

Progress or the Status Quo? Systems-thinking and Targeted Practice in  
Development

by

Reshem Khan

A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in  
Political Science

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2016

© Reshem Khan 2016

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## ABSTRACT

The policy space in which development happens spans the globe and innumerable contexts depending on the geographical, cultural, or normative scope of the intervention. Taking the complexity of the policy space, the agents of development and the tension between objectivity and orthodox practice and subjective contextual practice, it comes as no surprise that development features a significant degree of unpredictability in outcome. While some element of unpredictability is taken as a given in practice, I argue that theorists and practitioners should not yield so readily to the unknown. The framework presented here with which practitioners may improve upon their analytical capacities offers an introductory roadmap for the types of pre-intervention research necessary to anticipate and mitigate the effects of unintended externalities. In this paper, I apply structuration theory to analyze failures in World Bank development practice. I argue that *the structural configurations of recipient states constrain the potential of externally-directed development initiatives that in turn can reinforce the very institutional features of 'underdevelopment' that are targeted for change. Developing structural and institutional profiles of recipient states in anticipation of development activity will reduce the very prevalent risk of failed development initiatives.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisors, Dr. David Welch of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Dr. Anna Drake of the University of Waterloo. Both were infinite in their wisdom, support and patience throughout the process. Their guidance was both constructive in criticism where warranted and motivating. I am truly grateful.

I would also like to thank the following University of Waterloo faculty members for their insight and expertise in the relevant components of this thesis: Dr. Mariam Mufti (Department of Political Science), Dr. Larry Swatuk (School of Environment, Enterprise and Development), and Dr. Lorne Dawson (Department of Sociology). I would also like to single out Dr. Mariam Mufti for her frank practicality and humour, and Dr. Bessma Momani for her unconditional support and positivity. Both are uniquely invested in their students and were sources of support and wisdom throughout my experience at the University of Waterloo.

I must express my profound gratitude for the 2015/2016 cohort who were only ever a source of laughter, friendship and support—a miraculously compatible bunch. I would also like to thank my best friend who made all of this possible. Finally, I would like to thank my family, for better or worse you are, and will always be, my favourite people in the world.

Thank you.

Reshem

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
<b>PART ONE: THE PROBLEM, THEORY AND PRACTICE</b> .....	7
<b>CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION TO DONOR-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT</b> .....	8
<b>Objective v. subjective aspects to development</b> .....	8
<b>Defining Development</b> .....	10
<b>Social, Economic, Political, Human, Sustainable Approaches to Development</b> .....	11
<b>Social sector-centric approaches to development</b> .....	12
<b>Economic-centric approaches to development</b> .....	13
<b>Political approaches to development</b> .....	15
<b>Environmental/Sustainable approaches to development</b> .....	18
<b>Who does development? External development vs. internal development</b> .....	20
<b>Informed development or efficient development?</b> .....	21
<b>How to do development: Development policy tools</b> .....	23
<b>CHAPTER TWO: PUZZLES IN DEVELOPMENT</b> .....	28
<b>Why is development so complicated?</b> .....	28
<b>Autonomy and ownership</b> .....	29
<b>Paternalism</b> .....	30
<b>Initiative overlap and Fratricide</b> .....	33
<b>Conceptualising and measuring success/failure in development</b> .....	34
<b>Business-Client Culture in Development: Who is the client?</b> .....	37

<b>Theory vs. Practice</b> .....	39
<b>Theories, Approaches, and Models for Development</b> .....	40
<b>PART TWO: THE CONTRIBUTION</b> .....	52
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONS, AGENTS, AND STRUCTURATION THEORY</b> .....	53
<b>Agents</b> .....	53
<b>Structures and their institutions</b> .....	55
<b>Structuration Theory</b> .....	56
<b>Passive agents, agents with potential, and agents with capacity</b> .....	57
<b>Structuration and Development</b> .....	58
<b>External agents and structuration</b> .....	61
<b>Structuration in action</b> .....	61
<b>Loans and structuration</b> .....	62
<b>How programs contribute to or subvert the status quo</b> .....	64
<b>How grants contribute to or subvert the status quo</b> .....	68
<b>Repayment and Structuration</b> .....	68
<b>Implications</b> .....	69
<b>Structural Maturation</b> .....	70
<b>Structural Subversion</b> .....	71
<b>CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDIES</b> .....	75
<b>Health System Modernization Project—Albania, 2006-2012</b> .....	78
<b>Health Workforce and Services Project—Indonesia, 2003-2008</b> .....	83

<b>HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project—Lesotho 2005-2008 .....</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>102</b>

## **INTRODUCTION**

The developing world possesses huge amounts of untapped normative and innovative potential. For decades, global policy discourse has targeted the developing world for external interventions designed to generate sustainable growth in recipient state economies and to raise standards of living for people in the developing world. External interventions by the developed world in developing state recipients have spanned decades and have reached some of the most remote regions of the world in attempts to replicate the ‘developed’ state condition. Results of these interventions, however, are varied and even contemporary interventions are, at best, a pseudo-science. What qualifies as a success or failure in externally-directed development interventions is also, at the end of the day, a matter of opinion.

Contemporary development and political discourse features a great degree of introspection regarding the development enterprise. There seem to be no guarantees. Successes and failures are subjective and no policy tool is a guarantee of a successful development intervention. With an increasing array of development policy tools at the disposal of development practitioners and increasing awareness of exactly how complex an undertaking ‘development’ is, contemporary challenges revolve around honing the analytical tools practitioners have at their disposal. With the flood of information and cautionary tales regarding the unintended externalities of externally directed development interventions increasing daily, practitioners must be better equipped to analyze the information at their disposal to craft a tailored development intervention—one that performs in an anticipated manner given the recipient state’s context.

Despite proliferation of normative and practical wisdom in the field, there remains a huge degree of uncertainty in the ability of development practitioners to guarantee or even predict



success for their proposed initiatives. This variability in outcome stems in part from the inherent complexity of ‘development’ as a concept. Development at its very core implicates questions of: autonomy, progress, capacity and optimization of a given state for the benefit of its people. In practice, solutions to these questions are either orthodox in their adoption of ‘best practice’ principles or innovative, holistic in application or targeted, and financed and conducted by external agents, internal agents, or a combination of the two. The policy space in which development happens spans the globe and innumerable contexts depending on the geographical, cultural, or normative scope of the intervention. Taking the complexity of the policy space, the agents of development and the tension between objectivity and orthodox practice and subjective contextual practice, it comes as no surprise that development features a significant degree of unpredictability in outcome. While some element of unpredictability is taken as a given in practice, I argue that theorists and practitioners should not yield so readily to the unknown. There may be few guarantees in development outcomes but far more needs to be done in improving the chances and preconditions of success.

The framework presented here with which practitioners may improve upon their analytical capacities offers an introductory roadmap for the types of pre-intervention research necessary to anticipate and mitigate the effects of unintended externalities in development practice. More importantly, my contribution to the development literature as well as to political analysis of the developing world and the development enterprise lies in the conceptual tool presented here. In this paper, I apply structuration theory to analyze failures in World Bank development practice. Through analysis of recipient state structures and institutions, I offer a theoretical conceptualization of the problem in order to demonstrate the feasibility of progress and improvement of development practice past its current degree of stagnation. This

conceptualization allows practitioners to analyze recipient states as well as development interventions with more precision and greater awareness of recipient state contexts in a way that limits the risk of unforeseen externalities. The core of my contribution comes from the introduction of the following analytical concepts through which specific development problems can be categorized and addressed: (productive and non-productive) status quo agent-structure interaction, structural maturation, structural subversion, and types of agency (passive, knowledgeable, and empowered). This allows practitioners to attribute successes and failures in the development intervention more effectively and focusses in analysis and improvement of a recipient state's absorptive capacity. Given the conceptual and practical complexities of the development enterprise, this paper addresses the question: *In what ways do structures and institutions in recipient states affect the effectiveness of externally-directed development initiatives?*

I argue here that *the structural configurations of recipient states constrain the potential of externally-directed development initiatives which in turn, may reinforce the very institutional features of 'underdevelopment' that are targeted for change. Structural configurations of recipient states signal whether an externally-directed development initiative will succeed or fail. Developing structural and institutional profiles of recipient states in anticipation of development activity will reduce the very prevalent risk of failed development initiatives.*

The data on which this research is founded were collected through qualitative analysis of World Bank program review documents of three development interventions in Albania, Indonesia, and Lesotho. Case studies were non-randomly selected to illustrate the type of analysis I advocate in this paper. I use the World Bank's development activity to exemplify orthodox 'externally-directed development activity'. As one of the world's largest producers of

development policy, practice and knowledge, the World Bank is a fitting focal point for analysis for the purposes of this paper. The case studies were also selected to ensure the programs being analyzed tend to feature varied geographical representation. The intention behind this was to demonstrate the universally applicable nature of the analytical concepts I develop in this paper. The programs being analyzed feature social sector interventions, this does not affect the type of analysis being conducted since the crux of the analytical framework developed here contends that development initiatives and outcomes are influenced by cross-sectoral, institutional, and structural factors. In other words, ‘social’ sectors of a state are actually far less clearly delineated from other sectors (i.e. economic, administrative, cultural, etc.) when analyzing development systemically. Another selection criterion ensured projects that offer solely technical assistance in the form of external consultations regarding economic policies or expertise on technical innovations were excluded. The assumption is that these projects feature objective development products in the form of expertise, as such they are not influenced by recipient state structures or institutions.

The analytical framework presented here was devised through scrutiny of the practical literature on development and then used to assess the case studies. Development theory was also informative and relevant in this review of the literature, however, given the divide between development theory and practice and the focus on providing a workable, implementable tool for improving development practice; the focus for this research was on the critical literature on development practice. This is well-represented by William Easterly’s writings on how to improve development practice and counter-balanced by Dambisa Moyo’s book *Dead Aid*, which argues that development aid has stagnated and must be phased out. As gaps in the development orthodoxy became apparent and a loose impression of what those gaps represented began to

materialize, I discovered Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. An influential though largely stagnated sociological theory which (when taken with a grain of salt) articulated quite well my conclusions on what ails the contemporary development enterprise. I draw heavily from Giddens' approaches to conceptions of agency, structures, institutions and structuration theory in the formulation of the analytical framework advocated in this paper though my application of these concepts into a broader theoretical whole is distinct. This thesis resides on the peripheries of post-modernisation theory in that I focus on more than just growth in economic sectors of a state in pursuit of development goals. I do however, remain wary of framing development as an iterative process towards a defined 'end' since the theoretical basis on which this thesis is founded is one which defines progress in development as an inherently subjective endeavour.

With this thesis, I offer analytical concepts for pre- and post-intervention research and analysis which can in turn inform the design of development interventions that account for (or at least take into consideration) a recipient state's structural and institutional parameters in the pursuit of program success. These concepts are developed as tools designed to respond to questions of aid effectiveness proposed by the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) (Organisation for Economic Development, n.d.). The thesis is divided into two parts, with part one detailing the problem and part two detailing my contribution through case study analysis. The next chapter offers an introduction to contemporary development theory and practice and establishes how the difficulties associated with defining development affects the difficulties associated with development practice. Chapter two exposes the complexity of development practice and the relationship between theory and practice. Chapter three introduces the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, the normative thrust of which I adopt in this paper. The rest of the chapters focus on my contribution to the

literature. Chapter four outlines the theoretical component of the approach advocated in this paper, structuration theory. I also apply the theory to assess the quality of popular development policy tools. Chapter five introduces and analyses five case studies of World Bank programs in accordance with the theory advocated here. The final and concluding chapter develops further my contribution through a broad roadmap on how practitioners may conduct their pre-intervention research using the theory developed in this paper.

## **PART ONE: THE PROBLEM, THEORY AND PRACTICE**

## **CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION TO DONOR-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT**

Development is a vast, cross-disciplinary, and often ambiguous field of study. Despite nearly a century of formalized development practice, there is still little contemporary consensus on what distinguishes a developing state from a developed state (OECD, 2006). Before delving into the core of my argument, I will attempt to lessen this ambiguity for the purposes of my paper while highlighting the scope and limitations of contemporary definitions.

### **Objective v. subjective aspects to development**

There are several ways to conceptualize development. In this section, I establish a binary categorization to begin with and further dissect the concept for the purposes of this paper.

Objective aspects of development theory and practice appeal to universal ideas of what it means to be a ‘developed’ state and appeal to quantifiable indicators such as GDP per capita, or income demographics in order to make assessments on a state’s development status, trajectory, and prospects.

Objective aspects of development theory and practice assume that there is a ‘start’ and an ‘end’ to the development process: every state is ‘developed’ once it achieves (and can sustainably maintain) a certain threshold of objective and measurable progress in key institutions or sectors. Often, objective aspects make use of economic indicators to gauge the developmental progress a state has made. In practice, objective aspects include attempting to first establish successful models of development in a recipient state and then attempting to replicate these successful development programs from one state or region to other parts of the developing world. These models target certain sectors as development priorities and operate on the objective

assumptions of what prerequisites are necessary to develop a state through appeal to some of the quantifiable indicators mentioned earlier

Much like with objective aspects of development, subjective aspects conceive of the ‘development’ of a state as a fluid process that can manifest in a variety of ways depending on the state in question. Subjective aspects of development also take time and space into consideration, acknowledging that what qualifies as ‘development’ at one point in history may not ‘keep’ when compared to what qualifies as ‘development’ at another point in time or space. However, subjectivity in development may advocate unique state-specific paths to development or may prescribe different models of development based on the type of state in question. This typology can be based on region, economic model, regime type, or the abundance of natural resources the state has at its disposal. Subjectivity in development leaves room for a wide variety of development trajectories and narratives, each state travelling a different path or arriving at a different manifestation of what it means to be a developed state.

Current development initiatives tend to combine subjective and objective aspects. For example, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a global set of priorities created by the UN for eradicating extreme poverty worldwide (United Nations, 2006). All signatory states commit to promote and implement the necessary measures to achieve quantifiable progress in the eradication of extreme poverty within their sovereign jurisdictions. These qualify in the categories articulated in this paper as an objective aspect of development practice given the universal definition of poverty that these goals are based on. However, in pursuing these goals, development practitioners will advocate different subjective approaches to poverty eradication given their resources, the type of program they perceive as the most effective in achieving the MDGs and the context in which they are operating. The commitments for the MDGs expired in



2015 and have now been extended and improved upon through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which are referenced in Paris and Accra (Sachs, 2012).

Acknowledging that some degree of objectivity is absolutely necessary in being able to measure progress in a state's developmental condition, I focus predominantly on the subjective 'method' of development employed by practitioners to achieve their goals. I endorse a hybrid approach to development in this paper and develop a procedure for assessing a development problem and designing an appropriate intervention through reference to a recipient states' structural and institutional configuration.

### **Defining Development**

Contemporary development studies feature a number of different definitions in use or in evolution based on the thematic approach the theorist or practitioner deems most important. Still, these thematic definitions have rarely been distilled or combined successfully to make a cohesive, generalizable whole. Even the United Nations—the global powerhouse of norm dissemination—is unable to offer a cohesive definition. The World Bank, which is a global leader in development practice and intervention in the developing world and whose case program documents I will be analyzing in the second part of this paper, has also failed to provide a definition of development. Instead, both organizations elect to dissect development into more manageable thematic definitions: human, economic, sustainable, environmental etc. Of course, development practice has, for much of contemporary history, been defined and authoritatively conducted by the West. This presumptuousness that has pervaded much of development theory and practice paradoxically informs both the idea of 'development' as it is often conceived of by practitioners and theorists as well as the definition of the contemporary problems in development. In an attempt to demonstrate this irony, Gilbert Rist offers a particularly pithy

definition of development: “Development consists of a set of practices, sometimes appearing to conflict with one another, which require—for the reproduction of society—the general transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand.” (Rist, 1997, p. 13).

Through this definition, Rist offers commentary on the effectively destructive process of ‘development’ as conducted and theorized by leading development practitioners, generally based in or informed by, the normative ‘West’. This definition while dripping with disdain for the field, actually offers a particularly concise conceptualization of current failures of development as a practice and reflects much of the frustration that has prompted my current study.

### **Social, Economic, Political, Human, Sustainable Approaches to Development**

Having established the objective/subjective binary categorization of different aspects of development theory and practice, it is possible to dissect the term further. Depending on whether the focus is on social, economic, political, environmental or sustainable indicators of development, we are exposed to a number of different conceptions of what it means to be ‘developed.’ It is important to note here that even definitions of specific thematic approaches to development vary greatly. As such, I offer one pre-established definition per theme as a base definition but acknowledge that every definition offered below has been scrutinized, critiqued, and even fallen out of use. The intention behind offering one admittedly fairly random (given the proliferation of definitions in current usage) definition is to impress upon the reader the general thrust of each approach in terms of its targets and conceptualization of development.

## **Social sector-centric approaches to development**

Social development focuses on the social prerequisites that promote growth in the social sectors. This approach derives its measure of success by looking at how the people subject to ‘development’ are affected by it. The assumption is that if the experiences of people (and society as a whole) can be targeted for development, other sectors of the state will benefit. While these sectoral distinctions are useful for practitioners in one sense, they obscure the inter-connectedness of different forms of development and serve to confuse initiatives and make development progress difficult to measure. In an extensive study on social development, James Midgely offers one such definition of development: ‘a process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic ‘development’ (Midgely, 1995, p. 8). This definition illustrates both the approach Midgely advocates as well as the means by which he perceives this type of development need be achieved, namely economic development. This definition also illustrates effectively the difficulty in distinguishing the inter-connectedness of different approaches in development. The fact that Midgely includes another distinct developmental approach in his definition of social development speaks well to the fact that a holistic definition would be beneficial in both filling these conceptual gaps and reducing definitional overlaps.

