD.	18 *1.2%*	72 *5.0%*	397 *27.5%*	384 *26.6%*	46 *3.2%*	528 *36.5%*	1445	4.35

Table 5-69: Personal Experience with the OIPRD: Satisfaction Matrix

As a subject and/or witness officer in a OIPRD investigation, how satisfied were you:							
	Very Dissatisfied (1)	Dissatisfied (2)	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied (3)	Satisfied (4)	Very Satisfied (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
That you were promptly notified of the OIPRD investigation?	45 *11.2%*	57 *14.1%*	73 *18.1%*	201 *49.9%*	21 *5.2%*	6 *1.5%*	403	3.28
That the OIPRD investigation process was explained to you?	53 *13.2%*	106 *26.4%*	78 *19.5%*	146 *36.4%*	10 *2.5%*	8 *2.0%*	401	2.95
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	57 *14.2%*	81 *20.1%*	85 *21.1%*	125 *31.1%*	10 *2.5%*	44 *10.9%*	402	3.20
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the OIPRD?	24 *6.0%*	32 *8.0%*	105 *26.2%*	132 *32.9%*	20 *5.0%*	88 *21.9%*	401	3.89
With the objectivity of the investigator(s)?	35 *8.8%*	41 *10.3%*	103 *25.8%*	150 *37.6%*	26 *6.5%*	44 *11.0%*	399	3.56
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	27 *6.8%*	30 *7.5%*	103 *25.9%*	150 *37.7%*	23 *5.8%*	65 *16.3%*	398	3.77
That the investigation was unbiased?	39 *9.8%*	41 *10.3%*	106 *26.6%*	152 *38.2%*	27 *6.8%*	33 *8.3%*	398	3.47
With the speed of the investigative process?	67 *16.8%*	89 *22.4%*	80 *20.1%*	127 *31.9%*	16 *4.0%*	19 *4.8%*	398	2.98
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	83 *21.0%*	110 *27.8%*	81 *20.5%*	92 *23.2%*	16 *4.0%*	14 *3.5%*	396	2.72
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	74 *18.5%*	101 *25.3%*	82 *20.6%*	108 *27.1%*	15 *3.8%*	19 *4.8%*	399	2.86
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	53 *13.4%*	68 *17.1%*	67 *16.9%*	169 *42.6%*	30 *7.6%*	10 *2.5%*	397	3.21

Table 5-70: Professional Standards Bureau Mandate

I understand the mandate of my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	
	Total responses (N)
Yes	1388 *96.5%*
No	34 *2.4%*
Don't know / Not applicable	17 *1.2%*
Total	1439 *100%*

Table 5-71: General Questions about the Professional Standards Bureau

	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neither Agree Nor Disagree (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
I respect the mandate of my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	19 *1.3%*	28 *1.9%*	115 *8.0%*	944 *65.5%*	308 *21.4%*	27 *1.9%*	1441	4.09
My organization has sufficiently educated me about our Professional Standards Bureau.	35 *2.4%*	172 *11.9%*	169 *11.7%*	816 *56.5%*	233 *16.1%*	18 *1.2%*	1443	3.76
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau helps to ensure accountability.	21 *1.5%*	65 *4.5%*	128 *8.9%*	911 *63.3%*	284 *19.7%*	30 *2.1%*	1439	4.02
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is effective in their oversight of my organization.	36 *2.5%*	97 *6.7%*	231 *16.0%*	817 *56.7%*	207 *14.4%*	53 *3.7%*	1441	3.85
I trust my police service's Professional Standards Bureau.	116 *8.1%*	187 *13.0%*	342 *23.8%*	613 *42.6%*	147 *10.2%*	35 *2.4%*	1440	3.41
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is biased against the police.	147 *10.2%*	730 *50.9%*	324 *22.6%*	134 *9.3%*	44 *3.1%*	56 *3.9%*	1435	2.56

