

“Lucky that East Germany also exists”: Yugoslavia between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic (1955-1968)

by

Alan Maricic

A thesis
presented to the University Of Waterloo
in fulfilment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2019

© Alan Maricic 2019

Examining Committee Membership

The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the Examining Committee is by majority vote.

External Examiner	DR. MARK KRAMER Program Director, Project on Cold War Studies, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies
Supervisor	DR. GARY BRUCE Professor of History
Internal Member	DR. DAVID MONOD Professor of History
Internal-external Member	DR. JOHN JAWORSKY Professor Emeritus of Political Science
Other Member	DR. ALAN MCDOUGALL Professor of History

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Abstract

This dissertation explores the relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the period between 1955 and 1968. This is the first analysis using sources from all three countries, and the first one written in English.

In 1955, the FRG developed a set of diplomatic measures which aimed to prevent the GDR's international recognition as a sovereign country. These measures became known as the Hallstein Doctrine, named after one of the West German civil servants responsible for developing them. Under these measures, the FRG would break off diplomatic relations with any third country that recognized the GDR. Thus the two Germanies became involved in a diplomatic battle, with the GDR searching for recognition and the FRG trying to thwart these efforts.

Much of the GDR's counter-efforts in the early years of the Doctrine were aimed at Yugoslavia, which was in the process of rebuilding its relations with the Soviet Union following the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. This development opened the door for Yugoslav cooperation with other Eastern Bloc countries, including the GDR. In 1957, Yugoslavia finally recognized the GDR. This caused the FRG broke off relations with Yugoslavia, a decision it would reverse eleven years later, in 1968. This dissertation shows that Yugoslavia's decision to recognize the GDR did not reflect its general foreign policy goals, and that in subsequent years, Yugoslavia was more concerned with developing good economic relations with the FRG. This dissertation also shows that the GDR expected Yugoslavia to influence other non-aligned countries to recognize it, but that Yugoslavia was reluctant to jeopardize its position in the non-aligned world by lobbying for the GDR.

By using multi-archival sources, this dissertation examines the relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies, focusing on their bilateral relations and agency, but also takes into account the broader Cold War context, including superpower interests and Yugoslavia's role as a leading non-aligned country.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Gary Bruce, who has helped me shape my research into a proper dissertation and offered advice when I was stuck, which happened more than a few times. I would also like to thank my committee members, Alan McDougall and David Monod, for their comments. They helped me look beyond my narrow topic and consider a broader context. I am especially thankful to Dr. Monod for the excellent Cold War readings and engaging discussions during my first year in the program. I also thank Mark Kramer for agreeing to be external examiner at my defence. His comments brought up a number of perspectives that can only enrich my research. My gratitude also extends to Cecilia Piller and the Waterloo Centre for German Studies for partially funded my research trips.

The administrative staff at the Department of History also have my gratitude. Without the help of Donna Hayes, Anne Leask, and Aaron Ducker I would have been truly lost. The staff at the archives in Belgrade, Berlin, and Zagreb were instrumental in helping me access and collect the documents for my research. I am also grateful to Hermann Wentker at the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Berlin for his insight on the German side of my research, as well as literature recommendations.

There are also people who I have never met in person, but who have played a role in getting my research over the finish line. I thank Milorad Lazić, Radmila Pejić, Aleksandar Marinković, Lorenz Lüthi and Robert J. McMahon for their time.

Friends in and outside academia helped me get through my studies. Dinko Sinovčić, Ivan Spajić, Jakov Perković, Iva Ivan, Borko Magazin, Martin Scheidl, Lib Gen, Lana Grahek, Filip Tenšek, Saša Vejzagić, Marko Miljković, and Kaete O’Connell have all contributed in their own way. Ben Bradley has been a good friend and my unofficial guide through Canadian academia during my studies here, and has read and commented on a large portion of my writing. I look forward to finally having time to read his work. I consider myself lucky to have had Jennifer Redler as a friend and fellow PhD student. Always willing to help with both academic and bureaucratic problems, but also share laughs about the absurdities of the PhD process. I could not have asked for a better *Doktorschwester*.

My family in Toronto has been a source of positive energy and love. Having had them with me during this journey was a joy. My parents back in Croatia have been so patient and loving throughout my life, and provided me with opportunities that allowed me to pursue this degree. I cannot thank them enough.

Finally, I would like to thank Laura, whose love, support, and own intellectual curiosity made these past five years infinitely more enjoyable.

Table of Contents

Examining Committee Membership	ii
Author's Declaration	iii
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgements	v
Table of Contents	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: No Guarantees: Yugoslavia and the two Germanies (1955-1956)	19
Chapter 2: Whose Success? Yugoslavia's Recognition of the GDR in 1957	49
Chapter 3: The Second Berlin Crisis and Yugoslavia (1958-1960)	76
Chapter 4: The Two Germanies and the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference	114
Chapter 5: Time of Transition (1961-1964)	143
Chapter 6: From Cairo to Kiesinger: The slow Decline of the Hallstein Doctrine (1964-1966) ...	202
Chapter 7: The new <i>Ostpolitik</i> and Yugoslavia (1967-1968)	227
Conclusion	266
Bibliography	275
Glossary	290

Abbreviations

AA	<i>Auswärtiges Amt</i> (Foreign Office of the FRG)
ADN	<i>Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst</i> (General German News Service)
AJ	<i>Arhiv Jugoslavije</i> (The Archive of Yugoslavia)
COMINFORM	Communist Information Bureau
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
DSIP	<i>Državni sekretariat za spoljne poslove</i> (State secretariat for foreign affairs of Yugoslavia)
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i> (The Free Democratic Party)
FNL	<i>Front de libération nationale</i> (National Liberation Front, Algeria)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
KPR	<i>Kabinet Predsednika Republike</i> (The Cabinet of the President of the Republic)
MfAA	<i>Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik</i> (The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PA AA	<i>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes</i> (Political Archive of the Foreign Office)
SED	<i>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</i> (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SKJ	<i>Savez Komunista Jugoslavije</i> (The League of Communists of Yugoslavia)
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SSRNJ	<i>Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije</i> (Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia)
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

Willy Brandt, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) vice-chancellor and foreign minister, arrived in Yugoslavia on June 12, 1968 for a state visit. Three days into his stay, Brandt finally met with the Yugoslav president Josip Broz-Tito at his summer residence on the Croatian Brioni Islands. At one point during their conversation, Tito argued that it is best for countries to develop relations step-by-step, as long as they are always moving forward. In response, Brandt joked that "one should not make steps bigger than one's stride." After a "heartfelt" laugh, Tito retorted, "sometimes, one could even leap [forward]."¹

Brandt's 1968 visit certainly symbolized a leap forward in relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. The two had reestablished diplomatic relations in January of that year, following an eleven-year hiatus caused by Yugoslavia's recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1957. Not only was Brandt the first West German foreign minister to visit Yugoslavia, he was also the highest ranking West German official ever to visit the country.

The breakdown in diplomatic relations was a stipulation of The Hallstein Doctrine – a set of measures the West Germans developed in order to prevent the recognition of the GDR by specifying that any act of recognition of the GDR by a "third country" would be considered an

¹ "Razgovor predsednika Tita sa Willijem Brandtom" (June 15, 1968), AJ, KPR I-3-a/83-19, p. 2.

“unfriendly act.”² The most severe official West German response was to break off diplomatic relations with that country.

This dissertation is an examination of relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies in the period between the introduction of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955, and the reestablishment of relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG in 1968. Analyzing the relations between these three countries offers a window into the interactions between lesser Cold War actors, who, nevertheless, played an important role during this period. Recognizing the GDR was not only detrimental for Yugoslavia’s relations with the FRG, it also contributed to the international tensions surrounding the division of Germany by making that division more concrete. At the same time, the FRG’s rigid adherence to the Hallstein Doctrine obstructed the European détente. It was not until Bonn began slowly dismantling the Doctrine in the late 1960s that significant progress was made in East-West rapprochement.

The West Germans unveiled the Doctrine in 1955 to prevent East Germany from achieving any sort of legitimacy in the international community. This was one of the central goals of the FRG’s foreign policy, and stemmed from its claim to sole representation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*). In other words, West Germany claimed to be the only legitimate representative of the German people on all of German territory. In its eyes, East Germany was still only the “Soviet Occupation Zone,” which was also the moniker West German politicians and media used for the GDR during this period. On the other side of the inner-German border, the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, SED)

2 The Doctrine was presented publicly in a radio interview with one of its authors, Wilhelm Grewe, who was the head of the Political Department at the FRG Foreign Office at the time. “Zusammenfassung Interview Des Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe Mit Dem Chefredakteur Des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunk, Hans Wendt [Hallstein-Doktrin], 11. Dezember 1955/ Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, München).” http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0019_hal&l=de.

initially also claimed sole representation rights, but by the mid 1950s had abandoned the claim, opting instead to lobby for the international recognition of the GDR as a second German state.

While Soviet patronage allowed the SED to stay in power, especially after the popular uprising of June 17, 1953, it also robbed it of internal legitimacy.³ The lack of popular domestic support was one of the main West German criticisms of the SED regime, yet an upper hand in legitimacy alone would do little to stop third countries from recognizing the GDR. After all, apart from Albania and Yugoslavia, none of the Eastern European countries' Communist regimes could boast of popular support either. They were all propped up by the Soviets, and yet they all enjoyed diplomatic relations with a number of non-Communist countries. Hence the West German need for a diplomatic mechanism to prevent the recognition(s) of East Germany. Using the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany was able to prevent a number of countries from recognizing the GDR. Conversely, the GDR wanted nothing more than recognition from outside their Bloc. The lack of international legitimacy weighed heavily on Walter Ulbricht's shoulders, so much so that in 1963 – during a successful diplomatic phase – the East German leader could finally boast that “we are also someone,” alluding to the West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's famous claim that “we are someone again!”⁴

The Hallstein Doctrine was in effect from 1955 until 1972, when the West German government under Willy Brandt's chancellorship officially abandoned it. The Doctrine's most severe measure was to break off diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the GDR.

3 The East German authorities were able to suppress the uprising only due to Soviet military involvement. Gareth Dale, *Popular Protest in East Germany* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 32-33. For the relationship between the GDR and the USSR during East German crises see Gary Bruce, “Die Sowjetunion und die ostdeutschen Krisen 1953 bis 1961” in Diedrich Torsten and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk (eds.), *Staatsgründung auf Raten?: zu den Auswirkungen des Volksaufstandes 1953 und des Mauerbaus 1961 auf Staat, Militär und Gesellschaft der DDR* (Berlin: Links, 2005), pp. 39-64.

4 Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973 : aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 31.

The West Germans only implemented this measure twice: first with Yugoslavia in 1957, and second, with Cuba in 1963.⁵ Thus, in late 1957, one of the most peculiar episodes of Cold War diplomacy began, involving the West, the East, and the non-aligned world.

What made the two Germanies' relations with Yugoslavia different than with other socialist countries? The answer lies in Yugoslavia's position during the Cold War. In 1949, the then United States secretary of state Dean Acheson allegedly repurposed an old bon mot and said that the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito was a "son-of-a-bitch," but that he was "our son-of-a-bitch."⁶ In the previous year, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had excommunicated Tito from the Soviet Bloc as punishment for refusing to conform to his leadership.⁷ Tito, like Enver Hoxha in Albania, had been the leader of a strong homegrown resistance movement against Nazi occupiers and local fascists with minimal aid from the Allies for much of the war.⁸ When Moscow demanded complete loyalty after the war, Tito decided he would not relinquish his hard-fought achievements. For this decision, Tito paid the price. It was only his mass support in Yugoslavia and the considerably large army experienced in guerrilla warfare that saved him from a Soviet invasion – a fate much worse than excommunication.⁹

Regardless of the veracity of Acheson's quip, the sentiment in Washington was clear. Tito was hardly a model recipient of American support, but in the harsh reality of a postwar bipolar world order, where the United States' foreign policy was shaped by George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram" and his policy of containment of Soviet expansion, discarding Yugoslavia

5 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 28.

6 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 33.

7 For the latest assessment of the Tito-Stalin schism see Jeronim Perović, "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (April 2007): 32–63.

8 Swain, *Tito*, p. 49, 57, 63.

9 Mark Kramer, "Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet–East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–53," in Svetozar Rajak et al., (eds.), *The Balkans in the Cold War*, e-book, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 34.

would have been a mistake which could have had grave consequences for West European and, by extension, American security.¹⁰

If the Americans were ready to embrace an orthodox Communist such as Tito, then the other Western Powers, the United Kingdom and France, not to mention the rest of the West European states, had to follow suit.¹¹ By the mid-1950s, owing a lot to this anomalous partnership, Yugoslavia had mutated into a socialist country *sui generis*. Buoyed by American loans and aid – totalling around US\$2.2 billion between 1950 and 1965 – Yugoslavia developed its own strain of economic system called ‘workers’ self-management’ which placed it firmly outside the planned economy orthodoxy of the Soviet Bloc.¹² On the other hand, it remained a one-party state that exercised complete control of its political sphere by regularly imprisoning Tito’s political opponents. These were mostly Communists still loyal to Stalin – the so-called *Informbiroovci* (Cominformists) – and to a lesser extent, various nationalists.¹³

As a renegade Communist, Tito would never completely side with either Bloc after 1948. While he valued Western aid that helped him stay in power, he was a Communist through-and-through. On the other hand, his fear of Soviet domination, not to mention his bruised ego, never did allow him to return to the Soviet fold, regardless of his eternal sympathies for Moscow as the epicentre of the socialist revolution – which always annoyed his top diplomats. However, as his former confidant and later dissident Milovan Djilas noted in 1980, Tito was a person

10 George F. Kennan was a US diplomat stationed in Moscow in 1946, where he drafted an outline of US foreign policy, later named the Long Telegram, which focused on the containment of Communism in Europe. For the full text of the telegram, see: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06/d475>

11 An example of this new alliance was in March 1953, when Tito became the first Communist head of state to visit the UK. Dragan Bogetić, “Saradnje Jugoslavije i Zapada u vreme sukoba sa Kominternom 1952-1955” in Ljubodrag Dimić, ed., *Velike sile i male države u hladnom ratu 1945-1955: slučaj Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Katedra za istoriju Jugoslavije Filozofskog fakulteta, 2005), p. 52.

12 Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito’s Yugoslavia*, e-book, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), p. 56. Adjusted for inflation, this would amount to just over US\$16 billion.

13 For an excellent analysis of the conflict between Tito and Yugoslav Stalinists see Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).

“exceptionally without any talent, except for one – political talent.”¹⁴ After 1948, this talent went into overdrive. As a result, Tito searched for a foreign policy that would eschew bloc allegiances and also ensure Yugoslavia’s survival (under his rule, of course). He found it in non-alignment. Isolated in Europe, Tito could only look outside its confines for support. Fortunately for Tito, a number of new countries in the Global South also decided to avoid alignment with one of the global superpowers.¹⁵ By the 1960s, the necessity of finding allies transformed Yugoslavia into a global diplomatic player. On the one hand, Yugoslavia was an impoverished socialist country which was being courted by both Superpowers and receiving large loans, usually in return for diplomatic support, but also just neutrality in certain international issues. On the other hand, it was developing strong ties in the Global South with the newly independent countries, as well as revolutionary and freedom movements alike.

The German Question, that is, the issue of a divided Germany, compared to Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, had a more immediate importance for Europe’s security. As Timothy Garton Ash argued, Germany was in fact the answer to the problem of a divided Europe.¹⁶ A divided nation at the centre of a continent was a practical issue as much as an ideological one, especially if we consider that apart from being the border between capitalism and socialism, it was also the front line of a nuclear standoff.¹⁷

14 Milovan Đilas, *Druženje s Titom* (Harrow: Aleksa Dijlas, 1982), p. 9.

15 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Neutrality and non-alignment during and beyond the Cold War” in Sandra Bott et al., (eds.), *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?*, 1st edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 213.

16 Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

17 The issue of nuclear weapons had been one of the most important political and diplomatic problems in postwar Germany, and indeed Europe. See Stephan Geier, *Schwellenmacht: Bonns heimliche Atomdiplomatie von Adenauer bis Schmidt*, (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013); Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-1970* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Benjamin Ziemann, “German Angst? Debating Cold War Anxieties in West Germany, 1945–90,” in Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, (eds.),

Conversely, Yugoslavia's non-alignment made an impact mostly in the post-colonial Global South. Although non-alignment was a manifestation of Tito's desire for ideological linkage outside the two blocs, it also developed out of a practical need for economic cooperation, since Yugoslavia had little more to offer Western Europe than raw materials. In his recent monograph on Yugoslavia's foreign policy, Richard Niebuhr argues that for Tito, non-alignment was "part of the deliberate effort by the regime to [...] search for external support" and that "Tito and his government manipulated foreign policy victories to reinforce the regime's standing among Yugoslavs."¹⁸ Although Niebuhr is right to identify Tito's pragmatism in developing non-aligned connections, the ideological component cannot be ignored. As Leo Mates, one of the scions of Yugoslavia's Tito-era diplomacy, argued, non-alignment is too broad of an idea to be described by just one narrow definition.¹⁹

In 1955, when the West Germans decided to begin sanctioning the countries that recognized East Germany by creating the Hallstein Doctrine, the German Question and non-alignment, two hitherto relatively separate issues, began to overlap. While the FRG had for years been using various diplomatic or economic measures to prevent the GDR's recognition, it was only in 1955 that it decided to implement the breaking off of diplomatic relation as one of these mechanisms. With the two blocs already entrenched in their positions, the Doctrine was clearly aimed at non-aligned countries. Conversely, by the mid-1950s Yugoslavia was quickly becoming a leader among non-aligned nations. As a result, the German Question became a non-aligned issue. This dissertation is a detailed investigation of this overlap and shows that the two

Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90, 1 edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

18 Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy*, p. 90.

19 Leo Mates, *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1972), p. 9.

Germanies, in their own diplomatic conflict over the German Question, spent considerable time and resources influencing Yugoslavia's German policy due to its specific position as a leading non-aligned country, and the only European non-aligned country.

The role of lesser actors in the Cold War was discussed by several political scientists as early as the 1960s.²⁰ In his 1968 study of small powers, Robert L. Rothstein dedicated a chapter to the various ways countries tried to eschew Superpower control to create their own foreign policies. Rothstein suggested that, at the time of writing, "on the political level (but not economic) and on the level of conventional warfare, bipolarity has given way to multipolarity in the ways in which states behave, if not in the actual capabilities they possess."²¹

This approach was tested by a number of historians using newly-declassified archival sources following the end of the Cold War. In his seminal book *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Odd Arne Westad argued against those historians of the Cold War who focused solely on the decades long sparring between the United States and the Soviet Union, and who discounted other countries – mostly in the Global South – for their lack of agency. Here Westad points out that Superpower involvement in some events in the Global South, such as revolutions, does not preclude the legitimacy of their struggle.²²

Tony Smith is another historian who addressed the importance of non-superpowers in the Cold War. Smith goes further than Westad when he argues that "while junior members in the international system at times took actions that tried to block, moderate, and end the epic contest,

20 In fact, small state agency became the focus of academic inquiry even earlier. Namely, in 1959, Annette Baker Fox analyzed the actions of smaller states during the Second World War. Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

21 Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 238. Similar arguments have been provided in Jan F. Triska, *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).

22 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.

they also took actions that played a key role in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging the struggle between East and West.”²³ In a recent essay, Robert McMahon also addressed the agency of “small powers,” indicating that actors on all three Cold War sides – East, West, and non-aligned – often disregarded the interests of the superpowers.²⁴

This dissertation is adjacent to Westad, Smith, and McMahon’s respective theses, in that it looks at events driven mostly by local actors directed – at times – by their respective superpower backers, but also takes into account the two Germanies’ own foreign policy goals, as well as Yugoslavia’s agency and influence as a non-aligned leader. By examining the relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies, I will show that Yugoslavia held a specific position in the foreign policies of the latter two. I will also show that often the two Germanies’ bloc allegiances did not always translate into complete compliance with their senior partners’ policies and wishes, even in the case of the Soviet satellite, the GDR.²⁵ The FRG enjoyed American support in its mission to stop the international recognition of the GDR, yet the US did not support the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine on Yugoslavia. Neither did the GDR always follow Moscow’s lead in several Soviet rapprochements with Yugoslavia during the Cold War, and when it did, it was often begrudgingly. Thus, this dissertation argues that the Cold War cannot be reduced to an ideological battle between two superpowers, and that the desires of less

23 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (January 1, 2000): 567–91, p. 568. See also: Federico Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703.

24 Robert J. McMahon, “Agency, Structure, and Interdependence: Reflections on the Regional and Global Cold Wars” in Lorenz Lüthi (ed.), *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 22-24.

25 This thesis is not novel. Perhaps the most notable research on East Germany’s ability to “wag the dog” is Hope Harrison’s *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*. Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961*, ACLS Humanities E-Book (Series) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

powerful actors were often strong enough to veer away from the course the United States and the Soviet Union set.

Many volumes have been produced that focus on either of the Cold War episodes that constitute the basis of this dissertation. There is a large body that deals with the FRG's foreign policy during the Cold War, both during and after the Hallstein Doctrine.²⁶ During Konrad Adenauer's tenure, the FRG's diplomacy was firmly turned towards the West. As Ronald J. Granieri explained, the FRG's foreign policy during the Adenauer years was marked by his drive to integrate West Germany into the West. The so-called *Westbindung* was Adenauer's strategy that would "allow the Federal Republic to determine its international fate, to be an independent subject rather than merely an object of superpower policy."²⁷ Adenauer's firm focus

26 For literature on West Germany's foreign policy before Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994*, 2nd edition (Schöningh: Paderborn, 1995); David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Yeshayahu Jelinek, *Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965, Ein neurotisches Verhältnis*, Reprint 2014 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2003); Eugenie M. Blang, "A Reappraisal of Germany's Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard's Response to America's War in Vietnam," *German Studies Review* 27, no. 2 (2004): 341–60; James C. Van Hook, *Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Hannfried von Hindenburg, *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Steven Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Mathias Stein, *Der Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen zu den Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973* (Göttingen: V&R unipress GmbH, 2011); Dominik Geppert, *Die Ära Adenauer*, 3. Auflage. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012); Mathilde author Von Bulow, *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War*, New Studies in European History (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

For literature on West German foreign policy during Brandt's tenure as foreign minister and chancellor, see Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973*, New Cold War History (Chapel Hill; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Horst Möller and Maurice Vaisse, *Willy Brandt und Frankreich* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2005); Julia von Dannenberg, *The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR*, 1 edition (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Dirk Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009); Claudia Hiepel, *Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou, Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch und Krise* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2012); Bernd Rother (ed.), *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik, Akteure Der Außenpolitik* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014).

27 Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 142.

on Western integration was coupled with a rigid stance towards Eastern Europe. While the latter was mostly informed by the issue of East Germany's claim to sovereignty, it was also in part motivated by the twelve million Germans expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European countries after World War II. The expellees demanded a return to their homes and refused to acknowledge the new borders drawn in the East. As Pertti Ahonen has shown, the expellees formed a voting bloc that was influential far beyond their numbers, because political parties championed expellee causes without being able to actually deliver on their promises.²⁸ The expellees' influence began to wane towards the end of the 1950s, which simplified West Germany's rapprochement with the East in the 1960s.

A wealth of literature on the GDR's foreign policy has also been published over the last three decades. The historiography here shows that it suffered from two key deficiencies: first, the Soviet Union's control of its foreign policy, and second, the absence of international recognition.²⁹ As Hermann Wentker argues, the GDR's diplomacy was operating in very limited parameters, and it owed its rare successes to external factors. There were periods of "aggressive" East German foreign policy, but these were in sync with the USSR's, and cannot therefore be seen as independent.³⁰

28 Pertti Ahonen, *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also R. M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

29 Gareth M. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, *Soviet and East European Studies*; 78 (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ingrid Muth, *Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen*, 2. Auflage (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2001); Heiner Timmermann, *1961 - Mauerbau und Aussenpolitik* (Münster: Lit, 2002); Joachim Scholtyseck, *Die Außenpolitik Der DDR* (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003); Hope Millard Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961*, 2005; Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989. Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007); Friederike Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968.*, 1st ed. (Köln: Böhlau, 2009).

30 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 559.

Yugoslavia's non-alignment also attracted considerable attention from various scholars during the Cold War. Alvin Rubinstein's analysis of non-alignment offered an early detailed look into the role non-alignment played in Yugoslav foreign policy. Rubinstein argued that it "filled various needs," from finding friends in the Global South, but also to encourage other states to adopt its own style of market socialism, and ultimately to "end its diplomatic isolation."³¹ William Zimmerman focused on the evolution of the Yugoslav leadership's thinking on how to proceed after the expulsion from the Cominform. According to Zimmerman, "[t]he impact of the changed international environment on Yugoslav behaviour could be felt only as mediated by changed perceptions on the part of the Yugoslav leadership, and as those changed perceptions were legitimated by explanations cast in doctrinal terms."³²

As Yugoslavia's archives opened after its dissolution, a number of studies of Yugoslav foreign policy – including its role in non-alignment – emerged, mostly authored by historians from former Yugoslavia.³³ One of the leading Serbian Cold War historians, Dragan Bogetić, argues that in the mid-1950s the Yugoslav leadership contemplated closer cooperation with the

31 Alvin Z Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 77.

32 William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution Of Yugoslavia* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 20-21. A discussion of the Yugoslav strain of Communism can also be found in Robin Alison Remington, "Eurocommunism and Yugoslavia," in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke (eds.), *Eurocommunism between East and West* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

33 Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici: (1948-1963)* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2002); Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike: 1956-1961* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006); Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010); Vladimir Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija studije i dokumentarni prilozi* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010); Dragan Bisenić, *Mister X: Džordž Kenan u Beogradu, 1961-1963*, 2011; Robert Niebuhr, "Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 10, 2011): 146–79; Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-57*, Cold War History Series (London, England); 26 (London; New York: Routledge, 2011); Aleksandar Životić, *Forsiranje peska: odred JNA na Sinaju (1956-1967)* (Beograd: Medija centar "Odbrana," 2011); Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971* (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2012); Đoko Tripković, *Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971* (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2013); Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat: ogleđi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014).

West, but that the realities of Yugoslavia's political incompatibility and economic backwardness would not produce positive results for Yugoslavia. Instead, Belgrade decided that creating strong economic ties with the even more underdeveloped Global South countries presented a more prudent strategy.³⁴ The intention here was to form relations from a position of strength, and to couple it with the worldview that opposed neocolonialism, in this instance US and USSR control. While the economic component of this strategy never panned out, since Yugoslavia could not compete with either bloc in that sector, "Yugoslavs had already staked out a claim of how to deal with both outside control and notions of transforming society," two other key issues on the minds of Global South leaders.³⁵ The latter two issues were more important to Tito, who did not have much proclivity for economic matters.

According to Vladimir Petrović, Tito's central role in creating Yugoslavia's foreign policy remains unchallenged in post-Cold War historiography. While other aspects of his rule have succumbed to – often malicious – revisionism, even the more sober accounts of Yugoslav diplomacy recognize Tito's importance in creating it.³⁶ This dissertation's findings are in agreement with both of these assessments, but with one caveat. Due to the poor state of Yugoslavia's relations with both Germanies through much of the first half of the Cold War, the focus here is often on contacts between low- to mid-level diplomats, far from the pomp usually associated with Tito's 'personal diplomacy'. It is therefore not surprising that Tito's role in this dissertation is not as prominent as in other studies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold War.

34 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 8.

35 Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy*, p. 99.

36 Petrović, *Titova licna diplomatija studije i dokumentarni prilozi*, pp.21-23.

As Federico Romero explained, in the past two decades Cold War historians have been trying to “decentre from a primarily Euro-Atlantic focus to the complex heterogeneity of the global South, and from a close frame on the superpowers’ decision-makers to the agency of a variety of actors in Latin America, Asia or Africa.”³⁷ Non-alignment studies have profited from this global turn in Cold War historiography, with numerous contributions reflecting this.³⁸ The Hallstein Doctrine received considerable attention from historians in the past twenty years as well, including specific studies on Yugo-German relations during this period.³⁹

This dissertation is situated in the nexus of these Cold War topics. It shows a Western lesser power, a Soviet satellite, and a non-aligned country navigating a quintessential Cold War hot spot that was the German Question. Yugoslavia faced pressure from both the GDR and the FRG, and to a lesser extent from the US and USSR, to adapt its position in this issue, and both Germanies used threats and incentives to achieve their goals. However, this dissertation is also a study of bilateral relations. Yugoslavia had a number of agreements in place with both Germanies concerning trade, culture, sports, and various other areas of cooperation. Finally, it is

37 Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” p. 686.

38 Two edited collections stand out in this field: Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade* (Routledge, 2014); Sandra Bott et al., (eds.), *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?*, 1 edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2015). There is also a recent history of the Non-aligned Movement published in German: Jürgen Dinkel, *Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992)* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015).

39 Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973 : aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001); William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Amit Das Gupta, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin* (Matthiesen, 2004); Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova Doktrina i Jugoslavija: Tito Između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004); Zoran Janjetović, *Od Auschwitza Do Brijuna : Pitanje Odštete Žrtvama Nacizma u Jugoslavensko-Zapadnonjemačkim Odnosima*. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007); Marc Christian Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin: die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu Jugoslawien im Vergleich, 1957-1968* (Berlin: Logos-Verlag, 2008). Vladimir Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973: Između Ideologije i Pragmatizma* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009); Dušan Nećak, “Ostpolitik” *Willyja Brandta i Jugoslavija (1963.-1969.)*, Biblioteka Povijest i suvremenost (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2015); Agnes Bresselau Von Bressensdorf, Christian Ostermann, and Elke Seefried (eds.), *West Germany and the Global South and the Cold War* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017).

a study of the two Germanies, as “junior members,” pursuing their own, local and global, foreign policy goals. In other words, attempting to “wag the dog,” with varying degrees of success.

This research project adds to the extensive body of scholarship mentioned above by bringing together for the first time archival evidence from both Germanies and Yugoslavia about the German-German-Yugoslav relations during the Hallstein Doctrine period. Most often historians were limited by their language skills – ones from the former Yugoslavia usually used only sources in Serbian/Croatian and English, while the rest used mostly German and English (or documents in other languages). For this dissertation, I have conducted research at two German archives. The first was the Political Archive of the Federal Republic of Germany’s Foreign Office in Berlin (*Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts*), which hold the records of the FRG’s Foreign Office, as well as the GDR’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The second one was the Berlin branch of the German Federal Archive (*Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde*), which holds the records of the GDR government as well as the SED. For Yugoslav primary sources, I have worked in the Archive of Yugoslavia in Belgrade (*Arhiv Jugoslavije*), which hold the records of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic (*Kabinet predsednika republike*), as well as the party archive of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista Jugoslavije*).⁴⁰ I have done additional research at the Croatian State Archive, which holds the records of the League of Communists of Croatia.

The dissertation is divided into seven chronologically ordered chapters. Chapter 1 sets the scene for this study. It covers the years 1955 and 1956, outlining the state of the three

⁴⁰ Yugoslav Communists adopted this name for their party in 1953 as part of a wider effort to distance themselves from the Soviets. John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 255.

countries' foreign policies during this period. West Germany's foreign policy was marked by the official announcement of the Hallstein Doctrine in December 1955. The GDR was still struggling with creating a reliable foreign ministry, and grappling with adjusting to the changes in Soviet foreign policy that were slowly under way following Stalin's death in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party. Yugoslavia, apart from rebuilding its own bridge to Moscow, was also in the process of solidifying its non-aligned connections in the Third World, symbolized by the summit meeting between Tito, the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The chapter takes into account how these separate events affected the relations between the two Germanies and Yugoslavia.

Chapter 2 (1957) deals with the events leading up to, and including the Yugoslav recognition of the GDR, the FRG's subsequent implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine, and the severing of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. The chapter discusses why Yugoslavia proceeded with the recognition even though Bonn had warned Belgrade on multiple occasions to tread carefully, taking into account ideological, as well as economic factors.

Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR reshuffled the cards in the Bonn-Belgrade-East Berlin triangle. Chapter 3 (1958-1960) deals with the recognition's actual aftermath, focusing on how each of the countries dealt with the newly reconfigured bilateral relations. Yugoslavia tried to keep the assertive East Germans at bay, while at the same time aiming to maintain good relations with the FRG, mostly for economic gain. This chapter will also explore to what extent the GDR – in the shadow of a new Yugo-Soviet breakdown – tried to exploit Yugoslavia's

position as a non-aligned leader and the only non-Soviet Bloc country to recognize it. Most importantly, this chapter will look at the ways the second Berlin Crisis, which began in 1958 influenced these relations.

In 1961, Belgrade hosted the first non-aligned conference. Chapter 4 (1960-1961) looks at East Germany's campaign to influence the conference, as a case study of its diplomacy in the Global South. Their goal was to include the German Question in the conference's agenda, with the hopes that a pro-East German discussion might ultimately lead to group recognition at the conference, which would have had much greater impact than recognition from individual non-aligned countries. This chapter will also analyze West Germany's attempts to prevent this outcome. Both Germanies used various diplomatic tools at their disposal, including sending out envoys to leading non-aligned countries in an attempt to convince them to support their agenda at the conference. In addition, the chapter analyzes the East German attempt to capitalize on the fact that they had a strong diplomatic presence in Belgrade, due to the existence of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

Chapter 5 (1961-1964) is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes Yugo-West German relations during chancellor Konrad Adenauer's last years in power, as well as his successor Ludwig Erhard's first year in office. This period was marked by intensified terrorist activities of Croatian fascist émigrés in the FRG who targeted Yugoslav diplomats. However, in 1963, officials from Yugoslavia and the FRG met officially for the first time since 1957, for economic negotiations. This was a breakthrough that paved the way for more official talks later on. The East Germans were also recalibrating their Yugoslav policy during this period, following a new Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, which resulted in Walter Ulbricht's first visit to

Yugoslavia in 1964. The second part of the chapter deals with the second non-aligned conference in Cairo in October 1964, and the efforts of both Germanies to influence the conference agenda, in a repeat of the their efforts during the 1961 Belgrade non-aligned conference.

The last two chapters focus mainly on the sea change in West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, and its effect on Yugoslavia. Chapter 6 (1964-1966) traces the transition in West German Yugoslav foreign policy from the Cairo non-aligned conference to the election of Kurt Georg Kiesinger as the new West German chancellor in December 1966. The most important event of Erhard's last year in power was his "Peace Note" initiative, through which the FRG offered to improve relations with Soviet Bloc countries, but excluding the GDR. This chapter will analyze the effect the peace note had on Yugo-West German relations, as well as the Yugo-East German relations, which entered a phase of stabilization in the mid-1960s, crowned by Tito's official state visit to East Berlin.

Chapter 7 (1966-1968) deals with the events leading up to, and including the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia in December 1968. The driving force behind it was Kiesinger's foreign minister, Willy Brandt. He instituted a significantly more lax reading of the Hallstein Doctrine than his predecessors, which allowed for the FRG and Yugoslavia to begin seriously contemplating reestablishing relations for the first time. This process culminated in January 1968 – eleven years after the FRG's implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine on Yugoslavia – when Yugoslavia and the FRG finally signed their agreement to reestablish diplomatic relations.

Chapter 1

No guarantees: Yugoslavia and the two Germanies (1955-1956)

On September 19, 1964, The Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Walter Ulbricht arrived in Belgrade by train. He was there to meet, for the first time as a head of state, the Yugoslav president Josip Broz-Tito.⁴¹ Although it was an unofficial visit – a stop on Ulbricht’s return from a state visit to Bulgaria – it fulfilled the East German leader’s long-standing wish to meet with Tito. After all, Yugoslavia was the first country outside of the Eastern Bloc to recognize the GDR, in 1957.⁴² During his toast at dinner at Tito’s Dedinje residence, Ulbricht praised the friendly Belgrade locals, who spontaneously approached him on the capital’s streets, and the gracious hosts. “In my opinion,” Ulbricht asserted, “it could not have been otherwise.”⁴³ In fact, the road to the Dedinje palace was anything but straightforward for the East Germans, and the relationship between both German states and Yugoslavia was a difficult one. The latter’s role in answering the German question was at times as complicated as the question itself. In order to understand why Yugoslavia decided to recognize the GDR and jeopardize its already advanced relations with the FRG, we must look at the relations between these three countries in the mid-1950s, and the series of events that facilitated the recognition.

41 Ulbricht and Tito most likely met in Moscow in the late 1930s, since both were living at the Hotel Lux, the infamous designated lodgings for international communists and the headquarters of the Communist Internationale (also known as the Comintern). Mario Frank, *Walter Ulbricht: Eine deutsche Biografie* (Siedler Verlag, 2009), e-book, “Leben im Lux.” Tito was living on the fourth floor of the hotel, and worked in the Balkan secretariat of the Comintern under Wilhelm Pieck, who was also the chairman of the German Communist party. Geoffrey Swain, *Tito: A Biography* (London ; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 16-20.

42 At that point in time, Yugoslavia remained the only non-communist country to recognize the GDR.

43 “Zdravica Valtera Ulbrihta na večeri u dvoru na Dedinju” (September 19, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8.

Ever since its creation in 1949, the German Democratic Republic had been pursuing international recognition. However, the years 1955-1956 were the turning point in this campaign. Early 1955 saw the GDR settled into a stable, albeit limited role as far as its foreign policy was concerned. In March 1954, the Soviet Union bequeathed sovereignty to the GDR, and the latter became a founding member of the newly formed Warsaw Pact in May of the following year. The integration of the GDR into the Eastern Bloc was thus solidified. Although East Berlin still paid lip service to German reunification, the de facto division of Germany – or “the two state theory,” as it was known – had been the preferred answer to the German question in Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership circles since 1953 at the latest.⁴⁴ Although this also meant that its foreign policy would continue to be constrained by Cold War realities, it was still more acceptable to the SED than a compromise with Bonn regarding reunification, which would have certainly resulted in the SED’s marginalization. The year 1955 was also important for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). After the failure of the European Defence Community the previous year, the FRG was made a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in May 1955.⁴⁵ Unlike the GDR, the FRG’s inclusion into a Cold War Bloc did not have an effect on its German policy, and Bonn continued to sincerely pursue reunification. Perhaps more importantly, its claim of being the sole legitimate representative for all of Germany was still at the heart of its foreign policy in 1955. In fact, in West German eyes, the negation of the GDR was a necessary prerequisite for reunification, even before the Hallstein doctrine made it policy, and West German diplomats were at times more than eager to warn any country about the

44 Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989. Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich: De Gruyter, 2007), p. 97.

45 For the demise of the European Defence Community and West Germany’s integration into NATO see David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

dangers of recognizing the GDR.⁴⁶ But generally, they lobbied throughout the non-aligned world against any kind of international endorsement of East Germany. In this respect, Yugoslavia was no exception. In this chapter I will trace Yugoslavia's shift towards the Soviet Bloc in 1955 and 1956, which opened the door for its recognition of the GDR, as well as the FRG's attempts to dissuade the Yugoslavs from doing so.

Early rapprochement between East Berlin and Belgrade

On January 14, 1955, the West German ambassador in Belgrade Hans Kroll met with the Yugoslav state undersecretary Aleš Bebler to discuss various issues.⁴⁷ One of them was East Germany's membership in the International Labour Organization. Bonn wanted Yugoslavia's support in blocking the East German access to this organization. Bebler was noncommittal, but added that Yugoslavia's position on the German question was well known, and that the West Germans had no reason to protest their policies so far.⁴⁸ Bebler was telling the truth. For example, when Tito visited Burma in January of 1955, he informed the Burmese prime minister U Nu that Yugoslavia had very good economic relations with the FRG, and that it was not against West German rearmament, as long as it was limited to self-defence capacities. Tito did add that he believed Germany would remain divided for the foreseeable future, but more as a

46 Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973: aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 19.

47 Bebler was one of the highest ranking Slovenes in the Yugoslav government during this period. He received a doctorate in international law from the Sorbonne. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War he joined the International Brigades. During the Second World War, he was one of the leaders of partisan resistance in Slovenia. After the war he held a number of positions in the Yugoslav diplomacy. "Bebler, Aleš (1907–1981) - Slovenska Biografija," accessed January 11, 2018, <http://www.slovenska-biografija.si/oseba/sbi1001800/>.

48 "Zabeleška," (January 14, 1955) AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 33.

judgment of Soviet intentions in Germany rather than an endorsement of the division.⁴⁹ It is also true that in early 1955 Yugoslavia had a far better relationship with the FRG than with the GDR. For one, it had established diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1951. It had also developed solid economic and cultural relations with the West Germans, and was in the process of negotiating an agreement regulating World War II reparations. On the other hand, the GDR had hardly any ties with Yugoslavia. However, this would soon start to change. By mid-1955, the rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia was well under way, and it would come to affect Yugoslavia's German policy in the near future. A Soviet delegation led by Nikita Khrushchev landed in Belgrade in May, eager to make amends for the 1948 split, and hopefully negotiate Yugoslavia's return to the fold.⁵⁰ Although Tito was much too shrewd to agree to the latter, he nevertheless welcomed a closer relationship with Moscow, preferably one that would not jeopardize his ties with the West. Conversely, Khrushchev could not return from his Canossa pilgrimage empty-handed. The result of the difficult talks was the Belgrade Declaration, which for the time being normalized the relations between the two countries, and paved the way for similar processes between Yugoslavia and the rest of the socialist camp.⁵¹

The newfound understanding between Moscow and Belgrade was mirrored in the Yugoslav view of the German question. A 1955 Yugoslav report stated that the existence of two Germanies was "an objective fact," a fact made even more palpable after the signing of the Paris Accords and the creation of the Warsaw Pact. The report also compared the Soviet German

49 "Zabeleška" (January 12, 1955), AJ, KPR I-2-4-2, doc. no. 506.

50 Khrushchev saw the split with Yugoslavia as one of Stalin's biggest errors, and the visit to Belgrade was more than a gesture of good will. In addition, Khrushchev wanted to use the visit to undermine his Politburo adversary Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the most vocal proponents of the split, who still opposed the rapprochement. William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man, His Era*. (London: Free Press, 2005), p. 267.

51 Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-57*, (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 109.

policy favourably against the Western one, arguing that at least the Soviets did not deny the existence of Western Germany, whereas the West denied the existence of the GDR and tried to suppress any attempts by the latter to act internationally.⁵² On the other hand, Belgrade had been slowly growing impatient with Bonn over their negotiations. Yugoslav officials believed that the West Germans were dragging their feet, themselves unhappy with Yugoslav demands, which they considered unrealistic.

With the relationship between Bonn and Belgrade seemingly stuck on the most important bilateral issue, the East Germans seized the chance the Belgrade Declaration gave them to improve their ties with Yugoslavia. Even before the Declaration was signed, East German diplomats in Prague approached their Yugoslav counterparts inquiring about the possibility of opening trade offices in Belgrade and East Berlin.⁵³ A few weeks later, a joint delegation of the GDR's Foreign Trade Ministry (*Ministerium für Außenhandel und Innerdeutschen Handel*, MAI) and the Foreign Trade Chamber (*Kammer für Außenhandel*, KfA) visited Belgrade in late June 1955 in search of improved trade relations. The East Germans suggested that the negotiations should take place between state level delegations with the opening of trade missions in Belgrade and East Berlin as the ultimate goal. Their hosts believed that the East Germans were getting ahead of themselves, citing the poor trade results so far.⁵⁴ The two countries signed a trade agreement worth four million dollars in 1954, but only a fraction had been fulfilled by mid-1955.⁵⁵ For comparison, West Germany was Yugoslavia's number one trade partner, with the former receiving over seventy percent of Yugoslavia's exports in 1954.⁵⁶

52 "Pitanje stava i odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom" (1955), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

53 "Gespräche unserer diplomatischen Vertreter in den befreundeten Staaten mit den dort anwesenden jugoslawischen Vertretern" (June 23, 1955), PA AA, MfAA, C 360/75, p. 156.

54 "Zabeleška" (June 27, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/81-1, p. 608.

55 "Pitanje stava i odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom" (undated, 1955), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

56 "Naši ekonomski odnosi sa Zapadnom Nemačkom" (April 6 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/82-2, p. 319.

Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were open to the East German suggestions. According to the Yugoslav report, the East Germans “could not hide their delight.”⁵⁷ Their reaction was not surprising. The meeting had taken place just weeks after Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, and now it seemed that the GDR had taken a giant step towards establishing a strong presence in a European country outside of their bloc.

To be sure, this was not the GDR’s first diplomatic success. Due to the Soviet influence in Finland, the East Germans had opened a trade mission in Helsinki in 1953. The Soviet influence was also strong enough to limit the West German presence in Finland, resulting with the Helsinki government accrediting a FRG trade mission but not a diplomatic outpost, thereby ensuring that both Germanies were treated equally.⁵⁸ The GDR had also made inroads outside of Europe, opening up a trade ministry office in Egypt and an office of the chamber of commerce in Burma in 1954.⁵⁹ However, having the opportunity to develop relations with Yugoslavia, with palpable results, was a matter of prestige considering Yugoslavia’s international position.

Alongside the trade delegation, representatives of the East German Film Company (DEFA) also visited Belgrade in late June. They arranged a deal with Jugoslavija Film, the state-owned cinema distribution company, to exchange a number of films. East Germans also planned to send a gymnastics team to an international competition in Ljubljana, and to invite the conductor of the Belgrade philharmonic to East Berlin. A first time showing at the Zagreb Trade

57 “Zabeleška” (June 27, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-B/81-1, p. 608. East Germans described the meeting as “cordial and friendly.” PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, P. 45.

58 William Glenn Gray, *Germany’s Cold War: the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), p. 18.

59 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 21. Of all the non-aligned countries, the GDR enjoyed the most advanced relations with Egypt. In fact, Egypt had been one of the few countries to initiate contact with the GDR, as far back as during King Farouk’s reign. First real trade exchanges followed in 1953, also quite earlier than other East German non-aligned contacts. Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, pp. 104-105.

Fair was also planned.⁶⁰ It seemed that the East Germans were taking full advantage of Khrushchev's nod.

West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer's visit to Moscow, however, overshadowed the successes in Belgrade. Khrushchev invited Adenauer to discuss establishing diplomatic relations, following the Four Powers summit in Geneva in July, where the Soviets sabotaged any prospect of a German reunification.⁶¹ Adenauer was ambivalent after the summit, writing Dulles that:

in my opinion the 1st Geneva conference showed that the Soviets do not understand a reasonable and normal language and that they are inaccessible for objective considerations. They are and remain convinced that communism will rule the world and that they are and shall stay to be the leaders of communism [sic]. Insofar the 1st Geneva conference will have a good effect [sic], if the free world is going to draw the necessary conclusions therefrom, as you have already said in a press interview.⁶²

From an East German perspective, although Khrushchev promised East Berlin that he would keep its interests in mind during his talks with Adenauer, they could not take this statement at face value.⁶³ The fact that their benefactors would negotiate with the Bonn government about their international status, without ensuring that the GDR could do the same with the other powers, showed that Moscow would circumvent East Berlin if it were beneficial to Soviet

60 "Jugoslawien" (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 45.

61 Steven Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 131.

62 *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI*, Eds. Roberta L. DiGangi, Lorraine Lees, Aaron Miller, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 39. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v26>

63 Johanna Granville, "Ulbricht in October 1956: Survival of the Spitzbart during Destalinization," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 3 (2006): 477-502, p. 482.

interests. This did not sit well with Ulbricht, but he could not sway the Soviets.⁶⁴ The Yugoslavs followed the Moscow talks closely. The head of the Yugoslav military mission in West Berlin, Dimitrijević, told a GDR Foreign Office official that he hoped that Adenauer would not be too successful in Moscow, as that would strengthen his presently weak position at home, and that he did not expect the talks to move beyond an exploratory level. However, Dimitrijević did not want to comment on the German question in the context of the talks.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the Yugoslav ambassador to West Germany, Mladen Iveković, saw the outcome of the Moscow talks as a Soviet victory.⁶⁶ The pro-Soviet tone in Iveković's report indicated Yugoslavia's position. Its alignment with the Soviet Union in regards to the German question was further revealed in a November 1955 letter from Tito to the Soviet leadership after a meeting with the US foreign secretary John Foster Dulles, held during a break of the Geneva Summit. Tito argued that East Germany, as a "new state formation," must be made part of the reunification processes. Tito added that the Western fear of East Germans spreading communism into the rest of the country in the case of a reunification was unfounded, and that East Germany could be the counterbalance to the revanchism in the West.⁶⁷ These statements suggested that the rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow, however guarded, would continue into 1956, and the GDR was eager to continue capitalizing on that.

The West Germans, on the other hand, were growing ever suspicious of Tito's intentions. There were fears in Bonn that after the Moscow talks other countries might begin to ignore the

64 Gerhard Wettig, "Adenauers Moskau-Besuch aus sowjetischer Sicht Wende der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik nach Stalins Tod," *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, 12 (2005), p. 198. Accessed October 29, 2017, <http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.7498/c>

65 (September 6, 1955) PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 65-66.

66 "Sporazum Moskva-Bonn o uspostavi diplomatskih odnosa" (September 26, 1955), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 19.

67 AJ, 507 IX 119/I, p. 45-60, as cited in: Vladimir Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija studije i dokumentarni prilozi* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010), p. 90.

FRG's sole representation claim, although Adenauer argued that nothing had changed in this respect.⁶⁸ These fears extended over the FRG's relations with Yugoslavia, and some believed that Belgrade was being diplomatic about the German question only because of the still ongoing reparation negotiations.⁶⁹ By the end of the year, these fears turned into policy. At the ambassadors' conference in Bonn on December 8, foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano, state secretary Walter Hallstein, and the head of the political department at the Foreign Office Wilhelm Grewe, presented their ideas to West German diplomats. In his talk, Grewe laid out a policy that would be strong enough to prevent any third country from recognizing East Germany. Central to the policy was the idea that any act of recognition was an "unfriendly act" towards the FRG, one that accepted the division of Germany, and thus undermined the FRG's claim to represent all of Germany. As a result, those countries would have to face consequences. Likewise, any East German attempts in this respect had to be blocked.

The Hallstein doctrine was conceived after Adenauer's visit to the USSR, whose diplomatic relations with both Germanies Bonn labelled as a singularity, and it wanted to keep it that way. The FRG's penalty for any country recognizing the GDR would be to immediately end diplomatic relations with it. Although its seeds originated in the Moscow visit, the doctrine seemed to have been developed with Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries in mind. Grewe was a pragmatist, and understood that the FRG could not completely isolate a territory with 17 million inhabitants, and therefore allowed the possibility of trade and traffic agreements between the GDR and third countries.⁷⁰ This decision was probably also influenced by the fact that several countries, including Yugoslavia, had already developed trade relations with the

68 Adenauer's speech in the Bundestag, (September 22, 1955), <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/02/02101.pdf>

69 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 40.

70 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, pp. 22-23.

GDR. Accordingly, the doctrine would not be implemented retroactively. In an interview following the ambassadors' conference, Grewe explained that it could not always be clear whether a recognition took place, and pointed out that there were several intermediate stages in appraising diplomatic actions, and that the reaction had to correspond to the gravity of the action in question.⁷¹ West Germany knew that it wanted to punish any country which acknowledged East German sovereignty, but it was not exactly sure what the punishment would be, barring a case of outright recognition. This was in part fuelled by West German fears that the East German campaign for recognition was gaining some momentum, as witnessed by India's, Yugoslavia's, and Egypt's vote to admit the GDR to UNESCO.⁷² Thus the Hallstein doctrine signalled to the third countries that they would have to tread carefully without knowing the boundaries. In other words, they would have to find the boundaries themselves. Yugoslavia was to be the first country to find, but also test these boundaries.

1956 – The year the gates opened

The year 1956 was one of the most tumultuous in the history of the Soviet bloc. The catalyst for the tumult was Khrushchev's 'secret speech' at the 20th Congress of the CPSU on February 25, in which he addressed and criticized the mistakes made during Stalin's reign. The Soviet leader's quasi-public denunciation of Stalinism signalled to the Soviet satellites that they too

71 "Zusammenfassung Interview Des Ministerialdirektors, Professor Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewe Mit Dem Chefredakteur Des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunk, Hans Wendt [Hallstein-Doktrin], 11. Dezember 1955 / Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, München)," accessed November 9, 2017, http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0019_hal&l=de.

72 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI*, Eds. Roberta L. DiGangi, Lorraine Lees, Aaron Miller, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 40. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v26>

might attempt a course correction of their own without repercussions. This belief was most prominently seized upon by the Poles and Hungarians, with disastrous results later that year. While the ‘secret speech’ and its effects dismayed the ever orthodox East German leadership because they endangered the cohesion of the bloc – and more importantly, their own position – they did not influence their relations with Yugoslavia. This course had been plotted with Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade the previous year, and it seemed that the turmoil within the bloc had no effect on it.

On January 20, 1956, Fritz Grosse, a senior official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, MfAA), sent the Ministry for Foreign and Intra-German Trade (*Ministerium für Außenhandel und Innerdeutschen Handel*, MAI) a memo about a meeting between the Yugoslav and East German ambassadors in Prague. The Yugoslavs proposed Prague as the official location for all future diplomatic contacts between the two countries. Grosse assessed this as a serious offer, and suggested that the MAI should also consider Prague for all future contacts with the Yugoslavs.⁷³ Yet from the East German perspective, the Yugoslavs were not moving fast enough. The GDR’s plans for 1956 aimed to build on the contacts established during the previous year, but at a pace which by the end of the year would result in the international recognition of the GDR, not just better trade or cultural relations, although these played an important part in the East German strategy. The list of tasks necessary to carry out this strategy was laid out in the 1956 annual plan composed by Herbert Barth, the head of the Yugoslav department at the MfAA.⁷⁴ These revolved mainly around preparing for the

73 Letter from Grosse to the MAI (January 20, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, pp. 129-130.

74 “Perspektivenplan” (January 23, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, pp. 133-139.

negotiations with Belgrade, such as collecting information on the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia, the potential reparation demands, and the Yugoslavs in the GDR; and selecting the appropriate staff for the future embassy in Belgrade. Other objectives included publishing propaganda material in Serbo-Croatian, both in print and on film, and distributing it in Yugoslavia. Connections in areas where there were no or very few contacts, such as sports, culture and the sciences were also to be intensified. Lastly, the mass and party organization contacts were to be intensified as well. The MfAA's plan was ambitious, especially since Barth petitioned for "a second staff member" to be added to the Yugoslav department, hinting at the lack of qualified personnel, one of the biggest problems faced by the MfAA in its early years.⁷⁵

The main thrust of the GDR's Yugoslav spring campaign was Ulbricht's March 20 letter to Tito, inviting him to send a delegation to the SED party congress taking place in East Berlin on 24-29 March.⁷⁶ This was significant due to the importance party connections held in the Communist world view. Ulbricht's timing left no room for manoeuvring, and the Yugoslavs had to decline the invitation. They responded with a short note thanking Ulbricht and expressing their best wishes for the congress. At the same time, the Yugoslav ambassador in Prague explained to his East German counterpart that since the two countries have not had any relations so far, sending a delegation would not be understood by the public in Yugoslavia or abroad, and that relations needed to develop gradually.⁷⁷ Ambassador Iveković met with Mihajlo Javorski over three days in early April to discuss the state of relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG. They concluded that it was now clear that the two countries did not have the same international interests and hence cannot act together. The Yugoslavs blamed this outcome on West German

75 Ibid.

76 Telegram from Ulbricht (March, 20, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

77 Letter from Vlahović to Mladen Iveković (March 23, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

insistence on sole representation. However, they did not see this as a barrier to their economic relations, which they presumed could grow substantially. Seemingly, their only concern was the ratification of the reparations agreement, which they hoped would happen before the summer break in the Bundestag, and were ready to use the full potential of the Bonn embassy to push for an early ratification. The Yugoslavs also discussed their position on the GDR. Their primary concern was the creation of some sort of official presence in East Berlin – most likely an outpost of the chamber of foreign trade – since the military mission in West Berlin was not suited for such a role. Apart from this office, the Yugoslavs also planned to open a diplomatic office by the end of the year, the title of which was not as important, as long as the Belgrade government had an official presence in East Berlin. The Yugoslavs were annoyed that even some NATO countries had better relations with the GDR than they did, something that they again blamed on the FRG, for delaying the ratification of the reparations agreement.⁷⁸ In the final analysis, the West Germans seemed to be a nuisance more than anything else, but Belgrade prescribed caution in Yugoslavia's dealings with the GDR.

For Yugoslavia, caution may have been the order of the day as far as high-level bilateral meetings with the East Germans were concerned, but contacts at lower levels were not avoided. At the meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (SEV) in Berlin in early June 1956, the East Germans approached the Yugoslav delegation for talks. It seemed that the East Germans invested a lot of effort into these meetings. Vljako Begović, one of the Yugoslav delegation members, reported to Tito that they had met with a large number of high ranking GDR officials, including Peter Florin, the head of the International Connections (*Internationale Verbindungen*) department of the SED, and the GDR prime minister Otto Grotewohl. The East

⁷⁸ "Zabeleška" by Mihajlo Javorski (undated), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, doc. no. 357/56.

Germans agreed with the Yugoslav stance on the German question (not expanded on in the report), and Grotewohl personally thanked the Yugoslavs for helping the GDR by expressing this stance in international fora. Trying to build on this, the East Germans pressed for closer ties on all levels. Most importantly, however, they were hoping that Yugoslavia could help them break through their international isolation. Primarily, they could help in setting up connections with West Germany, especially the Social Democrats. Furthermore, Yugoslavia could aid them in establishing ties with Asian countries, and facilitate exports outside the socialist camp. In exchange, the GDR offered technical aid, and suggested expanding bilateral trade. Lastly, the East Germans were also interested in cultural exchange, handing the Yugoslavs a list of over forty suggestions.⁷⁹

While the East German advances were in line with their annual plan, it is also important to note that Tito was visiting Moscow at the same time, which was perceived as the high point of Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, and the East Germans might have felt that events were developing in their favour.⁸⁰ Conversely, the West Germans were aware of the potentially damaging outcome of this meeting could have on their German policy. Therefore, the West German ambassador in Belgrade Karl-Georg Pfeleiderer met with Tito prior to the Yugoslav president's trip to Moscow. Pfeleiderer had hoped to persuade Tito to use his influence in Moscow to steer Khrushchev towards a more acceptable Soviet German policy.⁸¹ Pfeleiderer's appeal fell on deaf ears. Even if Tito had found Bonn's policy appealing, Khrushchev would not have been persuaded. During his talks with Tito, the Soviet leader was adamant that the GDR

79 "Izveštaj o razgovorima u Istočnoj Nemačkoj i preduzetim merama" (June 3, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1.

80 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 152.

81 Dragan Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike: 1956-1961* (Beograd: Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju, 2006), pp. 118-119.

must be made the “showcase” of the socialist world, and that the Soviets would pour all necessary aid into East Germany to do so. The East German leadership undoubtedly understood that achieving a favourable result with the Yugoslavs would be easier with the weight of the Soviet support in their corner, now that the Soviets and the Yugoslavs seemed to have made amends.

After their meetings in East Berlin, the Yugoslav delegation devised a set of general guidelines in response to the East German proposals. The most important detail of this plan was the item pertaining to the renewal of their trade agreement. According to the Yugoslavs, initially it would be renewed at the level of the Chambers of Commerce, but as soon as the reparations agreement with the FRG was ratified by the Bundestag, the agreement would be raised to the state level, at least in its content.⁸² The wording here shows that the Yugoslav leadership was still not bold enough to predict a recognition of the GDR in the near future, but still certain enough that it would have more leeway with the West Germans after they ratified the agreement. Barth wrote a similar assessment of these meetings, but pointed out that creating mass and party organization links should perhaps be postponed until a more opportune moment. Since this was one of the main objectives in Barth’s annual plan, this decision can be attributed to Yugoslav caution.⁸³

Several days after his return from the SEV meeting, Begović wrote to Heinrich Rau, the GDR trade minister, informing him that Belgrade agreed with what was discussed in East Berlin. Begović repeated the main ideas in the Yugoslav guidelines, and also informed Rau that the Yugoslavs had contacted the West Germans to probe them about the possibility of

82 “Izveštaj o razgovorima...”

83 “Bemerkungen zu Jugoslawien” (June 1, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 180.

establishing direct lines of communication between the two Germanies. According to Begović, Bonn categorically refused to talk to the GDR leadership, namely Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and especially the GDR minister of justice, who's name Begović could not remember.⁸⁴ Begović did not mention whether the West Germans suggested any alternative interlocutors.⁸⁵

At this time the equilibrium of relations between the two Germanies and Yugoslavia seemed to be shifting irrevocably in the GDR's favour. On June 19, towards the end of his visit to Moscow, Tito gave a speech at the Dynamo football stadium. Despite the volatile nature of the talks, Tito decided not to antagonize Khrushchev. The Soviet leader, who spoke before Tito, "used the occasion to launch an exceptionally vitriolic attack on the West." Tito did not contradict him in his speech. In general, Tito avoided any public manifestation of a discord between the two leaders during his stay in Moscow, even though more than a few chances to do so arose. Tito's motivation here was to not undermine Khrushchev's position, which he knew was under attack by a Politburo faction.⁸⁶ However, Tito's remarks on the German question during his Dynamo stadium speech were all his own.⁸⁷ He asserted that the question of German reunification must be seen through the lens of the factual state of affairs, which was that there were now two German states.⁸⁸ This position, a staple of Yugoslav internal discussions but never

84 The minister of justice at this time was Hilde Benjamin, who was vilified in the West for her role in the show trials following the 1953 uprising in the GDR. More on Benjamin in: Marianne Brentzel, *Die Machtfrau: Hilde Benjamin 1902-1989* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2013).