Social-centric indicators of development can focus on health indicators, rates and quality of education, gender parity, and rates of conflict within the state. Health indicators can include rates of malnourishment among the population, rates of child and maternal death, prevalence of epidemic-level diseases, health risks the population is subject to, and quality and level of access to health care. Education can also offer insight on the level of state development, this includes: rates of literacy among the population, percentage of children in primary school, costs of

education, the number of post-secondary institutions in the state, and quality and level of access to education. Additionally, gender parity is increasingly recognized as a telling indicator of state development since this cross-cuts many of the other social indicators for example, the gendered disparities of rates of education or access to health. Another useful measure for gender parity is through assessment of the legal processes and guarantees featured in the state and the degree to which the reliability of these guarantees deviates in relation to men and women. Assessing rates of conflict within the state can also signal developmental prospects for a state. Paul Collier has written extensively on the correlations between economic growth/stagnation and prospects for civil war (Collier, 2000). However there is a hierarchy of types of conflict and their influence on assessing degrees of development. For example, violent civil war/conflict based on ethnic, religious, or sectarian divisions is a far more potent indicator of a state that is still developing than non-violent political disunity or conflict that is common in developed states.

### **Economic-centric approaches to development**

Approaches to development that focus on the economy assess developmental progress through analysis of economic indicators of the state in question. Through appeal to free market principles, the assumption here is that economic development promotes positive, trickle-down growth in other sectors. This means that figures such as GDP, GDP per capita, GNP, average income, and sector specific economic profiles are factored in when formulating a development policy intervention. The intervention can focus on improving economic efficiency in certain sectors, lowering barriers to trade, establishing new trade relationships, introducing new economic policies and can inform national economic policy. As has been noted by many academics in the field, economic growth and economic development are often used interchangeably, as Linda Hauner notes, this informs the approaches to development advocated

in the field of development (Hauner, 2008, p. 7). A prominent assumption in the economics of development is that the condition of ‘underdevelopment’ is symptomatic of inefficiencies in the way domestic markets and the economic sector operates. If recipient states can reform their economy and markets, the other cross-sectoral features of development will be promoted as well.

The field of development economics focusses specifically on the economies of developing states and theorists and practitioners approach these states with a diagnostic eye and it is most frequently associated with Albert Otto Hirschman (Hirschman, 1958). Development economics has been recognized as much of the ideological underpinning of the Post-Washington Consensus (Fine, 2006, p. 7). This is contrasted with ‘economic development’, the principles and theories of which are presumed to apply universally and which examines methods and implications of generating economic growth, locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. The more general ‘economic development’ is defined by Lorenzo G. Bellu on behalf of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as; ‘improvement of the way endowments and goods and services are used within (or by) the system to generate new goods and services in order to provide additional consumption and/or investment possibilities to the members of the ‘system’ (Bellu, 2011, p. 3); Development economics on the other hand, while lacking a general definition, combines economics with development studies in an attempt to ‘provide a mathematical model of core-periphery ‘development’ (Fine, 2006, p. xix). The aspirational mathematical modelling of core-periphery development has however fallen under severe scrutiny in recent years. The most vocal opponent of development economics and its thus-far failed attempts to model core-periphery relationships is Paul Krugman, who argues that development economics (or as he refers to it, ‘high development theory’) is in crisis due to this very inability to model what is being theorized (Krugman, 1994).

An alternative, more radical economics-centric approach to development that does not prescribe to either the Washington or Post-Washington Consensus is not limited to, but is well exemplified by, Dambisa Moyo's controversial book *Dead Aid*. In 'Dead Aid', Moyo argues that most of the orthodox tools of development advocated by the World Bank and IMF are exacerbating the realities of underdevelopment in recipient states. She limits her analysis to the African continent but her claims transcend geography and offer a radical alternative to dominant consensus' in development practice. Moyo offers a compelling account of current failings in the logic and practice in the field of development and the approach promoted in this paper is in agreement with much of her exposition of problems in development. However, Moyo's analysis of current crises in development leads her to conclude that much of the development 'product' that is being received by the developing world is defective and thus must be discontinued, hypothetically within 5-10 years (Moyo, 2009, p. 76). The policy recommendations advocated in part two of this paper are far more optimistic about the potential of current development tools at the practitioner's disposal.

### **Political approaches to development**

Approaches to development that focus on the political features of the state in question identify regime type, electoral processes, degree of transparency, leadership, and governance as key indicators of developmental success. Development practitioners may target political mechanisms for succession, for example electoral processes, for reform. They may also support the development of oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency in democratic elections. Corruption is perhaps the most significant and nebulous issue that development practitioners target for mitigation in the developing state context since it can be identified as exacerbating any and all state-wide economic/political/social processes that are targeted for improvement.

Many development theorists envision the establishment of democracy within a struggling recipient state context as a panacea for chronic underdevelopment, the assumption is that democracy is an objectively superior political mechanism by which the will of the people is represented and manifested. Democracy is assumed to be the prerequisite for other advancements in a state that lead to developmental progress. Prominent economist Hernando de Soto and director of International Programs at the Instituto Libertad y Democracia Deborah Orsini articulate this quite effectively in a brief article detailing puzzles in development,

Democracy encourages the participation of interested citizens in government decisions.

Democracy allows politicians to do what they are mandated to do—not what they think is their royal prerogative. The crux of democracy is government by the people and for the people. (De Soto & Orsini, 1991, p. 112)

De Soto has written extensively on the indispensability of democracy as a prerequisite and necessary component for social development and economic growth in the developing world.

Another significant thematic focus of development theory is on the political leadership in the recipient state targeted for intervention. This discussion of leadership manifests in two notable ways in the literature: leadership as an independent variable to promote in development, or as a dependent variable that is influenced through development interventions.

First, theorists treat political leadership as a variable that can intervene in the effectiveness of a development intervention in a number of ways. In the literature, this can mean that political leadership in the recipient state can be supportive of a development intervention or can impose conditionalities or limits on the degree of effectiveness of the intervention. James Raymond Vreeland discusses this at length in his paper ‘The IMF and Economic Development’ in which he argues that political will is a complicating factor in planned interventions. Political

will is complicated due to the fact that it is necessary to ensure program effectiveness but it also sometimes contributes to elite interests, the argument is that political elites decide to appeal to the IMF for intervention in the form of loans or programs because they perceive the intervention as strengthening their position in society (Vreeland, 2008, p. 353). Vreeland goes on to argue that while political will is necessary to improve prospects for successful development interventions, IMF interventions should target political reformers as the agents by which the programs or loans are disbursed (Vreeland, 2008, p. 366).

A second conclusion regarding political leadership in development treats it as a dependent variable in the impact of interventions. This literature contends that political leadership may become dependent on constant flows of loan monies and programmatic assistance. The assumption here is that when recipient state leadership is given access to large volumes of capital through external agencies, they become less answerable to local constituents. In a democratic context, theory dictates that political leadership is beholden to deliver on election promises, specifically on promises of economic growth since state administration relies on capital (either through taxation of constituents or through economic activity). This feedback loop which features some degree of guarantee on political accountability can be significantly diminished when political leadership establishes a donor-recipient relationship with the IMF since the reliance on constituents for fiscal capacity is eroded (Moss, Pettersson, & Van de Walle, 2008, p. 269).

A brief note on the literature on corruption in the developing state context which is widely recognized within social sciences as being systemically contagious. By this, I mean that corruption does not tend to stay localized within one local geographic space within the recipient



state or within one sector of the state. A particularly insightful excerpt from a 4<sup>th</sup> century Indian treatise exposes the complexity of the problem contending with rampant corruption,

‘Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving underwater cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves)’ (R. P. Kangle 1972, p. 91).

As such, there is yet to be a compelling and applicable theorization of a potential ‘cure’ for the problem of corruption. Regardless, valuable efforts have been made to map out the extent to which corruption exists and persists in states, both developed and developing.

### **Environmental/Sustainable approaches to development**

Environmental considerations are becoming increasingly prominent for development practitioners, developing states, and the developed states which interact with them. There is growing recognition that the forerunners for growth in the developing world, the BICs (Brazil, India, and China) all incur huge environmental costs as an externality of their impressive growth rates. Many of these states incur these costs as a result of MNCs from the developed world taking advantage of lax environmental regulations in the recipient state (Osabuohien, Efobi, & Gitau, 2015, p. 132).

However, some argue that the recipient state itself is a source of the problem. For much of their developmental story, developing states have had other concerns such as famine, civil war, dictatorial leadership, etc. these take precedence and national priorities are naturally different from state to state. It must also be stressed that the developed world as it exists today has only achieved developmental progress through a necessary phase of excessive carbon

expenditure through the use of dirty oil, coal, and other cheap sources of energy. It is only through this lower cost, higher growth model that the developed world can claim the benefit of their relative success and that the developing world must also be afforded that freedom. Clean energy is costly and requires technical expertise with significant proportions of GDP being diverted for research and development. Therefore, many argue that environmental considerations are a luxury that only the developed world can afford.

The discussion on the implications of development for the environment is complex and on a thematic level features issues of: climate justice, responsibility, blame, and moral normative impositions by the West of what is perceived by the developing world to be a luxury. At a practical level, discussions revolve around the most suitable policy tool by which the effects of climate change are mitigated globally, these include: cap and trade, carbon taxes, and R&D into green technologies (this includes discussion on patents).

Conceptual issues surrounding policy application features most significantly, discussions on whether the developing world should bear the responsibility for the current climate change crisis, or whether the developed world should bear the responsibility for past pollutive sins that have contributed to contemporary environmental issues (Eberlein & Matten, 2009). This is well exemplified by the analysis of local blame in the small island state of the Marshall Island detailed by Peter Rudiak-Gould. The Marshall Islands and other small island states like the Maldives bear the brunt of the negative impact of climate change. As sea levels rise, the recognition of climate change and the externalities of unchecked environmental depletion is, in many places in the developed world, an abstract concept. The observable and very real destruction that climate change has wrought on small island states places them at the front line of a conflict they contributed to minimally at best (Rudiak-Gould, 2014).

## **Who does development? External development vs. internal development**

The process of state development can be further categorized based on whether the agents who engage in development originate within the state or outside of it. Externally directed development work can encompass a wide range of agents including: donors, World Bank/IMF officials, NGOs, NPOs, technocrats, field personnel etc. These agents can range from a wide variety of professional, cultural, national and ethno-religious backgrounds. These backgrounds inform their normative inclinations, their values, their assessment of the development challenges and their motivations for engaging them.

Analyzing internally directed development work is a bit more nebulous. The line between agent contributions to ‘develop’ the state and agent contributions to day to day state functions, is blurred on various levels and raises a number of questions that are often left unanswered in development practice. First, do intentions matter? Second, is there recognition domestically that the state is ‘developing’ and what priority is placed on addressing this? Third, does all state activity within a developing state context affect that ‘developing state’ status? Lastly, at what point are domestic agents engaging in state development and at which point are they engaging in the normalized day to day activity of the state in question?

If we assume the position that all state activity within a developing state context contributes in one way or another to the degree of ‘development’, then we must conclude that all activity within the developing state context affects that ‘developing state’ status regardless of whether it is day-to-day state activity and processes or not. This has important implications for who qualifies as an agent of development. Based on this assumption, a fruit vendor in rural Bangladesh contributes in the same way (albeit on a potentially smaller scale) to the country’s

degree of development as a government official introducing trade liberalisation reforms at the national level.

Alternately, if we accept that intentions do matter and that a state and domestic agents must *decide* to engage in development, then we must first deduce whether state agents in question are cognizant of their country's degree of development. We must then ascertain whether there exists (national or local-level) impetus to further 'develop' the state. There may also exist counter-intentionality among domestic agents who may disagree about the degree to which their state is 'developing' or the routes being advocated as means to promote state development.

This debate also hints at the complexity of issues of attribution when discussing development 'successes' and 'failures'. If a state that has some degree of domestic agent capacity also hosts external development agents then it is an immensely complicated task to determine causality between external agent activity and developmental success vs. internal/domestic agent activity and developmental success. This complication is also evident when assessing failures in development. Is progress in a state's development the result of external intervention or is it the result of a natural (or concerted) effort on the part of domestic agents?

### **Informed development or efficient development?**

The debates revolving around: objective vs. subjective aspects of development work, the role of external and internal agents in state development, and the problem of attribution of development success/failure; are represented in the 'doing' of development. There are several ways agents can 'do' development.

Depending on whether they focus more heavily to the objective or subjective aspects of development theory and practice, or a hybrid of both, development agents have a number of tools

at their disposal with which to 'do' development. An implication of objectivity in development is that according to this approach, not only is there a start and end to development, there is also a correct and incorrect way to achieve that development 'end'. Therefore, as long as development agents or practitioners have the 'end' in sight and the 'correct' route with which to embark on that journey, deviations from that route are only relevant insofar as they help practitioners gauge how best to 'right' a developing state's incorrect trajectory. In other words, regional, national, or local conceptualizations of what constitutes development and how to do it, become less relevant when diagnosing and prescribing solutions to a state's failed development enterprise. This becomes a useful approach for external development agents since context becomes less relevant when operating in states they are not familiar with. The burden of knowledge is less of an impediment.

Implications of the subjective components of development theory and practice are that due to the importance of regional, national and local contexts in informing the policy tools that are used to promote development, agents and practitioners must in a sense 'start from scratch' every time they embark on a new development initiative. The assumption that there is no 'correct' way to do development, means that expertise in the field is far more elusive. This makes the 'doing' of development a more complicated task. There are fewer tried and true policy tools at your disposal, successes are more difficult to define and measure, and therefore, there are no guarantees. While there are undoubtedly proponents of objective routes to development within developing states, subjectivity is harder to avoid in the domestic context. The closer development agents and practitioners are to the problem, the more information they are privy to. The more information they are subject to, the more information they deem relevant. The greater their knowledge of domestic context, the heavier the burden. This is not to suggest that

practitioners are advocating ignorance, rather, the incentives to pursue specialized knowledge is minimal. In effect, many practitioners operate with impunity within this policy space of minimal specialized knowledge.

The perception of trade-offs between objectivity and subjectivity when it comes to state development can be summarized in the following dichotomy: effective development through efficiency (freedom from the burden of knowledge) or effective development through specialized knowledge (greater informational input reduces the risk of oversight or incorrect assumptions).

### **How to do development: Development policy tools**

Keeping the influence of different approaches in mind, we can identify a number of different policy tools with which practitioners honour their visions for the state in question. Policy tools practitioners employ to enact their development agendas can include: loans, grants, programs and expertise; in isolation or combined with other tools.

#### ***Loans***

Historically speaking, loans are one of the most popular policy tools development practitioners have employed. The institutionalized use of loans to influence (development or other) outcomes in states dates back to the period immediately after World War II. The devastation the war wrought on Europe impressed upon the United States the benefit a large injection of capital would have on reconstruction efforts. The United States having a vested interest in the economic health of Europe and being largely shielded from the destructive effects of the war, was the prime candidate to spearhead the initiative. Thus, Europe reaped the benefits of the Marshall Plan which featured a total disbursement of 13.15 billion dollars for the purposes of reconstruction and economic stimulus (Price, 1955, p. 88). At the same time, discussions were underway for the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions; what are today known as

the IMF and the World Bank The *raison d'être* for the World Bank was to facilitate reconstruction and capital investment and the IMF was established to manage the global financial system (Moyo, 2009). The Marshall plan and the Bretton Woods institutions worked together successfully to reconstruct and repair European institutions and to reset development in the region back to its pre-war trajectory.

Modern usage of loans for the purposes of development has evolved significantly from its earliest manifestations. Today, institutions and states that offer loans to the developing world do so in a variety of ways. Loans can be: conditional, tied, bilateral, multilateral etc; and all of them of course have to be repaid. Conditional loans to developing states are quantities of cash or capital that are accompanied with enforceable caveats and restrictions on either how the money is used or on how the developing state must operate prior to qualifying for initial or subsequent tranches of the loan (Agostino, 2008). Tied aid is a type of loan that limits the recipient state to conducting business or signing contracts for sectoral reform or development with the donor state. Contracts for transportation infrastructure development for example must be offered to construction companies from donor states (Abe & Takarada, 2005). Bilateral loans are exchanged between a donor state and a recipient state with little to no intervention or input from multilateral organizations like the IMF or the WB. Bilateral loans are employed for a variety of reasons and necessarily establish a 'special' relationship between the recipient and the donor states. Bilateral loans can be offered for geo-strategic purposes (ie. to establish allies in a strategic position) or can be offered to maintain historical relationships between states (ie. former colonies). Multilateral loans involve institutions like the IMF and WB and generally feature a pooling of risk between member states (typically from the developed world) who contribute

percentages of capital to the final loan amount to be disbursed to developing states (Brech & Potrafke, 2014).

### ***Grants***

Grants are offered in much the same way loans are but are issued without the burden of repayment. This form of aid is gaining more traction since rising backlash in the 80s and 90s against harsh interest rates and crippling levels of debt among recipient states in the developing world (IMF, 2005). The billions of dollars' worth of loans that have flowed to the developing world since 1945 have been accompanied by even greater amounts of debt for the very developing world that the loans were meant to help. The huge amounts of debt incurred by developing states compounds and exacerbates the plight of the developing state that was targeted for improvement in the first place.

### ***Programs/Projects***

Another policy tool used by aid practitioners is that of programmatic aid. Aid programs (appears to be used interchangeably in the literature with 'projects') can take a multitude of forms depending on the focus and approach the engineer of the program prescribes to. Programmatic aid provides financial, technical and organisational resources to a developing state. Using these resources program engineers develop a program to be implemented in the developing state. These programs are diverse in scope and focus. Some programs may target certain social sectors at the national level such as curriculum updates in the education sector or vaccination drives in the health sector. Others may be more local in scope, attempting to generate community-level growth through the building of a water pump in a municipality that does not have immediate access to water. Additionally, programs can be even more expansive and may feature a re-engineering of the economic model a state employs, for example SAPs which



attempted to implement neo-liberal economic policies within the developing states (SAPs comprised the conditional component to many loans in the 80s) (Gilbert, 2013).

### *Expertise*

Another significant policy tool used by aid practitioners is that of expertise. This can be offered to recipient states in the developing world in the form of technocrats or technology. Conditional loans, grants, and programs may all be accompanied by diagnoses on what the recipient state needs to target for development and prescriptions for improvement (Hayes & Westrup, 2012). These diagnoses are generally conducted by experts in the fields that are targeted development. These technocrats are often trained in the context of the donor's (institutional, NGOs, or state) normative climate.