My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is objective when they conduct investigations.	68 *4.7%*	138 *9.6%*	339 *23.6%*	676 *47.1%*	141 *9.8%*	74 *5.2%*	1436	3.63
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators are qualified to investigate alleged police misconduct.	29 *2.0%*	65 *4.5%*	205 *14.2%*	807 *56.1%*	257 *17.9%*	76 *5.3%*	1439	3.99
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	163 *11.3%*	745 *51.8%*	333 *23.1%*	111 *7.7%*	35 *2.4%*	52 *3.6%*	1439	2.49
My organization supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau.	6 *0.4%*	12 *0.8%*	130 *9.0%*	801 *55.7%*	421 *29.3%*	69 *4.8%*	1439	4.27
My police association supports the work of our Professional Standards Bureau.	21 *1.5%*	82 *5.7%*	301 *20.9%*	738 *51.3%*	167 *11.6%*	129 *9.0%*	1438	3.93

Table 5-72: Personal Experience with the Professional Standards Bureau

Have you ever been a subject or a witness in an investigation conducted by your police service's Professional Standards Bureau?		**During your Professional Standards Bureau investigation(s), were you...**	
	Total responses (N)		Total responses (N)
Yes	1030 *71.2%*	A *subject*	237 *23.1%*
No	417 *28.8%*	A *witness*	241 *23.4%*
Total	1447 *100%*	I have been both a *subject* and a *witness*.	550 *53.5%*
		Total	1028 *100%*

Table 5-73: Personal Experience with the Professional Standards Bureau: Satisfaction Matrix

As a subject and/or witness officer, how satisfied were you:								
	Very Dissatisfied (1)	Dissatisfied (2)	Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied (3)	Satisfied (4)	Very Satisfied (5)	Don't Know / Not Applicable	Total responses (N)	Mean
That you were promptly notified of the Professional Standards Bureau investigation?	61 6.0%	124 12.1%	123 12.0%	607 59.3%	105 10.3%	3 0.3%	1023	3.57
That the Professional Standards Bureau investigation process was explained to you?	74 7.2%	173 16.9%	159 15.5%	524 51.2%	88 8.6%	6 0.6%	1024	3.39
That you were interviewed soon after the investigation was initiated?	85 8.3%	154 15.1%	148 14.5%	505 49.4%	82 8.0%	49 4.8%	1023	3.48
That you were treated courteously by the staff of the Professional Standards Bureau?	88 8.6%	81 7.9%	112 10.9%	573 56.0%	155 15.2%	14 1.4%	1023	3.65
With the objectivity of investigators from the Professional Standards Bureau?	94 9.2%	112 11.0%	154 15.1%	516 50.5%	124 12.1%	22 2.2%	1022	3.52
With how fair the investigators' questions were?	81 7.9%	82 8.0%	153 15.0%	528 51.8%	124 12.2%	51 5.0%	1019	3.67
That the investigation was unbiased?	93 9.1%	121 11.9%	149 14.7%	495 48.7%	131 12.9%	28 2.8%	1017	3.53
With the speed of the investigative process?	135 13.2%	198 19.4%	184 18.0%	418 41.0%	74 7.3%	11 1.1%	1020	3.13
That you were kept informed of the progress of the investigation?	161 15.8%	270 26.5%	180 17.7%	334 32.8%	59 5.8%	15 1.5%	1019	2.91
With the amount of time it took to complete the investigation?	157 15.4%	220 21.5%	194 19.0%	368 36.0%	63 6.2%	19 1.9%	1021	3.02
That you were told about what happened as a result of the investigation?	118 11.6%	187 18.5%	136 13.4%	475 46.9%	84 8.3%	13 1.3%	1013	3.26

Appendix F

Items from *Chapter 6: Survey Questionnaire: Multivariate Analysis*

Table 6-74: Recoded variables: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.	RECODE Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.
We should keep civilians out of police oversight.	RECODE We should keep civilians out of police oversight.
Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.	RECODE Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.
Civilians are biased against police officers.	RECODE Civilians are biased against police officers.
I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct	RECODE I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct
I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).	RECODE I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).
Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.
If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct.	RECODE If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct.
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 - Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-75: Component Matrix: General Questions about Civilian Oversight – General Attitudes