85 Dušan Nećak, *Hallsteinova Doktrina i Jugoslavija: Tito Između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004), p. 99.

86 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 160.

87 Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine: 1956-1958*. (Zagreb: Liber, 1977), p. 89. There is also no evidence that Khrushchev pressured Tito into promising to recognize the GDR within a year, as claimed by Marc Christian Theurer. Marc Christian Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin: die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu Jugoslawien im Vergleich, 1957-1968* (Berlin: Logos-Verlag, 2008), p. 25. Cf. Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man, His Era*, p. 334.

88 "Information" (October 12, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, C 360/75, p. 109.

expressed publicly until late May, delighted the East Germans. Unsurprisingly, the West Germans were even more irritated.

On the evening of Tito's Dynamo stadium speech, ambassador Pfleiderer met with the Yugoslav state undersecretary for foreign affairs Dobrivoje Vidić to discuss the Yugoslav president's statements in Moscow. He "was not pleased" with Tito's words regarding Yugoslavia's position on the German reunification, which Tito had described as being "similar" to the Soviet position. Pfleiderer wanted to know whether "similar" meant the same thing as "identical," in which case Yugoslavia would not find much understanding in Bonn, not even from the socialists. He added that he would soon be consulting with Brentano regarding Tito's Moscow visit. Vidić described Pfleiderer as being "dramatic" for alluding to the possibility of a civil war in Germany.⁸⁹ Immediately prior to his trip to West Germany, Pfleiderer met with another state undersecretary, Srđan Prica. This time Pfleiderer was more diplomatic. He asked his host whether Yugoslavia was responsible for the positive aspects of the Tito-Khrushchev joint statement, such as the call for foreign powers to be proactive in the reunification process. Prica answered affirmatively, but in their conversation added that Yugoslavia could recognize the GDR, but chooses not to in the current political climate, which might endanger Belgrade's relationship with the West. In short, Prica added, the Yugoslavs were being realistic. Although this answer could not have pleased Pfleiderer since it left the door wide open for the recognition of the GDR, Prica reported that this answer satisfied the West German ambassador.⁹⁰ But even if Pfleiderer was satisfied, Bonn most certainly was not.

89 "Zabeleška" (June 19, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 598.

90 "Zabeleška" (June 23, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 614.

On June 30, after returning to Belgrade, Pfleiderer informed the Yugoslavs that all parties in the Bundestag were now linking the ratification of the reparations agreement with the Yugoslav position on Germany. The Yugoslavs were “surprised and unhappy” with this development and saw no logic behind it.⁹¹ The feigned surprise was certainly diplomatic posturing, since by now all sides involved were aware that the only thing keeping Yugoslavia from recognizing the GDR was the ratification of the agreement. A week later, Pfleiderer tried to ameliorate the tense situation. He informed undersecretary Prica that the delay in ratifying the agreement was a result of other parliamentary debates that simply took up more time than expected. He added that the agreement will most likely be ratified within the next two months, and that it would help if he could meet with Tito.⁹²

Pfleiderer was most likely acting on orders from Bonn, where a few days earlier Adenauer’s cabinet discussed the agreement. Walter Hallstein was present at the meeting, and provided five courses of action: to condition the agreement with the non-recognition of the GDR; to reject the agreement altogether; to delay the ratification until after the Bundestag elections; to ratify the agreement after a satisfactory statement from Tito about Yugoslavia’s intentions regarding the recognition of the GDR; and to ratify the agreement but declare the non-recognition as the basis for the agreement’s fulfillment [without making it legally binding]. Hallstein himself suggested the last option as the most suitable, reflecting his longstanding belief that trust had to be built mutually, and in this case he was willing to show Yugoslavia that the FRG trusted it.⁹³ The cabinet did not make a decision that day, but agreed that there must be

91 “Zabeleška” (June 30, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 669.

92 “Zabeleška” (July 9, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 698.

93 Lothar Lahn, “Walter Hallstein as State Secretary” in Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels, (eds.), *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?* (London: New York: Macmillan Press; St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 28.

no delay in the ratification, and that it would be best if Hallstein spoke in the Bundestag and persuaded the members of this necessity.⁹⁴ Undersecretary Prica was not convinced by ambassador Pflleiderer's explanation and acted aloof during the meeting, which ended unsatisfactorily for both parties.⁹⁵ This was the first signal that the relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia were taking a sharp turn for the worse, beyond a disagreement and towards a serious rift.

In the week following Tito's visit to Moscow, the MfAA evaluated Yugoslavia's current position as a positive development. Their report asserted that Yugoslavia now assumed that there were two sovereign states on German territory, the GDR and the FRG. The report also pointed out that Tito even signed a joint statement with Khrushchev in which East Germany was referred to by its full official name. Although Tito's position on the actual act of reunification was vague, the report pointed to a statement by the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koča Popović.⁹⁶ When asked by a reporter whether Tito supported an all-German election – which was a West German suggestion for solving the German question – Popović answered that Tito would have said so if that were the case.⁹⁷ From the East German perspective, Yugoslavia had not only unofficially just recognized the GDR, but also became an international advocate for its

94 "142. Kabinettsitzung am 4. Juli 1956", accessed November 7, 2017 at <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/index.html>

95 "Zabeleška" (July 9, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, p. 698.

96 Konstantin "Koča" Popović was one of the outstanding personalities of the Yugoslav leadership. Born to a wealthy Serbian family, he spent his childhood in Switzerland, and studied law in Belgrade, and philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he became active in the Surrealist movement. During his studies in Paris, he also became a communist, and joined the Spanish Republican Army when the Spanish Civil War broke out (this was unusual, as most international fighters on the Republican side joined the International Brigades). He joined the Yugoslav partisans shortly after the Germans defeated the Yugoslav Royal Army, and quickly became their most competent commander, according to Tito. He left the Yugoslav Army in 1953 to take over as the foreign minister, a position he held until 1965. "Obituary: Koca Popovic," *The Independent*, October 31, 1992, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-koca-popovic-1560672.html>.

97 "Zur Haltung Jugoslawiens hinsichtlich der Deutschlandfrage" (June 23, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 1-5.

recognition, finally granting them a foot in the door of the non-aligned world.⁹⁸ Following this realization, the report concluded with a proposal for the next step, namely to persuade other statesmen to publicly endorse the GDR in the same way Tito did, and to ask the Yugoslav leader to assist the East Germans in this undertaking, starting with his upcoming summit meeting with the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, at his summer residence on the Brioni islands in early July.⁹⁹

Equipped with the belief that Yugoslavia had the potential to initiate a recognition domino effect in Asia and Africa, Ulbricht wrote to Tito in the hopes of kick-starting this process. In his appeal, he linked the German question to the principles of the Bandung Conference.¹⁰⁰ The East German leader explained that the GDR shared those same principles.¹⁰¹ In addition, Grotewohl wrote to Nasser and Nehru. He repeated the same themes from Ulbricht's letter, urging them to stand with the "peace-loving forces of the German people" and by doing so help shape the future of Europe.¹⁰² The letters did not have the desired effect. The three non-aligned leaders prioritized other topics, such as disarmament and the situation in the Middle East, but even here they were cautious in their statements, partially as a result of the nature of non-alignment, but also a reflection of the three leaders' inability to agree on some of the non-

98 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 61.

99 "Zur Haltung Jugoslawiens..."

100 The Bandung Conference took place in April 1955. Most of the participating states were former colonies, and many of them feared that the new world order, ushered in with the creation of the United Nations guided by the permanent members of its Security Council, would not be dissimilar to the colonial system which the new states had only recently started dismantling. The Conference was conceived the previous year during a meeting between the prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia, and its aim was to harness the potential of the new states and claim their position as legitimate political actors not only in Africa and Asia, but globally as well. The magnitude of the conference was not lost on the GDR. Some of the principles espoused by the organizers – self-determination, peace, international cooperation – were shared by the East Germans, at least in theory. The GDR did attempt to introduce the German question into the Conference's proceedings, but was unsuccessful due to various factors, not least due to its almost non-existent diplomatic presence in Asia.

101 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 61.

102 Letter from Grotewohl to Nasser and Nehru (July 6, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 776 and 777.

aligned issues. Hence, a strong position on Germany could not have been expected. In the summit joint statement, the German question was addressed carefully, as a “question [that] should be solved in conformity with the wishes of the German people by peaceful negotiated settlements.”¹⁰³ Although by this time the GDR had made substantial contacts with the non-aligned world, the reduction of the German question to a platitude at the Brioni summit showed that the East Germans still could not seriously penetrate the agenda of the Global South, even when their efforts were framed within the non-aligned ideology.

Regardless of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Brioni summit, the GDR’s relationship with Yugoslavia seemed to have reached a new peak in the summer of 1956. Prior to the talks in Moscow, the Soviets had promised to assist Yugoslavia develop its aluminum production. Tito had made it clear that he wanted this agreement to be settled bilaterally, rather than through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), in order to preserve its non-alignment.¹⁰⁴ Although unable to bring Comecon into the deal, the Soviets chose to pressure Tito into allowing the GDR to sign the treaty as a co-creditor. It is unclear whether this idea originated in East Berlin or Moscow, since the East German economy could hardly afford to take part in an international operation worth 700 million rubles.¹⁰⁵ The Yugoslavs attempted to avoid the inclusion of the GDR, and when confronted by ambassador Mićunović, the East Germans themselves did not object to Yugoslavia’s reasons for leaving them out.¹⁰⁶ However, the Soviets kept increasing the credit amounts for the East Germans, while decreasing the size of the loan promised to the Yugoslavs. Thus the East Germans clearly accepted their role in this triangle,

103 “Joint Statement by the President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of India” (July 19, 1956), AJ, KPR I-3-c/2.

104 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 152.

105 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 163.

106 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 110.

using their position to their advantage. The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow Veljko Mićunović saw this as a transparent ploy to force Yugoslavia into closer ties with East Germany by making the latter the former's debtor.¹⁰⁷ Ultimately, the Soviet pressure was too strong for the Yugoslavs in dire need of foreign aid. The aluminum production in particular was crucial for Yugoslavia, as it was a prerequisite for developing its own arms industry, another aspect of non-alignment pursued by Tito.¹⁰⁸ On August 1, the tripartite treaty between the USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia was signed in Moscow.

When the news of the agreement reached Bonn, the West Germans were incensed and demanded an explanation through their embassy in Belgrade. Ambassador Pfleiderer was away due to illness, and his place was taken by an interim chargé, Herbert Müller-Roschach. In his meeting with state undersecretary Vidić, he voiced Bonn's biggest concern over the treaty, which was whether the treaty was an indirect act of recognition of the GDR, since it was signed by an East German government representative.¹⁰⁹ The West Germans asserted that this would have negative implications on the ratification of the reparations agreement, and rob the future of the Yugo-West German relations of a "healthy political basis." Vidić answered that the only reason the East German signatory was a member of the government was because of the centralized nature of Eastern Bloc economies, where all decision-making power lay in the hands of the government. Hence, this signature was a mere technicality, and not intended to prejudice an act of recognition. Vidić added that given Yugoslavia's foreign policy, the recognition of the GDR would be "quite natural," but that Belgrade chose not to do so out of consideration towards the FRG. It would be unrealistic of Bonn to expect Yugoslavia to conduct its foreign

107 Ibid.

108 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 171.

109 The East German signatory was Fritz Selbmann, the deputy prime minister at the time.

policy guided only by West German wishes. Interestingly, Müller-Roschach then assured the Yugoslavs that the Bonn government would continue endorsing the ratification of their agreement. By saying so, Müller-Roschach framed the delay of the ratification of the agreement as a conflict between the government and the Bundestag, which was misleading, but bought Adenauer more time.

Another West German concern was the Yugoslav trade mission in East Berlin. The West Germans were hopeful that Yugoslavia could follow Egypt and India's example.¹¹⁰ These two countries had agreed to open trade missions in East Berlin and allowed the East Germans to open their missions in Cairo and New Delhi, which the East Germans did. However, the Indians and the Egyptians did not follow up on their end of the bargain, and avoided opening their respective missions in East Berlin.¹¹¹ Ultimately, the Yugoslavs did not offer a response to this plea.¹¹² Although the reparations agreement gave Bonn a strong position in the stand-off with the Yugoslavs, this meeting gave the impression of a West Germany almost resigned to Yugoslavia sliding towards East German recognition. This can partially be attributed to Müller-Roschach's inexperience, since he had only arrived in Belgrade a couple of weeks earlier. However, he had also undoubtedly been instructed by Bonn prior to his arrival. Regardless of the reasons, it seemed that Bonn could do nothing else but wait and see.

With the tripartite treaty signed, the East Germans' attitude to Yugoslavia evolved in a more positive direction. A short MfAA report on the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia asserted that the latter are very interested in establishing diplomatic relations.¹¹³ The MfAA's

110 "Zabeleška" (August 23, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, doc. no. 914.

111 The Egyptians would go on to open a trade mission in East Berlin in 1957. Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 108.

112 "Zabeleška" (August 23, 1956), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-2, doc. no. 914.

113 "Stand der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der FVRJ" (August 31, 1956), PA AA, MfAA, A 4982, p. 200.

annual 1957 plan for Yugoslavia echoes this sentiment. Although it was the same goal as the previous year, the language used to describe Yugoslavia was much friendlier, with it referred to as a socialist country, a description previously reserved only for the Eastern Bloc countries, whereas Yugoslavia was often labelled capitalist in older reports. The plan cited the Moscow Declaration as the foundation for the recognition, and although shorter than the one for 1956, the plan for 1957 seemed more realistic, if only because the East Germans could now refer back to public statements made by Tito endorsing the GDR's statehood. Furthermore, economic ties now also had a concrete foundation in the aluminum treaty. Compared to this, other areas of economic interest in the plan seemed well within reach, unlike the previous year's plan, which read more like a "wish list" than a realistic diplomatic road map.¹¹⁴

As important as Yugoslavia's recognition was on a state level, a people's democracy's diplomatic relations with another socialist country could not be complete without official party connections. Hence, the SED believed that the time was ripe to negotiate an official agreement with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), something that both sides had been discussing since June 1956.¹¹⁵ On August 28, SED Central Committee member and head of its Foreign Affairs department Peter Florin wrote his counterpart in the SKJ Veljko Vlahović and inquired whether the SKJ would be willing to host him in Belgrade and establish contact. Despite the confidence the East Germans might have felt at this point in time, Florin suggested that the talks be held in secret.¹¹⁶ For good measure, and in his capacity as the First Secretary of

114 Nećak, *Hallsteinova Doktrina i Jugoslavija*, p. 97.

115 Ibid., p. 100.

116 Letter from Florin to Vlahović (August 28, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69, p. 194/56.

the SED, Ulbricht himself wrote Tito on this matter and repeated the request.¹¹⁷ The Yugoslav response was affirmative, and the meeting was scheduled for the week of September 25.¹¹⁸

Florin and Fritz Müller, the head of the SED Central Committee's department of finances, arrived in Belgrade not only with the intention to establish party connections, but to also set the groundwork for mass organization cooperation, and to discuss the "problems of German politics," hinting at the increasingly unavoidable issue that was the German question.¹¹⁹ Florin and Müller met with Vlahović and Begović on September 26. The minutes of their meeting showed that Yugoslavia saw the GDR's "specific position" as no real obstacle on the path towards the GDR's recognition. Yugoslavia would have preferred the recognition to be a multilateral move, hopefully made with Egypt and India, but if that could not be engineered then Belgrade would probably go it alone.¹²⁰ As in the past, the Yugoslavs indicated their current relations with the FRG as the only real roadblock, and pointed out that the timing of the recognition should be such as to provide maximum benefit for both the GDR and Yugoslavia.¹²¹

While most of the Yugoslav position was acceptable to Florin, he added that the GDR wanted the recognition to have an effect on the FRG as well. Specifically, the East Germans wanted to use the recognition to manipulate the West German elections in late fall of 1957, in order to remove Adenauer from power. For this purpose the recognition should take place in the spring of 1957. The East Germans were operating under the assumption that Adenauer planned to recognize several socialist countries before the election, a move that, according to Florin, would help him win. The GDR's recognition would therefore not only undermine Adenauer's

117 Letter from Ulbricht to Tito (September 4, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

118 Note from Vlahović (September 13, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

119 "Zabeleška" (September 26, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

efforts to improve relations with the Eastern Bloc, but also “break the illusion” that a German reunification on his terms would ever be possible. Florin added that East Berlin was keen on group recognition only because of the West German elections.¹²² Florin and Müller met with Vlahović and Begović once again at the end of their visit to Yugoslavia, this time to officially ask for an exchange of party delegations before the end of the year, which the Yugoslavs rejected on the grounds of an already full schedule, and any further cooperation would have to continue after the New Year.¹²³

For Yugoslavia, the more immediate concern was the situation in Hungary in late 1956. The Soviet Union could no longer tolerate the reformist movement and the popular revolt which threatened Moscow’s stranglehold on the country, and the effects of the uprising would undoubtedly also have an effect on Yugoslavia.¹²⁴ Tito was initially sympathetic to Imre Nagy, the ousted Hungarian prime minister whom Moscow removed in 1955 for pushing de-Stalinisation too far for their liking, leaving Mátyás Rákosi, the Stalinist chairman of the Hungarian Communist Party, in control. According to one Yugoslav report, Nagy survived that crisis mostly due to Tito’s public support.¹²⁵ Despite this, Tito also instructed his diplomats in Budapest to closely monitor the activities of the more moderate Communists such as János

122 Ibid.

123 “Zabeleška” (October 2, 1956), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69.

124 On the Hungarian Revolution, see Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford, Calif, 2006); Csaba Békés, “Cold War, Detente, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, (eds.), *The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality,” *Cold War History* 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 477–500; László Eörsi, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Myths and Realities* (Boulder; New York: East European Monographs, 2006); On the connections between the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis, see Peter G. Boyle, “The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis,” *History* 90, no. 300 (October 2005): 550–65.

125 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat: ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014), p. 210.

Kádár and István Kovács, who were “anti-Rákosi” rather than “pro-Nagy.”¹²⁶ This indicated that Tito was invested in an acceptable ending to the Hungarian crisis, but not one which necessarily involved Nagy. In any case, Tito was careful not to let his support for the anti-Stalinist forces in Hungary get in the way of rapprochement with Moscow. As the Hungarians pushed for Nagy’s reinstatement, Tito avoided making any comments on the situation in Hungary during his meetings with Khrushchev in the first half of 1956, despite the rumours circulating in Moscow that Tito demanded the removal of Rákosi. According to the rumour, which ambassador Mićunović recorded in his diary, Tito also demanded the removal of Walter Ulbricht.¹²⁷ While these claims were fabricated, they spoke to the Soviet perception of Tito as a disruptive maverick. In fact, Tito was not that reckless. He found both Rákosi and Ulbricht odious, but he did not directly lobby for their removal. The Soviets themselves decided that Rákosi’s position was untenable, but they replaced him with another Stalinist, Ernő Gerő, whom the Yugoslavs found no different than Rákosi. When Khrushchev presented Tito with the Soviet decision to crush the revolt, the Yugoslav leader could only accept the *fait accompli*. More importantly, Tito did not want to provoke the Soviet leader at a moment when he was ordering a military intervention in a neighbouring country, and tried to avoid providing his critics in the Soviet Bloc with more reasons to pin him as the inspiration for the reformists in Hungary, a claim which was not unfounded.¹²⁸ In the final analysis, the Hungarian Revolution pushed Yugoslavia further into the Soviet orbit, and by extension closer to the GDR, even though the Soviet intervention in Hungary showed the Yugoslavs that any real reconciliation was impossible as long as Moscow was willing to exercise total control over its satellites.

126 Ibid., p. 209.

127 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 99.

128 Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat*, p. 238.

The East Germans, for their part, were not as concerned with the Yugoslav role in the Hungarian Revolution or the events in Poland for several reasons. The first was the Yugoslav self-restraint in commenting on these events, especially in the case of Hungary, since the Hungarian Revolution deviated from a ‘different road to socialism,’ and veered toward its complete rejection, a development which horrified even Tito.¹²⁹ In regards to Poland, the events there were far less worrisome to the Yugoslavs than the Hungarian Revolution. This was not only because of the geographic distance between Yugoslavia and Poland, but also because the new Polish leadership under Władysław Gomułka was not a direct threat to the integrity of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet hegemony, demonstrated by Gomułka’s attempts to placate Khrushchev, something the Soviet leader could not expect from the Hungarians.¹³⁰ Besides, Gomułka sided with the rest of the Warsaw Pact members in describing the Hungarian Revolution as “counterrevolutionary.”¹³¹

The second reason was that the Yugoslav position regarding the German question was enough to counteract any desire to criticize Tito. The prospect of Yugoslav recognition was simply too enticing to bring up old animosities.¹³² Furthermore, Yugoslavia and the GDR were also in agreement over the Suez Crisis.¹³³ Both countries strongly criticized France, United

129 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 65.

130 Gomułka promised that Poland wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union instead of jeopardizing them “impressed” Khrushchev because of its “earnestness.” Krzysztof Persak, “The Polish – Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Military Intervention in Poland,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (December 2006): 1285–1310, p. 1293.

131 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 157.

132 Granville, “Ulbricht in October 1956: Survival of the Spitzbart during Destalinization,” p. 493.

133 On the Suez Crisis, see Cole C. Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1995); Mott Golani, *Israel in Search of War: The Sinai Campaign 1955-1956* (Brighton ; Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 1998); Ralph Dietl, “Suez 1956: A European Intervention?,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (April 2008): 259–78. Simon C. Smith, (ed.), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath*, 1 edition (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2008); Guy Laron, *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle Over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956* (Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Pr, 2013).

Kingdom, and Israel for their military intervention in Egypt in October 1956, following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.¹³⁴ However, while the East Germans toed the Soviet line, the Yugoslavs were more concerned with the survival of Nasser, a key non-aligned partner. They supported the Egyptian President in the UN, which drew the ire of the Western Powers.¹³⁵ Furthermore, by supporting Egypt, Yugoslavia aligned itself with the GDR in regards to Israel, which amplified Yugoslavia's divergence from the West.¹³⁶ Regardless of their motives, both countries supported the same outcome of the Suez Crisis, namely the retreat of all foreign troops from Egyptian territory, which precluded any East German criticism of Yugoslavia.

Conclusion

The period between early 1955 and the end of 1956 signified a shift in Yugoslavia's relations towards the GDR and the FRG. The key element in this shift was the thaw between Moscow and Belgrade, initiated by Khrushchev as part of the de-Stalinization process. The Yugoslavs were socialists, and good relations with Moscow were a desired and valuable goal, but not only from an ideological perspective. Yugoslavia was in need of foreign aid, and the Soviets promised to support Yugoslavia with large loans, specifically for developing its aluminum industry. While Khrushchev was keen to rebuild relations with Yugoslavia, he was also intent on making the GDR the "showpiece" of the Eastern Bloc, and convinced Tito to

134 The East Germans took advantage of the conflict to open an office of a "permanent special envoy" in Cairo, established under the guise of managing humanitarian aid from the GDR. However, the office remained long after the war had ended. Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, pp. 110-111.

135 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 130.

136 *Ibid.*, p. 137. For more on the two Germanys and Israel in the early Cold War see: Lorena De Vita, "Overlapping Rivalries: The Two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War," *Cold War History* 17, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 351-66.

accept the GDR as a co-creditor for the loan. The tripartite agreement had a three-fold purpose for the Soviets. It brought Yugoslavia closer to Moscow, while at the same time promoting the GDR to the position of an economic powerhouse, capable of crediting other countries, ignoring the fact that the GDR's share of the credit was financed by the Soviets in full. The third benefit was the reconciliation between East Berlin and Belgrade, after years of animosity and mistrust. To be sure, the rapprochement was superficial, and these feelings continued to fester beneath the surface.

The FRG's foreign policy during this period showed that the West Germans were still not sure how to maintain the GDR's international isolation, at least in regards to Yugoslavia. For all its economic power, the FRG could not use it as leverage against Yugoslavia, which refused to profess long-term commitment to not recognizing the GDR. The West Germans were hoping that Yugoslavia would recognize the benefits of maintaining good relations between them, but their efforts were milder than the Hallstein doctrine would suggest, which allowed the Yugoslavs to continue forging closer relations with the GDR.

While the SED delegation was in Belgrade negotiating the seemingly bright future of the GDR-Yugoslav relations, the West German parliament finally ratified the reparations agreement. With a vote of 236 for and 96 against, the West Germans opted to act in good faith, shifting the onus on Yugoslavia.¹³⁷ This was a precarious position, since prior statements from Belgrade never suggested that a desirable outcome for the FRG was forthcoming, but simply that there will be no recognition at this particular point in time. There were no guaranties that Yugoslavia would continue holding this position in 1957.

¹³⁷ "Ratifizierungsgesetz zum deutsch-jugoslawischen Vertrag von Bundestag verabschiedet" [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: September, P. 131. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 9996 (cf. AdG Bd. 2, P. 1796)]

Chapter 2

Whose Success? Yugoslavia's Recognition of the GDR in 1957

On a cold January 1957 evening in East Berlin, crowds gathered at *Ostbahnhof* on a platform decorated with flowers. A military band played the German Democratic Republic's anthem as an East German delegation boarded the night train to Moscow.¹³⁸ Led by Walter Ulbricht, the delegation was travelling to meet the Soviets in the wake of the Hungarian revolution and amidst a Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership feud. The fanfare sent off a strong delegation: Ulbricht was accompanied by Otto Grotewohl and other top GDR officials, including foreign minister Lothar Bolz. The high ranking group was travelling to Moscow to discuss a plethora of important issues with their Soviet patrons, ranging from regulating the international use of GDR's airspace to negotiating a new Soviet loan.¹³⁹ In addition, the East Germans were to meet with a Chinese delegation, led by Premier Zhou Enlai. On the margins of this important visit, at a dinner party the East Germans organized at their embassy, Grotewohl and Ulbricht approached ambassador Mićunović. While Grotewohl was courteous, Ulbricht bluntly asked Mićunović whether Yugoslavia intended to recognize the GDR in the same way it recognized the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁴⁰ Mićunović answered vaguely, saying that Yugoslavia, and any other country interested in a peaceful solution, will make the right decision in this matter, an answer which did not satisfy the East German leader. Never known for his subtlety, Walter Ulbricht's

138 "Regierungsdelegation nach Moskau" *Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR)*, January 2, 1957, p. 1.

<http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?id=view1&purl=SNP2532889X-19570102-0-1-6-0>

139 (January 8, 1957), *Archiv der Gegenwart*, p. 1846.

140 "Zabeleška" (January 10, 1957), *AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1*, p. 38.

outburst was not well received in Belgrade, especially since this encounter was reported by *Neues Deutschland*, the SED party organ, painting Yugoslavia in a unfavourable light.¹⁴¹

What had changed in the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia in the short period between Peter Florin's visit to Belgrade in late September and the dinner at the East German embassy? Certainly, the Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia regarding the handling of the Polish crisis and the Hungarian Revolution left a bitter taste in Tito's mouth.¹⁴² Ambassador Mićunović noted in his diary on January 10 that it was obvious that the Soviet-Yugoslav relations had deteriorated because of Hungary. To Mićunović it seemed that Moscow was willing to honour all of its economic agreements, including the latest one with the GDR, except the ones with Yugoslavia, and that Moscow was willing to elevate this latest rift to an international level.¹⁴³

Ulbricht must have been in two minds over this development. On the one hand, Yugoslavia's unwillingness to adopt the Soviet position vis-à-vis Hungary vindicated the East Germans' view of Yugoslavs as pseudo-communists. On the other, the possibility of Yugoslavia recoiling from its rapprochement with the Soviet Bloc would jeopardize the prospect of East Germany's recognition. Given his opinion on Yugoslavia, and despite a low in relations not seen since 1954, Ulbricht was not about to become pragmatic. January 1957 was the point in time when Ulbricht decided to use the aluminum treaty to blackmail the Yugoslavs into recognizing the GDR.¹⁴⁴ This decision was probably an option since the treaty's inception, but the immediate cause was the Yugoslav reparation agreement with the FRG, which the East Germans believed

141 "Erlauschtes aus einem Gespräch Walter Ulbrichts mit dem jugoslawischen Botschafter" *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, GDR), January 9, 1957, p. 8. <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19570109-0-3-103-0>

142 Tito voiced his disagreement with the Soviet intervention in a speech made in the Croatian town of Pula on November 11, 1956. The speech was made public a few days later.

143 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 222.

144 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 163.

signified the Yugoslav pendulum swinging toward Bonn. In addition, Ulbricht had survived the turmoil of 1956 and had consolidated his power, which gave him emboldened him to take more decisive action against Belgrade.¹⁴⁵ The Yugoslavs had just ratified the agreement with the FRG in early January, and the East Germans realized that only strong pressure could force Belgrade to fulfill what East Berlin believed was promised to them.¹⁴⁶ In early February, a Yugoslav delegation visited East Berlin in order to sign a new trade agreement between the two countries valued at 12 million US dollars. Initially, the agreement was supposed to be signed by chamber of commerce representatives, but at the last moment the East Germans insisted that it be signed on a governmental level. Their bluff backfired. The Yugoslavs were angered, and left East Berlin without having signed the agreement.¹⁴⁷ But Ulbricht was also not keen on destroying his relationship with Yugoslavia, and apologized to the Yugoslavs shortly afterwards via a representative of the GDR foreign trade office in Belgrade.¹⁴⁸

The East German apology was merely an interlude. The Yugoslav ambassador in Prague, Marko Nikezić, was one of Yugoslavia's best and brightest diplomats and would later become its foreign minister (1965-1968). He met with his East German counterpart Bernard Koenen in early March after the latter's return from consultations with Ulbricht. Ulbricht's message to the Yugoslavs was more nuanced than during his exchange with ambassador Mićunović in Moscow, but still barbed. But most of all, it was symptomatic of the GDR's conflicting and inconsistent policy towards Yugoslavia. Koenen opened the meeting with Ulbricht's apology about the mistreatment of the Yugoslav trade delegation at the hands of the East German authorities. The

145 Gareth Dale, *Popular Protest in East Germany*, p. 70.

146 Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*, pp. 111-112.

147 Ibid., pp.112-113.

148 "Zabeleška" (February 18, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, p. 196.

next point was Ulbricht's suggestion to negotiate a trade agreement on a ministerial level, which in itself was a reiteration of previous East German demands, but this time they included a veiled warning, adding that it would not be in Yugoslavia's interest to decline this proposition. The final item during this meeting was a note from the GDR government asking for Yugoslav support in its campaign to become an observer at the European Economic Commission and thanking them for all their support in international organizations, including this one.¹⁴⁹ The mixed message sent from East Berlin must not have confused the Yugoslavs, who were accustomed to East German whims, but it was undeniably counterproductive. Both sides retreated, and their relations entered a lull that was to last until late summer of that year.

If the West Germans, who followed the quarrelsome relationship between East Berlin and Belgrade with some glee, had hoped that this could open up the possibility of a definitive Yugoslav rejection of the GDR's recognition, they were mistaken. A Yugoslav report of a meeting between ambassador Pfleiderer and the new state undersecretary Mladen Iveković, who had just ended his tenure as the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn, showed that there was no progress on this front. Pfleiderer complained about an anti-FRG text in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) party organ *Borba*, and Iveković argued that the recent debates in the Bundestag showed that West Germany was not really working towards better cooperation between the blocs.¹⁵⁰ Soon afterwards, Dušan Kveder, who succeeded Iveković as the ambassador in Bonn, compiled an extensive report on the latest developments in West

149 Letter from Nikezić (March 2, 1957), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 82. The organization in question is presumably the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Ulbricht had pointed out that the FRG had become an observer recently. Membership in the ECE was important for the GDR due to the nature of the agency, where capitalist and socialist member states were compelled to interact directly. This mode of activity meant that Western countries would have to acknowledge the existence of the GDR at least on one level.

150 "Zabeleška" (February 2, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 72.

German foreign policy, in which he described the Bonn government as utterly convinced of the hopelessness of any chance of reunification at this point, which was reflected in their policies. According to Kveder, they simply blamed the USSR for this impasse.¹⁵¹ While this is not completely true, the fact of the matter was that for all the focus on the reunification in FRG's public sphere, the West Germans did not expect any change of the current situation in the near future, but Adenauer did acknowledge that it was a result of inflexibility on both sides.¹⁵²

Regardless of Bonn's perspective on reunification, it was not willing to completely resign itself to the status quo. Chancellor Adenauer was facing domestic criticism for his seemingly soft stance on German reunification. In the previous year, he had initiated a reunification campaign to placate his voters, but it had failed.¹⁵³ While Adenauer could not force a reunification by dealing with the Soviets, he could at least try to prevent Yugoslavia from recognizing the GDR, an act that would have made his bid, not to mention reunification, exponentially more difficult. In mid-April, ambassador Pfleiderer met again with Iveković, in what seems to have been a West German attempt to charm the Yugoslavs and dangle in front of them the carrot of economic cooperation. Pfleiderer had just returned from a trip through Germany, and in every *Land* (West German federal state) he met people who were apparently interested in Yugoslavia and harboured sympathies towards it. He also met with a number of industrialists, including representatives from Krupp and GHH, who admittedly were not particularly keen to support the development of the Yugoslav aluminum industry, but were rather interested in the production of electricity. After Pfleiderer's presentation, the conversation

151 "Teze o spoljnoj politici Savezne Republike Nemačke" (February 16, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 193/57.

152 Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer*, p. 204.

153 *Ibid.*, p. 174.

inevitably turned to the GDR. The exchange between him and Iveković again showed that the divide between Bonn and Belgrade could not be bridged by the mere prospect of economic cooperation. While Pfleiderer tried to emphasize the commonalities shared in their foreign policies, Iveković was quick to point towards a wide range of issues where they disagreed. The most important of Iveković's points was also indicative of the evolution of Yugoslavia's German policy. Iveković repeated the now well-known idea that the existence of two German states was a reality, but added that the logical consequence of this position should be the recognition of the GDR. This was a significant departure from the previous Yugoslav position, which merely indicated the idea of recognizing the GDR as a clear and acceptable option.¹⁵⁴ If this change alarmed the West Germans, they gave no indication.

Pfleiderer returned in June with another proposal for economic cooperation, this time suggesting that Bonn had changed its mind about aiding Yugoslav aluminum production, but that the financing thereof posed an issue. Pfleiderer's idea reeked of desperation. Iveković told him that Belgrade had in the past made inquiries about working with Western companies, including some from the FRG and the US. Yugoslavia had always made it clear that it could not bear the financial burden of these endeavours alone and therefore needed substantial loans, but none were forthcoming.¹⁵⁵ Pfleiderer must have known of these Yugoslav travails, which made his meeting with Iveković seem that much more like a last-ditch effort, which, as is often the case, failed. Pfleiderer brought up this idea one more time with Iveković, admitting that he is taking it upon himself to pursue this option, since the German government showed no interest in it. Not surprisingly, Iveković did not respond positively to this suggestion, and Pfleiderer never

154 "Zabeleška" (April 17, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 412.

155 "Zabeleška" (June 21, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 651.

brought it up again.¹⁵⁶ As in the previous two years, the West Germans did not have a solution to the Yugoslav problem.

Perhaps Pflleiderer sensed that the window for West German action – at least in order to prevent the triggering of the Hallstein Doctrine – was closing fast. A period of tense Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which started with the Hungarian Revolution, continued until the summer of 1957. Then, a series of events caused a new, but rather short thaw between Moscow and Belgrade. In June, Khrushchev was able to survive the ‘Anti-Party Group’ coup led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, and consolidate his power. Even before Khrushchev removed the Stalinist faction from the Politburo, the Yugo-Soviet relations were sailing towards calmer waters. Set in motion before the coup, a high ranking Yugoslav delegation visited Moscow shortly thereafter. The delegation was headed by Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s closest associate and the main Yugoslav economic planner, and Aleksandar Ranković, another of Tito’s closest associates and considered to be the third most powerful man in Yugoslavia due to his control of the secret police.¹⁵⁷ The visit was marked by an uneasy atmosphere and ended on a sour note.¹⁵⁸ Despite the turmoil in Moscow, the visit was a positive step for the Yugo-Soviet relations, because in late July Yugoslav, Soviet, and East German delegations met in Moscow to

156 “Zabeleška” (July 1, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 682.

157 Kardelj was a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia since 1928, and spent 1934-1937 in Moscow as a student at the Comintern’s Lenin School. He was instrumental in helping Tito rebuild the party after the Great Purge. A member of the Partisan Supreme Command during World War II, he held many high ranking positions after the war, including that of foreign minister. Wojciech Roszkowski and Jan Kofman, *Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 1st edition (Routledge, 2016), p. 437; Ranković was another long-time member of the Party who played an important role in its leadership after the 1937 purge of the CPY. He was the founder of the Yugoslav secret police (OZNA, later UDBA) and after the war became the interior minister. Roszkowski and Kofman, *Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, p. 842.

158 On the Yugoslavs’ last evening in Moscow, the Soviets organized a dinner at the CPSU Central Committee dacha outside Moscow surprised them by also inviting to dinner Enver Hoxha and Todor Zhivkov, Albania’s and Bulgaria’s respective rulers and Tito’s constant critics. Ambassador Mićunović considered this Soviet move a “surprise attack” and the rest of the Yugoslav delegation was visibly irritated by it. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 333.

finalize the timeline for the fulfillment of the aluminum treaty.¹⁵⁹ During this meeting, the East Germans again attempted to use the treaty as leverage to gain recognition, but the Yugoslavs did not bow to their pressure, and the timeline was confirmed without any conditions. This was the highlight of an otherwise calm summer as far as East Berlin-Belgrade relations were concerned.

These positive developments culminated in a meeting between Khrushchev and Tito in August. The meeting took place in Bucharest and was for the most part, unremarkable.¹⁶⁰ Nothing of importance was decided in this small town near Bucharest in terms of Yugo-Soviet relations, but the mere fact that it happened demonstrated that both sides were committed to cooperation. The Soviets were hoping that the meeting would show that Yugoslavia was indeed politically and ideologically moving closer to the Soviet bloc, and the Yugoslavs hoped that their cooperation would motivate the Soviets to carry on with the process of de-Stalinisation, cut short by the interventions of 1956.¹⁶¹ However, Tito did make two concessions to the Soviets in Romania. One was to allow a Yugoslav delegation to attend the 40th anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in November. The other concession was Tito's promise to recognize the GDR.¹⁶² The latter was hardly a coup for the Soviets, since Tito had been considering the recognition for some time, but it did attest to the general atmosphere of reconciliation in Romania. In addition, the East Germans had always believed that the Yugoslav recognition was somehow owed to them by virtue of 'socialist duty', but they were not certain whether it would ever happen. This was the East German sentiment as late as July 1957.¹⁶³ Therefore, Tito's concession offered some certainty to the East Germans.

159 Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*, p. 117.

160 The decision to hold the meeting in Bucharest was highly symbolic, since it was the location where the Comintern expelled Yugoslavia from its ranks in 1948. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, pp. 339-340.

161 Ibid.

162 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 202.

163 "Materialien zur Haltung Jugoslawiens zur Deutschlandfrage" (July 22, 1957), PA AA, MfAA, C 369/75, p. 71.

The eastward shift in Yugoslav foreign policy became apparent soon after the meeting in Romania. A Polish delegation, led by Władysław Gomułka was set to visit Belgrade on September 10. Ambassador Pflaederer approached state undersecretary Iveković and voiced his concerns about the possible outcome of the Polish visit. Pflaederer argued that German-Polish relations were developing in the right direction and that any disturbance from the outside could jeopardize them. Pflaederer referred to the communiqué of the latest East German-Polish meeting, in which there were some accusatory formulations regarding the FRG. In addition, Bonn would have preferred it if there was to be no public endorsement by either delegation of the Oder-Neisse border. Pflaederer's concerns were not completely unfounded. Iveković answered that there would probably be no attacks on the FRG in the communiqué, but that in his personal opinion the Oder-Neisse border was a reality, and that he could not guarantee that the communiqué would not contain a formulation to this effect.¹⁶⁴

Gomułka arrived in Belgrade at the tail-end of his reformist period. Just a few weeks later he would begin a crackdown on all dissent that was brewing in Poland under his watch.¹⁶⁵ At the time of his meeting with Tito in September 1957, Gomułka no longer presented any danger for East Berlin – whose rocky relationship with Warsaw was beginning to steady around this time – or Moscow, but it did worry Bonn. Gomułka's visit took place just days before the Bundestag elections, so any negative news coming from Belgrade was bound to have an effect on Adenauer's bid for the chancellorship. Bonn's fears were justified. Tito endorsed the Oder-Neisse border twice, during a toast and in the final communiqué of his meeting with Gomułka. Pflaederer met with Iveković to protest Tito's first endorsement, citing the delicate timing of the

164 "Zabeleška" (September 11, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 1323.

165 Anthony Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 131.

toast. Iveković rebuked the German ambassador for interfering in Yugoslavia's foreign policy, especially in matters that were well known, such as the Oder-Neisse border or the recognition of the GDR, which was going to happen, according to Iveković, "sooner or later." That last remark seemed to have broken Pfleiderer. He replied that he imagined a different path for the FRG-Yugoslav relations, and that it seemed that Yugoslavia only wanted to "receive West German machinery and to trade and – nothing else." What more could the FRG do for Yugoslavia to believe that Bonn would never start another war, he asked. Iveković suggested that the FRG needed to decisively end all ambitions of creating a nuclear arsenal and to do more in their rapprochement with Poland. Arguably, these two issues were not at the top of Yugoslavia's concerns, and Iveković most likely produced them simply as a counterargument.¹⁶⁶ Pfleiderer attempted to intervene with Iveković once again later that day, but was unable to elicit a promise that an endorsement of the Oder-Neisse border would not be included in the final communiqué.¹⁶⁷

This was to be the last meeting between Pfleiderer and Iveković. Bonn had withdrawn Pfleiderer for consultations after the final communiqué, which included the endorsement of the Oder-Neisse border, was published. Unfortunately, Pfleiderer had fallen gravely ill during his last days in Belgrade. He had wanted to take leave and to convalesce in the Serbian countryside, but the recall to Bonn meant that he would have to keep working. The illness caught up to him on October 15, when he died. With his death, the West German circles that opposed the full implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine had lost one of their most vocal advocates in the FRG's diplomacy.¹⁶⁸

166 "Zabeleška" (September 11, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 876.

167 "Zabeleška" (September 11, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 917.

168 Lahn, "Walter Hallstein as State Secretary," p. 29.

In hindsight, Gomulka's visit to Belgrade did not make a big splash in West Germany. The West German government met two days after withdrawing Pfleiderer. At the meeting, chancellor Adenauer tried to play down the effect of Tito's statements. He could afford to do so since his party, the CDU, managed to win the Bundestag elections. However, Brentano warned the cabinet that Yugoslavia might immediately recognize the GDR. Adenauer declared that this matter would have to be addressed by the new cabinet, so no position could be taken until then, not even in the press. Regardless of Adenauer's attempt to calm his cabinet, his Foreign Office feared that, in face of recent events, Yugoslavia was about to recognize the GDR, and that the West German hands were tied due to the transition period in Bonn.¹⁶⁹ It seemed that their timing could not have been worse, but in fact it was already too late for any kind of effective action on their part.

The Yugoslavs and the East Germans were also aware of the window of opportunity offered by the cabinet formation in Bonn, in addition to the Yugo-Soviet thaw. Otto Grotewohl had written to Tito on August 21 with an indirect request to establish diplomatic relations. In his opening paragraph, Grotewohl congratulated Tito on the recently agreed-upon dates for the fulfillment of the tripartite aluminum treaty. This was the GDR's prime minister's reminder that since the East Germans have agreed to sign the treaty, it would only be fair that Yugoslavia agreed to establish closer relations. Grotewohl suggested that since the negotiations regarding the trade agreement – which was less significant than the aluminum treaty and which the Yugoslavs had abandoned earlier that year – were about to be resumed, it would be of interest to both governments to discuss and negotiate the steps necessary to improve their relations.¹⁷⁰ The

169 “195. Kabinettsitzung am 18. September 1957,” accessed January 25, 2018 at <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/index.html>

170 Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*, pp. 117-118.

letter was delivered to the Yugoslavs by the East German deputy foreign minister Georg Handke, who visited Belgrade at the same time as the Polish delegation. Interestingly enough, Ulbricht himself wrote to Tito to ask for his permission for the letter to be delivered, which Tito allowed. The East German decision to first seek approval through party channels indicated that this initiative was of primary importance to them. The Yugoslav answer to Grotewohl followed shortly thereafter, first in the form of a verbal note to Handke. As far as the Yugoslav government was concerned, the letter was interpreted as an East German call to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Yugoslav response was positive. Nothing stood in the way of recognition.

However, the wording of the note was cautious and subdued. The Yugoslavs wanted to avoid a special ceremony with high ranking delegations from either side, something that East Germany suggested. The East German desire to make this event as conspicuous as possible was understandable, since they aimed to maximize its international exposure. However, Tito's decision to forego "exaggerated publicity" seemed to be taken with the West Germans in mind, although he did not fear drastic repercussions from Bonn.¹⁷¹ This opinion was likely informed by Adenauer's lukewarm reaction to Tito's statements on the Polish-German border that, as William Glenn Gray argues, emboldened him to proceed, but with caution.¹⁷²

The official letter from Tito mirrored the verbal note, including the lack of enthusiasm.¹⁷³ In addition, Tito preferred that the two countries opened legations – one rung below an embassy – in their respective capitals, to which the East Germans agreed without any argument.¹⁷⁴ In

171 "Zabeleška" (September 13, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1016.

172 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 76.

173 Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina i Jugoslavija*, p. 120.

174 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 81.

further evidence of Yugoslavia's desire not to upset its already precarious relations with the FRG, the Belgrade foreign office developed, and Tito signed off on, a plan by which Poland would ask to establish full diplomatic relations with the FRG. Bonn was on the verge of proposing to Warsaw to establish consular relations. The Yugoslavs planned to convince the Poles to delay any decision regarding this proposal, and to announce their own plan at the same time as the Yugoslav recognition of the GDR became public.¹⁷⁵

This Yugoslav plan came to nought, but it spoke to the nature of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. As many other times since 1948, Yugoslavia was willing to make decisions that placed it at odds with either of the two blocs – and sometimes with both – with considerable consequences. Tito's foreign policy was a tightrope act between economic and ideological considerations, but his audiences abroad were not always appreciative of the feat.

Yugoslav discordant behaviour was most obvious after the two key Yugoslav decisions since 1948. In the aftermath of the split with Stalin, Tito's only chance at maintaining Yugoslav independence was to cooperate with the West in exchange for aid, which then earned him endless and vitriolic criticism from Moscow and its satellites.¹⁷⁶ For Tito, and the rest of the Yugoslav leadership, the denouncement by communism's ideological authority was the bitterest of pills. Conversely, after Stalin's death and the rapprochement with Khrushchev, the Americans did not look kindly on Yugoslavia's potential return to the Soviet bloc. The American reaction was punishment in the form of a decrease in military aid.¹⁷⁷ Since the early rapprochement with the USSR hardly brought with it strategic relief for Yugoslavia, Washington's decision had a

175 "Uspostava diplomatskih odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom" (October 3, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, signed by Tito, no number.

176 For examples, one needs to look no further than the pages of *Neues Deutschland* during this period.

177 Bojan Dimitrijević, "Jugoslavija i NATO 1951-1958. Skica intenzivnih vojnih odnosa," in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961 zbornik radova* ed. Slobodan Selinić, (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), p. 270.

long term effect on Yugoslavia's national security.¹⁷⁸ The idea that Yugoslavia would most likely alienate one bloc with each one of its foreign policy decisions was clear to Tito. It was also clear to him that he would have to keep taking some of these decisions to stay on course, regardless of the risk. For this reason, he preferred not to enact these decisions alone, since they would leave him exposed and vulnerable internationally. While this line of reasoning led to Tito's investment into non-alignment, the same rationalization informed his foreign policy decisions before Yugoslavia's complete immersion in the non-aligned movement.¹⁷⁹ The case of the GDR's recognition followed the same pattern. The recognition was surely going to antagonize the West, but if Yugoslavia could convince Poland to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG at the same time, then the international community would have seen the Yugoslav decision as the first step toward a peaceful resolution of the German question, and quite possibly the catalyst for ending the Cold War. But without a corresponding move from Warsaw, Yugoslavia again had to take action without the support of other actors.

The recognition and its immediate aftermath

Just two days after Tito wrote the letter to Grotewohl confirming Yugoslavia's decision to recognize the GDR, an East German delegation visited Belgrade to negotiate a trade agreement. Yugoslav state undersecretary Dobrivoje Vidić received Fritz Grosse, the intended GDR ambassador to Yugoslavia, and Eleonore Staimer, the head of the foreign trade delegation.

¹⁷⁸ It also probably added urgency to the development of Yugoslavia's aluminum industry, a prerequisite for creating its own armament production.

¹⁷⁹ For the origins of Tito's non-alignment, see Robert Niebuhr, "Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 10, 2011): 146–79.

However, the meeting lacked any sense of occasion. Vidić began the meeting by bringing up the “anti-Yugoslav campaign from the East” after the Tito-Stalin split, and lamented the damage the recognition would cause to economic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. Staimer and Grosse replied that they did not expect any retribution from Bonn, since this recognition has been anticipated for quite some time, and that the FRG seemed to be more focused on improving its relations with the Soviet Bloc.¹⁸⁰ This reasoning was presumably not the actual opinion of the East German delegation, and only meant to assuage Vidić. The state undersecretary would not be assuaged. In his report he added that he purposefully emphasized the gravity of the situation, lest his interlocutors assume that it was a frivolous affair, “like an operetta.”¹⁸¹ Regardless of the tone of the meeting, the upshot was that the technicalities for the actual act of recognition were decided upon, and that the East German delegation left the Foreign Office building content. On October 8, Tito signed off on the decision to publicly announce the recognition on October 12. It was important for the Yugoslavs to make this decision public several days before Marshall Zhukov’s visit to Belgrade. Namely, Tito did not want the international press to assume that his decision was made under Soviet pressure.¹⁸² Unfortunately, since Yugoslavia needed to inform several foreign governments about their decision, the date of the announcement had to be postponed until October 15, when Zhukov was already in Belgrade. The Yugoslav need to dispel the image of Soviet pressure over the recognition was so strong that they amended the announcement to include the dates of the letters exchanged between Grotewohl and Tito.¹⁸³ East German representatives in Belgrade spent the

180 “Zabeleška” (October 5, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1003/i.

181 Ibid.

182 “Objavljivanje zajedničkog saopštenj[a] o uspostavljanju diplomatskih odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom” (October 8, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1.

183 “Saopštenje o uspostavljanju diplomatskih odnosa sa Istočnom Nemačkom” (October 9, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1.

following days fine-tuning the details of the recognition together with their hosts. In accordance with the Yugoslav wish, there was to be no ceremony, and the only document signed by the East German ambassador and the Yugoslav government would be the joint announcement.¹⁸⁴

The disparity between the Yugoslav and East German perceptions of the recognition was evident not only in the attitude of their respective representatives, but also in the internal justification of the recognition. The East Germans indicated a consensus between the two states on all significant international issues. According to the East Germans, as far as the German question was concerned, diplomatic relations with both Germanies could help German reunification. In the case of Yugoslavia, the establishment of diplomatic relations did not only help their bilateral relations, but was also a recognition of the socialist efforts in the GDR, the “bulwark of freedom.”¹⁸⁵ This internal rationalization focused on the validation of the GDR’s existence. If outwardly the East Germans claimed that the recognition was Yugoslavia’s socialist duty, this document showed, perhaps inadvertently, that this act was a coup for East Berlin.

The Yugoslav view was more nuanced, and more importantly, restrained. The foreign office, in a statement they intended to publish on October 15, repeated the Yugoslav mantra that the existence of two Germanies was a reality. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs placed their decision within their broader foreign policy, so that “in the spirit of [their] non-bloc policy of active coexistence, [they could] build equally good relations with both German states.”¹⁸⁶ Again, this was a wish divorced from reality. When the Yugoslav ambassador in Bonn, Dušan Kveder sought out Walter Hallstein on October 14 to inform him of his government’s decision, Hallstein

184 “Zabeleška” (October 14, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1053.

185 “Argumentation zur Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Föderativen Volksrepublik Jugoslawien, no author, (October 1957), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072 pp. 1-9.

186 “Saopštenje Državnog sekretarijata inostranih poslova povodom uspostave diplomatskih odnosa između FNRJ i DDR” (undated), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1.

reminded him of Brentano's statement from August 1956, which held in it the core of the Hallstein Doctrine, namely that any recognition of the GDR by a third country would be interpreted by the FRG as an unfriendly act, and that the relations between the FRG and this country had to be reviewed.¹⁸⁷ Immediately after the meeting, Hallstein travelled to Paris to meet with the NATO council and seek its approval for breaking off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavs were not expecting a complete break in diplomatic relations because the West Germans never explicitly warned them about it. However, the Yugoslavs did expect some sort of sanctions of some sort for ignoring Bonn's wishes. Later that same day, a West German official warned the Yugoslav embassy that the FRG would suspend an economic cooperation agreement worth 240 million marks if Yugoslavia sent an envoy to East Berlin. This was Hallstein's initiative – not an official decision – and it was not an effective deterrent.

On October 15, Yugoslavia and the GDR made the recognition public. In the GDR, *Neues Deutschland* lauded it as a "contribution to the consolidation of peace in Europe," and called the West German public to stand up against the voices which call for reprisals against Yugoslavia."¹⁸⁸ The West Germans were facing one of the biggest diplomatic challenges of their postwar history, and the voices calling for reprisal were indeed very vocal. Several high ranking FRG officials, including the ambassador to NATO Herbert Blankenhorn, opposed a diplomatic break with Yugoslavia, but the Adenauer-Brentano-Hallstein axis prevailed, and on October 17 the West German cabinet decided to break off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. At the

187 "Jugoslawien. Deutschland (Ost-) (West-)" (October 19, 1957), *Archiv der Gegenwart*, p. 11294.

188 "Beitrag zur Festigung des Friedens in Europa" *Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR)*, October 16, 1957, p. 1.
<http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?purl=SNP2532889X-19571016-0-1-5-0>

cabinet meeting, Adenauer cited the “overall global situation” as a determining factor.¹⁸⁹ He estimated that ignoring the Yugoslav recognition could result in as many as thirty five other countries recognizing the GDR.¹⁹⁰ In addition, there are indications that his decision was informed not only by the immediate West German concerns such as the right to sole representation, but more with the ‘Sputnik shock’, the feeling that the Soviets might be gaining the upper hand in the Cold War, symbolized by the launch of their Sputnik satellite. It was important to show to the Soviet Bloc and the rest of the world that the FRG would not be idle in the face of Communist advances.¹⁹¹ At the same cabinet meeting, Brentano advocated the inclusion of economic sanctions in this decision. He argued that if severing diplomatic ties was the harshest punishment possible, then surely the economic ties had to be cut as well.¹⁹² Although Yugoslavia was not a significant West German trade partner in general terms, it was a leading supplier of wood and bauxite, the latter being especially difficult to procure elsewhere.¹⁹³

These, and other, economic considerations prevented an even harsher West German reaction. On October 19, ambassador Kveder was summoned to the foreign office in Bonn and notified of the West German government’s decision. The West German note was an unequivocal denunciation of the Yugoslav decision and the policy that led to it.¹⁹⁴ At the same time, the West German chargé in Belgrade Müller-Roschach met with state undersecretary Vidić to hand him a

189 “Sondersitzung am 17. Oktober 1957,” accessed January 30, 2018 at

<http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/index.html>

190 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 57.

191 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 27.

192 “Sondersitzung am 17. Oktober 1957,” accessed January 30, 2018 at

<http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/index.html>

193 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 32.

194 Interestingly, the note referred to the GDR as “Mitteldeutschland,” indicating the Bonn government’s refusal to forgo pre-1938 German border. Note from Brentano to Kveder (October 19, 1957), Reinhard Bettzuege and Auswärtigen Amts, *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994*, (Köln: Verl. Wiss. und Politik von Nottbeck, 1995), pp. 243-244.

copy of the same document. The meeting was courteous, but ironically, Vidić told Müller-Roschach that the Yugoslav government saw the decision as an “unfriendly act.”¹⁹⁵

Yugoslavia had little reason to be pleased with the recognition. In Moscow, ambassador Mićunović lamented, “it seems that Yugoslavia has lost more from one side than it gained from the other.” Western diplomats were either aloof around Mićunović or confronted him over the recognition. At the same time, he found that “the Russians have not become more open.” His meeting with Khrushchev also failed to fill him with confidence. The Soviet leader did not seem to “attach any significance to Yugoslavia’s decision” nor did he have any specific comments on the situation. Mićunović concluded that both the GDR and the Soviet Union saw the recognition as a right – rather than a concession – that was long overdue.¹⁹⁶ To add to Yugoslav misery, even Bonn was aware of the lack of enthusiasm in the Soviet Bloc for Belgrade’s decision.¹⁹⁷

Elsewhere in the West, Yugoslavia’s actions seemed to prove that, to a large extent, Tito had aligned himself with the Soviets. NATO analysts were correct in pointing out that the recognition had little to do with the “bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Zone,” but rather with Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Bloc, meaning Moscow.¹⁹⁸ American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated in a meeting with his British counterpart Selwyn Lloyd that the US had no intention of dissuading the West Germans from breaking off diplomatic relations with Belgrade, since “in our opinion, the Yugoslavs have already proceeded too far into the danger zone in their relations with the USSR” by siding with the Soviets over Hungary. Now, with this decision, there was almost no difference between the USSR and

195 “Zabeleška” (February 2, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, document no. 109.

196 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, pp. 355-356.

197 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 56.

198 “Situation in Eastern Europe” (October 31, 1957), NATO, AC/119-WP/94.

http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/4/3/4328/AC_119-WP_94_ENG.pdf accessed February 15, 2018.

Yugoslavia as far as foreign policy was concerned. While the US was not willing to give up on Yugoslavia completely, Dulles pointed out that their latest decision would result in a decrease of US military aid. Lloyd agreed, gleefully noting that the German decision to cut off diplomatic ties would be a “slap in the face for Tito.”¹⁹⁹ Americans had warned the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington Leo Mates that there would be consequences to their actions, and also made it clear that they would support Bonn’s reaction.²⁰⁰ On October 24, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clarence Dillon summoned ambassador Mates to explain the US decision to reconsider the amount of aid earmarked for Yugoslavia, since their “closer, if not total, alignment with Soviet positions on major international issues created a very difficult problem for us in providing aid to Yugoslavia.” Although Mates tried to separate Yugoslavia’s foreign policy from the Soviet one, arguing that the US was focusing on particular issues rather than the whole policy, Dillon replied that Yugoslavia’s decisions on these issues have tipped the balance of power toward the Soviets.²⁰¹

As much as the Americans disagreed with Yugoslavia’s decision, they did not want to tip the balance any further by rash decision-making. The deliberations over the curtailment of aid were drawn out, and while in progress, the aid programs already underway carried on as planned.²⁰² A few days later, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy wrote to State Secretary Dulles, stating, “there are numerous indications that Yugoslavia miscalculated the force of the West German reaction, and wishes now to avoid any further deterioration of relations with Bonn.” Furthermore, Murphy suggested that Tito might

199 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI*, Eds. Roberta L. DiGangi, Lorraine Lees, Aaron Miller, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 309.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v26>

200 *Ibid.*, Document 132.

201 *Ibid.*, Document 315.

202 *Ibid.*, Document 316.

have realized “that he may have gone too far in his rapprochement with the USSR.” As a result, some of the American objectives had already been reached, and Tito was most probably not inclined to continue along the path of rapprochement with the USSR.²⁰³

The American assessment was correct. The Yugoslavs spent the rest of the year dealing with the fallout following the recognition. Even as early as mid-October, the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement was beginning to unravel. Ambassador Mićunović noted that the Soviets seemed to revel in the triggering of the Hallstein Doctrine, which gave them a good excuse to attack the FRG and the United States.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, the Soviets had to be pleased with the fact that Yugoslavia lost a considerable amount of Western support and good will.

The next hurdle in the Yugo-Soviet relations was the meeting of the twelve Communist parties in Moscow in early November. In late October, the Soviets released a draft of a declaration that was intended to be signed by all attending parties. The declaration’s content was an affront to Tito, since it practically annulled the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations. He decided not to sign the declaration, nor to attend the meeting.²⁰⁵ A Yugoslav delegation did make the trip to Moscow, where they faced harsh criticism from Khrushchev. Refusing to sign the 12 Party declaration, the Yugoslavs did sign another, watered-down version of the declaration, signed by sixty-four Communist and worker’s parties.²⁰⁶

While in Moscow, the Yugoslav delegation also met with Ulbricht and the rest of the East German delegation and discussed future cooperation. The East Germans seemed more eager to capitalize on the recognition, rather than focus on the unsigned declaration.²⁰⁷ They

203 Ibid., Document 317.

204 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, pp. 356-357

205 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*, p. 202.

206 Tripković, Đoko. *Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971*, p. 75.

207 Veljko Vlahović noted in his diary: “[Ulbricht] sees things as an operative rather than as a politician.” Veljko Vlahović, *Strogo pov.: neobjavljeni rukopis Veljka Vlahovića: 1955-1958*. (Beograd: Stručna knjiga, 1998), p.

picked Eleonore Staimer, the head of the trade delegation that had just visited Belgrade, for the position of the East German envoy in Yugoslavia. Although Staimer had no previous diplomatic experience, she was the daughter of the East German president Wilhelm Pieck, which showed the importance the GDR assigned to the posting.²⁰⁸ The East Germans also intended to send a sizable embassy staff to Belgrade – altogether 52 employees. The Yugoslavs did not seem to appreciate this, as a disproportionately large staff would certainly irritate Bonn, but also draw unwanted attention from other observers, when the Yugoslavs wanted nothing more but to minimize the negative effects of its recognition of the GDR.²⁰⁹ The matter, however, did not seem to interfere with the legation’s establishment.