Another form of expertise is the donation of technology to recipient states. This is more frequently done by MNCs that target a developing state for investment. The MNC may erect a factory or administrative hub and import the necessary technology to ensure efficiency in process. The technology is often more advanced than the local models and patents for them are often protected as corporate secrets. Alternately the introduction of advanced technology or processes in the context of the developing state may spur technological evolution or innovation within local machinery or technology.

Given the demonstrated complexity in defining what constitutes development, it is intuitive that development practice should also feature a great degree of fragmentation, disharmony, and fundamental ideological disagreements regarding the nature of the enterprise. In addition, the question of who an agent of development may be and what tools they have at their disposal in the context of ideological disagreements also contributes to the complexity of development practice and alludes to why it is crucial to establish a process by which this

complexity is not overlooked but managed. The next chapter further examines this disharmonious state of affairs by exposing conceptual puzzles in the practice of development.

With this thesis, I elect a holistically subjective approach to development in that while my case studies focus on development initiatives that target the social sectors, I do not contend that the social sectors are more conducive to development progress. Additionally, in regards to progress, I adopt the approach of post-modernisation theorists in defining subjective development as the pursuit and attainment of a maximisation of quality of life and well-being for the peoples subject to that progress. I argue here that in order to attain this quality of life, agents of development must look to institutional health across all sectors within a recipient state. This incorporates all sectors, both external and internal agents of development and implicates development policy tools in illuminating and unanticipated ways.

## **CHAPTER TWO: PUZZLES IN DEVELOPMENT**

### **Why is development so complicated?**

Since the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and 70 odd years of donor-recipient relationships between the developed world and the developing world, countless lessons have been gleaned regarding what it means to ‘develop’ and how complex that process actually is. The initial optimism of the developed world for the plights (real or imagined) of the developing world has since faded considerably in the form of disillusionment and donor-fatigue. Billions of dollars and a variety of approaches to the multitude of problems were injected into the developing world and resulted in (occasional) improvement, stasis, or at worst, exacerbation of the problem. Faced with far too many instances of unsuccessful development initiatives and unproductive donor-recipient relationships, it became apparent to many in the field that development practitioners and theorists were in over their heads. Criticism of developed world interventions in the developing world rose. I will highlight some broad conceptual puzzles of the development enterprise as well as some broad practical puzzles in order to demonstrate the extent of the problem my proposed framework addresses: the ambiguity between development work and state-building, the inherent paternalism of externally directed development, program initiative overlap and counter-productivity.

Conceptually speaking, there are a number of complex issues that must be reconciled (or at the very least, addressed) if the developed world is to guarantee effectiveness in its interventions in the developing world. First and foremost, the relationship between development work and state-building must be recognised and made explicit. The categories of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ at their very core attempt to address questions of both state capacity and state sustainability. These are core considerations in the area of state building. Questions of what

constitutes a sustainable state and the capacity of that state to engage in self-sustaining behaviour are common considerations between state building and development literature. I contend that the conditions and features of the foundational elements of a state, its structures, are prescriptive of whether a state qualifies as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’, and that we must take into assessment the degree of structural change, growth, or maturity we are attempting to facilitate. This raises questions of sovereignty and ownership for developmental success or failure.

### **Autonomy and ownership**

Development initiatives must take into consideration the degree to which practitioners are supporting, promoting, or subverting state autonomy. Recipient state governments often grant a considerable degree of autonomy to external development agencies to operate within the jurisdiction of the state. Development agencies can use this operational autonomy to set new, productive, precedents within a recipient state, irreversibly implicating the donor in that state’s processes. This is especially the case if those new and productive precedents are identified as being contingent on the donor’s involvement, the benefits that follow from donor intervention may be reversed if the donors withdraw after implementing the program.

Development initiatives that require recipient state support, for example to perhaps implement new national economic policies, must recognize the degree of delegative and oversight processes that are implicated by the initiative in question and the practitioners. This consideration would allow for precautionary measures to be woven into the components of the initiative that could prevent backsliding into the pre-intervention conditions of the developing state in the event that the development agency withdraws, perhaps through reservation of key operational and influential roles for recipient state agents.

Questions of delegation, oversight and transparency also implicate issues of attribution and ownership for successes and failures. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to trace developmental success to dedicated ‘development’ work or organic, internal state processes. As Banerjee and He note,

When we do something and things look as if they are getting better, it is tempting to think that it was all because of what we did. The problem is that we have no way of knowing what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. (Banerjee & He, 2008, p. 57)

Only through appeals to counterfactuals can theorists speculate on causality. When a development outcome is achieved, the implications for state autonomy when external practitioners take ownership for the success are significant.

### **Paternalism**

Another significant conceptual issue that is prevalent in all externally driven development work is that of paternalism. There are volumes written on the ‘white man’s burden’ and Western interventions in the developing world. The white man’s burden is the assumed responsibility of the ‘white’ ‘west’ to liberate, educate, and civilize the peoples of the developing world (Tripathy, 2011, p. 110). The problem of paternalism is well-documented in Maria Eriksson Baaz’s book ‘The Paternalism of Partnership’ in which she highlights Western assumptions of recipient state ‘backwardness’. These assumptions are evident in accounts of development practice in which recipient states are described and admonished as being childlike. Theorists and practitioners who subscribe to the idea that development occurs in stages may offer analyses featuring paternalistic statements such as ‘they are not ready yet’ and harbour pessimism towards a region’s potential

for growth (Baaz, 2005, p. 42). In this conceptualization of the developing world, the Western world is cast as the only qualified director of development efforts.

This ‘white man’s burden’ mentality is evident in many of the objective elements of development when practitioners attempt to emulate the ‘developed’ ideal of the West and assume technical authority on how best to replicate this in the developing state context. The more recent export of democracy is yet another manifestation of the white man’s burden. This paternalism takes many forms and inherently underscores most of the donor-driven development enterprise. The white man’s burden assumes responsibility for development, placing the onus on donors in the West for failures and acknowledges Western efforts for successes. The prominent economist turned development theorist, William Easterly has written extensively on this topic and positions himself in opposition to development orthodoxy both of theory and practice. During the course of my research, I waded through one particularly illuminating edited volume of his however and found curious contradictions in his critical approach. In ‘Reinventing Foreign Aid’, Easterly offers an account of a number of practical and theoretical crises contemporary development work faces. The volume is categorized into five conceptual parts: evaluations, interacting with recipient state governments, donor failings, the IMF and the World Bank, and imagining new forms of foreign aid. The result is admittedly introspective and self-critical but in the most paradoxical way. Easterly and his contemporaries’ brand of self-reflection is so loaded with hubris it is almost miraculous in its ignorance. Given that Easterly and co. seem to acknowledge that development is in crisis, the book features a puzzling amount of round-about self-congratulation as well. For example, terms like ‘savvy altruists’, ‘true believers’, ‘brilliant well-meaning people’, ‘ten smart people’, ‘high-quality technocrats’ and ‘planners’ vs the more admirable ‘searchers’ are frequent and are used predominantly to refer to the external,

predominantly Western aid practitioner or theorist (Easterly, 2008). Treatment of the recipient on the other hand is far less generous with discussions like Ritva Reinikka's on 'increasing recipient power', 'training' donors, 'promoting citizen voice', or Bertin Marten's discussion on imposing conditionalities on loans that apply punitive pressure to recipient governments, as one would a misbehaving child who does not know any better and must be taught how to spend her money (Easterly, 2008, pp. 179, 289). The common theme treats external development practitioners as benevolent parents to an inept, incapable recipient state. The implication is that even when external practitioners have demonstrated time and time again that they are often normatively and practically ill-equipped to intervene effectively within a recipient state's context, the onus must remain on practitioners to improve. The possibility that recipients employ inherent agency and capacity is precluded since, according to Easterly et al., recipient states are at the end of the day underdeveloped through their own ineptitude. This leaves little room for recipient state autonomy or ownership for the successes or failures of the development initiatives. The inherent and problematic paternalism of externally-directed development work must however be reconciled with the fact that external agents possess the resources and capacity that is lacking in the developing state context.

Efforts have been made to mitigate this paternalistic streak through an increasing number of domestic partnerships with local experts and field staff. However many have noted that these partnerships are often more lip service than a substantial, meaningful effort being made by external development practitioners (Baaz, 2005, p. 6). The degree of autonomy and authority that domestic partners have varies. While limited, efforts are being made to expand the role of domestic partners. Nevertheless, externally directed development initiatives often feature external agents in key decision-making roles.

## **Initiative overlap and Fratricide**

In practice, another set of development puzzles become evident. With the multitude of external, internal, multi/bilateral, organisational, and individual level development agents operating within one policy space, the risk for redundancy and counter-productivity is ever present. A development initiative may overlap jurisdictionally, conceptually, or in terms of outcome. A hypothetical (but quite common in practice) example of this is a program developed by an NGO that promotes higher rates of female enrollment in primary school education. Simultaneously there may be a nation-wide program that also promotes increased rates of female enrollment. This can result in either complementary interaction between the NGO's program and the national program or an increased risk that the NGO program may become redundant in the context of the national program. Both programs may have the same outcomes in mind and the same tools employed to achieve this outcome, the difference is that the nation-wide program with the administrative, financial, and technical advantage will make the NGO's program redundant. This results in a misuse of resources and time on the part of the NGO that may be of better service filling a gap in the national policy agenda and also is demonstrative of a collective action problem as detailed by Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman,

From the perspective of the recipient country's welfare, incentives for any one donor to shirk on activities that maximize overall development in favour of activities that contribute to donor-specific goals strengthen as the number of donors increases. Donors' multiple and conflicting objectives exacerbate this basic collective action problem.

Donors are undoubtedly in most or all cases concerned with development of the recipient country, but must trade this objective off against other goals as well, such as commercial and security objectives. (Knack & Rahman, 2008, p. 334)



Another challenge development practitioners face is when development initiatives overlap to produce contradictory or counter-productive outcomes. Two development agencies may be operating in the same policy space and the activity of one may undermine the success of the other. For example, an organisation may have crafted an initiative for polio eradication in a certain region, while another organisation, with different approaches to health may have crafted an education initiative for why the polio vaccine is actually ineffective and exacerbates other health issues. The latter being more effective in the implementation of their education program may win favour among the population in the policy space and therefore the success of the former is undermined. This disunity in development goals and outcomes can be caused by different philosophies or different data packages and information that lead each agent to arrive at different conclusions regarding the polio vaccine.

### **Conceptualising and measuring success/failure in development**

Failures in development initiatives are frequent and can vary in scale and impact. A failure can be gauged in terms of the ineffectiveness of a program or initiative to contribute to the desired development outcome. A failure can also be gauged in terms of the degree to which a program actually contributes to a worsening of the pre-program conditions. Failures of both kinds occur regularly in the field. This is not in itself damning, after all, assessment of past failures can prove fruitful in the improvement of future programs, can help correct incorrect assumptions and contribute to the base of knowledge the practitioner has at their disposal. What is damning and reprehensible is when practitioners engage in development work without sufficient base research on the absorptive capacity of the recipient state for the development intervention they are advocating.

An example of this is the building of a water pump in a community that's only other source of water comes from the women of the community travelling by foot for four hours (often with their school-age daughters in tow) to the nearest river bed to haul water back to the community for cooking, cleaning, bathing etc. (Vandendriessche, 2012). A development agency comes in with an innovative and marketable solution for a water pump. These 'Playpumps' were essentially modified merry-go-rounds which would tap into a water storage tank to siphon water out for the service of the community (Vandendriessche, 2012). The community historically lacked a space for the children to play, the Playpump hit two birds with one in this regard; providing water for the community and recreation for the children. Locals were trained in the proper maintenance of the program it even incorporated a revenue-creating mechanism by means of advertising on accompanying billboards. The program received massive international support and funding however after a few months passed, programs reviews were conducted and found that the Playpump program, for all of its promise had failed to generate the development outcomes envisioned (Vandendriessche, 2012). Among the failures of the program were the higher cost associated with the Playpump in comparison with a simple water pump, the failure of the billboards to attract revenue-generating advertisements, the unfeasibility of children being able to play for hours and hours on end in order to draw the requisite water volumes for community use, and the operational difficulty of the Playpump in comparison with a standard water pump. This last point was particularly damning when it was revealed that women of the community were forced to operate the Playpump to draw water when children were not playing in demeaning form and with greater difficulty than they would with a standard water pump (Vandendriessche, 2012).

This example represents a loss of revenue, time, and resources for the development agency as well as a burden for the women of the community and the community at large for not reaping any benefit from the lengthy program. Program failures like these are common in development work and effectively demonstrate the lack of information development agencies in the developing world have regarding the micro-level contexts for why a state exists in the form that it does (Stepanek, 2010).

Successes in development are also frequent though, for the reasons detailed earlier, causality for why an initiative succeeds is often a complicated thing to determine. Successes can be gauged similarly in terms of the implementation of a program or in terms of the achievement of a broader development outcome that is the sum of a variety of programs, an agenda. Development agendas tend to be larger financial and temporal commitments in the recipient state and feature a variety of related development projects. An example of this is a wholesale reform of the financial sector in an effort to increase efficiency, this could include projects to weed out nepotism in order to re-instate more meritocratic hiring processes, enforcing mandatory internal auditing of firms, coupled with external technical consultation on how to improve processes. In addition to the issue of ownership, successes are often sporadic and tracing causality is complicated. Referencing the water pump example again, a developmental success could be simply that the water pump worked, the women were no longer burdened with the immense task of the four hour hike, and it is being used to this day. To be clear, this does happen and often (Ika, Diallo, & Thuillier, 2012). However what makes successes like these more difficult to work with is the fact that, as demonstrated with the water pump example, what works in one developing state context does not work in all contexts. There is an alarming tendency among external development practitioners to fall victim to the logical fallacy that suggests that if a

program has seen success in one context, that the success offers commentary on the quality of the program rather than on the appropriateness of the preconditions of the specific recipient state. A more expansive example of the failure of these cookie cutter prescriptions for the developing world is evident in the failure of structural adjustment programs in the late 1970s and 1980s. These SAPs featured a series of economic principles informed by the Washington consensus which prescribed to a more objective approach to development. The assumption is that the economic policies informed by the neoliberal Washington consensus were the reason for the successes of many of the formerly ‘developing’ states like the Asian tigers and much of the Western world. For example, according to global normative measures, successes such as those of the East Asian Tigers prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 were emblematic of the effectiveness of Washington Consensus principles as reliable development tools. Of course, after the AFC, global normative assumptions on what is required to develop a state were reluctantly (and to a limited degree) revisited (Raffer, 2007, p. 2). By the end of the 80s and an overwhelming number of failures of SAPs, the Bretton Woods institutions recognised that unconditionally free markets were no longer the solution for developing states. While this realization was welcome, it was a long time coming, and that time was destructive for the developing states upon which these policies were imposed.

### **Business-Client Culture in Development: Who is the client?**

A final comment on what constitutes successes and failures in development. As development work becomes an increasingly profit-driven undertaking, success and failures are becoming increasingly defined by the ability of a development agency to gain funding for a proposed program. For many of these agencies, success and failure starts and ends with the ability of an agency to attract donor funding for their various programs. This is unquestionably a

problematic development as far as the recipient state in the developing world is concerned. This raises questions as to who the appropriate client is and who they should be in the business of development. It is important to question who the client is in any developmental transaction between the developed and the developing world (Ika & Hodgson, 2014, p. 1187).

If the client is the developing world, one can assume that the developing states and their governments should be able to 'shop around' for the best option. The degree to which this is true in practice is questionable. Developing state governments could assess which development agency and program can offer them the most returns for their dollar. But as has already been established, the reason that developing states and their governments appeal for developmental services, is because often they do not have the capital necessary to provide these services on their own. One can then perhaps rule out developing states and their governments as 'clients' in the context of the 'agency as a business' analogy. Further reason for why the developing state is not the client stems from the recognition that for much of the history of externally driven development work in the developing world, the developing world has been acted upon. Questions of agency seem to become secondary considerations the moment a state is identified as 'developing' and targeted for intervention. There is little room for agency in current conceptualisations of what a developing state is. Lastly, there exists a centuries old trend for donor-recipient state relationships based on strategic benefit that is skewed in favour of the donor. Countless contemporary iterations of this exist. We need only look to the decades old donor-recipient relationship between the US and Pakistan, a military alliance based on the geo-strategic advantage of Pakistan to its neighbours (Boutton & Carter, 2014).

Since casting the developing world as the client is dubious, can we infer that the development agency is the client? There are two possibilities here, first that the developing world

is the 'seller' or second that the donors who fund developing agencies are the 'seller'. Evidence certainly does exist that suggests that developing states must make themselves as appealing as possible in order to garner the favour of the developed world. There are several development practitioners who argue that only certain developing states that demonstrate good behaviour and who possess some degree of capacity are worth intervening in (Easterly, 2008, p. 255). This means that developing states must 'sell' their credentials and capacity in order to receive the services of the development agency.

As alluded to earlier, the importance of a sound 'business model' and the necessity of offering competitive services is becoming increasingly important for development agencies and practitioners (Martens, 2005, p. 11). One implication of this is that the responsibility to attract 'investors' or donors is significant. This means that the donor is increasingly assuming the role of the client. The attractiveness of a development program is tailored to appeal to the donor rather than the developing state. This becomes problematic since often the donor's idea of what makes an attractive development program is often less related to the viability or promise of the program for the recipient state and rather is related to how marketable the program is. Therefore, we can conclude that 'success' for a development agency as a business can often be at odds with 'success' for a development agency as a contributor to development outcomes in the developing world. The incentive to review programs and improve upon past ones to create a better 'product' is no longer as compelling.

### **Theory vs. Practice**

Surveying the dominant theories in development studies and the key issues in the discourse in comparison with the way development is practiced, an alarming trend becomes apparent. Development theory holds a fairly low presence in the practice. While some degree of

detachment between theories and practice is evident in most fields, when surveying literature from practicing development experts, it becomes apparent that there is often little to no dialogue with the theory whatsoever.

Between World Bank program review reports and books like Easterly's, it is evident that theory is less relevant. There are certainly exceptions to this claim and there is increasing attention by technocrats and practitioners being paid to incorporating theoretical frameworks to justify and substantiate their approaches to a particular development problem or the developing state in question. However, this study focusses on the instances in which this is not happening as such the proportions of theory-less programs in comparison with theorized programs is less relevant. As long as the trend persists, it is indicative of careless, poorly researched, wasteful and detrimental practice by development agents.

