

The Interval

in-between unmaking and remaking the body

by

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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

By its individual terms, we can think of a body in two coincident ways that meet it in the middle: from the familiar inside-out and from the less familiar outside-in. To proceed from the middle of things conceives of a body always already extended into the world, able to affect and be affected by other bodies that share its environment. That is to say, a body is both a self-sustaining composition of related parts and a composition of the environmental forces that assemble its relations as a body.

In contrast to a body's eminently apparent material composition, its immaterial movements are observable only in dynamic continuity and shifting relations among other bodies. Elusive as movements may be, the impact they carry are felt in a body as intensive force or sensation, bringing individual bodies into immediate relational movement. Intensively connected, bodies shift each other's movements in time and space by their affective powers. Opening an inquiry into the interval, the moment of encounter, enters into the immediacy of relational movement between bodies—the pre-personal gap of space and time between stable forms in which a body is reconstituted in a state of instability.

The body's dynamic plasticity is first presented in three sets of pictures that isolate its material corporeality and immanent movements before reassembly as living bodies caught in the middle of intense physical negotiation. The liminal body is then opened in detail along its constituting lines and its processes of framing, registering, and moving through the world by which it returns to itself innately.

A critical analysis of paintings by Francis Bacon reveals the methodical practice and the intensity of forces required to unmake and remake bodies in paint, while Antonin Artaud practices his method on the masses via the production of bodily performance. A final return to the individual body calls on the imperative to take up movement in counterpoint to other bodies as both productive experimentation and the reciprocation of power at the body's shifting limits.

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What a trip.

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*“A body can be anything; it can be an animal,
a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a
linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.”*

Gilles Deleuze,
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy





fig. 1.1 - 1.4
fig. 2.1 - 2.3

'Shaved stick' figures and stacked torsos:
 the family tree

(Algeria, Melanesia, Ecuador, New Mexico
 Batak, Navaho, neolithic Europe)

Introduction

The first book I picked up on the human body was a copy of *Patterns that Connect: Social Symbolism in Ancient & Tribal Art*, an exhaustive work in comparative anthropology featuring drawings by Carl Schuster made over years of travel, curated and set to writings by Edmund Carpenter. In 313 pages this abridged book condenses 7000 illustrations that span the full 12 volumes. While the University of Waterloo unfortunately does not have access to the full set, the shortened version left an indelible mark on my mind in presenting a body central to cultural production since prehistory.

Throughout Schuster's travels and interviews with indigenous societies across the globe, he finds over and over again that kinship relations underlie the artistic expressions of tribal and wider inter-tribal connections. His illustrations show the human figure as a primary source and widespread visual motif for abstracted forms in art, from crude stick figures to the most intricate arabesque-like patterns. The body motif becomes the hinge between nature and culture by which human to human relations are expressed.¹ This art is not of meaningfully posed figurative paintings, but more often of geometrically-abstracted networks that interlink humanoid forms, seeming to return to a single theme: the relational nature of bodies.

The figures themselves are less to be identified than to be simply recognized. Form is merely the threshold to the formation of connections, and the exhibition and fidelity to the human form is never the point of focus. Similarly, the inward turn towards the individual body is only for its deliberate decomposition, towards an outward turn that renders visible the intangible lines that create larger communal bodies out of separate bodies.² As they reach increasing levels of abstraction the images take apart the anatomical body to make a field of connections on which can still be found vestigial resemblances to the human form. The body is carefully unmade to remake a new body through a rigorous undertaking beyond the means of figurative transformation.

Schuster and Carpenter kept to the task of curating resemblances (both likeness and difference) in tribal art according to its perceptible qualities, without judgement




fig. 3.1, 3.2

Type I systems: diagonal limb continuity
(New Guinea, Marajoara)

fig. 3.3, 3.4

Type II systems: horizontal limb continuity
(Cameroon, Melanesia)

and unfounded speculation on the foreign cultures they encountered. In doing so *Patterns that Connect* unfolds the body as a wellspring of productive relations, beginning with simple and familiar associations that build towards a multiplicity of bodily couplings. The unfolded, expanded body becomes an analogical mirror to other assembled and self-consistent bodies, both human and nonhuman, both simple and complex. Folded back together, we come to see the body as the primary tool of experience and reference—simultaneously vessel, medium, and frame through which we encounter other bodies.

Considering the growing focus on the futurological expansion of the body, such as transhumanist efforts to extend the body's capacities past its biological limitations, drawing attention to what the body can already do may be seen as a regressive project. However, returning to the the body's first extension into the world—its own corporeal frame—enters directly into the nature of a body's immediate contact with other bodies as the basis for further mechanisms of mediating its environment.³

The focal lens on the body that this book adopts is the work of Gilles Deleuze and the community of thinkers and makers who have in directly confronting a territory (a body) ended up in its interstices, in the smooth connective tissue that holds it together and that forms its edges with adjoining territories. In confronting the body Deleuze encounters its invisible lines of movement along which intensive forces reach through and compel it into relational structures with other bodies. Hidden in plain sight beyond the lines of movement are the lines of power—the gradients of nonhuman desire that produce states of dynamic equilibrium and instability—along which bodies are made, live, and are unmade by other bodies.⁴

Deleuze builds his work on an anti-judicial lineage of thought to reset the body from conceptions that make it beholden to transcendent organization, seeking to free the body from external and unassailable powers of control.⁵ In emphasizing a body undergoing sustained dynamic iteration, Deleuze counters




fig. 4.1 - 4.3

Interlacing shadow systems
(Australia, Caduevo, Cambodia)

the representation of the body bound to a static essence with a body that is always multiple, living in the intervals between apparent form. To this end, the necessity to create and maintain a representational image at all becomes fraught, since an image reduces the moving body to a static position easily susceptible to outside manipulation and appropriation into a stratum that reasserts the limits of what a body can do.⁶ A moving body is far more difficult to capture than a fixed body.

Alternatively, a body is recognized by its haecceity—how a body becomes expressive innately through its actions and behaviour in a landscape of shifting forces where it only ever finds durational, event-specific, and relational form. A body can still be named, but for Deleuze identity does not come before the body's agency to act on its own. By a body's haecceity, self-actualization is coupled with prelingual and physical interaction, where a body does not stop to claim identity.

Deleuzian thought reassess the conception of what a body can be as a thing to be identified in isolation to what a body can become in relation to other bodies. The expanded body is then conceived as a politically-capacitated body, as it engages its power to affect and be affected by other bodies in intensive negotiations risking physical investment and consequences. In the arena of physical negotiations a body is inseparable from the territorialized event which engenders it, and the lines on which a body was made are the same lines by which that same body can be unmade—unless new lines are opened.

To expand the limits of architecture we ask, 'what can architecture do?', or 'what can architects do?' Architects have the power to influence how a building is assembled and marshal the construction of the built environment. The architect wants to affect a building's inhabitants, but can do so only indirectly through the assembly of another body with power to affect in the way the architect desires. A building is simply there and will be used however people are able to by their individual power and the circumstances by which they live; a gilded palace is not

"We live together, we act on, and react to, one another; but always and in all circumstances we are by ourselves. . . . By its very nature every embodied spirit is doomed to suffer and enjoy in solitude. Sensations, feelings, insights, fancies - all these are private and, except through symbols and at second hand, incommunicable. We can pool information about experiences, but never the experiences themselves. From family to nation, every human group is a society of island universes. . . . The mind is its own place, and the places inhabited by the insane and the exceptionally gifted are so different from the places where ordinary men and women live, that there is little or no common ground of memory to serve as a basis for understanding or fellow feeling. Words are uttered, but fail to enlighten. The things and events to which the symbols refer belong to mutually exclusive realms of experience.

. . .

To be shaken out of the ruts of ordinary perception, to be shown for a few timeless hours the outer and the inner world, not as they appear to an animal obsessed with survival or to a human being obsessed with words and notions, but as they are apprehended, directly and unconditionally . . . this is an experience of inestimable value to everyone . . ."

Aldous Huxley,
The Doors of Perception

beyond the reach of further spray-can decoration and a busy stadium may be instantly appropriated for a refugee camp, its intended purpose swept away in an instant. What remains are the spatial tectonics and the pervading atmosphere that stand on their own. The architect should not have to loiter in the halls and dictate the rules of inhabitation. Regardless of the architect's intentions, the building always has its own power to affect by the way its materials are assembled to create space and the affordances it creates for movement and inhabitation.

The extent of the architect's power lies in the precision of how affects are crafted in the building's design and assembly, which hinges not only on the architect's intimacy with materials and techniques but also intimacy with the territory that the building engages. But before engaging a territory and asking what specifically an architect or architecture can do, this book asks as a precondition the silent reciprocal question: what can a body do? What of the body that is subject to affects, to the powers of the built environment? What are its own powers to engage in the pre-personal interval of immediate contact with the nonhuman bodies made in architecture and with those found beyond the domain of human culture?⁷ The intention behind asking what a body can do is to underscore its reciprocal powers of relation with other bodies in its environment, in which coupled bodies are complicit in each other's mutual engenderment.

When the body is freed from the constrictions of predetermined form and regains the power to become body-only-as-body, we may begin to revisit the more radical propositions of what else a body can become, and the new interrelations of a liminal body and its environment.

form to Figure

corpus, corporeal

the animal body
the body only as body,

its build
its mutability,

front(?) and back(?) photographs of
eight different clay figurines,

. . . how can a body stand on its own?



fig. 5.1



fig. 5.2





fig. 6.1

—
fig. 6.2





fig. 7.1

—
fig. 7.2





fig. 8.1

—
fig. 8.2





fig. 9.1

—
fig. 9.2





fig. 10.1

fig. 10.2





fig. 11.1

—
fig. 11.2





fig. 12.1

fig. 12.2






fig. 13.1

fig. 13.2



The expanded practices of the 'plastic arts' includes all arts that liberate sensations through the physical manipulation of a material medium. In this regard, the animal body can be readily considered as composed of a supple, fleshy medium open to transformations ranging from taxidermy to prosthetic interventions.

Certainly, flesh can be directly altered as in the practices of various body arts that incise, cauterize, gouge, distend, and extend skin, muscle, bone, and all the soft tissues between. Currently, these practices create changes in the body that largely reside close to the surface skin where they are visibly apparent. The result is that only the bounding form or image of the body is altered, often in order to change the projected identity of the body, crafting cultural signs for how the body is meant to be perceived by others.

But what is far more interesting than curating the image of the body is the manipulation of the logic of flesh and sensation, intervening in the nature of flesh's very plasticity by training the body's instincts. Engaging such an artistic practice radically changes the behaviour of the medium itself, as if painting with paint that no longer behaved like paint or moulding clay that no longer behaved like clay. What new potentials lie there?

“ . . . the being of sensation is not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, makes them whirl around like winds. Flesh is only the developer which disappears in what it develops: the compound of sensation.”

Gilles Deleuze
What is Philosophy?

interval (1)

the event of
your deformation

*the interval in the Figure
its virtual vitality made visible over time,*

the frame,

*10x3 stacked chronophotographs
composed as a looping video
set to a slowed heartbeat,*

*decomposed and dilated to show
the intervals of formation and deformation.*




fig. 14.1

—

fig. 14.2



“For Deleuze, form entails force relations, and strictly speaking, there are only forces. Forms are a becoming of forces. So, the Figure does not reproduce a molded body with its individual form, but tries hard to attain all the drives of the body, the nonorganic vitality of the body without organs.”

Anne Sauvagnargues
Deleuze and Art



fig. 14.3

fig. 14.4





fig. 14.5

fig. 14.6





fig. 14.7

fig. 14.8





fig. 14.9


fig. 14.10





fig. 14.11

fig. 14.12



“The transformation of form can be abstract or dynamic. But deformation is always bodily, and it is static, it happens at one place; it subordinates movement to force, but it also subordinates the abstract to the Figure. When a force is exerted on a scrubbed part, it does not give birth to an abstract form, nor does it combine sensible forms dynamically: on the contrary, it turns this zone into a zone of indiscernibility that is common to several forms, irreducible to any of them; and the lines of force that it creates escape every form through their very clarity, through their deforming precision.”