After the disappointment of the Moscow meeting, the Yugoslavs also had to face the American ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger. Visiting Tito at his Brioni residence, where the Yugoslav president was recovering from illness, Riddleberger repeated Washington’s main concerns regarding Yugoslavia’s recent foreign policy decision, emphasizing the implications these could have on the availability of US aid to Yugoslavia. Tito adopted an ambivalent stance. He asked for American understanding of Yugoslavia’s delicate position between the two blocs. He argued that the recognition was a result of this position, and was not aimed at damaging Adenauer. Nor was it part of an agreement with Khrushchev.²¹⁰ These two points are only partially correct. The Yugoslavs knew that the East Germans wanted the recognition to inflict maximum damage on Adenauer’s position, and they agreed to time the

192.

208 Tobias C. Bringmann, *Handbuch der Diplomatie 1815-1963: Auswärtige Missionschefs in Deutschland und deutsche Missionschefs im Ausland von Metternich bis Adenauer* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), p. xxxvii.

For more on Staimer’s career, see the chapter “ELEONORE STAIMER: Die Tochter Wilhelm Piecks” in

Ursula Müller, *Gewandt, geschickt und abgesandt: Frauen im Diplomatischen Dienst* (Munich: Olzog, 2000).

209 “Zabeleška” (November 18, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1149.

210 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe*, Document 320.

recognition accordingly. It was true that the recognition was not part of a deal with Khrushchev, because the Soviets offered nothing in return. Riddleberger was concerned about the effect that the recognition might have on other Cold War territorial disputes. He asked Tito whether this prejudiced Yugoslavia's position regarding China and Taiwan or North and South Korea, but the Yugoslav president seemed flustered, and could not provide a clear answer.²¹¹

The conversation with Riddleberger must have left Tito feeling burdened by the lopsided relations with the US – caused by Yugoslavia's reliance on American aid – since a few days later he instructed his ambassador to Washington, Leo Mates, to call on deputy undersecretary Murphy to inform him that the Yugoslav government decided to terminate the military aid program, since the “political difficulties caused by [it] now outweigh the value of the military equipment involved.”²¹² By doing so, Belgrade hoped to improve its relations with the US.²¹³ Furthermore, the Yugoslavs could not be accused by the Soviets of depending on American aid; a timelier manoeuvre considering Moscow had given up on any pretense of socialist comradeship with Yugoslavia after the Moscow twelve party meeting.

The East Germans, however, were still confident that Yugoslavia was heading in the right direction – as evidenced by the recognition and the subsequent signing of a new trade agreement – and were hoping for an even closer relationship in the future.²¹⁴ The initial contacts between the East German diplomats in Belgrade and their hosts reflected East Berlin's assessment. They were grateful for Yugoslav support, which they deemed necessary in the current situation, when it appeared that Yugoslavia was less than enthusiastic about its

211 Ibid.

212 *FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe*, Document 322.

213 Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici: (1948-1963)* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2002), p. 120.

214 “Vorschläge für den außenpolitischen Teil der Berichtes der Abteilung Jugoslawien des MAI” (December 20, 1957), PA AA, MfAA, A 5065, pp. 1-3.

recognition of the GDR.²¹⁵ The Yugoslavs were pleased with the way their legation in East Berlin was settling in as well, although they did not immediately send an envoy. At the same time, attacks aimed at Yugoslavia were still being published in the GDR. For example, an East German economics professor published an article criticising Yugoslavia's economic policy, and the man behind it, Edvard Kardelj, which reflected the ambiguity towards Yugoslavia in the GDR.²¹⁶

The West German Socialist Party (SPD), traditionally on good terms with the SKJ, found Tito's decision difficult to accept. In a personal letter to Mladen Iveković, one of the SPD's leading functionaries, Herbert Wehner, decried Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR.²¹⁷ According to Wehner, it signalled the retreat of real socialists from a pan-European dialogue. "Should the field be dominated by the Mollets?" asked Wehner, referring to the French prime minister Guy Mollet, whose active role in escalating the Suez Crisis earned him plenty of criticism from the European Left.²¹⁸ At home, the SPD criticized Adenauer and his government for implementing the Hallstein Doctrine, which it saw as the failure of the chancellor's East European policy. For the most part, the West German press also criticized the move, and only a minority of the public supported it.²¹⁹

Suffering losses on almost all sides, the Yugoslavs found some solace in the response of the German business community. According to one report, German companies were not pleased with their government's decision. Some of them, however, were, informed (presumably by

215 "Zabeleška" (December 26, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1291.

216 "An East German Attack on the Yugoslav Economic System" (December 14, 1957), HU OSA 300-8-3-2447.

217 Wehner was a member of the German Communist Party from 1927-1942. He and Tito met in Moscow, while they were both staying at Hotel Lux. Wehner joined the SPD in 1946. Jože Pirjevec, *Tito and His Comrades*, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2018), p. 359.

218 Letter from Wehner to Iveković (October 24, 1957), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 1232.

219 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 30.

contacts in the government) that the business connections between the two countries would not be affected. Given the threat of economic repercussions from the Bonn government, it was comforting for Belgrade to know that the trade between West German and Yugoslav companies was seemingly proceeding unhindered by the Hallstein Doctrine.²²⁰ Furthermore, it foreshadowed the future of the relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia for the duration of the Hallstein Doctrine, with sanctions at the highest levels of bilateral relations, but otherwise normal flow of goods and people.

Conclusion

Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR, the watershed moment in the triangular relations between Belgrade, Bonn, and East Berlin, carried a multitude of consequences for all three sides. The GDR had achieved an unprecedented diplomatic victory over the FRG. On October 16, 1957, an anonymous *Neues Deutschland* editorial boldly proclaimed that "every government which in fact wants to embrace the interests of its own country and those of the peace, will come to the inevitably necessary conclusion and normalize their relations with the German Democratic Republic, just as was done by the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia."²²¹

But for all the East German optimism, the recognition was more a byproduct of Yugo-Soviet relations than a triumph of the GDR's diplomacy. In fact, the latter had proved to be quite ineffectual, to the point of being counterproductive, as demonstrated during the trade agreement

220 "Stav zapadnonemačkih firmi posle prekida diplomatskih odnosa sa FNRJ" (November 7, 1957) AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3.

221 "Beitrag zur Festigung des Friedens in Europa" *Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR)*, October 16, 1957, p. 1. <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?purl=SNP2532889X-19571016-0-1-5-0>

negotiations in East Berlin in January 1957. If Ulbricht had success in forcing the Soviet hand, as Hope Harrison argues, the evidence showed that this was not one of those occasions. If Khrushchev told Ulbricht in 1960 that “your needs are our needs,” there is nothing to show that he entertained the same belief in 1957, at least not in the case of Yugoslavia.²²² If anything, Ulbricht had wisely adapted to the new *diktat* from Moscow.²²³

It was the second thaw between Yugoslavia and the USSR, this one taking place in the summer of 1957 following the fallout over the Soviet intervention in Hungary that had enabled the recognition. In addition, it was a gesture of Yugoslav good will towards the Soviets, and not a result of direct Soviet pressure, although the Soviets did lobby the Yugoslavs to this end. The East Germans hoped that Yugoslavia’s recognition would trigger a domino effect among the non-aligned countries, but there were no signs of this happening in late 1957. Most importantly, there was no other country outside the Soviet bloc which aligned itself with Soviet values as much as Yugoslavia did, to the point of choosing the GDR over the FRG.

The West German decision to break off diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia carried with it an aura of a necessary evil. For all the uncertainty about its stages and trigger mechanisms, and the flexibility regarding trade and transit regulations, in the final analysis the Hallstein Doctrine was a fundamentally rigid set of policies. Hence, the Bonn government could only act in one way, as long as the Doctrine’s creators had the upper hand in the Foreign Office and the cabinet.

Yugoslavia had lost the most out of all involved. While the recognition of the GDR was aimed to bolster its relationship with the USSR, no reciprocal measure was offered by Moscow at the time, and by late October their relationship began to sour again, thus making the

²²² Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*, p. 1.

²²³ Friederike Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik Der DDR 1946 Bis 1968*. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), p. 90.

likelihood of any such measure in the future minimal. As expected, the Yugoslav decision afforded them no sympathies in the West. Tito's balancing act between the blocs, which had hitherto yielded disproportionate success for the small Balkan state, had faced its first major failure. The reason behind this miscalculation was Tito's ideological world view. Tito was a Communist, and regardless of all past conflicts with the Soviets, he still desired a close relationship with them. However, his concern about Yugoslavia's independence – and therefore its position in the international order – superseded his personal feelings about the Soviets, and 1958 would mark the beginning of the next phase of Yugoslavia's non-aligned policy after the explorations of the mid-1950s.

In December 1957, a State Department report on Germany stated that “the Berlin situation calls for the utmost vigilance of the Western Powers” due to its location, where it is “exposed to constant Communist pressures and harassment.”²²⁴ The Berlin situation would in fact become the focal point of the German question in the next few years for both Germanies. It would also test the strength of Yugoslavia's relations with the GDR, but also the West German resolve to uphold the validity of the Hallstein Doctrine.

²²⁴ *FRUS, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe*, Document 237.

Chapter 3

The Second Berlin Crisis and Yugoslavia (1958-1960)

Following the initial shock of Yugoslavia's recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the implementation of the Hallstein doctrine, it seemed that the long term consequences of Belgrade's decision – as far as the two Germanies were concerned – were not catastrophic, but neither were they cathartic, nor groundbreaking for any of the countries involved. To be sure, all three countries had to make diplomatic adjustments in the recognition's aftermath, but none resulted in a tectonic shift in relations. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) maintained a diplomatic presence in Yugoslavia by retaining the general consulate in Zagreb, and France agreed to represent West German interests in Yugoslavia through their embassy in Belgrade (in fact, several of the West German diplomatic staff remained in the FRG embassy in Belgrade, but had merely replaced the West German flag and plaque on the building with the French ones). In Bonn, the Swedish embassy took on the same role for Yugoslavia.²²⁵ Much of the trade between the two countries continued unhindered, as per previously signed agreements.²²⁶ Conversely, the relationship between the GDR and Yugoslavia also seemed to retain some of the qualities it held before the recognition, namely the mutual distrust and animosity. This state of affairs pointed to a lack of substance in their relations, which in turn showed that the recognition was not only an anomaly, but one which occurred due to external factors, namely the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. As they entered

²²⁵ Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 124.

²²⁶ "Referat" (February 19, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 266/58.

another hostile phase of relations in late 1957, Yugoslavia found no reason to develop its relations with the GDR at a rate faster than before the recognition. The Berlin Crisis, which began in November of 1958, added to Yugoslavia's strained relations with the Soviet Bloc.

After the disappointment of yet another breakdown in Yugo-Soviet relations, Tito turned his attention to improving and creating new contacts in the non-aligned world. His numerous trips abroad between 1958 and 1961 were also partially inspired by the Hallstein doctrine and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the FRG which, although not exceedingly severe, left a bitter taste in his mouth. These trips, planned for 1957 but postponed due to the diplomatic difficulties – namely the decrease in American aid and the conflict with the Soviet Union – were always meant to strengthen Yugoslavia's international position, but now the stakes for Tito were much higher.

Conversely, the East Germans characterized their relations with Yugoslavia since the recognition as satisfactory. However, they recognized that all initiatives to improve bilateral relations were coming from East Berlin, which worried them. Moreover, it seemed that the Yugoslavs were invested in minimizing any activity that might jeopardize their already precarious relationship with the FRG.²²⁷

The Yugoslavs indeed did not want to irritate the West Germans by building up their relations with the GDR even further, and were actually hoping that Bonn would reverse its decision in the near future.²²⁸ The Bonn government was still unsure on how to proceed with the trade relations, but regardless of Belgrade's hopes, it was steadfast in upholding the Hallstein

227 "Der Stand der Beziehungen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Föderativen Volksrepublik Jugoslawien" (March 20, 1958), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 10-17.

228 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 57.

doctrine.²²⁹ Incidentally, the FRG and Yugoslavia found themselves embroiled in the same Cold War crisis around this time, namely Algeria. France, which had been at war with the Algerian independence movement National Liberation Front (FNL) since 1954, was trying to eliminate the FNL's supply shipments from abroad, including weapons. The French government was especially angered by the supplies coming from the FRG, its NATO partner. While the weapons recovered by French officials were West German, the FRG argued that these weapons could have originated from Eastern European sources, either from old WWII stock, or modern replicas produced by a Czech manufacturer.²³⁰ Even though some FNL supplies were indeed coming from the FRG, Bonn felt vindicated when the French seized a Yugoslav ship containing a weapons shipment so large, it would have constituted a half of all weapons currently in the FNL's possession.²³¹ The West Germans tried to shift the blame for the illegal shipments on Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, even though the Bonn government was still unable to control its illegal exports to Algeria.²³² Needless to say, this affair did not help Yugo-West German relations, even though there were no serious repercussions.

Meanwhile, the difficulties surrounding the establishment of respective East German and Yugoslav legations best symbolized the less than ideal relations between the other Germany and Yugoslavia. As late as February 1958, the East Germans were still not able to procure a building for their legation. In a conversation with the state undersecretary Srđa Prica, envoy Eleonore

229 Ibid., pp. 58-59.

230 Mathilde Von Bulow, *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 149. For an overview of the Algerian War, see Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, 1 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); For the role of Algeria in Third World internationalism, see Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); For the Yugo-Algerian relations during this period, see Jeffrey James Byrne, "Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment," *The International History Review* 37, no. 5 (October 20, 2015): 912-32.

231 Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, p. 162.

232 Von Bulow, *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War*, p. 148.

Staimer complained about this delay. She claimed that the Western press wrote about her “sitting in some castle and waiting” because no one in the Yugoslav government was willing to meet with her to accept her accreditation letter, and now she expected them to write about her “sitting in a hotel,” because the Yugoslavs were not in a hurry to accommodate the legation’s opening.²³³ The Yugoslavs had no such complaints regarding their legation in East Berlin.²³⁴ This was partially due to the disparate sizes of the personnel in the legations. While the Yugoslavs sent only four persons to East Berlin, Staimer informed Iveković that the GDR was planning to man the Belgrade legation with eighty-five employees, a number which “stunned” her interlocutor.²³⁵ Although it was an unconventionally large number – Iveković argued that even the largest Yugoslav embassies number around thirty employees – the main Yugoslav concern was that it would be too conspicuous to international observers, but according to Iveković, Staimer did not even seem to acknowledge his remark.²³⁶

As much as the Yugoslavs tried to impede the East German advances, they could not, nor did they want to completely ignore them. In fact, in some areas, such as trade, there were indications that cooperation between the two countries was improving as a result of the recognition.²³⁷ In April, the East German Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade Heinrich Rau even predicted, rather optimistically, that the trade volume could reach 200 million USD

233 “Zabeleška” (February 4, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 184.

234 “Informativni podaci o Nemačkoj demokratskoj republici” (February 7, 1958) AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 176.

235 “Der stand der Beziehungen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Föderativen Volksrepublik Jugoslawien” (March 20, 1958), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 10-17; “Zabeleška” (February 18, 1958), AJ, KPR AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 242.

236 Ibid.

237 “Referat” (February 27, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 295/58.

within two to three years.²³⁸ This was a far cry from the unfulfilled four million dollar trade agreement signed by the GDR and Yugoslavia in 1954.

Even though the outlook for Belgrade's relations with Moscow seemed positive, the latent conflict between the two flared up again in April. The cause for this latest clash was the draft of the new League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) party program that was supposed to be adopted at its 7th party congress in May. At the core of the program was the reinforced idea of Yugoslavia's unique geopolitical position as a non-aligned country, but it also included conciliatory tones aimed towards the West. The Yugoslavs presented the Soviets with the draft of the program, and soon thereafter Moscow and its satellites launched a vitriolic attack on Belgrade. Not by chance, the Soviet attacks on the SKJ program coincided with Khrushchev completing his consolidation of power by becoming the prime minister of the USSR in March 1958.²³⁹ The Soviets saw the program as a direct attack on the USSR, especially regarding its foreign policy. The Soviet embassy in Belgrade relayed Moscow's concerns about the program. One of the main criticisms was the use of the term 'hegemony,' which the Soviets believed was aimed at them. The Soviets found this term, normally reserved for capitalist countries, extremely offensive.²⁴⁰ According to the Soviets, the fact that the Yugoslavs published the SKJ program as a book, and even translated it to other languages, was evidence of Yugoslav bad faith.²⁴¹

After Belgrade showed no intention of changing the program's contents, Soviet Bloc countries decided to boycott the SKJ congress.²⁴² As a result, the Yugo-East German relations also stopped improving. In his official note to the SKJ, with which he informed the Yugoslavs

238 "Zabeleška" (April 10, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 477.

239 Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat*, p. 241.

240 Tripković, *Jugoslavija - SSSR*, p. 78.

241 Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 425.

242 Western social-democratic parties also boycotted the congress, but they did so to protest the fall of Milovan Djilas. Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat*, p. 242.

that the GDR would also not be sending a delegation to the congress, Ulbricht repeated the Soviet line that the SKJ program was in direct opposition to Marxist-Leninist principles, and warned the SKJ that it undermined the struggle against NATO.²⁴³ While Ulbricht's protestations were sincere, they had their limits. For example, When the GDR president Otto Grotewohl visited Beijing in 1959, he was confronted with a Chinese proposal to break off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia – presumably by all socialist countries – over the SKJ program.²⁴⁴ The aggressive Chinese position on Yugoslavia was well known to the East Germans, as they had complained in 1958 to the GDR's foreign minister Johannes König about Yugoslavia paying lip service to non-alignment, but in fact “working against the socialist camp.”²⁴⁵ This latest outburst was too much even for the East Germans. Grotewohl had to vehemently decline this suggestion, as it would have greatly devalued the GDR's international standing.²⁴⁶

Some diplomats from socialist countries, including the GDR envoy Staimer, did attend the SKJ conference but left during an intermission. As in the past, this latest falling out between Moscow and Belgrade also had an effect on the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia, and envoy Staimer felt that her biggest complaint about the speeches at the Congress was not the criticism of the Soviet Bloc parties *per se*, but rather the lack of self-critique in the SKJ. Staimer conveyed her thoughts to Mitja Vošnjak, who had been selected as Yugoslavia's envoy in East Berlin and was about to fly to the East German capital.²⁴⁷ Vošnjak arrived in East Berlin six

243 Letter from Ulbricht to the SKJ CC (April 15, 1958), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

244 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 168.

245 As cited in Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), p. 135.

246 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 168.

247 Staimer was also critical of Yugoslav worker's self-management, arguing that it might have been necessary for Yugoslavia's development, but German workers were “disciplined ‘workhorses’” who did as they were told. “Zabeleška” (May 13, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 565.

months after the Yugoslav legation opened its doors, but the East German welcome was friendly, and his hosts even offered to organize a study trip for a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation.²⁴⁸

Diplomatic niceties aside, the Yugoslavs did not have to wait long for the Soviet retribution for the 7th SKJ congress. On May 28, Khrushchev informed the Yugoslavs that the payments for the fulfillment of the aluminum treaty were going to be postponed until 1963. Furthermore, the GDR government was consulted about this decision and was in complete agreement with it.²⁴⁹ For all the ideological discord between the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia, which affected Tito personally, it was the economic punishment that hurt Yugoslavia the most. On June 10, 1958, Yugoslav foreign minister Popović summoned Staimer and suggested that, if the GDR felt bound by the treaty to act in unison with the USSR, then perhaps the GDR and Yugoslavia could find a way towards a new arrangement.²⁵⁰ It is unclear whether this was an honest proposal or a provocation, but the Yugoslavs could not realistically expect the GDR to directly disregard Soviet foreign policy. Three days later, the East Germans presented a verbal note to the Yugoslav legation in East Berlin, by which the East Germans rebuked the Yugoslav change in policy, arguing, “[t]he treaty is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism. In opposition to that, the Yugoslav side has now announced that economic relations must be based on the principle of mutual advantage.” The East German government saw no reason to reverse its policy and accept a bilateral treaty.²⁵¹ The end of the aluminum treaty thus marked the end of Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with Moscow, and weakened its already fragile relations with the GDR.

248 “Zabeleška” (May 22, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 671.

249 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 47.

250 “Zabeleška” (June 3, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 658.

251 “Verbalna nota” (June 13, 1958), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

The damage Yugoslavia suffered from the withdrawal of Soviet and East German funds was compounded by the nadir reached in its relations with the US, as discussed in the previous chapter. Left without crucial financial support from both Blocs, Yugoslavia's relations with the GDR entered a period that resembled a truce more than a lull. As a result of this near isolation, Tito probed the West Germans through his ambassadors in Brussels, Rome, and Jakarta to see whether they would consider reestablishing relations.²⁵² According to West German reports, the Yugoslavs "urgently wanted" the renewal of bilateral relations.²⁵³ Adenauer was aware of Tito's dire situation and agreed to secret talks, which took place in Rome in September. The optimism surrounding the meetings dissipated almost immediately, as it became clear that each side wanted the other one to make the first concession. Yugoslavia believed that by exchanging envoys instead of ambassadors with the GDR it had already done all it could without further damaging its relations with Moscow, while the West Germans did not want to compromise the Hallstein doctrine by making concessions before Yugoslavia even downgraded its relations with the GDR.²⁵⁴ The two countries abandoned the talks soon thereafter.

With the Eastern and Western avenues exhausted, Tito again turned towards the Global South to bolster his international position. An internal Yugoslav report noted that the Soviet attacks on Yugoslavia only improved Belgrade standing in the non-aligned world.²⁵⁵ With this in mind, the Yugoslav president planned a tour of several non-aligned countries beginning with the United Arab Republic in December. However, the approaching Berlin Crisis would pull him back into the maelstrom of the European Cold War.

252 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 264.

253 Ibid., p. 266.; Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 59.

254 Ibid., p. 62.

255 "Poslednje pogoršanje medjunarodnih odnosa i položaj Jugoslavije" (June 23, 1958), AJ KPR I-5-a/2.

The beginning of the Berlin Crisis

On November 10, 1958, Khrushchev made a speech that began a three year crisis centred on the status of Berlin in the divided Germany. To be sure, Berlin had been a point of contention since the beginning of the Allied occupation in 1945. The city had already experienced one Superpower confrontation in 1948, and had been living in the shadow of constant tension between the US and USSR ever since. Khrushchev, on the other hand, had not been prone to lashing out like his predecessor, and he aimed to use Berlin in order to rid himself of the albatross that was the German Question. The Soviet leader explained:

The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to ... create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union, for its part, would hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet agencies. . . . Let the United States, France and Britain themselves ... reach agreement with [the GDR] if they are interested in any questions concerning Berlin. As for the Soviet Union, we shall sacredly honor our obligations as an ally of the German Democratic Republic.²⁵⁶

Khrushchev's speech could have been interpreted as mere posturing, but it was accompanied by a twenty page memorandum published and distributed by the East Germans, which hinted at the seriousness of the Soviet initiative.²⁵⁷ Khrushchev's speech alarmed even the Yugoslavs, who had a military mission in Berlin and were concerned with his intentions. When the East German envoy Staimer delivered her government's memorandum to the Yugoslav state undersecretary

²⁵⁶ As cited in Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, p. 396.

²⁵⁷ *FRUS, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII*, ed. Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 27. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v08>.

Prica, she assured him that Khrushchev was not threatening unilateral action, but was merely stating Soviet readiness to relinquish the last of its control in the GDR.²⁵⁸ Yugoslav concern was significant enough for its foreign ministry to request from its legal department an assessment regarding possible ramifications of Khrushchev's latest actions. Their conclusion was that, judging by the speech, Khrushchev's intentions were inconclusive, but that any unilateral action would not be a violation of international law – since the current situation outgrew the parameters set by the Potsdam agreement – as long as the rights of the other Powers and West Germany were respected.²⁵⁹ Judging by this assessment, there was no immediate cause for Yugoslav action at this point, which probably suited Tito after the difficult year behind him. However, on November 27, Khrushchev followed up his speech with a more concrete proposal for solving the Berlin question. His plan was to force the Powers to sign a German peace treaty wherein Berlin would become a free and demilitarized city. The deadline for the peace treaty was six months, after which the Soviets would unilaterally transfer their authority in Berlin to the East Germans.²⁶⁰ The Yugoslavs were now faced with a tangible problem, but they were still avoiding taking a decisive stance, and when they finally did give a statement on the Berlin situation to the foreign press, it seemed evasive. From a Soviet and East German point of view, the Yugoslav press was even less supportive of their cause, since their content allegedly reflected a Western point of view, which the GDR saw as openly siding with the “imperialist states.”²⁶¹

258 “Zabeleška” (November 15, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1199/i.

259 “Medjunarodnopravni položaj Berlina” (November 21, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 1225/i.

260 Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, p. 397.

261 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, pp. 67-68. A more detailed East German view of the Yugoslav press at this time can be seen in PA AA, MfAA, C 441, pp. 55-57.

The Yugoslav reaction may have irritated the East Germans, but it should not have completely surprised them. Namely, an anti-Yugoslav campaign was simultaneously under way in the GDR, which probably did not encourage Belgrade to offer its support over the Berlin question. Started in early summer, following the termination of the aluminum treaty, the anti-Yugoslav campaign in East Germany had intensified by mid-October. One of the criticisms was that Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment was dangerous, since it allegedly equated the socialist with the "imperialistic" bloc, and that the criticism of Yugoslavia in the 1948 conflict with the Cominform was justified, since the same anti-socialist tendencies were still present in Yugoslavia's policies. The campaign also included personal attacks on Tito, calling him "arrogant" and "conceited," and a "leader of a small country that pretended to a leading role in the international worker's movement."²⁶² While the East Germans published these attacks using the usual channels – the press and low-level party officials – the campaign also included attacks from the highest levels of the SED. At a conference of fifteen Communist parties held in East Berlin in July, it was the SED leadership which suggested that a "strong judgment of revisionism, especially Yugoslav revisionism" be included in the final communiqué, and it was only due to the Italian Communist Party delegation's intervention that a milder assessment of Yugoslav policies was included.²⁶³ By mid-December it became clear to the East Germans that they would have to change their approach if they were to garner support from Yugoslavia, especially in the public sphere. One of the issues was that all Yugoslav reports from Berlin were filed by a correspondent for Tanjug (the Yugoslav national news agency) who was based in West Berlin, and who seemed to only repeat the writing of the West German press. Thus the East

262 "Antijugoslovenska kampanja u NDR" (November 8, 1958), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

263 "Angažovanje SED u antijugoslovenskoj kampanji" (undated), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

Germans planned to focus their attention on this correspondent in order to change the GDR's image in the Yugoslav press. In Yugoslavia itself, part of the plan was to distribute propaganda material directly to the major national newspapers, organize meetings with journalists and cultural circles, as well as show films dealing with the Berlin question. The East Germans hoped that these measures would clarify to the Yugoslav public that Soviet proposal would lead to a détente rather than the aggravation of the German question, as well as the international situation.²⁶⁴

Envoy Staimer also participated in the East German charm offensive. During a conversation with the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović, she praised the cleanliness of the Yugoslav sleeper cars – “unlike the Bulgarian ones” – and pledged to visit all six Yugoslav republics. Popović, on the other hand, was more concerned about an incident in East Berlin, where a visiting Albanian delegation, lead by Enver Hoxha, had engaged in open criticism of Yugoslavia during a reception in his honour.²⁶⁵ The Albanian tirade took place in the presence of the Yugoslav envoy, Mitja Vošnjak, who found this outburst offensive enough to leave the ceremony.²⁶⁶ Staimer tried to brush the incident aside, blaming the Albanian southern temperament, and assured Popović that none of what Hoxha said would be included in the final communiqué.²⁶⁷ It is true that Albania belonged to the group of socialist countries that were the most critical of Yugoslavia (the others being China and Bulgaria).²⁶⁸ The Albanian criticism was that much more jarring given the broken relationship between former allies Hoxha and Tito.²⁶⁹

264 The films suggested were *Alarm im Zirkus*, *Berliner Romanze*, and *Berlin-Ecke Schönhauser*. “Vorschläge für die Popularisierung der Berlin-Frage in der FVRJ. PA AA, MfAA, A 4994, pp. 7-8.

265 “Zabeleška” (January 13, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 138/i.

266 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 70.

267 “Zabeleška” (January 13, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 138/i.

268 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 198.

269 For the Yugoslav perspective of the breakdown in Yugo-Albanian relations, see Aleksandar Životić and Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile: (1945-1961)* (Beograd: Arhipelag : Institut za noviju

Nevertheless, the incident was a serious gaffe by the East Germans, especially in the midst of their propaganda campaign in Yugoslavia, and pointed towards a dissonance in the GDR structures that could not seem to reconcile their need for Yugoslav support and their animosity towards Tito's foreign policy.

Tito's travels

On December 2, Tito embarked on a several month long journey throughout the non-aligned world on his presidential yacht, *Galeb* (The Seagull).²⁷⁰ The motivation behind the trip was not only to strengthen Yugoslavia's relations with other non-aligned countries, but to also test the waters for the institutionalization of non-alignment. Drawing on experiences of the most current events, it was clear to Tito that Yugoslavia's precarious position in the bipolar world order could only be strengthened by creating an organization of like-minded countries outside the two Blocs.²⁷¹ His first meeting was an unofficial one with Abdul Gamal Nasser, during the *Galeb's* passage through the Suez Canal. Speaking about Yugoslavia's relation with the Soviet Bloc, Tito shared his frustration with the Egyptian president: "...[E]conomic relations with W. Germany are developing normally. They are fulfilling their commitments, so one can even say that they are acting more decently than the USSR regarding their economic commitments towards us."²⁷² When discussing the latest developments regarding Berlin and Khrushchev's initiative, however, Tito was less prone to criticism. During the Indonesian leg of his trip, Tito

istoriju Srbije, 2011); for the Albanian perspective see Blendi Fevziu, *Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania*, ed. Robert Elsie (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016).

270 During his tour, Tito visited Burma, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the UAR. Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, p. 165.

271 Ibid., p. 166.

272 "Kraći presjek situacije od prošlih razgovora na Brionima" (undated) AJ, KPR I-2-11-1.

told the Indonesian prime minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja that Khrushchev's intentions were good and that the West should try and reach a solution of the Berlin question. Although the Soviet proposal was flawed, it was up to the Western Powers to take advantage of Khrushchev's gesture.²⁷³ Throughout his Afro-Asian tour, Tito avoided discussing the GDR directly, opting to refer only to the USSR as the party of interest in the Eastern half of Germany. He had no qualms talking about the FRG.

Tito's next stop was India, and here his aversion to acknowledging the GDR reached a new level. Otto Grotewohl, the GDR's prime minister who was on an unofficial state visit to India at the same time, proposed a meeting with Tito, which he declined. In addition, Tito requested that Grotewohl be "kept busy" outside New Delhi while the Yugoslav president was visiting the Indian capital.²⁷⁴ The East Germans were aware of Tito's relationship with Nehru, and his attitude to Grotewohl probably did not help the East German prime minister's mission, which was to lobby for India's recognition. Conversely, Grotewohl was most likely aware of Tito's current attitude, and did not introduce Yugoslavia's recognition as an argument in his conversation with Nehru.²⁷⁵

It seemed that the incident in India did not encourage the East German leadership to adopt a friendlier position regarding Yugoslavia. Upon his return from the 21st Congress of the CPSU, Walter Ulbricht accused Yugoslavia of depending on "imperialistic" countries and for being a member of the NATO-sponsored Balkan Pact. Ulbricht was only repeating Khrushchev's words, but the intent to malign Yugoslavia's foreign policy was mutual.²⁷⁶ At the

273 "Zabeleška" (December 20, 1958), AJ, KPR I-2-11-2, pp. 14-15.

274 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 73.

275 "Vermerk" (February 6, 1959), BA, NY 4182/1324, pp. 28-54.

276 "Der Parteitag; der Erbauer des Kommunismus" *Neues Deutschland (Berlin, GDR)*, (February 15 1959), p. 3.
<http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19590215-0-3-0-0>

same time, Siegfried Hoeldtke of the GDR's Belgrade legation was reporting back to East Berlin about the lack of affirmative reporting on the GDR in the Yugoslav press. The main complaint was that all the news items pertaining to the East German activities, numerous though they were, comprised only wire stories. Hoeldtke gave as an example Grotewohl's tour of Asia, where the newspapers reported on his travels in a dry, factual manner, whereas the West German reactions and opinions on this event were more detailed and given more space in the Yugoslav press. The report lamented the general pro-Western bias in the Yugoslav press. This, according to Hoeldtke, was especially evident in the Yugoslav coverage of the German Question. His explanation was that the Yugoslavs neglected to separate their position on the GDR with the international issue of a divided Germany, and failed to openly engage with the content of the Soviet proposal.²⁷⁷

Khrushchev's note also influenced the state of Yugoslavia's relations with the FRG. The West Germans understood that they could not count on Yugoslavia's support without loosening at least some of the constraints of their diplomatic break up. In early December of 1958, the chairman and the editor-in-chief of the German national news agency DPA visited Belgrade for negotiations with the Tanjug agency. During their stay, they requested a meeting with undersecretary Prica, with the aim of finding out Yugoslavia's position regarding the renewal of diplomatic relations with the FRG. Prica answered that Yugoslavia was open to all possibilities, and would welcome the reversal of the Hallstein doctrine, but that previous attempts – such as the talks in Rome – did not build confidence for a mutually beneficial solution. Prica added that the biggest obstacle was the West German demand for Yugoslavia to recall their envoy from

²⁷⁷ "Haltung der jugoslawischer Presse zur DDR und zum Deutschlandproblem." (February 10, 1959) PA AA, MfAA, A 5071, pp. 31-33.

East Berlin.²⁷⁸ Yugoslavia was open to compromise, but after the lessons learned after the implementation of the Hallstein doctrine, it was not inclined to be reckless in their decision-making. Therefore, while a reversal of the recognition was out of the question, the Yugoslavs were less clear on “putting to sleep” their relations with the GDR, as Adenauer phrased it.²⁷⁹ This left room for optimistic speculations in Bonn.²⁸⁰ Thus, without a clear agenda, but with both sides keen on improving relations, delegations from Yugoslavia and the FRG met in Venice in February 1959, and attempted to assess their current relations and explore options for a way forward. The circumstances were promising, but in the course of the talks it transpired that their success again hinged on Yugoslavia’s willingness to venture beyond the limits of what they thought was prudent. ‘Putting to sleep’ their relations with the GDR was a step too far.²⁸¹

Despite the Venice talks not yielding any results, they did at least show Bonn that Belgrade was willing to discuss their bilateral issues. This was especially encouraging given Yugoslavia’s general aversion towards forging closer ties with the GDR. This, in combination with the new low in Yugo-Soviet relations, allowed Adenauer to maintain the status quo, which was certainly more preferable than a deterioration in relations. It is also important to note that the West Germans were not making an exception by offering a compromise to the Yugoslavs. Privately, Adenauer was equally open to a de facto recognition of the GDR – a de jure recognition was out of the question – which hinted towards a possible shift in Bonn’s German policy.²⁸² For the time being, the West German-Yugoslav relations would continue on the current path. Not having to worry about Yugoslavia turned out to be a boon to Adenauer, who focused

278 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1958), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 1324/i.

279 This figure of speech was used by Adenauer to symbolize any degree of a downgrade in Yugoslavia’s and the GDR’s diplomatic relations. Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 74.

280 Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, p. 99.

281 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 75.

282 Brady, *Eisenhower and Adenauer*, p. 247.

his attention on the next Geneva conference of foreign ministers, to be held in May 1959.²⁸³ The East German-Yugoslav relations followed the same pattern, but East Berlin found little comfort in the status quo.

An East German assessment of the Yugoslav position on the ‘West-Berlin question’ found that, although Yugoslavia hailed the Soviet plan as a positive development, the identification of “superpower bloc politics” as the root of the problem indicated that Yugoslavia was “trying to hold a hybrid position”, which should be monitored very closely in future negotiations with the Yugoslavs.²⁸⁴ Again, the East Germans simply could not accept Yugoslavia’s non-alignment. As soon as Belgrade’s position did not align perfectly with that of Moscow and East Berlin, the officials in the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MfAA) saw it as a dangerous deviation that needed to be remedied.

The interactions between Yugoslav diplomats in East Berlin and their hosts attested to the icy relations and mistrust between the two countries. In February, the East Germans banned a showing of a Yugoslav film, citing its “inappropriateness” for local audiences, and argued that they wanted to spare the Yugoslavs the embarrassment of audience members walking out. In another interaction, the East Germans berated envoy Vošnjak for displaying in open sight the program of the 7th SKJ congress on their book stand at the Leipzig Trade Fair, “where it could have been taken by anyone.” The Yugoslavs pleaded ignorance, but it later transpired that the publishing companies displayed the programs on their own and only gave them out when someone requested them. To Vošnjak it seemed that the East German reaction was exaggerated,

283 The three Western powers agreed on February 16 to hold the conference as a response to the Soviet draft of a peace treaty for Germany, published on January 10.

284 “Verhalten Jugoslawiens zum Abschluß des Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland und zur Lösung der West-Berlin-Frage” (April 27, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A C 369/75, pp. 50-55.

since he believed that the people who did take a program were all secret police agents, since regular citizens would have been too afraid to ask for one.²⁸⁵ These incidents, while small, were not insignificant. They were symptomatic of the state of cultural relations between the two countries: generally very poor, and sporadic at best.²⁸⁶ They also exposed the unwillingness of the East Germans – and to an extent the Yugoslavs as well – to mend their crumbling relations. However, the East Germans were far from nonchalant about Yugoslavia’s contacts with the FRG.

The East German deputy foreign minister Sepp Schwab attempted to extract information about the Yugo-FRG Venice talks from Vošnjak, who promised to inquire about the matter with Belgrade.²⁸⁷ Staimer and her staff tried to find out more in Belgrade, but it seemed that the only source available to their contacts was a Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) correspondent, who was willing to share only the most general information about the talks.²⁸⁸ Vošnjak returned a couple of weeks later, and almost teasingly informed Schwab that he now had more information, but was unable to share more than he did during their last conversation. However, Vošnjak was willing to discuss other matters in more detail, namely the visit of a SPD delegation in Belgrade.²⁸⁹

Led by deputy Bundestag fraction leader Fritz Erler, the SPD delegation was welcomed with open arms, and their talks with SKJ officials were friendly. The SPD delegation was

285 Interestingly, the East Germans omitted any mention of Yugoslavia in the Leipzig Trade Fair program. “Pregled pošte iz DR Nemačke” (April 2, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 237/i.

286 There were, however, some improvements. A Yugoslav report from 1960 noted that a plan of cultural cooperation was in the works, mostly due to the East Germans finally showing some interest for its establishment. Also, according to the report, cooperation in sports was satisfactory. “Informacija o Nemačkoj demokratskoj republici” (April 20, 1960), KPR I-3-a/82-2, doc. no. 271/i.

287 “Vermerk” (March 20, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 21-22.

288 “Kurzinformation über den Besuch einer SPD-Delegation in Jugoslawien” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 41-45.

289 “Vermerk” (April 3, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 24-32.

returning from Moscow, where they met with Khrushchev and presented their new plan for solving the German Question. They introduced the plan to their Belgrade hosts as well, and told them that they supported the unconditional renewal of diplomatic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia, while criticising Adenauer as “reactionary.”²⁹⁰ However, the two delegations found little common ground as far as the current division of Germany was concerned.²⁹¹ Nevertheless, Erler also invited a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation to West Germany, where he “would secure for the delegation contact with the government in Bonn.”²⁹²

After Vošnjak informed Schwab about this visit, the latter argued that it remained to be seen whether the SPD was simply paying lip service to German reunification.²⁹³ The discussion was immaterial, since the SPD was not able to gain Khrushchev’s support for their plan. East Berlin was equally loathe to consider the SPD plan, which proposed a German confederation, but the Soviets instructed the East Germans to feign interest, in order to stimulate the SPD left wing’s support for the SED. However, this campaign fizzled out with the Geneva summit a few months later, and its death was confirmed with the change in SPD’s direction in late 1959.²⁹⁴ On November 13, at its congress in Bad Godesberg, the SPD had decided that the party should “modernize” and become a catch-all party, which meant leaving behind its traditional goal of building socialism, which also meant distancing itself even more from Moscow.²⁹⁵

A much more urgent issue for Belgrade was the anti-Yugoslav campaign in the Soviet Bloc that began at the 21st CPSU Congress in February, but showed no signs of abating. Vošnjak

290 “Zabeleška” (March 26, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 213/i-59.

291 The SPD believed that the USSR intended to make the division of Germany permanent with their latest policies. Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 276.

292 “Zabeleška” (March 26, 1959), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-3, doc. no. 223/i-49.

293 “Vermerk” (April 3, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5072, pp. 24-32.

294 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, pp. 143-144.

295 Harold Kent Schellenger, *The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 86-87.

asked the East Germans for support in this matter, but was rudely interrupted by Schwab, who told him that this was not an East German concern, and that Vošnjak “knew the address” where he should direct his complaints, alluding to the source of the campaign in the Kremlin. From that point on, the tone of the meeting escalated, with both sides demanding support for their policies, which they both believed was unreciprocated. At the end of the conversation, Vošnjak attempted to unofficially solicit the GDR’s support for Yugoslavia’s bid to expand the number of participants at the Geneva summit, but Schwab berated him, saying that the GDR is presently concerned only with its own participation.²⁹⁶

The truth about the anti-Yugoslav campaign, of course, was somewhere between Yugoslavia’s and East Germany’s respective positions. The East German government was following the direction set by Khrushchev at the CPSU Congress, albeit in a less ferocious manner than some other Soviet satellites. A possible reason for this was that they did indeed require Yugoslavia’s help in the international arena. The East Germans were probably relieved when they read former Yugoslav ambassador in the FRG Mladen Iveković’s editorial in the SKJ party organ *Borba*. Iveković criticized Adenauer’s government for effectively trying to use the Venice talks to take advantage of the alleged precarious relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc – including the GDR – to reaffirm the Hallstein Doctrine. Iveković went on to condemn Adenauer for doing so months before the Geneva Conference, and for failing to work together with the SPD regarding German reunification.²⁹⁷ Iveković’s editorial smacked of defensiveness. Yugoslavia was feeling vulnerable as a result of Khrushchev’s anti-Yugoslav campaign, as evidenced by Vošnjak’s meeting with Schwab, and it did not appreciate

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ “Mißerfolge einer ‘Doktrin’” (April 1, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 46-48.

Adenauer's proposal for Yugoslavia to 'put to sleep' its relations with the GDR. At the same time, Belgrade was not inclined to improve its relations with East Berlin as long as it was participating in attacks on Yugoslavia. Temporary relief came in mid-1959, although not from Yugoslavia's own strength or diplomatic prowess, but from Moscow.

The 1959 Geneva summit

In late spring of 1959, the Soviets were preparing for the Geneva Summit, and the continuation of attacks on Yugoslavia in their current form and intensity, would have reflected poorly on Khrushchev and even weakened his position at the summit, which would force him to go on the defensive in front of the other Powers. Therefore, Khrushchev decided to deescalate the conflict with Belgrade. Some Soviet statements around this period did indicate a considerable deescalation of the Yugo-Soviet conflict, but the Yugoslav leadership dismissed Kremlin's overtures. The Yugoslavs believed that the Soviets had no real intentions to improve relations.²⁹⁸

Rather, Belgrade saw these olive branches, and rightly so, as part of the Soviet charm offensive. This mini-thaw, however, did allow the GDR and Yugoslavia to discuss the Summit under somewhat less strained circumstances. In a conversation with the MfAA Yugoslav section head Otto Becker, the Yugoslav press attaché in East Berlin, Veselin Lazović, attempted to gain some clarity on the GDR's position before the summit, in particular regarding the GDR's position on Yugoslavia's efforts to expand the circle of participants at the conference. After a prolonged discussion about mass organization cooperation, Lasović finally addressed the issue

²⁹⁸ Đoko Tripković, *Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971* (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2013), pp. 102-103.

at hand. The East Germans could offer no satisfying answer, and directed Lasović to the earlier conversation between Schwab and Vošnjak. Given the way that particular conversation ended, one can conclude that the East Germans were not inclined to lobby for Yugoslavia's participation, especially after Lazović conceded that there was not much interest in the conference among Yugoslav workers.²⁹⁹ The lack of support for this bid bothered the Yugoslavs, but the East Germans brushed their grievances aside, arguing that the Geneva summit was not a peace conference, and that not anyone could attend it, and, after all, it was only due to Soviet intervention that the GDR was able to attend the summit. As for Poland and Czechoslovakia, who did receive support in this matter from the GDR, well, they were East Germany's neighbours, and as such did have a direct interest in the summit.³⁰⁰ Not wanting to press the issue further and escalating it to a formal complaint, the Yugoslavs backed away.

The GDR's and Yugoslavia's inability to come to an agreement stemmed from their disparate foreign policies, and ultimately, their ideological differences and allegiances. The East Germans denied the Yugoslavs their support because they rejected Belgrade's apparent desire to barter for favours. The GDR understood that the Yugoslavs offered a quid pro quo arrangement, where the Yugoslavs would support the East German foreign policy in exchange for their support for participating at the summit. East Berlin assessed this offer as disingenuous, and essentially antithetical to socialist internationalism as practised by the Soviet Bloc countries.³⁰¹ From the Yugoslav perspective, there was no obligation to obey the Bloc code of conduct. Belgrade's proposal slotted neatly in their active coexistence policy, which advocated cooperation between countries that did not depend on bloc alliances, but in fact aimed to

299 "Aktenvermerk" (May 11, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 55-58.

300 "Aktenvermerk" (May 20, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 60-63.

301 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 83.

overcome them.³⁰² The Yugoslavs were ultimately unable to obtain a seat at the table in Geneva after failing to secure Western backing as well, since the rest of the Powers saw no reason why a country, which from their perspective, was aligned with the USSR on this matter, should be allowed to participate at the summit. This constituted a considerable setback to Yugoslavia's foreign policy, since Belgrade saw itself as a natural intermediary between the blocs.

The Geneva summit began on May 11, 1959, and ended three months later. The circle of participants remained small as initially intended, with the Four Powers, represented by their foreign ministers seated at the large, central table. In addition, there were three smaller tables, which the West German press dubbed the *Katzentische*, the children's tables (literally the 'cats' tables'). On the central small table sat the summit's secretariat, to their left sat the East German delegation headed by the foreign minister Lothar Bolz, and on their right the West German delegation, led by the state secretary Wilhelm Grewe.³⁰³ The seating arrangement showed that the delegations from the two Germanies were treated as equals for the first time since 1951, no small victory for the East Germans.³⁰⁴ However, the three Western powers were also quick to point out that the GDR's participation was not an unofficial act of recognition. Naturally, the USSR saw it as just that.³⁰⁵ Western observers understood that Khrushchev's intention – in the face of the fast approaching deadline he himself imposed on the other three powers regarding Berlin – was “the confirmation of the status quo.”³⁰⁶ Thus, they did not expect too much from the conference, especially with the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko on the other side.³⁰⁷

302 Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, pp. 76-77.

303 “Botschafter am Katzentisch,” *Die Zeit*, November 21, 2012, <http://www.zeit.de/1959/20/botschafter-am-katzentisch>.

304 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, pp. 100-101.

305 Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, p. 412.

306 Kitty Newman, *Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 101.

307 The Western Powers believed that Khrushchev would want to be there in person if there was any credit to be taken. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*, p. 122.

Ultimately, the summit yielded no real results in terms of solving the German question, but it did bring the powers together in order to probe the concerns on both sides, and temporarily ended the tense situation over Berlin. Khrushchev reneged on his Berlin ultimatum, agreeing to the other three powers staying on in Berlin for the time being.

Conversely, the East Germans were initially far more enthusiastic about their debut on the global diplomatic stage. The West German press even reported that the Soviets reprimanded the delegation from East Berlin because of its aggressiveness during the conference's early days.³⁰⁸ Therefore, the staff of the GDR's Belgrade legation was understandably irritated by the lack of summit coverage in the Yugoslav press. They reported back to East Berlin that there was little content on the summit in general and when there was any, it was void of editorial commentary. Even worse was the coverage of the GDR's delegation's activities. The Yugoslav correspondent from Geneva chose to write about the "essentially identical" positions instead of "the great differences" between the two German delegations.³⁰⁹ At the same time, Tito stated in a speech that he expected the powers to de facto recognize the GDR, since the existence of two Germanies with two different social and political systems could not be overlooked, and that the reunification was a problem that had to be solved by Germans alone.³¹⁰

Since the East Germans did not believe the Yugoslavs supported them in earnest and had made clear to Belgrade that any sort of exchange of favours was unlikely, Tito's statement could most likely be attributed to the lingering Yugoslav desire to participate in the discussion over the German Question. In one internal report which outlined Yugoslavia's foreign policy's approach

308 "GENF / DEUTSCHE FRAGE: Die Birne," *Der Spiegel*, May 20, 1959, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42625395.html>.

309 "Zwischenbericht" (July 17, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, A 5701, pp. 99-109.

310 "Haltung Jugoslawiens zur Deutschlandfrage im Zusammenhang mit der Genfer Konferenz" (July 4, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C 369/75, pp.41-49.

to the GDR, one MfAA analysts even went as far as to describe it as “petty bourgeois,” and, as such, failed to acknowledge the differences between the socialist and capitalist societies, which made Belgrade’s wish to treat Bonn and East Berlin as equals a simple fig leaf for its self-serving interests.³¹¹ Since the GDR believed that Belgrade’s statements of intent were not sincere, it was up to the GDR to inform the Yugoslavs of the dangerous tendencies in West Germany.³¹² However, the report concluded, due to the potential benefits of Yugoslav support during the Geneva conference, the Soviets were willing to overlook the negative aspects of their foreign policy.³¹³ Disregarding actual Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia during the Geneva summit, this report indicates that the East Germans were less inclined to strike out on their own as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, and that in East Berlin Soviet considerations were still given precedence when creating the GDR’s Yugoslav policies.

When the Geneva summit ended on August 5, 1959, Germany was nowhere nearer reunification. For the most part, the status quo was maintained. Khrushchev’s visit to Washington in September failed to deliver the great breakthrough regarding the German Question, although the Americans promised Khrushchev a summit meeting in the spring of next year. And as the year drew to a close, chancellor Adenauer stated – and the Berlin mayor Willy Brandt agreed with him – that no change in the current status of Berlin would be preferable, and that Berlin should be integral to any future talks about the German Question.³¹⁴ The relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies were likewise generally unchanged. Bonn and

311 “Über die Jugoslawische Haltung zur Deutschlandfrage” (August 29, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C 369/75, pp.34-40.

312 According to the report, these tendencies included nuclear armament, but also renewed *Anschluss* of Austria. Ibid.

313 Ibid.

314 “Adenauer und Brandt völlig einig, daß keine Änderung des derzeitigen Berlin-Status wünschenswert sei” [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: November, P. 113. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 13941 (cf. AdG Bd. 3, P. 2541)]

Belgrade continued their economic cooperation while at the same time keeping their diplomatic relations broken off, while the relations between East Berlin and Belgrade followed the oscillating Yugo-Soviet relations. Within this framework, however, there were some significant changes in each of the relations.

New positions

In November of 1959, the SPD adopted a new party program with which they broke away from their Marxist revolutionary past, but equally as important, changed its German policy, since giving “priority to German reunification over the Federal Republic's Western integration seemed to lead the party even further along a dead end road, and doom it to additional years of stagnation.”³¹⁵ The rejection of Marxian foundations was most likely not welcomed in Belgrade, and the SPD’s turn towards Western integration definitely meant that the Yugoslavs lost a reliable and sympathetic interlocutor in Bonn. In a speech given at a party rally in Zagreb on December 14, Tito criticized Adenauer’s refusal to recognize the reality of a divided Germany, but hoped that “there will be found people in West Germany who, sooner or later, will realize this as a fact which they have to take into account.”³¹⁶ Given the SPD’s shift towards the centre and thereby closer to Adenauer, it is unclear who Tito had in mind when he gave this speech.

315 Dietrich Orlow, “Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945-1966,” *German Studies Review* 16, no. 1 (1993): 77–102, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1430232>, p. 89.

316 “Tito States Main Task is to Defend Interests of his Own Country” (December 14, 1959), HU OSA 300-8-3. <http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:2a8f08ed-b8fc-445f-ac31-12ef9e293fe8>

The economic relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia also seemed to have been suffering during this period. The trade agreement extension for 1959 was only signed after the deadline had passed, and the position of the economic advisor at the Zagreb consulate was left vacant between November 1959 and February 1960.³¹⁷ Although the economic relations were undoubtedly better than the diplomatic ones for obvious reasons, due to the lack of political support they too were beginning to suffer under the strain of the Hallstein doctrine.

The deterioration of one set of relations did not imply the improvement of the other. After the Geneva summit, the GDR's foreign policy became more rigid. East German disappointment with the Soviet fumbling over the German question, combined with the ever growing numbers of refugees fleeing to the West, spurred the SED to change course.³¹⁸ Ulbricht demanded not only support, but also action from Khrushchev, while simultaneously escalating attacks on the FRG, especially the SPD. The GDR and Yugoslavia were unable to build on the mutual aversion to the SPD's transformation, since the SED found more similarities than differences between the SKJ and the SPD than differences, and openly criticized them for this imagined overlap.³¹⁹ The East German indictment was familiar: Yugoslav "revisionism" and anti-bloc position were no better than anything coming out of the FRG, echoing East Berlin's position in the early 1950s.³²⁰ As a result, at the beginning of 1960 the Yugoslav pendulum between the two Germanies was faintly swaying around the centre. Having failed to insert itself in the international discussion over the German Question, Yugoslavia had reached a new nadir in European politics.

317 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 90.

318 Scholtyseck, *Die Außenpolitik Der DDR*, p. 19.

319 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 95.

320 "East German Leader Accuses Yugoslavs of Revisionism" (January 28, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:21df2989-cfbd-436b-a5b7-988e5652ce44>

The bickering between the GDR and Yugoslavia continued throughout the spring of 1960 but was mainly limited to the press.³²¹ Then, a brief respite occurred in the mid-1960. First, a group of East German observers from the National Front attended the 5th Congress of its Yugoslav counterpart the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), which was the largest mass organization in Yugoslavia. Its goal was the ideological education and political participation of the Yugoslav population without the burden of actual membership in the SKJ. During their stay, the National Front delegates met with a number of Yugoslav party officials, as well as president Tito. Although their meeting with Tito was somewhat awkward – Tito had indirectly told the East Germans that their attempts at collectivization were bound to fail, based on Yugoslav experiences – their stay in Yugoslavia seemed to have been a mostly positive experience.³²² This was most likely the result of the absence of contact between the delegates and the Belgrade GDR legation that, according to a Yugoslav report, was actively avoiding meeting them. Being members of an organization that had only the most rudimentary ideological education, and having no instructions from the East German diplomats, they probably decided not to engage in political debate with Tito, and limited their comments on the more technical aspects of their particular field of expertise.³²³

Later, after finally meeting with the Belgrade legation staff, the delegates did engage in discussion with local officials on Yugoslavia's social system, as well as its foreign policy, but without the vitriolic tone so familiar to Yugoslavs from their previous contacts with the East

321 Letter from Staimer to the MfAA, (March 25, 1960), PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, pp. 4-7.

322 "Promatrači Nacionalnog fronta Nemačke demokratske republike na V kongresu SSRNJ" (May 7, 1960) 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ. The criticism of the collectivization in the GDR had been a staple of the Yugoslav response to East German anti-Yugoslav campaign. See: "Yugoslavs Say "Punitive Organs" in East Germany to Promote Collectivization" (February 16, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3; "Yugoslav Paper on Collectivization in East Germany" (April 6, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3.

323 "Promatrači Nacionalnog fronta Nemačke demokratske republike na V kongresu SSRNJ" (May 7, 1960) 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

Germans.³²⁴ Regardless of the circumstances, this was a clear improvement in the relations between East Berlin and Belgrade. On the heels of the National Front delegation came the visit of an East German parliamentary delegation led by the People's Chamber's president Johannes Dieckmann. In their conversation with Tito, which was conducted in a friendly atmosphere, the East Germans thanked him for his speech at the SSRNJ congress, wherein he indirectly attacked the FRG, and made pro-Soviet remarks.³²⁵ Apart from that, the conversation centred on the GDR's and Yugoslavia's respective achievements, with both sides openly discussing various aspects of socialist state building and the economy.³²⁶ The relations Belgrade and East Berlin had not been this friendly since the recognition, but they were not to last more than a few weeks. Again, the international situation obstructed the reconciliation.

The failed Paris summit and the 15th United Nations General Assembly

On May 1, an American U-2 spy plane crashed in the USSR while on a reconnaissance mission. The pilot survived and was captured by the Soviets. Khrushchev was rightfully incensed, but decided to keep the pilot's capture secret from the public while he deliberated his future course of action. An event worthy of an international scandal in itself, the damage done to the US-USSR relations by this incident was compounded by its timing. A new Four Power summit was to take place in Paris on May 16, and while Khrushchev decided to attend it despite

324 For example, the East Germans indicated that Yugoslavia's non-alignment could be discussed, and refrained from rejecting it. "Zabeleška" (April, 1960), 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

325 *FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2*, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 155.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/ch4>

326 "Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika republike Josipa Broza Tita sa članovima parlamentarne delegacije DR Nemačke s predsednikom parlamenta Johanes Dikmanom na čelu" (April 29, 1960), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-2, doc. no. 2196/2.

the incident, the crash was weighing too heavily on the Soviet leader. He felt betrayed by president Eisenhower, who had authorized the mission. Just days before his departure to Paris, Khrushchev decided to sabotage the summit with the revelation that the pilot was in Soviet hands.³²⁷ From the Soviet perspective, the only thing that could have saved the summit was an apology from Eisenhower, but the American president refused to do so, thereby effectively ending the talks.³²⁸ The news of the U-2 plane and the collapse of the Paris summit also set in motion a series of events that stopped the GDR-Yugoslav rapprochement. On May 17, Tito touched upon the failed summit in a speech at a rally in Subotica. In the speech, Tito blamed the US for authorizing the spy plane missions, but concluded that this incident did not warrant Soviet withdrawal. Holding a non-aligned position inevitably earned Tito a salvo of criticism from Socialists. Leading the charge were Albania and China, who derided Belgrade for “serving imperialism.”³²⁹

China, which had been one of the most vocal critics of Yugoslavia ever since the Tito-Stalin split, had by 1960 become heavily entrenched in an ideological conflict with the USSR. Beijing questioned Moscow’s leadership of the socialist camp, and the U-2 incident provided more fodder for the Chinese leader, Mao Tse-Tung, who not only felt vindicated for his mistrust of Eisenhower – thereby indirectly criticizing Khrushchev’s perceived gullibility and weakness – but also used the incident to pursue stronger influence among socialist countries.³³⁰ The East

327 Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, pp. 459-460.

328 See William B. Pickett, “Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair: A Forty-Six-Year Retrospective” in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honoring Robert H. Ferrell* (University of Missouri Press, 2007); For two recent assessments of Eisenhower’s tenure, including his handling of the U-2 incident, see Louis Galambos, *Eisenhower: Becoming the Leader of the Free World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017); William I. Hitchcock, *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).

329 “Yugoslav-Soviet Skirmish over Broken Summit” (May 23, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:80cd3923-27d7-4447-91de-1c2f1ae3d5e4>

330 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 165.

Germans were trying to keep a low profile in the Sino-Soviet conflict, believing that improved relations with China could aid their foreign policy in Asia, and found common ground with the Chinese in criticizing Yugoslavia.³³¹

The East Germans found that Tito had reverted to his “old tendencies.”³³² Tito’s position was truly reflective of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment, but it was peculiar that it came just weeks after he voiced support for Khrushchev at the SSRNJ congress. It is possible that that speech was tailored to his audience, namely the representatives of various foreign socialist mass organizations, but the speech in Subotica represented Tito’s endorsement of a non-aligned policy, which he would soon take to the global stage.

Around the time of the Paris summit, Tito began preparations for the United Nations General Assembly in September.³³³ After the failure of acquiring an invitation to the Geneva summit, the General Assembly presented itself as an even better substitute for a chance to promote Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. Unlike during the buildup to the summit, Yugoslavia did not have to lobby for an invitation, and would also have a larger, global audience. Furthermore, Tito had secured the Egyptian president Nasser’s support prior to the conference, thereby amplifying his message of non-alignment.³³⁴ Between the breakdown of talks between Khrushchev and Eisenhower and the escalation of the crisis in Congo, the German Question was going to be pushed to the side at the 15th UN General Assembly, even though the West German

331 In a rare example of willful divergence away from Moscow’s control, the East Germans’ were able to send a delegation to Beijing in 1961, without Moscow’s approval, to discuss the Berlin crisis and the political status of Taiwan. Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 168.

332 Letter from Vosseler to the MfAA, Sektion Jugoslawien, (May 17, 1960), PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, p. 12.

333 Tito had sent an envoy to several African nations in May 1960 as part of these preparations. Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, p. 167.