### **Theories, Approaches, and Models for Development**

In addition to the reference to different approaches to development detailed in the first chapter, this thesis categorizes the literature in terms of theories, approaches, and models for development. To review, the approaches already detailed are: economic approaches, political approaches, social approaches, domestic approaches, and external approaches. Practitioners subscribe to a specific approach or a combination of them and consider their approach the most important one in achieving wholesale development across all sectors.

Four broad theories have been particularly influential in development discourse over the decades. These theories are: modernization, dependency, world-systems theory, and globalization. Modernization theory suggests that there is a modern, developed end to be achieved by all states. In this conceptualisation, the west represents that modernity and that there are developmental phases that each state must undergo in order to achieve this (Engerman, 2003,

p. 63). Development practice that draws on this theory attempts to replicate these phases in the developing state in order to create a modern society. This is an example of an objective, Universalist approach to development, there is a definable, achievable end to the developmental process and there are concrete steps a state can and must take in order to arrive at this desirable end. Another implication of this approach is that the already modern, developed world has an inherent authority on what constitutes development to this end and how best to achieve it. This means that this theory also generally promotes the authority of externally directed development in the recipient state.

Dependency theory conceptualizes states of development in regards to the types of relationships between the ‘core’ (read developed) states and the ‘periphery’ (read developing) states. This theory borrows heavily from Marxist theories and incorporates a strong economic component to prescriptions for development. The general logic of the theory asserts that the periphery states are maintained in a retrograde state due to an extractive relationship with the core states by which the core benefits from exploitation of the periphery. The asymmetrical power dynamic between the core and periphery means that the core (developed) states dictate who develops, how, and when (if at all) based on perceptions of potential benefit (Tausch, 2011, p. 468). The asymmetry between core-periphery is also replicated within the developing state itself, with a small elite benefiting from the relationship and power dynamic. At the inter-state level, the developing world is on the losing end of an extractive relationship with core states and at the sub-state level elites constitute or represent core interests and the non-elite majority constitute the periphery.

World systems theory takes a far more holistic approach to development than the two previous theories. While dependency theory focusses on analysis of the ‘periphery’ and



economic components of periphery societies, world systems theory looks at the interactions between the core, semi-periphery, and the periphery in equal degrees. World systems theorists analyze these interactions and argue that there is no single traceable cause for different states of development and create room for the possibility that often degrees of underdevelopment are less the result of any feature of the state itself but can often be attributed to the other states that they interact with and the types of relationships they hold with these other often developed states. These theorists also incorporate several analytical conceptualizations of the state, social, political and economic in their claims and conclusions. This theory features a more subjective approach and blurs the internal and the external, claiming that they are mutual reinforcing and mutually implicated by relationships between states (Reyes, 2001).

Lastly, theories of globalization also take a global analytical perspective and focus more on cultural components of societies and intercultural exchange as a crucial process of development. It has been noted that the fashionable ideas associated with globalisation have historically (and with a diminished profile) been featured in development studies (Eriksen, 2002, p. 423). Additionally, the systemic, transnational, and what are often ungovernable forces that are the subject of the study of globalisation, are noted as overlooking several areas of the world depending on the degree of development a state has achieved. What are acknowledged as being the most underdeveloped states in the world are also often overlooked by the positive aspects of globalisation (cross-cultural exchange, knowledge exchange, etc.) but tend to fall victim to the negative aspects of it (extractive trade relationships, norm imposition, neo-imperial forces) (Dohlman & Halvorson-Quevedo, 1997, p. 36)

This paper positions itself at the peripheries of dependency theory and a post-modernisation perspective, with post-modernisation theory doing most of the heavy lifting.

Where modernisation theory focusses predominantly on maximising economic growth in pursuit of more objective development ends, I incorporate a great deal of subjectivity into the conceptualisation of development progress endorsed here. Post-modernisation theory places greater emphasis on maximising quality of life rather than economic growth.

In addition to theories of development there are also different focal points for how theorists recommend pursuing their theoretically-informed development goals. A few of these models are informed by: those that advocate the dominance of the state/government as a vehicle for development, those that advocate the role of business, free market, and the private sector as a vehicle for development, those that are informed by the Washington consensus and the neo liberalism of the 90s, and those that are informed by the newer post-Washington consensus.

In summary, the complexity of development as a concept, as a practice and as advocated through different theories generates a great deal of diversity in externally-directed development interventions and in the normative foundations by which success and failure is assessed. This is not altogether unexpected, preventable, or necessarily a bad thing, given the global scope of the undertaking and the range of actors involved. The significant risk of malpractice and exacerbation of serious development issues is however reprehensible. It is not sufficient to acknowledge that development is complicated to 'do', there must be genuine interest in improving development practice and analyzing causes of intervention failure. The next chapter introduces two key documents that represent a normative shift toward recognising the responsibility of major development organisations like the World Bank to greater responsibility towards ensuring aid effectiveness: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE PARIS DECLARATION AND ACCRA AGENDA FOR**

### **ACTION**

Acknowledging the degree of complexity and disunity in the practice and theorisation of international development, the persistence of seemingly inexplicable failures has reached a saturation point that the international community can no longer ignore. In recent years, it has become difficult to dismiss the prevalence of failures in development practice and the lack of accountability on the part of development organisations, agencies and practitioners, in those failures. As pressure on multilateral normative and practical leaders in development mounts, the international community becomes increasingly persuasive in calls for a concrete and genuine shift in development practice orthodoxy. In response to this mounting pressure, the Organisation for Economic Development hosted a High Level Forum (HLF-2) in Paris in February 2005 with over 100 developed and developing countries in order to arrive at a consensus of sorts regarding the very pressing issues plaguing the promise of development aid. Three years later, a third High Level Forum on aid effectiveness (HLF-3) was held in Accra with the purpose of furthering and strengthening the progress made at Paris.

#### **The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)**

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was the result of HLF-2 in Paris in 2005 and is based on five principles by which adhering countries and organisations can improve the effectiveness of their aid efforts: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. Optimistic about the potential of the declaration, the OECD describes the declaration as;

More than a statement of general principles, the Paris Declaration lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It puts in place a series of specific measures for implementation and establishes performance indicators that assess progress. It also calls for an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable – a feature that is unique among international agreements (OECD, 2008)

So far so good. The declaration demonstrated at the very least a definitive shift in development thinking by some of the most influential multi-lateral donor organisations dealing with either monetary or programmatic aid.

The first principle of ‘ownership’ in the declaration addresses the detrimental practice by external development practitioners to defer to external authority in the context of aid program implementation within a recipient country. In the case of the World Bank, this means that prior to the Paris Declaration despite movement in the direction of recipient state ownership of a given development initiative, the practice of positioning elite or external technocrats in key oversight roles persisted. According to the OECD, the principle of ownership commits to the importance of developing countries taking ownership for their own poverty reduction strategies, the developing country must be the author of those strategies as well as the primary implementing agent of that strategy (OECD, n.d.)

The principle of ‘alignment’ is targeted to external donor countries and organisations to address the lack of cohesion with domestic development strategies and initiatives. In the case of the World Bank, this necessitates a shift away from external development and implementation of an aid program with little to no recognition or incorporation of domestic strategies and poverty-reduction programs. The principle of alignment states that donor activity within a developing

country must be cohesive with domestic objectives and operate within local contexts (OECD, n.d.).

The third principle of ‘harmonisation’ is again directed at external donors with the intent of mitigating the potential for duplication in aid programs when donors do not collaborate with one another to simplify processes and share information (OECD, n.d.). As one of the largest multilateral aid organisations, the World Bank has implemented a cumulative 12,682 projects in 173 countries since 1947 to the present day (World Bank, n.d.). While it can be assumed that harmonisation of programs within the World Bank’s scope of activity in a developing country is a given, the same scrutiny is not applied to other donors operating within the same policy space. Where the World Bank does not step on its own toes in aid activity, the same cannot be said when comparing inter-agency aid initiatives and there exists significant overlap and fratricide among separate donor organisations and countries.

The fourth principle, ‘results’, deals with the lack of sufficient review, monitoring, and evaluation processes by donors during and post program implementation. Failing to assess results both in the event of program success or failure means that often program design is replicated and implemented repeatedly without recognition of why that design produces the results that it does. The World Bank has engaged in program review and assessment of results for several years prior to the declaration, however, not all programs are reviewed and, as I will illustrate in chapter five, even the Independent Evaluation Group rates the World Bank’s capacity for monitoring and evaluation as sub-optimal on far too many occasions. In an attempt to rectify the lack of normative pressure among donors to measure results, the declaration states that both developing countries and donors must make substantial and paradigm-shifting efforts to

normalize and implement program review to a far greater degree than what currently exists (OECD, n.d.).

The final principle of ‘mutual accountability’ again targets both donors and developing countries who fail to create productive partnerships in which they hold each other on par as accountable partners for program operation and outcome. This principle seems to serve as a safeguard in the enforcement of the previous four principles. So developing countries must take ownership for their own development strategies and donors must align themselves behind them. Harmonisation and measuring results is a way to assess how effectively the first two principles are being adhered to and the principle of mutual accountability holds both donors and recipients responsible for development outcomes in all aspects of an aid intervention respectively (OECD, n.d.).

### **The Accra Agenda for Action (2008)**

The Accra Agenda for Action arose out of HLF-3 in 2008 in Accra and was designed to strengthen and further progress made three years earlier in Paris. The agenda is based on four themes, closely related to those of the Paris Declaration: ownership, inclusive partnerships, delivering results, and capacity development. The OECD describes the agenda as:

The AAA seeks to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (the Paris Declaration). Prepared through a broad-based process of dialogue at both country and international levels, it takes stock of progress on the commitments of the Paris Declaration and sets the agenda for accelerating progress to reach the agreed targets by 2010 (see accompanying summary of the Paris Declaration) (OECD, n.d.).

The agenda demonstrated at the very least that just three years after Paris, significant progress had been made in shifting development thinking and practice. Even by virtue of the 2008

monitoring survey which reviewed the influence that the Paris Declaration had on development activity, it was evident that the declaration, non-binding as it was, was more than just lip-service. There was an enthusiasm about the Paris principles and an impetus to keep the ball rolling in a promising new normative direction.

The theme of ‘ownership’ was carried over from the Paris declaration and strengthened in lieu of progress reports on implementation of Paris’ principles. The agenda suggested that developing countries need to take greater ownership for their development processes through greater emphasis on policy formulation, leadership and strengthening of domestic mechanisms of aid delivery (OECD, n.d.). The necessity of reiterating and emphasising the role of ownership stemmed from findings in the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration that indicated that while progress was being made in promoting developing country ownership, not enough was being done (OECD, 2008). The Accra agenda offered more specific guidance on how endorsing countries could best honour their commitments to ownership including; broadening development policy dialogue within the developing country, strengthening capacity for leadership and management in development initiatives, and continuing to strengthen and deepen developing country-level systems for program implementation (OECD, n.d.).

The second theme of ‘inclusive partnership’ in development was also informed by the Paris declaration principles of harmonisation and mutual accountability. The agenda recommended that all partners, including donors, developing countries, civil society and other multilateral organisations, participate fully in poverty-reduction strategies and development initiatives (OECD, n.d.). It was evident in the 2008 survey that while progress had been made in harmonising and encouraging mutual accountability between donors and developing country partners, it was not enough to the projected targets by 2010 (OECD, 2008). The Accra agenda

combined these two principles from Paris and promoted the achievement of inclusive partnerships through the following imperatives; reduction of aid fragmentation that proves costly to both donors and developing countries, increasing the value of aid given to developing countries by removing conditionalities like tied aid, increasing collaboration with other development actors operating within the same development policy space, deepening engagement with civil society actors, and tailoring aid policies to suit country contexts which may vary in degrees of fragility, stability, and capacity (OECD, 2008).

The third theme of ‘delivering results’ improves upon the similar Paris principle of ‘measuring results’. The agenda reiterates the importance of measuring results and adds an important re-phrasing so that endorsing development agents are impressed upon to *deliver* rather than simply measure them. This creates additional impetus for all development partners to actually conduct program evaluations and analyse results since in an environment where the agenda is implemented to its fullest, all partners will rely on each other’s program evaluations and assessment of results to proceed with and improve upon further development initiatives (OECD, n.d.). According to the 2008 survey, ‘significant’ efforts have been made among countries to strengthen monitoring and sector specific information systems, however, few have developed mutual review processes by which to hold development partners accountable for commitments (OECD, 2008). In response to the survey findings, the Accra agenda advocates the following actionable recommendations; focussing on delivering results, increasing accountability and transparency of program results for the public and for general knowledge sharing, amending the purpose of conditionality in a way that supports ownership, and increasing predictability of aid outcomes through focus on the medium-term duree of development strategy and program implementation (OECD, 2008).



The fourth more informal theme in the Accra agenda for action is that of ‘capacity development’. This agenda item is a culmination of the three previous themes and honours the normative spirit of the Paris declaration. The paradigm shift represented by the declaration and agenda is one which identifies that development when stripped of subjective normative influence is a process of capacity development and promotion within a national or regional policy space (OECD, n.d.).

### **Criticism**

Despite the promising precedents set in Paris and Accra, academics and policymakers alike have offered criticism on areas where both the agenda and declaration fail. Much of the criticism revolves around themes of; authorship/ownership, measuring results, and directional ambiguity. Many have noted that the development agents who critique the way global funds are allocated, managed, and deployed, are the very same who allocate, manage, and deploy those funds (Isenman & Shakow, 2010). Additionally, those same agents are also the ones leading the reform process at Paris and Accra. Others have pointed to the difficulty in measuring results as a consequence of the vague directives of Paris and Accra. It is unclear to signatories and member states what success looks like under Paris and Accra and how to achieve and measure it (OECD, 2014, pp. 30-31). Lastly, the declaration and agenda are critiqued for being too ambiguous in their policy recommendations, giving donors and recipients very little direction on how to achieve their commitments. Additionally, the OECD lacks the enforcement mechanisms necessary to incorporate binding clauses into declarations such as Paris and Accra (Droop, Isenman, & Mlalazi, 2008, p. 30). Therefore, as promising as Paris and Accra are, at the end of the day, they do not bind member countries to adhere to the principles since no punitive mechanisms exist in the event that countries do not comply.

## **Response**

With this thesis I address the criticism regarding the directional and policy ambiguity featured in key aid effectiveness documents such as Accra and Paris. The lack of clear directives and policy recommendations on how best to achieve a responsible, mutually accountable donor-recipient partnership means that the promise of the normatively novel aid effectiveness agenda languishes as member states operate without cohesion or direction-- the policy equivalent of stumbling around in poor focus for your reading glasses. I do not seek here to remedy poor vision so to speak, I think Paris and Accra do an admirable job in articulating what an ideal donor-recipient partnership can look like. Rather, I hope to arm policy experts with a type of lens through which problems of aid effectiveness may be analysed with the broader goal of contributing to the principles of Paris and Accra. My contribution comes in the form of analytical concepts which I propose are crucial in assessing a developing country in anticipation of an aid intervention. The concepts are as follows; status quo structuration, non-status quo structuration, structural maturation, structural subversion, passive agents, agents with knowledge, and agents with capacity. The next chapter establishes the theoretical basis on which these concepts are founded.

## **PART TWO: THE CONTRIBUTION**

## **CHAPTER FOUR: STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONS, AGENTS, AND STRUCTURATION THEORY**

This chapter introduces some of the conceptual tools I advocate for incorporation into World Bank development intervention analysis in order to support the principles of Accra and Paris to improve the practice and type of knowledge gleaned from these interventions. The concepts are as follows; status quo structuration, non-status quo structuration, structural maturation, structural subversion, passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered agents. In order to do this I borrow conceptually from Giddens' structuration theory though do not adhere to all its tenets as law. As has been demonstrated in the discussion so far, the question of who does development, the agents, is a pressing one. In addition to internal and external agents of development, I argue in this paper that analysis of recipient state structures and institutions is also crucial in assessment and pre-intervention research. This chapter introduces structures, agents, institutions and structuration theory, and will analyze their contributions to the development enterprise.

### **Agents**

Giddens offers a multi-faceted definition of an agent. He claims that the human condition is one of agency, human beings act and have purposive weight behind those actions. The intentions behind agent behaviour may not be relevant when assessing the impact of an agent's actions. From this, it is inferred that agents have significant potential and that potential is manifested through their behaviour and activity, what they choose to do and what they refrain from doing and why. However, Giddens goes on to claim that an agent ceases to be an agent if he/she loses the capability to 'make a difference' or to exercise some degree of power (Giddens, 1984, pp. 1-34). Accepting Giddens' position regarding the human condition and agency, it

becomes difficult to reconcile this claim with the one he makes later regarding the forfeit of agency if a human being loses the capability to ‘make a difference’. It becomes necessary to amend Giddens’ conception of the agent, I claim that human beings cannot forfeit their agency and offer an alternative conception, one that further dissects the ‘agent’ into three categories: passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered agents.

An individual within a state who has no awareness of any development agenda but is perhaps unintentionally engaging in state processes may be considered a passive agent. Both agents with knowledge and empowered agents on the other hand, have the purposive weight of intentionality behind their development contributing behaviour. Thus, development agents are knowledgeable drivers of development. An agent with potential is knowledgeable but is constrained (perhaps structurally or institutionally) from contributing substantially to development. An empowered agent is a knowledgeable agent who has both the potential, resources, and means to pursue purposive interaction with a state’s structures and institutions, and does.

An implication of the behaviour of empowered agents is that given the structural or institutional constraints agents with potential face, empowered agents are able to operate freely within the parameters and permissions of these structural and institutional configurations but their actions can collectively alter those parameters and permissions. These parameters and permissions dictate the degrees of capacities of agents subject to their constraints. As such, empowered agents benefit the most from existing structural and institutional configurations of a given state. This means that they benefit from and therefore contribute the most to the structural and institutional status quo. This is structuration in action. It is necessary then to question how (or whether) empowered agents are actually contributing to development. If we acknowledge

that part and parcel of developmental progress is an improvement or re-engineering of structures and institutions and subsequently the way these structures and institutions constrain and enable agency and action within their jurisdiction, then we must infer that knowledgeable empowered agents are engaging in structuration but structuration that is status quo. In other words, empowered agents within a state do not so much contribute to development as they do to the established degree of development of their state, from which they benefit.