Gilles Deleuze
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation







fig. 15

the space between heartbeats



“Instead of conceiving of relations between fixed identities, between entities or things that are only externally bound, the in-between is the only space of movement, of development or becoming: the in-between defines the space of a certain virtuality, a potential that always threatens to disrupt the operations of the identities that constitute it. . . . The space in between things is the space in which things are undone, the space to the side and around, which is the space of subversion and fraying, the edges of any identity’s limits. In short, it is the space of the bounding and undoing of the identities which constitute it.”

Elizabeth Grosz
Architecture from the Outside







fig. 17
intervals



“The first invisible forces are those of isolation: they are supported by the fields, and become visible when they wrap themselves around the contour and wrap the fields around the Figure. The second are the forces of deformation, which seize the Figure’s body and head, and become visible whenever the head shakes off its face, or the body its organism. . . . The third are the forces of dissipation, when the Figure fades away and returns to the field . . .”

Gilles Deleuze
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation

*The number and order of possible assumptions
in this field
is precisely
infinity.*

And what is infinity?

We do not know exactly.

*It is a word
which we use
to indicate
WIDENING
of our consciousness
towards an inordinate,
inexhaustible and inordinate
feasibility.*


Antonin Artaud
The Question is Raised Whether (excerpt)


fig. 18


a single line of deformation

fig. 19

overleaf: a field of immanence, of potential deformations; lines are selected from and return to the field







“Of course, it is impossible actually to diagram every step in a topological transformation. Practically, only selected stills can be presented. Once again, the need arises to superpose the sequencings. It is only in that superposition that the unity of the figure can be grasped as such, in one stroke. That one stroke is the virtual image center of the figure. It is virtual because you cannot effectively see it or exhaustively diagram it.”

Brian Massumi
Parables for the Virtual

**interval (2) the event of
our mutual deformation**

the zone of indiscernibility,

*the interval between two bodies
in timing and in space,*

*controlling the interval
the negotiation of power,*

*the clinch
the fight.*

fig. 20



- the flinch -

“ . . . there are nothing but affects; that is, ‘sensations’ and ‘instincts,’ according to the formula of naturalism. Sensation is what determines instinct at a particular moment, just as instinct is the passage from one sensation to another, the search for the ‘best’ sensation (not the most agreeable sensation, but the one that fills the flesh at a particular moment of its descent, contraction, or dilation).”

Gilles Deleuze
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation

fig. 21

The fulcrum for continuity of movement; when a body cannot even flinch anymore, relational movement ends.



- beginnings -

*"An event is neither a beginning nor an end point,
but rather always 'in the middle.'"*

Cliff Stagoll
The Deleuze Dictionary




fig. 22.1

Opening: exploiting the interval



“ . . . ‘difference-in-itself’, the uniqueness implicit in the particularity of things and the moments of their conception and perception . . . of each individual thing, moment, perception or conception. Such difference is internal to a thing or event, implicit in its being that particular. Even if things might be conceived as having shared attributes allowing them to be labelled as being of the same kind, Deleuze’s conception of difference seeks to privilege the individual differences between them.”

Cliff Stagoll
The Deleuze Dictionary




fig. 22.2 - 22.13

Openings



- ending.




fig. 23.1

Sweep and dump



“ . . . what a body can do is determined, at least in part, by its relations with other bodies. The degree of power possessed by any given body is dictated by those which surround it.”

Moira Gatens
Feminism as “Password”: Re-thinking the
“Possible” with Spinoza and Deleuze

fig. 23.2


Total domination




hunting, or being hunted

*relational movement
towards its productive limit,*

point and counterpoint.



the interval



*variations on the interval
by increasing equality of power.*

- capturing, or being captured -




fig. 24.1






fig. 24.2 - 24.9



- striking, or being struck (unguarded) -




fig. 25.1






fig. 25.2 - 25.9



- striking, or being struck (through guard) -




fig. 26.1






fig. 26.2 - 26.9



- blocking, or being blocked -




fig. 27.1






fig. 27.2 - 27.9



- denying, or being denied -




fig. 28.1






fig. 28.2 - 28.9



- evading, or being evaded -




fig. 29.1






fig. 29.2 - 29.9



- countering, or being countered -




fig. 30.1






fig. 30.2 - 30.9



So much of the action in a ring is impossible to capture in the medium of photography.

While the chronophotography of Étienne-Jules Marey or Eadweard Muybridge are able to compose durational bodies on a single plate, it has an inherent weakness in its inescapable simplicity of a set-up, of sanitized action caught in a studio. Photography always tacitly acknowledges its limits in capturing 'the moment' or 'the truth'. The inability to capture subtly complex movement is a shortcoming of the photographic instrument, which is set up to capture an image only along its focal plane. The camera is always side-on, or the subject is always side-on to the camera when exhibiting its movements. Simple lateral movement as the limit. Movement perpendicular to the focal plane becomes exponentially more difficult to show clearly as a photograph.

This might require the image itself to move, but that is the realm of cinema, which cannot adequately be shown in the pages of a book.

The images collected in the preceding catalogue were selected and edited to the best of my ability in black and white, to render as clear as I could make the beautiful movements in the ring.



Kinetics

*consistency of parts
internal relations,*

*a vivisection by four cuts through a living body
unmaking a body.*

From the Water Book:

“Adopt a stance with the head erect, neither hanging down, nor looking up, nor twisted. Your forehead and the space between your eyes should not be wrinkled. Do not roll your eyes nor allow them to blink, but slightly narrow them. With your features composed, keep the line of your nose straight with a feeling of slightly flaring your nostrils. Hold the line of the rear of the neck straight: instil vigour into your hairline, and in the same way from the shoulders down through your entire body. Lower both shoulders and, without the buttocks jutting out, put strength into your legs from the knees to the tips of your toes. Brace your abdomen so that you do not bend at the hips.

...

To cut and to slash are two different things. Cutting, whatever form of cutting is, is decisive, with a resolute spirit. . . . When cut, your spirit is resolved. You must appreciate this.”

Miyamoto Musashi
A Book of Five Rings

cut: returning

Re-evaluation

The body is a familiar home when we know and are able to anticipate its desires. Nestled in comfort and shelter, it becomes easy to forget the body is a dynamic construct, excessive in its tastes and actions that exceed any one rigid system of order. Open to the thrill of the unknown, an experimental body bears continued re-evaluation because we are always returning to it anew.¹

The act of returning in re-evaluation carries with it the matter of the body's value to the human, a designation which has historically signified a delineation outside of and above animal life or any other nonhuman body.² From a Deleuzian conception, all life is reset on a level field on which the first step for the human is the acknowledgement of its evolutionary ancestry and reclamation of its own corporeal, animal being. A re-evaluation of the body then affirms the animal as central to the human, and that there is nothing human about being human other than its definition.³ The human proceeds in experimentation outside its familiar boundaries by its animal instincts, which are changeable and make the human animal without finite definition.

On the newly levelled field bodies are compared on an ethological basis—by a body's embodied behaviours—providing an immersive overview from which different bodies are simultaneously surveyed from above and appraised from the middle.⁴ The ethological field precludes a body's taxonomical designation, instead appraising a body by its immanent qualities; the focus shifts from identification to the conditions by which a body is assembled and manifests its relational structure with other bodies. A body may still be precisely located on the field, but only as a relative position to other bodies and not to a fixed originary position. Its coordinates are then plotted along kinetic and dynamic axes—a body's state of material consistency and its immaterial powers of relation, respectively.⁵ By appraising both a body's internal relation of parts that sustain the individual as a body and its power to affect and be affected by other bodies, horizontal relations can be drawn across taxonomical trees such




fig. 31

that a draught horse is more similar to an ox than a race horse in stature, modes of movement, and affective power.

Animal

The human body *is* the animal body as far as they share the same external resemblance, but they do not move in the same ways. The human is a space around the animal body in which it is free to tell its stories and build its culture, just as much as any other animal species expresses its particular culture when its individuals congregate in one place.⁶ The animal is the nonhuman body-only-as-body, continuously co-generating its embodiment among other bodies in its environment, but in everyday life the animal body only reveals itself when human space is momentarily collapsed in urgent and immediate bodily exchange.

Elizabeth Grosz suggests a diagram to illustrate this dynamic internal mechanism of the animal body: borrowing from Lacan, Grosz appropriates the topological figure and inverting action of the Möbius strip as an apparatus on which thought and action are stretched through one another.⁷ The model of the Möbius strip twists the notion of interiority and exteriority as binarized opposites rather than abolishing it outright, and in doing so imbues it with a renewed plasticity that describes a body always open and engaged with its environment.⁸

Extended into the environment, the Möbius strip is equally a model of the animal body's interface with its surroundings. As the strip twists, inside world and outside world are enfolded and unfolded in one another through a continuous process of material exchange that remakes bodies. In this doubling-back rhythm, we are continuously returning to our bodies, even if we are not always attentive to this process.



fig. 32

cut: framing

Autonomic

External to our fleshy corporeal frame, the first mediator is the architectural frame that selects, delays, and inflects the unbridled vitality of the cosmos flowing through it.¹ The frame becomes the first toehold in living with the forces that course through the cosmos regardless of our interactions with it, ambivalent to human judgements and emotions. The frame is built in the middle of an intensive ground, on which we mark out, carve, mould, make and remake the extensive boundaries of our home.² The basic act of framing selectively captures points of interest from an environment, foregrounding the selection against the environmental background. The immersive frame itself occupies the midground as inhabitable space.

Each framing is a sustained effort, having a provisional consistency only for as long as the action is maintained.³ In negotiating its physical surroundings the body continuously reconstructs its frame with each new encounter, engaging new sensory signals selected by the frame. The classical senses of sight, sound, taste, smell, and touch work in unison to link sensory reference points, extracting and making navigable relational networks from around the body.

The construction of frames via the signal-sensing and relation-navigating process is performed autonomically by all animals, but varies in scope between species in proportion to the sensory range in which an organism can be affected. To address difference in animal subjectivity, Jakob von Uexküll developed the theory of *Umwelt*: the limited sensory world of an organism, composed of only the environmental signals that it has the biological capacity to be stimulated by.⁴ Uexküll further distinguishes plural *Umwelt* from the singular *Umgebung*, which comprises the total range of signals put out by the environment, so that within the same environment different organisms will inhabit their own, different sensory worlds.

To make a stark illustration of his theory, Uexküll describes the *Umwelt* of the common tick as it carries out a parasitic relationship with its host organism. The adult female tick reacts to only three stimuli: the smell of mammalian skin, the physical




fig. 33

Microscopic frame: scanning electron micrograph image of a feeding black-legged tick

collision with hair, and the temperature that corresponds to warm skin. These stimuli compel the tick to fall from its perch onto a passing mammal, latch onto and climb through its hairs, and finally locate a bare patch of skin on which it can feed and complete its life cycle.⁵ In its adult life the tick lives out its three functional cycles, feedback loops of internal-external point and counterpoint that couple stimuli with signal recognition and response mechanisms.

In its simple contrapuntal relations with its environment, the tick's every possible action can be accounted for, precisely anticipated, and exploited to the extent that the tick, with no sense of taste, will readily ingest any liquid as long as it corresponds to the temperature of warm skin. As Uexküll observed, a simple body frames and engages its environment in limited ways, making its movements easily predictable. However, as bodies increase in internal complexity, its potential contrapuntal relations expand accordingly, to the point that its movements become increasingly unpredictable, and quantifiable possibilities become open-ended potentials.

To human perception the tick will lie dormant for years waiting for these specific stimuli, but the tick, with no other means of framing the world, is effectively asleep in a timeless limbo.⁶ The tick's existence is durationally tied to its three sources of stimulation and is effectively alive only while moving between its affective states.

Notwithstanding its parasitic nature, we might be tempted to pity the tick for its utterly restricted connection to the world. Yet before doing so Uexküll would remind us that as an organism it perfectly inhabits its ecological niche and is incapable of feeling any discontent we may project onto it.⁷ An organism's biology is intrinsically different between species, at once providing and limiting its sensory world, such that the totality of an Umwelt is neither shareable or knowable across species.⁸

Umwelt theory locates all organisms on an unbounded plane of composition on which life manifests as different




fig. 34

The functional cycle for a single stimulus (an object's relevant perception-mark).

bodily compositions. Different organisms and different modes of framing are then comparable solely through difference in itself. The human animal finds its body on this plane among its nonhuman counterparts.