Variable	Component 1	2
Civilian oversight of policing helps to ensure accountability.	.697	.484
Civilian oversight maintains public trust in policing.	.584	.524
RECODE Civilians are incapable of understanding police work.	.659	
RECODE We should keep civilians out of police oversight.	.758	
Civilians have the necessary skills to investigate police wrongdoing.		.485
RECODE Alleged police misconduct should only be investigated by police officers.	.667	
RECODE Civilians are biased against police officers.	.650	
RECODE I would prefer that my police service's Professional Standards Bureau investigators exclusively handle investigations regarding alleged police misconduct.	.599	
RECODE I would prefer civilians only review allegations of police misconduct (not investigate).		.470
RECODE Civilian oversight infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	.743	
RECODE If civilian investigators were former police officers, I wouldn't mind if they investigated alleged police misconduct.		.409

	3.858 Eigenvalue ; 35.077 % of variance explained	1.367 Eigenvalue ; 12.428 % of variance explained
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.		
2 components extracted.		

Table 6-76: Recoded variables: Respondents Governed by a Police Services Board - General Questions

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
My detachment's Police Services Board doesn't affect me very much.	RECODE_Detachment PSB doesn't Affect Me Much
Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE_PSBs Infringe On Prof Status of Police
The Police Services Board's oversight of my detachment is mostly political "window dressing."	RECODE_PSB_Mostly Window Dressing
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-77: Recoded variables: Respondents Not Governed by Police Services Boards

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
Police Services Boards infringe upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE_NON PSB Infringement on Profess Status of Police
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-78: Recoded Variables: SIU – General Attitudes

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
The SIU is biased against the police.	RECODE_SIU is Biased Against Police
The SIU infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE_SIU infringes On Professional Status of Police
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-79: Recoded Variables: OIPRD – General Attitudes

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
The OIPRD is biased against the police.	RECODE_OIPRD is Biased Against Police
The OIPRD infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE_OIPRD infringes Professional Status of Police
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-80: Recoded Variables: Professional Standards Bureau – General Attitudes

ORIGINAL VARIABLE	RECODED VARIABLE
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau is biased against the police.	RECODE_Professional Standards Bureau Biased Against Police
My police service's Professional Standards Bureau infringes upon the professional status of police officers.	RECODE_Professional StandardsBureauInfringes Profess Status Police
1 – Strongly Disagree 2 - Disagree 3 – Neither Disagree nor Agree 4 – Agree 5 – Strongly Agree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable	1 – Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 – Neither Agree nor Disagree 4 – Disagree 5 – Strongly Disagree 6 – Don't Know / Not Applicable

Table 6-81: Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model – Alternative View

Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model – Alternative View - PART 1 of 2								
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001* N=1285 for all models	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β
Constant	-.298 (.081)		-.292 (.082)		-.196 (.074)		-.178 (.079)	
Sex – Female	-.075 (.066)	-.031	-.074 (.066)	-.030	-.192 (.060)	-.079**	-.185 (.061)	-.076**
Age – Over 45	.181 (.078)	.091*	.181 (.078)	.091*	.125 (.070)	.063	.124 (.070)	.062
University Education	.225 (.055)	.112***	.223 (.055)	.111***	.209 (.050)	.104***	.207 (.050)	.104***
Career Experience – Over 20 years	.153 (.079)	.077	.154 (.080)	.077	.192 (.072)	.097**	.191 (.072)	.096**
Rank – Above Constable	.291 (.058)	.146***	.293 (.058)	.147***	.205 (.052)	.103***	.205 (.052)	.103***
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.069 (.059)	.033	.073 (.062)	.035	.101 (.056)	.048	.104 (.057)	.050
Do not regularly attend police association meetings	-.152 (.074)	-.056*	-.152 (.074)	-.056*	-.159 (.066)	-.058*	-.159 (.066)	-.058*
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards			.000 (.000)	-.125	.000 (.000)	-.083	.000 (.000)	-.086
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards BINARY			.238 (.237)	.117	.129 (.214)	.064	.135 (.214)	.066
Gen. Attitudes – SIU					.418 (.024)	.419***	.421 (.025)	.422***
Satisfaction – SIU							.000 (.000)	.072
Satisfaction – SIU BINARY							-.180 (.243)	-.090
Gen. Attitudes – OIPRD								
Satisfaction – OIPRD								
Satisfaction – OIPRD – BINARY								
Gen. Attitudes – Professional Standards Bureau								
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau								
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau – BINARY								
R / R² / Std. Error of Est.	.285 / .081 / .956		.287 / .082 / .956		.503 / .253 / .863		.504 / .254 / .863	