### **Structures and their institutions**

Turning to conceptualizations of structures, I again turn to Giddens' approach for the base definition that I work with. Within the framework of his 'structuration theory' (elaborated upon in the next chapter), '...structure is regarded as the rules and resources recursively implicated in social reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time and 'space' (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). Giddens goes on explain that 'structure can be conceptualized as two aspects of rules-normative elements and codes of 'signification' (Giddens, 1984, p. 29). Despite these very detailed parameters for what constitutes a structure, Giddens fails to offer concrete, reliable examples of structures in practice. This fluidity in the definition is arguably a benefit to a concept as abstract as 'structure' and allows for flexibility in the components of the state that a researcher might wish to analyze as a type of structure. However this fluidity also limits the applicability of the concepts and risks lending itself to conceptual stretching.

Accepting Giddens' approach as a base definition for a structure, using inference (and taking advantage of Giddens' conceptual generosity) I posit a number of identifiable state-level structures. These structures can be religious, cultural, economic, political, legal, and otherwise normative. While sets of religious, cultural, legal, political, economic, and otherwise normative

configurations within a society may constitute the more esoteric structural components of the state, the institutions that are derived from these structural rules and norms are far more concrete and identifiable. Examples of these are: religious institutions such as synagogues and Sikh temples, legal institutions such as the Supreme Court, political institutions such as the executive branch of government, economic institutions such as banks, or cultural institutions such as ethnolinguistic clubs.

Having established the conceptual bases for agents, structures and institution, it is now possible to analyze the process by which these core components of any given developed or developing state interact. The next chapter introduces structuration theory as a way to conceptualize how state structures and institutions are erected, maintained, or adjusted through agent interaction.

### **Structuration Theory**

Having established the conceptual elements of the approach advocated in this paper (agents, structures, institutions), I now turn to their interaction through a survey of Giddens' structuration theory. Structuration theory examines the role of agency in interactions between agents and structures. The institutions that I have elected to include in the analytical method advocated in this paper are also implicated by this structure-agent interaction. Giddens adopts some of Talcott Parson's previously established assumptions regarding the dualism between agents and structures featured in 'action theory' (Munch, 1981). This dualism represents the indivisibility of agents and structures. According to Giddens, agents and structures are mutually constitutive and act upon each other in recursive ways. "According to structuration theory, the moment of the production of action is also one of reproduction in the contexts of the day-to-day

enactment of social life.” (Giddens, 1984, pp. 1-37) That is to say that agents contribute to the qualities of the structure and structures simultaneously inform the behaviour of the agent.

### **Passive agents, agents with potential, and empowered agents**

Applying the established conceptualization of types of agents to this process of structuration, I propose that different agents possess different degrees of agency in relation to the structuration of their societies/states. Passive agents are not knowledgeable in the ways they contribute to structuration and do not possess the capacity to influence change within the institutions they encounter in their day to day lives and the structures that inform them. Therefore, passive agents contribute to the reproduction of the society as it exists, has existed, and will continue to exist across time. Most conceptualizations of agents allows for flexibility and a range of actions given structural parameters and permissions. This flexibility and choice in a particular course of action within the parameters of the structure are generally evident in the reasoning an agent employs when justifying his or her actions. While agents may choose similar or identical actions given the range available to them, they employ unique rationalizations for these actions. This is significant and telling when exploring the degree of agency structures and their institutions offer to individuals subject to their parameters. Passive agents in this conceptualization of the process of structuration, are the most status quo agents. They are acted upon by structural instructions on how to conduct oneself within the context of that specific state and do not grate against the parameters of those structures. These passive agents are individuals who do not possess (either deliberately or by circumstance) the resources or knowledgeability to influence, either through expansion or restriction, the parameters of the structure.

Contrasting passive agents with agents with potential, the key distinction --the level of knowledgeability-- becomes evident. Agents with potential are those individuals within a given



society who possess the knowledgeability of their role in structuration, but who lack the resources or access to influence structures and institutions. Agents with potential, as is the case with passive actors and empowered agents, also engage in status quo behaviour. The difference is, that agents with potential may not see benefit of the structural parameters as they exist in the form of resources that empowered agents do. As such, agents with potential are critical of existing structural configurations of the state and the form that resulting institutions take.

Empowered agents on the other hand, possessing both knowledge knowledgeability and resources, are aware of the full scope of their agency in relation to the structures they are recursively linked to. In addition to their knowledgeability, they also possess the resources to engage in structuration. As alluded to earlier, the implication of this is, that empowered agents are actively engaged in structuration, but in much the same way as passive actors, they are operating within the parameters of the structures as they exist. Since their level of capacity is also a result of the agent-structural dualism, empowered agents engage in status quo structuration as well, being conscious of how it benefits them.

### **Structuration and Development**

Applying what I have established about structuration theory, it is now useful to apply this to the processes and approaches of development detailed earlier. This framework attempts to demonstrate that external development agents are also engaging in similar agent-structure interactions as agents within the targeted developing state. At this juncture it is important to stress that once external development agents act in the context of the recipient state, their actions are also dictated by the structural parameters that are active within that state. They do not continue to operate in the context of their own state's structural context and subsequent parameters. I will elaborate on this further below.

Conceptually speaking, accepting that the skeleton of any given state involves at its very core the interaction of structures and agents, we can infer that some agent-structure interactions are ‘productive’ (contributing to development) and that others are ineffective or sub-optimal (contributing to developmental stasis or underdevelopment). The structural configuration of states is unique and can exist in various stages of productivity depending on the intended developmental ‘product’ or outcome. While we can fairly safely take patriarchy as a given structural component of any state, the other structural components and the institutions that are derived from it can vary considerably.

An example of a state’s structural configuration can be as follows. States like Pakistan feature the political precedence of the military as a component to governance, the structural weight of the prominent religion, Sunni Islam, and its influence on healthcare and educational institutions. Pakistan also features economic structures that reflect neo-liberal norms from the West such as relatively free markets and compliance with the rules and regulations of many international trade agreements of which they are members. We see a democratic regime type that features hybrid civilian/military rule. We see ethnic hierarchies at the structural level of the state in which institutions derived from this configuration work to benefit and favour certain ethnicities over others. Cultural structures also manifest in the type of cultural products Pakistan produces (TV dramas, music, prayer mats). Underpinning all of these structural components is the omnipresent structure of patriarchy which underscores other structural and institutional components of the state and often compounds their effects.

When multilateral institutions that engage in development like the IMF and the World Bank categorize states as either developing or developed, it is the products of these structural configurations on which they base their conclusions. Normative conclusions on the day to day

effects that structures have on the lives of the people and the degree of sustainability through economic activity a state can maintain, are the basis by which the world is divided into developed and developing. These normatively-laden assumptions on what constitutes a ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ state are generated in the developed world. Based on these normative assumptions, the developed world features productive structural configurations. The way the component structures of developed states act and interact and the way the institutions that are derived from these structures are layered, are perceived to be conducive to the normative ideal of a developed state.

Developing states that are identified for developmental interventions either through invitation from the developing state’s government or through externally-lead initiatives, are therefore targeted for what is conceptually speaking, structural tailoring or amendment. The structures of the recipient state are the source of any institutional or otherwise observable/measurable realities of a given state. After all, following structuration theory, a state would not be developed or developing unless its structural and institutional configuration allowed it to be. For example, if a targeted developing state is identified as having high rates of infant and maternal mortality, the quality of healthcare institutions is most obviously implicated. However, the suitability and functionality of the economic system and its ability to allocate revenue effectively to crucial sectors is also implicated. The institutional capacity of the political administration is also implicated, are they failing in tax revenue collection or is endemic corruption siphoning off taxpayer dollars for individual benefit rather than the societal good? Are specific religious institutions disseminating ideas that promote the use of more traditional healthcare methods? Is the patriarchal structure that underscores many of the other structures and

subsequent institutions preventing a prioritization of maternal health? The answers to these questions are crucial for generating holistic, organic, and concrete developmental progress.

### **External agents and structuration**

Given that within the context of a state, agents with varying degrees of potential, capacity, and passivity engage in structuration and replication of the structural configuration of the state as it exists. When external development agents act within a developing context, they too possess agency only as far as the structural parameters of that state allow. They are constrained in the same way agents of the state are. Unless the external development agent is willfully violating recipient state laws, they do, as empowered agents that is possible through recipient state sanction, contribute to the structural status quo from which they benefit. This is not to suggest that the development agent is simply ‘playing the game’ which allows them employment and the chance to travel, or that they have malicious intent in which they want the developing state to remain in a degree of underdevelopment. Rather, I argue here that this glaring fallacy in contemporary donor-driven development work is simply ignored.

### **Structuration in action**

There are significant ways that the contemporary tools of development that are most commonly employed in externally-directed developing state interventions are implicated in replication of recipient state structures and institutions. While Giddens does not offer specific instructions on how best to research and demonstrate processes of structuration, he does give a broad directional recommendation:

‘analysing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such systems grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in

the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in ‘interaction’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 25).

Using this broad prescription, I will demonstrate the ways in which different development policy tools and agents contribute to agent-structure interactions.

### **Loans and structuration**

Keeping these micro-level interactions by which agents engage with structures and their institutions in mind, it is possible to apply the same logic demonstrated above to analyze the contributions of dominant development policy tools to the structural configuration of recipient states. Turning first to the use of loans for the purposes of filling a deficiency in the capital necessary to jump-start self-sufficient development, a number of problematic processes become evident.

As has already been established, loans are offered to the administrative units of developing states by a number of donor-types including: multilateral organisations like the IMF, bilateral partners, NPOs and NGOs. Millions of dollars flow to the developing world through the disbursement of these loans. Loans are in theory, conditional on repayment. Donors can refuse disbursement of subsequent tranches of loans if the recipient state has not made efforts to repay what has already been issued. A recipient state’s history of repayment of loans can also negatively affect its international standing as a ‘good investment’ for foreign direct investment and other loans. In practice, loans have for decades been issued in overwhelming contravention to these good-practices of lending. Many recipient states continue to receive huge amounts of loans from donors for either geo-strategic purposes or because they have been identified as ‘special projects’ for development agencies (Frot, Olofsgard, & Berlin, 2013). The fact that many recipient states that fail to generate some minimal degree of self-sufficiency continue to

receive loans becomes hugely problematic when loans repayment deadlines loom and interest begins to accumulate on these loans. If the recipient state is unable to repay the base amount of the loan, it stands to reason they will be doubly unable to repay the huge amounts of interest that accumulate (Bjornskov & Schroder, 2013).

Loans are exposed as deeply problematic in the event that the recipient state features a non-productive status quo. I argue that loans first and foremost reinforce the status quo through the contribution of vast amounts of resources by which agents within the recipient state's context may engage in structuration. As has been demonstrated, a state that is identified as a prospective recipient for loans is identified on the basis of its sub-optimal structural configuration. While this is not overt or often even apparent to donors, these structural configurations exist and are maintained through capital and other resources. These structural configurations may be not be productive in contributing to developmental outcomes but they do benefit certain agents within the recipient state. These agents who stand to benefit are empowered agents who are engaging in status quo agent-structure interaction. Empowered agents are often (but not always) optimally-positioned within society in ways where they may maintain the status quo. This often means they are part of the administrative apparatus of the state, the same administrative apparatus that is on the receiving end of development loans. Loans make their way to the hands of empowered agents, who can use this capital to reinforce and strengthen the institutional manifestations of the structural status quo. Therefore, once capital is introduced into the structural context of the recipient state, it often operates counter-productively to the development goal the loan was intended to contribute to.

## **How programs contribute to or subvert the status quo**

Externally directed development programs are used frequently by multilateral institutions like the World Bank and can be either formulaic or context-specific. They can be national initiatives, sector specific, or local. What relationship do these programs, their goals, and their methods have with the established institutional and structural status quo? Having established that loans are conceptually problematic when viewed from the perspective of structuration theory, programs are by this same measure less so. While programmatic interventions certainly feature capital resources for administrative and implementation purposes, the thrust of their contribution comes from the expertise, personnel, organization, and substance of the program.

In terms of interaction with recipient state structural configuration, programs may either reinforce the status quo, occupy a space within the structural parameters of the state that is not status quo, or fail. Many externally-directed development programs attempt to introduce either incubators for crucial components of development which do not already exist in that state or aim to nurture promising developments that are in their fledgling (and therefore most vulnerable) period. Externally directed development initiatives are often informed by lessons gleaned from either the developed world or lessons gleaned from development initiatives in other parts of the world (Coelho & Goldemberg, 2013). The expertise used to inform the programs is therefore often 'foreign'. Thus, these programs may lack recipient state specific information to inform the formulation of their programs. Additionally, experts and administrators of these programs are often external development agents. While domestic partnerships certainly exist and at times may even be domestically directed, they are often conceptualized in isolation from recipient state structural considerations.

In practice, we see that a development agency may decide to implement a program in a specific state. In their assessments of what may be a useful program for the recipient state, questions often revolve around what the recipient state is missing. So for example, if the recipient state has poor educational infrastructure, the development agency may seek to supplement what is lacking and arrive at the program prescription of training primary school teachers. This logic avoids any consideration of the structural parameters of the recipient state. Instead of being content with asking ‘what is the state lacking?’ development practitioners must push their pre-program analysis further. The more pertinent and telling question when accounting for unique structural configurations is ‘Why is the state lacking in this issue area?’ This question will, when explored to its fullest, reveal structural explanations for varying degrees of development. This shift in thinking I am advocating in this paper has already begun and is best exemplified by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. However, I argue here that while the Declaration and Agenda paint a rosy and promising picture in theory, applying the principles is more difficult in the context of minimal or negligible enforcement mechanisms between donors and recipients. Why does Pakistan have such low rates of rural literacy? Using what has been established about agents, structures, and structuration, I highlight three of many possibilities.

First, Pakistani social structures and their institutions limit the ability of agents to promote rural education. What does this mean specifically? According to the conceptualization of structuration theory advocated here, the structures that exist in Pakistan and the institutions that arise from them are configured in a way that is pre-disposed to produce certain development outcomes and inhibit others. In this case, Pakistan’s religious structure produces a variety of religious institutions. Among these varieties, the most dogmatic have taken root in rural areas.



Despite Pakistan officially being a secular state, these rural religious institutions promote religious education over secular curricula. Additionally, rural religious institutions may have manifested in a particularly dogmatic way because Pakistan's economic institutions are inefficient at allocating the benefits of economic growth to the rural areas. This lack of resources in rural areas may contribute to higher rates of poverty, malnutrition, scarce or poor health services, and therefore higher rates of mortality among adults and children. It can be inferred that having to contend with higher probabilities of the death of loved ones, Pakistanis in rural areas may seek solace in their religious institutions. These religious institutions may have responded to this need and manifested in such a way that focuses on the hereafter as a means of consolation and prescriptions for how to attain it and therefore worldly achievements like secular education are deemed insignificant. This may contribute to lower demand among rural populations for secular education, local leaders may feel no pressure to push the agenda and thus rural agents engage in status quo structuration. The result is a lack of rural pressure for leaders to prioritize secular education.

This partly informs the second possibility, that structural parameters do allow for improvements in rural education but these routes have not been explored due to status quo agent-structure interaction and the fact that knowledgeable agents who may understand the processes by which rural education may be improved upon do not have the capacity to engage in more productive interactions. Low rates of rural education can be identified by local affected agents as a problem, but it may be a scenario where the agents with potential who are best situated within the agent structure dualism to critically reflect on the processes of status quo agent-structure interactions they witness, lack the resources to affect the opinions of local leadership. They may

be members of an ethno-religious minority, or women, or children. In a patriarchal society, these intersectional markers are as effective at stifling dissent as a physical gag.

A significant implication of the fact that agents with potential are the best suited to reflect critically on sub-optimal structural configurations, is of course that that critical engagement is sanctioned within the parameters of those very configurations. This creates promising prospects for harnessing agents with potential for sustained and productive development outcomes. This also suggests that there exists a wide variety of institutional and developmental potentials for structural configurations and the parameters they set and they need only be operationalized.

This leads to the third possibility, that the structural configuration as it exists today may not be conducive to development in rural educational, but that the trajectory of this configuration may in the future be conducive to sustained improvements in rural education. Applied to the example of rural education, this can mean that the decentralized mode of government in rural Pakistan may be a relatively new installation and local leadership is still in the establishing phase of its administration. This can mean that at present, local leadership is relying on dominant ethno-religious affiliations in the area to decide agenda items and to allocate funding. However, in the long-run, if a rural municipality is beginning to decay and central authority begins to apply pressure to local leadership, these leaders may then be influenced to respond to local dissent in a more conciliatory manner. This may create openings for agents with potential to use their critical knowledge of local processes through the resources of more willing local leadership. And while there are certainly prospects for backsliding and renegeing on commitments, there are also prospects that that specific instance of non-status quo agent-structure interactions may have set too powerful a precedent to renege on.

## **How grants contribute to or subvert the status quo**

A last external development policy tool that is gaining in popularity is that of grants. Grants are disbursements of capital that are issued without the condition of repayment. For conceptual clarity, I include loans that are forgiven by donors to recipients who are severely incapacitated as conceptually equivalent to a grant since the outcome is the same. Grants and forgiven loans represent an injection of capital that is not accompanied with the complementary and compounding burden of repayment.

Building on what has already been established about the contribution loans make to structuration, much of the same logic also extends to grants insofar as they also represent an injection of capital is used in the domestic structural context by empowered agents to engage in status quo structuration. Using this conceptualization, the appeal of grants for many development practitioners and recipient governments that are earnest in their desire to improve their state's developmental prospects, is lessened. If the similarity between loans and grants in their immediate contribution to the recipient state result in similar conclusions about their contribution to status quo agent-structure interaction, it may be useful to analyze the issue on the basis of the dissimilarities.