334 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, pp. 342-343.

weekly *Die Welt* claimed that Tito was planning to address it on the East River.³³⁵ The East Germans also dismissed this claim as a provocation, since such a bold move would have to be coupled with a proposed solution, or at least a strong position on the German Question, something that Yugoslavia had been stubbornly refusing to do for years.³³⁶ However, the East Germans were concerned with the FRG's military's recent request for nuclear armament. With this in mind, the East German counsellor in Belgrade Walter Vosseler met with Veljko Mićunović, who had taken the position of the state undersecretary after his return from Moscow, and informed him that the GDR would be initiating a campaign for nuclear disarmament for both Germanies in front of the General Assembly. Vosseler, an experienced communist who had survived the Spanish Civil War, Stalin's purges, and German concentration camps, did not divulge the details of the East German campaign, but Mićunović professed that Yugoslavia shared the same position, saying that "the GDR activity in New York, as part of general activity against nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr [...] was a desirable and positive measure that will enjoy the support of everyone who condemns this militaristic conception of [the FRG] as a dangerous threat to peace."³³⁷ Mićunović concluded that the Yugoslav position towards this campaign would, in general terms, be positive.³³⁸ This was as close to a complete endorsement that the GDR had received from Yugoslavia since the recognition in 1957, but it was more an indication of Yugoslav non-alignment than an olive branch offering to the East Germans. In fact, the East Germans acknowledged the sincerity of this statement because they believed that Yugoslavia was indeed extremely worried about West German nuclear armament.³³⁹ Another

335 "Tito und Nasser beraten über UNO-Lösung für Berlin," *Die Welt*, May 24, 1960, in PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, p. 23.

336 Letter from Vosseler to Becker, June 14, 1960. PA AA, MfAA, A 5130, pp. 25-26.

337 "Zabeleška" (September 9, 1960), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-1, doc. no. 544/i.

338 Ibid.

339 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, pp. 100-101.

indication that the Yugoslavs were actually supporting the East Germans was that there was no reaction from Belgrade when the East Germans introduced special passes for West Berliners wishing to travel outside the three Western Zones.³⁴⁰

In the midst of the Yugoslav preparations for the General Assembly, Tito met with George Kennan, the former US ambassador to the USSR, who at the time was working at Princeton and was attending an academic conference in Belgrade.³⁴¹ According to Kennan, Tito believed the Soviet plan for Berlin as a free city made no sense if it did not include East Berlin as well, which was a concession the Soviets – or the East Germans – were not willing to make. As for Yugoslav relations with the FRG, Tito “laughed about the German break with Yugoslavia, saying that it had hardly affected the course of events at all.”³⁴²

The Yugoslavs truly did not seem to be overly concerned about the lack of resolution between them and the FRG. As long as the cogs of their economic relations were oiled and moving at a satisfactory rate, the diplomacy could wait. Such was the Yugoslav confidence that their plans for a foreign exchange reform relied partially on the availability of a West German loan.³⁴³ Therefore, there was realistically no danger of Tito bringing up the German Question at the UN. During his speech to the General Assembly, Tito addressed a wide range of subjects.

340 “DDR-Behörden erkennen bei Westberlinern nur noch Westberliner Personalausweis, nicht aber Bundespaß, als legitimes Dokument an” [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: September, P. 60. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 14789 (cf. AdG Bd. 3, P. 2698)]

341 Kennan was the US ambassador to the USSR for several months in 1952, and was the author of the “Long Telegram,” an outline of a containment strategy aimed at stopping Communist expansion in Europe, which informed much of president Truman’s Soviet policy. He would become the US ambassador in Yugoslavia in 1961. See John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); For Kennan’s time in Belgrade see Dragan Bisenić, *Mister X - Džordž Kenan u Beogradu (1961-1963)* (Klub Plus, 2011).

342 *FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2*, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 161.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/ch4>

343 *FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2*, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 163.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v10p2/ch4>

The majority of his speech was dedicated to the developments in Africa and the end of colonialism, but he also touched upon the “revival of militarism” in the FRG.³⁴⁴ The decision to focus on the FRG was conspicuous. On September 13, just over a week before the UN General Assembly, Ulbricht had introduced visas for West Berliners entering East Berlin.³⁴⁵ However, Tito’s speech in New York did not reflect his actions, because his efforts behind the scenes were focused on rapprochement between the Superpowers. Supported by a coalition he formed with Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno and Nkrumah, Tito sponsored a resolution that called for the superpowers to resume talks. Despite the resolution narrowly losing the vote at the General Assembly due to opposing votes from US-aligned countries (the socialist bloc was sustained), Tito’s five state initiative was a bold statement by the non-aligned leaders. In a conversation with Tito during the Assembly, US president Kennedy said, “that he understood the neutral position of Yugoslavia, but expressed the hope that as the old saying went, it would be neutral on our side.” It seemed that Kennedy was not pleased with Tito’s initiative.³⁴⁶ Although the international press falsely was this campaign as a founding moment of a third Cold War bloc, there was no denying that a new, strong voice in global politics, which challenged both the Soviets and the Americans, had emerged at the UN.³⁴⁷

As much as Yugoslavia’s new role at the UN grabbed the world’s attention, it did little to improve its relations with the GDR and the FRG. This was most likely due to the Yugoslav decision to focus on other matters in New York, but even Tito’s activities in general did not elicit a response from the German press. The competition between the two Germanies in Yugoslavia

344 “Tito’s Speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations,” (September 24, 1960), HU OSA 300-8-3.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:a8ab6fc7-418d-4af1-8263-061924a7b961>

345 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 133.

346 *FRUS, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2*, ed. Glenn W. LaFantasie, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), Document 170.

347 Bogetić, *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike*, p. 343.

manifested itself even as Tito was forging new alliances at the UN. The Zagreb Fair, the largest in the country, hosted exhibits from both countries, and the East German press informed the public of the prominence of the GDR exhibits and the success they enjoyed at the fair, from Tito visiting their pavilion and inquiring about the achievements of the Carl Zeiss-Jena works, to the ‘Day of the GDR’, attended by 300 Yugoslav dignitaries and foreign diplomats.³⁴⁸ But the East German legation reports to East Berlin were marked with concern about the FRG’s presence at the fair. Reportedly, they had their own brand new pavilion, as well as an information stand staffed with West German officials. It worried the East Germans that the West Germans might have an even larger presence at the fair than they did.³⁴⁹ Although this seemed like a relatively insignificant issue, the East Germans were most likely aware that the Zagreb Fair dwarfed the GDR showpiece fair in Leipzig – which took place earlier that month – at least in terms of non-Eastern Bloc participants, a fact even the West German press picked up on.³⁵⁰ Hence, avoiding being outdone by the FRG in Yugoslavia (of all countries) was indeed an issue worth fretting over for the East Germans, however inconsequential to actually making a difference in the GDR’s international prestige. A small contribution to the latter arrived in December, when Yugoslavia and the GDR finally signed a new four-year trade agreement, which ambitiously proposed that the economic exchange in 1961 increase by almost 160 percent in comparison to 1960.³⁵¹

While this new agreement was still just a fraction of the economic exchange volume between the FRG and Yugoslavia, it clearly showed that the economic relations between East

348 “Raum für Frühjahrsmesse is bald vergeben” *Berliner Zeitung* (Berlin, GDR), September 14, 1960; “Tag der DDR in Zagreb” *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, GDR), September 22, 1960.

349 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 99.

350 “Schwarze Messe in Leipzig” *Die Zeit*, September 16, 1960. <http://www.zeit.de/1960/38/schwarze-messe-in-leipzig>

351 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 101.

Berlin and Belgrade were moving along, however slowly and meanderingly. In this sense, Yugoslavia's relations with the GDR began to look increasingly like the ones with the FRG. That is to say, the economic element was developing independently from the political one, and for the most part, the former was more advanced than the latter. However, as was typical for these relations, the current situation would not be maintained as status quo. In the spring of 1961, following the moderate success of a non-aligned coalition's debut at the UN, the Yugoslavs announced that a conference of the non-aligned countries would take place later that year. The conference would provide another arena for the GDR's attempts at breaking through the Hallstein doctrine, with Yugoslavia playing a key part, not as an ally, but as a defensive host.

Conclusion

After the initial shock of Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR wore off, it seemed that not much has changed in the relations between Belgrade, East Berlin, and Bonn. Yugoslavia retained the crucial economic ties with West Germany, while the recognition did little to diminish Soviet and East German antipathy towards Yugoslavia's brand of socialism. However, between 1958 and 1960, the German question did have an effect on how Yugoslavia conducted its foreign policy.

Khrushchev's November 1958 decision to instigate the Berlin Crisis had a far reaching effect on how Tito viewed the world. The resulting diplomatic standoff between the USSR and the US over Berlin put the Yugoslav leader in a precarious position. The reasons for this were of ideological nature. The gains of the post-Stalinist rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR had melted away by early 1958, mostly over the contents of the new SKJ program, which

did not align ideologically with the CPSU. The Soviets launched an anti-Yugoslav campaign soon thereafter, and the Yugoslavs responded in kind. In June 1958, after Khrushchev criticized Yugoslavia for accepting US aid, Tito famously retorted:

Comrade Khrushchev often repeats that Socialism cannot be built with American wheat. I think it can be done by anyone who knows how to do it, while a person who doesn't know how to do it cannot build Socialism even with his own wheat. Khrushchev says we live on charity received from the imperialist countries ... What moral right have those who attack us to rebuke us about American aid or credits when Khrushchev himself has just tried to conclude an economic agreement with America?³⁵²

The poor relations between Moscow and Belgrade naturally precluded any outright Yugoslav support for Khrushchev's Berlin plan. The matter was hardly helped by Ulbricht's participation in Moscow's anti-Yugoslav campaign. Although the East Germans attempted to deviate from the course set by Moscow, their efforts were not enough to entice Tito to assume their position. Tito's initial reaction to the Soviet Bloc attacks was to seek rapprochement with the West Germans, but here Yugoslavia stumbled on chancellor Adenauer's first and most important requirement, namely the 'downgrading' of relations with the GDR.

Aware that any such 'downgrading' would only worsen his relations with Moscow, Tito turned his attention to improving Yugoslavia's international status by forging even closer ties with the non-aligned countries, with a long term goal of institutionalizing non-alignment. In 1959 Tito visited several non-aligned leaders, and it seemed that finding interlocutors interested in developing relations outside of the two Blocs appeared to have renewed Tito's commitment to non-alignment. Tito criticized both Superpowers after the failed Paris Summit in May 1960, and

³⁵² Jasper Godwin Ridley, *Tito* (London: Constable, 1994), p. 348.

helped organize a non-aligned voting group at the United Nations General Assembly whose intent was to bring the US and the USSR back to the negotiating table. Yugoslavia's reinvigorated non-aligned role earned it more criticism from both Moscow and East Berlin, but Tito no longer felt as isolated as he did just a year earlier.

Chapter 4

The Two Germanies and the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference

In the spring of 1961, Tito and the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that a conference of the non-aligned countries would take place in Belgrade on September 1-6. The announcement of the Conference of Head of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries was welcomed by the GDR. The East Germans saw it as a unique opportunity to influence a group of countries that the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten*, MfAA) had been trying to lobby for recognition for years. The GDR was interested in being recognized by the non-aligned countries as a group, which they saw as carrying more weight than recognition by various countries individually. While the MfAA had attempted a similar operation in 1955 during the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, the campaign to influence the Belgrade Conference was on a scale larger than any recognition campaign they had previously tried.³⁵³ In this chapter I examine the GDR campaign to influence the Belgrade Conference and the West German response. Their manoeuvrings around the conference showed that both Germanies recognized that Yugoslavia was a valuable and influential gatekeeper to the non-aligned world. This analysis serves as an example of how Yugoslavia was positioned to play a role in the German question beyond its bilateral relations with both Germanies.

For the East German regime, 1961 was shaping up to be a year almost as disastrous as 1953, when Soviet tanks had to crush the popular uprising that threatened its survival. The

³⁵³ See various MfAA reports on Bandung operations in PA AA, MfAA, A 9623.

Socialist Unity Party's (*Sozialistische Einheits Partei*, SED) leadership could no longer ignore the problem of the porous Berlin demarcation line between the Soviet and Western zones, through which millions of East Germans escaped to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Not only did the population loss weaken the SED's position at home and abroad, but also seriously damaged its already weak economy, and the SED chairman Walter Ulbricht was aware that no incentive the party could provide was strong enough to stop this flight.³⁵⁴ The East German leader had urged the Soviets to approve the construction of a physical barrier in Berlin that would finally close this escape route. However, the Soviets were reluctant to sanction this request, since their policy did not coincide with East German wishes. While East Germany saw the Berlin Crisis as a matter of sovereignty, the Soviets considered it a key segment in their strategy against the United States, and as such wanted to avoid any unilateral action by East Berlin.³⁵⁵ However, the Soviets had no issue with the East German campaign for international recognition, as long as it did not encroach on Soviet European strategy.

For Yugoslavia, the Belgrade Conference was the crowning achievement of its foreign policy over the past six years. Tito, along with Nasser, Nehru, and others, had been slowly building the foundations for smaller nations to be heard. As Svetozar Rajak argues, the non-aligned wanted to make "the resolution of global crises a concern for all nations and extricate this privilege from the two Superpowers who, in their opinion, had proven incapable of constructively working toward the easing of international tensions."³⁵⁶

354 Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989* (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 44.

355 Bernd Bonwetsch and Alexei Filitow, "Chruschtschow Und Der Mauerbau. Die Gipfelkonferenz Der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten Vom 3.-5. August 1961," *Vierteljahrshfte Für Zeitgeschichte* 48, no. 1 (2000): 155–98, p. 157; See also Chapter 2 in Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*.

356 Svetozar Rajak, "'Companions in misfortune' From passive neutralism to active un-commitment": The critical role of Yugoslavia" in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?*, 1st edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 85-86.

The preparations for the Belgrade Conference

Compared to Bandung in 1955, it seemed that the GDR would have a much easier task ahead of them in Belgrade. The MfAA was a much better organized ministry than it was in 1955, and it had developed a network of diplomatic outposts throughout the non-aligned world, mostly in the form of trade missions, and as mentioned, the host was the only country outside of the Soviet Bloc which had recognized the GDR, so the conditions seemed objectively far better than in Bandung.

However, the relationship between the GDR and Yugoslavia was hardly friendly, and Belgrade's recognition had failed to cause a domino effect among the non-aligned countries.³⁵⁷ In fact, the East German officials continued to criticize Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment, which they considered to be decidedly bourgeois: "self-serving" and "self-aggrandizing."³⁵⁸ Furthermore, East Berlin accused Tito of attempting to create and seize the leadership of a third Bloc, comprising "young, politically relatively inexperienced" and therefore "easily influenced" countries.³⁵⁹ In addition, the SED felt that, despite the recognition and the triggering of the Hallstein Doctrine, Yugoslavia still perceived the FRG as the 'real' Germany.³⁶⁰ The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, were irritated by the constant anti-Yugoslav sentiment voiced in the East German public sphere.³⁶¹ In spite of strained relations with Belgrade, East Berlin was aware of

357 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 24.

358 "Über die Jugoslawische Haltung zur Deutschlandfrage" (August 29, 1959), PA AA, MfAA, C S69/75.

359 "Vorlage für das Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischer Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (July 7, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 13346, pp. 22-28.

360 As illustrated by the sign on the building of the defunct FRG embassy in Belgrade, which claimed that henceforth the French embassy would represent all German interests. This angered the East Germans enough to devise a strategy to incite its removal, including invoking international law. "Werter Genosse Hoffmann!" (April 6, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, pp. 40-41.

361 Various reports in AJ, 507/IX, 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

the effect close ties with the 'young nation states' could have on their international standing. Indeed, it was a policy the SED had been pursuing for years, and would not let their antipathy towards Yugoslavia stand in the way of a broad diplomatic offensive aimed at the Belgrade Conference.

The announcement of the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade naturally drew some interest in the West as well. The United States did not view the conference favourably. In July, while recovering from illness at his Brioni Island residence, Tito informed the American ambassador in Belgrade, George Kennan, that he did not intend to "exacerbate" the current global political situation, but that regarding the German Question he "had no choice but to support the Russian bid for recognition of the East German regime." Kennan noted that the Yugoslavs "were sorry if this inconvenienced us; [but] foreign policy was something one had to be consistent about."³⁶² Nevertheless, Kennan, accompanied by State Undersecretary Chester Bowles, again met with Tito at the end of July to ask him to consider representing the American position at the Belgrade Conference. The American duo did not make much headway. Tito argued that although Khrushchev was responsible for the Berlin Crisis, but that his aim was to solve this issue, not humiliate the Americans. This conversation also revealed that Tito still held Ulbricht in low esteem, claiming that he was "not denying the depth of Ulbricht's political failure," but that the GDR's recognition "lay at the heart of difficulty with Russia."³⁶³

In the months leading up to the conference, the MfAA created two working groups: one dealing with the political and organizational aspects of the conference, the other with the

362 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 93.

363 *Ibid.*, Document 94.

international propaganda.³⁶⁴ As their strongest diplomatic weapon, East Berlin sent special envoys to India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, and several other non-aligned countries. Their mission was to convince the non-aligned leaders to lend their support for the GDR's actions in Berlin and their German policy in general. Kurt Hager, the GDR's special envoy to India, later argued that the special envoys were not able to secure an endorsement from their hosts, who were "non-aligned and neutral" in their stance. In some instances, the special envoys were not even able to arrange a meeting in time for the conference.³⁶⁵ The special envoys also faced other obstacles in their missions. For example, Hager himself had difficulties successfully explaining the East German position to prime minister Nehru.³⁶⁶

With East Berlin's two-pronged strategy in mind, the GDR legation in Belgrade took a proactive role in developing its own contribution to influencing the conference.³⁶⁷ In an exchange with the MfAA, the legation's second-highest diplomat counsellor Walter Vosseler offered several suggestions for the legation's activities.³⁶⁸ The MfAA seemed to have accepted some of these suggestions, because the Belgrade legation went ahead and developed a more detailed plan for the conference. Its most important segment was the preparation, which aimed to steer the conference in a "positive course." This included collecting information regarding the participants' intentions and the contradictions between delegations, creating and fostering contacts which could be exploited during the conference, and detecting disruptive Western

364 Letter from Jacobs to Vosseler (July 24, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295.

365 Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989*.

Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Walter de Gruyter, 2007), p. 276.

366 Lorenz M. Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147, p. 107.

367 This was likely the result of criticism received earlier in the year for poor results in forging connections with the diplomats from nonaligned countries. Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 119.

368 Letter from Vosseler (June 26, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 74-75.

actions, as well as developing and suggesting countermeasures.³⁶⁹ At times, however, limitations in the resources of the MfAA proper curbed the Belgrade legation's efforts. In one example, the MfAA charged them with compiling a list of potential contacts at the conference, and in turn the legation requested from the MfAA's Yugoslav department detailed information regarding the participating countries' political positions on key questions to help with this task, but this request was denied. The MfAA argued that the request "by far exceeded their capabilities." The same letter, perhaps as a form of consolation, also included news of a reinforcement in expert personnel for the duration of the conference operations.³⁷⁰

For all their planning, the GDR legation in Belgrade had a difficult time achieving positive results. In addition to coordination issues between the East Berlin headquarters and the Belgrade legation, the East Germans also had to deal with the uncooperative Yugoslavs. On August 2, envoy Eleonore Staimer met with state undersecretary Veljko Mićunović, to whom she delivered a note with the request for approval of a GDR observer delegation at the conference. Mićunović informed her that only those countries that were invited but declined to send a delegation would be allowed to send observers, and denied that the German question or the Berlin Crisis would be on the conference's agenda.³⁷¹ In his report on the meeting, Mićunović noted that a coordinated Communist attempt to introduce the issue of Berlin could not be ruled out. Like in Bandung, Cuba would most likely be the conduit for this action. He added that a memorandum from Ulbricht addressed to the conference concerning Berlin could also be expected.³⁷² Mićunović was correct in his assumptions. Yugoslavia saw Cuba as a part of

369 "Vorlage für die Dienstbesprechung" (July 7, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 80-81.

370 Letter from Jacobs to Günther (August 18, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 145.

371 "Vermerk über die Besprechung der Genossin Staimer mit dem Amtierenden Staatssekretär für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der FVRJ, Genossen Mićunović" (August 2, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171.

372 "Zabeleška o razgovoru drž. potsekretara Veljka Mićunovića sa poslanikom NDR E. Štajmer" (August 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-5-b/81-2.

the “radical group” at the organizational meeting in Cairo – alongside Mali and Guinea – that represented Soviet views.³⁷³ Ulbricht sent a letter to the Cuban leader Fidel Castro on August 10 urging him to actively represent the East German standpoint and pursue the open discussion of the Berlin Crisis at the conference.³⁷⁴ Although the MfAA still hoped that their observers would be allowed to participate, a few days after her meeting with Mićunović Staimer met with the state undersecretary Leo Mates, who confirmed that no observers from uninvited states would be accredited in Belgrade.³⁷⁵ However, if the East Germans had difficulties accessing the conference’s agenda prior to August 13, the events of that day made the discussion of the Berlin Crisis inevitable.

The construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13 created a new, more complicated problem for Ulbricht.³⁷⁶ On the one hand, it ended the mass emigration to West Germany. On the other, the Berlin Wall was perceived in the West as irrefutable evidence of the GDR’s moral bankruptcy, and even Nasser and Tito were appalled by its construction.³⁷⁷ The fact that it happened just weeks before the Belgrade conference undoubtedly increased the magnitude of an international backlash. Paradoxically, the Berlin Crisis was now more than likely to be discussed in Belgrade. Both the East Germans and the Soviets seized this opportunity and increased their

373 Bilten Državnog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove o Konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja br. 3, AJ, KPR, I-4-b/2 K-202.

374 Draft of a letter from Ulbricht to Castro (August 10, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, G-A 425, pp. 120-124.

375 “Vermerk über die Besprechung der Genossin Staimer mit dem Gehilfen des Staatssekretär für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der FVRJ, Genossen Mates (August 5, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171.

376 For the Berlin Crisis and the Berlin Wall see Rolf Steininger, *Berlinkrise und Mauerbau. 1958 bis 1963*, 4th ed. (München: Olzog, 2009); Gerhard Wettig, *Band 3 Kulmination der Berlin-Krise (Herbst 1960 bis Herbst 1962)* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2011); Gerhard Wettig, *Band 2 Anfangsjahre der Berlin-Krise (Herbst 1958 bis Herbst 1960)* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015); Gerhard Wettig, “Der Höhepunkt der Berlin-Krise 1961,” *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2016); For Western Alliance politics and the Berlin Wall, see Kori Schake, *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances*, ed. J. Gearson, 2002 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); On the connections between the Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Christof Münger, *Die Berliner Mauer, Kennedy und die Kubakrise* (Paderborn: Schoeningh Ferdinand GmbH, 2003).

377 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 115.

diplomatic activities, even before the construction of the Wall began.³⁷⁸ Generally speaking, the Soviets wanted to avoid the participants drawing any equivalency between the Eastern and Western bloc at the conference. They could accept non-alignment only if it was more critical towards the West. But now the main aspect of their diplomatic campaign was to gather support for their actions in Berlin. The Soviets put pressure on leading non-aligned states, either through meetings with their diplomats, or by sending messages to their leaders, as Khrushchev did to Nasser and Nehru. The Soviet leader also addressed the situation in Berlin in his speech on August 7, insisting that neutral states in particular could not stand on the sidelines during the crisis.³⁷⁹

The West German diplomats, on the other hand, did not seem as concerned with the prospect of a non-aligned conference. A West German Foreign Office report written on August 18 condescendingly argued that the “neutralist movement” was fraught with weakness and, given that the conference would bring together many divergent views, one must question the possibility of it producing any conclusion that could be taken seriously. Bonn was wondering whether the German question would even be included in the conference’s agenda, although the West German government saw it almost as a certainty following the latest developments in Berlin. According to the author, the real danger coming from the German question being discussed at the conference was that most of the participants were insufficiently educated on the matter, and that the “resentment” – assuming towards the former colonial powers – and their “general mentality” offered fertile soil for Soviet interference. Especially worrisome were the

378 Khrushchev and Ulbricht agreed on closing the border between East and West Berlin on August 1, 1961.

"Notes on the Conversation of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht on 1 August 1961,"

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110206>.

379 “Bilten br. 6.” AJ, KPR I-4-a/2 K-202.

staple concepts in socialist messages regarding Germany: the “peace treaty,” “occupying regime,” and “securing the international peace.” These, the author argued paternalistically, had found traction among many non-aligned countries due to their “blurry worldview.” However, the West Germans seemed to believe that not having a discussion would have been more damaging. The report argued that it would be a mistake to try to suppress the debate on the German question. Instead, Germany should be open to discussion and promote its own position, namely that the only approach to solving this question was by self-determination, a policy which many of the non-aligned countries themselves supported. The report concluded that it was impossible to predict whether it could count on a positive or negative outcome of the conference, but that it was also likely that regardless of the outcome, one should not expect bombastic statements or concrete demands.³⁸⁰

The Yugoslavs were hardly going to break from their current German policy, although there were some indications that Tito would address some uncomfortable issues. For example, on August 31, his foreign minister Koča Popović hinted that the Yugoslav president would include in his speech the issue of the Polish-East German border along the Oder-Neisse line, which would undoubtedly upset Bonn.³⁸¹ Popović was referring to the fact that even fifteen years after the end of World War II, the West German government did not accept the new border between what they called the ‘Soviet Occupation Zone’ and Poland, which ran along the Oder and Neisse rivers. According to Adenauer, German borders were still the ones from 1937, and

380 “Aufzeichnung” (August 18, 1961), PA AA, AA, B 12 896.

381 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 95.

any agreement between the GDR and Poland on the border was illegitimate, a position which was firmly planted in the FRG's sole representation claim.³⁸²

Although Bonn did not expect the Non-Aligned Conference to produce a mass recognition of the GDR, it did mount a campaign to inform the non-aligned countries about their position on the German question, with direct messages from the Bonn government to the participants. The message, in the form of an aide-mémoire, carried the central idea of the West German plan, namely the right to self-determination for all of Germany. This idea permeated the whole document, attempting to expose the East German entity as void of any popular support and afraid of allowing its inhabitants any say in the way the country was run. Following the idea proposed in the August 18 report, the aide-mémoire played to the non-aligned own recent history, reminding them that they too exercised the right to self-determination in order to gain independence.³⁸³ The Bonn government sent out another aide-mémoire regarding the Berlin Crisis at the same time. In it, the West German government accused the Soviets of creating in its occupying zone a concentration camp with sixteen million prisoners. In general, the document focused mostly on the Soviet actions and policies, mentioning the East Berlin government only to point out its dependence on Moscow. The aide-mémoire ended with a plea to the participants to ask the Four Powers to “respect the existing agreements concerning the problem of Germany and Berlin and to abstain from any unilateral act that might render agreement by negotiation more difficult.”³⁸⁴

382 Adenauer staked the FRG's claim on its eastern territories during his first speech in front of the Bundestag in 1949. “Ausgangslage der Bundesrepublik” in Betzüge (ed.), *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 170-175. On the Oder-Neisse Line as a foreign policy issue, see Debra J. Allen, *The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War* (Westport: Praeger, 2003).

383 “Aide-mémoire”, (Undated), PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 214-218.

384 “Aide-mémoire”, PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 219-222.

In the final week before the conference, Ulbricht attempted to persuade the Yugoslavs one last time to grant his diplomats some sort of access to the delegates. On August 24, his special envoy, the Minister of Construction Ernst Scholz, along with Deputy Foreign Minister Johannes König and envoy Eleonore Staimer met with Tito at his summer residence on the Brioni Islands. Officially, Scholz's mission was to deliver Ulbricht's letter to Tito. The letter explained the GDR's position regarding the finalization of the Peace Treaty and the solution of the West Berlin question. Indirectly, the meeting was very much about the Belgrade Conference. In his report, Scholz argued that, given the circumstances (short preparation period, Yugoslav refusal to allow GDR observers at the conference, and the refusal to comment on the GDR's positions), the visit should be assessed accordingly, meaning that it went as well as was possible. Scholz added that they were under the impression that Tito was interested, "without too much engagement," in helping other nonaligned states normalize their relationship with the GDR.³⁸⁵ Despite Scholz's positive perspective, the meeting was underwhelming. The Yugoslav report shows that Scholz did in fact directly ask Tito for support at the upcoming conference, to which Tito did not commit, saying that he would address the German question at the conference, but not before. Tito also wondered whether the East Germans' latest action could lead to an escalation in the East-West conflict. Finally, he questioned the lack of coverage of the conference in the East German press. Scholz's explanation that the press could comment only after seeing the conference's results was as noncommittal as Tito's position on the issues important to the East Germans.³⁸⁶

385 Unsigned report (September 4, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, pp. 74-84.

386 "Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika republike Josipa Broza Tita sa specijalnim izaslanikom predsednika državnog saveta NDR dr. Ernstom Scholzom" (August 24, 1961), AJ KPR I-3-a/82-3.

After the meeting with Tito, Scholz and the rest of the East German delegation had lunch with Tito's general secretary Bogdan Crnobrnja, with whom they also travelled back to Belgrade. The unproductive nature of the meeting with Tito was underlined when Scholz asked Crnobrnja whether the official press release could include a line about the "open and friendly" nature of the conversation with the Yugoslav president. Crnobrnja replied that since the relations between the two countries were far from friendly, such wording would not reflect their true state, a statement that displeased Staimer. Crnobrnja went on to criticize the contradictions in the East German position on the non-aligned conference. He asserted that in their meetings with the Yugoslavs, the East Germans agreed that the conference was a "significant and major event" but then their press practically ignored it. Crnobrnja saw this as counterproductive for East Berlin's agenda, as it undercut the support among the participating states. König responded cynically, saying that the conference's historical significance will manifest itself regardless of whether it is reported by the press.³⁸⁷

During their layover in Belgrade, the East German delegation met with the Soviet ambassador Alexei Yepishev. He informed them that, contrary to what Crnobrnja said in previous conversations with the East Germans, the delegates would have some freedom to choose what they wanted to discuss during the conference. Furthermore, Yepishev argued that they must outmanoeuvre the West by working closely with the participating delegations, and by distributing propaganda material. He added that the Soviet embassy would do all it could to influence the participating countries through contacts with their diplomats in Belgrade.³⁸⁸

387 "Zabeleška iz razgovora Generalnog sekretara Predsednika Republike Bogdana Crnobrnje sa ministrom gradjevinarstva E. Scholzom..." (August 24, 1961), AJ KPR -3-a/82-3.

388 "Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit dem sowjetischen Botschafter Genossen Jepischew am 25.8.1961" (August 28, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 17171, pp. 8-10.

Despite this encouraging meeting, the East German delegation returned to East Berlin having accomplished nothing except confirming the status quo of their relations with Yugoslavia.

The Soviets did little to further the GDR's cause before the Conference, contrary to ambassador Yepishev's promises. In their contacts with the Yugoslavs in August, the Soviets addressed both the conference and the Berlin question, but failed to make a connection between the two, discussing them as two separate issues. They also did not press the Yugoslavs to change their position on Berlin.³⁸⁹ Tito complained to the Soviets that the East Germans saw everything in absolutes, that "they demand from us a position that is either-or, and that is not how things stand." There was nothing the Soviets could do for the Yugoslavs, or vice versa. Besides, more pressing were the recently announced Soviet nuclear tests.³⁹⁰ After the breakdown of talks with Kennedy in Vienna, Khrushchev's position on the nuclear weapons test moratorium changed, and the Soviet leader decided to resume nuclear tests in the fall, culminating with the detonation of the 'Tsar Bomb,' the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated.³⁹¹ For Tito, Khrushchev's decision seemed like it was intentionally timed to coincide with the start of the Belgrade Conference, which the Soviets denied. Nevertheless, Soviet timing left a bitter taste in Tito's mouth. Tito had already had a brush with Khrushchev's cavalier approach to discussing nuclear weapons.³⁹²

389 "Zabeleška" (August 16, 1961) in Dragan Dimić and Ljubodrag Bogetić (eds.), *Beogradska konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja 1-6. septembra 1961.: prilog istoriji Trećeg sveta* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2013), p. 368.

390 "Zabeleška" (August 16, 1961) in *Beogradska konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja 1-6. septembra 1961.: prilog istoriji Trećeg sveta*, Dragan Dimić and Ljubodrag Bogetić (eds.), (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2013), p. 368.

391 Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, "MAD, Not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 208–33, p. 225.

392 In 1956, Khrushchev showed Tito and his entourage film footage of nuclear weapons detonations, and according to Khrushchev, one Yugoslav official was overheard saying that "the operation of the hydrogen bomb was so powerful that if it were dropped over Belgrade, Zagreb would not survive either." 'Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in the Crimea, ' 8 October 1956, CWIHP Digital Archive: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112230>.

The West Germans used the last days before the conference to send out personal messages from chancellor Adenauer to the leaders of the participating states. Adenauer's message repeated the earlier points of the two distributed aide-mémoires, but with a direct and personal plea for support at the Belgrade Conference.³⁹³

Two days before the start of the conference, the GDR's foreign minister Otto Winzer wrote envoy Staimer with his final instructions. He informed her that because Yugoslavia would allow neither East German observers nor reinforcements for the GDR legation, the current staff would have to bear the burden of the operation alone. Their task was to deliver Ulbricht's memorandum to each of the delegations as soon as possible. Furthermore, unless Ulbricht's greeting telegram was not read or acknowledged during the opening session, it was their duty to deliver its text to the delegations. These were the only two actions to be carried out in the name of the Berlin leadership. However, Winzer also instructed Staimer which delegations to contact during the conference. Since the legation's staff was limited in numbers, they were to direct their efforts to particular countries. The ones which special envoys already visited were to be avoided. The focus of their attention was to be the countries that had some sort of diplomatic relations with the GDR but have not received envoys or messages from Berlin. Here, the highest ranking staff members were to hand over copies of Ulbricht's memorandum. Winzer also instructed Staimer to encourage the legation staff to establish contacts with delegation members on all diplomatic levels.³⁹⁴ Winzer's letter to Staimer exposed the failure of the first phase of the GDR's diplomatic campaign. But the efforts of the East Berlin leadership to send observers and reinforcements to the Belgrade legation also reflected the low level of trust the MfAA had in

393 Draft of Adenauer's message, PA AA, AA, B 26 152, pp. 210-213.

394 Letter from Winzer to Staimer (August 28, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 1571/72, pp. 4-8.

Staimer's staff. However, since the GDR was cut off from the conference's inner workings by the organizers, the absence of experts from Berlin did not constitute a major setback, as there was no room for a proactive approach. All the East Germans could do now was to analyze the information published in the press, passed on to them by their allies among the delegations, or hope for positive reactions to Ulbricht's memorandum.

Ulbricht's memorandum was a conventionally brutal attack on the FRG. Alongside accusations of unfinished "Hitlerite" ambitions among the German politicians and the government, Ulbricht blamed the nuclear arming of West Germany on the unsigned peace treaty. Without it, he argued, there were no set stipulations for curbing military expansion and left the door open for the Western powers and Bonn to arm West Germany. The peace treaty would also allow the German people to express their self-determination, which Ulbricht suggested would not be favourable to the West German government. On the matter of the Berlin Crisis, the memorandum called for a "demilitarized and neutral Free City," something that a signed peace treaty would also guarantee. Ulbricht saw this as a compromise and the sign of East German good will. He also addressed the construction of the Berlin Wall, repeating the argument that it was a defensive measure against "subversive activities" such as human trafficking, and that it was necessary to create an environment in which the peace treaty could be signed.³⁹⁵

³⁹⁵ "Memorandum," AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-204.

The German Question at the Belgrade Conference

The first non-aligned conference was a truly historic moment for Yugoslavia. One Yugoslav newsreel boasted (incorrectly, of course) that never before have there been so many heads of state in one place. The newsreel also showed Tito welcoming a long procession of guests at the Belgrade airport, welcoming them with firm handshakes and in some cases an awkward embrace. His meeting with Gamal Abdul Nasser was the exception. The two statesmen flew into each other's arms in a show of sincere friendship.³⁹⁶ Tito and Nasser were the driving force behind the conference, and this was their achievement. The world would be watching and listening to what they had to say about the global affairs.

As expected, the German question figured prominently during the conference. The Yugoslav delegation convened several days before its start to finalize its strategy. The delegates acknowledged that, although the Berlin Crisis was not part of the conference's official agenda, most participating countries showed "first rate interest in the Berlin problem and the crisis it created."³⁹⁷ They identified the need to recognize the reality of the current situation, meaning the existence of two Germanies, as the starting point to the solution of the problem. While discussing the draft of a final conference document, the Yugoslavs recognized that a more specific formulation was necessary, but that it was also important to avoid suggesting a concrete solution, since this was to be formulated only by the parties at the conference.³⁹⁸

396 YU 0 Laki / Jugoslovenski partizani, "Prva konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanih (1961) - Dokumentarni Film," YouTube video, 15:12, April 13, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nKiziXLWRus>

397 "Zabeleška o zaključcima sa sastanka jugoslovenske delegacije." AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-202, doc. no. 302/52.

398 Ibid.

Another departure in the Yugoslav view was the idea that the Berlin crisis was not only a localized byproduct of the Second World War, but that it could also possibly foment a new war. Thus, the severity of this prospect permitted the non-aligned countries to give their opinion on the crisis, which justified the discussions at the conference on the matter. However, the Yugoslavs took into account the precarious position of non-alignment. Although Yugoslavia supported the signing of a peace treaty in principle, the delegates warned against making any such claims during the conference. According to them, because Yugoslavia recognized the GDR, the treaty represented the consolidation of the *status quo*. This meant that the GDR would be recognized internationally. Following this line of argument at the conference would not be politically wise. In that sense, it would be best not to profess any type of opinion on the peace treaty.³⁹⁹ Nevertheless, another internal Yugoslav report suggested the possibility of exploring some concrete ideas to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The report suggested that the conference might consider sending Nehru to Washington and Moscow as a mediator.⁴⁰⁰ Presumably, this was because Nehru himself saw his role in the Cold War as the mediator between the two blocs.⁴⁰¹

Discussions about the German Question began on the first day of the conference. Several delegates, including Nasser, pointed to the necessity of solving the Berlin crisis. Nasser's about-face surprised Western observers, who expected the Egyptian president to avoid addressing this subject, since he had opposed its inclusion during the preparatory meeting in Cairo earlier that year.⁴⁰² Generally, however, there was little substance in these discussions. Most delegates spoke

399 Ibid.

400 "Naši stavovi i predlozi o Berlinu i Nemačkoj," KPR I-4-A-2 K-202, p. 121.

401 Lorenz M. Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147, p. 109.

402 "Zur Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Belgrad" (September 29, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 276.

in platitudes and forewent blaming either Bloc for the current crisis. Even the Afghan prime minister Daud Khan's speech was measured, despite the fact that Afghanistan had supported the Soviet solution in Cairo. The Indonesian president Sukarno was the only one to broach the idea of recognizing the GDR, but even he argued for merely a *de facto* recognition.⁴⁰³

On the second day of the conference, some of the speakers brought slightly more diverse views to the fore. President Makarios of Cyprus supported the West German plan (a plebiscite under UN supervision and unification), but only if both sides agreed to it. Prime minister of Ceylon Sirimavo Bandaranaike was critical of the Western solution, but asked from both sides to avoid a military solution.⁴⁰⁴ The mild diversity of the positions regarding the German question notwithstanding, not a single delegation pushed for the full recognition of the GDR, nor were there positive message towards the East German leadership. Some of these speeches were to be expected, since some countries were known to be closer to the West, as was the case with Cyprus. It was difficult for the East German diplomats to seek support from Nicosia for the outright recognition of two separate German states, since the goal of the Greek Cypriots was to keep Cyprus united.⁴⁰⁵ The MfAA's analysis was critical of Nasser's performance in Belgrade. His backtracking on several aspects of the German question disappointed the East Germans. The main reason for the weakening of his previous position was a West German loan, which he received just prior to the conference. Although initially adamant in maintaining the idea of two German states, consequent pressure from Bonn did make his

403 "Pregled istupanja šefova delegacija na Konferenciji prvog dana zasedanja" (September 1, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-204.

404 "Pregled istupanja šefova delegacija na Konferenciji drugog dana zasedanja" (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-204.

405 Makarios's statements in Belgrade earned him a substantial aid package from the FRG, as well as an "unusually warm welcome" in Bonn in 1962, which was his first European state visit. Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1981), p. 158.

statements on the matter more cautious and vague. The East German report on the UAR delegation at the conference specifically cited Nasser's statements as problematic. He avoided attacking either side, and he also avoided mentioning the existence of two German states. Furthermore, he tried to prevent, especially behind the scenes, the acknowledgement of the two German states, and its inclusion in the conference resolutions. The East Germans were disappointed that Nasser decided to side with the "reactionary forces," but were pleased that he did not cause a domino effect among the other delegations. Surprisingly, the East German analyst concluded that in the final analysis the UAR contributed to the "preservation of world peace" and echoed the Soviet positions in key questions.⁴⁰⁶

According to another East German report, Yugoslavia's stance on the German peace treaty and the solution of the West Berlin question came close to the position of the socialist countries, but then unfortunately it avoided being unequivocal in its opinion. Specifically, this meant that there was no support from Tito for the GDR's position on the West German "militarism and revanchism," or for its "constructive suggestions for the solution of the German question and European security."⁴⁰⁷ The East German sources were only partially correct. In his speech on the first day of the conference, Tito did in fact describe West Germany as a "typically capitalist social system, fraught and interwoven with remnants of fascist and revanchist conceptions and tendencies, which give cause for grave concerns." He continued with a warning that such tendencies could possibly spark a new conflict. The ones responsible for this conflict, according to Tito, would be the ones opposed to the signing of a separate peace treaty between

406 "Zur Haltung der VAR zu einigen Hauptproblemen der Konferenz der "nichtpaktgebunden" Staaten in Belgrad von 1.-6. 9. 61" (September 18, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 12618, pp. 11-23.

407 "Einschätzung zur Belgrader Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten – Haltung Jugoslawiens auf der Grundlage der Rede Titos am 3. 9. 1961," (September 9, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 286-288.

the GDR and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he saw the Oder-Neisse border as an “already settled question.” In comparison, Tito only mentioned that East Germany was developing within a socialist system, without going into further analysis or criticism. Perhaps more importantly, he was the only statesman, beside Nehru, who referred to East Germany by its full name.⁴⁰⁸ Still, the East Germans believed that, in an effort to break through the Hallstein Doctrine, Tito had exercised some influence over the non-aligned states in a way that would damage the GDR. One of the possible reasons why the East Germans had such a relatively unfavourable view of Yugoslavia’s position during the conference was because they expected more support from the only state that had recognized them.

The East Germans were more content with the Afghan delegation’s performance. Even though prime minister Daoud’s speech was not an endorsement of the GDR’s position, the East German sources at the conference informed them that the Afghans did suggest an explicit recognition of the existence of two German states in the conference’s declaration. It was only after they were confronted by other states that they withdrew this proposal. This was enough for the East Germans to identify Afghanistan as a progressive country. One of the countries that opposed the Afghans in the closed sessions was India. According to the East German sources, Nehru maintained his position that only the superpowers could solve the German question, and that India did not have the right to offer any suggestions for its solution. Due to this position, Nehru also did not mention the necessity of signing a peace treaty.⁴⁰⁹ This did not surprise the

408 Tito’s speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.

409 “Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage” (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, pp. 20-29.

East Germans, who had already criticized India for not expressing any sort of opinion that might have been construed as a critique of the United States foreign policy.⁴¹⁰

A further disappointment to the East Germans was the president of Mali, Modibo Keita. Special envoy Gerald Götting, who was visiting West African states in a damage control mission regarding the Berlin Wall, met with Keita in August. The Malian president was receptive to Götting's argument and agreed to support the GDR's policies at the Belgrade Conference.⁴¹¹ The East Germans must have been taken aback after Keita's statements during the open debates. He saw the peace treaty as a potentially dangerous development supported the West German definition of self-determination. Keita continued with the anti-GDR stance in the closed session, where he pushed for the recognition of the FRG as the only legitimate German state.⁴¹² It is unclear why Keita decided to take a position that was completely in line with the West German one, but it is most likely that Bonn applied enough pressure on him to make him reconsider the pledge he made to Götting.

The Ghanaians led by President Kwame Nkrumah, on the other hand, took a decisively pro-GDR position. Nkrumah argued for the recognition of two German states, which had now developed into states with "two very different social systems," and that it was "only reasonable" that the international community should recognize this fact. Furthermore, Nkrumah spoke out in favour of the Oder-Neisse border, asserting that it has been a fact for sixteen years now, and that any attempt to change it should be viewed as a provocation.⁴¹³ He also argued for the signing of a peace treaty, which would involve both Germanies' withdrawal from their respective military

410 "Die Haltung Indiens zur Aggression in Kuba" (May 19, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, C 1738/76, pp. 2-3.

411 Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961-1973," p. 107.

412 "Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage" (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 27.

413 Nkrumah's speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.

alliances. This was perfectly in line with the GDR policies outlined in Ulbricht's memorandum. According to the East German sources, the Ghanaian president supported these same ideas in the closed session.⁴¹⁴ The East Germans saw Ghana's position as one of the true successes of the GDR's diplomacy at the Conference, and the result of the GDR's close relationship with Nkrumah.⁴¹⁵

Finally, as expected, the Cubans went further in their support for the GDR than any other delegation, and held an "overall positive stance in regards to the most important problems in the German question."⁴¹⁶ In his speech, the Cuban president Osvaldo Dorticos asked for the German borders, as they were drawn in Potsdam, to be respected.⁴¹⁷ In addition to endorsing the signing of the peace treaty, the Cubans also drew up the draft of a resolution that recognized the existence of two German states.⁴¹⁸

The "Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries," the Belgrade Conference's final document, reflected the general position of the participants, in that it refrained from prescribing concrete solutions to the issues discussed during the previous six days. It included the idea that the "German problem is not merely a regional problem" and warned that it was "liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations." The Declaration also called on the "parties concerned" to solve the problem peacefully.⁴¹⁹ The Declaration's wording was mild in order to bring the two blocs

414 "Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage" (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 26.

415 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 122.

416 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

417 Dorticos' speech (September 2, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-203.

418 "Einige Bemerkungen zur Haltung der auf der Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten vertretener Staatsmänner zur Deutschlandfrage" (undated), PA AA, MfAA, A 11040, p. 29.

419 "Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries" (September 6, 1961), AJ, KPR, I-4-A-2 K-204.

together to solve the various Cold War conflicts, rather than pointing fingers and deepening the crises. However, the Conference did not have the desired effect in the case of the German question.

The aftermath

Yugoslavia's position at the conference caught the Americans off-guard. US ambassador Kennan noted that the "[p]assage on Berlin [in Tito's speech] contains no words that could not have been written by Khrushchev," which certainly would force the United States to reconsider the way it assessed Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement, since it did not expect such hostility towards its allies in Bonn. Kennan voiced his dismay to Nehru, who was typically "non-committal," but Kennan had hoped that the Indian prime minister would adopt the US position.⁴²⁰ Washington also relayed its disappointment to the Yugoslavs via an aide-memoire, which the latter interpreted as undue pressure on a small country by a superpower.⁴²¹ This latest asymmetry in policies added more pressure on the strained US-Yugoslav relations. After some deliberation, Kennan concluded that the Yugoslavs should not be allowed to maintain their current course without any consequences, but that "[t]o be forced to realize this is highly disagreeable to Yugoslavs, who are not used to taking political consequences of their own words and to whom pleasure of eating cake and having it too has become so familiar as to seem a god-given right."⁴²²

420 According to Kennan, Berlin mayor Willy Brandt's envoy at the conference also approached Nehru in regards to Tito's Berlin position, which bolstered the American ambassador's hopes for Nehru's change of heart.

FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 96.

421 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI*, Document 98.

422 *Ibid.*, Document 100.

Unlike the disappointment in Washington, the initial reaction in Bonn at the end of the Belgrade meeting was one of relief, according to one Yugoslav report. An unnamed West German Foreign Office official told the Yugoslav diplomats in Bonn that there was a large group among his colleagues who lobbied for the termination of the Hallstein Doctrine prior to the conference. Their position was informed by various reports that claimed that the conference would endorse a full recognition of the GDR. Given this possibility, they argued, it would have been necessary to preempt such a decision. Therefore, their detractors welcomed the conference's outcome, which reinforced "those circles which were of the opinion that the Hallstein Doctrine can still be effective." The West German official also disclosed that West Germany was not surprised by Yugoslavia's statements, but that they were disappointed with those made by other delegations. He singled out Nehru who, from a West German perspective, just about advocated the recognition of the GDR. In fact, according to the Bonn source, all of the countries seemed receptive to the FRG government's aide-mémoire and Adenauer's message, but then most of them failed to propagate these ideas at the conference. The official concluded that there are still fears of a possible secret agreement among the non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR.⁴²³

Envoy Staimer's assessment was similar to the West German one in some aspects. She too recognized the change in Nehru's overall position. Initially, she argued, the West relied on Nehru's group – comprising India, Burma, Ceylon, and Cambodia – to follow a West-friendly policy of avoiding the discussion of the German question. Although this did not correspond to the content of the West German aide-mémoires and Adenauer's message, Nehru's actions did represent an unwanted divergence for the West. Staimer considered the conference a mixed

⁴²³ "Prva Reagovanja na Konferenciju," (undated) KPR I-4-A/2 K-202.

success in regard to the German question. Most of the speakers spoke out in favour of signing a peace treaty and the majority of delegates in the closed sessions advocated for the recognition of the GDR. This helped raise the profile of the East German demands. However, most of the statesmen opposed an official act of recognition. Staimer argued that this was the result of Western influence, but added that despite the Western interference it became obvious that many at the conference believed in the existence of two German states.⁴²⁴ At the end of her September 29 report, Staimer offered several suggestions for any future conferences, based on the experiences of the Belgrade staff.⁴²⁵

The East German leadership, Staimer's report notwithstanding, found the Belgrade legation's performance lacking, and initiated a long discussion about the reasons why the GDR failed to achieve better results in Belgrade. In an exchange with Vosseler, the ministry accused the Belgrade staff of failing to establish close ties with the non-aligned representatives, which in turn led to below average reports for the MfAA. Furthermore, the legation failed to give any "political guidelines" to the official General German News Service (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst*, ADN) correspondent that the MfAA sent to Belgrade, which were necessary for the completion of his tasks. Finally, the MfAA reprimanded the legation for failing to file a report after their meeting with the Burmese prime minister U Nu, or sending a superficial and factually incorrect report about their meeting with Bandaranaike.⁴²⁶ In a report to the SED, Staimer responded with a detailed explanation of the legations activities. According to her, the Belgrade legation staff achieved the most it could, given that there were no observers or reinforcements allowed by the Yugoslav authorities. She also pointed out that the allegations of

424 "Zur Konferenz der..." (September 29, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 274.

425 "Zur Konferenz der..." (September 29, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 282-284.

426 Letter from Becker to Vosseler, (October 2, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 292-294.

inefficiency from East Berlin were in most part due to time constraints, circumstances beyond their control or because of mistakes made in East Berlin. Regarding support from the Yugoslav government, the legation accused East Berlin of demanding help while at the same time downplaying the conference's significance or simply ignoring it. This made any kind of cooperation extremely difficult.⁴²⁷ Staimer was correct in her analysis of the Yugoslav perception. A Yugoslav foreign office report supported this claim, indicating that the SED central committee issued directives to the GDR press to report only the aspects of the conference favourable to them.⁴²⁸ The Belgrade staff did concede that contacts with the non-aligned representatives were inadequate, and that they were having problems with solving this issue. An explanation given in the report was that they set goals unattainable by such a small staff.⁴²⁹ In her conclusion, Staimer addressed the criticism from East Berlin, saying that "it is good, even harsh criticism, but it must be justified and it must be helpful and constructive." The Belgrade staff believed that the ministry as well as the SED should give their final assessment only after taking their report into account.⁴³⁰ It seems that East Berlin did not agree with Staimer. The head of the SED Department for Foreign Policy and International Cooperation Peter Florin complained to König that the report from Belgrade looked "more like an excuse than an evaluation."⁴³¹ The discussion regarding the Belgrade legation's performance spilled over into 1962. In a letter from the deputy Foreign Minister Georg Stibi to the head of the Southeast European Department of the MfAA Otto Becker, the former conceded that Staimer's staff was

427 "Bericht für die Einschätzung der Tätigkeit der Gesandtschaft..." (November 16, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 302-313.

428 "Prva reagovanja na Konferenciju," KPR I-4-A/2 K-202.

429 Bericht für die Einschätzung der Tätigkeit der Gesandtschaft..." (November 16, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, 302-313.

430 Ibid.

431 Letter from Florin to König (November 27, 1961), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, p. 315.

correct in some of their assertions. Stibi referred to the ministry's last minute instructions for the conference, the rushed effort of creating Ulbricht's memorandum, as well as the oversights in coordination between the legation and the ADN correspondents.⁴³² The issue was yet to be resolved in April 1962, when König was still demanding further clarification from Staimer regarding her criticism of the MfAA.⁴³³ There did not seem to have been any negative repercussions for Staimer, who remained at the head of the Belgrade legation, and later became the first East German ambassador in Belgrade, returning to East Berlin in 1969.⁴³⁴ A possible reason for the absence of sanctions for Staimer was that she was able to forge a relatively close relationship with Tito, in spite of the unsteady relations between the two countries, which made her a most valuable asset for the GDR.⁴³⁵

Conclusion

The Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries brought about a strong diplomatic effort by the GDR, the goal of which was to influence the conference in a way that would benefit its search for international recognition. The East Germans had hoped that a number of newly independent Asian and African countries would recognize this desire. On the other hand, the West Germans, in an effort to thwart this campaign, appealed to the non-aligned states' sense of self-determination. In many ways, the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference helped clear up both Germanies' policies toward the non-

432 Letter from Stibi to Becker (January 3, 1962), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 321-322.

433 Letter from König to Staimer (April 4, 1962), PA AA, MfAA, A 5295, pp. 342-345.

434 "Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Savezne Skupštine Milentija Popovića sa Staimer sa ambasadorom Nemačke Demokratske Republike Nemačke Eleonorom Staimer" (February 1, 1969), AJ, KPR, I-5-B-81-5.

435 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 120.

aligned states more than it helped to solve the German question. In hindsight, the conference did nothing to remove or even destabilize the Hallstein doctrine, as the East Germans had hoped and West Germans feared. After the conference, the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* argued that the West German success was a result of Bonn's generous aid programs, rather than the fear of the Hallstein Doctrine among the Asian and African countries.⁴³⁶ However, these two approaches, while not officially connected, became intertwined, and the West German strategy prior to the conference clearly showed that the Hallstein Doctrine had outgrown its initial diplomatic framework, the West German loan to Egypt being the most prominent example.⁴³⁷

The East Berlin foreign office blamed the weak results of their campaign on the GDR's Belgrade legation staff. However, the reasons for such results were to be found in the MfAA's inability to provide the legation with ample time to prepare for the conference, which pointed to the disorganization in East Berlin. Another important factor was the Yugoslavs' decision to bar East German observers from the conference, and refuse entry to Yugoslavia for additional legation staff sent from East Berlin. These circumstances were burdensome for the Belgrade legation, which was already severely understaffed and lacked diplomats qualified enough to fulfill set goals, both problems indicative of the general issues plaguing the MfAA. Part of the blame should also be ascribed to the weak results that the special envoys achieved. However, contrary to East Berlin's negative assessment immediately following the Conference, the special envoys were later seen as a success, in that they forged personal relationships with many non-aligned leaders, thus increasing the GDR's diplomatic acumen in the Global South.⁴³⁸

436 "NEUTRALE: Punkt 27," *Der Spiegel*, September 13, 1961, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43366351.html>.

437 Young-sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*, 1st Edition edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 239.

438 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 276.

Many delegates voiced strong opinions regarding the German question and the Berlin Crisis, but both Germanies benefited more from the agreement between the conference participants to reach all decisions unanimously. This decision precluded harsh criticisms aimed at both sides – heard in speeches and during the debates – from being included in the final Conference documents. If East Germany hoped, and West Germany feared that the non-aligned movement could be more than a sum of its parts, the Belgrade Conference proved them both wrong. It also proved that the idea of a new force in the bipolar world order, namely the non-aligned movement, did not come to fruition. The West Germans realized that the Hallstein Doctrine was strong enough to withstand even the most intensive East German diplomatic offensive. Conversely, the East Germans continued to look for the cracks in the Hallstein Doctrine in the non-aligned world, but were now armed with the knowledge that the big breakthrough might not come in the form they expected.

As for Yugoslavia, the Belgrade conference was a resounding success. Hosting the first meeting of non-aligned states not only solidified its position as a leading force in the movement, but also ensured that the message of non-alignment was heard around the world. Regarding its relations with both Germanies, Yugoslavia was able to come out of their duel mostly unscathed. Belgrade managed to resist East German pressure and limited their diplomats' access to the conference participants. While Tito's position on the German question at the conference aligned with the Soviet one, which irritated Bonn, the final conference communiqué reflected the caution of the majority of other delegates.

Chapter 5

Time of transition (1961-1964)

After the failure of the East German campaign to influence the Belgrade Non-aligned Conference, the Yugo-East German relations remained strained, especially since Belgrade contributed to the poor East German results in Belgrade. The Yugoslavs barred entry to additional GDR diplomatic staff into the country, and curtailed their legation staff's activities at the conference. But it was West Germany that caused the first Yugo-German crisis after the events in Belgrade. On November 1, 1961, the police in Munich arrested Lazo Vračarić, a Yugoslav salesman, for the murder of two German soldiers. Soon after the arrest, it became known that the warrant for Vračarić's arrest was issued in October 1941, that the soldiers were killed in Wehrmacht-occupied Zagreb, and that Vračarić was a Yugoslav partisan at the time.⁴³⁹ Vračarić was released five days later with an apology from the Munich police, but not before the Yugoslav government seized upon his arrest and used the embarrassing incident to publicly underline their long-held belief that the national socialist tendencies in the FRG were on the rise.⁴⁴⁰ This incident opened another dimension to the contentious relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG.

439 "Alarm aus Zürich" *Der Spiegel* November 15, 1962. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43367410.html>

440 For a detailed discussion on the Croatian Ustashe émigrés see Mate Nikola Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 16, no. 5 (2009): 739–53; Mate Nikola Tokić, "Avengers of Bleiburg: Émigré Politics, Discourses of Victimhood and Radical Separatism during the Cold War," *Politička Misao; Zagreb* 55, no. 2 (2018): 71–88; Pino Adriano and Giorgio Cingolani, *Nationalism and Terror: Ante Pavelić and Ustasha Terrorism from Fascism to the Cold War* (Central European University Press, 2018).

The Yugoslav foreign ministry (*Državni sekretarijat za spoljne poslove*, DSIP) distributed notes to (former) Allied diplomatic missions in Belgrade, in which the Yugoslavs combined their outrage over the arrest with a request for further Allied action. The Yugoslavs wanted to prevent any future West German attempts at arresting Allied soldiers, which of course included former Yugoslav partisans.⁴⁴¹ The note met with a mixed reception among Western diplomats. Most agreed that the incident was unfortunate. However, Allied ambassadors, including United States' George Kennan, rejected Yugoslav insinuations that Vračarić's arrest was emblematic of the rise of far right extremism in the FRG. Kennan and other ambassadors outright refused to officially endorse the contents of the note in the name of their respective governments.⁴⁴² Nevertheless, Belgrade continued to pursue the matter. Tito himself addressed this incident in a speech in Skopje, explaining to his audience that Yugoslavia should feel "lucky" about the existence of East Germany, which, unlike West Germany was not arresting Yugoslav citizens who fought against the "barbaric occupiers" during the war. Tito continued:

The arrest of Vračarić is not just a small provocation or a reflection of positions held by some fascist elements. It is, in fact, something deeper than an individual act or an act of one small group. And [that means] that it is then a much deeper issue – it is something that they want make into law, to retaliate *en masse* against those who defended their country with their own blood and lives. That's revanchism! That's their policy. That is the gist of it, but that is something those people who arm West Germany with nuclear and all other kinds of weapons do not want to acknowledge, not thinking about what will happen tomorrow when the "all hell breaks loose"⁴⁴³

441 Foreign ministry note, (undated), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 653/6.

442 "Zabeleška" (November 7, 1961), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 653/i.

443 Tito, *Govori i članci. 1961/1962, Vol. 17*, (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1965), p. 141.

Tito's acerbic reaction might have seemed disproportionate compared to the incident's severity, but it soon became clear why Belgrade was extremely sensitive to the matter. The FRG was indeed a hotbed of far right activity, and although the Bonn government did not directly support the Croatian Ustashe émigrés, it was nevertheless lenient towards them, turning a blind eye to them organizing throughout West Germany, and allowing them to become increasingly active.⁴⁴⁴

A few weeks after Vračarić's release, on November 25, a group of Ustashe-led Croatian nationalists raided a Yugoslav national holiday celebration in Munich, which the Yugoslav consulate organized for its citizens, comprising mostly guest workers. Several attendees were injured before the West German police arrived and stopped the riot.⁴⁴⁵ The next day, a demonstration disrupted a performance of the Croatian National Ballet in Stuttgart. Demonstrators held anti-Yugoslav signs, one of them reading "The killer Vracaric belongs in prison."⁴⁴⁶ Then, on December 7, the Yugoslav consul in Munich, Predrag Grabovac was deported. The Croatian émigrés had alerted the local authorities, via a Bavarian regional parliament member, of Grabovac's alleged wartime activities.⁴⁴⁷ Grabovac was a partisan officer, and had reportedly ordered the execution of hundreds of Wehrmacht prisoners.⁴⁴⁸ Wanting to

444 The Ustashe were the WWII German collaborators in Croatia, who found refuge in the West after the war, mostly in Argentina and Spain, but in other Western countries as well. For example, the Ustasha leader, Ante Pavelić moved to Buenos Aires as "Peron's guest." Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-1945* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 1964), p. 174. For Nazi escape routes after WWII, see Gerald Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); On NS legacy in the two Germanies, see Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*, New edition edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

445 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 127.