Deliberate

All organisms, the human animal included, interact with the world according to their own biologies, acting through sensory frames that both select certain environmental signals and exclude others that are not perceptible but real nonetheless. On this basis it becomes possible to address the condition of being unavoidably at the centre of our human Umwelt.⁹ Through our biological frame, it is entirely natural to regard human biology and our body's material relation with the world from an anthropocentric paradigm. Although the human might not readily act beyond its biology, the human can abstractly think beyond it and create mediators that bridge the perceptibility gap. We originate from the organism, the animal body that is the human's native soil and primary point of reference—but the body is also the point of departure, where decentering the human is the first deliberate act of expanding our frame.¹⁰

Here, Uexküll paves the way for engaging the nonhuman animal body freed from human sentiment. Human and nonhuman bodies necessarily become equal in difference, by the shared aspect of their singular corporealities, by having internally-regulating and self supporting structures that express natural behaviours and tendencies specific to their own bodies.¹¹ Each body is a system thermodynamically coupled to its environment through material interactions and the exchange of energy, and resolves those interactions through its specific composition as a body.¹² As such, even nonorganic bodies have their way of framing the world by way of their internal material qualities and predispositions, manifesting as material vitality, logic, and agency distinct and unknowable from the life, sentience, and power of an animal.

The relationship between a body's biology and the resolution of energy exchange penetrates down to the molecular level,

where atomic bodies possessing distinct chemical properties react automatically and preferentially with one another to form larger bodies, constructing new chemical structures and properties. Beneath the layers of biological and chemical interaction lie the physical relation of forces that pervade all real interaction. Leaping through scales of perception, the human framing of life quickly broadens to a flat field of all organisms, itself within a vast field of nonorganic bodies. The field of nature is unceasingly inclusive and productive, a proliferation of points and the endless lines of relation that weave through them.¹³

Returning to the tick, the three sources of stimulus that it responds to are in fact sources of productive energy, latent with the potential to propel the tick into movement. The tick's autonomic mode of framing quickly establishes lines of relation with its surroundings that it traverses in reflexive feedback loops of stimulus and response. In contrast, the animal that deliberately frames its territory as a creative act not only navigates but draws relations that become bodies themselves, new and independent of the animal's body.¹⁴ From the centre of its Umwelt, the human animal draws relations that construct art, philosophy, and science.¹⁵ By embracing all that nonhuman and nonorganic life has to offer in its myriad ways of material embodiment, we may discover compositional lines that echo our own and adjoin their worlds along these lines. Our deliberate framing can become even more deliberate in expanding the ways by which the human can engage and frame its territory.

cut: registering

Surface

An eye is incapable of seeing its act of seeing. It may recognize its image in the mirror of another body, but cannot see past the image surface and feel its inner mechanism at work. Similarly, the auditory, olfactory and gustatory senses cannot register their action through their own means: we cannot feel the feeling of the ear hearing, the nose smelling, or the tongue tasting. Alone, they are incapable of bringing attention to their own modes of perception.¹ Of the body's eminent senses, touch is the only sense that registers external stimuli through apparent material interaction

For each other sense, we must turn our cerebral thought to its act of sensing, just to become aware of the act's passing. In doing so, we can employ each sense selectively; thought is the driver as we consciously operate each sense. But thought is a slow driver, since it encounters the world only as images which it must first analyze before calling on the body's flesh to act.² Cerebral thought acts as a mediator which prolongs the time and space of an action made to pass through it, and depending on the task can either offer clinical clarity or become an obstruction.

Although we can separate the senses in an instrumental fashion, where thought amplifies the singular nature of each sense, a far more intriguing experience arises when the senses are free to run in conjunction with each other. When the senses naturally cross-pollinate their richness we can feel contour and depth with tactile eyes or hear music in resonant stomachs through an intensive synesthesia where selective sensing falls back to an attuned opening to sensations and forces.

The body's skin is more than just surface, having thickness and material resistance making it a self-registering medium capable of producing sensory feedback. The other senses rely on environmental information travelling through an external medium such as air or water, which then interact with localized sensory receptors to produce new information that the brain forms into recognizable perceptions. In contrast, the body's tactile sense is embedded throughout the skin as an internal




fig. 35

Waterfall,
M. C. Escher

fig. 36

The Rape of Proserpina (detail),
Gian Lorenzo Bernini

sensory medium. Touching is *of* the body and the skin is therefore capable of feeling itself feeling without external mediation.

To be clear, skin needs to be in material contact in order to register touch; without friction the body is blind to the skin's presence, blind as it always is to the presence of the other sensory organs. The friction created between two surfaces meeting involves a measure of force pressing them together—it could be the slightest force of a feather brushing against skin and the stimulus will still register. Skin is incredibly responsive to touch but requires the transfer of energy for a reaction

Medium-depth

Deeper below the skin, flesh is another sensory medium occupying the middle layer of the body around the core of internal organs. The muscles and connective tissue that make up flesh are assisted in their task of animating the body's skeletal apparatus through the sense of proprioceptive feedback. Like touch, proprioception is an autonomic sense that we are also able to turn our attention to and observe its act of sensing through its own means.³ Discovered and named by Charles Sherrington, proprioception constructs the body's kinaesthetic awareness of its limbs in relation to one another in space, through sensors located in muscles, tendons, and joints.⁴

Along with proprioception, Sherrington also introduced the terms exteroception and interoception to refer to the senses that gather sensory information from outside the body and from the internal organs, respectively. Compared to the outward- and inward-oriented senses, proprioception has no fixed orientation as it is solely self-referential in its task of mediating the body to itself.⁵ Mechanical receptors in elastic tissues register relative tensile change, registering the varying internal forces created by the the body's movements. Put simply, the self-registering medium of flesh enables you to touch your nose with closed eyes.




fig. 37

Self-inspecting body from
Anatomia del corpo humano,
Juan Valverde de Amusco

Bridge

Proprioception, vision, and balance form a trio of continuously-operating and mutually-assisting senses that establish the body's sense of physical presence while operating below our everyday threshold of perception.⁶ For a healthy body the sense of having a body ordinarily goes unquestioned. However, the medical sciences continually provide opportunities to study the body when it does something abnormal. Oliver Sack's story 'The Disembodied Lady' describes his encounter as a neurologist with a female patient who suddenly lost and never regained her sense of proprioception. As the neurological disorder fully set in within a matter of days, her gross and fine motor skills deteriorated drastically and any physical effort required great mental concentration to coordinate. She retained motor functions but had lost the feeling of her body.

The resilient patient was able to adapt to her new condition, and her deliberate mental efforts to recreate nonconscious bodily processes eventually became second nature. Even so, she could not help but question her corporeality due to the continued inability to feel her body.⁷ It is as if the silencing of her proprioceptive sense had caused an entire sector of her neurological circuitry to go dark while leaving a lingering connection at its periphery. In place of her body there was an unfeeling void, unknowable to anyone but herself.

Skin and flesh are intimately connected and form a combined proprioceptive medium bridging the body's internal framing and the body's framing of its environment.⁸ This wider interrelation of bodily self-sense and the body's interacting with the world was the source of the patient's sense of dissonance. Her means of external framing remained, but any information entering into her body did not register and dissipated in the void. Through the proprioceptive sense the body recognizes itself as only body—as animal.⁹ In her inability to relate her body to her sense of self, Sack's patient had become a human without an animal body.



fig. 38
Hollowing

Sensation

Sensory signals can be redefined as stimuli when framed within an organism's Umwelt as a biologically-limited selection of environmental data. However, stimuli cannot be further redefined as sensations which are an altogether different order of bodily experience. The accumulation of stimuli only provides a sensory frame of experience. Within this frame, sensations describe the manner of encounter by the qualities, of gesture and intensity, that characterize the event.

Data, stimulus, and sensation each relate differently to an experiencing body:

1. Data refers to the abstraction of lived experience. Data exists outside the durational encounter of bodies.
2. Stimuli refer to the limited selection of environmental data contingent on an encounter by an animal body. Stimuli are *sensed* by an attuned body and remain abstract until the moment of experience. The body references its sensing process in thought after the fact of experience.
3. The body *feels* sensations. Sensations refer to the immediacy of felt experience, to the recursive first moment and transitive '-ing' of another body's actions. The body self-referentially registers sensation before the forming of cerebral thought.

The animal encounters its own body through internal action manifesting as physical effect; its movements register in proprioceptive flesh as a rising chest, a rolling shoulder, an extending arm, etc. Flesh is sympathetic to moving flesh, so that when we become acutely aware of another animal's actions, we feel its effects proprioceptively in our own flesh. Biological flesh is equally sympathetic to the 'flesh' of nonorganic bodies and their material effects. In each case, sensation becomes felt without having to understand the internal mechanics within each material body that create its surface effects.¹⁰ The immediate felt experience of a body is never of that body itself but of the encounter with its sensation, registering its actions in proprioceptive flesh.¹¹



fig. 39
Lunging

Vital medium

The junction of bodily mechanism and effect marks a distinction between the body's functional capacities and the actions a body creates. With effects as carriers of sensation, mechanisms are then emphasized as effecting-techniques. Mechanism and effect compose a hinge, where the body's techniques are leveraged for the effects it potentially creates. This distinction establishes a toehold into the bodily dimension beyond the mechanical statics of flesh and contented *being-in-the-world* to a dynamic flesh that *becomes* the effects that it engages.

The gut forms the last component of the proprioceptive bridge linking the body's inner world and outside world. The inner surface of the gastrointestinal tract forms a continuous surface with skin, but unlike skin the gut lining contains no nerves. By contrast the muscular wall just behind the lining is host to a dense network of neurons along its entire length, the enteric nervous system. This distributed 'second brain' is dedicated to the self-regulating functions of the gut, capable of operating outside direct control by the brain.¹² The gut brain 'thinks' in feelings, forming reflexes—immediate reactions to direct nervous registration. The gut brain acts as a mirror to sensation, which instantly doubles back through flesh charged with agency to agitate flesh.

It is this charge that makes a self-registering medium into a vital medium with the potential to invent new movements. Vital flesh takes on the extended roles of skin and gut, a synesthetic nexus that becomes the material developer for sensation, disappearing from conscious thought through the effects it develops and that become felt in its place.¹³ Vital flesh exceeds the body's minimum of practical functions, exposing the dimension of the unresting animal body ceaselessly engaging in new movements and new relations.




fig. 40

Innervation of the intestines

cut: moving

Returning once more to Uexküll's tick, we can now picture its movements according to how it reacts with sensations. The tick's dormant flesh carries the charge of potential movement immanent to living bodies—flesh that betrays its vitality when it quivers in excitation upon encountering the sensations of a passing mammal. As fresh sensations course through it, the tick joins in the event of reaction coupling with reaction, propelling itself reflexively toward its target. Together, the continuous stream of mammalian sensations and its own movements affirm the tick's course of action, as it seeks out its reproductive imperative.

Sensation that moves flesh can be called force, indicating the potential of an action to deform the material it moves through. Whereas sensations are felt exclusively in living, self-referential bodies, forces register in all material bodies whether organic or nonorganic. Sensation and force refer to the event of immaterial exchange in material interaction: two bodies engage in an exchange of forces, and in their mutual deformation the bodies' material structure remains the same but their consistencies change.¹ The forces exceed the physical envelope of the bodies involved, giving fleeting perceptible definition to the event-space between bodies.²

A body can move, but before it can move it must be able to stand on its own and sustain its movements as a body. The event is a self-consistent and sustained body, as are forces and sensations, but theirs is a body that is virtual, that runs through and remakes actual bodies. A virtual body's very immateriality is its corporeal basis, immateriality that precludes material technique and that makes it a body of pure effects. The event body is the ghostly trace of movement or the whisper of movement to come, immaterial yet perceptible.