## **Repayment and Structuration**

How does the issue of repayment contribute to status quo agent-structure interactions in the developing state, if at all? Considering the necessary condition of repayment that accompanies loans, we can draw significant conclusions on the contribution of repayment to the structural status quo. Revisiting what I have already established regarding the role of monetary resources in structuration, I argue that repayment actually creates the potential for non-status quo paths of structural engagement. If loan monies fall into the well-worked institutional and

structural grooves by which the status quo is perpetuated, then mechanisms by which monetary resources are removed for the purposes debt-servicing from this process weakens that status quo. This stripping away of structural and institutional reinforcements opens up the possibility for new avenues and iterations of non-productive status quos. I argue that recipient state governments that are burdened with repayment must make difficult choices regarding where the money for repayment will come from. This can mean one of two things: that recipient state governments either make myopic cutbacks in sectors that affect marginalised groups who do not have the resources or the knowledgeability to challenge the status quo, or, that recipient states governments can harness the burden of repayment to generate new (non-status quo), more productive policies and institutional arrangements. In this sense, the burden of repayment actually contributes more to growth and development than the loan itself. The difference is that the loan capital itself benefits and reinforces the structural status quo but does not effectively create sufficient pressure for structural/institutional revision. The burden of repayment however, acts as a penalty or negative reinforcement of the status quo which must be mitigated through institutional adjustments. The result is that the loan that is offered to the recipient state benefits the status quo while the process of repayment implicitly challenges it. Grants, as has already been established are not only more conducive to problematic status quo structuration, but are also not accompanied with a ‘stick’ component to the carrot that might compel the recipient state government to at the very least consider non-status quo options when faced with the prospect of repayment.

### **Implications**

The implications of what I am arguing are as follows: development is a complex hybrid of objective aims and subjective manifestations and that development is fluid. Each state can

exist with a variety of alternative structural configurations. The key lies in finding the one most conducive to development and promoting it. The bigger issue is understanding and allowing for the prospect that development can look a lot of different ways. These diverse manifestations of what a developed state can look like, may not be familiar conceptions of development or progress and may even appear contradictory to Western manifestations. The measure of successful development is, at its most reductive, at least as far as external interventions and agents are concerned, about generating the capacity for self-sufficiency. The dissection of agency featured in this thesis reveals the importance of selecting the correct candidates for implementation of an aid program. This also demonstrates some of the different mechanisms by which agents and institutions interact, the nature of the interaction is reflected in the outcome. The next sections illustrate and expand upon the types of agent-structure interactions in order to further reveal the micro-mechanisms by which a state is produced and reproduced in a given form.

### **Structural Maturation**

If the intention of the development intervention is one of structural maturation, where the developing state in question is identified as being in a state of underdevelopment due to the fact that the structural components of the state and the institutions are perhaps new or constrained in their maturation through a lack of resources, then formalized, status quo channels for the intervention are appropriate. This can be suitable when the recipient state features strong structural foundations but the institutions may be weak or constrained. Leadership in these states is most likely supportive of interventions when taking development outcomes into account and leaders are generally on board with development interventions provided they are sensitive to local contexts and sufficient jurisdictional deference to state authority is provided.

In these scenarios, loans may be appropriate policy tools through which structural maturation is achieved. Loans in this scenario are best issued to recipient state governments that will possess greater knowledge of where best to allocate ‘water’ based on where it is most needed within the ‘tree’. In this case, status quo agent-structure interactions are productive and necessary and empowered agents and their propensity for the status quo is a positive. However, if it is recognized that a lack of resources in achieving structural maturation is the main impediment for development, grants may be more effective a policy tool. Since grants are not paired with the requisite burden of repayment, they may be the most efficient at achieving the development outcome.

### **Structural Subversion**

If the aim of the development intervention is to circumvent the institutional constraints of the state, it is best to harness the seeds of potential and create a permissive environment for them to flourish within the resource radius of the target tree. Development practitioners may need to circumvent the structural/institutional configuration of the recipient state in instances where it is identified as being fully matured, unproductive, or in a state of decay. This can be identified in instances where the formal structural channels are recognised as being a part of the problem. A developing state in this case may be rife with corruption and nepotism in key institutions. Leadership can be unelected, unconcerned with the health of the state or its people (or actively oppressive to them), or focussed solely on amassing personal wealth.

In these scenarios it is most conducive to developmental outcomes to avoid the formal channels for development when possible (without of course breaking the law). This type of intervention would be a more delicate process requiring agent and development tool sensitivity. If the need for structural subversion and institutions is recognized, the seeds of potential

alternative configurations of structures and institutions must be planted. They must be planted however, by domestic agents. This is crucial, any developmental progress must be authored by domestic agents so that it is sustainable without constant intervention by external agents. The right domestic agents will also inherently possess greater knowledge of domestic structural/institutional permissions and constraints and potential for change.

As has already been established, empowered agents will necessarily be status quo and are likely to operate in key positions within the state/society that allow them to maintain the structural status quo. Passive agents will also be status quo through the lack of resources and knowledge regarding the processes of structuration. Agents with potential are the ones who are best equipped to erect subvert existing structures. An excellent example of structural subversion lies in the prevalence of large informal sectors in many developing states such as the popularity and proven success of microfinance programs in the developing world. These two examples feature agents with potential identifying harmful constraints within their structural/institutional realities and working actively to circumvent them.

External development practitioners must target agents with potential if it is identified that the status quo is non-productive. As has been established grants are the most conducive policy tools to status quo agent-structure interaction. However, another caveat must be added here to reign in my damning treatment of grants as an ineffective policy tool. If the grants are being issued through formal channels and therefore necessarily interacting with institutions and subsequently reinforcing structures, grants are the most detrimental and counter-productive policy tool. If development practitioners are targeting agents rather than institutions however, grants gain a significant degree of utility. In this conception, empowering an agent with potential

to engage in productive non-status quo agent-structure interaction can be realized in a number of ways.

Development practitioners can offer funding for microfinance programs through grants that do not require repayment. Microfinance programs are conceptually different than development programs that facilitate the building of schools or hospitals. This is due to the fact that microfinance programs are not normatively laden. They provide the universal currency for agent-structure interaction, money. What beneficiaries of this program do with the money is not dictated by the program. This freedom allows agents with potential to act upon their knowledgeability to create non-status quo channels of productive institutional configurations or to subvert existing institutions to fill in gaps where the status quo configuration fails.

Another route for subverting structures can come from something as small-scale as offering agents with potential the funding for business ventures. This can only succeed when the donor does not place conditions on the funding, agents must be able to actualize the benefit of the funding in whichever way they deem fit. This can mean something as small-scale as donors providing the capital for an agent to develop their own clothing store. This clothing store if successful can provide clothing for the community at costs lower than they might get at other established multi-national clothing stores. It can provide a source of employment for the community and can allow employees and owners the financial means by which they can educate their children. The success of the store can dictate whether the owner of the business engages in community building programs. The business may expand to provide even greater means of employment and community enrichment. The business may also decide instead of importing clothing or purchasing pre-made garment wholesale, to venture into weaving. This can create expertise in the community and be a source of knowledge dissemination.



This is organic, local, micro-scale development at its best and most effective. These recommendations do not preclude the possibility that many of these ventures may fail or the grants and loans that are issued by donors may be productive, they may make their way back to formal channels and contribute to the structuration of a detrimental status quo. It is argued here however, that the possibilities for success are much more promising than they are through offering large-scale loans to developing state governments or to agents who contribute to a non-productive status-quo. The amount of development interventions that are funded and which fail necessarily incorporate risk as well, and this is risk on a far larger scale than that being advocated here.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDIES**

Given what has been established thus far regarding the types of considerations that must be taken into account when developing programs for recipient states, it is possible to create a guiding framework for analysis of development interventions, both pre- and post-program.

In this chapter, I present a number of pertinent questions that must be addressed by development practitioners both pre- and post-program intervention.

I endorse the following analytical questions for consideration by World Bank program development agencies prior to the planned intervention. These questions are informed by principles which inform the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action:

What is the development problem being addressed?

Why is this a development problem?

What cross-sectoral or state-wide structural influences act upon the identified development problem? I.e. how does the economic model/system affect a problem identified in the health sector?

Interview those affected by the problem, what do they identify as causation or correlation for the problem? (this would require community-wide, sector-wide, or national-level surveys depending on the issue)

Interview those on the administrative end, what do they identify as causation or correlation for the issue? (this would require community-wide, sectoral-wide, or national-level surveys depending on the issue)

Analyze results to determine causality

Identify whether you are attempting:

- a. Structural maturation (promoting the status quo or circumventing it) or

b. Structural subversion

Identify agents accordingly

Design the development intervention accordingly

For post-intervention evaluation, analyses must continue to assess failures/success/ and externalities. However, following the logic of structuration theory, successes need only be analyzed for the purposes of increasing country-specific knowledge—development successes must not be replicated in different contexts. Failures must be analyzed in as similar manner to the pre-intervention analyses advocated above. I endorse the following questions for adoption by the World Bank program evaluation agencies (to report back to program development agencies) after the development intervention has been implemented. These questions are again informed by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action but my contribution lies in the introduction of the analytical concepts by which I propose the World Bank answer these questions:

1. Attempt to answer why the program failed or succeeded through systemic thinking

Based on structurally informed development goals, were the goals achieved?

- a. Did the project succeed or fail in facilitating or promoting structural maturation (status quo or non-status quo)?
- b. Did the project succeed or fail in facilitating or promoting structural subversion?
- c. In the event of intervention failure: was the data misinterpreted? Were the wrong agents targeted?

Conduct surveys of those affected and those implementing the program to determine causation and gain greater information regarding the conditions around failure or success.

These analytical tools of inquiry are not presented here as the only relevant analyses for development interventions, rather they are promoted as crucial components to any pre- and post-intervention analysis. The focus on systemic thinking will improve the degree of knowledgeable for development practitioners and will limit instances in which interventions fail, produce unexpected negative externalities, or exacerbate the development context in which they are operating. A key take-away of this analysis focuses on allowing those subject to (or affected by) the development intervention to create the narrative. This will necessitate a re-alignment of elite technocratic intuition, namely that experts only exist on the basis of knowledgeable of: economics, project management, or policy development, etc. I argue that those subject to the conditions of underdevelopment may be equally or more qualified to comment on or contribute to solutions. This must be acknowledged in a greater capacity than it currently is among development practitioners, that is, mainly through lip-service and must be operationalized.

Another key takeaway is that the ‘order of operations’ of development interventions is important and subjective! This is not to imply that there is a concrete order of operations that all states must follow in order to develop. Rather, I argue that there is a subjective, state-specific, order of development milestones that build upon the foundational capacity for sustained development and which prime the recipient state for successful programmatic interventions. Attention must be paid to these foundational prerequisites for development, if practitioners aim to increase chances of success. This foundation can be unique and must be established if the

development enterprise and its interventions are to gain any degree of reliability and efficacy in the work they claim to specialize in.

In order to demonstrate that this type of systemic thinking is not being incorporated into current World Bank operations, I present below six geographically diverse case studies. These case studies feature reviews of programmatic interventions in the recipient state and are conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) within the jurisdiction of the World Bank. These cases have been selected relatively randomly, some consideration was given to ensure geographical and programmatic diversity. I analyze these case studies through the analytical framework presented above. The case studies are: the health system modernization project in Albania, the health workforce and services project in Indonesia, the higher education development project in Jordan, the HIV/AIDs capacity building and technical assistance program in Lesotho, and the second social action fund in Tanzania.

### **Health System Modernization Project—Albania, 2006-2012**

The Health System Modernization Project (HSMP) was directed by the World Bank and supported by an International Development Aid (IDA) credit of 10.7 (US \$15.4) million in special drawing rights (SDR). The project was implemented in the context of a severely overburdened, inefficient, and fragmented health system. Program objectives were focused on: improving access to high quality primary health care services, improving government capacity to formulate policies and reforms in the health sector, and to improve hospital governance and management (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 11). The program also prioritized improving poor and under-serviced areas and weeding out inefficient use of hospitals. The project's outcome is rated moderately unsatisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed highly relevant to national health priorities, the relevance of the design of the project to these

objectives was rated modest, the risk posed to the objectives of the project were rated significant, overall bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory, overall borrower performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory, implementing agency performance was rated moderately satisfactory, and monitoring and evaluation was rated modest (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, pp. xii-xiv).

***Structural Analysis of the HSMP (based on information gathered by the WB for the program)***

The development problem being addressed by the HSMP is not explicitly stated in the performance review conducted by the IEG. Based on the information provided as well the parameters and features of the program detailed, an initial problem is inferred here. The development problem the HSMP attempts to contend with is that of an overburdened, inefficient, and fragmented health care system. These failings in Albania's health care system are amplified when considering the experiences of marginalized groups (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 5).

This is identified as a development problem on the basis of near-universal recognition that the health of a society is crucial for its development (Taylor & Hall, 1967). Key health challenges identified in the report include: a growing incidence of non-communicable diseases, the affordability of health care for low-income groups, and a health-sector ill-equipped to deal with the burden of new health risks (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 5).

Cross-sectoral and structural influences that act upon the identified development problem can be determined throughout the report by analyzing the explanations offered for component or entire program outcomes. The report identifies several barriers to implementation including; political strife related to the 2009 elections (half way through the period of program

implementation), significant turnover of health ministry staff, and ambiguous delineation of roles and responsibilities in geographical jurisdictions and levels of bureaucracy (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 14). Additionally, the appointment of staff to the ministry of health is identified as being based on political favours and exhibitiv of cronyism within Albania's political system. This replacement of qualified ministry of health staff with politically appointed staff has led to significant loss of institutional memory, expertise, and a drop in quality of services being provided (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 35). The chaotic election campaign and the disorderly transition of power featured in the 2009 Albanian elections also indicates structural and institutional weaknesses in the Albanian political system.

The report identifies the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as a contributing factor to the program's sub-optimal outcome. This lack of delineation is attributed to the decentralized environment in which the health sector operated at the time of project implementation (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 14). From this, one can conclude that the decentralized system may not have had the chance to fully mature before the project was implemented. One could also conclude however that the dysfunctionality of the program under the decentralized system speaks to the inappropriateness or unfeasibility of the decentralized system in the Albanian context.

One way to probe the issue further to gain greater conclusiveness on one claim over the other is to investigate the features of the decentralized system itself. This can be conducted through interviews and subsequent analysis of the first hand experiences of the people subject to the decentralized system. Another way to probe the issue further is to re-visit the policies and legislation surrounding the process of decentralization, investigating both whether the legislation warrants review and whether the agents of decentralization within the state are adhering and

engaging in structuration within the parameters of those parameters and laws. From this development practitioners and government officials can determine whether the failings of the decentralized system are beyond repair or whether the issue lies in the way agents are behaving within the structural parameters dictated, I.e. in a non-status quo way when status quo behavior is warranted.

Additionally, the performance review points repeatedly to the lack of quality in the products being offered by the health sector. The program incorporates a financing scheme that would allow low-income groups in Albania to pay for health services at a more forgiving pace. Despite this however, due to the fact that the Albanian health care system does not yet feature a ‘culture’ of quality services, many marginalized groups who do seek healthcare solutions feel compelled to offer bribes out of pocket in an attempt to guarantee better service for themselves and their loved ones (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 28). This introduces yet another institutional malady into the equation, that of corruption. The fact that even when offered other avenues for payment which would be more forgiving to patients and their families, institutionalized usage of bribery still persists is indicative of broader structural failings in the political, social and economic system. The fact that those on the receiving end of the bribes continue to accept them is a major contributing factor for the persistence of that form of corruption within the Albanian health care system. The fact that it is socially recognized that a bribe will presumably guarantee better service is indicative of the socialized normalization of the use of bribery in day to day life. Lastly, paying bribes affects every Albanian financially. Upper or middle class families must incorporate the normalized necessity of bribes into their budgeting and lower class families are even more significantly affected since the financial impact of paying bribes will be much greater relatively speaking on them and may affect their ability to maintain



even subsistence living. On the other hand, those receiving bribes may do so predominantly for financial gain but this again implicates questions of agency. Are the agents in society who receive bribes doing so as passive agents who uncritically follow the predetermined societal status quo, because ‘it is just the way things are done in Albania’? Or, are they receiving bribes to supplement income that is not being sufficiently provided by national wage rates for their professions? Is the social welfare system weak or nonexistent and therefore provides impetus for agents within the society to accept bribes in the event that they may need the extra income in cases of emergencies? Lastly, are the agents who receive bribes positioned in society in a manner where they have the capacity to be on the receiving end of bribes and therefore invested in the maintenance of that status quo? All of these factors are relevant and equally crucial in the resolution of core, systemic issues in the event that something like corruption and a ‘culture of bribery’ is identified as an impeding factor in the success of a development intervention like the HSMP.

To summarize, some of the structural and systemic issues identified as impediments to the success of the program are: corruption, cronyism, societal normalization of bribery, inefficiencies in the economic system, political instability, the lack of a culture of quality within the health care system, and a dysfunctional decentralized system (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014). Analyzing the implicated structural and institutional features of Albania, it is possible to infer that given the fact that many of the impediments to program success are couched in the formal administrative end, that the structural status quo that represents is problematic. However, this inference coupled with the fact that many of the formal, administrative elements that are identified as problematic are also identified in terms that suggest they are ‘immature’, we can also conclude that status quo maturation may be appropriate in this case. This means that the

formal administrative channels for development and the agents may be harnessed for development through the provision of resources and technical capacity. However, given the Albanian condition of cronyism, this means that alternative agents may need to be identified for implementation of the program that are not part of the administrative status quo.

### **Health Workforce and Services Project—Indonesia, 2003-2008**

The Health Workforce and Services Project (HWS) was conceived and developed by the World Bank and supported with an IDA of \$54.78 million. The objectives of the project were: piloting effective health sector decentralization in selected provinces, supporting the ministry of health in a new oversight role in a decentralized health system, and to support effective health workforce policy and management (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiii). The project's outcome is rated unsatisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed highly relevant, the relevance of the design of the project to these objectives was rated modest, the risk posed to the objectives of the project were rated significant, overall bank performance is rated unsatisfactory, overall borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory, implementing agency performance was rated unsatisfactory, and monitoring and evaluation was rated negligible (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiv). The report makes explicit the fact that this project was implemented in the context of a recently decentralized Indonesian Health care system (1999, four years before project implementation) (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiii).