Predicting Overall Attitudes Toward Civilian Oversight - Final Multivariate Regression Model – Alternative View - PART 2 of 2								
	Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
p < .05 p < .01 *** p < .001 N=1285 for all models	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β	B / Std Error	β
Constant	-.165 (.079)		-.157 (.087)		-.166 (.087)		-.156 (.087)	
Sex – Female	-.204 (.061)	-.084**	-.198 (.061)	-.081**	-.198 (.061)	-.081**	-.194 (.061)	-.080**
Age – Over 45	.116 (.070)	.058	.112 (.070)	.056	.105 (.070)	.053	.104 (.070)	.052
University Education	.213 (.050)	.107***	.213 (.050)	.106***	.216 (.050)	.108***	.216 (.050)	.108***
Career Experience – Over 20 years	.194 (.072)	.097**	.198 (.072)	.100**	.204 (.072)	.102**	.200 (.072)	.101**
Rank – Above Constable	.214 (.052)	.107***	.218 (.052)	.109***	.234 (.053)	.117***	.227 (.054)	.114***
Community Size – Over 100,000 or N/A	.095 (.056)	.046	.091 (.057)	.043	.093 (.057)	.044	.092 (.057)	.044
Do not regularly attend police association meetings	-.162 (.066)	-.059*	-.167 (.066)	-.061*	-.169 (.066)	-.062*	-.165 (.066)	-.060*
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards	.000 (.000)	-.083	.000 (.000)	-.082	-.000 (.000)	-.079	.000 (.000)	-.078
Gen. Attitudes - Police Services Boards BINARY	.136 (.214)	.067	.136 (.213)	.067	.136 (.213)	.067	.135 (.213)	.066
Gen. Attitudes – SIU	.398 (.026)	.400***	.399 (.026)	.401***	.415 (.027)	.416***	.415 (.027)	.416***
Satisfaction – SIU	.000 (.000)	.063	.000 (.000)	.066	.000 (.000)	.075	.000 (.000)	.078
Satisfaction – SIU BINARY	-.184 (.242)	-.092	-.189 (.242)	-.095	-.205 (.242)	-.103	-.207 (.244)	-.104
Gen. Attitudes – OIPRD	.075 (.026)	.075**	.077 (.027)	.077**	.083 (.027)	.083**	.084 (.027)	.084**
Satisfaction – OIPRD			.001 (.000)	.315*	.001 (.000)	.321*	.001 (.000)	.318*
Satisfaction – OIPRD – BINARY			-.720 (.327)	-.323*	-.736 (.327)	-.330*	-.725 (.327)	-.325*
Gen. Attitudes – Professional Standards Bureau					-.050 (.027)	-.050	-.049 (.027)	-.049
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau							.000 (.000)	-.055
Satisfaction – Professional Standards Bureau – BINARY							.073 (.171)	.033
R / R² / Std. Error of Est.	.508 / .259 / .861		.511 / .261 / .860		.513 / .263 / .859		.514 / .264 / .859	