The virtual lives in-between actual bodies—always already there—not entirely invisible, but often going unnoticed beneath the threshold of ordinary attention. The in-between is composed of infinitesimal and immeasurable intervals of time and space between the actual things that remain still for long enough to

to roll	to curve	to scatter	to modulate
to crease	to lift	to arrange	to distill
to fold	to inlay	to repair	of waves
to store	to impress	to discard	of electromagnetic
to band	to jere	to pair	of inertia
to shorten	to flood	to distribute	of ionization
to twist	to smear	to surfeit	of polarization
to dapple	to rotate	to complement	of refraction
to crumple	to swirl	to enclose	of simultaneity
to shave	to support	to surround	of tides
to tear	to hook	to encircle	of reflection
to chip	to suspend	to hide	of equilibrium
to split	to spread	to cover	of symmetry
to cut	to hang	to wrap	of friction
to sever	to collect	to dig	to stretch
to drop	of tension	to tilt	to bounce
to remove	of gravity	to bind	to erase
to simplify	of entropy	to weave	to spray
to differ	of nature	to join	to systematize
to disarrange	of grouping	to match	to refer
to open	of layering	to laminate	to force
to mix	of jelling	to bond	of mapping
to splash	to grasp	to hinge	of location
to knot	to tighten	to mark	of context
to spell	to bundle	to expand	of time
to droop	to heap	to dilute	of carbonization
to flow	to gather	to light	to continue

fig. 41

Verb List,
Richard Serra

express perceptible qualities. Both the virtual and the actual are real but only the actual can be touched while the virtual is the very stuff of interaction in the act of touching.³ The virtual is expressed in a vocabulary of solely verbs, impossible to capture on their own—but when the virtual finds itself an actual body it may be captured, framed, and recomposed with new life. Or it may be stifled, squandered, frozen, its intensive vitality made docile and subservient to the noun.

Material bodies join in an event where intra-bodily actions become inter-bodily actions. Bodies react and are remade by the event; bodies remake the event with their reactions. Events never happen alone, always both nested and interwoven with other events. The animal's body-as-Möbius strip is always inverting inside and outside. The beginning-less and end-less rhythm of the Möbius strip's action goes *-tick-tock-*: an internal force as counterpoint for every external force. The Möbius strip moves as multiple simultaneous actions, each inversion at once affirming prior and impending actions in the present action.⁴ Internal forces become catalysts for the body to enter into external relations anew. External forces become catalysts for the body to construct new internal relations. The body that is in motion is always already in motion.

Movement is immanent to a living body extended into the world and charged to its sensations.⁵ While we are awake the body cannot be relinquished, set aside for a while to break from its continuous movements. In this manner, all animals are Uexküll's tick at their core, always producing a baseline of reflexive movement. From this core, modes of movement extend outward in concentric circles. At its centre, we take in and frame environmental movements in order to maintain a minimum of internal bodily movement. In the next circle, we actively construct movements in our bodies, recomposing environmental and bodily movements at will. In the last circle, we invent new movements in attention with other bodies, movements that flow free and unobstructed by human thought. This last circle is also the first circle, the proper domain of the animal body. It takes great effort for the human to become-animal.




fig. 42
To Lift,
Richard Serra

or,
a piece of rubber

A living body cannot afford to stop here, getting stuck in only the exultation of movement. In a vacuum movement may be freely given and freely taken, however no such space readily exists. Free movement may be exercised in a conceptual vacuum that establishes a stopgap condition of freedom, but such a space must first be established via a violent break or a walling-off to deny entry the intensive pervasion of reality that disrupts imposed order. In the real world, movement finds a territory: a particular place, a particular people, a particular time, and the particular forces that bind and express the particularities of that territory.⁶ In a territory, movement becomes expressed in a body that has the power to affect other bodies.

Far outside an established territory, the body faces attrition that put it at risk of losing its consistency as a body. At the junction between territories movement exists in an environment of dynamic consistency, emerging expression, and shifting relations that remake bodies as they are unmade.





Dynamics

remaking a body

From the Fire Book:

*You cannot profit from small techniques particularly
when full armour is worn.*

Miyamoto Musashi
A Book of Five Rings



the clinch

An animal body hums with ever-present agitation that charges its flesh with vitality. Its incipient movement emerges through the body in as many degrees of freedom that its biology affords and the forces its body can withstand bringing to bear by its own agency.

One body begins to dance out of exuberance, linking movement to movement as small gestures swell and compound in crescendoing arcs. Ecstatic waves rush through and are set free from the edges of the quickened body. Eventual exhaustion sets in and the body is expended, ending the dance as freely as it began. The event dissipates in the air.

Two bodies meet in violent confrontation, crashing, piercing, cutting. In the course of the event their bodies are run through with the other's movements leaving each irrevocably altered. The event lives on in the wake of the confrontation—etched into flesh of the two freshly deformed bodies.

Two territorial animals dispute a border. They circle each other, weighing the consequences of the impending struggle. As they close in on each other, so closes the space to deliberate, select, and perform a movement. As space closes completely at the point of contact, each body pressures a reaction out of the other. In the urgency of the moment each body must act or else become overwhelmed. They clash, withdraw, and clash again. Each closing of bodies, each exchange of sensations and physical deformation cues separate internal confrontations within both animals as they encounter their own newly deformed bodies. The remade body must discover its new manner of movement in order to endure new sensations, and to keep exerting its body against the other. The living event created through the two animals invents movements in their bodies; the event is the unfolding of invented movements manifested by their shifting bodies. The struggle ends abruptly as one animal finally submits under the other's pressure, finding its body crippled and its movements made lame. It ceases to move, broken, and relinquishes the territory.

Contact

fig. 43



fig. 44

Disruption

Too much movement deforms a body, which only finds its consistency as a body between a minimum intensity of movement and an upper limit beyond which its consistency becomes unstable. Throughout this range of intensities a body can comfortably balance the exchange of external and internal forces before returning to its movement in-place.¹ Beyond the range lies the abyssal realm of uncertainty and unpredictable movements.

Bodies coupled in a struggle inhabit a space of uneasy proximity. In this zone of uncertainty sensations pass through the coupled bodies with a violent momentum that disrupts the continuity of their consistency.² Unlike ordinary sensation, violent sensation thrusts excessive movement into a body, from which the uncontainable forces must then find release. A deformation indicates the site of bodily rupture, where an injection of intensities has exceeded the limits of the body's stabilizing efforts. Outside the body, violent sensation exerts a precursory bow shock, that stiffens air with projected form capable of affecting a body's movements in space.

In the struggle between living bodies, violence refers to the directness in which a force acts on the body and the immediacy of reaction it compels.³ Both bodies exert a double-headed effort to disrupt the other's body and movements while coping with the disruptions that have affected it. Violent sensations impacting directly on the nervous system close the space between reactions to its shortest interval. Oscillation between the actual and virtual reaches a fever pitch in the zone of uncertainty between bodies.



fig. 45

The capacity of violent sensation to deform matter unmakes a body, fraying the edges of its haecceity. Under pressure, the body takes on provisional consistencies, still a body but no longer the same body as before.⁴ It is not always the case in a struggle that instability leads to further instability, to the point of destructive collapse. Violent sensation enacts a finality only if there is a total imbalance of power in the coupled bodies. Viewed constructively, violent sensation enacts a double movement—equally action and reaction, unmaking and remaking in a tenuous balancing act of continuous bodily development. The space between bodies supporting a constructive struggle is a momentary space of becoming another body—an experimental space created by the autogenic movement immanent to states of instability.



fig. 46

Two Studies for a Portrait (detail)

volatile bodies

Francis Bacon commits violence on the canvas with paint, line, and colour. Out of the productive struggle to attain the Figure in his paintings, Bacon creates new sensations in the bodies he frames on the picture plane.¹ Bacon wants to capture in his work the bare fact of life—what is directly sensible in bodies, and the violence of physical negotiations that deform bodies. The task of Bacon's art is to bring the viewer into immediate relation with his paintings, to make the sensations captured in the paintings physically felt in the viewer while actively resisting the cerebral detour of narrative or symbolic understanding.²

Bacon paints bodies that often resemble human figures, rendered with voluptuous contour and rich colours that flaunt their vitality. But each body's vitality is disturbed with a madness evidenced by its spastic appearance, and in its semblance to the human form reveals a doubled, virtual body. These bodies are no longer figurative representations of a static human form but Figures—living bodies caught in the middle of intense bodily deformation.³

To record the fact of life Bacon uses paint as his primary medium of choice. He renders Figures using brusque yet visually distinctive techniques (brushing, smearing, rubbing, spattering, etc), each marking committed vigorously against neighbouring lines and patches of colour.⁴ These urgent markings rarely resolve beyond a medium level of detail, lending each painting a sense of having been left unfinished, a painting still in the process of resolving as a painting.

Varying intensities of action-marks roughly mix the layers of paint directly on the canvas in a collage-like manner. The markings that make up a Figure express a stuttering smoothness as the Figure spasms violently in place. Experienced at full scale, the effect is one where the viewer does not necessarily begin to identify forms before having already entered deeply into the painting along the deformations and breaks of line and colour.

Painting violence



fig. 47

Second Version of Painting 1946

Meat

In a thin crusting of paint Bacon fills the canvas with violent movement by first committing violence against the paint. Using dry brushwork followed by scrubbing with cloth Bacon breaks the liquid elasticity of paint, making what paint remains on the canvas thin and fragile. Here, the material violence of paint is joined by the violent deformations of the Figure that happen within the constructed reality of the picture. The violence of the Figure's deformation is borne by a body made of meat in which flesh and bone confront each other, forcing the flesh into a state of instability.

Bacon treats meat with veneration, seeing in meat the fact of life shared between humans and animals, their zone of indiscernibility in both physical corporeality and vulnerability to deformations.⁵ Most explicitly, Bacon shows the body as a carcass by opening it and laying bare its meat. Cut open from head to tail, the animal body is presented with an unblinking internal reflection of itself. This image of meat manages to demonstrate the state of flesh that tumbles from and tugs on bone, and the inert bone armature that resists the acrobatics of flesh seeking to contort it.⁶

However, these explicit depictions of meat only show its relations within the carcass' skin, terminating at its point of contact with the rack from which the carcass is hung. The cleaving open of the body enacts a finality on its movements (having nothing to do with the finality of death) by denying it further gestural movement in relation to other bodies in the picture. As a result these bodies do not yet attain the Figure; they still exhibit the stiff self-awareness of a subject being exhibited to an audience of spectators.



fig. 48
Painting

In contrast to exhibiting opened carcasses, Bacon's dominant method for showing the body involves a softer mixing of its interior and exterior in order to attain the Figure. Bacon commits a soft violence that extracts the interior colours of skin, flesh, and bone, mixing them back at the surface in a combined violence of material paint and pictorial meat. As a painter, Bacon's violence belongs to the surface trauma of the picture plane, showing the interior of the painting without having to cut open the canvas. The pictorial Figure is attained between a queasy slippage of material and movement that makes the movement visible in the material.⁷

A minimal structuring of space defines a place where the event of the Figure's deformation happens, where it is isolated in relation to itself or other Figures. Oftentimes the Figure inhabits a rudimentary approximation of a domestic setting, where its violent agitation becomes prominent in an otherwise casual atmosphere of repose. There is always a place where something happens, that frames a relation between parts, but the manner of relation is intentionally disjointed in a way that challenges narrative reading, leaving only the bare unfolding event.

The inhabitants of Bacon's paintings strain with the forces they are coupled with in even the most mundane tasks. They are not so much consumed by their activities but rather perform their task with such violent intensity that their bodies cannot conceal their extreme discomfort.⁸ Easy strides become struggling lurches, reaching for a door becomes a desperate grasping that stretches the body like a worn rubber band, while lying in bed becomes a heavy flattening under the weight of sleep. Even a gracious sitter for a portrait convulses uncontrollably from hours of holding a pose. Within a composing frame a volatile body loses its own composure and attains the Figure. Unable to withstand the intensity of its own movements, the body strains and deforms in place, contorted into a violent caricature of the task it is engaged in.



fig. 49

Two Men Working in a Field




fig. 50

Studies of the Human Body (centre panel)

Building on the isolated Figure, Bacon captures two Figures in conjoined deformation.⁹ Two Figures become coupled to each other's body and movement in a clinch, a live negotiation of forces generating a dynamic exchange of deformations. Caught in the clinch, the two Figures tend towards two dynamics of mutual deformation: the sharing in a single deformation where their separate bodies repeat each other's gesture, or more commonly the Figures manifest their individual deformations which then mix their bodies with indiscernible movement.