446 Letter from Peer-Uli Faerber to Tito, (November 27, 1961), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, no number.

447 The MP in question, Paul Wüllner, was a member of the marginal right-wing All-German Party. Otto v. Loewenstern, "Ein Abgeordneter im Porzellanladen", December 15, 1961, *Die Zeit*.
<http://www.zeit.de/1961/51/ein-abgeordneter-im-porzellanladen>

448 According to some accounts, Grabovac was also responsible for organizing the failed attempt on Ante Pavelić's life in Buenos Aires in 1957. B. E. "Dvostruka igra sekretara ambasade." Blic.rs. Accessed September 27, 2018. <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/reportaza/dvostruka-igra-sekretara-ambasade/45917cd>; "Pero Zlatar: Pričao sam Sa stotinama ljudi da bih napisao roman o Paveliću" Jutarnji List, January 16, 2010. Accessed September 27, 2018. <https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/pero-zlatar-pricao-sam-sa-stotinama-ljudi-da-bih-napisao-roman-o-pavelicu/3143051/>.

avoid a diplomatic scandal by arresting Grabovac, and unable to guarantee his safety, the West German authorities convinced the consul to leave the country under the cover of night.

The Yugoslavs saw these events as an affront. How could those who suffered so much under the Nazi occupation, and who came out of the war as victors, be subject to such treatment? Although such questions might have been on the minds of many Yugoslavs, this opinion was not universal, or purely natural. In a conversation with ambassador Kennan on January 5, 1962, the Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović admitted that the Yugoslav press's treatment of the Vračarić case spurred much of the anti-German sentiment in Yugoslavia, which was especially egregious given the FRG's press's balanced approach to the same subject. According to Kennan, Popović also understood that Yugoslav moralizing could have a negative effect on FRG-Yugoslav relations, especially in the tourism and trade sectors.⁴⁴⁹ Perhaps due to Popović's realization, the Yugoslav government attempted to influence the public opinion among its citizens living abroad by issuing short term entry visas, as well as providing a 50 percent discount on return train tickets from Germany to Yugoslavia in time for Christmas holidays. According to one Yugoslav report, this move was intended to disengage the Yugoslavs abroad, many of whom felt isolated, from nationalist agitators. The Yugoslavs considered the visa campaign a resounding success, with almost 1500 visas issued. In addition, the Yugoslav authorities saw the campaign as a blow to the nationalistic diaspora, who allegedly felt demoralized by the number of visa applicants.⁴⁵⁰ This was, however, just a brief respite, as

449 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 115. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v16>

450 "Akcija na razbijanju neprijateljske emigracije u Zapadnoj Nemačkoj," (January 10, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 37/i.

Yugoslavia would continue grappling with the extremists in Germany throughout the 1960s and 1970s.

Because of the latest bout of incidents involving Yugoslav émigrés in the FRG, The East Germans sensed an opportunity to drive a wedge between Belgrade and Bonn, and approached the Yugoslavs with a gesture that was intended to stoke Yugoslav fears of fascist resurgence in the FRG. On Christmas Day 1961, envoy Staimer presented Popović with a set of documents pertaining to this topic. The most important item in the package was a book tendentiously titled *From Ribbentrop to Adenauer*, which addressed the issue of numerous National Socialist officials still employed in the FRG government and other official bodies.⁴⁵¹ If the East Germans could not make the Yugoslavs align with their own policies, they could at least attempt to sabotage their chances at reconciling with the West Germans. With this in mind, the GDR's Belgrade legation staff also made visits to Belgrade newspapers during this period, and attempted to influence the coverage of the FRG, but with little success.⁴⁵² But another issue altogether would burden Belgrade's relations with both Germanies even more, even without German prodding.

In May 1961, the Yugoslav government presented the East Germans with an aide-memoire concerning several war reparation categories. This was a delicate matter, and the East Germans most likely deliberately waited until after the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference to provide an official answer, to avoid irritating the Yugoslavs at a time when their assistance with accessing the conference was necessary.⁴⁵³ At a meeting in October, the East Germans signalled

451 "Zabeleška" (December 25, 1961), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, doc. no. 732/i.

452 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 131.

453 Unofficially, the East Germans were annoyed by the aide-memoir and shifted all of the blame and responsibility on the FRG. "Informacija" (January 17, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.

that they might be ready to begin planning the negotiations, but the Yugoslavs believed this to be a stalling tactic, since East Berlin wanted to link the negotiations to a separate peace agreement. The Yugoslavs were vehemently against a separate peace agreement since it was a unilateral Soviet proposal, and therefore incompatible with non-alignment. The Yugoslavs were correct in their assessment, because in March 1962 the East Germans rejected any responsibility for the reparations in an aide-memoire, arguing that West Germany was the only German state responsible for reparations, according to the Potsdam Agreement.⁴⁵⁴ That is, the GDR did not consider itself a successor to the Third Reich, and could therefore not be held responsible for its crimes. This was a position the GDR had already taken before, for example when confronted with Israeli demands for reparations in the 1950s.⁴⁵⁵ The GDR was, however, willing to open negotiations on some aspects of war damages, such as stolen artwork or real estate, but only within talks on a separate peace agreement.⁴⁵⁶ While envoy Staimer, who presented the aide-memoire to president Tito, reported that he saw this compromise as a good initial effort for solving the issue of war reparations, later events showed that the Yugoslavs did not accept the East German proposal.⁴⁵⁷ With the East German refusal to even acknowledge Yugoslavia's demands as legitimate, the matter of the reparations was shaping up to become a major stumbling block in the relations between the two countries, albeit not the only one.

In the Yugoslav East Berlin legation's annual assessment of bilateral relations with the GDR for 1961, the author argued that the GDR was stuck between its position as a member of the Soviet bloc and its own desire for international affirmation. Therefore, these contradictions

454 "Aide-memoire" (undated, most likely March 13, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.

455 Gareth Winrow, "East Germany, Israel and the Reparations Issue," *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 20, no. 1 (March 1990): 31–46, p. 33.

456 "Aide-memoire" (undated, most likely March 13, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.

457 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 133.

also weighed heavily on their relations with Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the author argued, Yugoslavia could have been useful in legitimizing GDR's diplomatic forays in the non-aligned world. On the other hand, bloc allegiances limited the extent of this cooperation. The author singled out two events from the past year that exemplified these two considerations: the Belgrade Conference and the separate peace agreement.⁴⁵⁸ Paradoxically, the GDR wanted to take advantage of Yugoslavia's non-alignment in order to elicit recognition from Asian and African countries, but also draw it closer to the Soviet Bloc, which a separate peace agreement between Yugoslavia and the GDR would undoubtedly do.

These evaluations occurred in the shadow of the 22nd Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress – held from October 17-31, 1961 – where Khrushchev addressed the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, but without reaching a clear resolution. Although Khrushchev attacked the Yugoslavs for their “revisionism,” he proposed better bilateral relations.⁴⁵⁹ Khrushchev also announced a new round of de-Stalinization, which Belgrade greeted positively, although it added to the generally contradictory messages coming from Moscow.⁴⁶⁰ Mixed signals from Moscow most likely did not satisfy East Germans, since Soviet decisions still, for the most part, steered their foreign policy. Moreover, Khrushchev's address at the congress tested East Berlin's own relations with Moscow. The Soviet leader had stated that if Western Powers were willing to cooperate with the Soviets in solving the German questions, then the separate peace agreement with the GDR could be postponed. Having expressed this position, Khrushchev directly reneged his promise to sign the agreement by the end of the year,

458 “Izveštaj: bilateralni odnosi” (January 10, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, no number.

459 Geoffrey Swain, *Tito: A Biography* (London ; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010), p. 134.

460 Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971* (Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2012), p. 40.

lest the Four Powers come to a satisfactory arrangement.⁴⁶¹ The promise was made in a memorandum published after Khrushchev's meeting with president Kennedy in June in Vienna. However, the construction of the Berlin Wall changed the circumstances under which the memorandum was drafted. The Wall might have been Khrushchev's concession to Ulbricht's pressure, but its construction itself was not the East German leader's ultimate goal. As Hope Harrison argues, Ulbricht was going to be satisfied only with the annexation of West Berlin.⁴⁶² He continued to provoke Western military personnel throughout the fall of 1961, which culminated in a military standoff between Soviet and American troops at Checkpoint Charlie in the last days of October. Kennedy and Khrushchev quickly agreed to diffuse the situation, which was the nearest the two came to an armed conflict during the crisis. In the aftermath, Khrushchev naturally took a much more restrictive position towards Ulbricht after realizing that he could not be satisfied. Ulbricht's actions seemed to portend an even more belligerent approach to the Berlin question he would embrace in the first half of 1962.⁴⁶³

Despite the complications surrounding the war reparations, the relations between the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) did not seem to suffer during this period, and in fact most of the planned contacts between various party bodies and mass organizations in 1961 were fulfilled, with the head of the SED foreign policy department Peter Florin even agreeing to visit Belgrade at some point in the following year.⁴⁶⁴ In Belgrade there were some misgivings about several SED initiatives, such as their request for Nazi-era documents in Yugoslav possession, which could incriminate some West German

461 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 213.

462 Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall*, p. 219.

463 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 213.

464 "Pregled planova i ostvarenih veza društvenih organizacija FNRJ i NDR u 1961 godini" (undated), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, no number; "Zabeleška" (November 10, 1961), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, no number.

officials. But even in this instance the Yugoslavs were reluctant to comply. This reluctance, however, was not motivated by bilateral concerns. The Yugoslavs merely wanted to avoid supplying ammunition for the GDR's attacks on the FRG.⁴⁶⁵ Although they themselves often criticized the FRG's unwillingness to address fascist tendencies in West German society, Yugoslavia decided against positioning itself in the conflict between the two Germanies. This, then, was a reflection of Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment, rather than a desire to undermine the GDR's position vis-a-vis the FRG, or to weaken inter-party relations.

Good party relations notwithstanding, the Yugoslavs were not willing to be lenient in the matter of reparations due to financial needs and in May 1962 considered escalating the diplomatic exchange by issuing a note, rather than an aide-memoire, which was a considerably more serious diplomatic statement.⁴⁶⁶ The note draft's content clearly showed that Belgrade was not ready to accept the East German attempt to wash their hands of responsibility for the reparations, since there were whole groups of Yugoslav citizens – for example, workers who contributed to the German social insurance fund while working on German territory now part of the GDR – whose claims were not addressed in the Potsdam Agreement.⁴⁶⁷

For Ulbricht, the outlook was less than promising in regards to Yugoslavia's potential agreement to East German demands. Stonewalled by Tito, he could hardly rely on Khrushchev to apply pressure on the Yugoslavs. After the 22nd CPSU Congress, the Soviets were more amicable towards Tito than they had been in years, and were very concerned with improving bilateral relations, as demonstrated when the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited

465 Letter from Jelko Žagar to Dobrivoje Vidić at the Commission for International Connections (March 19, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, no number.

466 "Kabinetu predsednika republike" (May 7, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, doc. no. 329/i.

467 "Nacrt note DR Nemačkoj o starim jugoslavenskim potraživanjima" (May 28, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.

Belgrade in an atmosphere of mutual friendship. Gromyko invited Tito to visit Moscow, and the Yugoslavs reciprocated by inviting the Soviet head of state Leonid Brezhnev to Belgrade.⁴⁶⁸ Although the invitations were for state leaders rather than party chairmen, they nonetheless represented a considerable improvement in Yugo-Soviet relations. The friendly meeting between Tito and Gromyko and the invitations for state visits marked yet another thaw between Yugoslavia and the USSR. This was a stark contrast to the instability of previous years, when their relations suffered, mostly due to Soviet frustration at Yugoslavia's non-alignment, and their subsequent accusations of Belgrade's revisionism.

The Soviets did not want to endanger these relations by leaning on Yugoslavia to sign the peace agreement with the GDR, especially since Khrushchev downgraded its importance. Moreover, Ulbricht could not even count on Soviet assistance domestically. The Soviet Union had experienced a catastrophic harvest in the fall of 1961, and the knock-on effect led to makeshift solutions such as increased food prices and tinkering at the lowest organizational levels, neither of which actually improved the dire situation. Although Khrushchev promised massive investments in agriculture, he soon had to go back on his promise, and even pretended he never gave it. There was simply not enough money for any such endeavour.⁴⁶⁹ So when the East Germans approached the Soviets with a request for more financial support – which both sides had nominally agreed upon earlier in the year – they were turned away with the sarcastic recommendation to prove to everyone that they were indeed the “socialist showpiece” and help their economy themselves.⁴⁷⁰ Without the support of their patrons, there was little the East Germans could do to soften Yugoslavia's position on the reparations by using their usual tactics.

468 Tripković, *Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971*, p. 129.

469 Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, pp. 516-519.

470 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 216.

The United States, like the GDR, were also monitoring the thaw between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union with some dismay. Tito's pro-Soviet statements at the Belgrade non-aligned conference were only the beginning of a difficult period for US-Yugoslav relations. Ambassador Kennan was initially very much in favour of some type of punishment in the aftermath of the conference, preferably by ending one of the economic aid programs. His reasoning was that there was no danger of Yugoslavia's returning to the Soviet camp, that US aid was not crucial for its survival, and that in fact it only provided Tito the opportunity to engage in Third World enterprises, effectively funding non-alignment.⁴⁷¹ The United States Congress was also of the opinion that a country with such explicit pro-Soviet positions should not be receiving aid from the US. Then, in April 1962, another incident occurred which burdened their relationship further. The Yugoslav dissident and Tito's former close associate Milovan Djilas was arrested after his book *Conversations with Stalin* was released in the West, with the Yugoslav authorities insinuating that the US embassy in Belgrade had assisted Djilas in publishing the book.⁴⁷² Such allegations angered the State Department, which instructed Kennan to confront the Yugoslavs.⁴⁷³ Since they never offered concrete evidence for US involvement, the incident did not escalate. The planting of the idea was a poor decision, especially in the light of then-current Congressional debates over the extension of Yugoslavia's status as a "most favoured nation," as well as fate of some aid programs.⁴⁷⁴ Finally, in June, the Congress decided to vote on the matter. In the months following the Belgrade Conference, Kennan had slowly changed his

471 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 106.

472 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi*, 70.

473 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 132.

474 For some US congressmen, the arrest, which coincided with the Gromyko visit, was a clear sign of a Yugoslav "left turn." Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi*, p. 70.

position on Yugoslavia, and had even travelled to Washington to lobby for the status extension, but he could not overturn the decidedly anti-Yugoslav sentiment in the Congress, which voted against the extension.⁴⁷⁵ President Kennedy's later intervention ensured that at least agricultural surplus could be sent to Yugoslavia, preventing a total halt of American aid.⁴⁷⁶ Not surprisingly, the vote in Congress did nothing to correct Yugoslavia's foreign policy in American favour. To be sure, Belgrade's friendlier rapport with Moscow might have seemed like a slippery slope to some observers in Washington, but George Kennan was right. There was no danger of Yugoslavia returning to the Soviet camp, although a Yugoslav official did ask him after the Congress vote whether the Americans wanted them to return to the Bloc.⁴⁷⁷ The question, of course, was rhetorical.

Many of Yugoslavia's foreign policy considerations in the fall of 1962 were influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁴⁷⁸ With the world facing the biggest postwar crisis, Yugoslavia could ill afford tipping the balance of the US-Soviet stand-off, but it also did not want to refrain from involvement in Cold War global politics at such a crucial moment. Therefore, Yugoslavia chose to limit its activities to the United Nations, where it participated in an effort coordinated with other non-aligned countries to negotiate a favourable outcome to the crisis. Although Tito

475 Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, p. 172.

476 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi*, p. 75.

477 Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*, p. 173.

478 On the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*, 2nd ed. edition (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Sheldon M. Stern, *The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality*, Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, *The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015); For a non-binary perspective on the historiography of the Crisis, see Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, "Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (September 2008): 555–77.

made some remarks that Washington recognized as pro-Soviet, Yugoslavia managed to come out of the crisis on relatively good terms with both superpowers.⁴⁷⁹

Yugoslavia's position in the Cold War thus remained the same, and while there was much overlap with the Soviets on many global issues, the non-aligned philosophy made Yugoslavia wary of unconditionally following Moscow's lead. A Yugoslav foreign ministry report on the German question showed Belgrade's irritation regarding the USSR's German policy. According to the report, the Soviets ignored Yugoslavia as a legitimate participant in the diplomatic discussions about Germany, even though Yugoslavia had a "sovereign interest" in this matter, which could have a negative effect on Yugo-Soviet relations.⁴⁸⁰ While the Yugoslavs wanted to avoid appearing like one of the Warsaw Pact countries, they saw no danger in continuing on the path of improved bilateral relations with the Soviets.

The Yugoslavs were also reevaluating their relationship with the two Germanies at this juncture. They most certainly preferred to mend their relations with Bonn rather than with East Berlin. In April 1962, the Yugoslav ambassador in Rome Mihailo Javorski told his West German colleague that the recognition of the GDR was a mistake. Nevertheless, this confession – sanctioned by Tito – was not a harbinger of any real change, since Yugoslavia never made any formal (or public) statements to this effect.⁴⁸¹ To be sure, the West Germans themselves were not rushing to extend an olive branch to the Yugoslavs, and they made this clear both privately and publicly.⁴⁸² Javorski's message, however, was revealing of Tito's true sentiment regarding

479 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi*, p. 94.

480 "Nemačko pitanje i naša aktivnost" (July 25, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, doc. no. 492/i.

481 Indeed, Yugoslavia lobbied for the GDR's membership in the The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in April 1962. Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 141.

482 *Ibid.*, 145.

Yugoslavia and the two Germanies. Five years after they recognized the GDR, there were still no tangible benefits for Yugoslavia.

Conversely, the East Germans probably recognized that the latest Yugo-Soviet rapprochement was not a temporary blip, especially after Khrushchev travelled to Yugoslavia in April in order to gain Tito's support for a summit on disarmament in Geneva.⁴⁸³ Given the state of the GDR's own relations with the USSR and Yugoslavia, a course correction was the only reasonable option for East Berlin. This resulted in front line reshuffling. In July 1962, the GDR's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MfAA) dispatched Gerhard Waschewski to Belgrade to replace the prickly attaché Glückauf.⁴⁸⁴ Waschewski's approach was friendlier, and he tried to insert the GDR in the narrative of Yugo-Soviet rapprochement. After Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September, Waschewski informed his hosts that Yugoslavia's relations with other "socialist countries were good, and that there are realistic opportunities for their improvement."⁴⁸⁵ A couple of weeks later, Waschewski was even more direct and suggested that Brezhnev's visit could have a positive effect on GDR's relations with Yugoslavia, but he did not elaborate on this point.⁴⁸⁶ From the Yugoslav perspective, East German motives were transparent. Their advances were meant to take advantage of the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement in order to increase the chances of Yugoslavia signing a separate peace agreement with them, and to improve the GDR's overall international standing. Because of this, the East Germans also

483 Khrushchev had proposed a summit of the UN's Committee on Disarmament, which included four non-aligned representatives. He wanted Tito to use to his influence over the non-aligned countries in order improve the Soviet position at the summit. Lorenz Lüthi "Non-Alignment, 1961-1974" in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?*, Sandra Bott et al., (eds.), (London ; New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 93.

484 A Yugoslav report cited one meeting with Glückauf, who made barbed comments about the inequalities between various Yugoslav republics, which did not impress his hosts. "Zabeleška" (July 26, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, marked as "1962."

485 "Zabeleška" (September 26, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-1454.

486 "Zabeleška" (October 8, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 08-1585.

began evaluating Yugoslavia's non-alignment more positively, especially in the light of the latest GDR campaign for a separate peace agreement. Namely, if Yugoslavia signed the agreement, it would have had a great effect in the rest of the non-aligned world. The East Germans were less forthcoming in the matter of war reparations, and delayed answering the Yugoslav note from earlier in the year.⁴⁸⁷ The West Germans were also facing Belgrade's renewed claim for war reparations, which now included additional victim groups affected by the National Socialist occupation, such as Jews or the victims of Nazi collaborators. The West Germans believed that Yugoslavia's demands were fuelled by its urgent need for hard currency. What other reason would the Yugoslavs have for increasing the total number of victims?⁴⁸⁸ The number of Jewish WW2 victims was indeed known for years, so for Yugoslavs to have included it only now lent the German assessment some credibility.

The Yugoslavs never pursued this claim beyond that initial demand, and by the end of the year, the issue of the far right Croatian diaspora exploded again and removed the reparations from the agenda of bilateral issues, for the time being. On November 29, 1962, the main Yugoslav state holiday (Republic Day), twenty-six armed Croats from an organization calling itself the Croatian Brotherhood of Crusaders stormed the Yugoslav mission in Bonn's Bad Godensberg neighbourhood. They fatally injured the janitor, a Yugoslav citizen, and detonated explosive devices that destroyed the mission's interior. The Yugoslavs were outraged and berated the West Germans for allowing the Ustashe émigrés to continue organizing after numerous warnings from Belgrade, especially in the wake of the violent incidents in 1961.⁴⁸⁹

487 "Zabeleška" (November 12, 1962), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05/004.

488 "Abschluß eines Wiedergutmachungsabkommens mit Jugoslawien" (August 10, 1962), PAAA, AA, B 26-152, pp. 408-411.

489 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 147.

This latest incident was especially worrisome for the Yugoslavs because of the terrorist group's composition. The organizers were well known Ustashe, or Ustashe sympathizers – one of them was the WW2 Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić's personal chaplain – but many of the attackers were recent immigrants, including guest workers, whom the organizers had recruited in West Germany.⁴⁹⁰ The Yugoslav realization that the Ustashe émigrés had the ability to indoctrinate new members who were free to return to Yugoslavia at any point was, in the long term, the most dangerous aspect of this incident. On the other hand, the West German authorities' biggest concern was the escalation of violence. Whereas previously the Ustashe had committed terrorist attacks, this one surpassed them all in scale of violence and the number of armed assailants. And although the attack prompted the West Germans to concentrate on breaking up Ustashe organizations, they could not prevent them from organizing.⁴⁹¹ The Ustashe were able to organize a conference in Munich just a month after the attack in Bonn, and the Yugoslav foreign ministry lamented the influence the Croatian organizations had on the Croatian guest workers, who accounted for almost two thirds of the Yugoslav guest worker population in the FRG in 1962/1963.⁴⁹²

Bonn was embarrassed by the incidents and its own inability to prevent them. Initially, it feared a strong reaction from Tito, and believed that he might even break off all consular relations between the two countries, leaving them without any diplomatic ties.⁴⁹³ However, Belgrade's constant criticism was not well received at the West German foreign office, who rebuked the Yugoslavs for “not showing interest in improving mutual cooperation, for

490 Alexander Clarkson, *Fragmented Fatherland: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945-1980* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), p. 67.

491 Ibid., p. 70-71.

492 “Informacija” (February 12, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 805.

493 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 148.

‘prescribing’ Bonn what needs to be done in regards to the émigrés, and that following the crime committed in Bad Godesberg it has organized a campaign against the [Federal Republic of Germany].”⁴⁹⁴ This message was the prevalent sentiment in Bonn, but the FRG representative at the French embassy in Belgrade, Hans Bock, rushed to point out that it was not the official Bonn position, but rather a hot-headed reaction by some officials. He argued that the arrest of several émigrés and the ban of the Croatian Brotherhood of Crusaders proved that the FRG was proactive in preventing any further incidents.⁴⁹⁵ Indeed, the Yugoslav foreign ministry saw these actions as a “positive [...] step.”⁴⁹⁶

Milan Georgijević, the Yugoslav diplomatic representative in Bonn, gave a presentation in late April at the Yugoslav foreign ministry on the relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. According to his analysis, they were developing satisfactorily. He expected, rather optimistically, that the FRG would be mindful of Yugoslavia’s influence in the non-aligned world regarding the German question, and that it might gradually move toward solving open bilateral questions, which would hint at a complete abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine.⁴⁹⁷ Georgijević’s assessment contradicted an earlier Yugoslav report about a meeting between a West German and a Yugoslav official in Paris in November of 1962. The Yugoslav official complained about the West German obstructionism in various international organizations, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Yugoslav official believed that the West German actions were part of the Hallstein Doctrine, since dealing with Yugoslavia on an equal

494 “Zabeleška” (March 21, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 242/i.

495 Ibid.

496 “Fernschreiben” (March 15, 1963), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 28.

497 “Neki aspekti politike SR Nemačke” (April 27, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. K-76/55.

footing in these organizations would have implied a partial lifting of the Doctrine. His West German colleague, “clearly affected” by these accusations, denied their validity, but also added that West German officials might have been operating under old instructions from Bonn.⁴⁹⁸ Since this explanation is unlikely, it was clear that the FRG did not want Yugoslavia to participate in the West European economic sphere as an equal. Nevertheless, Georgijević remained optimistic.

Georgijević (who, incidentally, was present during the Croat attack on the Yugoslav mission) then moved on to the matter of the Croat émigrés in the FRG. He found this issue to be less important than others, acknowledging that the West German authorities were actively working on breaking up terrorist cells, even though they were avoiding prohibiting all types of diaspora organizing. It was up to Yugoslavia to keep reminding the West Germans of the negative effects of allowing these groups to exist, while at the same time regulating the composition of the guest workers leaving for the FRG. Georgijević added that the issue of reparations could also be remedied by “systematic action toward the political and social forces in FR Germany which can influence the government’s policies toward fulfilling the [...] obligations toward Yugoslavia.” Georgijević had hoped that both the parliamentary opposition and the more left-leaning elements in the government could be persuaded to lobby for Belgrade’s interests in this matter.⁴⁹⁹

Khrushchev’s close calls with the Americans in Cuba and Berlin made him aware that cooperation was better than confrontation, and in the spirit of this realization he informed the

498 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 439443, p. 3.

499 Here Georgijević mentions the SPD and FDP, as well as the progressive wing of the CDU as parties which might be sympathetic to Yugoslavia’s demands. “Neki aspekti politike SR Nemačke” (April 27, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. K-76/55.

Americans that he was ready to discuss the most pressing Cold War issues. Germany was not one of them. He told the Americans that the German question was “practically solved.”⁵⁰⁰ Although Kennedy initially ignored his advances, Khrushchev adopted a wait-and-see approach, and by mid-1963 the two were exchanging reconciliatory messages.⁵⁰¹ Accepting the principle of compromise in diplomacy, Khrushchev was also able to mend his relationship with Tito, who spent more than two weeks in the USSR in December of 1962.⁵⁰²

The Americans did not seem to find Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union too problematic. US secretary of state Dean Rusk visited Belgrade in May 1963 to discuss bilateral matters, but also probe Yugoslavia’s relations with the USSR, and its position on Cuba, which was still a thorn in America’s side. Yugoslavia’s foreign minister Koča Popović pointed out the differences in opinion regarding Cuba, but praised Kennedy for his restraint in the matter during the crisis.⁵⁰³ As for the Yugo-Soviet relationship, Popović assured Rusk that theirs was “good” and “normal,” but not “brotherly,” and that they were certainly not allies.⁵⁰⁴ According to Yugoslav sources, Rusk was satisfied with what he heard in Belgrade.⁵⁰⁵

Ulbricht was left in the lurch by his patron in Moscow, and he therefore chose to maintain a foreign policy that was less aggressive, much as it was since late 1962.⁵⁰⁶ Ulbricht’s more temperate approach also applied to Yugoslavia. Furthermore, his more benevolent stance toward Tito’s brand of socialism might have also been partially influenced by the outcome of the internal ideological shift in Yugoslavia. The struggle between the ‘reformists’ led by Edvard

500 Taubman, *Khrushchev: The man and his Era*, p. 582.

501 Ibid., p. 602.

502 Geoffrey Swain, *Tito*, p. 135.

503 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 160.

504 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971*, p. 129.

505 Ibid.

506 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 218.

Kardelj and the ‘dogmatists’ lead by Aleksandar Ranković was, for the time being, tipped in favour of the latter when he was elected secretary of the SKJ Central Committee. The rapprochement with Moscow and the dogmatist victory were hardly signs of Yugoslavia’s complete surrender to Moscow, as some Western observers had feared, but they undoubtedly lessened the East Germans’ apprehension.⁵⁰⁷

After deciding that Yugoslavia’s deviations were not as dangerous any more, the East Germans invited a Yugoslavs delegation to the SED congress in January 1963. The Yugoslavs accepted the invitation and dispatched a delegation, with positive results. On their return to Belgrade, they reported that the East German treatment of their delegation pointed to a general reluctance to engage with the SKJ delegates, but that overall their visit was an improvement for party relations, and that any negativity should not be perceived as a result of particular animosity towards Yugoslavia, but rather that it was the result of the “existing dogmatic burden.” The author’s impression was that Yugoslavia was finally “legalized [sic]” as a socialist country in the GDR, which opened up room for closer relations between the two countries.⁵⁰⁸ Another SKJ report also noted the positive effect these changes could have on their bilateral relations, welcoming the “favourable opportunities” despite the “reserve and elements of declarativity” still found in East German statements.⁵⁰⁹ These impressions were not completely wrong. In the month of the SED congress, the two countries began negotiations regarding the wartime social insurance payments, a significant part of Yugoslavia’s war reparations demands,

507 A 1963 NATO report warned that Tito might side with the Soviets in case of a new world war. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The Puzzle of the Heretical: Yugoslavia in NATO Political Analysis, 1951–72,” in *The Balkans in the Cold War*, ed. Svetozar Rajak (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2017), 89–108, p. 97.

508 “Izveštaj o VI. Kongresu SEDa, održanog pd 15. 1. - 21. 1. 1963.” (February 20, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-1-69 A-CK SKJ.

509 “Bilateralni odnosi u 1963. godini” (undated), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ.

and the only one for which the East Germans accepted responsibility.⁵¹⁰ Then, in March, a GDR delegation arrived in Belgrade to continue the negotiations. It seemed that East Germans were becoming more at ease with the Yugoslavs even though the negotiations were difficult, because at the margins of these meetings Johannes Könnig, GDR's deputy foreign minister (and chief GDR negotiator at the meetings), met with his Yugoslav counterpart Dušan Kveder to ask for Yugoslavia's assistance regarding an East German delegation's trip to Africa.⁵¹¹ The Yugoslavs obliged, and on April 1 the delegation, headed by the GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer, arrived in Belgrade, where they stayed for a day before continuing on to Africa.⁵¹²

The early 1960s were a boom period for the GDR in regards to developing relations with the non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia. The East Germans themselves were not content with their achievements because they were measuring them against their ultimate goal, namely breaking through the Hallstein Doctrine.⁵¹³ The most glaring example of the FRG's stranglehold on African countries was the case of Guinea, whose president Sékou Touré seemed to be sympathetic to the East German cause.⁵¹⁴ The GDR's efforts to elicit Guinea's recognition were thwarted in 1960 by Bonn after a series of close calls, including a verbal promise from a Guinean diplomat in East Berlin that Touré authorized him to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR.⁵¹⁵ However, considering the circumstances, the East German results were not catastrophic in the long term. While the Belgrade Conference was a failure by all metrics, the

510 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 154; "Nota Demokratske Republike Nemačke o našim potraživanjima" (November 23, 1962), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-2, no number.

511 "Zabeleška" (March 20, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 194/i.

512 "Zabeleška" (April 1, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 231/i.

513 As noted in the SED ZK report "Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen der DDR zu den Afrikanischen Staaten im Jahre 1961," (February 23, 1962) SAPMO BARCH, DY 30/IV 2/20/53, pp. 11-24.

514 Touré had been active in French communist circles, and Guinea was a single party state, ruled by "a body known as the Politburo." Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 106.

515 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 95.

connections forged with a number of African and Asian countries at lower levels – mostly through trade missions – seemed satisfactory when compared to the humble results of the 1950s. The wave of independence that swept Africa from 1960 to 1962, coupled with a larger, more organized East German diplomacy, formed the foundation for these advances. The nature and scope of East German operations in Africa and Asia showed that they could not compete with the FRG economically, and they therefore placed heavy emphasis on cultural diplomacy. Their aim was to show the Africans that everything that is “good, beautiful and progressive in German history” had its home in the GDR.⁵¹⁶

Shipping Marxist literature to non-aligned countries and inviting their students to the GDR were tasks that the East Germans could surmount, at least most of the time.⁵¹⁷ But they needed all the help they could get to make a dent in the FRG’s economic supremacy in Africa and Asia. This was the reason minister Winzer asked for an audience with the Yugoslavs before departing for Africa. Winzer flattered his host, deputy foreign minister Marko Nikezić, noting that the GDR could learn much from Yugoslavs about the African countries because out of all the socialist countries, they had the most developed relations with them. More specifically, Winzer was looking to meet with a Yugoslav delegation that was already in Africa in order to learn from them about the local economic situation, which could help them outmanoeuvre the FRG. The Yugoslavs saw no reason why the two should not meet, if their paths in Africa crossed.⁵¹⁸ More to the point, Winzer also probed Yugoslavia’s willingness to aid the GDR in

516 “*Orientierung für die Planung der kulturellen Beziehungen mit den afrikanischen, arabischen und südostasiatischen Ländern im Jahre 1963*” (undated) PA AA, MfAA, A 16837, p. 288.

517 The East Germans did sometimes blunder when shipping propaganda to the non-aligned countries. For example, the GDR trade mission in Conakry, Guinea received a shipment of political literature in Swedish. “*Stenografische Niederschrift: Sitzung des Ausschusses für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Volkskammer der GDR,*” (May 16, 1962) PA AA, MfAA, A 14816, p. 143.

518 “*Iz zabeleške*” (April 1, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 232/i.

gaining non-aligned support and “combating the Hallstein Doctrine.”⁵¹⁹ The Yugoslavs did warn the Americans that they would launch a campaign for the GDR’s recognition among the non-aligned countries as early as February, but it seems that this was a plank of their anti-FRG plans following the *Ustasha* incidents, rather than a result of East German lobbying.⁵²⁰

In general, the East Germans seemed to have interpreted these recent manifestations of Yugoslav goodwill as an invitation to maximize the extent of their diplomatic relations, both symbolically but also concretely. MfAA officials in East Berlin approached the Yugoslav legation on several occasions with the request to upgrade their legations to embassies. A relatively small distinction, it was nevertheless a symbol of Yugoslav reluctance – maintaining legations had been their idea – to irritate the West Germans, diplomatic threats notwithstanding. Therefore, East Germans would have considered attaining the rank of an embassy a notable victory over the FRG. Not surprisingly, Belgrade resisted these requests, despite numerous overtures. The reasoning behind Yugoslav resistance was twofold. First, if the upgrade was such a desirable goal for the GDR, denying them would keep East Berlin’s criticism somewhat subdued, since the only way to achieve the upgrade was through cooperation. Second, Yugoslavia was still not willing to provoke the FRG and the West in general, especially over a matter as trivial as this one (even though they indirectly threatened the West Germans with doing just that a few months earlier).⁵²¹ Indeed, Tito told the US ambassador in Belgrade

519 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 85-86.

520 These retribution tactics included bringing this matter up in front of the United Nations, upgrading the GDR legation to an embassy, and limiting the number of German lessons in Yugoslav schools. “Gespräch des Ministerialdirigenten Reinkemeyer mit dem amerikanischen Gesandten Morris” (February 26, 1963), AAPD 1963, p. 350; An anonymous officer of the Yugoslav military mission in West Berlin repeated some of these threats in June. PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 148.

521 “Problem podizanja ranga predstavništva sa Nemačkom Demokratskom Republikom” (July 2, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, no number.

Kennan that Yugoslavia would not sacrifice its relations with any of its Western neighbours just to improve relations with the USSR.⁵²² This policy presumably extended beyond the neighbouring countries.

A more consequential issue where the GDR saw Yugoslavia as a useful ally was their campaign for United Nations membership. Yugoslavia had had a history of proactively working to include the East Germans into the activities of various UN bodies. For example, the Yugoslav representative in the Economic Commission had consistently employed East German experts in its projects, which were open to citizens of non-member states as well.⁵²³ In July 1963, the East Germans asked the Yugoslavs to advocate for their place as an official observer at the UN. While this was one of many East German campaigns to penetrate the Hallstein Doctrine by gaining a foothold in international organizations, this one was limited to lobbying socialist countries. It was therefore significant that Yugoslavia was the only country outside the Soviet Bloc that the East Germans approached in this campaign.⁵²⁴ Envoy Staimer did not provide any reason for this departure, but it was further evidence of East Berlin's changing attitudes toward Yugoslavia after years of distrust.

Other areas of bilateral relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia were also showing signs of improvement, although perhaps not as fast as the diplomacy. For example, the economic exchange for 1963 was projected to rise by nine percent over last years trade volume amounting to around 100 million US dollars.⁵²⁵ A respectable increase, but according to

522 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 154.

523 This practice stopped in September 1963, presumably due to Western intervention. "Zabeleška" (January 27, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 412820.

524 "Iz zabeleške" (July 23, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 487/i.

525 "Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR" (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 86. According to the East German annual report, the exact sum was 98 million dollars. Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 153.

Yugoslav reports for the previous year, trade between the two countries was suffering due to solvency issues on both sides. The Yugoslavs also lamented the relatively narrow fields of trade, with the largest issue for them being the inability to buy machinery from the GDR.⁵²⁶ The least developed area of cooperation in 1962 seemed to have been scientific and technical exchange. An agreement to improve cooperation in these areas was signed in 1960, but had not been fulfilled. Here the Yugoslavs blamed the East Germans for the agreement's failure, citing their unwillingness to even begin its implementation.⁵²⁷ However, due to the thaw in their relations beginning in 1963, the East Germans finally started showing some interest in reviving the agreement.⁵²⁸ The reasons for the East German awakening in regard to this agreement probably owed something to the 'New Economic System', a program of reforms announced at the Sixth Congress of the SED in January, with the first reforms enacted by mid-1963. The NES was a comprehensive plan that envisioned a more flexible East German economy, which would improve its efficiency as well as technological development.⁵²⁹ Mass organization cooperation between Yugoslavia and the GDR was also satisfactory, as demonstrated by the visit of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) delegation to the GDR in March and the GDR's National Front delegation visit to Yugoslavia in November.⁵³⁰

Cultural relations were the most successful area of cooperation between the GDR and Yugoslavia in 1962 and 1963. The highlights included the Croatian National Theatre's guest

526 "Bilateralni odnosi izmedju FNRJ-NDR u 1962. godini" (undated), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 73.

527 Ibid., p. 74.

528 "Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR" (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 86.

529 Ralf Ahrens "Debt, Cooperation, and Collapse East German Foreign Trade in the Honecker Years," in Hartmut Berghoff and Uta Andrea Balbier, (eds.), *The East German Economy, 1945-2010: Falling Behind or Catching Up?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 166.

530 "Zabeleška o poseti delegacija Nacionalnog fronta demokratske Nemačke" (undated, but covers the period November 14-22, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, pp. 5-8; "Informacija o boravku delegacije Nacionalnog fronta Nemačke demokratske republike" (November 26, 1963), HDA, CK-SKH D-168, doc. no. 168.

appearance in East Berlin, and the Dresden Philharmonic concert in Dubrovnik, both of which were reported on in the East German press devoid of the usual political commentary, to the point where the praise seemed excessive and “at times spilled over into flattery,” a treatment to which the Yugoslavs were evidently not used to.⁵³¹ The only seemingly contentious question remaining unanswered in the bilateral relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia was the latter’s demand for reparations. Although Belgrade agreed to lower its demand by more than half, from a hundred forty-seven to seventy million Deutschmarks, the East Germans were ready to only pay fifty million.⁵³² Although the East Germans promised not to drag out the negotiations, there were no indications that they were going to be resolved quickly, given the GDR’s issues with solvency. The matter of reparations, coincidentally, would be the reason that brought the Yugoslavs and the West Germans back to the negotiating table in the spring of 1963, this time under somewhat friendlier circumstances.

The struggle to find a common language

After the dust had momentarily settled on the issue of Croatian fascists in the FRG, Belgrade continued its pursuit of war reparations. Back in March, Bonn informed Belgrade that it was willing to form a joint commission to discuss “Yugoslav wishes in the area of economy.” In addition, the West Germans were willing to consider increasing the amount of reparations for the victims of human experiments, but reestablishing talks about general war reparations was out of the question. This decision was a compromise, by which the FRG aimed to improve

531 “Bilateralni odnosi izmedju FNRJ-NDR u 1962. godini” (January 8, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 89.

532 “Aktuelna pitanja iz bilateralnih odnosa SFRJ-NDR” (April 9, 1963), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, p. 87.

relations with Yugoslavia, but also show the “fickle neutrals” that the recognition of the GDR had economic consequences as well.⁵³³

The Americans played a key role in nudging the West Germans to reopen negotiations with the Yugoslavs. According to the FRG foreign office, the US would welcome new talks, since they would strengthen the Western, and weaken the GDR’s position in Belgrade.⁵³⁴ It was not surprising that Washington was the initiator of these talks. President Kennedy was still at loggerheads with the Congress in May over aid for Yugoslavia.⁵³⁵ A friendly gesture from one of America’s allies would have certainly helped to keep Yugoslavia closer to the West. Despite Tito’s proclamations of non-alignment, Washington did not want to rely purely on his word. Thus a joint West German-Yugoslav commission met in Vienna for two days in mid-May to discuss the agenda for a future meeting. The outcome reflected the long backlog of economic issues plaguing their relations. The Yugoslavs wanted to discuss various issues concerning trade, industrial and technological cooperation, as well as the vague but crucial “financial questions.” However, the meeting was hardly a West German courtesy to the Americans. Bonn provided the other half of the agenda, including the contrarian demand for compensation for German workers in Yugoslavia.⁵³⁶

The negotiations themselves took place over two sessions in Belgrade and Munich, and the Yugoslavs ended them abruptly on July 12. They justified their decision with what they perceived to be a lack of good faith from Bonn. The talks did in fact reveal that there was much mistrust on both sides. From Belgrade’s perspective, the West German decision to renege on

533 “Vermerk” (July 2, 1963), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 134.

534 Ibid.

535 *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994), Document 159.

536 “Iz zabeleške” (May 17, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 344/i.

their position on various points in the time between the preparatory talks in Vienna and the first round of negotiations in Belgrade, and the refusal to seriously consider Yugoslav demands were reasons valid enough to end the talks. The Yugoslav foreign ministry pinpointed several reasons for the change in West German attitude: the lack of funds necessary to fulfill Yugoslav demands, FRG's foreign minister Gerhard Schröder's need to placate the CDU's right wing, and Bonn's fear that Yugoslavia and the GDR might finally agree to upgrade their respective legations to embassies. Whatever the West German reasons may have been, Bonn offered to resolve issues other than the reparations, which to the Yugoslavs seemed like a compromise which was mostly cosmetic, and not intended to truly improve relations.⁵³⁷ The West Germans were slightly disappointed, but hardly angry, since these were the first official talks between the two countries since 1957 and the breaking off of diplomatic relations.⁵³⁸ In fact, the West German representative in Belgrade Hans Bock even said as much during his first audience at the Yugoslav foreign ministry after the negotiations were broken off. Bock also relayed the FRG's readiness to resume negotiations at any moment. Belgrade did not immediately accept this offer, although the Yugoslavs were pleased with the West German self-criticism, and they did leave open the possibility of more talks in the fall. Finally, the Yugoslavs agreed to sign one of the agreements discussed in Munich, namely the reparations for the victims of human experiments in the amount of eight million Deutschmarks.⁵³⁹ This particular agreement was especially sensitive. The West Germans initially offered only 1.75 million marks for five hundred and thirty victims, but after the Yugoslavs found out that the FRG paid several times more to the

537 "Prekid ekonomskih pregovora izmedju SR Nemačke i SFR Jugoslavije" (July 17, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 438/i.

538 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 160.

539 "Zabeleška" (July 26, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-B/82-4, doc. no. 491/i.

victims in Poland and Hungary, they increased their demand to eleven million marks, before finally settling for the eight million.⁵⁴⁰ The West Germans believed that this agreement was crucial, since it demonstrated – to Belgrade, but also to Washington – that Bonn was committed to maintaining contact with Yugoslavia.⁵⁴¹

The extent of West German good will was put to the test the same day. At 5:17 a.m., a powerful earthquake hit the southern Yugoslav city of Skopje. Around eighty per cent of the capital of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was reduced to rubble. The catastrophe triggered a massive response from the international community, including West Germany. Bonn approved an aid package worth over two million DM – although the FRG government donated only 20,000 marks, the rest being donations – which certainly helped improve the atmosphere of distrust that was obstructing the negotiation process.⁵⁴²

Adenauer steps down

However, the bilateral relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia entered a lull during the summer of 1963, which might have been the result of transition of power in the FRG. On April 24, Chancellor Adenauer's own party had voted him out of power in a secret vote, but he had remained Chancellor until October, when Ludwig Erhard replaced him.⁵⁴³ The transition did not cause a great stir in Belgrade. From the Yugoslav perspective, Adenauer's departure was

540 "90. Kabinettsitzung am 11. September 1963" accessed May 23, 2018 at <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/k/index.html>

541 "Aufzeichnung der Legationsrätin Rheker" (August 2, 1963), AAPD 1963, p. 894.

542 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 163.

543 Adenauer's descent began in the fall of 1962 with the *Spiegel* affair, when several of its journalists were arrested for publishing sensitive government material. The public outcry against the arrests had a long-reaching effect on the governing coalition, and the vote of non-confidence can be traced back to this affair. M. Kintzinger et al., *Die Ära Adenauer* (Darmstadt: WBG, 2007), pp. 137-138.

merely a manifestation of a wider transformation of West Germany's foreign policy, which was influenced by the global shift away from "East-West tensions." The Yugoslavs believed, however, that this transformation would be slow, since the FRG would try to maintain its role as the bulwark against Communism. Belgrade argued that because of this, Yugoslavia should not have expected a quick solution to the issue of war reparations, and should have aimed to use it as leverage against other forms of financial aid. Belgrade opted instead for economic gain, rather than undoing the Hallstein Doctrine.⁵⁴⁴

In hindsight, West Germany, including its foreign policy, was indeed at a crossroads with Erhard in the chancellor's office, but at the time it was not very clear – both to the public or the governing administration – which path it would choose in the post-Adenauer era.⁵⁴⁵ Adenauer had steered West Germany through the difficult postwar period and the denazification process, which, for better or for worse, allowed Western Germans to move forward, or at least postpone the painful reckoning with their National Socialist legacy.⁵⁴⁶ It was under Adenauer's auspices that the West Germans were able – with American aid, of course – to rebuild their economy and become a European powerhouse in a very short time. He also negotiated with Khrushchev the return of the last German prisoners of war from Soviet captivity, long considered his greatest achievement.⁵⁴⁷ But Adenauer also oversaw the construction of the FRG's rigid foreign policy

544 "Informacija" (October 18, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-4, doc. no. 609/i.

545 According to a poll published in *Der Spiegel*, only 51 percent of the respondents believed that Erhard would continue Adenauer's policies. "ERHARD-BAROMETER." *Der Spiegel* October 16, 1963.
<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46172302.html>

546 For an in-depth analysis of Adenauer's stewardship in this period, see Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

547 Dominik Geppert, *Die Ära Adenauer*, 3., Auflage. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012), p. 59.

that tied it to the West while at the same time building a wall of its own towards the East. By the end of his tenure, Adenauer's achievements were overshadowed by his failures.⁵⁴⁸

For many West Germans, however, Erhard still retained the cachet of those years of postwar growth. His name was synonymous with the *Wirtschaftswunder*, the economic miracle of the 1950s. The 'social market economy' he introduced in 1958 "gradually assumed a political and cultural significance in West Germany that transcended its ostensible purpose as a set of economic policies."⁵⁴⁹ Since the West German economic successes replaced nationalism as the social cohesive after 1945, it was not surprising that Erhard still enjoyed mass support.⁵⁵⁰ However, foreign policy was not Erhard's forte. He favoured the liberal ideal of the market as the preferred arena for international relations, but even this was an economic matter and could hardly apply when dealing with the Soviet Bloc, or even Yugoslavia.⁵⁵¹ Gerhard Schröder remained the foreign minister under Erhard, and the two found common ground on some foreign policy issues, such as preventing the French president Charles de Gaulle from gaining too much influence in West European politics. However, many in the Bonn foreign office apparatus were still loyal to Adenauer (who remained in West German politics as the leader of the CDU), which caused much friction during this period.⁵⁵² The East Germans expected no changes in the FRG's German policies, but Khrushchev overrode East Berlin's considerations and in December

548 Fulbrook, *A History of Germany 1918-2014*, pp. 164-165.

549 James C. Van Hook, *Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945-1957* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1. Van Hook also

550 David F Crew, *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2003), p. 7.

551 However, Erhard's plump physique and proclivity for cigars did make him a walking advertisement for German economic success in the 1950s and 1960s. Young-sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) (ebook), p. 238.

552 Alfred C. Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard: A Biography* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 185.

initiated closer contact with Bonn, hoping that Erhard would be more inclined to cooperate with Moscow than Adenauer.⁵⁵³ By doing this, Khrushchev weakened the GDR's position.

Despite Khrushchev's decision, East Germans could find some consolation in their vastly improved economic relations with Yugoslavia. In 1963 at least 90 percent (around 90 million USD) of the planned trade volume had already been fulfilled by the end of September. The only segment that was still underwhelming was the scientific and technological cooperation. Overall, however, the Yugoslavs noted that the East Germans were more open than ever before to consider improving all aspects of economic exchange.⁵⁵⁴ For good measure, the East Germans also offered an additional one million USD loan towards the reconstruction of Skopje.⁵⁵⁵ The East Germans could also find consolation in the renewed decay of FRG-Yugoslav relations. Bonn's refusal to couple their recent economic talks with the Yugoslav war reparation claims became the main thrust of a Yugoslav diplomatic campaign against the FRG, which reached its zenith in the spring of 1964, during the preparations for the second Non-aligned Conference. The East Germans were also able to persuade the Yugoslavs to sign a cooperation agreement between their respective national journalist associations, through which they intended to minimize the still lingering negative coverage in the Yugoslav press.⁵⁵⁶ Envoy Staimer's last meeting of the year with Tito also reflected the amiable state of GDR-Yugoslav relations. Staimer presented Tito with two film projectors – presumably as New Year's presents, since Communists do not celebrate Christmas – well aware of Tito's love of cinema.⁵⁵⁷ Staimer and

553 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 220.

554 "Informacija" (October 19, 1963), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, no number.

555 Ibid.

556 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 182.

557 For more on the relationship between Yugoslav cinema and politics see Daniel J. Goulding, *Liberated Cinema: The Yugoslav Experience, 1945-2001*, 2nd ed., rev. and expanded (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Pavle Levi, *Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Cinema* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). Tito's personal relationship with cinema was

Tito spent the rest of the meeting discussing president Kennedy's assassination and the identity of the conspirators responsible for his killing, a far cry from most past meetings between Staimer and Yugoslav officials, which were often tense affairs filled with passive aggressive exchanges and veiled threats.⁵⁵⁸ The West Germans could only have hoped to achieve this level of familiarity with the Yugoslav leader.

Their good relations carried on into the new year. On January 4, 1964, Staimer presented state undersecretary Marko Nikezić with a note from the East German government against the FRG's nuclear armament. Nikezić was quick to assure her, that "even without knowing the details in the note" and not being able "to tell [her] in what form we will support this step," the Yugoslav public would undoubtedly greet it favourably.⁵⁵⁹ In previous years, the Yugoslavs were extremely cautious with giving the East Germans any indication of their position toward their demands or statements. Therefore Nikezić's reaction represented a notable departure from previous practices and, however minute, this gesture embodied the transformation of relations during this period. Not surprisingly, the Yugoslav official response to the note was affirmative.⁵⁶⁰ Then, in February, the two countries signed a consular agreement, which allowed them to open consulates on their partner's territory.⁵⁶¹

The positive development of bilateral state relations paved the way for even closer party relations. As on previous occasions, the initial impulse came from the SED. In March, Walter Ulbricht wrote the SKJ Central Committee in the name of their SED counterparts, suggesting a

covered in Mila Turajlić' 2010 documentary *Cinema Komunisto*.

558 "Zabeleška" (December 2, 1963), AJ KPR I-3-a/82-5.

559 "Zabeleška" (January 6, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 20/i.

560 The Yugoslav diplomat who delivered the answer also informed the East Germans that he will soon be able to inform them about their request for Yugoslavia's support in gaining membership in the World Health Organization. "Vermerk" (February 26, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, p. 25.

561 "Referat" (February 12, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 300/ii.

series of steps that would strengthen the cooperation between “the leading forces of our peoples.”⁵⁶² Tito’s answer was equally friendly, and he agreed to most suggestions with some minor adjustments.⁵⁶³ On April 21, Ulbricht accepted Tito’s terms.⁵⁶⁴ It seemed that the two countries were entering a new phase of relations never before achieved, not even after Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR in 1957. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs harboured no illusions about the motives behind the East German openness. Boško Šiljegović, the president of the SKJ Central Committee’s International Commission, asserted that “the fact that the SED is the only party from the socialist countries which has established formal contacts with the SKJ is interpreted, primarily, through political interests of the GDR as a country on the international scene.” These interests guided the GDR to act out of step with the rest of the Soviet Bloc, but Šiljegović argued that the SED still made certain to signal to Moscow (and the rest of the bloc) that it still condemned “all types of revisionism.”⁵⁶⁵ Despite this apprehension, the SKJ was more than happy to further develop its relations with the SED.

As promised, a SKJ delegation – led by Tito’s confidant Edvard Kardelj – visited Ulbricht in May. But the Yugoslav preparations for the visit encountered one sizable obstacle. On April 14, just a month before Kardelj’s departure for East Berlin, a distressed envoy Staimer approached the Yugoslav deputy state secretary Mirko Tepavac at a cocktail party at the Polish embassy in Belgrade. Staimer “expressed consternation” regarding the Yugoslav version of the SKJ itinerary, which apparently did not include a visit to the Berlin Wall. Given the value East

562 The suggestions ranged from deepening mass party organization contacts to inviting respective high ranking party officials and their families on holiday in the GDR and Yugoslavia. Ulbricht’s letter to the SKJ CC (February 8, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-230.

563 Tito’s main concerns were schedule-related, he had no objections to the contents of Ulbricht’s proposal. Tito’s letter to the SED CC (March 19, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05230/2.

564 Ulbricht’s letter to the SKJ CC (April 12, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-506.

565 Odnosi između Saveza Komunističke Jugoslavije i Jedinствene Socijalističke Partije Nemačke” (April 25, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-435.

Berlin placed on the Wall, this omission undoubtedly angered the East Germans. Tepavac argued that Yugoslavia just did not find the Wall to be as important as they did, and that a recent Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) delegation, led by the SKJ Central Committee member Veljko Vlahović visited the Wall, which proved that this was not part of an anti-Wall policy and that Yugoslavia did not need to prove its position against West German revanchism with small gestures.⁵⁶⁶ Vlahović did indeed visit the Wall in 1963, but he labelled it an “embarrassment for humanity” in his report.⁵⁶⁷ This was Vlahović’s personal opinion, but others in the Yugoslav leadership probably shared the sentiment. It is unclear whether Kardelj visited the Wall during his stay in East Berlin, and he did not discuss it during his meeting with Ulbricht, but he did address the issue in a conversation with a group of city officials. Kardelj validated Ulbricht’s decision, garnishing his approval with only a lukewarm disclaimer:

We completely understand these reasons [for the Wall’s construction].... Of course, we, as a socialist country do not care much for isolating ourselves from the outside world. However, this wall is apparently a consequence of certain power relations and, above all, the fact that certain circles in West Germany and the West are not at all ready to recognize the existence of two German states. This is why we believe, since that wall has contributed to the stabilization of relations between the two Berlins, that this was a historically justified decision. And it is simultaneously a contribution to world peace.⁵⁶⁸

Regardless of whether Kardelj visited the Berlin Wall or not, it seemed that the Yugoslavs took East German concerns seriously, and gave their most decisive endorsement of the Wall since its construction.

566 “Zabeleška” (April 16, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 271/i.

567 “Neka zapažanja druga Veljka Vlahovića o unutrašnje političkim problemima Nemačke Narodne Republike” (January, 1963), AJ 507/IX 86/I-1-69 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-30.

568 “Zabeleška” (May 14, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-847.

West Germany makes concessions

In the spring of 1964, the Yugoslav foreign ministry took stock of Yugoslavia's relations with the FRG. While the unknown author argued that the good faith Yugoslavia showed in economic negotiations with the FRG during the past year was misunderstood as weakness in Bonn, which decided to focus on forging relations with Soviet Bloc countries while ignoring Yugoslav interests. The author argued that Yugoslavia had been holding back in its criticisms of the FRG, especially among the non-aligned countries and suggested a much more aggressive approach, the main thrust of which would comprise developing closer ties with the GDR.⁵⁶⁹ Although this report did seem rather harsh, Western observers also found Bonn's Yugoslav policy to be somewhat unproductive. During a regular consultation between French and West German diplomats in March, one of the French diplomats suggested that the FRG should be "more flexible" with Yugoslavia, since it wielded considerable influence in the non-aligned world. Several West Germans retorted that the FRG was more than lenient, and listed a number of Yugoslav actions that were to blame for the poor relations between them. Among the present West German officials who reacted to these suggestions was Herbert Müller-Roschach. Müller-Roschach worked at the West German embassy in Belgrade between 1956-1957 and was a direct participant in the events that lead to the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine. Müller-Roschach boiled down the FRG's position by arguing that it is "mutually incompatible for a country to recognize the Soviet Zone and demand reparations from the Federal Republic" at the

⁵⁶⁹ "Naši stavovi u odnosima sa Zapadnom Nemačkom," (undated), AJ, KPR I-5-B/82-5.

same time.⁵⁷⁰ His statement revealed that the Hallstein Doctrine orthodoxy was alive and well in the Bonn foreign office.

The claims of West German leniency, however, were not unfounded. West German and Yugoslav delegations resumed their economic talks on February 20 after a four month hiatus, and the West German chief negotiator Oskar Schlitter presented a number of concessions that were more agreeable to the Yugoslavs, yet the reparations were not one of them, which the Yugoslavs found “unacceptable.”⁵⁷¹ Considering the state of Yugoslavia’s economy during this period, this reaction was understandable. After a period of growth in the 1950s, the Yugoslav economy began experiencing serious problems in the 1960s.⁵⁷² An injection of hard currency – in the shape of war reparation payments – would have helped with the issues arising from uneven growth and the somewhat unpredictable self-management system, not to mention the constantly underperforming agricultural sector.⁵⁷³ Following the difficult negotiations, Schlitter also met with state undersecretary Marko Nikezić the same day, and attempted to convince him that the FRG was acting in good faith. Nikezić welcomed the West German efforts to move their relations forward, and while the reparations remained the one obstacle which the Yugoslavs could not overlook, he believed that solving every other issue on the table could clear the way to solving even that problem.⁵⁷⁴ Nikezić, who was part of the liberal current in the Yugoslav leadership, framed Schlitter’s visit in positive terms, especially since Schlitter arrived as an official representative of the Bonn government, which was not the case in previous meetings.

570 “Deutsch-französische Konsultationsbesprechungen” (March 18, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 75.

571 “Iz zabeleške” (March 1, 1964), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 142/1.

572 Swain, *Tito*, pp. 139-140.

573 On the problems facing the Yugoslav economy see Ljubo Sirc, *The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Management*. (New York: St-Martin’s Press, 1979); Branko Horvat, *The Yugoslav Economic System: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016); Branko Horvat, *Jugoslavenska privreda, 1965-1983* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1984).

574 “Zabeleška” (February 27, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5.

Nevertheless, the reparations were an issue where the Yugoslavs refused to meet the West Germans half way, and the Yugoslav foreign ministry instructed its diplomats to continue their campaign against the FRG in their respective host countries.⁵⁷⁵

The anti-West German campaign was indeed causing a headache for the Bonn government, but not because of the reparations, which the West Germans considered to be inconsequential to Yugoslavia's negative attitude to their German policy.⁵⁷⁶ The real issue was that Belgrade was also encouraging those non-aligned countries (that were considering recognizing the GDR) by arguing that the FRG was not really losing anything with the GDR's recognition, which was a "blemish" at best.⁵⁷⁷ It appeared that Yugoslavia was no longer restraining itself regarding the German question, which given the upcoming non-aligned conference in Cairo, posed a problem for Bonn. By summer, not much headway was made, as both sides continued reiterating their well known positions. At that point, diplomatic efforts of both Germanies turned to the non-aligned conference in Cairo.

Second chances: The 1964 conference of the non-aligned States in Cairo

From East Berlin's perspective, the timing of its rapprochement with Belgrade could hardly have been better. Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser, two old friends and the driving force behind non-alignment, released a communiqué in the spring of 1963 calling for the second non-aligned conference.⁵⁷⁸ The non-aligned leaders had decided to hold their next conference in

575 "Kabinetu Predsednika Saveznog Izvršnog Veća" (February 24, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5.

576 The West Germans believed that Yugoslavia was going to adapt the Soviet position regardless of the status of reparations. "Runderlaß des Ministerialdirektors Krapf" (March 23, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 77.

577 Ibid.

578 "Potsjetnik" (October 27, 1964), AJ KPR I-4-a-5.

October 1964 in Cairo, and this time the number of invited participants had swelled to almost fifty and Latin American countries participated for the first time as delegates rather than observers. While still not a formal organization, the non-aligned countries had grown both in numbers and stature in the time since the Belgrade non-aligned conference.