#### ***Structural analysis of HWS***

Again, the project review does not explicitly state a development problem that is being tackled. The general development objective is 'to support health sector decentralization in four provinces for sustainable financing and client-centered delivery of health services' (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 37). The specific objective was to

assist the borrower in achieving the effective delivery of health services in Indonesia in a decentralized setting by strengthening (i) the financing and delivery of health services in the borrower's provinces of Jambi, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and West Sumatra, so as to enhance the quality of care and health outcomes at the District Level; and (ii) health workforce policy, management and development at the national and sub-national levels so as to improve allocative efficiencies and equity in the distribution and use of health 'resources' (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 37).

In addition, the project aimed to empower the Ministry of Health (MoH) and to assist in the clear delineation and definition of jurisdictional roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders and sectors as well as to generally improve policymaking mechanisms, and technical and institutional capacity within the different provinces and districts (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 38).

The project focus on assisting Indonesian health ministry officials stemmed from the relatively recent implementation of the decentralization program, the aim being to build capacity among MoH agents. Since decentralization was introduced to the Indonesian health sector relatively recently, the risk to the effectiveness of health service provision was identified as being elevated (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 48).

A number of cross-sectoral and structural influence can be identified as intervening variables in the effectiveness of the project. Ambiguous and poorly defined roles and responsibilities were identified in the report as a significant challenge for successful project implementation. Program developers assumed that the roles and responsibilities that they would need to secure successful implementation already existed in the context of a decentralized Indonesia. This proved untrue and lead to opacity in tracing the transfer of funds between

ministries, districts and jurisdictions. The districts were identified in the report as having limited control over the financial resources allocated to them and therefore inefficiencies were bred into the flow and process of disbursement of funds (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 14). In addition, WB program developers assumed that Indonesia's central governmental authority was in support of the ministry of health's newly decentralized system, which also proved to be an untenable assumption. This lack of support for the program from central authority explains some of the transparency and opacity in tracing the funds for the program.

The tension between the interests of the central authority with the districts and ministry of health can be identified as a cross-sectoral impediment to implementation. Studies have shown that Indonesia's decentralized health system does not clearly delineate responsibilities between central government and districts (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, pp. 2-4). The roles of district-levels versus those of ministry of health officials tends to incorporate redundancies in jurisdiction and process, breeding inefficiencies into the system. Alternately, gaps are identified in other areas where there is no oversight for some processes being conducted at the district-level (Lieberman, Capuno, & Minh, 2005, p. 59). This suggests a degree of political disjunction at the administrative level. The influence of political disjunction in the success of the development intervention is quite apparent in this example.

The decentralisation of Indonesia's health care system was initiated in the context of a 'reform era' in Indonesia. The sparks of political optimism that pervaded Indonesian society after President Suharto resigned his post were at their most vibrant in 1999, immediately after the succession. Health sector decentralization was initiated under the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid and his National Unity Cabinet (USA International Business Publications, 2008, p. 25). However, the HWS program was implemented in 2003, during the reign of his successor

President Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) from 2001-2004. Sukarnoputri was widely recognized as a symbol rather than an authoritative leader and most day to day government decisions and activities were directed by the Mutual Assistance Cabinet. Corruption was pervasive during this time (Mydans, 2001). The 2004 Indonesian elections ushered in the reign of yet another leader, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party of Indonesia (Ananta, Arifin, & Suryadinata, 2005, p. 89). It was under Yudhoyono that the majority and remainder of the HWS was implemented. A point worth mentioning here is that during Yudhoyono's reign, Indonesia suffered a slew of natural disasters including the 2004 Indian earthquake, the Tsunami at Nias Island, the 2006 Mount Merapi eruption, and an earthquake that struck Yogyakarta (Ananta, Arifin, & Suryadinata, 2005, p. 135).

Within this political context, it is important to note that the program development phase of the HWS was conducted under Wahid's presidency, the HWS was initiated under Sukarnoputri and was completed under Yudhoyono. It stands to reason that three political administrations coupled with a slew of natural disasters during the implementation of the program will have affected the success of the program which again, was rated unsatisfactory in terms of outcome. When viewed through the structural lens, a number of conclusions can be drawn.

First, while the political structures in Indonesia may have been functioning relatively soundly in the post-Suharto period (exemplified by the relatively democratic process of orderly transition of power), the institutions that are informed by the political structure exhibit dysfunction and sub-optimal conditions. Democratic elections were certainly held and transitions of power resulted with relative normalcy (periodic political unrest certainly occurred) however,

the degree of administrative upheaval between each successive leader bred significant volatility into the program intervention context. Second, while relatively free and fair democratic elections occurred, the prevalence of corruption within this process persisted. As mentioned earlier, the flows of program funding were notably opaque and difficult to trace from the source to the intended recipient sector and agents.

From recognition of these institutional influences on the effectiveness of the HWS program, two possible avenues for tailored programs arise. First, one can conclude from the fledgling wave of health sector decentralisation that the reason the program failed was because of the immaturity of the decentralised system. The institutional strength necessary for a successful program of decentralisation was not sufficiently achieved in Indonesia at the time of implementation. Following the framework provided, the optimal program design would be one that facilitates institutional maturity. At first glance, the HWS seems exactly that, a program designed to provide support to the decentralised health sector for further entrenchment and enhanced performance. On closer inspection of the program components however, it becomes apparent that the program was not aimed at structural maturity of the decentralisation project due to the fact that the assumptions made by HWS developers were not in tune with the realities of Indonesia's decentralised health sector. Rather, they made assumptions on what support for decentralisation should look like based on previous experiences with decentralisation, presumably based on other country contexts or on 'best practice' norms. In practice, this manifested in the form of assumed roles and responsibilities for Indonesian health officials and jurisdictions within the program implementation scheme. In effect the HWS aimed to mold the decentralised health system in accordance with pre-established norms of what decentralisation 'should' look like. These norms were promoted for many of the East Asian countries,

specifically in the health sector by the World Health Organization which endorsed decentralization as a means by which citizens were better represented in decision-making and mechanisms for resource allocation were more efficiently than a centralised system (Lieberman, Capuno, & Minh, 2005, p. 156). This was no doubt done with the intention of maximising the benefit to patrons of the health sector, as has been established however, the program was unsuccessful and resulted in a waste of WB resources (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 50).

An important note here, while the program was unsuccessful, the lessons gleaned from the program experience are actually quite insightful in this review. Significant among them is the recognition that the recipient state possesses the capabilities to implement the program as it is designed. Based on what has now been established about the significance and precedence of structural considerations when developing programs, one can certainly argue that the program should be designed based on recipient capacity rather than the other way around. The logic that recipient state context is important is still sound. Namely, that recipient state context is important! Another promising lesson detailed by the IEG is that the program should ensure institutional flexibility. This speaks directly to the point made earlier regarding the many ways in which structural features of a state can be manifested through the institutions, i.e. just because decentralisation is lagging or inefficient in the Indonesian health sector, does not mean that decentralisation is 'inappropriate' for the Indonesian health sector. Rather, the point the IEG makes demonstrates the structural logic promoted here, that decentralisation in the context of the Indonesian health sector can manifest in a number of ways and while one manifestation may not be productive, promoting institutional flexibility may allow for different more productive manifestations of the structure. Keeping the baby, not the bathwater.

Based on available knowledge regarding Indonesia's political limitations and the prevalence of corruption, I argue that for Indonesia decentralisation is the most effective route for sheltering the population from the negative effects of these institutional failings. Due to the likelihood for frequent political transitions of power and the policy volatility that breeds coupled with widespread corruption, the central government is a sub-optimal agent for program implementation. Subsequently, firming up decentralised authority in local districts is a non-status quo way to ensure structural maturation of service delivery mechanisms in Indonesia.

How would a program that works to reinforce processes of decentralisation while building capacity among agents differ from the HWS? As has already been established, status quo structuration of the decentralised health governance system would need to be done through established roles and responsibilities. This would mean engaging directly with district, sector, and local agents. Monetary and technical resources would need to be administered directly to decentralised authorities rather than through the central government for eventual disbursement to districts. This would provide capacity to agents in the decentralised health system without diluting the effectiveness of the resources through the central sieve. The key difference with the proposed intervention would be to avoid central authority and to work within pre-established, context-specific roles and responsibilities. The impulse to weed out ineffective or redundant roles and responsibilities is understandable and ostensibly necessary. However, external development practitioners must recognize that this is an eventuality once the decentralised system gains sufficient capacity. Ownership for the development and articulation of elements of that system must belong to domestic agents if they are to take root past short-term administrative stints and be sustainable.



## **HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project—Lesotho 2005-2008**

The HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project (HCTA) was conceived and developed by the World Bank and supported with a loan of US \$ 5 million. The objective of the project was ‘to increase Lesotho’s capacity to use effectively the resources provided through a \$29 million Global fund grant to support the implementation of HIV/AIDS programs within its ‘territory’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. xii). The project’s outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed highly relevant, the relevance of the design of the project to these objectives was rated modest, the risk posed to the objectives of the project were rated substantial, overall bank performance was rated satisfactory, overall borrower performance was rated moderately satisfactory, implementing agency performance was rated moderately satisfactory, and monitoring and evaluation is rated modest. The objective to increase institutional capacity to use global fund resources was deemed substantially achieved. The objective to increase the institutional capacity to use these resources effectively was modestly achieved (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, pp. xii-xiii).

### ***Structural Analysis of HCTA***

The development problem being addressed by this program is not explicitly stated, this is expected since its mandate was one of support for a larger national HIV/AIDS strategic plan rather than spearheading a self-standing directive. As in other places in the world, HIV/AIDS has had a devastating impact on Lesotho. Lesotho has the tragic distinction however of being the country with the 3<sup>rd</sup> highest incidence rate of HIV/AIDS in the world (CIA , 2014). The national HIV/AIDS strategic plan and the corresponding policy framework were devised in recognition of the severity of the epidemic in Lesotho. The HCTA operated in the context of a \$34 million grant

issued by the Global Fund to finance the national plan. Targeted groups were young people in Lesotho and people already living with HIV/AIDS:

Strategies included youth education and prevention, behavioural change communication (BCC) and community outreach, condom distribution, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, care and support for the chronically ill and their families, antiretroviral treatment and monitoring, HIV counseling and testing, care and support for other orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs), stigma reduction in all settings and respect for confidentiality, policy development (including workplace policy), and information systems and operational research.’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 27)

Several inter-connected and cross sectoral and structural influences have affected the extent of damage HIV/AIDS has wrought on Lesotho. Four underlying structural themes emerge in the analysis of program outcome: instability in political institutions; the influence of religious institutions; labour economy inefficiencies; and the compounding influence of other health issues in Lesotho.

Lesotho has a historically turbulent political system, including periods of military rule, widespread protests and riots, and contested election results (United Nations Development Program, 2012). The PPAR identifies the political controversy surrounding the National AIDS Commission as a source for sub-optimal project outcome. There is recognition within Lesotho that the commission coupled with the appeal to the global fund was a political move to quell societal unrest surrounding the destruction HIV/AIDS has wrought on the people of Lesotho. The commission was seen as a face-saving political tool being used by the government of Lesotho to project the image of accountability and to appear to be proactive in the face of the

epidemic. Additionally, it was perceived to be sugar-coating sub-optimal government performance in other crucial sectors of society such as provision of public services to a grossly neglected rural population. The report identifies that if managerial staff in crucial positions in the health sector were to operate at full capacity, the program would have better chances of success (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 44). This supports the general assumptions regarding the lack of societal and political consensus on the aims of the National AIDS Commission and it being used solely as a tool of political leverage and to boost public image of the government (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 48).

The influence of religious institutions on the success of HIV/AIDS initiatives similar to the one being examined here is also demonstrated in analysis of the project outcome. Lesotho is a predominantly Christian society and the influence of the Catholic Church on politics and society is significant. The PPAR identifies that the Catholic Church has intervened actively to prevent previous family planning interventions aimed at limiting the spread of the epidemic in Lesotho. This becomes particularly problematic when factoring in the fact that health service delivery is conducted mainly through the public Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) and private, faith-based organizations, the largest of which is the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL) which operates roughly half of the country's health facilities (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 3). The public MOHSW and the private CHAL operate in different geographical locations such that they do not often compete for clients or services, rather people generally travel to which ever facility is closest. This means that roughly half the health care facilities administered by the CHAL and other private religious institutions may be offering HIV/AIDS treatment that does not incorporate proven family-planning preventative services. While the Global Fund resources coupled with the NAC do officially operate through

the public health sector, taking into account political instability and the assumed tokenism of the initiative, the risk that the resources are funneled away or misallocated in a way that they bolster the private health service sector are high. This would be a valuable research undertaking for future program development.

Structural inefficiencies in key aspects of the economy are also evident in program outcome. The labour economy is revealingly influencing success of HIV/AIDS initiatives in Lesotho as well as detrimentally affecting other key aspects of society. According to the PPAR, Lesotho's human resources sector is in a state of 'perpetual crisis' (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, pp. 4 (Box 1-1)). Crucially, this means that doctors and nurses in Lesotho are dangerously scarce given the severity of the epidemic. The majority of Lesotho's physicians and nurses are from neighbouring states who work in Lesotho on a temporary basis while they await accreditation in South Africa and abroad. This brain drain is a damning exposition on the inefficiencies in Lesotho's labour economy. The IEG recommends that special attention must be paid to the establishment of a sustainable human resources retention program (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 49).

Lastly, the prevalence and gravity of other health issues in Lesotho operate in confluence with the HIV/AIDS epidemic to tax an already weak health system. The PPAR speculates that the focus of the HCTA program on solely Global Fund (and therefore solely HIV/AIDS issues) resources may have exacerbated the neglect of other debilitating health issues in Lesotho. Further compounding cross-sectoral and structural influences on the effectiveness of HCTA and Global fund interventions is the persistence of Tuberculosis in Lesotho. In addition to having the third highest incidence rate of HIV/AIDS, Lesotho also has the fifth highest incidence rate of TB in the world. Contracting TB is the leading cause death for those already living with HIV/AIDS.

Worse still, the number of people with multidrug and extensive drug resistant strains of TB are suspected of rising (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, pp. 44-45). The IEG recommends that HIV/AIDS programs must be balanced with attention to, and integration with, other key health priorities.

Applying the structurationist framework to this structural profile, a number of observations and recommendations can be made. The influence of religious institutions on the impact and societal approval of family planning initiatives and outcomes is evident. Lesotho is a predominantly Christian nation, as such religious institutions engage in status quo agent-structure interaction and define certain health sector initiatives and preclude prospects for success. Acknowledging that there is growing dissent in Lesotho regarding the epidemic and the way it is being addressed by administration, it is possible to avoid passing societal and religious judgement on the people of Lesotho as being inherently ill-equipped as a predominantly Christian nation to contend with the epidemic. It is evident that the flaw does not lie in the religiously inclined 'Christian-ness' of Lesotho since dissent is audible and growing regarding the status quo. Following structurationist logic this dissent is not un-Christian and is actually only possible within the parameters dictated by the religious structure. From this, one can take cues from the non-status quo religious structural parameters and investigate what permissions are allowed within the religious structure to allow for more welcome adoption of family planning interventions.

In regards to inefficiencies in the labour economy and the compounding influence of other health issues in Lesotho, the instability of the political system is identified through application of the structurationist framework as a non-productive vehicle for status quo structuration. From this it is recommended here that HIV/AIDS interventions in Lesotho must

target a number of sectors to ensure holistic improvement not only to raise chances of successful development outcomes but also to minimise the risk that successful outcomes are only quick-fixes. Additionally, development interventions in Lesotho must take religious structural parameters into consideration when developing programs. There is evidence to suggest that the religious structural parameters in Lesotho do allow for dissent in regards to the non-productive status quo (in this case, the Churches decrees on family planning). Successful programs crafted with an ear to the structural grounding of Lesotho will explore Christian teachings that would create a permissive and welcoming environment for proven HIV/AIDS interventions such as family planning and operationalise these teachings. In structural terms, this would be nurturing and maturing the religious structure in a way that produces non-status quo institutional teaching. Alternately, development interventions would identify agents who are engaging in non-status quo protests and assist them in carving more productive routes of structuration. On the other hand, given what has been established about the multi-sectoral, layered and dysfunctional effects of political, economic, and religious structures in Lesotho, development interventions should be crafted in a way which empower agents with knowledge who identify flaws in the status quo to plant their own seeds of novel institutions. This can mean financing agents with knowledge within Lesotho to create health service outlets which operate legally within the political parameters but which employ non-status quo agents and who operate outside the public purview. If private religious institutions persist in contributing to the inefficiency of HIV/AIDS prevention programs, this subversion of existing structures can manifest in a non-status quo religious fashion or can be secular and private.

### **Analysis and Structural Profiles**

Through examination of development interventions and the analysis of those interventions through structurationist principles, the value of systemic thinking in developing interventions becomes apparent. This chapter will provide a tentative framework for creating structural profiles of recipient states prior to an intervention and aims to operationalize principles from Paris and Accra. This profile includes an outline of the structural features of the state as well as a study of the institutional ones. In this analysis, structures will be far more static over time and space than institutions and will dictate the parameters and permissions of resulting institutions. Examples of these foundational structures include but are not limited to: patriarchy, the type of political system, the economic system, ethno-religious dynamics and degree of religious or secular precedence throughout society. The institutional features of the state will be more iterative in the sense that they may exist in different forms over time and space and have the capacity to evolve. They may build upon each other or evolve (for better or worse) over time. Regardless, each institutional manifestation of the structure will be informed by its precursors. Examples of these relatively superficial institutions include: economic institutions such as banks, religious institutions such as synagogues, churches, mosques, political institutions such as the legislature or public service, and specific ethno-religiously segregated schools, places of business and community centres.

The structural profiles of states will differ less since all states in the international system must adhere to global normative assumptions of what qualifies as a state. The different iterations of resulting institutions are the observable qualities by which degrees of development are assessed. It is the health and sustainability/productivity of these institutions that will be targeted or avoided by the development intervention devised as a means of affecting structural change.