It is notable that in Bacon's entire catalogue of work he makes almost no attempt to include more than two Figures in a clinch, or more than one clinch in a painting, to perhaps further explore the specifics of interwoven group dynamics in an expanded clinch. Such studies would likely be pedantic since any additional dynamics depicted would already be addressed in the basic dynamics between two Figures: harmonious and unidirectional movement, or everything else. By limiting the clinch to two Figures, Bacon maintains an emphasis on the plain fact of bodily negotiation and deformation.




fig. 51
Triptych

And yet despite Bacon's insistence on only two Figures in a clinch we often see multiple instances of the Figure inhabiting peripheral positions in a painting. The role of these Figures is most clear in Bacon's triptychs which show the clinch in the central panel and the secondary Figures in the side panels attending to the clinch.¹⁰

The coupling forces of the clinch extend to the attendants, who do not affect the clinch, but are all the same affected by its forces. Within the format of the triptych, the attendants are none other than the clinched Figures themselves, watching themselves from outside the frenzied centre of the clinch. The attendant is the Figure's disembodied self-awareness with a gestalt sense of the unfolding event, tracking the continuity of movement in the coupled Figures' mutual unmaking and remaking.¹¹

Just as the format of the triptych is separated into a central panel flanked by two ancillary panels, the event is separated into different streams of experience—the attendants inhabit the painting outside the duration of the central event, perceiving the event independently from a detached space.¹² The attendant lives in a liminal position between the Figures caught on canvas and the painting's viewer, providing a rewarding yet highly tenuous line for the viewer to enter into the middle of the clinch.



fig. 52

Still taken from *Women in Love* of Gerard and Rupert spontaneously wrestling, pasted over photograph of two men viewing Bacon's *Triptych* in the AGO.

animal-headed

The framing of Francis Bacon's painting in the hushed silence of a gallery creates an ambiguous space of agency for the viewer to engage the Figure, its deforming power dampened by the institution's atmosphere of quiet civility. The viewer stands alone before the painting and hesitates to react in kind to the intense pictorial agitations, or perhaps turns away from it entirely. For a full encounter with the Figure the painting must be engaged on the viewer's self-actualized terms, and that cannot be enforced.

Here, a proposal by theatre-maker Antonin Artaud provides the grounds for unselfconscious engagement with intense sensations: make from disparate individuals an emboldened mass, an audience of attendants. Artaud's vision of theatre hinges on the staging of mass experience able to disembody the individual, dismantling the self-referential subject to make a pack with mass body, mass awareness, and mass momentum bolstering the individual with extraordinary power to affect and be affected.¹

As an avant-garde performance artist, Artaud seeks to abolish traditional theatre in which a sedate audience indulges the staging of illusory spectacle, succumbed to the cultivated consumption of familiar stories. To Artaud's mind, such an audience consists of aloof and distant voyeurs, unable to engage with the performance any more than a spectator at the periphery of the event.² For the spectator, sensation passes through the body without resistance, deflected from physical registration into the mind as a pre-formed image in ersatz of the felt sensation.³

Conceiving a new form of theatre, Artaud wants the audience's unreserved attention even if he must violently shock the audience out of its habits. He wants to dissolve the stage, urging the audience to attend the middle of the event and reminding them of the experience of intense sensations.⁴ He assails the audience's senses with nonsensical sounds and actions, looking to provoke a genuine reaction from an audience taken out of its comfort zone.⁵ By engaging the audience with performance that is challenging to digest, the audience is forced

Provoking an audience

I mean that I have found a way to be rid
of this monkey once and for all
and that if not one believes in god any longer, every
one will believe in man all the more.

Now it is man we must decide to emasculate
at this time.

How so?

How so?

no matter how one tries to understand you, you are mad,
mad enough to to be tied up.

By putting him once more, but the last time,
on the autopsy table so as to reconstitute his anatomy.
I say, so as to reconstitute his anatomy.
Man is sick because he is badly made.
We must decide to lay him bare so we can
scratch this insect for him, which itches him to death

god

and with god

his organs

for you may bind me if you wish
but there is nothing more useless than an organ.

When you have given him a body without organs
then you will have freed him from all his automatisms
and returned him to his true freedom.

then teach him to dance backwards again
as in the frenzy of dance halls
and that reversal will be his proper place.

From the conclusion of
To end god's judgement
by Antonin Artaud

to rise out of passivity and work through the sensations.⁶ Artaud wants to drive the audience to its unfiltered instincts in reacting to his performance, to push the audience beyond the brink of reasoning, sensibility, and how it is accustomed to being an audience.

In his written work, Artaud explores a level of bodily engagement beyond that of an audience reliant on his emboldening efforts. What he truly wants is for the audience to engage the event by its own powers, where his violent acts serve only to jolt the audience into an attentive and differently-empowered nature. This changing of behaviour requires a rigorous body method by which a pedestrian entering Artaud's theatre is unmade and remade as an attendant.⁷

For the process of making an attendant audience able to digest previously indigestible sensations, Artaud proposes the adoption of an intensive body that digests sensations with intuition, which he calls the Body without Organs (BwO).⁸ A closer engagement with an event through a BwO entails an experimental, investigative contact that begins to learn and intuit another body's manner of movements on immanent terms, rather than looking for form or meaning.

Artaud is vehemently opposed to thinking of a body's kinetic and dynamic axes as a fixed intersection. It is through the BwO that Artaud further proposes the changeability of a body's innate way of being, in opposition to a body permanently bound to a set of fundamental behaviours.⁹ Not to mistake a BwO for a literal body stripped of its organs, in relation to the animal body the BwO is perhaps better understood as a 'body before organs', the unformed state of a developing egg with open-ended and unresolved dynamic potential.¹⁰ In this state the organs are not so much discarded but conceived in new potential relations so that the redeveloped body can act with new powers as a body, by its new instincts and behaviours.¹¹

Thinking-feeling



fig. 53

The *kru* (teacher) looks on.

For Artaud movement and thought are inextricably bound, so that continuous and consistent movement requires likewise continuous and consistent thought. He finds in the animal a model for the rigorous production of thought with a consistency proper to thought that might be called spirit, or as Artaud calls it, cruelty—an unwavering persistence required for unceasing thought.¹² Artaud puts animal thought in harsh contrast against cerebral thought that cannot help but picture the indeterminate interval between movements as a fixed state, thereby breaking the flow of relational movement between bodies.¹³ In relation to flesh, cerebral thought can only produce pre-meditated action, and not the immediate reaction that Artaud seeks in his audience. Only animal thought, or instinct embedded in flesh as material logic can ceaselessly produce new movements in the passing of sensation through the body.

To make a BwO is to make a new set of movements for a body. That is to say, you have to make a move in order to first feel out how to move properly in relation to another body so as to then move with consistency. In practice, a BwO establishes a consistency of movement, a set of instincts and behaviours specific to the body which moves, the relations that connect it to another body, and their environmental circumstances. In nonhuman terms, a BwO can be a storm that materializes from a confluence of extreme climatic forces, which the storm then resolves over time until the forces are dissipated. In practical human terms, to make a BwO is to train an unskilled novice in the instincts necessary to resolve the challenges of a specific physical task, an age-old practice common to every craft-based discipline. In the negotiation between bodies, craft is understood in the German sense of the word *die Kraft*, which denotes force and power (*die Macht*)—in addition to the common understanding of craft in terms of skill in making.



fig. 54

Through the BwO we can more fully grasp the powers of the attendant audience who enters the event between visceral experience and vicarious disembodiment, sympathetically attuned to its clinched bodies. And yet, while feeling can be extended into the centre of the event, without physical involvement the attendant has no power to shape the event.

However, in a state of utmost attention requiring unbroken contact in thought and feeling, the attendant no longer reacts to sensation as the registration of movement, but to the incipient movement in sensation. Locked into the middle of the clinch, the attendant intuits movements before they arrive, reacting viscerally to the germinal forces of movement. In matching instinct to instinct, the attendant does not need to be physically involved in the event since the relation is purely virtual, yet a feeling grips the body—a sense of real potential power to shape the actions of the actual bodies caught in the clinch.

Artaud seeks to empower individuals as a communal body by injecting violent sensations into the crowd, making a mass BwO. But the crowd whipped up by Artaud is constantly on the edge of collapse without continued whipping, at which point individual constitutions return and the sensations that were bearable as a mass now overwhelm the individual. On the other hand, the individuals in the crowd can attempt to make a BwO for themselves by their individual constitutions, but that is a lot to expect for the first time of an unpracticed audience, especially when Artaud characterizes its individuals as desensitized and complacent. Despite his sincere efforts, Artaud risks alienating his audience as much as his ambition is to instill in the audience a new, robust set of instincts capable of digesting the reality of violent sensations.

Nevertheless, through experimentation in the face of risk Artaud produces the concept of the BwO, uncovering in one manner of speaking the way in which an individual changes its powers as a body in relation to other bodies. In expressing his power as an artist, Artaud can only make his audience flinch and hope that they rise from their seats.

Animal-attendant

The flinch



fig. 55

All physical reaction is rooted in the flinch—the body’s involuntary and immediate reaction to being affected by another body.¹⁴ The flinch is pre-personal, pre-emotional, and pre-cerebral. The intensity of the flinch can be as subtle as a frisson that runs up the back of the neck as muscles tighten imperceptibly, or it can be as vigorous as a clenching of the whole body that escapes through the mouth as a yelp.

In the body’s registration of violent sensation the flinch accompanies every nervous shock that arrests human thought and opens a brief gap of animal thought. Without seizing on it with action, the gap closes and human thought returns. The flinch that is incipient to further movement is the same flinch equally capable of arresting movement between the two modes of thought, where the body balks in indecision. The increase or decrease of a body’s power is shaped in the flinch, the tipping point between the opening and ending of relational movement.

Seeing that the way of flinching is determined by instinct, practicing to flinch in an intentional or desirable manner then constitutes a training of a body’s instincts. The flinch can be deadened, refined, made sensitized, or drawn out in its interval, reshaping bodily movement from its incipient roots. A changing of instincts realigns a body’s dynamic axis along its kinetic axis, which remains fixed without changing the body’s component parts.

A body is most supple along its dynamic axis, by which it is capable of continually returning to its kinetic axis anew. However, Artaud reveals two ways in which a BwO is made in a body: by its own powers or by another body’s powers. A body’s instincts and behaviours can be trained by its own agency or equally by an exterior agency, for which there is no guarantee of benevolent intent.

counterpoint

Toro and torero fight for territorial rights of the arena. They circle each other, taking measure of each other's power; big toro thrusts its horns with incredible brute strength, little torero stabs precisely with the tip of its sword. Awaiting the moment of contact, they position themselves in the arena. The audience attends in silent suspense, shifting uneasily to the edge of their seats. With a last look, toro charges and torero moves in without hesitation. Sprinting headlong, toro dips towards its quarry but it is gone in a flash. Time slows. Torero deceives, concealing its body with a cape. Toro charges past torero's true body and in the opening torero strikes deep into toro, piercing its heart. Torero begins to turn to the adoring crowd with its trademark flourish, but the crowd remains silent. They want to yell for torero to turn back, seeing that toro still lives. Before a syllable can be uttered toro whips its head in a final gesture, goring unaware torero through the gut. Toro and torero become conjoined for a last time.

The bullfight

The bullfight depicted in Francis Bacon's paintings depict a space of intense coupling between the combatants, the arena, and the audience, where the conjoined bodies become vulnerable to each other's powers to shape movement in space and time. Amid the frenzied action it becomes impossible for the audience to focus solely on one fighter over the other. The event can only be taken in as an all-consuming immersive whole; any attempt to identify separate bodies within the event loses grasp of the event in its continuity.¹ In the event and as the event, the audience loses itself in the enmeshed actions that manifest a joint haecceity between toro and torero, their zone of indiscernibility. As the coupled bodies in the arena unmake and remake each other, so too the bodies of the audience are unmade and remade, dissolving in the combatants' mutual dissolution.

Bacon depicts two iterations of the bullfight in close resemblance, excepting two major differences. In the second version, the crowd previously mounted in a vertical panel disappears entirely, leaving only the panel. Additionally, the floor of the arena is extended to fill the bottom of the painting.




fig. 56
Study for Bullfight No.1



fig. 57

*Second Version of Study
for Bullfight No. 1*



fig. 58

The two versions can be considered in the following ways:

1. The second version stands as a correction of the first painting.
2. The second version indicates a transition, a subsequent condition of the event depicted in the first painting.
3. The paintings are viewed simultaneously, in which the second version is immanent to the first—not as reduction to linear causality, but held in potential such that there is a potential third version immanent to the second version, though it remains unpainted.²

From the first painting we can see that the crowd is depicted to resemble something akin to a Nuremberg rally or a Roman legion assembled behind the eagle banner. It is the initial mass body that Artaud desires of his audience, a BwO made for viewing the violence of the bullfight. Following the logic of Bacon's attendants, we can see that the crowd vanishes from the second painting, becoming disembodied amidst the clinched bodies of toro and torero within the arena.³ Finally, the extending action of the ground towards the painting's viewer serves as an invitation for the viewer to dissolve with the attendants into the middle of the clinch.