The German Democratic Republic's plans to influence the 1961 conference in Belgrade had floundered for several reasons, not least due to poor relations with Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslavia was not the host of this conference, its healthy relationship with the GDR was certainly a boon for East Berlin's potential plans to influence the conference in Cairo. The GDR's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten/MfAA*) retained the same goals as in 1961, namely to elicit recognition from non-aligned countries, preferably with a joint statement at the conference. The GDR wanted to convince the non-aligned countries that they had a common interest pertaining to the German question, namely its peaceful solution. Apart from the goals, the MfAA's methods also resembled the ones they used in 1961.⁵⁷⁹ According to an MfAA report, the GDR considered Belgrade an ally in this campaign since only Yugoslavia and Cuba were listed as the countries with which MfAA officials were supposed to consult about the conference's agenda, but the report provided no more details.⁵⁸⁰ During Edvard Kardelj's East Berlin visit in May – discussed in the previous chapter – he and Ulbricht also touched on the Cairo conference. Ulbricht expressed his understanding for the numerous African countries that did not recognize the GDR because they were economically dependant on “imperialistic powers,” but that it was crucial for them to see through the West

579 These included sending special envoys to various non-aligned countries, sending an observing delegation to the conference, and drafting a memorandum explaining the East German position. “Entwurf: Konzeption und Maßnahmen des MfAA im Hinblick auf die geplante Gipfelkonferenz neutraler Staaten” (February 19, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, pp. 124-126.

580 Ibid.

German sole representation claim. “And it is our request,” Ulbricht continued without mentioning the conference directly, “that [our] Yugoslav friends support our efforts,” since they held a “completely correct position” on this issue. Kardelj could not offer much encouragement in this respect. He argued that these countries had also already agreed with the East German position in that they had developed economic relations with the GDR. However, the fact that they depended on the West – including the FRG – meant that they did not want to jeopardize this relationship by recognizing the GDR. Kardelj added that, although even the more influential non-aligned countries like India and Egypt understood and privately agreed with the East Germans, the stakes for them were too high to disregard the warnings from Bonn.⁵⁸¹ Kardelj’s assessment was correct. Perhaps the best example for this was India, whose president Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan visited Moscow in September, which resulted in a joint communiqué which mentioned “the fact of the existence of two German states.”⁵⁸² A bold statement, it had no bearing whatsoever on the Cairo Conference because India made no effort to repeat it in the final conference documents. Kardelj specifically cited the Hallstein doctrine as the key deterrent for non-aligned states. Therefore, there was “no chance” that the Cairo conference could engender a change in position among such a large group of countries. The only remedy Kardelj could suggest was for the socialist countries to focus on the economic aspects of their relations with the non-aligned countries if they wanted to make an impact, since this would be the only way to break through the Hallstein doctrine.⁵⁸³ Kardelj’s analysis was incisive. The FRG was more worried about the diplomatic than the economic aspects of containing the GDR. Therefore,

581 “Zabeleška” (May 13, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-845.

582 As cited in Lorenz M. Lüthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147, p. 113.

583 “Zabeleška” (May 13, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-845.

even though the chances of disrupting the FRG's economic dominance in the Global South were low, they were still higher than convincing one of the non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR. The Hallstein doctrine was still proving to be effective.

An earlier MfAA report on the positions of leading non-aligned countries also concluded that it was unlikely that any of them would advocate the German question's inclusion in the conference agenda, and that not even Yugoslavia, which directly suffered from the Hallstein doctrine, would take the lead in the initiative to recognize the GDR.⁵⁸⁴ This analysis was most likely based on information passed on by the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (*Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije/CK SKJ*) department of foreign relations to the Belgrade legation in March.⁵⁸⁵

The fact that the German question was a considerably less acute global issue than it was in 1961 and that it would be much more difficult to force its inclusion into the conference agenda, meant that the East Germans needed to maximize their efforts too. After the conference agenda was confirmed – as expected, the German question was excluded – the MfAA concluded that there was still enough overlap between the East German foreign policy and the non-aligned ideals that a successful campaign to influence the conference would be possible, regardless of what Kardelj relayed to Ulbricht. To this end, the MfAA sent out a circular note in June to all East German diplomatic outposts, including the one in Belgrade, with detailed instructions for the various diplomatic corps.⁵⁸⁶

584 "Zur Haltung der wichtigsten neutralen Staaten zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der 2. Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Oktober d.J. in Kairo" (June 30, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 93-96.

585 "Aktenvermerk" (March 4, 1964), DY 30/IV A 2/20 241, pp. 2-6.

586 Letter from Kieswetter (June 6, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 83-91.

Even before the MfAA issued these instructions, Staimer addressed the issue of the conference agenda with a seemingly irritated Mirko Tepavac, Yugoslavia's deputy foreign minister, who noted that the East Germans were "badgering" them, and that "we should tell them even now that they have explained their position in enough detail, but that we have decided that we will not be moving towards that [goal]." Tepavac advised that this matter should be dealt with before the GDR State Council member Bruno Leuschner's imminent visit to Belgrade.⁵⁸⁷ Tepavac seemed to have had a clear estimation of East Germany's plans, because in late April, the MfAA's Yugoslav department held a meeting with the staff of the Belgrade legation, with the conclusion that Yugoslavia "should be exploited to the largest extent possible in order to support the GDR's objectives, namely to increase the consolidation of its authority among the participating countries, and possibly to arrive at a diplomatic recognition."⁵⁸⁸

It seemed that the East Germans were unaware of the effect they were having on Yugoslav officials (or were unconcerned) because shortly after the MfAA issued its instructions, the Belgrade legation began lobbying for the GDR at various Yugoslav institutions. While at a meeting with representatives of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, Staimer's deputy Herbert Schlage diverted the conversation to the topic of the Cairo non-aligned conference, wondering whether "the next step toward the GDR's international affirmation" would be taken there, adding that he "counted on Yugoslavia to do its part." It seemed that the Yugoslav government took Tepavac's suggestion seriously, and that they informed and coached relevant Yugoslav officials, because Schlage's interlocutor simply deferred to Kardelj's

587 "Zabeleška" (April 16, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, 274/2.

588 Friederike Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik Der DDR 1946 Bis 1968*. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), p. 257.

statements made in East Berlin in May.⁵⁸⁹ Nevertheless, a June MfAA report comprising an assessment of Yugoslavia's current foreign policy and a prognosis of its activities at the Cairo conference presented a more optimistic view of Yugoslavia's position. The MfAA's analysis was based on general changes in Yugoslavia's foreign policy, primarily its rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. The East Germans wanted to use Yugoslavia's influence on the non-aligned countries, since its improved relations with the USSR would allow East Berlin to extend its own influence in Africa and Asia. None of the evidence used in the report mentioned the German Question, but the author believed that "there is no doubt" that Yugoslavia was going to lobby for a "broad treatment of the German problem," and while they did not expect Yugoslavia to take initiative in pushing for the GDR's recognition, their understanding was that it would "completely support" any such initiatives from third countries.⁵⁹⁰

As the conference approached, the West Germans were also looking toward Cairo with some apprehension, due to the perceived possibility of a pro-GDR campaign at the conference. The West German government even summoned Yugoslavia's representative in Bonn Milan Georgijević – an unprecedented move – to share these concerns.⁵⁹¹ Bonn's foreign office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) planned to influence the preparatory meeting in the Ceylon capital of Colombo, but the documents do not reveal if this mission was successful.⁵⁹² But the West German ambassador in Colombo Rolf Ramisch did report to Bonn that there was no discussion of the German question at the meeting.⁵⁹³ The Yugoslavs also confirmed this during the joint

589 "Zabeleška" (July 15, 1964), AJ 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-948.

590 "Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten" (June 12, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 114-123.

591 "Zabeleška" (June 13, 1964), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 387/1.

592 Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 176.

593 Telegram from Ramisch (March 23, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 323-324.

committee negotiations in Belgrade in June.⁵⁹⁴ However, Ramisch did mention an anti-FRG campaign in the Ceylonese leftist press, wherein the FRG was attacked for harbouring *Ustasha* organizations.⁵⁹⁵ Ceylon was one of the non-aligned countries which was on the fence regarding the German Question – the GDR opened a consulate in Colombo just a few months earlier – so Bonn was especially wary of any anti-FRG campaign there.⁵⁹⁶ Not leaving anything to chance, Chancellor Erhard considered inviting the Egyptian president Nasser to Bonn, in order to convince him of the correctness of the West German position, and ask him to influence other non-aligned statesmen. In a conversation with the US ambassador in Bonn George McGhee on April 11, Erhard estimated that his chances of succeeding were reasonably high, since “the Germans had never fought the Arabs and had, he believed, a considerable reservoir of good will in the Arab states.”⁵⁹⁷ Unfortunately for the FRG, Erhard could not say the same for the Yugoslavs, on either count.

According to a January 1964 Bonn Foreign Office (AA) report compiled for the Bundestag foreign policy committee, the West German-Yugoslav relations had reached another impasse. The report’s author believed that the FRG – acting within the parameters set by Yugoslavia’s recognition of the GDR – had exhausted all options for improving these relations. While the recognition of the GDR was the biggest impediment to better relations, several other issues plagued them, most prominently the war reparations.⁵⁹⁸ The Yugoslav anti-FRG

594 “Zabeleška” (June 13, 1964), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 387/1.

595 Telegram from Ramisch (March 23, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 323-324.

596 “111. Kabinettsitzung am 19. Februar 1964” accessed on August 1, 2018 at <http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0/index.html>

597 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 25. (ebook)

598 Another issue mentioned in the report was a charge brought by a West German lawyer against Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović for alleged WWII killing of Wehrmacht prisoners of war. The charge was dropped in early 1964. “Aufzeichnung” (January 6, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 180-185.

campaign, which had been using precisely these issues against the West Germans, had also reached the non-aligned countries. The AA sent out a circular note to its diplomatic outposts in March warning them that “Yugoslavia was conducting [...] an increasingly strong anti-German propaganda campaign” and asking them to be vigilant and report back on any such Yugoslav activities.⁵⁹⁹

The reports the AA received from its diplomatic outposts showed that a campaign was indeed taking place, but not everywhere. And where it was present, it had limited reach. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, there was no Yugoslav propaganda present in the press, which the West German ambassador assigned to Yugoslavia's good standing in the country, and which Belgrade did not want to tarnish with political agitation.⁶⁰⁰ In Cambodia, all foreign propaganda had to be vetted by the censor's office before it could be published. Since Yugoslavia's material did not meet the censor's standards, it was confined to being distributed only in other socialist embassies.⁶⁰¹ West Germany's ambassador in New Delhi Dietrich von Mirbach noticed a stronger Yugoslav campaign in India, where the Yugoslavs apparently tried to discredit West Germany, describing it as a less than honest advocate of world peace, but even here Mirbach saw no reason for countermeasures.⁶⁰² Furthermore, Mirbach claimed that Tito was more interested in strengthening his influence among non-aligned countries than he was invested in the GDR's agenda.⁶⁰³ The same argument was used by the Yugoslav ambassador in London.⁶⁰⁴ The MfAA also came to this conclusion in June.⁶⁰⁵ Yugoslav propaganda's furthest

599 “Jugoslawische Haltung in der Deutschland-Frage” (March 12, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 288-289.

600 Letter from Reichold, (March 31, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 351.

601 Letter from Berendonck, (July 13, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, p. 402.

602 Letter from Duckwitz, (March 26, 1964), PA AA, AA B 42-39, pp. 346-347.

603 Telegram from Duckwitz, (April 27, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page.

604 Telegram from Etdorf, (May 13, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page.

605 “Einschätzung der jugoslawischen Haltung zur Vorbereitung einer zweiten Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten” (June 12, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 114-123.

reach was in Egypt, which was not surprising, given Tito's close relationship with Nasser. There the state-owned Cairo evening newspaper Al-Messa published an article that described the Yugo-West German relations with a discernible Yugoslav bias. According to the West German embassy in Cairo, the article seemed to be a direct translation of a Yugoslav pamphlet on this subject.⁶⁰⁶

The Egyptians did not publish the article merely as a courtesy to Tito, but also because West Germany was on the verge of recognizing Israel.⁶⁰⁷ The Arab world was strongly opposed to any recognition of Israeli statehood, and Egypt's role in the non-aligned movement, combined with the GDR's campaign for recognition, provided both Egypt and the FRG with some leverage against each other. But it could only have been used sparsely. Had Egypt recognized the GDR, it would have triggered the Hallstein doctrine mechanisms. Conversely, had the FRG recognized Israel, Egypt would have broken off diplomatic relations with the FRG. At this juncture, Erhard decided to placate the Egyptians, while putting his rapprochement with Israel on hold until after the conference. Secret aid to Israel did continue, but as William Glenn Gray has noted, "it was Bonn's overriding interest in isolating the GDR that led it to court Nasser so assiduously and, therefore, to prefer only the most clandestine measures in support of Israel."⁶⁰⁸

With Egypt not entirely committed to the West German line, and Yugoslavia behaving somewhat antagonistically, the FRG could not rely on its diplomatic clout alone to secure guaranteed compliance with its aims. Therefore, Bonn turned to its allies for help. Foreign minister Gerhard Schröder pleaded with the American foreign secretary Dean Rusk to lean on

606 Letter from Federer (July 22, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 42-39, p. 403.

607 For the genesis of the FRG's and the GDR's relations with Israel and the Arab world, see Lorena De Vita, "Overlapping Rivalries: The Two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War," *Cold War History* 17, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 351-66.

608 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 167.

the Yugoslavs and obtain their assurance of non-intervention at the Cairo conference, citing their alleged near-alignment with Soviet foreign policy, which could have been damaging considering Yugoslavia's influence in the non-aligned world.⁶⁰⁹ The American response was not what the West Germans were hoping for. Even though Americans were also concerned with the apparent overlap of Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policies, they did not want to push the Yugoslavs even closer toward Moscow by applying pressure in a matter that was not a priority for them. Their solution was for the FRG to initiate rapprochement, which was still anathema to many in Bonn.⁶¹⁰ The American proposal was in line with US policy, wherein German reunification was a noble goal, but not a priority, as Lyndon B. Johnson demonstrated during his first meeting with Erhard in December 1963. The American president made it clear that he supported Erhard's campaign for German reunification, but that what he actually needed from Bonn was more financial support for the US troops stationed in the FRG.⁶¹¹ Erhard acquiesced, thereby setting the precedent for the FRG-US relations during his time in office. Rusk merely followed the same principle when he turned down Schröder's request, and because the FRG could not count on US support, they decided to begin a new round of economic negotiations with Yugoslavia in June.⁶¹² The West Germans offered higher export credit guarantees, a concession they were not willing to make in previous negotiations. The Yugoslav delegation concluded that the Germans

609 "Bundesminister Schröder an den amerikanischen Außenminister Rusk" (April 22, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 470-474).

610 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 165.

611 Eugenie M. Blang, "A Reappraisal of Germany's Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard's Response to America's War in Vietnam," *German Studies Review* 27, no. 2 (2004): 341-60, p. 344.

612 This was just one of the issues where Erhard had acted on Washington's request. The list of other concessions given by the US embassy in Bonn is quite substantial: "increase their aid to underdeveloped countries; speed up formation of their peace corps; send troops to Cyprus; send aid and a medical unit to South Vietnam; give aid to Zanzibar; give aid to Turkey; extend the offset agreement; increase their military budget; make concessions to Yugoslavia; support our position on observation posts and other disarmament matters; liberalize their restitution program; give arms aid to Israel; increase American imports." *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 45. (ebook)

had in fact reached the limit of their current capabilities, and recommended to the government in Belgrade to stop pressuring Bonn for more concessions.⁶¹³ As a result, on July 14 the FRG and Yugoslavia signed an agreement regulating “trade and economic relations.” West Germans were able to include a “good behaviour” clause in the agreement, in which both sides promised to “avoid political disturbances,” which gave the West Germans at least some hope that the Yugoslavs would not support damaging motions at the Cairo conference.⁶¹⁴ After the wrangling with the Egyptians and the Yugoslavs, the West Germans were probably relieved to hear that India opposed the inclusion of the German question in the conference agenda.⁶¹⁵ Bonn was also able to count on its other Western allies for support in this matter, as they issued a number of warnings to the participating countries in the weeks leading up to the conference.⁶¹⁶

The GDR’s and the FRG’s last diplomatic efforts before the conference

The East Germans were very interested in the contents of the new economic agreement between Yugoslavia and the FRG, since they had been closely monitoring Bonn’s activities leading up to the conference. The MfAA reported a noticeable increase in West German activity in the non-aligned world – mostly through development aid – with the sole aim of influencing the Cairo conference.⁶¹⁷ Therefore, the GDR saw West Germany’s advances toward Yugoslavia as part of the same campaign. After the West German press claimed that the recently signed

613 “Zabeleška” (June 13, 1964), AJ KPR I-3-a/82-5, doc. no. 387/i.

614 Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, pp. 165-166; Theurer, *Bonn-Belgrad-Ost-Berlin*, p. 180.

615 Telegram from Mirbach, (August 6, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 130 3129A, no page number.

616 Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, p. 164.

617 Although, paradoxically, the MfAA’s analysis suggested that this approach made it harder to expose the West German neocolonialism, but that at the same time the effects of Bonn’s anti-GDR propaganda were abating. PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 30-70.

trade agreement between the FRG and Yugoslavia contained a clause by which the latter would abstain from raising the issue of German unification, GDR's deputy envoy Schlage asked the head of the Eastern Europe department at the Yugoslav foreign ministry (Dimitrijević) whether this was true, but Dimitrijević denied it and added that these allegations were just aimed to calm down certain West German circles, and that Yugoslavia could not be influenced economically.⁶¹⁸ It is unclear just how much influence the agreement actually had on Yugoslavia's behaviour during the conference, but considering the consistency of Yugoslav statements on the German Question since the conference's early planning stages, it seemed that Dimitrijević was not lying to Schlage. That Yugoslavia took advantage of West German anxieties (or rather, American ones, since they were responsible for forcing the FRG to the negotiating table) was another matter altogether.

Ulbricht could not keep up with the West German economic offensive, but he did begin pushing for a new agreement with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1964, one that would "increase the GDR's authority." Moscow was reluctant at first, but ultimately agreed to sign a 'friendship agreement', which was a significantly gutted version of Ulbricht's proposal.⁶¹⁹ In fact, the agreement was so void of substance that the Western observers believed that it was signed only to raise the GDR's profile before the Cairo conference.⁶²⁰ But the East German leader did have one more chance at effective lobbying before the conference. On August 11, envoy Staimer was able to meet with Tito at his summer residence on the Brioni Islands and

618 "Aktenvermerk" (July 25, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 360/75 p. 76.

619 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, pp. 220-221.

620 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 163.

asked whether he would be open to meeting with Ulbricht in September, during the latter's return from a visit to Bulgaria. Tito agreed to hosting Ulbricht "with pleasure."⁶²¹

Ulbricht's first visit to Belgrade was a milestone for the relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia (discussed in Chapter 2), but in the context of the East German non-aligned conference campaign, it was hardly a success. In the preparatory notes for Ulbricht's visit, the Yugoslav foreign ministry suggested that Yugoslavia should maintain the same position regarding the Cairo conference, especially since the East Germans had not accepted the explanation Kardelj gave them in May, effectively repeating the inner Yugoslav reasoning that its position in the non-aligned movement was more valuable than the GDR's recognition.⁶²² Dimitrijević also noted in his report that the Yugoslavs should brace for East German pressure regarding the Cairo conference.⁶²³ However, the East Germans were well aware of Yugoslavia's consistency in this matter, so much so that it was Tito, rather than Ulbricht, who first brought up the German question and the Cairo conference during their conversation. The fact that Ulbricht did not press the matter showed a certain level of comfort with the current state of its campaign. However, Tito seemed more concerned with his and Yugoslavia's role at the conference, and was only inquiring about this issue because he would be questioned about it by other non-aligned statesmen. It was Ulbricht himself who stated, "the conference in Cairo will certainly not address the German question separately," but he had hoped that the discussion of issues that might discredit the FRG, whether directly or by association, would take centre stage at the conference.⁶²⁴ It seems this was the extent of Ulbricht's lobbying. Envoy Staimer did attempt to

621 "Zabeleška" (August 11, 1964), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-70-99 A-CK SKJ, doc. no. 05-136.

622 "Informacija" (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, no number.

623 "Zabeleška" (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, doc. no. 504/2.

624 Here Ulbricht mentioned Cyprus as well as the nuclear-free zones in Africa and Europe as the two issues he expected to occupy the delegates the most. (September 19, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, no number.

organize another, more private meeting between Ulbricht and Tito, but the Yugoslavs rejected the proposal.⁶²⁵

The West German state secretary Rolf Lahr also made a visit to Belgrade in September. The reason for his visit was the FRG's foreign minister Gerhard Schröder's circular note on September 5, warning West German diplomats of the Soviet plan to influence the Cairo conference and non-aligned countries in order to elicit their recognition of the GDR. Schröder singled out Yugoslavia as the country most likely to comply with the Soviet plan, or "at least to promote it" at the conference, but noted that Bonn found the Yugoslav position on the German Question more palatable since the economic agreements the two countries signed earlier in the year.⁶²⁶ Nevertheless, the West Germans wanted one last assurance before the conference. Although Lahr's primary mission was probing the issue of war reparations, he also inquired about the Cairo conference.⁶²⁷ Lahr found that his interlocutor, the foreign minister Marko Nikezić, had a "thoroughly Western disposition," that he was "intelligent, open-minded, without complexes and taboos," and that he was a good listener that was not shy about any subject.⁶²⁸ Yugoslav foreign minister Nikezić assured him that Yugoslavia would not contribute to the discussions regarding the upgrading of the GDR's international status.⁶²⁹ This appears to have been the last official contact between the West Germans and the Yugoslavs before the conference. It seems that someone leaked the contents of this meeting to envoy Staimer, because she asked the deputy foreign minister Mirko Tepavac whether Yugoslavia planned to abstain

625 "Zabeleška" (September 20, 1964), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-8, doc. no. 504/6.

626 "Rundschreiben des Bundesministers Schröder" (September 4, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 994-995.

627 Lahr had performed a similar mission in Ghana in May. After a meeting with Kwame Nkrumah, Ghanaian press ceased with the negative reporting on the FRG. *Ibid.*, p. 994.

628 "Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Lahr" (September 8, 1964), AAPD 1964, pp. 1001-1003.

629 Nikezić also told Lahr that Yugoslavia would not initiate a motion at the UN to grant the GDR observer status (like the one the FRG already had), but if a third country did initiate it, Yugoslavia would have to vote in support of the motion. "Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Lahr" (September 8, 1964), AAPD 1964, p. 1002.

from initiating any discussion about East Germany's international status at the conference, as per a rumour she heard. According to Staimer, it was the West German representative in Belgrade, Hans Bock, who had disclosed this information. Naturally, Tepavac denied any such "promise," but added in his report that it would be "very inconvenient" if any other Yugoslav official confirmed that this alleged promise was actually given to the West Germans.⁶³⁰

The non-aligned conference in Cairo and the German Question

The 2nd Conference of the Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government in Cairo began on October 5, with opening speeches from several non-aligned leaders including the host Nasser and the Yugoslav president Tito. The German Question – seemingly stuck in status quo – had little chance of reaching the spotlight in Cairo, even without West German intervention. This was definitely not a "second Belgrade," as some observers described it.⁶³¹ The most visible absence in Cairo was that of Jawaharlal Nehru. India's first prime minister had passed away in May, which left non-alignment without one of its founding members, who was the most cautious of the original triumvirate that first met on the Brioni Islands in 1956. Another change was the stronger presence of African nations, which had created the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and had an agenda of their own.⁶³² Compared with the Belgrade conference, the delegates in Cairo were far less focused on the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The issues that affected them were more relevant to the non-aligned countries themselves, such

630 "Zabeleška" (September 15, 1964), AJ KPR I-5-b/81-3, doc. no. 515/3.

631 Dietmar Rothermund, "The Era of Non-Alignment," in Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska (eds.), *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung - Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 27.

632 Ibid., p. 28.

as the Congo crisis or Portuguese colonialism. The non-aligned leaders were growing more aware of their place in global politics and shifted their focus accordingly. Their concerns were hardly similar to those of Bonn and East Berlin. Besides, the growing number of participating countries also diminished their capability to form consensus on any point.⁶³³

Tito, a European statesman whose international position was by that point firmly rooted in the Global South, straddled the line between the conclusions of the Belgrade conference and the new non-aligned issues. The Yugoslav president spoke mostly in general terms, focusing on the relief of inter-bloc tensions and economic problems experienced by the non-aligned countries. He did mention the German question, but in terms which provided nothing novel:

In line with [the American-Soviet thaw], I think we may conclude that there has also been a slackening of tension over the German question, a settlement of which should be sought primarily through negotiations between the two German [s]tates, thereby enabling the German people to decide on their future.⁶³⁴

To be sure, the East Germans could find nothing wrong with Tito's statement. The existence of two German states and the importance of allowing the German people to find the solution themselves were both staples of East Germany's German policy, and having them repeated in front of more than fifty world leaders could have been considered a success. However, Yugoslav reports of Tito's private conversations with other leaders showed not only that the Yugoslav president avoided addressing the German question, but also that his interlocutors never even

633 Jürgen Dinkel, *Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992)* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), p. 130.

634 "Statement by his excellency Josip Broz Tito" (October 6, 1964), KPR I-4-A-5 Box II, p. 6.

mentioned it.⁶³⁵ Nor did any other speaker take it upon themselves to touch upon the German question during the plenary meetings.

The West Germans were still actively attempting to influence the conference while it was already under way. After finding out that the issue of the world's divided nations, such as Vietnam and Korea, would be addressed – with the recommendation that they should begin negotiations for reunification – the West German ambassador in Cairo approached his Italian counterpart, and asked him to use his contacts to prevent the inclusion of this point in the conference agenda. While he was not successful, he did later express his satisfaction with the Yugoslav position regarding the German question, which showed that Belgrade honoured the “good behaviour clause” in the agreement signed by Lahr and Nikezić in September.⁶³⁶

The conference's vague conclusions reflected the sheer number of participants and their disparate interests and positions.⁶³⁷ For one, the conference's final document, the “Programme for Peace and International Co-operation,” was several times longer than the one from Belgrade, but still managed to be less precise in its formulations. In the final analysis, the East German government could do nothing else but latch onto the conference declaration. In its official statement on the conference, East Berlin agreed with the declaration's central ideas, inserting them into its own foreign policy framework, and nestled its own aims among the ones non-aligned states provided. For example, the East Germans felt vindicated by the declaration's call for divided nations “to seek a just and lasting solution in order to achieve the unification of their territories by peaceful methods without outside interference or pressure.” Furthermore, the GDR

635 Various reports in KPR I-4-a-5 Box II.

636 “Bilten br. 10” (undated), KPR I-4-a-5 Box II, p. 17.

637 Jürgen Dinkel, *Die Bewegung bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927 – 1992)*. (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), p. 130.

also agreed with the non-aligned statement “that resorting to threats or force can lead to no satisfactory settlement, [and] cannot do otherwise than jeopardize international security.”⁶³⁸ According to the GDR’s response, this idea was aligned with their perennial call for a peace agreement and the solution of the Berlin question.⁶³⁹ The MfAA assigned some of the perceived success to Ulbricht’s meeting with Tito, which smacked of sycophantism rather than sober analysis.⁶⁴⁰ The West Germans also found the conference’s outcome acceptable, although they were dismayed at the effort and funding that went into securing an agreeable treatment of the German question in Cairo, and the prospect of forthcoming Global South conferences where they might have had to repeat the same tactics.⁶⁴¹

Conclusion

Yugoslavia’s relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic continued to fluctuate unevenly in 1961 and 1962. The FRG emerged as the winner of the diplomatic battle with the GDR over the Belgrade non-aligned conference. However, its relations with Yugoslavia suffered a blow shortly after the conference ended. Croatian extreme right émigrés in the FRG committed a series of violent incidents and terrorist attacks on Yugoslav officials. Even though Bonn regretted the incidents, they ignored Yugoslav demands to implement new repressive measures against these groups, and Belgrade felt that the

638 “Programme for Peace and International Co-operation,” in *Summit Declarations of Non-Aligned Movement (1961-2009)*, (Kathmandu Institute of Foreign Affairs: Nepal 2011), p. 18.

639 “Erklärung der Regierung der DDR zu den Ergebnissen der Konferenz nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Kairo” (October 25, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 15-20.

640 “Einschätzung der Haltung Jugoslawiens auf der Kairoer Konferenz der nichtpaktgebundenen Länder” (November 2, 1964), PA AA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 1-13.

641 The second Bandung Conference was planned for 1965 in Algiers. However, it never took place. Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, p. 169.

West German response was wilfully inadequate and initiated their own measures to influence the opinion of Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG, used as a recruitment pool for the Croat extremists. The East Germans attempted to exploit this crisis in West German-Yugoslav relations to improve their own relations with Yugoslavia, but their efforts were not fruitful. Ulbricht also failed to capitalize on Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, which was gaining momentum in 1962. Khrushchev needed Tito's support more than he needed the GDR's international affirmation. Nevertheless, Belgrade did continue to offer limited assistance to East Berlin in Africa and Asia as long as it did not jeopardize Yugoslavia's standing as a non-aligned leader.

When Ludwig Erhard replaced Konrad Adenauer as the West German chancellor in October 1963, not much changed in the FRG's foreign policy during the first few months of his tenure, as Gerhard Schröder remained the foreign minister in the new government. However, a small breakthrough occurred in the spring of 1963 when, with a prod from Washington, Bonn approached the Yugoslavs and suggested a meeting of a joint West German-Yugoslav commission to discuss bilateral economic questions. The two sides were also able to come to an agreement on the reparations for the victims of Nazi human experiments, which was a significant milestone in the negotiations over war reparations. At the same time, Yugoslavia's economic relations with East Germany were improving at a steady pace. Yugoslavia's trade with the GDR was growing in almost all sectors, with planned trade volumes being met ahead of schedule.

Overall, Yugoslavia's relations with both Germanies had taken a turn for the better in 1963 and 1964. The FRG began to show more goodwill towards Yugoslavia, as evidenced by the first official contacts between the two governments after 1957 and the agreement on the

reparations for human experiments. Conversely, the GDR was finally beginning to profit from the Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, and was on the receiving end of Yugoslav goodwill itself. With the Cairo non-aligned conference looming, both Germanies could feel more confident about Yugoslavia's position than they could three years earlier in Belgrade, but in the zero-sum game that was the Hallstein Doctrine, only one Germany could profit from this development.

For the FRG and the GDR, the non-aligned conference in Cairo in October 1964 was a significant diplomatic duel, with the non-aligned position on the German Question at stake. For the second time since Belgrade in 1961, the GDR had a chance to convince the non-aligned states to endorse its recognition as a group, a considerably more powerful statement than receiving recognition from individual countries. The non-bloc countries' recognition of the GDR would have been a decisive diplomatic victory not only for Ulbricht, but also for the Soviet Bloc in general. Conversely, it would have been the death knell for the FRG's Hallstein Doctrine.

The GDR was more confident about its chances this time. Not only had it mended relations with Yugoslavia, it had done the same with Egypt and other non-aligned states. In the months leading up to the Cairo conference, the East German foreign ministry instructed its Belgrade diplomats to pressure the Yugoslavs into lobbying for the GDR's recognition. Given the recent Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, especially in foreign policy matters, East Germans believed that their campaign could prove fruitful. However, the West Germans were able to use their economic clout to prevent Yugoslavia from agitating for the GDR's recognition in Cairo. In July 1964, the FRG and Yugoslavia signed a trade agreement that included a "good behaviour clause," which stipulated that the both sides would refrain from exacerbating "political" issues. Both sides understood that this vague formulation pertained to Yugoslavia's treatment of the

German Question, and Bonn made certain to confirm the stipulations of this clause in September, during another round of economic negotiations in Belgrade.

The Cairo conference again exposed the disparity between the FRG's and the GDR's diplomacy. East Berlin's ideological alignment with Yugoslavia could not compete with the FRG's economic influence in Belgrade. It could also not compete against the FRG elsewhere, since the FRG was successful in preventing other leading non-aligned countries from addressing the German Question in Cairo by measures similar to the ones they employed when dealing with Yugoslavia. The East German foreign ministry recognized that West German economic influence was responsible for poor results in Cairo, but also that the "young nation-states" simply did not recognize the dangers of West German "imperialism."⁶⁴² Even after a second failed campaign to influence a non-aligned conference, the East German diplomats were not ready to exercise self-criticism.

To be sure, this outcome was the result of the FRG's diplomatic supremacy which – coupled with the notably lesser importance the German Question held in global politics at that time – prevented any favourable outcome of the Cairo non-aligned conference. But the East Germans were not willing to concede that their approach needed to change. From Bonn's perspective, this was a resounding victory and another reason for the Hallstein Doctrine's supporters to be satisfied with its implementation. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, the movement against the Doctrine was growing ever stronger, and the Cairo conference was its last resounding success. The West German government was beginning to acknowledge the

642 "Erklärung der Regierung der DDR zu den Ergebnissen der Konferenz nichtpaktgebundenen Staaten in Kairo" (October 25, 1964), PAAA, MfAA, C 1572/72, pp. 15-20.

negative effects the Hallstein Doctrine was having on its foreign policy. As a result, Bonn would enact measures that initiated the doctrine's demise.

Chapter 6

From Cairo to Kiesinger: The slow Decline of the Hallstein Doctrine (1964-1966)

In the small Bavarian town of Tutzing on July 15, 1963, at the eponymous Evangelical Academy, Egon Bahr gave a talk in which he outlined a proposal for a new West German approach to international engagement, which would become synonymous with the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) foreign policy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, Bahr was the head of the Press and Information Office for West Berlin and practically a spokesperson for Willy Brandt, the West Berlin mayor, who had given a similar-themed talk at the same event in Tutzing.⁶⁴³ Brandt was the Social Democratic Party's political superstar, who achieved this status during the second Berlin Crisis as the city's mayor. He travelled the world in search of support for the West German solution to the crisis, and his popularity even earned him a ticker tape parade in New York.⁶⁴⁴ But in Tutzing, it was Bahr's speech that left the deeper imprint.⁶⁴⁵ Bahr demanded an overhaul of Bonn's German policy, arguing that its rigidity was

643 "Willy Brandts Rede in der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 15. Juli 1963," *Willy Brandt Biografie* (blog), accessed June 25, 2018, <https://www.willy-brandt-biografie.de/quellen/bedeutende-reden/rede-tutzing-1963-2/>.

644 Barbara Marshall, *Willy Brandt: A Political Biography*, 1997 edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), pp. 35-36.

645 It was Egon Bahr whom the German press dubbed "the Architect of the Ostpolitik" upon his death in 2015. Karl-Ludwig Günsche, "Zum Tode Egon Bahrs: Wegbereiter Der Einheit," *Spiegel Online*, August 20, 2015, sec. Politik, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/egon-bahr-ist-tot-willy-brandts-engster-vertrauter-a-1048965.html>; Daniel Friedrich Sturm, "Egon Bahr: Architekt von Brandts Ostpolitik ist Tot," *DIE WELT*, August 20, 2015, <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article145429912/Egon-Bahr-Tod-einer-deutschen-Jahrhundertfigur.html>; "Architekt der Ostpolitik: SPD-Politiker Egon Bahr gestorben," *FAZ.NET*, August 20, 2015, <http://www.faz.net/1.3759543>; FOCUS Online, "Der Architekt von Brandts neuer Ostpolitik ist tot," FOCUS Online, August 20, 2015, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/egon-bahr-ist-tot-der-architekt-von-brandts-neuer-ostpolitik-ist-tot_id_4891824.html.

counterproductive not only to an eventual German reunification, but also detrimental to ending the Cold War. At the heart of Bahr's speech was the concept of "change through rapprochement." He believed that only if both sides cooperated closely could a meaningful breakthrough be achieved.⁶⁴⁶ There was no room for negative policies to which Bonn was still hanging on.

The Hallstein Doctrine, with its own limiting rigidity, clearly fell under the umbrella of the changes Brandt and Bahr wanted to make in West Germany's foreign policy. The opposition to the Doctrine had existed in West German politics since its inception, and Brandt had been at its forefront for just as long.⁶⁴⁷ However, the Hallstein Doctrine's detractors lacked influence during those years.⁶⁴⁸ But the dissenting voices grew stronger over the years, convinced that the Doctrine weakened, rather than strengthened the FRG's international position, and Cuba's recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1963 only served to prove the point.

Five months before Bahr's Tutzing speech, on January 11, Cuba had finally recognized the GDR after years of hesitation. The Cuban act of recognition itself was sudden, since Cuba had maintained relations with the FRG, established before Fidel Castro took control of this Caribbean island, and the new regime was initially reluctant to jeopardize them by recognizing the GDR.⁶⁴⁹ Yet by 1963, Cuba was definitely part of the Soviet Bloc and hardly a 'third state' as defined by Hallstein Doctrine. After all, Cuba had been the mouthpiece for the GDR at various

646 "Volltext Egon Bahr, Wandel Durch Annäherung. Rede in Der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing [Tutzingener Rede], 15. Juli 1963 / Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, München)," accessed June 25, 2018, http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0091_bah&object=translation&st=&l=de.

647 In 1957, the year of Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR, Brandt called for closer cooperation with the Soviet Bloc. Marshall, *Willy Brandt*, p. 34.

648 Wolfgang Schmidt "Willy Brandts Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik" in Bernd Rother, ed., *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik, Akteure Der Außenpolitik* (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), <http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658029180> (ebook), p. 167.

649 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 115.

international venues, including the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961. The FRG was somewhat surprised by the recognition, but quickly regrouped and retaliated with full force. Unlike with Yugoslavia in 1957, Bonn did not pull any punches in its implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine. It had severed all diplomatic, consular, and economic relations with Cuba.⁶⁵⁰ While this was an easy decision to make, since Cuba was not one of FRG's major trade partners or an important player in European Cold War politics, it did show that the FRG was willing to go to unprecedented lengths to prevent the GDR's recognition.

This mindset was anathema to Brandt. He and Bahr had been working closely since the 1950s, and since then their position on the German question, quite different than Adenauer's, had been slowly evolving in constant cooperation.⁶⁵¹ At the centre of his thinking lay the idea that Socialist countries should be approached as partners rather than adversaries.⁶⁵²

In February 1964, Brandt became chairman of the SPD, and the party decided to make him their next chancellor candidate for the second time. As the SPD chairman and its chancellor candidate, Brandt was in the best position to make his case in front of the West German public. However, it would take several years before the ideas Brandt and Bahr put forth became West German policy and changed the triangular relations between the FRG, the GDR and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Tutzing speeches were indeed a harbinger of change, a change made necessary after the FRG's foreign policy painted itself into a corner in 1965 and 1966.

650 Ibid., p. 137.

651 "New Ostpolitik and European integration Concept and policies in the Brandt era" in N. Piers Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973*, 1 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 67-69.

652 In 1962 Brandt argued that "if we can manage to link the interests of the Eastern bloc, or those of single Communist countries, with our own interests, we will have created an instrument of political action far more effective than any paper protest." Willy Brandt, *The Ordeal of Coexistence* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 34.

Ulbricht's temporary triumph

In the three years between Tutzing and Brandt becoming the FRG's foreign minister in 1966, some positive developments in West German foreign policy had taken place. It cannot be said that the foreign office under Schröder was not trying to improve relations with the Soviet Bloc, since the FRG opened a number of trade missions in socialist countries during his second term in office.⁶⁵³ However, after the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference, the Hallstein Doctrine seemed to have entered a "period of crisis," as one Yugoslav report described the FRG's foreign policy in May 1965. The report cited Walter Ulbricht's state visit to Egypt in February and March as proof of the Doctrine's failure.⁶⁵⁴ The author assigned much agency to the GDR's foreign policy and the general interest of Afro-Asian countries in improving their relations with the GDR.⁶⁵⁵ This assessment was only partially correct. East Berlin had indeed ramped up its efforts to break through the Hallstein Doctrine by focusing on a small number of non-aligned countries. However, Egypt was nominally not a primary target of these efforts.⁶⁵⁶

Nevertheless, Ulbricht had been pressuring the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to invite him for over a year, but the Egyptians finally agreed only after Bonn ignored Arab protests over West German arms shipments to Israel.⁶⁵⁷ The Egyptians were willing to call the FRG's bluff because the issue of arms trade with Israel took precedence over their relations with Bonn. Thus it was not the GDR's diplomacy which exposed the Hallstein Doctrine's

653 Michael Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West* (I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 56.

654 For the GDR's diplomatic campaign in Egypt and Ulbricht's meeting with Nasser see Rainer A. Blasius, "Völkerfreundschaft' Am Nil: Ägypten Und Die DDR Im Februar 1965. Stenographische Aufzeichnungen Aus Dem Ministerium Für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten Über Den Ulbricht-Besuch Bei Nasser," *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 46, no. 4 (1998): 747–805.

655 "Informacija o stanju odnosa SR Nemačka-SFR Jugoslavija" (May 1, 1965), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 161/i.

656 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 277.

657 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, pp. 123-124.

weaknesses, but rather it was the FRG's own inability to function in a world of *Realpolitik* which caused this potentially dangerous breach. Not surprisingly, the West German reaction to Ulbricht's visit was severe. Bonn cancelled several loans and aid programs to Egypt even before Ulbricht's arrival in Cairo.⁶⁵⁸ However, in an attempt to allay the crisis in the Middle East, Bonn also tried to stop its arms shipment to Israel with mixed success.⁶⁵⁹ The reason for this decision was to remove Nasser's main motive to recognize the GDR.⁶⁶⁰ But the most interesting West German decision was the one not made. Soon after East Berlin announced Ulbricht's visit to Egypt, chancellor Erhard called for the immediate implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine.⁶⁶¹ The FRG's ambassador in Egypt Georg Federer joined him and suggested threatening Nasser with the triggering of the Doctrine.⁶⁶² Foreign minister Schröder, realizing the potential danger the implementation of the Doctrine on Egypt might pose, talked Erhard off the ledge. Schröder pointed out that Nasser had been useful in the past, especially among the non-aligned countries, and that implementing the Hallstein Doctrine would cause an outpouring of solidarity among Arab nations, which would presumably result in a mass recognition of the GDR.⁶⁶³ Although this scenario was averted, the Hallstein Doctrine was proving to be a liability for the FRG's foreign policy.⁶⁶⁴

658 Ibid., p. 132.

659 Bonn offered to compensate the Israelis for the arms, but the latter declined the offer. Through underground channels and without explanation, 40 out of 90 promised German tanks made it to Israel on an Israeli ship sailing from Rotterdam. Ibid., p. 135.

660 "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Krapf" (February 2, 1965), AAPD 1965, p. 242.

661 Ibid., p. 136.

662 "Botschafter Federer, Kairo, an Staatssekretär Carstens" (January 26, 1964), AAPD 1965, p. 194.

663 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 137.

664 West Germany's relationship with Israel was another aspect of its foreign policy that severely limited its foreign policy in the Middle East. In May 1965, the FRG finally recognized Israel, but there was no retaliation from Arab countries in the form of recognition of the GDR. For an analysis of the FRG's foreign relations with Israel until the recognition, see Yeshayahu Jelinek, *Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965, Ein neurotisches Verhältnis*, Reprint 2014 (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2003), <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783486594584>; For the role of social movements in the FRG in Bonn's decision to recognize Israel see Hannfried von Hindenburg, *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965*

Tito in East Berlin

Several months before Ulbricht's visit to Cairo was announced, the word got out that Tito was planning an official visit to East Berlin in June. Initially, this news caused much less commotion in Bonn than Ulbricht's Cairo sojourn, and some in the foreign office found these rumours to be almost unbelievable.⁶⁶⁵ Nevertheless, West Germans were worried that Tito was becoming increasingly less considerate towards their interests. As case in point, Ulbricht and his inner circle had departed for Cairo from the Yugoslav port town of Dubrovnik.⁶⁶⁶ In previous years, Tito would not have permitted East Germans to make such use of Yugoslav territory, but this time he instructed his officials to provide Ulbricht the "full protocolar courtesy" at his arrival at the Dubrovnik airport, which included a military battalion with "flags and music."⁶⁶⁷ To be sure, several SED officials had travelled through Yugoslavia before, but never in such high-profiled fashion. More importantly, while Ulbricht's visit to Belgrade in September 1964 was unofficial, Tito would be greeted in East Berlin with full honours. Therefore, Bonn instructed their representative in Belgrade, Hans Kroll, to inform the Yugoslavs about their position, which was that if Tito could not avoid visiting East Berlin, he should try to downplay its significance. At the time, Kroll was gravely ill and bedridden, and he invited a Yugoslav foreign ministry official to his home to discuss Tito's East Berlin visit over tea. It seemed that Kroll's illness was responsible for the tone of the conversation because, according to the Yugoslav report, his plea was quite meek. Kroll explained to his interlocutor that the FRG

(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).

665 "Möglicher Besuch des jugoslawischen Staatspräsidenten Tito in der SBZ", (November 30, 1964), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, p. 119.

666 Ibid., 132.

667 "Informacija" (February 17, 1965), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-13.

understood the Yugoslavs, but that they “also wanted them to understand us.” Kroll suggested that Tito could ask Ulbricht to remove the Berlin Wall. In general, Kroll concluded, West Germans would have preferred if Tito’s visit was short and “unspectacular,” much like Ulbricht’s visit to Belgrade in 1964.⁶⁶⁸

Belgrade sensed a lack of conviction and intent in Bonn’s contacts with Yugoslavia compared to previous years, and intended to take advantage of the new situation by going ahead with Tito’s visit. However, the West Germans were not retreating. Bonn decided to break off the negotiations over a guest worker agreement, and vetoed Yugoslavia’s request to set up a mission with the European Economic Community.⁶⁶⁹ It appeared that the Yugoslavs received Bonn’s message, and the Belgrade foreign ministry recommended that the Yugoslav legation in East Berlin should not be upgraded to an embassy during Tito’s visit, lest it provoke the West Germans even more. Belgrade’s foreign office’s assessment of Bonn’s foreign policy listed fifteen countermeasures at their disposal, citing the economic ones as the biggest concern. The report clearly showed that the FRG had the upper hand in the standoff over the GDR.⁶⁷⁰ Nevertheless, this was not enough for Tito to reconsider his visit. He also ignored the West German suggestion to visit the GDR before his planned visit to Norway, which would have made his stay in East Berlin look like a stop on the way to Oslo, and not the final destination.⁶⁷¹ In the final analysis, Yugoslavia was very mindful of the limits of what was acceptable to Bonn, but did not cower under West German pressure.

668 “Zabeleška” (January 22, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 69/i.

669 The FRG justified the EEC decision with the poor relations between the two countries. Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 201.

670 “Informacija” (April 6, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 233/i.

671 Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung*, p.264. The West Germans based their suggestion on the rumours circulating in the Western diplomatic circles in Belgrade. “Angekündigter Besuch Präsident Titos in der SBZ” (March 10, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 123-124.

Tito landed in East Berlin on June 8, 1965 for what was a historic visit for the Yugoslav leader as well as Walter Ulbricht, who welcomed him with open arms. Ulbricht greeted Tito at the Schönefeld airport with the highest honours, and then paraded him through the streets of East Berlin in an open top limousine in front of thousands of cheering locals.⁶⁷² The atmosphere in East Berlin was festive, but Tito received some bad news from the FRG at the end of the day. In the late evening hours a Croatian extreme right émigré attempted to assassinate the Yugoslav consul in Munich, Andrija Klarić. Tito instructed his foreign ministry to take “strong diplomatic steps, and in the press too [sic]. This is not an individual act, rather it is connected to the [West German] policy toward our country. There are similar émigrés in other countries and such cases do not happen there.”⁶⁷³ The Yugoslav foreign ministry translated Tito’s anger into a strongly worded note.⁶⁷⁴ The Yugoslav president himself publicly addressed the assassination attempt during his speech in Halle, condemning the fact that in the FRG “Quislings from various countries can continue their terrorist activities unpunished, that the militarist and fascist forces, that were the bearers of enslavement of other nations and inhumane atrocities are still living there, and are allowed to be openly active.”⁶⁷⁵

Tito voiced the same concerns during his meeting with Ulbricht. They might have even influenced his attitude during their conversation. While neither leader usually shied away from polemicizing with their interlocutors when in disagreement, these talks were marked by mutual understanding and flattery. Tito claimed that if he put the two Germanies on a scale, Yugoslavia would have to be on the side of the GDR, “regardless whether the other one is richer,” he

672 “Vieltausendfach rief Berlin: Willkommen. Genosse Tito!” *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, GDR), June 8, 1965.

<http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/index.php?id=view1&purl=SNP2532889X-19650609-0-1-5-0>

673 “Very Urgent” (June 6, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 69.

674 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 203.

675 “Aufzeichnung” (June 18, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 142.

continued, “we have to be on the side where socialism is being made, where socialist relations are being built.”⁶⁷⁶ After his meeting with Ulbricht, Tito also met with Max Reimann, the exiled chairman of the illegal West German Communist Party. Reimann briefed Tito on the current political situation in the FRG, something that Tito could have learned from his own diplomats. Reimann then inquired whether the Yugoslav press might report on their meeting, and also include his statement condemning the assassination attempt on consul Klarić, which Tito permitted. At the end of the meeting, Tito invited Reimann to spend his holidays in Yugoslavia.⁶⁷⁷ While it might have been part of Tito’s protocol, the Yugoslav leader was certainly aware that publishing a report about their meeting and the invitation for Reimann to visit Yugoslavia could only have been construed as a provocation in Bonn. The Yugoslav president allowed himself this little jab at the West Germans after their attempts to influence his visit to the GDR.

Tito’s provocation only added to Bonn’s already considerable discontent. It felt betrayed by his actions. After the two countries adopted the “good behaviour” clause prior to the Cairo non-aligned conference, by which Yugoslavia agreed not to disturb the status quo of its relations with the GDR, Tito’s visit seemed like a gross dereliction of responsibility. On July 15, foreign minister Schröder announced that Yugoslavia could not expect any more leniency from Bonn.⁶⁷⁸ The West German government was upset with the Yugoslavs for a couple of reasons. Apart from reneging on the agreement, the Yugoslavs also claimed that Tito was only returning the favour after Ulbricht’s visit in 1964, but this was clearly a lie since Tito asked Ulbricht to visit Belgrade

676 Transcript of Tito-Ulbricht talks (June 12, 1965), AJ, KPR I-2/26-2, doc. no. 69/26. The reason for this meeting was not included in the file on Tito’s visit.

677 “Beleška o razgovoru druga Tita sa drugom Maksom Rajmanom” (June 12, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 68.

678 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 204.

again in 1966. According to the West Germans, this was part of a wider strategy to mend relations with Moscow, which experienced a patchy period after Khrushchev's ousting.⁶⁷⁹

To what extent was the West German analysis correct? It is true that the future of Yugo-Soviet relations was unknown when the news of Khrushchev's demise reached Belgrade. However, the new Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev quickly made it clear that, as far as their relations were concerned, continuity would be preferable. A number of high-profiled meetings between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs took place in the first half of 1965, culminating with Tito's visit to Moscow in late June and early July, right after his visit to the GDR. The Soviets made an effort to host Tito almost as an equal, without any indications that there was a rift between them. Quite the opposite, their aim was to bind the Yugoslavs to their policies.⁶⁸⁰

Tito was certainly pleased with the way the Soviets treated him. At the same time, Yugoslavia's new foreign minister Marko Nikezić – who belonged to the liberal wing of the new crop of Yugoslav Communists – pushed for better relations with the United States, and preferred to keep a distance between Yugoslavia and the USSR, especially in the very delicate matter of the Vietnam War, which was proving to be an ever growing concern in global diplomacy. This dichotomy of “ideological affinity and the imperative of maintaining national independence,” as Dragan Bogetić put it, was a staple of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, but it seemed that the German Question was no longer an issue that would cause a rift between Tito and his diplomats.⁶⁸¹ The antagonism between the FRG and Yugoslavia, at this juncture, was undoubtedly initiated by Bonn. Tito's visit angered the West German foreign office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA), and this attitude lingered there even after the September 19 Bundestag

679 Teleprinter from Krapf (June 30, 1965), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 170-172.

680 Tripković, *Jugoslavija – SSSR*, p. 174.

681 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971*, p. 187.

elections. The Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) were able to remain the largest party bloc, and even increase its number of seats in the Bundestag compared to the 1961 election. Their coalition partners, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) lost votes, but remained strong enough to continue the coalition. The Social Democrats, with the Berlin mayor Willy Brandt as their chancellor candidate, received 40% percent of the vote, seven percent behind CDU/CSU.⁶⁸² This meant that any changes in Germany's foreign policy would happen only if Erhard and his coalition partners agreed to them.

Erhard was able to save the foreign office from any major changes. However, while he won the election comfortably, the cabinet-building process took a toll on the chancellor, especially concerning the foreign office. Schröder had many detractors among his fellow party members, including former chancellor Adenauer, but also in the FDP, his coalition partner.⁶⁸³ Erhard fought to keep Schröder in the cabinet, but he was able to secure political support for him only by promising to curb the AA's plans for a diplomatic campaign in the East.⁶⁸⁴ Schröder had namely intended to take a more positive approach to the Socialist countries, but Erhard's enemies ensured that this plan was scrapped. They preferred to maintain the status quo, which prolonged the poor state of relations between Bonn and Belgrade for most of Erhard's chancellorship. The tensions surrounding Tito's trip to East Berlin before the election certainly did not help the matter.

682 Dietrich Staritz, *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Geschichte, Entstehung, Entwicklung ; eine Einführung*. (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1976), pp. 1963-164

683 Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, p. 199.

684 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, pp. 207-208.

The Yugoslavs understood that no progress could be made with the current government in Bonn, and they regretted the halt in negotiations on reparations and other open issues. However, the status quo also assured the continuation of economic relations in their current state, which was hardly a punishment from Belgrade's perspective. By the end of 1965, Yugoslav exports to the FRG had risen by 16.6 percent, while the imports had decreased by 2.3 percent.⁶⁸⁵

There were indications that negotiations regarding Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG were also exempt from limitations set by Bonn, and might resume in early 1966.⁶⁸⁶ The number of all foreign guest workers among the employed in the FRG rose from 1.3 percent (279,000) in 1960 to 6.1 percent (1,314,000) in 1966, primarily due to the West German economy's growing need for cheap labour.⁶⁸⁷ This was an issue which both sides wished to regulate as soon as possible, since Yugoslavia was also more than happy to send a number of its citizens to the West, not only to relieve the pressures of an ever growing workforce on its ailing economy, but also to reap the benefits of remittances, a valuable source of hard currency.⁶⁸⁸ The Yugoslavs conceded that they had "relatively weak capabilities" to apply pressure on the FRG in the matters of reparations and the extreme right émigré organizations, and that Belgrade had done little to change this.⁶⁸⁹ However, the Yugoslav government did not want to directly address Bonn to improve its position. The likely reason for this was that there were no signals from Bonn that

685 "Odnosi SFRJ-SRN" (December 8, 1965), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 651/i.

686 Ibid.

687 Ulrich Herbert and Karin Huhn, "Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic" in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 196.

688 For a detailed discussion of the history Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG and Austria, see Vladimir Ivanović, *Geburtstag pišeš normalno: Jugoslovenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji 1965-1973* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012).

689 "Odnosi SFRJ-SRN" (December 8, 1965), AJ KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 651/i.

a satisfactory resolution was possible. Instead, the Yugoslavs considered developing their cooperation with those European countries that could limit the FRG's bullish foreign policy.⁶⁹⁰

None of the options mulled over by the Yugoslav leadership included a downgrade in relations with the GDR, but it did proceed with caution. In December 1965, delegations from both countries met in Belgrade to discuss the GDR's initiative on European security and its application for membership in the United Nations. East Germans wanted Yugoslavs to act as messengers for their security campaign and to lobby for the GDR's membership at the UN. Foreign minister Nikezić was reluctant to offer Yugoslavia's unconditional assistance, citing numerous problems that lobbying for the GDR might create for Belgrade.⁶⁹¹ This was not the answer the East Germans were expecting, as they were hoping to build on Tito's visit. East German expectations were not exactly unfounded. Just a few weeks prior to the Belgrade meeting, a Yugoslav diplomat assured them that they would receive all the necessary help from Belgrade.⁶⁹² Regardless of the less than satisfactory Belgrade meeting, East Germans did not have to fear for their relations with Yugoslavia, especially as long as the FRG insisted on maintaining the status quo. Because the anti-Schröder faction prevented West German diplomats from initiating dialogue with the Soviet Bloc, they could only observe from the sidelines as the GDR continued to develop its relations with Yugoslavia, with Ulbricht's upcoming Belgrade visit as the next East German coup.

If the recent manifestations of friendliness between Ulbricht and Tito could have been construed as a new phase in GDR's relations with Yugoslavia, their day-to-day dealings did not

690 This report does not mention which European countries the Yugoslav foreign ministry had in mind. "Zaključci" (December 2, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-5, doc. no. 364/11.

691 "Informacija" (December 21, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-3.

692 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 214.

reflect this. On the contrary, there was little evidence of a shift in the way the two countries cooperated. For example, bilateral trade had failed to reach its goal for the year, and Tito rejected the East German request to open a consulate in Zagreb, which the GDR planned to use for strengthening its presence and influence in the more affluent western Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia.⁶⁹³ The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) also rejected the SED's proposal to increase the number of East German party officials who were to spend their holidays in Yugoslavia.⁶⁹⁴ The Yugoslavs were willing to invite only six SED officials and their wives, and in the spirit of parity, they themselves would send only six SKJ officials to spend their holidays in the GDR.⁶⁹⁵ Overall, however, party relations were evolving at a steady pace.

Erhard's "Peace Note"

In the meantime, Bonn itself was beginning to feel the pressure of its outdated, negative *Ostpolitik*. The realization that it was doing more harm than good could be traced to the success of the East German New Economic System, which had made the GDR's economy stronger than ever. The NES allowed East Germans to enjoy levels of prosperity not experienced since before World War II, and for many of its younger citizens it was as good as it ever was.⁶⁹⁶ The West Germans believed, not without reason, that the SED gained the peoples' consent through these changes, and that with their newly gained legitimacy it would be improbable that Ulbricht's

693 Ibid., p. 215.

694 "Beleška" (January 21, 1966), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-100-147, doc. no. 05-117.

695 Tito's letter to the SED CC (March 1, 1966), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-100-147, doc. no. 05-318.

696 David F. Crew, "Consuming Germany in the Cold War: Consumption and National Identity in East and West Germany, 1949-1989, an Introduction" in David F. Crew ed. *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2003), p. 5.

regime would collapse in on itself.⁶⁹⁷ The West German realization was sped up by the lack of Allied support. The United States president Lyndon B. Johnson, whom Erhard considered his most important ally, found the chancellor's problems secondary at best. He needed the West Germans to support the United States' war in Vietnam, and for the FRG to pay off its offset obligations.⁶⁹⁸ The latter would later become an even larger stumbling block in Erhard's relationship with Johnson.⁶⁹⁹

West Germans understood that "German reunification could only be achieved with the full support of all three Western powers."⁷⁰⁰ Without US backing, any hope of reunification was dashed, but the West Germans could not even gain support from the UK or France. Somewhat isolated, West Germans resigned themselves to a course correction. Although they were still unwilling to recognize the GDR, chancellor Erhard extended an offer to all Soviet Bloc countries – excluding the GDR – to sign a nonaggression agreement with the FRG. This offer, named the "Peace Note," was published on March 25 and circulated to all countries with which the FRG had diplomatic or consular relations.⁷⁰¹ The SPD praised Erhard's bold move, and several years later Willy Brandt identified the Peace Note as one of the important acts in the

697 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 192.

698 Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, pp. 199-200.

699 These offset payments were an agreement between the FRG and the US, by which the FRG agreed "to reduce its surplus with the United States by purchasing American military equipment." H. W. Brands "The United States, Germany, and the Multilateralization of International Relations," in Professor of History Emeritus Heidelberg University Founding Director Detlef Junker et al., *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook Vol. 2* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 51-52.

700 Eugenie M. Blang, "A Reappraisal of Germany's Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard's Response to America's War in Vietnam," *German Studies Review* 27, no. 2 (2004): 341-60, p. 346.

701 "Friedensnote der Bundesregierung" in Bettzüge (ed.), *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 295-298.

rapprochement between the FRG and the Soviet Bloc.⁷⁰² Foreign observer, including those in the Global South, saw the note as a positive step.⁷⁰³

The Yugoslavs did not receive the note as favourably, which was understandable given the state of relations between the two countries. On February 12, just weeks before the West Germans circulated the Peace Note, the FRG's representative in Belgrade Hans Bock met with Ljubo Drndić, the chief Yugoslav economic negotiator with the FRG. Bock intended to brief Drndić about his recent visit to Bonn, but the meeting soon turned into a mutual airing of grievances. However, Drndić was able to glean from the conversation that the West Germans were considering making the Hallstein Doctrine more flexible.⁷⁰⁴ For Yugoslavia, this was the first indication that the FRG was reconsidering its *Ostpolitik*. However, Belgrade was disappointed by the contents of the Peace Note. The official Yugoslav response to the note reflected this feeling. The Belgrade foreign ministry found no particular change not only in the FRG's goals, but also in the way it pursued them, since it presumed that German reunification was the only precondition for European security. The Yugoslavs also found Bonn's continuous implied support for the Hallstein Doctrine – “the current policy gave results which encourage the government to maintain this course” – severely lacking, more so because the Note did not call for establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc countries.⁷⁰⁵ A draft of the official Yugoslav response to the note revealed the same reluctance to acknowledge Erhard's note as a genuine contribution towards solving the European security situation. According to the Yugoslavs, the West German government was putting the cart before the horse by claiming that

702 Rainer A. Blasius, “Erwin Wickert Und Die Friedensnote Der Bundesregierung Vom 25.März 1966,” *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 43, no. 3 (1995): 539–53, p. 539.