Depending on whether practitioners are engaging in structural maturation or non-status quo subversion, they can then target the appropriate agents.

How might this be achieved? Practitioners must identify a development problem in consultation with or under the direction of domestic authorities. First, the development problem must be explicitly stated as the process of defining will inform the subsequent institutional analysis. It is important to note that this explicit articulation of the problem is missing in several IEG program review documents. Next, instead of asking ‘how do we fix this?’ practitioners should ask ‘why is this the case?’ While pure subjectivity in development work may leave many spinning their wheels on the philosophical repercussions of ‘developing’ a state, the objectivity that persists in development work is also detrimental.

Practitioners must use structural profiles to inform development objectives within the recipient state. More specifically, they must analyze the structural profiles of the recipient to inform their development interventions, this will help determine systemic causality for the development problem identified. In addition to development and analysis of structural and institutional profiles, practitioners must also identify whether the status quo is productive or at the very least, on a promising trajectory. Identifying this will dictate whether structural/institutional maturation is required, narrowing the range of appropriate interventions and development agents. Alternately, the institutions may be revealed to be dysfunctional or non-productive/contributive to the degree of development of the recipient. In this scenario, the recipient features a non-productive status quo and institutional subversion or supplementation is warranted. Agents with knowledge are the appropriate vehicle for this type of development intervention.



Based on analysis of the structural and institutional variables that intervene and affect a development issue and its outcome, practitioners can arrive at a number of possible interventions that incorporate these structural/institutional features into the proposed solution. According to the systemic thinking proposed through structuration theory, these proposed interventions will often target intervening structures that may not appear at the outset to be related to the development problem. The goal is to support and maintain the prerequisites for a successful development outcome. This may be criticised by many as 'mission creep' however, systems-level thinking advocates holistic approaches to problems in which case, the solution to the problem must permeate and create positive precursors throughout the structural and institutional system of a recipient state in order to generate sustained development. Possible interventions should target religious institutions, economic institutions, and the patriarchy.

## CONCLUSION

Structures and institutions are the basic building blocks of the state. In order to effect change within a state, agents of development must first and foremost target these roots of any identified development issue. Interventions must be organic and must be implemented through the appropriate domestic agents. Practitioners and theorists alike must identify whether a developing state features an unproductive structural status-quo, an immature structural status quo, or a productive structural status quo. Once this is identified, depending on what the intervention is attempting on a thematic level, the appropriate agents for implementation will become evident.

This thesis has introduced structuration theory to conceptualize contemporary failings in development theory and practice. A detailed distinction between types of agents has been presented: passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered agents within a state. Additionally, I have articulated the structural and institutional-level mechanisms by which development interventions fail, succeed, or are otherwise derailed. I have also articulated the mechanisms by which externally-directed development initiatives unwittingly reinforce, undermine, or promote realities of ‘underdevelopment’ within the recipient state. Lastly, I have introduced the idea of ‘status quo’ or ‘non-status quo’ structuration and structural subversion. I believe these are crucial ideas to incorporate into development theory and practice.

This paper contributes conceptually to both the theory and practice of development while offering practical analytical tools by which the often abstract concepts presented in this paper may be operationalized. The key motivation that has driven this research is that there is no silver bullet in the ‘doing’ of development. The diversity of life from the local to the global is immense and complex. Development theorists and practitioners must now contend with the complexity of

their field, in earnest. To assume a generic, objective ‘end’ to the development enterprise, is to willingly embrace the parochial.

I advocate a form of radical subjectivity in the conceptualization of development issues and contend that the analytical framework offered in this paper is an objectively useful and universally applicable tool in development practice. To ground this subjectivity and avoid the ambiguity of conceptualizing development as a ‘choose your own mission’ style endeavour in which ‘development is what you make of it’, I recognize the necessity of certain objective indicators and goals of development which can inform subjective interventions. Practitioners should take regular ‘snapshots’ of a developing state on current performance vis à vis these indicators. The World Bank already performs this type of data collection, it is now on practitioners to analyse that data towards meaningful conclusions regarding the micro-processes of state development and the external agent’s role in facilitating or subverting those processes. Development in this sense can be measured as progress against these indicators. Universal indicators for development action like the poverty line of \$1.25/day would remain in use by international agencies like the World Bank to help prioritize the most pressing cases for intervention. From this then, my contribution calls for radical subjectivity in both the conceptualization and analysis of both the development issue and in the engineering of whatever intervention is devised in response—not development as a whole. For example, domestic agents with contextual knowledge of what ails the recipient state may not say ‘we need to strengthen our education system’, instead, they may say ‘we need to strengthen the ability of the state to redistribute economic gains to the wider population’. Knowledgeable agents may prioritize the latter because they know that despite the dire need for a stronger education system, it would not be feasible without the adequate financial capital and appropriate allocative mechanisms for that

capital. So, despite knowing that basic needs like education are crucial for development, I argue that the correct domestic agents are inherently better equipped to assess order of operations for achieving those basic needs. By combining the subjective and the objective in development, I advocate creating space for the subjective, contextual order of operation that is necessary to pursue and achieve objective goals. In this sense, I advocate systems-thinking in conceptualizing development issues in order to arrive at a targeted and precise, context-specific development intervention. This radical subjectivity enables agents of development to move past lip-service and recognize that the capacity by which the developed world influences and molds the domestic and the global is the same capacity that lies latent in the developing world.

The aim of development study and practice should be to awaken this potential so that the developing world may also articulate in myriad and complex ways, what a developed state can look like. As demonstrated, the pursuit of replicability or some reliable development prescription is problematic. Therefore, I call for an actionable protocol that is thematic rather than specific that can be used by practitioners who could then provide the contextual information necessary for the specific recipient state in question. This will require checking assumptions that persist to this day in the development enterprise originating from the West that recipient states are inherently inept and then acting on this realization.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abe, K., & Takarada, Y. (2005). Tied Aid and Welfare. *Review of International Economics*, 964-972.
- Alkire, S. (2010). Human Development: Definitions, Critiques, and Related Concepts. *Human Development Report*.
- Agostino, M. (2008). World Bank Conditional Loans and Private Investment in Recipient Countries. *World Development*.
- Ananta, A., Arifin, E. N., & Suryadinata, L. (2005). *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Andersson, M., & Gunnarsson, C. (2003). *Development and Structural Change in Asia-Pacific: Globalising Miracles or the end of a Model?* London: Routledge.
- Angeles, L. (2004). New Issues, New Perspectives: Implications for International Development Studies. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.
- Baaz, M. E. (2005). *The Paternalism of Partnership*. London: Zed Books.
- Banerjee, A. V., & He, R. (2008). Making Aid Work. *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, 57.
- Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 1320.
- Baruah, B. (2005). Gender and Development in South Asia: Can Practice Keep Up with Theory? *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.
- Bellu, L. G. (2011). Development and Development Paradigms: A (Reasoned) review of Prevailing Visions. *Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*, 3.
- Bjornskov, C., & Schroder, P. J. (2013). Are debt repayment incentives undermined by foreign aid? *Department of Economics and Business*, 1073-1091.
- Boissiere, M., Baig, S., Modi, M., & Zafar, F. (2007). *Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Primary Education in Pakistan: A Country Case Study*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Boutton, A., & Carter, D. B. (2014). Fair-Weather Allies? Terrorism and the Allocation of US Foreign Aid. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Brech, V., & Potrafke, N. (2014). Donor ideology and types of foreign aid. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 61-75.
- Butt, A. I. (2014). A Theoretical Framework for Engaging with Religion in Development Projects. *Sage Publications*.

- Checkel, J. T. (1998). The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics*, 324-348.
- Chenery, H. B. (1975). The Structuralist Approach to Development Policy. *The American Economic Review*, 310-316.
- CIA . (2014). *Country Comparison: HIV/AIDS- Adult Prevalence Rate*. Retrieved from The World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2155rank.html>
- Cicchone, A., & Matsuyama, K. (1993). Start-up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development. *NBER Working Paper Series*.
- Coelho, S. T., & Goldemberg, J. (2013). Energy access: Lessons learned in Brazil and perspectives for replications in other developing countries. *Energy Policy*, 1088-1096.
- Collier, P. (2000). Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy. *World Bank Economics of Crime and Violence Paper*, 1-25.
- De Soto, H., & Orsini, D. (1991). Overcoming Underdevelopment. *Journal of Democracy*, 112.
- Dohlman, E., & Halvorson-Quevedo, R. (1997). Globalisation and Development. *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development*, 36.
- Dreher, A., Klasen, S., Vreeland, J. R., & Werker, E. (2013). The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.
- Droop, J., Isenman, P., & Mlalazi, B. (2008). *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Study of Existing Mechanisms to Promote Mutual Accountability (MA) Between Donors and Partner Countries at the International Level*. Oxford Policy Management.
- Dur, R., & Roelfsema, H. (2005). Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities? *Public Choice*, 395-416.
- Easterly, W. (2008). *Reinventing Foreign Aid*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Eberlein, B., & Matten, D. (2009). Business Responses to Climate Change Regulation in Canada and Germany: Lessons for MNCs from Emerging Economies. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 241-255.
- Engerman, D. C. (2003). *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*. Cambridge: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Epstein, S. B., & Kronstadt, K. (2013). Pakistan: US Foreign Assistance. *Congressional Research Service*.
- Eriksen, S. S. (2002). Globalisation and Development . *Forum for Development Studies*.

- Fine, B. (2006). *The New Development Economics: Post Washington Consensus and Neoliberal Thinking*. Chicago: Zed Books.
- Frot, E., Olofsgard, A., & Berlin, M. P. (2013). Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the post-Communist Transition. *World Development*, 127-138.
- Fukuda-Parr, S. (2014). Global Goals as a Policy Tool: Intended and Unintended Consequences. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*.
- Gamage, S. (2015). *Globalization, Neoliberal Reforms and Inequality: A Review of Conceptual Tools, Competing Discourses, Responses, and Alternatives*. Sage Publications.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Gilbert, N. (2013). International aid projects come under the microscope: clinical-research techniques deployed to assess effectiveness of aid initiatives. *Nature Publishing Group*, 462.
- Gualerzi, D. (2012). Development Economics: A Theoretical and Historical Perspective. *International Journal of Political Economy*, 3-23.
- Hauner, L. K. (2008). Poverty and the World Bank: An Examination of Economic Development Theories and Practice. *Economics and Social Science Consortium*, 7.
- Hayes, N., & Westrup, C. (2012). Power/knowledge and impact assessment: creating new spaces for expertise in international development. *New Technology*, 9-22.
- Heijden, J. (2011). Institutional Layering: A Review of the Use of the Concept. *Politics*.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1958). *The Strategy of Economic Development*. London: Yale University Press .
- Hou, J. W. (2011). The role of the state in structural transition and economic crisis. *The Social Science Journal*, 1-12.
- Ibhawoh, B. (2011). The Right to Development: The Politics and Polemics of Power and Resistance. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 76-104.
- Ika, L. A., & Hodgson, D. (2014). Learning from international development projects: Blending Critical Project Studies and Critical Development Studies. *International Journal of Project Management*, 1186.
- Ika, L., Diallo, A., & Thuillier, D. (2012). Critical success factors for World Bank projects: An empirical investigation. *International Journal of Project Management*, 105-116.
- IMF. (2005). Shift to grants for poorest. *Finance and Development*, 3.
- Independent Evaluation Group . (2013). *Project Performance Assessment Report: Indonesia* . The World Bank.

- Independent Evaluation Group. (2006 ). *Pakistan: An Evaluation of the World Bank's Assistance*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Independent Evaluation Group. (2010). *Project Performance Assessment Report: HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project*. The World Bank.
- Independent Evaluation Group. (2011). *Project Performance Assessment Report: Higher Education Development Project*. The World Bank.
- Independent Evaluation Group. (2014). *Project Performance and Assessment Report- Health System Modernization Project* . The World Bank.
- Independent Evaluation Group. (2016). *Project Performance Assessment Report: Second Social Action Fund*. The World Bank.
- Isenman, P., & Shakow, A. (2010). Donor Schizophrenia and Aid Effectiveness: The Role of Global Funds. *IDS Practice Paper 5*.
- Jackson, W. A. (1999). Dualism, duality and the complexity of economic institutions. *International Journal of Social Economics* , 545-558.
- Jochoms, T. P., & Rutgers, M. R. (2005). Coming to Terms with the Complementarity of Agent and Structure. *Public Administration Quarterly* , 383.
- Joshi, D. K. (2012). Varieties of Developmental States: Three Non-Western Pathways to the Millenium Development Goals. *Sage Publications*.
- Khader, S. J. (2009). Adaptive Preferences and Procedural Autonomy. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*.
- Knack, S., & Rahman, A. (2008). Donor Fragmentation. *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, 334.
- Krugman, P. (1994). The Fall and Rise of Development Economics. *MIT*.
- Lieberman, S. S., Capuno, J. J., & Minh, H. V. (2005). Decentralising Health: Lessons From Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In T. W. Bank, *East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work* (p. 159). Washington: The World Bank.
- Lizardo, O. (2010). Beyond the atinomies of structure: Levi-Strauss, Giddens, Bourdieu, and Sewell. *Theor Soc*, 651-688.
- Martens, B. (2005). Why Do Aid Agencies Exist? *Development Policy Review*.
- Midgley, J. (1995). *Social Development: The Developmental Perspective in Social Welfare*. London: Sage Publications.
- Morrison, D. R. (2004). Teaching and Studying Development: Making it Work. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.



- Moss, T., Pettersson, G., & Van de Walle, N. (2008). An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, 269.
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Munch, R. (1981). Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. I. The Structure of the Kantian Core. *American Journal of Sociology*, 709-739.
- Mydans, S. (2001, July 24). Woman in the News; A Daughter of Destiny; Megawati Sukarnoputri. *The New York Times*.
- OECD. (2006, January 4th). *Glossary of Statistical Terms*. Retrieved from OECD: <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6326>
- OECD. (2008). *2008 Survey Monitoring the Paris Declaration*. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- OECD. (2008). *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid*. Retrieved from Organisation for Economic Development: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf>
- OECD. (2014). *Making Development Cooperation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report*. Washington: UNDP.
- OECD. (n.d.). *Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action*. Retrieved from Organisation of Economic Development: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>
- OECD. (n.d.). *The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)*. Retrieved from Organisation for Economic Development: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827311.pdf>
- Organisation for Economic Development. (n.d., n.d. n.d.). *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action*. Retrieved from Organisation for Economic Development: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf>
- Osabuohien, E., Efobi, U., & Gitau, C. (2015). Environment challenges in Africa: further dimensions to the trade, MNCs and energy debate. *Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal*, 132.
- Parpart, J. L., & Veltmeyer, H. (2004). The Development Project in Theory and Practice: A Review of its Shifting Dynamics. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.
- Phipps, A. G. (2001). Empirical Applications of Structuration Theory. *Geografiska Annaler*.
- Price, H. B. (1955). *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning: An independent and unbiased appraisal of the entire record*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Raffer, K. (2007). The Main Lesson from the Asian Crisis: "Dragons" Should Not Fundamentally Change Their Policies. *Austrian Foundation for Development Research*.
- Reyes, G. E. (2001). Four Main Theories of Development: Modernization, Dependency, World-System, and Globalization. *Revista Critica De Ciencias Sociales Y Juridicas* .
- Rist, G. (1997). *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith*. London and New York: ZED Books.
- Rogge, M. J. (2001). Human Rights, Human Development and the Right to a Healthy Environment: An Analytical Framework. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*.
- Rudiak-Gould, P. (2014). Climate Change and Accusation: Global Warming and Local Blame in a Small Island State. *Current Anthropology*.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2012). From Millenium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals. *The Lancet*.
- Sridharan, S., Maltz, E., Viswanathan, M., & Gupta, S. (2014). Transformative Subsistence Entrepreneurship: A Study in India . *Journal of Macromarketing*, 490.
- Srinivasan, T. (2014). Development Process: A Manual or a Collection of Anecdotes. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities* .
- Stepanek, M. (2010, November 3). *Exploring Failure: Failure and its upside-- a report from the 2010 PopTech conference*. Retrieved from Stanford Social Innovation Review: [http://ssir.org/articles/entry/exploring\\_failure](http://ssir.org/articles/entry/exploring_failure)
- Tahir, N. (2015). Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan? *Defence and Peace Economics*.
- Tausch, A. (2011). Globalisation and development: the relevance of classical 'dependency' theory for the world today. *UNESCO*, 468.
- Taylor, C. E., & Hall, M.-F. (1967). Health, Population and Economic Development. *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, 651-657.
- The World Bank Group. (2015). *Pakistan: Country Snapshot*. Washington: The World Bank Group.
- Tripathy, J. (2011). Does Development Exist outside Representation? *Journal of Developing Societies*, 110.
- Tripathy, J. (2011). Does Development Exist outside Representation? *Sage Publications*.
- United Nations. (2006). *About MDGs*. Retrieved from Millennium Project: <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/>
- United Nations Development Program. (2012). *Peaceful government transition in Lesotho*. Retrieved from UNDP Sustainable Development :

<http://www.ls.undp.org/content/lesotho/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/PoliticalTransitioninLesotho.html>

USA International Business Publications. (2008). *US Indonesia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook*. Washington: Global Investment Center.

Van den Bergh, J. (2010). Externality or sustainability economics? *Ecological Economics*.

Vandendriessche, M. (2012, March 22). *The Story of Playpumps: Merry-go-rounds, Water, and Failures in Development Aid*. Retrieved from United Explanations: <http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2012/03/22/the-story-of-playpumps-merry-go-rounds-water-and-failures-in-development-aid/>

Vanderheiden, S. (2011). Globalizing Responsibility for Climate Change. *Ethics and International Affairs*.

Vreeland, J. R. (2008). The IMF and Economic Development. *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, Cambridge.

Wendt, A. E. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, 335-370.

Werlin, H. W. (2008). The Evolution of Political Power in Political Development. *Sage Publications*.

World Bank. (n.d.). *Projects and Operations*. Retrieved from The World Bank: <http://www.projects.worldbank.org/>

Yamin, A. E., & Boulanger, V. M. (2014). Why Global Goals and Indicators Matter: The Experience of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in the Millennium Development Goals. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 218-231.