Through the bullfight it becomes possible to witness a version of relational movement between toro and torero in the arena in which two bodies attempt to affect each other's movements in attunement to each other's individual powers. At the productive limit of relational movement, bodies caught in a clinch move in counterpoint with respect to each other's power in space and timing. A body moving in counterpoint with another body no longer relates to apparent form or to apparent movement, but moves in relation with pure virtuality or potential movement—instinct moving with instinct.⁴

Moving in counterpoint is an empathic attending to another body, requiring a kind of attention that considers one's own agency as conjoined with another body's agency,




fig. 59

the two bodies always having reciprocal influence on each other's movements.⁵ Instincts can be discerned by learning a body's behaviours, and from its instincts it is possible to learn the ways in which that body innately resolves the struggles it faces. Building the knowledge of a body's struggles then creates the closest approximation of that body's Umwelt. Taking up the instincts and behaviours of another body means taking up another body's dynamic axis, its powers to affect and be affected as that body, to the extent that one is able to intuit how that body behaves in contrapuntal movement.

Moving in counterpoint with another body brings two Umwelten to their closest proximity, such that at the limit of one Umwelt can be felt the shape of another Umwelt in material presence and immaterial power. But to get to the point of moving in counterpoint requires the unmaking and remaking of the body. The human organism methodically unmakes its human-ness as an organism for its animal body capable of sustaining a Body without Organs in its unceasing production of thought and movement.⁶ The animal body is then methodically remade with new instincts attuned to another body's instincts. In a body's unmaking and remaking the external limit of its Umwelt is reached by first touching down at its internal limit—the outward turn via an inward turn, a twist of the Möbius strip.⁷

From the extreme edges of an Umwelt in contact with other Umwelten, each return to the organism marks the end of a significant journey that changes its body imperceptibly, but makes it different from before. Each return remakes the organism and its behaviours, with renewed instincts and a change in its powers.

Umwelt redux




fig.60

String Volume

fig.61

Double Blind

Robert Irwin

Deleuze remarks that architecture is the precursor to all arts because its most basic gesture is the making of the frame.⁸ Far from suggesting that architecture is entitled to a privileged consideration over all other arts, Deleuze only means that expressive qualities are made perceptible through an act of framing, the manner of framing being different according to each artistic discipline.

Francis Bacon paints the event within the pictorial frame, within which a clinch of forces is gathered by a spatial armature. Figures and attendants are made perceptible within the lines and colours of the arena, but the arena itself stands against a last element, the background. Executed consistently across all of his paintings, the background is integral to Bacon's paintings. Rendered as a strong uniform colour, the background prominently fills large swaths of the painting, threatening to engulf the event. Although the background lacks internal contrast, or precisely because it lacks any defining features, Deleuze recognizes in it what he terms the cosmos—the burbling source of nascent forces and unbridled nonhuman vitality from which expressive motifs and relational structures emerge and return to naturally.⁹

The frame faces the background, the cosmos, as much as it provides the armature for the house, mediating the passage of forces from outside-in and inside-out. From its simplest beginnings, the frame exists as an act of marking. As if lifted straight from Bacon's paintings, Robert Irwin constructs the bare minimum of space that expresses nothing more than the marking motif, like a creature marking a tree with its scent—*here is a border*.¹⁰ Robert Irwin makes space in the beginnings of materialization by fixing planes of light that begin to suggest walls and thresholds, a body that finds its consistency only in the presence of light. In a radical contrast Richard Serra deploys immense industrial processes to make resolute markings on the ground using forged steel. For both artists, the works ultimately exceed the domain of sculpture and internal point-and-counterpoint relations to make inhabitable bodies that extend the contrapuntal structure to its inhabitants.




fig. 62

Shift

Richard Serra

superimposed aerial and
ground-level views

As Uexküll observed, a simple body frames and engages its environment in limited ways, making its movements easily predictable. However, as bodies increase in internal complexity, its potential contrapuntal relations expand accordingly, to the point that its movements become increasingly unpredictable. Can architecture make spatial counterpoint responsive to the human Umwelt with the same height of attention Temple Grandin pays to the bovine Umwelt? Can architecture further engage its inhabitants, in the same breath making shelter from a territory while sending its inhabitants into a wild clinch of forces that remakes bodies with new life?

Drawing from the motifs of the tick and the contrapuntal structure of its Umwelt, as well as the event of the bullfight that unmakes and remakes bodies caught within the ring of the arena and the stands that house the audience, the assembly of a building as an architectural body can be understood in the contrapuntal relations it sets up in movement and the exchange of bodily power with bodies that encounter it and encounter each other within the building and the world it frames.

For an architect, then, it is impossible to design for even the bare minimum of shelter without any measure of reciprocal influence back on its surrounding confluence of socio-economic, geopolitical, ecological, and cultural networks, and the lives of other bodies both human and nonhuman that make up those networks.

Given the awareness of what simple and complex bodies can do, and their contrapuntal powers to affect and be affected by other bodies, it becomes imperative for any able individual to keenly attend the shaping of its own Umwelt and the agency by which it can do so.

For an architect, it can be argued that it becomes a responsibility to attend the struggles of bodies coupled in a clinch, the sensations and events that fold through and unfold around the bodies, the arena that brings them together making relations of forces and movements perceptible, and finally, to attend the networks of power that affect bodily agency when actualized in the framing of architectural space.



fig. 63

notes from the fight

Skilled and unskilled violence

Violence is necessary for the productive unmaking and remaking of bodies as much as it is necessary for the destructive unmaking and remaking of bodies.

In reciprocal counterpoint, the relationship of power extends in both directions between the conjoined bodies. The capturing body is not necessarily the more powerful of the two, but almost always the more skillful.

A skilled woodworker hews, splits, and cuts living wood, unmaking a tree for parts that may be rejoined to make a table or a house. In common usage, violence carries the connotation of action done with ill intent, to the exclusion of all other meanings. What is the intent, then, of the woodworker who carefully attends to materials tools, and techniques and whose sense of self is both drawn from and extends into the craft? What is the form of violence that distinguishes the woodworker from a woodchipper?

It is important to make a distinction between different forms of violence: hunting and brawling. The hunter takes up the instincts of the hunted, so that the feeling of hunting also means the feeling of being the target of one's own hunting intent. The brawler overpowers another body totally, with no attempt at establishing meaningful relational movement. Nothing remains of the other body to learn from. The hunter both gives and takes, while the brawler only takes.


With consent, making and unmaking a body is not about the 'creation of violence', but the opening of one's body in order to intentionally make it vulnerable to sensations that deform other bodies, and the sensations that another body can create in one's own body.

An understanding of a body's power to affect and be affected, the techniques of violence, and a body's expressive abilities makes it imperative, individually and collectively, to be vigilant of other bodies in the reciprocal nature of physical negotiations in which bodies are unmade and remade.

Return to page 1 to begin again.

BODY REFERENCE CHART

- the world through the human body -



Notes

Introduction (1 - 7)

1. Elizabeth A. Grosz, *Notes Towards a Corporeal Feminism* (Australian Feminist Studies 2, no. 5), 8: “The body itself is both biological and psychical. This understanding of the body as a hinge or a threshold between nature and culture makes the limitations of a genetic, or purely anatomical or physiological account of bodies explicit.”
2. Adrian Parr, ed., *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Rev. ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 35-36: “The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. . . . A body exists when, for whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its essence or power of existing.”
3. Ariane Lourie Harrison, ed., *Architectural Theories of the Environment : Posthuman Territory* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 67: “The question returns: how could we nowadays inhabit with or as animals again? And what are the settings for this cohabitation? The human who opens to the animalism that modernity has repressed is also open to his biology and his physical reality, to his flesh and body.”
4. Moira Gatens, *Feminism as “Password”: Re-thinking the “Possible” with Spinoza and Deleuze* (Hypatia vol. 15, no. 2) , 61 “The human body is permanently open to its surroundings and can be composed, recomposed, and decomposed by other bodies.”
5. *Ibid.*, 60: “Deleuze and Spinoza belong to a tradition of thought which has been called ‘anti-juridical.’ What defines this tradition is a commitment to thinking against a fundamental proposition of humanist philosophy, namely, that viable sociability requires the organization of individuals’ natural affects and dispositions by a power that transcends the natural condition—for example, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. This juridical view posits a dual ontology consisting of two distinct planes: first, a plane of immanence (nature itself); second, a transcendent plane which functions to organize and socialize the first.
6. Elizabeth A. Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside : Essays on Virtual and Real Space* (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 2001), 95: “Deleuze’s work allows us to question the very ideal of ‘constructing an identity’: he enables us to bypass the presumption that such an identity is necessary, or desirable, for the ongoing well-being of subjects and cultures. Or rather, his work affirms that any identity is always riven with forces, with processes, connections, movements that exceed and transform identity and that connect individuals (human and nonhuman) to each other and to worlds, in ways unforeseen by consciousness and unconnected to identity.”
7. *Ibid.*, 13-14: “Of all the arts, architecture offers embodiment the greatest sense of acceptance. . . . Architecture is a discipline, not unlike medicine, that does not need to bring the body back to itself because It’s already there, albeit shrouded in latency or virtuality. Bodies are absent in architecture, but they remain architecture’s unspoken condition. This is of course not only a problem for architecture but for every discipline.”

cut: returning (108 - 111)

1. Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, 105: “The most dynamic elements of architecture, as well as those of the arts and social and political life, aspire to revel in the sheer thrill of the unknown: it is these dynamic—or perhaps we should say experimental (more in the artistic than scientific sense)—forces that enliven culture and all cultural production.”
2. Cary Wolfe, *What is Posthumanism?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xv: “. . . ‘the human’ is achieved by escaping or repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether.”
3. Richard A. Grusin, ed., *The Nonhuman Turn* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 13: “. . . ‘at the heart of the human there is nothing human.’ For it is in the eminently objectless, immediately relational, spontaneously variation-creating activity flush with instinctive animality—this tendency the human shares with the gull—that the human ‘gains singularity in distinction,’ attaining its own ‘maximum determination’ in a passionate flash of supernormal becoming.”
4. Gatens, *Feminism as “Password”*, 62-63: “An ethological perspective has no ground on which to privilege human being over other forms of being since a ‘body can be anything; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity’. The distinctions between artifice and nature, human and non-human will not be of interest on an ethological view, since these terms too will be analyzable only on an immanent plane where distinctions between one thing and the next are reckoned in kinetic and dynamic terms.”
5. *Ibid.*, 62: “Along the kinetic axis we may say that an individual is composed of other bodies that have a characteristic relation, each to the other, of speed and slowness, relative states of motion and rest, that maintain the individual in existence as the same thing. Along the dynamic axis we may say that every individual is a “degree of power” (a capacity to affect) in the midst of other bodies, which both affect, and are affected by, that individual To conceive of individuals in this manner is to adopt a Spinozist modesty concerning the knowledge that we have of the human body. It is to acknowledge, with him, that we (still) do not know what the human body is capable of nor the limits of what it can do.”
6. Brian Massumi, *A Shock to Thought: Expression After Deleuze and Guattari* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 60-61: “The literary is that which shows forth the humanness of the human; it is the human activity par excellence. And the human is but the creation of a system of meanings and values that must in large part be called literary. The human takes shape among an endless proliferation of stories, characters, mythologies. There is no story without the human, no human without stories: one reality with two modalities.”
7. Elizabeth A. Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), xii: “I have taken a model that I came across in the reading the work of Lacan, where he likens the subject to a Möbius strip, the inverted three-dimensional

