

NEXT BABYLON

A Virtual Cartography of Utopia

by
Evelyn Hofmann

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis including any required final revisions as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that this thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

ABSTRACT

Migration is one of the defining issues of our time. Over the duration of writing this thesis, the total population of forcibly displaced people has increased from 65 million to more than 70 million people worldwide.¹ The contemporary phenomenon of global migration is representative of an “irrepressible desire for free movement” motivated by forces that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue both “negatively” *push* and “positively” *pull*.² However, the promise of globalization to weaken the physical borders that divide us has masked the reality of an expanding and intensifying infrastructure of borders reaching from the militarized edges of nation-states to spaces of everyday life. This network of borders and bordering technologies functionally produces spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures to restrict, manage, differentially include/exclude or *pause* movement.

The violence and insecurity (im)migrants experience is not an inevitable result of their movement or circumstances. People have always moved, but migration today is acutely subject to asymmetries of power mediated by an abstract and fragmentary global border regime, which perpetuates displacement and forced migration to maintain and expand Empire. This planetary phenomenon is entangled in legacies and ongoing impacts of relational structures and systems of dominant power, including colonialism, imperialism, white supremacy and capitalism. Moreover, these oppressive hierarchies and conceived divisions are inscribed and reproduced within the built environment. Borders are spatial representations of power that materially enforce and sustain imaginaries of legality and illegality as well as shape the lived conditions that determine why and how people may move. Despite these barriers, there has been an emergence of informal encampments across Europe. These spaces are inherently paradoxical: while they represent imposed control and purposeful abandonment that makes free movement *impossible*, they are also representational spaces that reveal the need and potential for a *possible* alternative future.

*Next Babylon*³ is a thesis concerned with examining these spatial conditions of migration and borders at three scales: Europe, France, and Paris. The human struggle with identity and place in the context of crisis is a common theme that inspired utopian responses throughout history. The idea of utopia has long been pursued in the realm of architecture. However, the designed responses to crisis often act as top-down solutions, or static representations of a future lacking a relationship to real dynamics of societal transformation. Rather than imagining what a world without borders would look like, this thesis takes on Henri Lefebvre’s position by arguing that utopia is an ongoing social process of positive and critical engagement with the present. A conceptual, methodological framework based on Lefebvre’s trialectic(s) is constructed and tested to reflect on this phenomenon of the present and to illustrate how spatial transformation through differential social use can make legible underlying socio-political conditions, tensions or contradictions. This analysis of contemporary bordered space, its production, occupation and transformation, provides evidence of ongoing societal change; *a virtual cartography of utopia* unfolds as a process, oriented toward a *possible/impossible* future.

1 “UNHCR Population Statistics Database,” *UNHCR*, accessed November 12, 2019, <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>

2 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. “Counter-Empire,” *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 213.

3 This title of this work is inspired by Constant Nieuwenhuys’ utopian project, *New Babylon* (1959-74).

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Although this program is considered to be an independent research thesis, the work I have accomplished could not have been done in isolation nor without the support of a tremendous faculty, staff and community at the School of Architecture. The work that we most often recognize and celebrate is only possible due to the labour behind the scenes that sustain our community here.

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*For my family
and in memory of
Christian Hofmann
Robert Wilson
Alan & Margaret Powell*

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A SPECTRE OF HOPE

Introduction



A SPECTRE OF HOPE

Introduction

*Today the mobility of labour power and migratory movements is extraordinarily diffuse and difficult to grasp. Even the most significant population movements of modernity constitute lilliputian events with respect to the enormous population transfers of our times. **A spectre haunts the world and it is the spectre of migration.** All the powers of the old world are allied in a merciless operation against it, but the movement is irresistible. Along with the flight from the so called Third World there are flows of political refugees and transfers of intellectual labour power, in addition to the massive movements of the agricultural, manufacturing, and service proletariat. The legal and documented moments are dwarfed by clandestine migration: the borders of national sovereignty are sieves, and every attempt at complete regulation runs up against violent pressure. Economists attempt to explain this phenomenon by presenting their equations and models, which even if they were complete would not explain that irrepressible desire for free movement. **In effect, what pushes from behind is, negatively, desertion from the miserable cultural and material conditions of imperial reproduction; but positively, what pulls forward is the wealth of desire and the accumulation of expressive and productive capacities that the process of globalization have determined in the consciousness of every individual and social group — and thus a certain hope. Desertion and exodus are a powerful form of class struggle within and against imperial post-modernity.** This mobility, however, still constitutes a spontaneous level of struggle, and, as we noted earlier, it most often leads today to a new rootless condition of poverty and misery.*

— Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, *Empire*¹

In four parts this introduction outlines (1) the forces behind the (urban) phenomenon of the present, with migration oriented as the social context of analysis; (2) the specific interest in developing a utopian analytic framework to describe and represent the transformative relationship between social struggles and the built environment; (3) the research objectives and methods, developed through the structure of the text as well as visual elements of the work; and (4) an overall summary of the three parts of the book.