703 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 192.

704 “Zabeleška” (February 12, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6.

705 “Informacija” (April 7, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 335/i.

German reunification was a precondition for European security and cooperation. The Yugoslavs also pointed out that omitting their own situation from the note was a sign that Bonn was not acting in good faith. After all, how does one initiate a campaign of inclusion without including the one European country with which the FRG has broken diplomatic relations?⁷⁰⁶ The Yugoslavs were not alone in their negative assessment of the note. The USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia rejected it as propaganda, with the Polish especially angered by the anti-Polish sentiment in the note.⁷⁰⁷ By May 1966, when the Yugoslavs published their answer, it was clear that the note failed to initiate a dialogue between Bonn and the Soviet Bloc countries. It turned out to be Erhard's last-ditch effort to make gains in the East without abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine altogether. What followed was a return to status quo, which would only be broken towards the end of his tenure.

Ulbricht's second visit to Yugoslavia

Erhard's failure must have put a smile on Ulbricht's face, and the fact that the status quo was maintained also meant that the international community and the East German public would see his September visit to Yugoslavia as another victory over the FRG. Bonn was certainly not happy with the Yugoslav decision to welcome Ulbricht with full honours, as a head of state. Throughout the summer of 1966, the AA tried to convince foreign diplomats in Yugoslavia not to attend the official events the Yugoslavs planned for Ulbricht.⁷⁰⁸ At the same time, the East Germans were intending to take full advantage of Ulbricht's first official visit to Yugoslavia.

706 "Nacrt odgovora vlade SFRJ na notu vlade SR Nemačke" (May 21, 1965), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 335/ii.

707 "Informacija" (May 18, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 418736.

708 Various reports and telegrams in PA AA, AA, B 42 178.

One East German diplomat commissioned 500 posters depicting the GDR's and Yugoslavia's friendship from the Croatian Institute for Advertising. The posters were to be placed in visible locations in Zagreb and Ljubljana. Tito allowed the placing of only a fraction of these posters, but saw no issue with the images themselves.⁷⁰⁹ Aside from the propaganda, East Germans also aimed to take full political advantage of this visit. Before Ulbricht arrived, deputy foreign minister Günter Kohrt met with Yugoslav foreign ministry officials to determine the topics of conversation for Ulbricht and Tito. Kohrt's attitude was "rigid and pessimistic," which his hosts interpreted as a way of testing the Yugoslav positions on various foreign policy questions.⁷¹⁰ The upshot was that the Yugoslavs expected Ulbricht to push for "much stronger" support for the GDR on a number of issues pertaining to its international status. Specifically, Ulbricht expected Yugoslavia to aid the GDR in strengthening its position among the non-aligned countries, especially the Arab ones, and to lobby for the GDR's membership at the UN, if possible directly with the Secretary-General.⁷¹¹ East German demands had a definite triumphalist tone, but the Yugoslavs were not ready to fully comply with their demands. On the contrary, the Yugoslav foreign ministry found that the GDR's zealous approach to conducting foreign policy was "objectively creating difficulties for positive movement in Europe" and, more specifically, "weakened [Yugoslavia's] position in terms of wider activity in Europe." Yugoslavia was equally reluctant to provide all the assistance the GDR demanded in Asia and Africa, even though the Yugoslavs wielded considerably more influence there. Yugoslavia agreed to represent East German interests in Ghana, but only in a limited capacity. Therefore, with all these issues

709 The photos used for the posters showed, among other scenes, Tito and Ulbricht during a toast, Tito's and Ulbricht's wives, Jovanka and Lotte, visiting in East Berlin; and Tito at the GDR pavilion at the Zagreb Fair.

"Zabeleška" (September 21, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 223/21.

710 "Informacija" (September 21, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 429380.

711 Ibid.

weighing down the Yugo-GDR relations, the timing of Ulbricht's visit was "not most convenient."⁷¹²

Finally, on September 26, Ulbricht and the rest of the East German delegation arrived in Belgrade for their first official state visit to Yugoslavia that was, compared to his previous visit in 1964, a grand entrance by any measure. According to a West German report, the streets of Belgrade were decorated with many flags, more numerous than during the visits by the king of Norway and the Iranian Shah, but about the same as during Nasser's visit. Near the Dedinje palace the Yugoslavs constructed an arch – apparently reserved only for the most prominent statesmen – adorned with the slogan "Long live the GDR State Council President Walter Ulbricht."⁷¹³ Ulbricht met with Tito the following day. In his opening statement, Ulbricht attempted to couple the GDR's search for recognition in Africa and Asia with the opposition to the Vietnam War and the "US imperial expansion." According to Ulbricht, in order to combat the spread of American and West German influence in "Afro-Asian countries," it was necessary to build an opposing front, made up of socialist as well as non-aligned countries. He argued that this front could only be made stronger with the GDR's participation, and more specifically, membership in the UN. Tito avoided addressing this particular Ulbricht's hint, but agreed with his negative assessment of West German foreign policy, especially in Europe. Tito expressed his irritation with the FRG's refusal to accept responsibility for the war reparations, which they had been using as leverage against further rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the GDR. The Yugoslavs had had enough, and Tito informed Ulbricht that the time had finally come to upgrade

712 "Informacija" (September 24, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15, doc. no. 429380.

713 Telegram from Belgrade (September 26, 1966), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 232-233.

their respective diplomatic outposts to the rank of embassies. “The West Germans have been blackmailing us for far too long,” Tito concluded.⁷¹⁴

After the meeting, Ulbricht and Tito visited the Friendship Park at the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers, where Ulbricht planted a lime tree.⁷¹⁵ This was an honour denied Ulbricht during his previous stay in Belgrade. At the end of Ulbricht’s visit, the two leaders presented a joint communiqué.⁷¹⁶ In it, they attacked the FRG for obstructing the security-building processes in Europe. The decision to upgrade legations to embassies was also included, albeit in one sentence and without explanation.⁷¹⁷

The West German reaction to the communiqué was subdued. Publicly, the Bonn government simply pointed out that it was just a continuation of a “regrettable” Yugoslav German policy, as witnessed during Tito’s visit to East Berlin in 1965.⁷¹⁸ But internally, the visit was seen as an egregious breach of the “good behaviour” clause Yugoslavia agreed to in 1964. The West German mission in Belgrade suggested several sanctions for this transgression. The most punishing measure suggested was a temporary ban on issuing entry visas to Yugoslav guest workers. This ban would presumably cause mass protests in Yugoslavia, with the people blaming the regime for “throwing away” their chance at achieving good income.⁷¹⁹ Conversely, the Belgrade mission also suggested taking certain measures to improve the political relations

714 Transcript of the Tito-Ulbricht conversation (September 27, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.

715 “Land des Lächelns,” *Der Spiegel*, October 3, 1966. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46414390.html>

716 The second meeting of Ulbricht’s visit took place on October 1 at Tito’s Brioni Island residence. The focus of those talks was the economy, without any mention of bilateral relations or international politics. Transcript of the Tito-Ulbricht conversation (October 1, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.

717 “Zajedničko saopštenje” (October 1, 1966), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-15.

718 Ulbricht in Jugoslawien; Gesandtschaften werden Botschaften; Stellungnahme der BRD

[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Oktober, P. 1. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 22131 (cf. AdG Bd. 4, P. 4092)]

719 Other proposed measures included a moratorium on currently valid economic agreements; a refusal to upgrade the FRG Belgrade mission (e.g. by moving the economic department from the Zagreb consulate to the Belgrade mission; and to halt the planned visit of the West German Industrial Association delegation. Telegram from Belgrade (October 7, 1966), PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 277-279.

with Yugoslavia, such as stricter control of Croatian extreme right organizations in the FRG. These positive measures, however, were to be implemented at some point in the future, lest they be misinterpreted as an admission of guilt by Bonn.⁷²⁰

Erhard's demise

Ulbricht's visit also had implications for West German domestic politics. Chancellor Erhard had been unable to consolidate his position since the elections in 1965, and was in dire need of a foreign policy victory. An American general – and Erhard's close acquaintance – visiting the FRG “reported that never before had he seen the Chancellor in such a shaken condition. He is fighting for his political life, and knows that many of his party colleagues are sharpening their knives to take advantage of the first opportunity to finish him off.”⁷²¹ Foreign minister Schröder provided Erhard some relief, as he was able to improve relations with a number of socialist countries, especially Romania.⁷²² In a conversation with the Americans on September 19, the West German vice-chancellor Erich Mende went as far as to argue that “West Germany's difficulties are limited to the East Zone and to a lesser extent to Moscow.”⁷²³ The “East Zone” was indeed proving to be quite a headache for Erhard, but it was hardly an isolated problem. Bonn's foreign office also noted that Ulbricht's visit to Belgrade was just one of many Soviet Bloc delegations visiting Yugoslavia. The West Germans also observed a number of Yugoslav officials visiting socialist countries. The West Germans believed that the Yugoslavs

⁷²⁰ Ibid.

⁷²¹ *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 168. (ebook)

⁷²² Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 226.

⁷²³ *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 169. (ebook)

were trying to align themselves with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict, which included courting the Albanians to return to Moscow's fold.⁷²⁴ This movement toward socialist diplomatic consolidation could have also had grave implications for the way the German question was treated by the international community. Around the same time, the United Nations Security Council began considering the GDR's motion – in the form of a letter from Walter Ulbricht – to join the organization.⁷²⁵ According to some West German diplomats, Yugoslavia was providing the GDR with the much needed non-socialist bloc support at the UN, adding to the FRG's foreign policy woes.⁷²⁶

Fortunately for Erhard, the Western Powers at the UN Security Council vetoed Ulbricht's application on the simple grounds that the GDR was not a state.⁷²⁷ However, this was an insignificant victory that came too late for the West German chancellor. Erhard had already been living on borrowed time, and shortly after the UNSC decision, it became clear that Erhard was abandoned by his allies at home and abroad, making his demise a foregone conclusion.

Erhard had visited Washington again in late September. He travelled there with the conviction that he was visiting his closest ally, and that he could negotiate more favourable offset payments, since he was unable to do so during his last meeting with President Johnson in 1965. Erhard's optimism was unfounded. Johnson was just as adamant about the FRG's obligations as he was the last time they met. This time Johnson went even further than the last time they met and attempted to bully Erhard into complying with American demands, and although Erhard was able to reject Johnson, it became obvious that he could not count on

724 Bonn foreign office circular (June 30, 1965) PA AA, AA, B 42 178, pp. 170-172.

725 "Tat bei Tisch" *Der Spiegel*, October 10, 1966. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46414483.html>

726 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 223.

727 Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 189. For the GDR's application and its treatment at the UN see Thomas D. Grant, *Admission to the United Nations: Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal Organization* (BRILL, 2009), pp. 152-160.

American support (even though Erhard himself still believed the opposite).⁷²⁸ In the meantime, another crisis was brewing back in the FRG. Amidst a small recession – which the media had exaggerated, by invoking many comparisons to the market crash of 1929 – Erhard had also lost the support of the FDP, his coalition partners. The Liberals had lost all confidence in Erhard and withdrew their ministers from the government on October 27, effectively ending the Erhard chancellery. Erhard accepted the decision, and informed his party of his resignation later that day.

The CDU/CSU decided to hold internal elections on November 8 to find his successor. Kurt Georg Kiesinger, the prime minister of Baden-Württemberg, won the vote in front of Gerhard Schröder.⁷²⁹ Kiesinger was not an uncontroversial choice. He had been a Nazi Party member from 1933 until Germany's defeat in May 1945. His Nazi past would also prevent him from forging a close relationship with his new coalition partners, the SPD.⁷³⁰ Kiesinger's history was hardly an issue for the CSU, whose support was decisive in the vote. The chairman of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauß, preferred Kiesinger over the other two candidates, foreign minister Schröder and the CDU/CSU Bundestag whip Rainer Barzel.⁷³¹

With the withdrawal of the FDP from the government, the possibility of a coalition between the two largest West German parties became a reality. Willy Brandt was not directly involved in the great coalition negotiations. Even though he was the SPD chairman, he had

728 Mierzejewski, *Ludwig Erhard*, p. 200.

729 "Vereinbarung einer großen Koalition; Vereidigung des Kabinetts Kiesinger"

[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Dezember, P. 1. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 22328 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4133)]

730 Marshall, *Willy Brandt*, p. 49.

731 Schröder was not a Catholic, and he opposed Franco-German cooperation, while Barzel was quite young, which would prevent Strauß from ever becoming chancellor, a position he still had aspirations toward. Dirk Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486594324>, p. 21.

suffered a short but grave illness that prevented him from taking on a more active role, but he was instrumental in persuading the party membership of the merits of a coalition with CDU.⁷³² He himself became the second most powerful person in the FRG when the new government was announced on December 1. As the vice-chancellor and minister of foreign affairs he could finally begin to implement the ideas he and Egon Bahr had been developing for years. The plan announced in Tutzing in 1963 would slowly start replacing the Hallstein Doctrine. Within the next few years, the FRG's German policy would experience a complete transformation, and so would its relations with Yugoslavia and East Germany.

Conclusion

Ludwig Erhard's time as chancellor marked the beginning of the transition period between the Hallstein Doctrine and Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Although the former remained the official policy until Brandt became chancellor, the first changes in the FRG's eastern policy were made under Erhard's supervision, as Bonn was beginning to feel the weight of the Hallstein Doctrine on its foreign policy. Although the FRG was able to continue operating from a position of strength when dealing with Yugoslavia, this was possible despite, not because of the Doctrine. Besides, the Doctrine could not prevent Tito's visit to the GDR, nor Ulbricht's to Yugoslavia. In addition, the doctrine severely hampered any attempts at developing better relations with the Soviet Bloc countries. Therefore, towards the end of Erhard's tenure, his foreign minister Schröder began pushing the boundaries of the Hallstein Doctrine to accommodate a more positive policy towards socialist countries.

⁷³² Marshall, *Willy Brandt*, p. 49.

Yugoslavia did not directly benefit from these changes. The “Peace Note,” Erhard’s March 1966 diplomatic initiative to improve relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe was directed solely at the countries of the Soviet Bloc, which excluded Yugoslavia. This was mostly due to Yugoslavia’s constantly improving relations with the GDR, the highlight of which was Tito’s official state visit to the GDR in June 1965. Bonn saw this as a breach of the “good behaviour” clause, which both the FRG and Yugoslavia agreed upon and which stipulated that neither side would disturb the German Question status quo. Tito’s GDR visit only served to reinforce the West German belief that Yugoslavia could not be trusted, and did not deserve Bonn’s good will. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was precisely Schröder’s foreign policy that enabled Kiesinger and Brandt to pursue West German rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

Chapter 7

The new *Ostpolitik* and Yugoslavia (1967-1968)

The new West German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger made his first public announcement about the country's foreign policy during his inaugural speech at the Bundestag on December 13, 1966. After distancing himself from the previous coalition government, which, among other things, was responsible for "foreign policy worries," Kiesinger turned to his own foreign policy plans.⁷³³ As Kiesinger spoke about the Federal Republic of Germany's relations with the socialist countries, it was clear that the chancellor did not intend to initiate tectonic changes in the FRG's *Ostpolitik*. If anything, it seemed that he had settled on the continuation of Erhard's – or rather Schröder's – late stage efforts. Kiesinger contended that it was true that West Germany desired better relations with the Soviet satellites, but that crucial questions such as the German-Polish border could only be agreed upon by a democratically elected all-German government.⁷³⁴ Kiesinger did not mention Yugoslavia specifically, and his speech did not seem to offer any reason for Belgrade to be optimistic. Yugoslavia had not profited much from Schröder's eastern campaign, and towards the end of his tenure the Belgrade foreign office lamented Bonn's "negative approach [...] to some principled questions of Yugoslavia's foreign policy," one of the reasons for this being the "traditional German interests in the Balkans, to which the existence of Yugoslavia had always been an obstacle."⁷³⁵ The "traditional German interests" was a thinly

733 Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!*, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition, p. 69.

734 "Bundeskanzler Kiesinger zur Deutschen Außenpolitik" in Bettzuege (ed.), *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 299.

735 "Odnosi SFR Jugoslavije sa SR Nemačkom" (September 17, 1966), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-6, doc. no. 664/i.

veiled accusation that the FRG is continuing the work of the Nazis, since in earlier times the Balkans were traditionally an Austrian, and not a Prussian or German sphere of influence. This extremely defensive tone reflected the poor state of relations between Belgrade and Bonn. While a new West German government seemed like a good opportunity to avoid further deterioration of relations with Yugoslavia, Kiesinger's speech contained no clues as to their future.

Regardless of Kiesinger's relatively discouraging message, the Yugoslavs apparently expected some positive changes in Bonn's foreign policy, and not without reason. With Willy Brandt in place as the FRG's foreign secretary, Belgrade had every right to expect positive changes.⁷³⁶ It spent the weeks following Kiesinger's speech trying to elicit, unsuccessfully it seems, some sort of clarification about the FRG's plans for Yugoslavia from West German diplomats in other countries.⁷³⁷ The West Germans were even reluctant to divulge the details of their foreign policy to the Americans, but Brandt admitted to the US ambassador in Bonn, George McGhee, that he wanted the FRG to go beyond the parameters of Erhard's peace note.⁷³⁸ In a conversation with his French counterpart Jacques-Maurice Couve de Murville on January 13, 1967, Brandt was more candid as he addressed the case of Yugoslavia. He disclosed that he would have preferred if the reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia did not give other non-aligned countries the wrong idea.⁷³⁹ Indeed, the Bonn foreign office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, AA) sent out a note to several Asian and African countries later that month

736 For West Germany's role in the European detente, see Gottfried Niedhart, *Entspannung in Europa, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Warschauer Pakt 1966 bis 1975* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486856361>; For Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and Détente see M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973*, New Cold War History (Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill [N.C.]; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

737 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 234.

738 *FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 188. (ebook)

739 "Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit dem französischen Außenminister Couve de Murville in Paris" (January 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 86.

reminding them that nothing had changed in the way the FRG would react if another country recognized East Germany.⁷⁴⁰ For good measure, the Western Allies also distributed a note with the same message.⁷⁴¹ While Brandt pointed out that the FRG perceived East Germany the same way as the previous West German governments, his conversation with Couve De Murville revealed that he was considering making an exception for Yugoslavia.⁷⁴² It appeared that the Yugoslavs were expecting the same. Brandt told Couve de Murville that Yugoslav officials had informed Bonn that they expected West Germany to make the first move, and indeed it seemed that – infused with new dynamism – the AA was moving towards making it.⁷⁴³

West Germany's new representative in Belgrade, Hans Werner Loeck also favoured a more lenient treatment for Yugoslavia. He urged Brandt to consider the damage that excluding Yugoslavia from his East European diplomatic efforts. Apart from the illogical aspects of ignoring Yugoslavia, namely that it would be difficult to justify treating Soviet satellites better than Yugoslavia, a country that "in actual relations is closely allied" with the FRG, especially if the alleged motivation for a new *Ostpolitik* was détente. In the final analysis, Loeck found more positives in the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia than continued isolation.⁷⁴⁴

A week after Brandt's visit to the Quai d'Orsay, chancellor Kiesinger revealed the FRG's plans during a press conference in Bonn. Asked whether the FRG would be willing to recognize Yugoslavia despite its recognition of the GDR, Kiesinger answered: "Conditions permitting,

740 Vladimir Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973: Između Ideologije i Pragmatizma* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009), p. 65.

741 Gray, *Germany's Cold War the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969*, p. 200.

742 "Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit dem französischen Außenminister Couve de Murville in Paris" (January 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 86.

743 Ibid.

744 "Die Frage: Was wird mit Jugoslawien? Bei der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zu einigen osteuropäischen Staaten" (January 11, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 169, pp. 5-13.

yes,” and added that West Germany needed to be “pragmatic” when dealing with “these countries,” meaning the countries which have recognized the GDR.⁷⁴⁵

The FRG demonstrated its pragmatism only eleven days after Kiesinger’s statement. On January 31, it established diplomatic relations with Romania. Granted, the FRG took a different approach to the Soviet satellites, which was defined by the *Geburtsfehlertheorie* (birth defect theory), which posited that the Soviets forced these countries to exchange ambassadors with the GDR, and therefore they could not be blamed for their actions.⁷⁴⁶ This theory was former foreign minister Schröder’s brainchild, and the FRG began the negotiations with Romania during his tenure.

The FRG’s decision to focus on Romania was well thought out. Although Romania was a member of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, it was able to create for itself in the 1960s – first under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and later under Nicolae Ceaușescu – a certain degree foreign policy autonomy, far greater than other Warsaw Pact countries. Dennis Deletant characterizes this autonomy as “the right to formulate indigenous policy rather than independence.”⁷⁴⁷ This autonomy manifested itself prominently in 1967 and 1968, when Ceaușescu reestablished diplomatic relations with the FRG, refused to break of diplomatic relations with Israel during the Six Day War, and strongly criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, clearly defying Soviet foreign policy in all three instances.⁷⁴⁸

The fact that Brandt picked up where his embattled predecessor had left off and was able to successfully conclude the negotiations with Romania was a testament to the new

745 “Zur Außenpolitik der Großen Koalition” in Bettzuege and Auswärtigen Amts, *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 305.

746 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 337.

747 Dennis Deletant, “‘Taunting the Bear’: Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963–89,” *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (November 1, 2007): 495–507, p. 496.

748 *Ibid.*, p. 499.

administration's resolve in making positive changes in West Germany's foreign policy. Apart from a direct promise from Kiesinger or Brandt to restore relations, Yugoslavia could have hardly wished for better signals from Bonn.⁷⁴⁹

The SED found the ever more proactive West German efforts in Eastern Europe a source of serious concern. Since the *Geburtsfehlertheorie* took hold in Bonn, Ulbricht, with the aid of the Soviets, started applying considerable pressure on other Bloc countries to end bilateral negotiations with Bonn, claiming that Brandt's offensive was "an aggression in felt slippers."⁷⁵⁰ He argued that the Warsaw Pact countries could establish relations with the FRG only if the latter recognized the GDR first.⁷⁵¹ Ulbricht finally managed to force the other countries to accept this position – which came to be known as the 'Ulbricht Doctrine' – during a meeting of Warsaw Pact heads of state in Warsaw in February.⁷⁵² Ulbricht could not afford another Romania. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was a different case. Here no coercion could help, and a more delicate diplomatic approach was necessary. However, by forcing the Ulbricht Doctrine on his allies, Ulbricht had not only cut off all of Bonn's contacts with the Soviet Bloc, but he had also left Yugoslavia as the FRG's only alternative socialist port of call.⁷⁵³ This meant that if the FRG wanted to make inroads in the Soviet Bloc, it was able to do so only through Yugoslavia. Therefore, Ulbricht was now faced with the double task of courting Yugoslavia, while also attempting to drive a wedge between it and the FRG. In any case, the situation required some

749 Brandt considered changing Yugoslavia's classification at the AA to an Eastern European country, but "admitted making a special case of Yugoslavia is a headache." *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 199. (ebook)

750 Julia von Dannenberg, *The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 29.

751 Baer, *Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung*, p. 293.

752 Apart from recognizing the GDR, other conditions placed on the FRG in the Ulbricht Doctrine were: the abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine; the recognition of the existing borders in Europe, meaning the Oder-Neisse border; the admission that the Munich Agreement was void from the beginning; abandonment of nuclear weapons; and the recognition of Berlin as a free city. Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, pp. 337-338.

753 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 238.

creativity. For example, the East German Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten/MfAA*) considered reframing its strategy on the West Berlin Question. Instead of insisting on Yugoslavia's wholesale rejection of the West German claim on West Berlin, the MfAA broke down their conditions into several separate categories. The reasoning behind this was that if the MfAA could make Yugoslavia agree to some of these categories, it would be easier to elicit a full endorsement from Belgrade further down the line.⁷⁵⁴

Despite these nominally mild changes, the East Germans continued to apply their traditionally abrasive methods in Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav report from April showed that the GDR was "not only constantly asking for our support" in international organizations and among non-aligned countries, but was also "often trying to dictate the shape and nature of this support."⁷⁵⁵ The same report claimed that the USSR had also attempted to influence the Yugoslav decision-making. Indeed, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade Alexander Puzanov called on Tito on March 30 to discuss the German Question. Tito rejected the Ulbricht Doctrine at this meeting, arguing that Yugoslavia "will not place any conditions" in the eventual process of reestablishing relations with the FRG.⁷⁵⁶ Then, a week and a half later, the Soviet embassy directly asked the Yugoslav foreign ministry to join Soviet Bloc countries in pressuring several Asian and African countries into recognizing the GDR. The Yugoslavs also rejected this plan on the grounds that it would undermine Yugoslavia's position in the non-aligned world.⁷⁵⁷

754 "Vorschlag zur Veränderung der Haltung der SFRJ in der Westberlinerfrage" (January 11, 1967), PA AA, MfAA, C 441, pp. 1-6.

755 "Informacija" (April 10, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, p. 94.

756 "Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike J. B. Tita sa ambasadorom SSSR A. N. Puzanovom 30. marta 1967 god." Miladin Milošević, *Jugoslavija -- SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR : 1965-1980*, (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016), p. 237.

757 Tripković, *Jugoslavija – SSSR*, p. 196.

Keeping Yugoslavia non-aligned was a constant concern for the Yugoslav leadership, which found this a constant balancing act given its communist pedigree, but it was an especially pressing matter at this point in time. After the Cairo non-aligned conference, the interest for non-alignment in the Global South waned, mostly due to the various forces pulling it apart, including disparate national interests of various non-aligned countries, which led to tensions between them, and discussions about the future of non-alignment. Tito found this development troubling and, as Lorenz Lüthi explained, tried to act as a mediator between Egypt and India, so that at least the main axis of non-alignment maintained dialogue.⁷⁵⁸ Considering that the future of non-alignment was hanging in the balance, the Yugoslavs wanted to avoid making decisions that might push them towards Moscow, or even create that perception among other non-aligned countries.

Soviet Bloc pressure on Yugoslavia continued throughout the spring of 1967. The 7th SED congress in East Berlin, which took place between April 17 and 22, was another opportunity to influence Yugoslavia's German policy. Economic growth buoyed the SED and the congress reflected that, with the main message being the "completion of socialism," rather than the "all-round construction of socialism" touted at the previous party congress.⁷⁵⁹ On the back of this success, the East Germans were not about to sit back while Bonn was on the offensive, and they felt confident enough to demand changes in Yugoslav foreign policy. One of the main impressions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia's (*Savez Komunističke Jugoslavije*/SKJ) delegation was that their hosts were primarily interested in influencing their position on the German Question in the light of Bonn's new German policy. Their efforts were

⁷⁵⁸ Lorenz Lüthi "Non-Alignment, 1961-1974," pp. 96-97.

⁷⁵⁹ Martin McCauley, *The German Democratic Republic since 1945*, (ebook) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). p. 123.

somewhat spoiled by the Yugoslav decision not to send a party delegation to Conference of European Communist Parties on European Security, which was to take place in Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia in April of that year.

The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev intended to use the Karlovy Vary Conference to consolidate the Soviet Bloc after the recent changes in European politics, not least the quite proactive Kiesinger administration. Apart from several smaller West European Communist parties, only Romania and Yugoslavia did not send their delegations to the resort town in Western Bohemia.⁷⁶⁰ The Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu was in the midst of a conflict with Moscow – with the establishment of relations with the FRG being just one of the issues – and the absence of a Romanian delegation undermined the planned show of communist unity.⁷⁶¹ Yugoslavia considered sending a delegation, but after the organizers refused to acknowledge some of the SKJ's suggestions, Belgrade decided to eschew the conference.⁷⁶² From an East German perspective, the Yugoslav absence was more damaging, since the Soviets intended to officially endorse the Ulbricht Doctrine in Karlovy Vary.⁷⁶³ By avoiding the conference, Yugoslavia also avoided agreeing to the Ulbricht Doctrine, and denied Ulbricht the guarantee that Belgrade would not follow Romania's example and establish relations with the FRG.

To preempt West German advances in this respect, Ulbricht sent a letter to Tito via ambassador Staimer on April 19, several days before the Karlovy Vary conference. In the letter,

760 "The Karlovy Vary Conference," *Survival* 9, no. 7 (1967): 208–15, p. 208.

761 Cezar Stanciu, "Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Origins of Eurocommunism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 83–95, p. 86. For a general overview of Romania's relationship with the Warsaw Pact, see Dennis Deletant, Mihail Ionescu, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955 - 1989," Cold War International History Project (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2004); For the genesis of Romania's contentious relations with the USSR under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej see Corina Mavrodin, "A Maverick in the Making: Romania's de-Satellization Process and the Global Cold War (1953-1963)" (phd, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2017) <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3555/>.

762 Tripković, *Jugoslavija – SSSR*, p. 197.

763 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 244.

Ulbricht repeated his eponymous doctrine's stipulations, and asked Yugoslavia to reject any West German requests for a mutual recognition of sovereignty. "Every state can only be responsible for the territory where it can exercise state authority," Ulbricht argued.⁷⁶⁴ Tito tried to allay East German fears when he told Staimer that Yugoslavia "is in no rush to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG. We have lived long without these relations and we can continue living without them." Tito complained that there were some West German initiatives by lower level officials, but that the FRG government has been keeping quiet.⁷⁶⁵ It seems that Tito wanted to reinforce this message, because at least two Yugoslav delegates at the 7th SED congress mentioned the Ulbricht Doctrine in their speeches, including its specific stipulations.⁷⁶⁶

Bonn's new Yugoslav policy takes shape

Yugoslavia's criticism of the FRG in private conversations with GDR officials was understandable, but the public repetition of the GDR's policy was counterproductive, especially after the quite positive signals it received from Bonn at the end of March, when the head of the Eastern European department at the AA, Jörg Kastl, visited Belgrade. In a conversation with Srđa Prica, the advisor to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Kastl declared, "the FRG has serious intentions to improve relations with Yugoslavia, including the reestablishment of diplomatic relations." However, the Hallstein Doctrine still loomed large over the Bonn-Belgrade relations. Kastl echoed Brandt's earlier concern, pointing out that the timing of the reestablishment was still an issue, since it might motivate a number of non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR.

764 Ulbricht's letter to Tito (April 18, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-17, p. 7.

765 "Zabeleška" (April 19, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-17, doc. no. 461/i.

766 Speeches by Djoka Pajković and Mirko Lacković (April 21, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174.

Prica concluded that the FRG was certainly changing its approach, but that only concrete steps could move their relations forward.⁷⁶⁷ He did not specify what these steps might have been.

What Prica noticed was not insignificant. Brandt had indeed begun transforming West Germany's foreign policy. This included a more lenient stance toward Yugoslavia. For example, the West Germans had begun to take a more proactive approach in dealing with the Croatian émigré organizations, a longstanding issue between the two countries.⁷⁶⁸ On a broader level, foreign minister Brandt was in the process of defining the FRG's framework for reestablishing relations with Yugoslavia, including the concrete steps that emigre Belgrade had been anticipating since Kiesinger's election. Earlier in March, he laid out his plan to Kiesinger in a letter. As before, the potential wave of non-aligned recognition of the GDR still presented the largest diplomatic obstacle. Brandt believed that both the FRG and Yugoslavia were responsible for preventing this outcome. In Brandt's opinion, Yugoslavia recognized the GDR under unique Cold War circumstances, and no non-European country should see the reestablishment of FRG-Yugoslav relations as an "alibi" to recognize the GDR.⁷⁶⁹ Brandt predicted that their diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia could be reestablished by the end of the year, if Belgrade agreed to fulfill a number of conditions.⁷⁷⁰ In the final analysis, Brandt saw fit to redefine the Hallstein Doctrine if its only purpose was to negate the existence of the GDR. He believed that non-recognition was merely a means for achieving peace in Europe, not a purpose onto itself, thereby effectively turning the FRG's foreign policy on its head.⁷⁷¹

767 "Informacija" (March 30/31, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, pp. 91-92.

768 "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete" (March 10, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 457-459.

769 "Bundesminister Brandt an Bundeskanzler Kiesinger" (March 6, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 412-415.

770 These conditions were not punitive. Most of them were mutually beneficial, such as the signing of a guest worker agreement, or the opening of their respective of cultural institutes. Ibid.

771 Ibid.

The West Germans were somewhat confused by Yugoslavia's indifference to their advances. After Tito hosted the GDR's defence minister general Heinz Hoffman, who was in Yugoslavia to hold a lecture titled "The GDR's Defence Policy with Particular Focus on the Aggressiveness of the KIESINGER [sic] Government," the West German mission in Belgrade drew two conclusions about the Yugoslav policy that to them seemed plausible. The first one was that the Yugoslavs believed that they could develop their relations with the two Germanies independent of each other, and the second was that they attached considerable importance to their relations with the GDR. The West Germans concluded that the Yugoslavs were going to do as much as they could to help the Soviets with Ulbricht, but not enough to damage their current state of relations with the FRG.⁷⁷² However, there were signs that Yugoslavia was not as aloof to the new currents in Bonn as it might have let on. At a session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, the Yugoslav envoy informed his West German counterpart that Belgrade was slowly becoming impatient with Bonn's reluctance to initiate the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. More importantly, the Yugoslav diplomat hinted that in case the relations were reestablished, Yugoslavia would not be inclined to urge non-aligned countries to recognize the GDR, directly addressing one of Bonn's greatest fears.⁷⁷³ This encouraging conversation was most likely a relief for the AA, as it indicated a more accommodating Yugoslav German policy.

It seemed that Brandt, energetic as he was, was not the only one responsible for this breakthrough. During a meeting of a joint FRG-Yugoslav trade commission in Belgrade in late April, the head of the West German delegation, Egon Emmel, claimed that the Bonn

⁷⁷² Telegram from Belgrade (April 7, 1967), PA AA, AA B 42 177, pp. 400-403.

⁷⁷³ "Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Schütz" (April 13, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 586-588.

government's decision to improve relations with Yugoslavia was "irrevocable" and that this was due to Brandt and Kiesinger's determination to make the rapprochement succeed.⁷⁷⁴ Emmel was an experienced diplomat, and he certainly would not have made this statement lightly.⁷⁷⁵ The mention of Kiesinger showed that the West German chancellor had accepted Brandt's suggestions – the meeting of the joint trade commission was after all one of Brandt's conditions for the reestablishment of relations included in his March 6 letter to Kiesinger. In another show of good faith, Brandt had also vowed not to obstruct Yugoslavia's relations with the European Economic Community just prior to the joint commission meeting.⁷⁷⁶

Although the meeting of the joint commission was intended to be a purely economic affair, both sides were aware of its importance in the overall rapprochement process, and therefore other issues were discussed as well. Emmel was quick to point out the difficulties the West Germans faced in their new *Ostpolitik* – mostly because they were trying to avoid angering the Soviets – but wanted the Yugoslavs to understand that West Germany had "the best intentions." The Yugoslavs did not appreciate Emmel's argument, and scolded him for discussing the reestablishment of relations instead of actually doing it, and more importantly, the West Germans did not offer a solution for the war reparations, a bilateral issue which they knew Belgrade wanted to regulate more than any other.⁷⁷⁷ While on the evidence of the Yugoslav report this meeting was not overly successful, it did provide a number of results pertaining to economic issues, including the West German agreement to begin negotiations over the

774 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 69.

775 Emmel had been employed at the AA since 1950, and in 1965 had taken the role of an ambassador at large, dealing with the FRG's trade negotiations. *International Who's Who, 1983-84* (Europa Publications Limited, 1983), p. 390.

776 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 69.

777 "Zabeleška" (May 3, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 497/i.

regulations for guest workers.⁷⁷⁸ From the West German perspective, it was important to make several concessions but to keep the real “prize,” namely the West German capital and investments, firmly out of Yugoslav reach but near enough to be used as leverage at a later date. Emmel reported that the FRG delegation achieved just that.⁷⁷⁹

Despite the relatively successful joint commission meeting, it was the Yugoslav opinion that Bonn had somehow reached the peak of its elasticity within its *Ostpolitik* and that it now had to go “one step further,” which meant establishing relations with a country that also recognized the GDR, which – following the introduction of the Ulbricht Doctrine – was only possible with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs believed that the West Germans were skittish when it came to crossing this line, and that this reaction was, to an extent, influenced by Belgrade’s refusal to beg for loans – which would have put the West Germans in a better negotiation position.⁷⁸⁰

Not the one to be discouraged by Yugoslav hard-headedness, Brandt wanted to make sure that they understood all that was on the table. With this in mind, he sent an unofficial envoy to Belgrade in early June. Oskar Schlitter, the erstwhile West German economic negotiator who had lead the FRG delegation during the 1964 talks with Yugoslavia, arrived in Belgrade to reveal all the concessions Bonn was willing to make in order to reestablish relations. These concessions were precisely the ones Brandt listed in his letter to Kiesinger in March.⁷⁸¹ Schlitter’s interlocutor was not authorized to respond, but Brandt’s decision to send an envoy who was a “man from [Brandt’s] party, who was in a certain period actively engaged in

778 “Informacija” (April 29, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 487/i.

779 “Aufzeichnung des Botschafters Emmel” (May 3, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 699-703.

780 “Iz Zabeleške” (May 8, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 588/i.

781 “Zabeleška” (June 4, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 1041/i.

German-Yugoslav relations” and someone with an “anti-Nazi past,” made a good impression in Belgrade.⁷⁸² Schlitter’s visit was all the more timely as it coincided with the end of Walter Ulbricht’s holiday in Yugoslavia.

On May 21, Walter Ulbricht arrived in Yugoslavia for a two week long stay, in a visit that reflected the good state of relations between him and Tito. From the East German perspective, the visit was timed perfectly as it gave Ulbricht an opportunity to personally try to drive a wedge between Bonn and Belgrade. The East Germans had already attempted to disrupt the FRG’s *Ostpolitik* earlier that month, when their prime minister Willi Stoph sent chancellor Kiesinger an open letter, asking him to abandon the claim to sole representation and to acknowledge the intra-German border.⁷⁸³ The East Germans never intended for the letter to improve German-German relations, since there was no realistic chance of Bonn accepting these suggestions. Instead, as Hermann Wentker argues, they merely used it to amplify their old positions.⁷⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs described this latest East German initiative as “valuable,” and argued that the Bonn government could no longer ignore the GDR.⁷⁸⁵ They understood the East German position, and expected Ulbricht to press them on several issues during his visit, but the most important one was certainly the development of their relations with the FRG.⁷⁸⁶ Another point of East German focus was the non-aligned world. East German foreign minister Otto Winzer had just completed a tour of several Arab countries. Winzer's objective was to prevent Arab-West German rapprochement, which had started with the Arab

782 Ibid.

783 Brief von Stoph an Kiesinger; erste Stellungnahme Kiesingers

[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Mai, P. 23. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 23145 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4292)]

784 Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, p. 244.

785 “Aktenvermerk” (May 16, 1967), PA AA, MfAA, C 440, pp. 1-3.

786 “Informacija” (May 20, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 515/6.

League secretary-general Abdul Khalek Hassouna's April 21 visit to Bonn and his meetings with Kiesinger and Brandt.⁷⁸⁷ Given the worsening of the political situation in the Middle East – discussed below – the Yugoslavs found that the GDR was aiming to use this crisis to gain Arab support in their quest for recognition, with Yugoslavia's help, of course.⁷⁸⁸

On May 22, after a long walk around the Brioni Island, Ulbricht sat down to talk with Tito on the patio of Hotel Neptun. Their conversation quickly turned to the West German government. Ulbricht attacked Brandt for feigning confusion about the Soviet Bloc position regarding the establishment of relations between the FRG and socialist countries. He believed that the FRG was planning to infiltrate the socialist markets because it was experiencing a recession, and finding millions of new consumers was the way out of it.⁷⁸⁹ In their second conversation on May 30, the two leaders focused on the crisis in the Middle East, which was coming to a head. Ulbricht argued that after Bonn failed to negotiate the reestablishment of relations with the Arab countries, it decided to side with the United States and Israel.⁷⁹⁰ In the final Yugoslav report on Ulbricht's visit, the anonymous author mentioned that the Middle East crisis occupied much of the other conversations between the two leaders. The upshot of these meetings was that the GDR's and Yugoslavia's positions on the simmering Arab-Israeli conflict were aligned.⁷⁹¹

787 Brandt was careful not to give this meeting too much gravity and pointed out that it an "exchange of ideas" and not a negotiation about the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. "Gespräch des Bundesministers Brandt mit Generalsekretär Hassouna, Arabische Liga" (April 21, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 620-627.

788 "Poseta ministra inostranih poslova NDR Oto Vincera arapskim zemljama" (May 18, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, supplement to doc. no. 515/6.

789 "Zabeleška" (May 22, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 515/7.

790 Draft of minutes of Tito-Ulbricht conversation (May 30, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, p. 13.

791 "Informacija" (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 1348/1.

Ulbricht departed Yugoslavia on the eve of the Six-Day War.⁷⁹² Yugoslavia had been very concerned about the recent developments in the Arab world, not least because the majority of the Arab countries were non-aligned. Tito saw the conflict as more than merely an Arab-Israeli affair, but as a battle between the imperialistic and progressive forces.⁷⁹³ In this constellation, after the fruitful talks with Ulbricht, it became clear that Yugoslavia could very possibly clash with the FRG over the war because of Tito's convictions.

West Germany's relations with Israel had been the cause of much frustration among Arab nations in the post-World War II period. After the news of secret West German arms shipments to Israel became public in 1964, the countries of the Arab League were on the brink of breaking off diplomatic relations with the FRG, and when chancellor Erhard decided to recognize Israel in 1965, the Arab League statesmen could no longer justify upholding relations with Bonn, which they broke off on March 15, 1965.⁷⁹⁴ The East Germans attempted to take the FRG's place, but were unable to secure the support of the majority of Arab League countries.⁷⁹⁵ The Arabs were not looking for a West German surrogate while they were still fostering relations with the FRG. Therefore, with the outbreak of the Six-Day War and West Germany's allegiance to Israel, a new window of opportunity was opened for the GDR to negotiate an Arab recognition.

792 For a recent history of the Six-Day War, see Guy Laron, *The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); For US policy in the Six-Day War see Peter L. Hahn, "The Cold War and the Six Day War: US Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Crisis of June 1967," in Nigel John Ashton (ed.) *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73*, Cold War History Series (London; New York: Routledge, 2007); The United Nations' role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is covered in Danilo author Di Mauro, *The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: American Hegemony and UN Intervention since 1947*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics ; 42 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2012); For an analysis of the Soviet involvement in the Six-Day War see Yaacov Ro'i and B. Morozov (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*, Cold War International History Project Series (Washington, D.C.: Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press, 2008).

793 "Informacija" (undated), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-19, doc. no. 1348/1.

794 Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin*, p. 143.

795 Ibid.

Yugoslavia's reaction to the outbreak of fighting in Egypt on June 5, 1967 was in line with its traditionally pro-Arab Middle East policy. Tito condemned the Israeli attacks on Arab countries and demanded its immediate retreat.⁷⁹⁶ Soviet Bloc countries, including the GDR, also condemned the attacks. *Neues Deutschland* published on its front page Ulbricht's message of support for the Syrian president Nureddin al-Atassi on the first day of war. Ulbricht did not fail to attack the FRG in his message, accusing Bonn of "supporting Israel for years. This includes close cooperation in the military sphere. Leading politicians as well as the press, radio, and television are taking the Israeli position and vilifying the just cause of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic and of other Arab peoples."⁷⁹⁷

Ulbricht's message was not purely performative. Just hours before Israel ordered the attack on Syria, he received a report – via foreign minister Winzer – from the GDR general consul in Damascus Horst Grunert, who had just returned from talks with several high ranking Syrian officials. Grunert was happy to report that the Syrians were more than willing to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR, which they called a "necessity" that was "undeniable." Grunert also noted that the Syrian military was interested in developing relations with their East German counterparts.⁷⁹⁸ Ulbricht followed up with his defence minister, Heinz Hoffmann, who informed him that his ministry had already begun developing these plans.⁷⁹⁹ While the GDR's response came too late for the Syrians to make a difference in the war, the East German military support would begin arriving in Syrian ports shortly after the fighting had ended, along with

796 Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010), p. 116.

797 "DDR entschlossen an der Seite der arabischen Staaten" *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, GDR), June 5, 1967.

<http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19670605-0-2-0-0>

798 Letter from Winzer to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen (June 5, 1967), BA-SAPMO, NY 4182/1334, p. 16.

799 Letter from Hoffmann's deputy Keßler to Ulbricht (June 9, 1967), BA-SAPMO, NY 4182/1334, p. 20.

supplies from other Soviet bloc countries.⁸⁰⁰ In an explicit show of socialist cooperation, Yugoslavia had provided the East Germans with the use of its ports in the Adriatic to transport the weapons to the Middle East.⁸⁰¹ Although Yugoslavia had more reason to be diplomatic during the actual war – there were still 300 Yugoslav soldiers stationed on the Sinai peninsula as part of the First United Nations Emergency Force mission – Tito had no intention of remaining neutral.⁸⁰² When the Egyptian authorities fed the diplomatic corps in Cairo with false reports of Arab successes, the Yugoslav ambassador in Egypt Salko Fejić allegedly stormed into the embassy salon and shouted, “We are entering Tel Aviv!”⁸⁰³

In the meantime, Tito decided to take control of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in this crisis. On June 9 he flew to Moscow without any of his top diplomats, in order to participate in a meeting of the heads of communist parties. The Soviets called the meeting to coordinate the Bloc’s reaction to the war. The participants released a statement the same day calling for Israel’s immediate withdrawal.⁸⁰⁴ Tito’s sojourn in Moscow caused an uproar among his closest foreign policy associates, for several reasons. Apart from Tito’s refusal to consult his diplomats and his decision to travel alone, they also criticized his decision to support the Arab countries unconditionally, which was a clear violation of the principles of non-alignment.⁸⁰⁵ Apart from signing the joint statement, Tito also decided to sever diplomatic ties with Israel, a decision which would remain in effect until 1992, when it was reversed by the already partially dissolved

800 Jeffrey Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967–1989* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 48-50.

801 *Ibid.*, p. 49.

802 The history of the Yugoslav National Army’s contingent in the United Nations mission on the Sinai peninsula is covered in Aleksandar Životić, *Forsiranje peska: odred JNA na Sinaju (1956-1967)* (Beograd: Mediija centar “Odbrana,” 2011).

803 Bogetić and Životić, *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967*, p. 117.

804 Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, p. 213.

805 *Ibid.*, p. 214.

Yugoslavia.⁸⁰⁶ Tito was obviously guided by his concern for Nasser – his closest international partner – as the United Arab Republic’s president, which caused him to disregard his subordinates’ pragmatism.⁸⁰⁷ But Tito’s alignment with the Soviet Bloc in this matter also brought him closer to Ulbricht. Paradoxically, he was now a better ally to Ulbricht than Ceausescu, a head of a Warsaw Pact country, who refused to travel to Moscow for this party meeting.

The effects of this harmonization were immediately tangible. On June 15, the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister Miša Pavićević informed ambassador Staimer that Tito had met with the Algerian president Houari Boumédiène and suggested that now would be a good time to recognize the GDR.⁸⁰⁸ Compared to records of previous Yugoslav conversations with third parties about the recognition of the GDR, this was a noticeable departure in the way Belgrade lobbied for the GDR. There was almost an air of nonchalance in the Yugoslav approach. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were aware of the limits of their influence, and were reluctant to act as couriers for the latest Ulbricht memorandum on GDR-FRG relations to countries outside of the non-aligned world. Even in the case of Switzerland, which was a neutral country, there was some hesitation at the Belgrade foreign ministry.⁸⁰⁹

806 Jacob Abadi, “Israel and the Balkan States,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 4 (1996): 296–320, p. 299.

807 As Vladimir Petrović argues, this was one of the rare occasions when Tito’s diplomats openly challenged him. *Ibid.* p. 213.

808 This report did not include Tito’s arguments for this suggestion. “Zabeleška” (June 16, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-4, doc. no. 1457/i.

809 “Generalnom sekretarijatu predsednika Republike” (July 25, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/81-4, doc. no. 733/1.

Clearing the way for a new start

Naturally, Bonn was curious about these latest developments in Yugo-GDR relations. On June 6, the West German representative in Belgrade Hans-Werner Loeck called on the head of the West Europe department at the Yugoslav foreign ministry Zvonko Lučić and “without mentioning the name Ulbricht,” asked about the recent “lively” contacts with the “Soviet Zone.” Lučić tried to downplay Ulbricht’s visit, asserting that he practically invited himself to Yugoslavia, and that he did not inquire about the recent developments in relations between Belgrade and Bonn, since he was aware that the Yugoslavs were sensitive about any criticism of their foreign policy.⁸¹⁰ Loeck was not convinced with the Yugoslav attempt to diminish the importance of Ulbricht’s visit, but he did get the sense that Yugoslavia would not be moved by the GDR’s wish to attach some conditions to their reestablishment of relations with the FRG.⁸¹¹ This was surely a comforting assessment for the Kiesinger government at a time when Yugoslavia seemed to be veering dangerously toward Moscow. Tito had also made some positive remarks about the exchange of open letters between the GDR’s prime minister, Stoph, and the FRG’s chancellor, Kiesinger, even though its real value was symbolic, since both sides continued rejecting each other’s proposals for solving the German question. Apparently, even the GDR’s foreign minister, Otto Winzer, found Tito’s support of the exchange surprising, given its cynicism and lack of any substance.⁸¹²

The West Germans were likewise confounded when Yugoslavia reverted to demanding war reparations from the FRG. On July 12, Yugoslavs handed the West Germans a verbal note in

810 Telegram from Loeck (June 7, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 172, pp. 11-14.

811 Ibid.

812 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 256.

which they again laid out their claim about the reparations for the victims of Nazi persecution.⁸¹³ There was no official reply, but after two months of considerations, counsellor Loeck suggested to the AA that the timing of the note was not a shift in Yugoslav policy, but rather a scramble for West German money. According to Loeck, with the prospect of Bonn establishing diplomatic relations with a number of Soviet satellites in the near future, Belgrade feared that West German financial incentives or aid to these countries would deplete any potential funds for war reparations. Belgrade wanted to avoid this potentially embarrassing situation.⁸¹⁴ However, by the time Loeck wrote his analysis in which he decided that the reparations would mostly likely not present a roadblock, the Bonn-Belgrade relations had already moved on.

September seemed to have been a turning point of sorts for Bonn-Belgrade relations. On September 9, the West German Minister of Family Affairs and Youth Bruno Heck arrived in the Croatian town of Karlovac to discuss the next steps in the Yugo-FRG relations.⁸¹⁵ It is not surprising that Kiesinger chose Heck for this mission. Heck was the secretary general of Kiesinger's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and although he claimed that the chancellor did not "order" him to come to Karlovac, it seemed that the meeting was indeed a somewhat clandestine operation that was initiated by Kiesinger.⁸¹⁶ Apparently, the West German press was not even informed about Heck's trip.⁸¹⁷ It is unclear whom Heck met, or why he met them in Karlovac, but this was most likely Kiesinger's attempt to regain some of the control

813 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 99.

814 "Botschaftsrat Loeck, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt" (September 19, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1274-1277.

815 The official reason for Heck's visit was a fire fighting competition in Karlovac. Heck himself was a district fire chief in West Germany and a foreign policy advisor to the president of the West German Firefighters Union, Albert Bürger. Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition*, p. 194.

816 Untitled report by anonymous author (date illegible), AJ, KPR i-5-B/82-7. Heck himself stated that he visited Karlovac in late summer, probably September. Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition*, p. 194.

817 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 250.

over Bonn's delicate relations with socialist countries, which he believed were in danger of slipping away from him due to his own foreign minister's efforts. Namely, Willy Brandt had visited Romania in August, and during a dinner toast declared that European security could only be achieved if the existing conditions were taken into account, including "both political orders that currently exist on German soil." According to a report in the West German daily *Die Welt*, Brandt had added this quote to his speech by hand.⁸¹⁸ Brandt later noted that he made this minor alteration "to relieve people of their sense of insecurity and their fear of war."⁸¹⁹

The incident in Romania was symptomatic of the relationship between Kiesinger and Brandt. While the latter was willing to publicly push the envelope of the FRG's *Ostpolitik*, the former was more cautious.⁸²⁰ He and Brandt had an uneasy relationship as coalition partners, especially in the area of foreign policy. Apart from having differing views on their East European policy, they also did not see eye to eye in their West European policy, especially in the matters of rapprochement with De Gaulle and the United Kingdom's candidacy for the European Economic Community (EEC). As Henning Türk explained, for Brandt the EEC expansion was "imperative" for the kind of foreign policy he championed, while Kiesinger was wary about the UK's willingness to cooperate once inside the Community.⁸²¹ Apart from disagreeing with Brandt regarding the methods of conducting foreign policy, Kiesinger also had to endure criticism from his supporters on the right.⁸²² To add to his woes, Kiesinger failed to

818 "Brandt in Rumänien" [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: August, P. 13. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 23407 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4342)]

819 Willy Brandt, *My Life in Politics* (New York: Viking, 1992), p. 163.

820 Judith Michel "Willy Brandt und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika" in Bernd Rother, ed., *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik, Akteure Der Außenpolitik* (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), [//www.springer.com/de/book/9783658029180](http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658029180) (ebook), p. 128.

821 Henning Türk, *Die Europapolitik der Großen Koalition 1966-1969* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2006), p. 237.

822 Joost Kleuters, *Reunification in West German Party Politics From Westbindung to Ostpolitik* (Springer, 2012), (ebook) p. 136.

gain the support of West German students. Beginning in the early 1960s, students began organizing throughout university campuses in the FRG in protest against the current political system, domestically as well as abroad. They took aim at the American involvement in Vietnam, but also domestic topics ranging from union politics to child rearing. Kiesinger, with his career in the Third Reich, was certainly not the politician that commanded respect from the mostly left-leaning students, some of whom even called for a Mao-inspired cultural revolution.⁸²³ Just a few months before Heck's visit to Yugoslavia, the West German police killed Benno Ohnesorg, one of the students protesting Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's visit to West Berlin. According to Nick Thomas, this was a watershed moment in West German politics, one that "exposed and deepened fault lines of opinion throughout West German society."⁸²⁴ And while Kiesinger denounced the student movement as the victims of an "international sickness," his government had difficulties containing student protest "without provoking more radicalism."⁸²⁵ Attacked from all sides, Kiesinger needed to show – not necessarily to the public at large – that not only was he in charge of the Great Coalition, but that he also knew what he was doing.⁸²⁶

823 Michael A. Schmidtke, "Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany," *South Central Review* 16/17 (1999): 77–89, p. 78.

824 Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy*, 1 edition (Oxford: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), p. 107. For more on West German student protest movement in the 1960s, see Pavel A. Richter, "Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 Bis 1968," *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft* 17 (1998): 35–55; Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht*, 4th edition (Göttingen: Steidl, 2008); Udo Wengst, *Reform und Revolte: Politischer und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vor und nach 1968*, 1st ed. (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2011); Robert Lorenz and Franz Walter, *1964 - das Jahr, mit dem »68« begann*, 1. Aufl. (Berlin, Boston: transcript Verlag, 2014); For broader analyses of 1968 protests, see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*, Revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977*, 2008 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

825 Suri, *Power and Protest*, p. 178.

826 Kroegel, *Einen Anfang finden!*, *Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition*, p. 171.

Kiesinger must have therefore felt vindicated about his approach in Yugoslavia, because Heck's meeting with Yugoslav officials produced surprisingly positive results. At this meeting, the Yugoslavs disclosed for the first time that they would not be making the war reparations a condition for the reestablishment of relations. This matter was an "issue [to be addressed] after the normalization," hinting that they did not wish to completely forget about the reparations.⁸²⁷ Heck also disclosed that he met the American and British ambassadors in Bonn to discuss the FRG's potential reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia – "without letting them know that we are already working on it" – and that they were supportive of the idea.⁸²⁸ It appeared that the reestablishment of relations was all but a foregone conclusion. With this in mind, Heck also reiterated West German fears over non-aligned countries recognizing the GDR, and meekly asked whether Yugoslavia might be able to exercise its influence in these countries to prevent such an outcome.⁸²⁹

The Yugoslavs found Heck's visit to have been very significant. Heck was the highest ranking West German official who had not only visited Yugoslavia, but also discussed their relations since 1957. More importantly, the content of the talks pointed towards an imminent breakthrough. The Yugoslavs singled out three main points Heck made during his presentation: a) the West German need to recognize the GDR and the existing borders in Europe as a reality; b) the need for the FRG to foster good relations with the USSR and other socialist countries in order to build a foundation for German reunification; and c) the role of Yugoslavia as the most important intermediary in this process because of the "position it now holds in the world [...]"

827 Untitled report by anonymous author (date illegible), AJ, KPR i-5-B/82-7, p. 3.

828 Ibid.

829 Ibid.

where it should practically act as a bridge for bringing together East and West.”⁸³⁰ These new impulses from Bonn forced Belgrade to take stock of their relations. The Yugoslav foreign ministry argued that in the nine months it had been in power, the Kiesinger government had consistently acted in accordance with the ideas the chancellor had announced at the beginning of his tenure, including building a better relationship with the Soviet Bloc countries. Although West German foreign policy was still anchored by the claim to sole representation, it was marked by a new “elasticity,” which helped it move away from the antagonism of the previous governments.⁸³¹ But in terms of bilateral relations, the Yugoslavs were more critical. They argued that the FRG had done little to really improve relations with Yugoslavia, with all the progress happening in areas of secondary importance – all while the FRG’s economic presence in Yugoslavia was rapidly expanding – and with no foreseeable change in Bonn’s approach.⁸³²

The Yugoslavs were also worried that the FRG’s diplomatic successes elsewhere would diminish Yugoslavia’s relative importance in Bonn’s foreign policy. Therefore, the Belgrade foreign ministry suggested a more proactive German policy, one containing measures which – and this was a crucial point for the Yugoslavs – would force Bonn to make concrete steps to improve relations with Belgrade.⁸³³ It is clear from the list of these measures that Yugoslavia did not have much leverage against West Germany, apart from perhaps the guest worker agreement, where the Yugoslavs considered cooperating with West German syndicates in order to pressure Kiesinger’s government from within the FRG as well.⁸³⁴ This miscalculation, however, was

830 Untitled report by anonymous author (dated October 19, 1967 but probably written just after Heck’s visit), AJ, KPR i-5-B/82-7, doc. no. 992/1.

831 “Spoljna politika SRN, bilateralni problemi i predlozi za naše dalje reagovanje” (September 9, 1967), AJ, KPR i-5-b/82-7, pp. 1-3.

832 Ibid., p. 21.

833 Ibid., pp. 19-22.

834 Ibid., p. 22.

inconsequential because at this point the only obstacle to an immediate reestablishment of relations was Kiesinger's and Brandt's opposition in their own parties.⁸³⁵

In the end, the Yugoslavs settled on a proactive approach in regards to the first step towards the reestablishment of relations. Any defensiveness immediately following Heck's visit would have been counterproductive. As a result, on September 15 Yugoslavia announced that it intended to name Zvonko Lučić, previously of the West Europe department at the foreign ministry, as the new head of the Yugoslav mission at the Swedish embassy in Bonn. This position had been left vacant since 1965, when the last representative Milan Georgijević returned to Belgrade. Equally significant was the West German decision to grant Lučić the rank of envoy, which was a point of contention in previous years as it was deemed too high of a rank for this position.⁸³⁶ But the decisive Yugoslav act came on September 18 in Paris, when their foreign minister Marko Nikezić admitted to his hosts that Yugoslavia had great expectations from the current West German government, and that Yugoslavia had wished that the two countries had already reestablished relations. Even though Nikezić regretted that this had not occurred, he declared that Yugoslavia would not create any obstacles for this to happen, and that the way it would happen was a secondary concern.⁸³⁷ Although Tito addressed the matter of war reparations again during a speech on October 3, it would appear that his statement did not constitute a serious change in Yugoslav policy and was most likely intended to appeal to the Yugoslav public.⁸³⁸

835 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 76.

836 "Aufzeichnung" (September 19, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 95-96.

837 Telegram from Paris (September 18, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 179, p. 42.

838 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 259.

By mid-October, however, the Yugoslavs were clearly beginning to feel frustrated over the lack of Bonn's initiative. The latter's stalling over the guest worker agreement – hitherto an issue nominally not tied to the reestablishment of relations – gave the Yugoslavs an opportunity to express this frustration, so much so that on October 12, FRG's representative in Belgrade Hans-Werner Loeck urged Bonn to finally set a date for the negotiations, before the Yugoslavs “abandon their restraint” and begin attaching conditions to the reestablishment of relations.⁸³⁹ Brandt responded the very next day. In his speech to the Bundestag, Brandt declared that “non-aligned Yugoslavia is, in the East as well as the West, an honoured member of the European community of states. The federal government wants to normalize relations with precisely this country.” Brandt also added that the FRG had scheduled “the negotiations over the finalization of a long-term trade agreement, over guest workers, and over cultural questions.”⁸⁴⁰ Brandt had conveyed a different message than chancellor Kiesinger, who in an October 11 interview had emphasized that there were “more substantial problems” in the FRG's relations with Yugoslavia as opposed to other socialist countries.⁸⁴¹ Regardless of the discrepancies between Brandt and Kiesinger's statements, the West German government argued that it was exercising extreme caution and “examining at this point in time all aspects and ramifications” of reestablishing relations.⁸⁴² However, at that time Kiesinger and Brandt simply did not have the support of the coalition parties necessary for moving forward with their agenda. Kiesinger admitted as much in a conversation with the US ambassador McGhee on November 15.⁸⁴³

839 “Botschaftsrat Loeck, Belgrad, an das Auswärtige Amt” (October 12, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1364-1265.