- figure eight. Lacan uses it in a different context and for different purposes, but it seems quite suitable for a way of rethinking the relations between body and mind. Bodies and minds are not two distinct substances or two kinds of attributes of a single substance but somewhere in between these two alternatives. The Möbius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of mind into body and body into mind, the ways in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side becomes another.”
8. Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, 65-66: “The boundary between the inside and the outside, just as much as between self and other and subject and object, must not be regarded as a limit to be transgressed, so much as a boundary to be traversed. . . . It is significant that Deleuze, like Derrida, does not attempt to abandon binarized thought or to replace it with an alternative; rather, binarized categories are played off each other, are rendered molecular, global, and are analyzed in their molar particularities, so that the possibilities of their reconnections, their realignment in different ‘systems,’ are established. So it is not as if the outside or the exterior must remain eternally counterposed to an interiority that it contains: rather, the outside is the transmutability of the inside.”

cut: framing (112 - 117)

1. Elizabeth A. Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art : Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 10: “The emergence of the ‘frame’ is the condition of all the arts and is the particular contribution of architecture to the taming of the virtual, the territorialization of the uncontrollable forces of the earth.”
2. Grosz, *Chaos*, 11: “The frame is what establishes territory out of the chaos that is the earth. The frame is thus the first construction, the corners, of the plane of composition. With no frame or boundary there can be no territory, and without territory there may be objects or things but not qualities that can become expressive, that can intensify and transform living bodies.”
3. Parr, *Deleuze Dictionary*, 27: “Deleuze believes that each change or becoming has its own duration, a measure of the relative stability of the construct, and the relationship between forces at work in defining it.”
4. Grosz, *Chaos*, 41: “Each organism in every species is surrounded by its Umwelt, an ‘island of the senses’ that is always a considerable simplification of the information and energy provided by any milieu. The Umwelt of the organism is precisely as complex as the organs of that organism . . .”
5. Jakob von Uexküll, *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans with A Theory of Meaning*, trans. Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 50: “It is seen that three functional cycles take place, according to plan, one after the other. The mammal’s skin glands comprise the feature carriers of the first cycle, since the stimulus of the butyric

acid sets off certain perception signs in the [tick's] perception organ, and these signs are transposed outward as olfactory features. The processes in the perception organ bring about corresponding impulses by induction (we do not know what that is) in the [tick's] effect organ which then bring about the releasing of the legs and falling. The falling tick imparts to the mammal's hairs, on which it lands, the effect mark 'collision,' which then activates a tactile feature which, in its turn, extinguishes the olfactory feature "butyric acid.' The new feature activates the tick's running about, until this feature is in turn extinguished at the first bare patch of skin by the feature 'warmth," and the drilling can begin."

6. Ibid., 52: "We shall therefore assume that the tick is, during its waiting period, in a state similar to sleep, which also interrupts our human time for hours. But time stands still in the tick's waiting period not just for hours but for years, and it starts again only when the signal "butyric acid" awakens the tick to renewed activity."
7. Ibid., 50: "All animal subjects, from the simplest to the most complex, are inserted into their environments to the same degree of perfection. The simple animal has a simple environment; the multiform animal has an environment just as richly articulated as it is."
8. Catherine Ingraham, *Architecture, Animal, Human: The Asymmetrical Condition* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 220-221: "If Uexküll is even partially right, animals, even or especially our own animalness, are not directly available to our perception . . . we cannot see any animal directly, least of all the animal so notoriously lurking within us. Uexküll's theory of animal life also indicates that in addition to not seeing the eyes or faces of any other animal, we know nothing of any other environment-world . . ."
9. von Uexküll, *Foray*, 45: ". . . each and every living thing is a subject that lives in its own world, of which it is the center."
10. Wolfe, *What is Posthumanism?*, xv-xvi: ". . . posthumanism names a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatics, and economic networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms (but also thrusts them on us), a new mode of thought that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions, of humanism as a historically specific phenomenon."
11. Parr, *Deleuze Dictionary*, 35-36 : "The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the 'essence' or a power of existing of that body, a degree of physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its essence or power of existing."
12. von Uexküll, *Foray*, 33: "In the meantime, less grandiosely, it is worth pointing out that there is something almost spookily semiotic about nonliving complex thermodynamically

- driven processes. They need not even be complex. Close to equilibrium situations, such as hot air in an imperfectly sealed container, will appear to “figure out” how best to equilibrate—reduce the gradient, spread the energy—“in order to” (preanimate teleology) achieve the temporary end state of gradient reduction implicit in extended versions of the second law.”
13. Simon O’Sullivan, *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari : Thought Beyond Representation* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 12: “A rhizome is a system, or anti-system, without centre or indeed any central organising motif. It is flat system in which the individual nodal points can, and are, connected to one another in a non-hierarchical manner. A rhizome then fosters transversal connections and communications between heterogeneous locations and events. Indeed a rhizome, ultimately, is composed not of points but of the lines between these points.”
 14. Grosz, *Chaos*, 7: “Art proper, in other words, emerges when sensation can detach itself and gain an autonomy from its creator and its perceiver, when something of the chaos from which it is drawn can breathe and have a life of its own.”
 15. Grosz, *Chaos*, 8: “Philosophy, like art and like science, draws on and over chaos. The chaotic indeterminacy of the real, its impulses to ceaseless variation, gives rise to the creation of networks, planes, zones of cohesion, which do not map this chaos so much as draw strength, force, material from it for a provisional and open-ended cohesion, temporary modes of ordering, slowing, filtering.”

cut: registering (118 - 127)

1. Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 14: “The feeling of having a feeling is what Leibniz called the ‘perception of perception.’”
2. Daniela Voss. “The Philosophical Concepts of Meat and Flesh: Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty.” *Parrhesia* no. 18 (2013), 118: “At all times, thought has to inspect the image . . . and to ‘read’ the signs. Between the depicted and the real object, there is no hidden analogy, no internal relation—solely an external relation of representation, which is to be interpreted by thought.”
3. Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales* (New York: Summit Books, 1985), 42: “. . . continuous but unconscious sensory flow from the movable parts of our body (muscles, tendons, joints), by which their position and tone and motion are continually monitored and adjusted, but in a way which is hidden from us because it is automatic and unconscious.”
4. Massumi, *Parables*, 179: “There is in fact a sixth sense directly attuned to the movement of the body: proprioception. It involves specialized sensors in the muscles and joints. Proprioception is a self-referential sense, in that what it most directly registers are

displacements of the parts of the body relative to each other.”

5. Sacks, *Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat*, 42: “Our other senses—the five senses—are open and obvious; but this—our hidden sense—had to be discovered, as it was, by Sherrington, in the 1890s. He named it ‘proprioception,’ to distinguish it from ‘exteroception’ and ‘interoception,’ and, additionally, because of its indispensability for our sense of ourselves; for it is only by courtesy of proprioception, so to speak, that we feel our bodies as proper to us, as our ‘property,’ as our own.”
6. Ibid., 46: “The sense of the body, I told her, is given by three things: vision, balance organs (the vestibular system), and proprioception—which she’d lost. Normally all of these worked together. If one failed, (the others could compensate, or substitute—to a degree.”
7. Ibid., 49-50: “She continues to feel, with the continuing loss of proprioception, that her body is dead, not-real, not hers—she cannot appropriate it to herself. She can find no words for this state, and can only use analogies derived from other senses: ‘I feel my body is blind and deaf to itself . . . it has no sense of itself—these are her own words. She has no words, no direct words, to describe this bereftness, this sensory darkness (or silence) akin to blindness or deafness. She has no words, and we lack words too.”
8. Massumi, *Parables*, 58: “Tactility is the sensibility of the skin as surface of contact between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. Proprioception folds tactility into the body, enveloping the skin’s contact with the external world in a dimension of medium depth: between epidermis and viscera.”
9. Ibid., 59: “Proprioception effects a double translation of the subject and the object into the body, at a medium depth where the body is only body, having nothing of the putative profundity of the self nor of the superficiality of external encounter. This asubjective and nonobjective medium depth is one of the strata proper to the corporeal; it is a dimension of the flesh.”
10. Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 285: “As one moves through the three ways of formulating the phenomenon of projection, the ‘body’ becomes progressively more interior in its conceptualization. To conceive of the body as parts, shapes, and mechanisms is to conceive of it from the outside: though the body contains pump and lens, ‘pumpness’ and ‘lensness’ are not part of the felt-experience of being a sentient being. To instead conceive of the body in terms of capacities and needs . . . is to move further into the interior of felt-experience. To, finally, conceive of the body as ‘aliveness’ or ‘awareness of aliveness’ is to reside at last within the felt-experience of sentience . . .”
11. Ibid., 90: “A creature’s perception is exactly proportioned to its action upon the thing. The properties of the perceived thing are properties of the action, more than of the thing itself. . . . they are tokens of the perceiver’s and the perceived’s concrete inclusion in each other’s world.”
12. Ibid., 265: “Physiologically, what is termed “viscerality” here pertains to the enteric

nervous system. This is a neuronal network in the gut which “functions independently of control by the brain or spinal cord.” Although it is not controlled by the brain—directly, autonomously processing unconscious perceptual stimuli—its operations have conscious effects. It communicates indirectly with the brain through peristaltic contractions of the bowel, which are felt proprioceptively, and through hormonal releases which alter mood.”

13. Deleuze, Gilles. *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 183: “In short, the being of sensation is not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them, makes them whirl around like winds. Flesh is only the developer which disappears in what it develops: the compound of sensation.”

cut: moving (128 - 133)

1. Massumi, *Parables*, 204: “When you place a brick next to another brick you are not placing matter against matter. You are placing effect against effect, relation against relation.”
2. Ering Manning, *Relationescapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), 16: “Inframodal vitality propels the dancers to become more-than, to embody more than the strict envelopes of their individual bodies. The dancers begin to feel the dance take over. They feel the openings before they recognize them as such, openings for movement that reach toward a dance of the not-yet.”
3. Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, trans. Samantha Bankston (London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 60: “. . . the actual and visual coexist. . . . Each is as real as the other, but the actual concerns the formed individual, the material crystal, while the virtual designates the problematic, pre-individual field, or non actualized intensive differentiation. Except, the virtual does not disappear once individuation is achieved: for Deleuze, form is not an exhausted force, but a provisional relation of forces, however slow.”
4. Massumi, *Parables*, 200: “The problem is that if the body were all and only in the present, it would be all and only what it is. Nothing is all and only what it is. A body present is in a dissolve: out of what it is just ceasing to be, into what it will already have become by the time it registers that something has happened. The present smudges the past and the future.”
5. Jonathan Hale, “Architecture, Technology and the Body: From the Prehuman to the Posthuman.” in *The SAGE Book of Architectural Theory*, ed. C. Greig Chrysler, et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2012), 514: “To be human – and hence to be embodied – is to be already extended into the world . . . a liminal realm where it becomes more and more difficult to say categorically what belongs to the self and what belongs to the environment. . . . we perceive the world through the medium of the experiencing body. . . . In perceptual terms this means that it is impossible to make a meaningful distinction between our experience of the objects

around us and our experience of the body itself in the act of experiencing.”

6. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 317: “. . . expressive qualities or matters of expression enter shifting relations with one another that ‘express’ the relation of the territory they draw to the interior milieu of impulses and exterior milieu of circumstances.”

the clinch (139 - 143)

1. Parr, *Deleuze Dictionary*, 36: "Bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree."
2. Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 36: "And positively, Bacon constantly says that sensation is what passes from one 'order' to another, from one 'level' to another, from one 'area' to another. This is why sensation is the master of deformations, the agent of bodily deformations. In this regard, the same criticism can be made against both figurative painting and abstract painting: they pass through the brain, they do not act directly upon the nervous system, they do not attain the sensation, they do not liberate the Figure—all because they remain at one and the same level. They can implement transformations of form, but they cannot attain deformations of bodies."
3. *Ibid.*, 39: "This is because violence has two very different meanings: 'When talking about the violence of paint, it's nothing to do with the violence of war.' The violence of sensation is opposed to the violence of the represented (the sensational, the cliché). The former is inseparable from its direct action on the nervous system, the levels through which it passes, the domains it traverses: being itself a Figure, it must have nothing of the nature of a represented object. It is the same with Artaud: cruelty is not what one believes it to be, and depends less and less on what is represented."
4. Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, 93: "The space in between things is the space in which things are undone, the space to the side and around, which is the space of subversion and fraying, the edges of any identity's limits."

volatile bodies (145 - 153)

1. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 35: "Color is in the body, sensation is in the body, and not in the air. Sensation is what is painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation . . ."
2. David Sylvester, *Looking Back at Francis Bacon* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000), 212: "Bacon constantly used the word 'violence' to designate a quality that he greatly valued in art. He knew that it was an ambiguous word and that his use of it provoked priggish disapproval of his own work. What he meant by 'violence' in art was that the energy pent up in things was being conveyed in a very immediate way."
3. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, x: "Francis Bacon's painting is of a very special violence. Bacon, to be sure, often traffics in the violence of a depicted scene: spectacles of horror, and crucifixions, prostheses and mutilations, monsters. But these are overly facile detours, detours that the

artist himself judges severely and condemns in his work. What directly interests him is a violence that is involved only with color and line: the violence of a sensation (and not of a representation), a static or potential violence, a violence of reaction and expression.”

4. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 143: “. . . Deleuze insists that it is not a question of transforming forms, but of deforming bodies. Bacon does not stick to the reproduction of past forms, or the discovery of new forms, but manages to capture the body’s forces and deformations, which must be accomplished from the perspective of the materials, lines, colors, and haecceities in painting, along with the affects that it produces.”
5. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 23: “Meat is the common zone of man and the beast, their zone of indiscernibility; it is a ‘fact,’ a state where the painter identifies with the objects of his horror and his compassion. The painter is certainly a butcher, but he goes to the butcher’s shop as if it were a church, with the meat as the crucified victim (the *Painting of 1946*). Bacon is a religious painter only in butcher’s shops.”
6. *Ibid.*, 20-22: “Meat is the state of the body in which flesh and bone confront each other locally rather than being composed structurally. . . . In meat, the flesh seems to descend from the bones, while the bones rise up from the flesh. . . . the bones are like a trapeze apparatus (the carcass) upon which the flesh is the acrobat. The athleticism of the body is naturally prolonged in this acrobatics of the flesh. . . . Meat is the common zone of man and the beast, their zone of indiscernibility . . .”
7. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 143: “The figural is not narrative, but is a figural event: something happens or takes place, and something moves in the sensible appearance of the ‘Figure.’ It arises from the intensive register of the body’s deformation (‘figural’) and not from the abstract illustration of formal transformation (‘figurative’).”
8. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, x-xi: “In the end, Bacon’s Figures are not racked bodies at all, but ordinary bodies in ordinary situations of constraint and discomfort. A man ordered to sit still for hours on a narrow stool is bound to assume contorted postures. The violence of a hiccup, of the urge to vomit, but also of a hysterical, involuntary smile Bacon’s bodies, heads, Figures are made of flesh, and what fascinates him are the invisible forces that model flesh or shake it. This is the relationship not of form and matter, but of materials and forces making these forces visible through their effects on the flesh. There is, before anything else, a force of inertia that is of the flesh itself: with Bacon, the flesh, however firm, descends from the bones; it falls or tends to fall away from them . . . What fascinates Bacon is not movement, but its effect on an immobile body: heads whipped by the wind or deformed by an aspiration, but also all the interior forces that climb through the flesh.”
9. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 83: “In the first place, in the simple paintings, there was a double movement, from the structure to the Figure, and from the Figure to the structure: forces of isolation, deformation, and dissipation. But in the second place, there is a movement between the Figures themselves: forces of coupling that incorporate the phenomena of isolation, deformation, and dissipation in their own levels.”

10. Ibid., 84: "Finally, there is a third type of movement and force, and it is here that the triptych intervenes: it can, in turn, incorporate coupling as a phenomenon, but it operates with other forces and implies other movements."
11. Ibid., 13: "In many cases there seems to subsist, distinct from the Figure, a kind of spectator, a voyeur, a photograph, a passerby, an 'attendant': notably, but not exclusively, in the triptychs, where it is almost a law. However, we will see that, in his paintings and especially in his triptychs, Bacon needs the function of an attendant, which is not a spectator but part of the Figure. Even the simulacra of photographs, hung on a wall or a railing, can play this role of an attendant. They are attendants not in the sense of spectators, but as a constant or point of reference in relation to which a variation is assessed."
12. Ibid., 84: "This then is the principle of the triptychs: the maximum unity of light and color for the maximum division of Figures. Such was the lesson of Rembrandt: it is light that engenders rhythmic characters. This is why the body of the Figure passes through three levels of force, which culminate in the triptych. First, there is the fact of the Figure, when the body is submitted to forces of isolation, deformation, and dissipation. Then, a first "matter of fact," when two Figures are included in a single fact, that is, when the body submits to a force of coupling, a melodic force. Finally, the triptych: it is the separation of bodies in universal light and universal color that becomes the common fact of the Figures, their rhythmic being, the second 'matter of fact' or the union that separates."

animal-headed (155 - 163)

1. Massumi, *Shock to Thought*, 88: "He replaces this 'ordinary psychological theatre' with 'the Theatre of Cruelty [that] proposes to resort to a mass spectacle; to seek in the agitation of tremendous masses, convulsed and hurled against each other, a little of that poetry of festivals and crowd when, all too rarely nowadays, the people pour out into the streets'"
2. Antonin Artaud, *The Theatre and Cruelty*, trans. James O. Morgan (The Tulane Drama Review vol. 2, no. 3), 75: "A concept of the theatre has been lost. And in direct proportion to the manner in which the theatre limits itself only to allowing us to penetrate into the intimacy of some puppet or to transforming the spectator into a Peeping Tom . . ."
3. Massumi, *Shock to Thought*, xxxi: "The calming alternative is to brush off the impulse as a mere anomaly. It all depends on which nervous system is hit: whether it can live with expressive turbulence, or has learned to divert it into placid ox-bows of complacency. Habit is the body's defence against shocks of expression. It 'recognizes' every arriving perception it can as being 'like' an impulse the body has already integrated as a functional life content."
4. Artaud, *Theatre and Cruelty*, 76: "We wish to make of the theatre a reality in which one is able to believe, and which contains for the heart and senses that sort of concrete sting or bite which accompanies all real sensations."

5. Massumi, *Shock to Thought*, 93: "Artaud's language is intended to incite the body into action, to contaminate it like a disease through indigestible sounds and syncopated rhythms."
6. Ibid., 88: "Artaud wants to hold the body's attention, he wants to both affect and correct the anatomy (recall his famous body without organs). . . . Artaud's theatre is not designed to represent or reproduce (describe) man but to create a being which moves."
7. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 155: "Training axiom—destroy the instinctive forces in order to replace them with transmitted forces."
8. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 44-45: "Beyond the organism, but also at the limit of the lived body, there lies what Artaud discovered and named: the body without organs. . . . The body without organs is opposed less to organs than to that organization of organs we call an organism. It is an intense and intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive reality . . ."
9. Massumi, *Shock to Thought*, 89: "Artaud rejects innateness as a natural and essential state, preferring to view the innate as the pure unthought within thought. This is because he disapproves of thinking of oneself as a being, as an innate being who is then able to represent/reproduce oneself. This type of innateness is synonymous with complacency, and habit, and must be whipped, stirred into being a being innately (the becoming of being innate)."
10. Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 58: "The body without organs is not a body deprived of organs, but a body below the level of organic determination, a body of indeterminate organs, a body in the process of differentiation. . . . Deleuze thus thinks of the organism as a form that imprisons the body in a definite, corporeal organization, in an organic determination that traps life and imprisons it. The body without organs designates *nonorganic* life and is a power of individuation that is not yet actualized in the form of an organism. . . . This nonorganic life animates the body as force relation, the intense power of differentiation, and is not yet individualized in a given form."
11. Gatens, *Feminism as "Password"*, 63: ". . . ethology does not disavow the organs but rather selects out the transcendent organization of the body's organs in favor of a principle of composition or a harmonics of bodies and their exchanges. . . . A Spinozist will insist that to think differently is, by definition, to exist differently: one's power of thinking is inseparable from one's power of being and vice versa."
12. Massumi, *Shock to Thought*, 92: "Artaud's peculiar conception of cruelty devotes itself to a pitiless persistence toward the production of thought. Rather than relate simply to the production of pain and suffering where cruelty is regarded as cause, that is, as producing effective torment, Artaud's cruelty is a form of severity in thought, diligent and strict. 'Cruelty signifies rigour, implacable intention and decision, irreversible and absolute determination'."

13. Ibid., 91: "Artaud does not reject the mind, he denounces it as an organ of the organized body and as an interpreter of meaning. . . . An event is always destroyed when understanding or perception divide it into consecutive states that hide the inseparability of its continuous transformation of reality. Artaud dislikes the weakness of thought which cannot think without the interim necessary to distinguish objects from their repeated state of conversion.
14. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 45: ". . . sensation, when it acquires a body through the organism, takes on an excessive and spasmodic appearance, exceeding the bounds of organic activity. It is immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion."

Counterpoint (165 - 177)

1. Hélène Frichot, "Bullfighting, Sex and Sensation," Colloquy 5 (2012), accessed May 1, 2016, [http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/wp-content/arts-files/colloquy/colloquy_issue_five/frichot\(2\).pdf](http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/wp-content/arts-files/colloquy/colloquy_issue_five/frichot(2).pdf), 1: ". . . the dance of the torero and toro. It is composed of a minimum of two parts that conjoin or become juxtaposed in a frenzy that approaches a state of mutual dissolution. This fleeting conjunction might be mapped or rapidly surveyed, but it resists the organizational grasp of good sense, and the predictable assumptions and identification of common sense. It is what Deleuze and Guattari describe as 'an experimentation in contact with the real' that resists the order of signification. It is, for instance, the first burst of the bull breaking into the arena, the explosive meeting place between it, the matador and the cheering crowds. It cannot be captured by the cool accounts of the attendant aficionados who pride themselves on their knowledge of the tauromachic craft. Maintaining the aloof eye of criticism, such experts are unable to forget themselves in the midst of the event."
2. Ibid., 3: "Bacon's two studies of a bullfight create a series; we are obliged to read one canvas alongside the other. As Deleuze points out, where Bacon's first study frames an aroused crowd inscribed upon the canvas inside a vertical panel, the second study obliterates these spectators."
3. Ibid., 3: "The spectator, or spectators of Bacon's first study enter the painting by losing their sharp relief against the background. The spectators become conjoined with the action of the fight, dissolving into the aplat, the infinite background of flat uniform colour, which in turn rises up in the broken and twisting lines of the almost indistinguishable forms of man and beast. Spectators are not left untouched at the periphery of the "terrain of truth", the corrida, or, for that matter, the painting, but are entangled, deterritorialized and reterritorialized, in turn, amidst the event or haecceity at hand."
4. Erin Manning, *Always More than One: Individuation's Dance* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 136: "The initial tendency is to place movement in the human body. Is especially the case in the context of stage-based choreography, where the dancing body tends to be at the forefront. . . . through an analysis of the techniques proposed by

Forsythe and his dancers . . . that take counterpoint to a very complex limit, I explore how what cues and aligns is not the human body per se but the landings of sites for future cueings and alignments. . . . Certainly, a body moves. But what moves the body is more-than-cue, more-than-alignment as such. What moves the body is a tendency for movement, a movement of thought.”

5. Ibid., 180: “It is less being attentive-to than becoming in attention-with . . .”
6. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 160: “You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive. Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds. passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor.
7. Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Smith, Daniel W. and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1: “Becoming does not move in the other direction, and one does not become Man, insofar as man presents himself as a dominant form of expression that claims to impose itself on all matter, whereas woman, animal, or molecule always has a component of flight that escapes its own formalization . . . To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernability, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and nonpreexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form.”
8. Deleuze, *What is Philosophy?*, 186: “Art begins not with flesh but with the house. That is why architecture is the first of the arts.”
9. Ibid., 181: “In Van Gogh, Gauguin, or, today, Bacon, we see the immediate tension between flesh and the area of plain, uniform color surging forth, between the flows of broken tones [tons rompus] and the infinite band of a pure, homogeneous, vivid, and saturated color . . .”
10. Ibid., 183: “Perhaps art begins with the animal, at least with the animal that carves out a territory and constructs a house (both are correlative, or even one and the same, in what is called a habitat).”

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Images

Fig. 1.1 - 4.3

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Fig. 33

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Fig. 34

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Fig. 35

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Fig. 36

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Fig. 37

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Fig. 46

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Fig. 47

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Fig. 48

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Fig. 49

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Fig. 50

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Fig. 51

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Fig. 56, 57

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Fig. 61

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