A Spectrum of Migration

When looking at the phenomenon of global mobility, a world without borders can appear to be both a possible and impossible outcome of our contemporary society. On one hand, our globalizing world under neoliberalism is expanding and accelerating humanity's ability to move as well as breaking down economic barriers. The World Health Organization approximates, "1 billion migrants in the world today of whom 258 million are international migrants and 763 million internal migrants — one in seven of the world's population."² On the other hand, migration is an asymmetrical social phenomenon that is increasingly subject to

Figure 0.1 (top image) *Untitled*. Image description: A small rubber dinghy filled with refugees and migrants arrives on the coast of the Greek island of Lesbos on 30 October, 2015. The island has seen hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees arrive from Turkey in 2015. Photo by Rasmus Degnbol.

Figure 0.2 (bottom image) *Untitled*. Image description: A group of Syrian refugees from Aleppo walks on the dirty track along the beach on Lesbos. The refugees have just arrived by boat from Turkey on 31 October, 2015. Photo by Rasmus Degnbol.

Figure 0.3 According to the UNHCR at the end of 2015 there were 63.91 million “persons of concern” globally.

Refugees: 16,121,427

include individuals recognised under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognised in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation.

Asylum-seekers: 3,219,941

are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.

IDPs: 37,494,172

are people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. For the purposes of UNHCR's statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. Since 2007, the IDP population also includes people in an IDP-like situation.

Returns: 2,518,729

Returned Refugees are former refugees who have returned to their country of origin spontaneously or in an organised fashion but are yet to be fully integrated. Such return would normally only take place in conditions of safety and dignity. Returned IDPs refer to those IDPs who were beneficiaries of UNHCR's protection and assistance activities and who returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence during the year.

Stateless Persons: 3,687,729

are defined under international law as persons who are not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law. In other words, they do not possess the nationality of any State. UNHCR statistics refer to persons who fall under the agency's statelessness mandate because they are stateless according to this international definition, but data from some countries may also include persons with undetermined nationality.

Others: 870,740

refers to individuals who do not necessarily fall directly into any of the groups above, but to whom UNHCR extends its protection and/or assistance services, based on humanitarian or other special grounds.

a complex network of borders and border controls that differentially discipline and control movement. Moreover, often the introduction of borders is the cause of forced migration. One thing is clear, whether people move for work and opportunity, become physically or socially displaced due to conflict, or other forms of insecurity, this contemporary phenomenon of migration is as diverse as it is pervasive. The question is, if a borderless world is the future of our global political economy, then who and what is guiding this future? Moreover, on the other side of that question, who is fundamentally excluded from the process and how? This thesis begins on the premise that these questions about the contemporary phenomenon of migration can be examined by looking at spatial evidence; that space “constitutes a real object of social science inquiry.”³

As Negri and Hardt argue, what can be discerned most fundamentally about migration in our era of unprecedented mobility is that it is an uneven process, which results from forces of various degrees of violence or intensity that displace or “negatively” *push*, compelling people to move.⁴ This movement is often toward prospective opportunities that “positively” *pull*, yet the gains are often unequally distributed.⁵ The impossibility of staying in one place and the possibility of reaching a “better place” or finding better opportunities often forces people movement, however, migration is not always an expression of freedom, nor does it guarantee the betterment of an individual's quality of life.

Thomas Nail argues in *The Figure of the Migrant* that this range of experience with different forms and degrees of “expulsion” is indicative of a divergence or “bifurcation” in the enactment of what he calls the “social process of migration,” arguing that, “For some, movement offers opportunity, recreation, and profit with only a temporary expulsion. For others, movement is dangerous and constrained, and their social expulsions are much more severe and permanent.”⁶ Nail illustrates that these contrasts between conditions of human mobility exist on a “spectrum” of lived experience: from migration as an “inconvenience” that temporarily disrupts life to migration as “incapacitation” which brings life to a full stop.⁷ He describes this as a “regime of social motion” that constitutes multiple kinds and intersections of experiences of migration as well as qualifying that all movement involves “a degree of expulsion from territorial, political, juridical, or economic status.”⁸