840 Brandt's speech at the Bundestag (October 13, 1967), <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/05/05126.pdf>.

841 “Intervju kancelara Kizingera...” (October 23, 1967), AJ, KPR i-5-b/82-7.

842 “Aufzeichnung” (November 7, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 115-116.

843 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 239. (ebook)

East Germany's attempts at preventing the reestablishment of relations between Yugoslavia and the FRG

As in previous months, the Yugoslavs attempted to downplay the increasingly close contacts with the FRG when discussing them with East German officials, although it seemed that the latter were not quite convinced by reassurances from Belgrade.⁸⁴⁴ Nevertheless, there were no signs that East Berlin was desperate to prevent the Bonn-Belgrade rapprochement. The GDR's Belgrade embassy continued to pursue their usual tasks without much urgency. For example, they complained to the Yugoslav foreign ministry about the Zagreb Fair, where the exhibits from West Berlin were labelled with the FRG's flag and country name, a staple of East German complaints during the Hallstein doctrine period, but a matter of relatively low importance.⁸⁴⁵ The East Germans did not even use party channels to apply pressure on Belgrade. In fact, according to the Socialist Unity Party Central Committee member Kurt Tiedke, party relations with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1967 were more developed than with any other communist party, excluding the CPSU, naturally.⁸⁴⁶ Why was the GDR so indifferent to a development that would have provoked Ulbricht's regime in earlier times? One explanation is that by late 1967, the East Germans believed that the reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia was a foregone conclusion. The GDR's foreign minister Winzer's November 24 message to his Yugoslav counterpart Nikezić lends credence to this assessment. Winzer wanted to visit Belgrade in the near future, not to persuade the Yugoslavs to reverse their decision, but to seek their support in gaining recognition from "at least one Arab country" before

844 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 268.

845 "Aktenvermerk" (September 11, 1967), PA AA, MfAA C 1420/70, pp. 86-88.

846 "Zabeleška" (October 23, 1967), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-148-174, doc. no. 05-1857.

Bonn and Belgrade came to an agreement.⁸⁴⁷ The GDR was still looking to exploit the aftermath of the Six-Day War, and was looking for support from the most influential actors (Winzer also disclosed that the GDR asked for Moscow's help in the matter).⁸⁴⁸ It appeared that Ulbricht sensed the end of the Hallstein Doctrine and wanted to deal it the final blow by negotiating one more recognition of the GDR. Yugoslavia was not a priority anymore.

Bonn and Belgrade come to an agreement at last

West Germans spent much of November mulling over their next step. In late October, the head of the Eastern subsection of the Political Department at the AA Ulrich Sahn compiled a report based on conversations Franz Barsig, the editor-in-chief of the *Deutschlandfunk* (the West German state-owned radio broadcaster) had with Moma Marković, the editor of the SKJ daily *Borba* and a member of the SKJ CC and Zvonko Lučić, the recently appointed Yugoslav envoy to Bonn. Their conversations covered ground familiar from previous contacts between West German and Yugoslav officials, but Sahn's report synthesized expectations of both sides, as well as the West German response options. Although these conversations took place before Loeck's warning to Bonn about Yugoslav impatience, the general positions remained the same. Sahn singled out the war reparations as the single largest obstacle in the FRG-Yugoslav relations, regardless of Belgrade's decision to accept the postponement of negotiations over this issue. Nevertheless, Sahn argued for a "destruction of Yugoslav illusions" regarding their reparation demands in order to prevent any problems at a later stage. Apart from the issue of

847 "Zabeleška" (November 24, 1967), AJ, KPR I-3-a/82-20, doc. no. 1135/1.

848 Ibid.

reparations, Sahm also warned of the possible public backlash over the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia. According to him, the Bonn government should not look desperate in the process.⁸⁴⁹

Based on Sahm's report, Brandt asked the head of the East European Department at the Bonn foreign office, Hans Hellmuth Ruete, to create a note for Kiesinger. Presumably based on Brandt's instructions, Ruete wrote that, by waiting, the FRG "will not find a more opportune moment for the resumption [of relations], nor will it improve the conditions for it."⁸⁵⁰ Hinting at the problem of non-aligned countries recognizing the GDR, Ruete suggested that Kiesinger should dedicate his time to this issue before his forthcoming Asian tour, and that the foreign office could initiate the negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as he returned from Asia.⁸⁵¹ In the meantime, Barsig again met with the SKJ Central Committee member Marković in Belgrade on November 28. Brandt had instructed Barsig to probe the Yugoslav about some open questions. Marković assured Barsig that Yugoslavia would not bring up the issue of war reparations during the negotiations, nor would it comment on the German Question after relations were reestablished. For Bonn, this was an important concession, since Romania continued to criticize the FRG's German policy after they established diplomatic relations in January.⁸⁵²

Kiesinger was able to secure guarantees from his hosts in India, Ceylon, and Pakistan that they would not recognize the GDR in the case of a reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia.⁸⁵³ Thus, the path was cleared for the FRG to make the first step that the Yugoslavs desired for so long. Kiesinger returned to Bonn on November 29, and already on

849 "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Sahm" (October 25, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1448-1454.

850 Ibid., p. 1454.

851 Ibid.

852 "Bundesminister Brandt an Bundeskanzler Kiesinger" (December 5, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1594-1597.

853 "An die Grenze" *Der Spiegel*, December 4, 1967. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46164830.html>

December 1 Loeck approached the Yugoslavs and laid out the West German blueprint for the negotiations over the guest worker agreement. Although Yugoslavia officially did not attach any conditions to the reestablishment of relations, it would have been imprudent for Bonn to take these statements at face value. Therefore, the FRG anticipated the diplomatic negotiations with the economic ones.⁸⁵⁴

Kiesinger had a hard time breaking down the resistance in his own party, which was using Yugoslavia for domestic politics. More precisely, the CDU was using this issue against the SPD, in order to “demonstrate that it was defining the rules of politics through the chancellor.”⁸⁵⁵

During this time, the two Superpowers took opposite approaches to the unfolding situation. The United States had been supportive of Kiesinger and Brandt’s efforts. After all, they had been lobbying for better relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia even during Adenauer and Erhard’s respective tenures, when this option was more or less a taboo in Bonn. In May, during a discussion in Washington about the new *Ostpolitik*, the Americans argued that for “this policy to be effective [The FRG] needs not only American understanding and trust, but as necessity arises also active American support against the Soviets.”⁸⁵⁶ By September, however, the US embassy in Bonn reported that there was “no present military pressure from the East, and the Germans are therefore in a position to concentrate more of their attention on problems where the US role is less important,” but also that the West Germans “appear to have concluded that too close an association with the US can be more of a handicap than a help.”⁸⁵⁷ As a result, the

854 “Zabeleška” (December 1, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5-b/82-7, doc. no. 1166/i.

855 Letter to Loeck from unknown author, (November 23, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 42 169, pp. 137-138.

856 “Botschafter Knappstein, Washington, an das Auswärtige Amt” (May 27, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 780.

857 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 229. (ebook)

United States seemed to have kept their distance throughout the duration of this process. The Americans were also considerably less involved in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was irritated by Bonn's persistence in courting the Soviet Bloc countries. After the Warsaw Pact countries closed ranks by adopting the Ulbricht Doctrine, the Soviets began harshly criticizing Bonn for focusing its attention on Yugoslavia. Because of this, the Soviets and the East Germans stepped up their claims that "the Federal Republic was in the hands of former Nazis and Nazi sympathizers."⁸⁵⁸

The Soviets were understandably far more critical of Bonn than they were of Belgrade. During and following the Six-Day War, the compatibility of Yugoslav and Soviet Middle Eastern policies was at an all-time high, exemplified by the fact that out of all the socialist countries, only Belgrade and Moscow provided free aid to Arab countries.⁸⁵⁹ Although the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington Bogdan Crnobrnja vehemently denied the accusation "that Yugoslavia, as a member of the Socialist Camp, was more or less obliged to side with the USSR when major issues arose between the US and the USSR," the fact remained that from the Western perspective Yugoslavia behaved no differently than Soviet satellites.⁸⁶⁰ In September, Belgrade even hosted a conference of socialist vice prime ministers aimed at organizing a better aid system for Arab countries.⁸⁶¹ Around this time, Tito also considered cooperating with Soviet Bloc countries in various endeavours in the non-aligned world. For example, during a conversation with Antonin Novotny – the General Secretary of the Communist Party of

⁸⁵⁸ Gray, *Germany's Cold War*, p. 205.

⁸⁵⁹ Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971*, p. 240.

⁸⁶⁰ *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 186. (ebook)

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Czechoslovakia and the country's president – Tito suggested that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia should work together in non-aligned countries, economically and politically.⁸⁶²

The exceptionally good cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc was most likely the reason why Moscow decided not to criticize Belgrade's rapprochement with the FRG, even though Yugoslavia bore responsibility for the rapprochement as well. On December 8, the Soviets delivered another note to the FRG embassy in Moscow (as well as the embassies of the other three occupying powers). In it, the Soviets again addressed the alleged reawakening of National Socialist tendencies in West German politics and society. Although the direct cause for the note was the extreme right National Democratic Party of Germany's congress in Hamburg, the Soviets also criticized the FRG's *Ostpolitik* by referencing the consequences of Germany's World War II occupation of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia.⁸⁶³ The Bonn government found the mention of Yugoslavia "unusual." Foreign office's Ulrich Sahn argued that it could not be ruled out that – apart from it being a direct attack on the FRG's *Ostpolitik* – the note also served as an indirect attempt at exerting pressure on Yugoslavia, since the Soviets released a similarly worded note during the FRG's negotiations with Romania earlier that year, prior to the establishment of relations between these two countries.⁸⁶⁴

The Soviet note was rejected by all recipients. Moscow's pressure was not strong enough to stop Kiesinger and Brandt from following through with their plan to reestablish relations with Yugoslavia. On December 5, Brandt suggested to Kiesinger that this matter be included in the agenda for the December 13 government meeting. Kiesinger agreed to this, having finally

862 Dimić, *Jugoslavija i hladni rat*, pp. 319-320.

863 Sowjetserklärungen an BRD, USA, Großbritannien und Frankreich wegen neonazistischer und militaristischer Vorgänge in der BRD; [Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Dezember, P. 74. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 23848 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4427)]

864 "Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Sahn" (December 11, 1967), AAPD 1967, pp. 1623-1626.

subdued the CDU faction opposed to reestablishing relations with Belgrade.⁸⁶⁵ Brandt was in Brussels at a meeting with the foreign ministers of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom when Kiesinger phoned him to inform him of his decision. Brandt then relayed the news to his interlocutors, adding, “if the pressure from Moscow and East Berlin does not put a spoke in [our] wheel, the relations [between the FRG and Yugoslavia] will be reestablished very soon.”⁸⁶⁶

Judging by ambassador Staimer’s December 4 meeting with a Yugoslav foreign ministry official, the FRG had little to worry about. Staimer argued that the GDR had nothing against the reestablishment of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia. In fact, it welcomed it as definite evidence that the Hallstein Doctrine was broken.⁸⁶⁷ The GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer’s surprise visit to Belgrade on December 11 also failed to make a difference. It is probable that Ulbricht did not expect much from Winzer’s mission anyway. *Neues Deutschland* gave minimal attention in its pages to Winzer’s meetings in Belgrade, leaving out any information about their contents or outcomes, while its headlines were dominated by Ulbricht’s visit to Moscow.⁸⁶⁸ Winzer’s half-hearted attempt to influence the Yugoslavs appeared to be the last East German effort against the reestablishment of FRG-Yugoslav relations. The GDR accepted the rapprochement. The SED informed the Yugoslavs that they had no issues with their decision to “normalize” relations with the FRG, and that if there was anything problematic with the process, it was surely to be found on the West German side, where Kiesinger and Brandt were facing

865 *FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin*, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), Document 241. (ebook)

866 “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete” (December 12, 1967), AAPD 1967, p. 1640.

867 “Zabeleška” (December 4, 1967), AJ, KPR I-5.b/81-4, doc. no. 1180/1.

868 See the *Neues Deutschland* issues from December 12 and 13, 1967.

strong opposition.⁸⁶⁹ This statement amounted to a practical blessing from the SED – not that Tito asked for one – that the negotiations could proceed.

Although the Yugoslavs still maintained the somewhat noncommittal position that there was no need for negotiations since the reestablishment of relations was either wanted or not, there was no actual obstacle left in its path.⁸⁷⁰ West German belief in a positive outcome of the as-of-yet unconfirmed negotiations was such that Loeck submitted a request to rent a new embassy building in Belgrade, until a new embassy was constructed.⁸⁷¹ On December 18 West Germans contacted the Yugoslav foreign ministry to arrange the time and location for the negotiations.⁸⁷² Yugoslavs suggested Belgrade as the location. They also wanted to start as soon as possible, since no real negotiations were to take place, beyond the ones focused on technicalities.⁸⁷³ However, West Germans preferred Bonn, and since neither side wanted to negotiate in their partner's capital, they finally settled for Paris and January 23, 1968 as the location and date.⁸⁷⁴

The negotiations took place at Hôtel de La Trémoille, the Yugoslav ambassador's luxurious residence in the 16th *arrondissement*, and although *Der Spiegel* described the talks as an attempt to salvage “at least the facade” of the “crumbling monument to Germany's foreign policy” that was the Hallstein Doctrine, there was no sense of West German desperation during those seven days in Paris.⁸⁷⁵ The West German delegation was led by the head of the East

869 “Zabeleška” (January 11, 1968), AJ, 507-IX 86-I-175-236, doc. no. 013/III-140.

870 “BRD beschließt Verhandlungen über Wiederherstellung diplomatischer Beziehungen”

[Deutschland 1949 bis 1999: Dezember, P. 82. Digitale Bibliothek Band 78: Archiv der Gegenwart, P. 23856 (cf. AdG Bd. 5, P. 4428)]

871 Telegram from Heize (December 18, 1967), PA AA, AA, B 169, p. 168.

872 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 78.

873 Ibid., p. 80.

874 Theurer, *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin*, p. 280.

875 “Alter Räuber” *Der Spiegel*, January 24, 1968. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45465043.html>

European Department at the AA, Hans Hellmuth Ruete, while Zvonko Perišić, the head of the West European Department at the Yugoslav foreign ministry represented Yugoslavia. After both sides decided not to attach any bilateral issues to the negotiations, the only point left on the agenda was a joint statement, to be released after the successful completion of negotiations.

In addition, West Germans wanted the second part of the statement to include unilateral statements from each government.⁸⁷⁶ West Germans drafted both unilateral statements, and when Ruete tried to convince the Yugoslavs to accept their portion of the draft – which included the standard West German endorsement of the right to self-determination for all Germans – Perišić protested. He argued that what Ruete was attempting amounted to influencing Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, which was unacceptable to them. What they wanted was a short joint statement.⁸⁷⁷ The following day, Ruete attempted to convince Perišić to accept the West German draft, but the latter again refused, arguing that Yugoslavia would not accept any statement that included taking a position on the German Question.⁸⁷⁸ Ruete decided not to insist any longer, and the two delegations began working on the joint statement. The negotiations over the statement lasted for hours and were “dogged,” as Ruete reported to Brandt, but the upshot was that Perišić would not object if the German Government addressed the German Question in a separate statement, after the negotiations had ended.⁸⁷⁹ Understanding the need for clarification beyond the short joint statement, Ruete and Perišić decided to have their respective governments make their own statements independently.⁸⁸⁰ However, Ruete then demanded that the two governments authorize each other’s statements, which elicited a sharp response from Perišić,

876 “Aufzeichnung des Legationsrats Gehl” (January 24, 1968), AAPD 1968, pp. 81-82.

877 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, pp. 79-80.

878 “Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z. Z. Paris, an Bundesminister Brandt” (January 25, 1968), AAPD 1968, p. 86.

879 “Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z. Z. Paris, an Bundesminister Brandt” (second report from January 25, 1968), AAPD 1968, p. 90.

880 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 80.

who questioned the Bonn government's readiness to actually proceed with the reestablishment of relations. Ruete then withdrew his demand, but still asked whether the Yugoslavs could be more "benevolent" in their statement.⁸⁸¹ In addition to the reestablishment of the relations, the Bonn government also wanted a Yugoslav endorsement of their foreign policy, but the Yugoslavs wanted to avoid the appearance of the FRG influencing their decisions. On January 29, Ruete and Perišić initialled the joint statement, and forwarded it to their respective governments, both of which approved the statement and voted in favour of reestablishing relations on January 31.⁸⁸²

The Bonn government announced its decision on the same day in a news conference, while the Yugoslavs released their statement through Tanjug, the government-owned news agency. Both statements were quite curt and did not reflect the monumental nature of the event, at least from a West German perspective. Among West Germany's allies, the prevailing emotion was that of relief because the constraints of the Hallstein Doctrine were finally lifted.⁸⁸³ The GDR, left in the dark by Yugoslav officials during most of the Paris negotiations, attempted to use the reestablishment of relations as evidence of Bonn's foreign policy's failure, but it was a thinly veiled admission of defeat in face of a watershed moment for Germany's Cold War history.⁸⁸⁴ It was a harbinger of a much more open West German foreign policy that would be ushered in with the Brandt chancellorship in 1969. Although Bonn still claimed the validity of the Hallstein Doctrine, the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia showed that it had run its course.

881 "Ministerialdirektor Ruete, z. Z. Paris, an Bundesminister Brandt" (January 25, 1968), AAPD 1968, p. 95.

882 Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973*, p. 80.

883 Ibid., p. 82.

884 "Wieder Beziehungen" *Neues Deutschland* (Berlin, GDR), February 1, 1968. <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19680201-0-8-0-0>

Conclusion

West Germany's reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia was an achievement worthy of the Great Coalition's name. Kiesinger and Brandt had managed to usher in a new era of the FRG's foreign policy by initiating the dismantling of the Hallstein doctrine in just over a year after forming the new government. Although the chancellor and his foreign minister did not always see eye-to-eye on various foreign policy issues, they both recognized the detrimental effect the doctrine had on the FRG's relations with the Soviet Bloc, but also with the non-aligned world. To be sure, the new government built on the efforts of their predecessors, but Kiesinger, and especially Brandt, infused this process with not only new energy, but also great conviction, as witnessed by the FRG's establishment of relations with Romania.

The reaction in the Soviet Bloc to the new winds blowing from the West was to close ranks. Spurred by Walter Ulbricht and enforced by the Soviets, Moscow's satellites rejected Bonn's advances by accepting the Ulbricht doctrine, which stipulated that the FRG had to recognize the GDR if it wanted to establish relations with a Bloc country. By enacting this doctrine, the GDR relegated itself to the role of an observer. It also left Yugoslavia as the sole socialist country that was still open to improving relations with the FRG, acting as a back door to the Soviet Bloc for a new *Ostpolitik*. Conversely, the Yugoslavs recognized that West Germany was genuinely interested in making progress in bilateral relations, yet Belgrade expected Bonn to initiate change.

The first major step toward Yugoslav-West German rapprochement during the Kiesinger-Brandt era started with the meeting of a joint economic commission in Belgrade, which also

dealt with the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Following these talks, a number of West German emissaries visited Belgrade to negotiate the conditions of reestablishing relations. The main point of contention were the war reparations for Yugoslavia and the regulation of Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG. While the West Germans demanded that no financial conditions be attached to the agreement on reestablishment of relations, the Yugoslavs were adamant about linking these issues to the negotiations. A compromise was struck in late summer, when Yugoslavs agreed to forego the linkage of their demands with the reestablishment of relations, but both sides promised to address them as soon as possible. Yugoslavia and West Germany finally reestablished diplomatic relations on January 31, 1968. This was not the final act of the Hallstein doctrine – which continued to be in force for the next few years – but it was a definitive sign that Bonn learned from its mistakes, and had opted to build bridges instead of burning them. It was only fitting that Yugoslavia, which had been the first country to experience the former, would also be the first to experience the latter.

Conclusion

A journalist once asked the former Yugoslav foreign minister Koča Popović whether there were any moments during his time in office when Yugoslavia veered away from its principles. To this, Popović replied:

We were becoming prisoners of these [...] partners who were never happy with the things we did for them. This was, to give a second example, happening to us with the East Germans whom we, it is my deepest conviction, unnecessarily recognized too early and brought into question our vital interests in Western Europe, and they, that is the East Germans, pressured us and asked for more after that.⁸⁸⁵

Popović gave this interview in 1989, thirty-two years after Yugoslavia recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and twenty-one after Yugoslavia reestablished relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One could argue that he had used the benefit of hindsight to form his opinion, yet the evidence reveals that Yugoslavia did not always act in accordance with its most important foreign policy tenet, namely non-alignment, where the two Germanies were concerned.

This dissertation has shown that relations between Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic between 1955 and 1968 were influenced by broader Cold War developments, but to a large extent also by these countries' individual concerns and interests, and that often the latter trumped the former. Their relations did not follow a set trajectory, and suffered from numerous fluctuations. In a thirteen year game of

885 Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočom*, p. 125.

diplomatic snakes and ladders, these countries added their own rules, often to their own detriment.

Between 1955, the year the West Germans created the Hallstein Doctrine, and 1957, the year Yugoslavia recognized the GDR, both Germanies approached Yugoslavia as a unique foreign policy object. Yugo-Soviet relations were experiencing a thaw during these two years, and leading Yugoslav officials, especially president Tito, became more confident in voicing the opinion that there were two German states on German soil. Consequently, the GDR pushed Yugoslavia to support those statements with its recognition, while the West Germans lobbied against it. After two years, the East Germans won this diplomatic tug-of-war.

Seen in the light of Yugoslavia's post-1955 rapprochement with the Soviet Union, its recognition of the GDR was part favour to the Soviets, part fulfillment of the conditions for a massive Soviet capital investment to create Yugoslavia's aluminum production. In that sense, the recognition was a practical matter. In Belgrade's foreign ministry, the Yugoslav antipathy towards the GDR's overzealous leadership (which had spent the years since the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 criticizing Yugoslavia) was somewhat overlooked when it came to rebuilding its relationship with Moscow. This was a manifestation of Tito's pragmatism, not his ideological compass. However, it was a miscalculation on his part, since the evidence showed that the Yugoslavs did not really believe that the West Germans might break off relations with them.

Similarly, the United States and other Western Powers supported Bonn's claim to sole representation, and augmented the FRG's diplomatic campaign against the GDR's recognition in the Global South. Yet they were less pleased with the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine on Yugoslavia. Since both superpowers were careful not to alienate Yugoslavia due to its unique

position in the Cold War, they passed on their concerns to their respective German allies. For example, the United States nudged Bonn to resume economic negotiations with Yugoslavia in 1964 when it seemed that their relations had reached a nadir. Therefore, it would be false to claim that superpower influence on the relations between Yugoslavia and both Germanies was negligible. However, after 1957, the relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies were largely created by these three states. The United States and the Soviet Union monitored them, but maintained their distance. The USSR in particular was not willing or able to influence Yugoslavia's German policy. This can be traced back to the fact that in times of rapprochement, when Moscow was focused on mending its relations with Yugoslavia, it did not press the matter of the GDR's international status, and during periods of poor relations, it did not have the leverage to do so.

In the case of Yugoslavia, there existed two levels in its foreign policy during this period. On top there was Tito, who set the tone for Yugoslavia's foreign policy and signed off on all key diplomatic initiatives. While his actions in 1948, namely the split with Stalin, and subsequent opening to the Global South showed that he was not conflicted about the course Yugoslavia should have been taking, he did remain sympathetic to the Soviets, which at times caused ire and frustration of his diplomats and foreign policy advisors, but almost never direct confrontation. Regarding Yugoslavia's relations with the FRG, Tito was less active, since the Hallstein Doctrine precluded contacts between him and Bonn's top officials. Thus most of the bilateral communications occurred between lower-level officials and diplomats or, in rare cases, between their respective embassies in third countries.

Likewise, the evidence shows that the West German leadership did not believe that the recognition of the GDR had to spell the end of all relations with the country that recognized it, even during Konrad Adenauer's tenure. Severing diplomatic relations with any country that questioned West Germany's claim to sole representation – as per the Hallstein Doctrine – was indeed a brutal response. However, at least in the case of Yugoslavia, West Germany left the door open for economic relations to continue developing. Although admittedly the Doctrine did hamper the latter to a degree, the West Germans opted not to proceed with full-scale economic sanctions. This line of action was peculiar, since Yugoslavia did not hide the primary reason for its cooperation with the West during the Cold War, namely economic support.

Regardless of West German motives, this arrangement allowed both countries to save face. West Germany could claim that it had sacrificed relations with Yugoslavia in order to defend its claim to sole representation. Narrowly considered, it was quite effective as a deterrent. If the leading non-aligned country was not safe from the Hallstein Doctrine, then the newly born post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia had no chance of escaping Bonn's wrath. Conversely, after 1957, Yugoslavia could claim that by recognizing the GDR it had only reacted to the realities on the ground, meaning the existence of two German states. In addition, Yugoslavia could also criticize West Germany for what it perceived to be the resurrection of fascism, especially in connection to the mostly Croat fascist groups which openly organized and perpetrated terrorist attacks on Yugoslav diplomats on West German soil. Thus both countries could honestly claim that they were adhering to their principles, while developing solid economic relations with each other.

And while both countries learned to deal with the situation they created in 1957, it was not the preferred *modus vivendi* for either, and the continued (and growing) trade, West German tourists on the Adriatic coast, and the Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG's factories prove this. Indeed, West Germany did eventually recognize that – as far as deterrents went – its economic power was far more effective than diplomatic threats and, even while the Hallstein Doctrine was in effect, decided to boost its humanitarian and development aid in the Global South as part of its efforts to maintain its claim to sole representation. It follows that for West Germany, Yugoslavia was part of its diplomatic learning curve. After 1957, Bonn had already played its trump card against Belgrade, and subsequently seemed only to drag its feet when it came to economic relations. And although Yugoslavia was not a newly-independent former colony in the Global South that could be easily bullied, it was dependant on Western aid.

The GDR was far more zealous than the FRG in its relations with Yugoslavia. However, it was also toothless, having little to no economic or political leverage of its own, and relied mostly on the Soviets for assistance. As mentioned above, Yugoslavia's recognition of the GDR in 1957 was a result of Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, not of any East German diplomatic skill. Nevertheless, the East German leadership felt a sense of entitlement when dealing with Yugoslavia, invoking socialist solidarity, or even duty, equally before and after the recognition. In fact, Ulbricht became even more forceful in the 1960s, as his regime achieved relative stability and economic growth at home. This attitude, which was closer to arrogance than confidence, coupled with disdain for Tito and his maverick actions made for a pungent stew that which the Yugoslavs never found particularly palatable. Hence, East German pressure did not translate into systematic Yugoslav diplomatic support. While Belgrade did lobby for East

Germany in some instances – for example in various United Nations agencies – it was far more careful not to emphatically endorse the GDR's recognition among its non-aligned partners. Therefore, on the base of available evidence, one can describe these efforts as sporadic at best.

In the first few years following the recognition, there was little incentive for Yugoslavia to do East Germany's bidding, since the Soviets failed to provide the promised aid for Yugoslavia's aluminum industry. In addition, lobbying for the GDR's recognition would have jeopardized Yugoslavia's economic relations with the FRG. This became an even bigger obstacle in the mid-1960s, after the rekindled diplomatic contacts between Belgrade and Bonn opened up space for better economic cooperation.

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's relations with the GDR also improved at this time, marked by Ulbricht's unofficial visit to Belgrade in 1964, and Tito's official state visit to East Berlin in 1965. Hence, after the turbulence of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960, the relations between Yugoslavia and the two Germanies entered a period of relative normalcy. West Germany's foreign policy began to change during the last year of the Ludwig Erhard chancellery, and his foreign minister Gerhard Schröder began to question the rigidity of the FRG's *Ostpolitik*. The FRG made concessions in trade as well as in their negotiations with Yugoslavia over war reparations, which helped mend relations, while East Germany decided to adjust its Yugoslav policy in accordance to the latest Yugo-Soviet rapprochement, as they did in the past, but with a notably more cordial approach which yielded above mentioned dividends.

Kurt Georg Kiesinger's victory in the 1965 FRG federal elections only made the change in West Germany's Eastern policy more pronounced. Its catalyst was Kiesinger's foreign minister Willy Brandt, who had been lobbying for cooperation with the Soviet Bloc rather than

obstruction that bordered on self-sabotage. While initial West German efforts were directed at several Soviet satellites, the GDR – with Soviet backing – successfully forced the Bloc countries to close ranks and reject the FRG’s diplomatic advances, using what became known as the Ulbricht Doctrine. Thus the West Germans turned to Yugoslavia in 1967, and found that the Yugoslavs were quite receptive to the idea of reestablishing relations as long as the West Germans made the first step, and that the process was not dragged out. While the GDR would have preferred for Yugoslavia to adopt the Ulbricht Doctrine, they had no way of forcing them to do so. As a result, the East Germans accepted the inevitability of Yugo-West German rapprochement, and turned their attention toward gaining recognition from several non-aligned countries before the FRG dismantled the Hallstein Doctrine, which was a matter of prestige rather than a practical concern. By December 1967 the FRG and Yugoslavia had reached an agreement to reestablish relations. This was a relatively painless process for both sides, and revealed the desire of both governments to put the past eleven years of poor relations behind them.

Looking toward the future

Walter Hallstein, the West German technocrat after whom the Hallstein Doctrine was named, found himself coming out of retirement and back in West German politics in 1968. Hallstein, who had left the West German foreign office in 1957, the year the FRG severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, was elected the first president of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) the following year, a position he held until 1967. Now,

on January 26, 1968, he spoke at a Christian Democratic Union conference in Saarbrücken as one of the party's new frontrunners for the 1969 federal election. After a career in which he focused on the FRG's foreign policy, and after ten years of EEC politics, Hallstein's main goal was to overthrow Willy Brandt, whose European policy he did not find European enough.⁸⁸⁶ Hallstein was elected into the Bundestag the next year, and spent his term working mostly in committees dealing with the FRG's European policy.⁸⁸⁷ However, he was not able to dislodge Brandt, whose Social Democratic Party achieved a strong result in 1969 and was able to bypass the CDU/CSU to form a coalition government with the liberal Free Democratic Party.

In a way, however, Hallstein's career trajectory reflected the new historical development in Europe as much as Brandt's *Ostpolitik* did. While under Brandt the FRG's focus had shifted from disputing the GDR's existence and sanctioning its supporters to a more forgiving foreign policy which centred on cooperation, Hallstein's vision was that of West European integration. Yet both were engendering the realities of postwar Europe. On the one hand, Brandt understood that European peace could not be achieved by rigid policies like the Hallstein Doctrine. On the other hand, European integration was the natural response in the West after the horrors of World War II, and provided security for the future.

Yugoslavia also adjusted its foreign policy at this time. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 spurred fears in Belgrade that Yugoslavia might be next, especially after it had vocally criticized the Soviet intervention.⁸⁸⁸ This caused Yugoslavia to seek new alliances and improve old ones. It did not have much success with the latter ones.

886 "Marsch auf Bonn" *Der Spiegel* January 29, 1968. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45465045.html>.

887 Thomas Jansen, "Walter Hallstein After the Presidency," in *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?*, ed. Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998), 165–80, p. 171.

888 Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971*, pp. 248-249.

When Belgrade attempted to revive the somewhat dormant non-aligned contacts, it found it a difficult task. Global South countries' interest in non-alignment waned in the late 1960s. Their individual national interests acted as a centripetal force in the non-aligned movement, and Yugoslavia's efforts here did not yield immediate dividends.⁸⁸⁹ However, the contacts with the EEC did. In September 1968 Yugoslavia and the EEC established diplomatic relations. As in the past interactions with the West, these relations were based on economic considerations after 1968. And while they were not free from complications, they indicated Yugoslavia's desire for economic integration with the West.⁸⁹⁰ The reestablishment of relations with the FRG was crucial here. Up until this point, the FRG had been obstructing Yugoslavia's integration into West European organizations. Therefore, the end of the Hallstein Doctrine allowed both countries to move on after thirteen years of stalemate, even beyond their bilateral relations.

After Willy Brandt ended the official part of his meeting with Tito on the Brioni Islands in June 1968, the two statesmen stayed on the patio of Tito's residence and talked privately for a while.⁸⁹¹ After he returned to Bonn, Brandt sent his Yugoslav counterpart Marko Nikezić a letter thanking him and Tito for the productive meetings, and asserted that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations was "the right decision."⁸⁹² Yugoslavia's German policy caused Bonn much grief over the previous eleven years, but now it was finally met by a West German foreign policy committed to bridging Cold War bipolarity, and one which matched non-alignment's optimism.

889 Dinkel, *Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten*, p. 161.

890 Ivan Obadić, "A Troubled Relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in Détente," *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 21, no. 2 (2014): 329–48.

891 "Razgovor predsednika Tita sa Willijem Brandtom" (June 15, 1968), AJ, KPR I-3-a/83-19, p. 2.

892 Brandt's letter to Nikezić, (June 18 1968), AJ, KPR I-3-a/83-19, doc. no. 42/549.

Bibliography

Archival sources

Croatia

Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA)

Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Hrvatske (CK-SKH)

Serbia

Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ)

Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR)

Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (CK-SKJ)

Germany

Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA)

Deutsche Demokratische Republik

Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO)

Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes (PA AA)

B - Auswärtiges Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AA)

M - Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR (MfAA)

Published primary sources

Betzuege, Reinhard. *Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994 ; herausgegeben aus Anlass des 125. Jubiläums des Auswärtigen Amtes*. Köln: Verl. Wiss. und Politik von Nottbeck, 1995.

Bogetić, Dragan; Dimić, Ljubodrag. *Beogradska konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja 1-6. septembra 1961.: prilog istoriji Trećeg sveta*. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike - Beograd, 2013.

Milošević, Miladin. *Jugoslavija - SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR. Tom 1*. Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2014.

Milošević, Miladin. *Jugoslavija - SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR: 1965-1980. Tom 2*. Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016.

Tito. *Govori i članci, 17*. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1965.

Digitized primary sources

Bayrische Staatsbibliothek, "100(0) Schlüsseldokumente zur deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert" www.1000dokumente.de/

Das Bundesarchiv, „Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung“
<http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/index.html>

“Drucksachen Und Plenarprotokolle Des Bundestages - Ab 1949.” <http://pdok.bundestag.de/>

“Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)”
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ebooks>

NATO Archives Online
<http://archives.nato.int/>

Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives at Central European University (HU OSA)
<http://www.osaarchivum.org/>

Reference Works

Archiv der Gegenwart, Deutschland 1949 bis 1999 CD-ROM. Berlin: Direct Media, 2002.

Roszkowski, Wojciech, and Jan Kofman. *Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. 1 edition. London: Routledge, 2016.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Berliner Zeitung

Der Spiegel

Die Zeit

Neues Deutschland

Memoirs and diaries

Brandt, Willy. *My Life in Politics*. New York: Viking, 1992.

———. *The Ordeal of Coexistence*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.

Đilas, Milovan. *Druženje s Titom*. Harrow: Aleksa Dijlas, 1982.

Hayter, William Goodenough. *The Kremlin and the Embassy*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Mićunović, Veljko. *Moskovske godine: 1956-1958*. Zagreb: Liber, 1977.

Vlahović, Veljko. *Strogo pov.: neobjavljeni rukopis Veljka Vlahovića : 1955-1958*. Beograd: Stručna knjiga, 1998.

Thesis

Mavrodin, Corina. “A Maverick in the Making: Romania’s de-Satellization Process and the Global Cold War (1953-1963).” Phd, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2017. <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3555/>.

Books and journal articles

- Abadi, Jacob. "Israel and the Balkan States." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 4 (1996): 296–320.
- Adriano, Pino, and Giorgio Cingolani. *Nationalism and Terror: Ante Pavelić and Ustasha Terrorism from Fascism to the Cold War*. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2018.
- Agnew, Jeremy, and Kevin McDermott. *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*. 1996 edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996.
- Ahonen, Pertti. *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Allen, Debra J. *The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War*. Westport: Praeger, 2003.
- Ashton, Nigel John. *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73*. Cold War History Series (London, England) ; 19. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Aspaturian, Vernon V., Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke. *Eurocommunism between East and West*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.
- Baer, Friederike. *Zwischen Anlehnung Und Abgrenzung: Die Jugoslawienpolitik Der DDR 1946 Bis 1968*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2009.
- Baker Fox, Annette. *The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Banac, Ivo. *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Békés, Csaba. "The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality." *Cold War History* 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 477–500.
- Berghoff, Hartmut, and Uta Andrea Balbier, eds. *The East German Economy, 1945-2010: Falling Behind or Catching Up?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Bisenić, Dragan. *Mister X - Džordž Kenan u Beogradu (1961-1963)*. Klub Plus, 2011.
- Blang, Eugenie M. "A Reappraisal of Germany's Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: Ludwig Erhard's Response to America's War in Vietnam." *German Studies Review* 27, no. 2 (2004): 341–60.
- Blasius, Rainer A. "Erwin Wickert Und Die Friedensnote Der Bundesregierung Vom 25.März 1966." *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 43, no. 3 (1995): 539–53.
- . "'Völkerfreundschaft' Am Nil: Ägypten Und Die DDR Im Februar 1965. Stenographische Aufzeichnungen Aus Dem Ministerium Für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten Über Den Ulbricht-Besuch Bei Nasser." *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 46, no. 4 (1998): 747–805.

- Blight, James G., Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch. *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse*. 2nd ed. edition. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002.
- Blight, James G., and Janet M. Lang. *The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Place of publication not identified: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.
- Bogetić, Dragan. *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi, 1961-1971*. Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2012.
- . *Nova strategija jugoslovenske spoljne politike: 1956-1961*. Beograd: Inst. za Savremenu Istoriju, 2006.
- Bogetić, Dragan, and Aleksandar Životić. *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967*. Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010.
- Bonwetsch, Bernd, and Alexei Filitow. “Chruschtschow Und Der Mauerbau. Die Gipfelkonferenz Der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten Vom 3.-5. August 1961.” *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 48, no. 1 (2000): 155–98.
- Bott, Sandra, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss, eds. *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* 1st edition. London; New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Boyle, Peter G. “The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis.” *History* 90, no. 300 (October 2005): 550–65.
- Brady, Steven. *Eisenhower and Adenauer: Alliance Maintenance Under Pressure, 1953-1960*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
- Brentzel, Marianne. *Die Machtfrau: Hilde Benjamin 1902-1989*. Ch. Links Verlag, 2013.
- Bressendorf, Agnes Bresselau Von, Christian Ostermann, and Elke Seefried. *West Germany and the Global South and the Cold War*. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2017.
- Bringmann, Tobias C. *Handbuch der Diplomatie 1815-1963: Auswärtige Missionschefs in Deutschland und deutsche Missionschefs im Ausland von Metternich bis Adenauer*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001.
- Byrne, Jeffrey James. “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment.” *The International History Review* 37, no. 5 (October 20, 2015): 912–32.
- . *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Cioc, Mark. *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

- Clarkson, Alexander. *Fragmented Fatherland: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945-1980*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013.
- Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*. 1 edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Craig, Campbell, and Sergey Radchenko. "MAD, Not Marx: Khrushchev and the Nuclear Revolution." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2018): 208–33.
- Crew, David F. *Consuming Germany in the Cold War*. Oxford; New York: Berg, 2003.
- Dale, Gareth. *Popular Protest in East Germany*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Dannenberg, Julia von. *The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR*. 1st edition. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Deletant, Dennis. "'Taunting the Bear': Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963–89." *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (November 1, 2007): 495–507.
- Deletant, Dennis, and Mihail Ionescu. "Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989." Wilson Center, July 7, 2011. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/romania-and-the-warsaw-pact-1955-1989-1>.
- Di Mauro, Danilo. *The UN and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: American Hegemony and UN Intervention since 1947*. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics ; 42. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2012.
- Dietl, Ralph. "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (April 2008): 259–78.
- Dimić, Ljubodrag ed. *Velike sile i male države u hladnom ratu 1945-1955: slučaj Jugoslavije : zbornik radova sa međunarodne naučne konferencije, Beograd, 3-4. novembar 2003 = Great powers and small countries in Cold war 1945-1955: issue of ex-Yugoslavia: proceedings of the international scientific conference, Belgrade, November 3rd-4th, 2003*. Beograd: Katedra za istoriju Jugoslavije Filozofskog fakulteta, 2005.
- . *Jugoslavija i hladni rat: ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944-1974)*. Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014.
- Dinkel, Jürgen. *Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten: Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992)*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015.
- Douglas, R. M. *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War*. New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Eörsi, László. *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Myths and Realities*. Boulder: New York: East European Monographs, 2006.
- Ferrell, Robert H. *Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honoring Robert H. Ferrell*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007.

- Fevziu, Blendi. *Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania*. Edited by Robert Elsie. London: I.B.Tauris, 2016.
- Frank, Mario. *Walter Ulbricht: Eine deutsche Biografie*. München: Siedler Verlag, 2009.
- Frei, Norbert. *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Fulbrook, Mary. *A History of Germany 1918-2014: The Divided Nation*. 4 edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Books, 2005.
- , Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- . *George F. Kennan: An American Life*. Reprint edition. New York: Penguin Books, 2012.
- Galambos, Louis. *Eisenhower: Becoming the Leader of the Free World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017.
- Garton Ash, Timothy. *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- Gast, Gabriele. *Die politische Rolle der Frau in der DDR*. Westdt. Verl., 1973.
- Gati, Charles. *Failed Illusions : Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*. Cold War International History Project Series. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, 2006.
- Geier, Stephan. *Schwellenmacht: Bonns heimliche Atomdiplomatie von Adenauer bis Schmidt*. 1 edition. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013.
- Geppert, Dominik. *Die Ära Adenauer*. 3., Auflage. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2012.
- Gibbs, D. N. "The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of 'Impartiality': Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, no. 3 (2000): 359–82.
- Golani, Mott. *Israel in Search of War: The Sinai Campaign 1955-1956*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998.
- Goulding, Daniel J. *Liberated Cinema: The Yugoslav Experience, 1945-2001*. 2nd Revised and Expanded ed. edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
- Granieri, Ronald J. *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003.

- Grant, Matthew, and Benjamin Ziemann, eds. *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*. 1 edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016.
- Grant, Thomas D. *Admission to the United Nations: Charter Article 4 and the Rise of Universal Organization*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Granville, Johanna. "Ulbricht in October 1956: Survival of the Spitzbart during Destalinization." *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 3 (2006): 477–502.
- Gray, William Glenn. *Germany's Cold War the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
- Gupta, Amit Das. *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin*. Husum: Matthiesen, 2004.
- Hahn, Peter L. "The Cold War and the Six Day War: US Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Crisis of June 1967." *The Cold War in the Middle East*, November 6, 1997.
- Harrison, Hope Millard. *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961*. ACLS Humanities E-Book (Series). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. "The Puzzle of the Heretical: Yugoslavia in NATO Political Analysis, 1951–72." In *The Balkans in the Cold War*, 89–108. Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*. New edition edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- . *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967–1989*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Hiepel, Claudia. *Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou, Deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch und Krise*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2012.
- Hindenburg, Hannfried von. *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy toward Israel, 1952-1965*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
- Hitchcock, William I. *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018.
- Hong, Young-sun. *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*. 1st Edition edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Hook, James C. Van. *Rebuilding Germany: The Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Horvat, Branko. *Jugoslavenska privreda, 1965-1983*. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva zal., 1984.
- . *The Yugoslav Economic System (Routledge Revivals): The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making*. 1st edition. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016.

- Hory, Ladislaus, and Martin Broszat. *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-1945*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2010.
- Ivanović, Vladimir. *Geburtstag pišeš normalno: Jugoslovenski gastarbajteri u SR Nemačkoj i Austriji 1965-1973*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012.
- . *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka, 1967-1973: Između Ideologije i Pragmatizma*. Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009.
- Jakovina, Tvrtko. *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici: (1948-1963)*. Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2002.
- Janjetović, Zoran. *Od Auschwitza Do Brijuna : Pitanje Odštete Žrtvama Nacizma u Jugoslavensko-Zapadnonjemačkim Odnosima*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007.
- Jansen, Thomas. "Walter Hallstein After the Presidency." In *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?*, edited by Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels, 165–80. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998.
- Jelinek, Yeshayahu. *Deutschland und Israel 1945–1965, Ein neurotisches Verhältnis*. Reprint 2014. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2003.
- Jersild, Austin. *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
- Junker, Detlef, Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris. *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- . *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990: A Handbook*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Kemp-Welch, A. *Poland under Communism : A Cold War History*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Kilian, Werner. *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973 : aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001.
- Kingseed, Cole C. *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956*. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1995.
- Kleuters, Joost. *Reunification in West German Party Politics From Westbindung to Ostpolitik*. Berlin: Springer, 2012.
- Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth. *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977*. 2008 edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Knoll, Thomas. *Das Bonner Bundeskanzleramt: Organisation Und Funktionen von 1949–1999*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004.
- Kopstein, Jeffrey. *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

- Kroegel, Dirk. *Einen Anfang finden!, Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Aussen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2009.
- Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. "Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis." *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (September 2008): 555–77.
- Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. 2 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Landsman, Mark. *Dictatorship and Demand the Politics of Consumerism in East Germany*. Harvard Historical Studies ; 147. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Large, David Clay. *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Laron, Guy. *Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle Over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956*. Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Pr, 2013.
- . *The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
- Larres, Klaus, and Elizabeth M Meehan. *Uneasy Allies: British-German Relations and European Integration since 1945*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Larres, Klaus, and Kenneth Osgood, eds. *The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.
- Lavy, George. *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest*. Psychology Press, 1996.
- Lees, Lorraine M. *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
- Levi, Pavle. *Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Cinema*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007.
- Lorenz, Robert, and Franz Walter. *1964 - das Jahr, mit dem »68« begann*. 1. Aufl. Berlin, Boston: Transcript Verlag, 2014.
- Loth, Wilfried, William Wallace, Wolfgang Wessels, and trans Bryan Ruppert, eds. *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?* 1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.
- Ludlow, N. Piers, ed. *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973*. 1st edition. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Lüthi, Lorenz M. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- , ed. *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.

- . “Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism.” *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 7, no. 2 (July 29, 2016): 201–23.
- . “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973.” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (January 13, 2017): 98–147.
- Marshall, B. *Willy Brandt: A Political Biography*. 1997 edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
- Mates, Leo. *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy*. New York: Oceana Publications, 1972.
- Mayes, Stanley. *Makarios: A Biography*. London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1981.
- McCauley, Martin. *The German Democratic Republic since 1945*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- Mierzejewski, Alfred C. *Ludwig Erhard: A Biography*. The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
- Milošević, Miladin. *Jugoslavija - SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR*. Tom 1. Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2014.
- . *Jugoslavija - SSSR: susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR: 1965-1980*. Tom 2, Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016.
- Mišković, Nataša, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska. *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi - Bandung – Belgrade*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Möller, Horst, and Maurice Vaisse. *Willy Brandt und Frankreich*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2005.
- Müller, Gerhard, and Josef Löffelholz. *Bank-Lexikon: Handwörterbuch für das Bank- und Sparkassenwesen*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2013.
- Müller, Ursula. *Gewandt, geschickt und abgesandt: Frauen im Diplomatischen Dienst*. Munich: Olzog, 2000.
- Münger, Christof. *Die Berliner Mauer, Kennedy und die Kubakrise*. Paderborn: Schoeningh Ferdinand GmbH, 2003.
- Muschik, Alexander. “Headed towards the West: Swedish Neutrality and the German Question, 1949–1972.” *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 4 (November 2006): 519–38.
- Muth, Ingrid. *Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen*. 2. Auflage. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2001.
- Nećak, Dušan. *Hallsteinova Doktrina i Jugoslavija: Tito Između Savezne Republike Njemačke i Demokratske Republike Njemačke*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2004.
- Nećak, Dušan. “Ostpolitik” *Willyja Brandta i Jugoslavija (1963.-1969.)*. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2015.

- Negt, Oskar. *Achtundsechzig. Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht*. 1., Göttingen: Steidl, 2008.
- Nenadović, Aleksandar. *Razgovori s Kočom*. Zagreb: Globus, 1989.
- Newman, Kitty. *Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960*. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Niebuhr, Robert. "Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 10, 2011): 146–79.
- . *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia*. Brill, 2018.
- Niedhart, Gottfried. *Entspannung in Europa, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Warschauer Pakt 1966 bis 1975*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014.
- Obadić, Ivan. "A Troubled Relationship: Yugoslavia and the European Economic Community in Détente." *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'histoire* 21, no. 2 (2014): 329–48.
- Orlow, Dietrich. "Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945-1966." *German Studies Review* 16, no. 1 (1993): 77–102.
- Ostermann, Christian F. "The Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series," n.d., 108.
- Otto, Astrid. *Sozialistische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in der DDR: Eine empirische Studie am Fallbeispiel des Leipziger Messeamts*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2014.
- Perović, Jeronim. "The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (April 2007): 32–63.
- Persak, Krzysztof. "The Polish – Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Military Intervention in Poland." *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, no. 8 (December 2006): 1285–1310.
- Petrović, Vladimir. *Titova lična diplomatija: studije i dokumentarni prilozi*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010.
- Phayer, Michael. *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965*. Reprint edition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Pirjevec, Jože. *Tito and His Comrades*. Translation edition. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2018.
- Rajak, Svetozar. *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-57*. Cold War History Series (London, England) ; 26. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Rajak, Svetozar, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi, and Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, eds. *The Balkans in the Cold War*. 1st ed. 2017 edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

- Rakove, Robert B. *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Richter, Pavel A. "Die Außerparlamentarische Opposition in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1966 Bis 1968." *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft 17* (1998): 35–55.
- Ridley, Jasper Godwin. *Tito*. London: Constable, 1994.
- Ro'i, Yaacov, and B. Morozov. *The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War*. Cold War International History Project Series. Washington: Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Romero, Federico. "Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads." *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685–703.
- Ross, Corey. *The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR*. London: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Roszkowski, Wojciech, and Jan Kofman. *Biographical Dictionary of Central and Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. 1st edition. London: Routledge, 2016.
- Rothstein, Robert L. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
- Rother, Bernd, ed. *Willy Brandts Außenpolitik. Akteure Der Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014.
- Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Sarotte, M. E. *Dealing with the Devil East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973*. New Cold War History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Schake, Kori. *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances*. Edited by J. Gearson. 2002 edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Schellenger, Harold Kent. *The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
- Schissler, Hanna. *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Schmidtke, Michael A. "Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany." *South Central Review* 16/17 (1999): 77–89.
- Scholtyssek, Joachim. *Die Außenpolitik Der DDR*. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003.
- Schrafstetter, Susanna, and Stephen Twigge. *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1945-1970*. Westport: Praeger, 2004.
- Selinić, Slobodan. *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950-1961 zbornik radova*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008.

- Sirc, Ljubo. *The Yugoslav Economy under Self-Management*. New York: St-Martin's Press, 1979.
- Smith, Simon C., ed. *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath*. 1st edition. Aldershot; Burlington: Routledge, 2008.
- Smith, Tony. "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (January 1, 2000): 567–91.
- Sodaro, Michael. *Moscow, Germany and the West*. New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993.
- Stanciu, Cezar. "Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Origins of Eurocommunism." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 83–95.
- Staritz, Dietrich. *Das Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Geschichte, Entstehung, Entwicklung ; eine Einführung*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1976.
- Stein, Mathias. *Der Konflikt um Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: die deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen zu den Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973*. Göttingen: V&R unipress GmbH, 2011.
- Steinacher, Gerald. *Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice*. Reprint edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Steininger, Rolf. *Berlinkrise und Mauerbau. 1958 bis 1963*. 4th ed. München: Olzog, 2009.
- Stern, Sheldon M. *The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory : Myths versus Reality*. Stanford Nuclear Age Series. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Suri, Jeremi. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*. Revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Swain, Geoffrey. *Tito: A Biography*. London ; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2010.
- Taubman, William. *Khrushchev: The Man, His Era*. London: Free Press, 2005.
- Theurer, Marc Christian. *Bonn, Belgrad, Ost-Berlin: die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu Jugoslawien im Vergleich, 1957-1968*. Berlin: Logos-Verlag, 2008.
- Thomas, Nick. *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy*. 1 edition. Oxford; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003.
- Timmermann, Heiner. *1961 - Mauerbau und Aussenpolitik*. Münster: Lit, 2002.
- Tismaneanu, Vladimir, and American Council of Learned Societies. *Stalinism Revisited the Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe*. ACLS Humanities E-Book (Series). Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2009.
- Tokić, Mate Nikola. "Avengers of Bleiburg: Émigré Politics, Discourses of Victimhood and Radical Separatism during the Cold War." *Politicka Misao; Zagreb* 55, no. 2 (2018): 71–88.

- . “Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism.” *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’histoire* 16, no. 5 (2009): 739–53.
- Torsten, Diedrich, and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk. *Staatsgründung auf Raten?: zu den Auswirkungen des Volksaufstandes 1953 und des Mauerbaus 1961 auf Staat, Militär und Gesellschaft der DDR*. Berlin: Links, 2005.
- Tripković, Đoko. *Jugoslavija - SSSR: 1956-1971*. Beograd: Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, 2013.
- Triska, Jan F. *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986.
- Türk, Henning. *Die Europapolitik der Großen Koalition 1966-1969*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2006.
- Vita, Lorena De. “Overlapping Rivalries: The Two Germanys, Israel and the Cold War.” *Cold War History* 17, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 351–66.
- Von Bulow, Mathilde author. *West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War*. New Studies in European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Wengst, Udo. *Reform und Revolte: Politischer und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vor und nach 1968*. 1st ed. München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2011.
- Wentker, Hermann. *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989. Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wettig, Gerhard. “Adenauers Moskau-Besuch aus sowjetischer Sicht Wende der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik nach Stalins Tod.” *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 12, no. 1 (January 2005).
- . “Der Höhepunkt der Berlin-Krise 1961.” *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2016).
- Winrow, Gareth. “East Germany, Israel and the Reparations Issue.” *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 20, no. 1 (March 1990): 31–46.
- . *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*. Soviet and East European Studies; 78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Zimmerman, William. *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution Of Yugoslavia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Životić, Aleksandar. *Forsiranje peska: odred JNA na Sinaju (1956-1967)*. Beograd: Medija centar “Odbrana,” 2011.

Životić, Aleksandar. *Jugoslavija, Albanija i velike sile: (1945-1961)*. Beograd: Arhipelag: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011.

Glossary

Adenauer, Konrad – FRG Chancellor, 1949-1964

Bahr, Egon – close associate to Willy Brandt; head of the Press and Information Office for the Land of Berlin, 1960-1966

Barth, Herbert – GDR diplomat, head of the Yugoslav department at the MfAA

Bebler, Aleš – Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1955

Begović, Vljako – high ranking Yugoslav official, held positions in various economic bodies

Bock, Hans – FRG representative at the French embassy in Belgrade until 1967

Bolz, Lothar – GDR minister of foreign affairs, 1953-1965

Bowles, Chester – USA Undersecretary of State, 1961

von Brentano, Heinrich – FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1955-1964

Brandt, Willy – Mayor of West Berlin, 1957-1966; FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1966-1968

Brezhnev, Leonid – First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964-1982

Broz, Josip (Tito) – President of Yugoslavia

Ceaușescu, Nicolae – Romanian statesman and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, 1965-1989

Couve de Murville, Maurice – French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1958-1968

Crnobrnja, Bogdan – General Secretary to the Yugoslav President, 1961

Dieckmann, Johannes – President of the GDR People's Chamber, 1949-1969

Djilas, Milovan – Yugoslav dissident, Tito's former close associate

Drndić, Ljubo – Chief Yugoslav negotiator with the FRG in 1963 talks; department head at the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1963

Dulles, Joh Foster – US Secretary of State, 1953-1959

Eisenhower, Dwight D. – President of the USA, 1953-1961

Emmel, Egon – FRG diplomat, trade negotiator with Yugoslavia, 1967

Erhard, Ludwig – FRG Chancellor, 1964-1966

Federer, Georg – FRG Ambassador to Egypt, 1964

Florin, Peter – SED Central Committee member and head of SED foreign affairs department, 1954- 1971

Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe – Romanian statesman and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, 1944-1954, 1955-1965

Georgijević, Milan – Yugoslav representative at the Swedish Embassy in Bonn, 1961-1965

Grabovac, Predrag – Yugoslav consul in Munich, 1961

Grewe, Wilhelm – head of the political department at FRG Foreign Office, 1955-1958

Gromyko, Andrei – Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1957-1985

Grotewohl, Otto – Prime Minister of the GDR, 1949-1964

Hager, Kurt – member Of the SED Central Committee, 1955-1989

Hallstein, Walter – FRG State Secretary, 1951-1958

Heck, Bruno – FRG Minister of Family Affairs, 1962-1968

Hoeldkte, Siegfried – Diplomat at the GDR legation in Belgrade, 1958

Hoffman, Heinz, GDR Minister of National Defence, 1960-1985

Hoxha, Enver – Albanian statesman and First Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania, 1944-1985

Iveković, Mladen – Yugoslav ambassador to FRG, 1952-1956, later Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Javorski, Mihajlo – Yugoslav official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, later ambassador to Italy

Johnson, Lyndon B. – President of the USA, 1963-1969

Kardelj, Edvard – Yugoslav deputy Prime Minister, 1946-1963, leading Yugoslav theoretician and law-maker

Kartawidjaja, Djuanda – Prime Minister of Indonesia, 1957-1959

Kastl, Jörg – Head of the Eastern Department at the AA, 1967-1970

Kennan, George – US ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961-1963

Kennedy, John F. – President of the USA, 1961-1963

Khrushchev, Nikita – First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1953-1964

Klarić, Andrija – Yugoslav consul in Munich, 1964-1969

Kohrt, Günter – GDR State Secretary, 1966-1973

König, Johannes – GDR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1959-1965

Kroll, Hans – FRG ambassador in Yugoslavia, 1953-1955

Kveder, Dušan – Yugoslav ambassador to the FRG, 1956-1957

Lahr, Rolf – FRG State Secretary, 1961-1969

Leuschner, Bruno – Member of the SED Central Committee, 1950-1965; GDR Deputy Prime Minister, 1955-1965

Loeck, Hans-Werner – FRG representative at the French embassy in Belgrade, 1967, later FRG ambassador to Yugoslavia

Lučić, Zvonko – Head of the West European department at the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yugoslav representative at the Swedish Embassy in Bonn, 1967

Mates, Leo – Yugoslav ambassador to the US, 1954-1958

Mićunović, Veljko – Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, 1956-1958; deputy foreign minister, 1958-1962; Yugoslav ambassador to the US, 1962-1967

Mirbach, Dietrich – FRG ambassador to India, 1965-1970

Müller-Roschach, Herbert – FRG diplomat at the Belgrade embassy, 1956-1957

Nasser, Gamal Abdel – Chairman of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council 1954-1956; President of Egypt, 1956-1970

Nehru, Jawaharlal – Prime Minister of India, 1947-1964

Nikezić, Marko – Yugoslav ambassador to Egypt, 1953-1956; ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1956-1958; ambassador to the US, 1958-1962; Deputy Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1965; Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs 1965-1968

Pavičević, Miša – Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1965-1968

Pfleiderer, Karl Georg – FRG ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1955-1957

Perišić, Zvonko – head of the Yugoslav negotiating delegation for the reestablishment of relations with the FRG, 1967-1968

Popović, Koča – Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1953-1965

Prca, Srđa – Yugoslav Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1955-1960

Puzanov, Alexander – USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1962-1967

Ramisch, Rolf – FRG ambassador to Ceylon, 1964

Ranković, Aleksandar – Deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 1949-1963

Rau, Heinrich – GDR Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade, 1955-1961

Reimann, Max – Chairman of the German Communist Party, 1948-1969

Riddleberger, James – US ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1953-1957

Ruete, Hans Helmuth – Head of the East European Department at the AA, 1966-1967

Rusk, Dean – USA Secretary of State, 1961-1969

Sahm, Ulrich – Head of the Eastern Sub-department of the Political Department of the AA, 1966-1969

Schlage, Herbert – GDR chargé d'affaires at the Belgrade legation, 1961-1965

Schlitter, Oskar – FRG chief economic negotiator, 1964

Scholz, Ernst – GDR Minister of Construction, 1958-1963

Schröder, Gerhard – FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1961-1966

Schwab, Sepp – GDR deputy Foreign Minister, 1956-1965

Staimer, Eleonore – GDR envoy/ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1958-1969

Šiljegović, Boško – SKJ Central Committee member, head of the SKJ CC International Commission, 1964

Tepavac, Mirko – Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1965

Ulbricht, Walter – First Secretary of the SED, 1950-1971; Chairman of the State Council, 1960-1973

Vlahović, Veljko – SKJ Central Committee member, head of the SKJ foreign affairs department
president of the foreign affairs committee of Yugoslav National Assembly

Vidić, Dobrivoje – Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, 1953-1956; state undersecretary for
foreign affairs, 1956-1958

Vosseler, Walter – Diplomat at the GDR legation in Belgrade, 1958-1962

Vošnjak, Mitja – Yugoslav envoy to the GDR, 1958-1961

Wehner, Herbert – SPD Bundestag deputy, 1949-1983

Winzer, Otto – GDR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1956 to 1965; Minister of
Foreign Affairs, 1965-1975

Yepishev, Alexei, USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961-1962