The spectrum of migration is a symptom of a greater phenomenon of global insecurity that relies on displacement and asymmetry of many types and forms to maintain the status quo of a mode of (re)production. Processes of mobility are maintained and reinforced socially through the hierarchies supported by laws and political and economic practices of nation-states but also spatially through the multi-scalar/dimensional securitization of territories through various forms of border infrastructures, apparatuses and technologies. Furthermore, in today's world migration intersects with our lives in many different ways, even if we do not experience an acute degree of expulsion personally, our material reality and our most basic necessities of life are often a product of migrant labour and insecurity therein. The shift in perspective recognizes that people who face a lesser degree of expulsion can still uphold and reproduce an oppressive and unequal system for others. We are all bound by these forces, whether we are benefitted or disadvantaged.

To put it simply, the particular ‘migration crisis’ our world is facing is a result of the contradiction between the ideals (or myths) of a liberal democratic state — its founding principles of universal human rights and equality — the provision of which is ideologically limited when it comes to human mobility.⁹ Western states are becoming more tangibly confronted with this contradiction as well as the direct effects of their long history of imperialism, colonialism and environmental degradation perpetuated through the many types, technologies and apparatuses of borders. As Harsha Walia argues, the effects of these borders range

from, “colonial displacement, capital circulations, labour stratifications in the global political economy, and structural hierarchies of race, class, gender, ability, and citizenship status.”¹⁰

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported, at the end of 2016, there were 67.75 million “persons of concern” globally — defined as “people displaced due to conflict, war, persecution and human rights violations” — including 36.6 million of whom were internally displaced within their own countries (See fig. # for a breakdown of statistics on “global persons of concern”).¹¹ A large percentage face even more vulnerability as half of the world’s refugees are women, and approximately 45 percent of forcibly displaced people are under the age of eighteen.¹²

Rather than addressing this reality, the response has primarily been to direct fear and blame towards the most at risk in society as scapegoat figures for a larger crisis faced by dominant regimes of global power. Harsha Walia states, “[...] the term *immigrant* presumes that people must naturally be bound to one place, and if they travel, then they are where they do not belong.”¹³ (Im)migrants are increasingly becoming a dominant scapegoat figure for complex problematics in society. Moreover, many myths about migration maintain a perception of a status quo in which the violence of the state and its borders is inevitable and natural. As Daniel Trilling argues:

*The disaster of recent years has as much to do with immigration policies drawn up in European capitals as it does with events outside the continent, and the crisis also consists of overreaction and panic, fuelled by a series of misconceptions about who the migrants are, why they come, and what it means for Europe.*¹⁴

In other words, the limits placed on human mobility are often a product of our own creation — an artificial result of misguided fear and a need to control each other’s movement. Ultimately, our built environment reflects and represents this fear through the creation of borders and other spatial technologies that mediate, manage, restrict or *pause* movement.

Amidst the confluence of forces that *push* and *pull*, are designed obstacles that create conditions of *pause* in lived spaces that either temporarily interrupts movement before ‘welcoming,’ or that prove to be insurmountable. These obstacles put in place by various governmental or dominant institutions (or even everyday people enforcing their ideology and authority) to restrict or divert flows of people toward their countries are often, in fact, responsible for creating the ‘problem’ of so-called ‘illegal’ migration; or rather, these obstacles force people with an irrepressible need to move to find alternative ways to cross borders and resultantly criminalize them for seeking survival.¹⁵

This thesis addresses the phenomenon of migration as merely an aspect of the insecurity and alienation of contemporary society, but in itself, it is a complex and contradictory process in both its confirmation of and confrontation with the dominant reality. As Negri and Hardt point out, “Desertion and exodus are a powerful form of class struggle **within** and **against** imperial post-modernity.”¹⁶ It is relevant to look at how these imposed processes of ‘social mobility’ and ‘expulsion’ in our current global political economy are challenged by those most directly affected to see the potential of social struggles to shift the direction of society *beyond* the confines of the present.

Scholars, artists and activists have begun to break apart and undo such harmful narratives by proposing analytical frameworks, representational methods, or other alternative tactics to address the social issues related to migration that don’t uphold

these system of power and oppression as a way to reconceptualize its relationship to the state and other institutional forms of power. This small piece of work aims to contribute to this discussion, not by designing a 'solution,' but by using an analysis of space, its production and internal contradictions, to expose the ongoing utopian process and its potential for new or differential spaces to emerge and pointing toward a possible future in which the autonomy of the figure of the migrant is realizable.

A Spectre of Hope

The premise of this thesis began early on with a general interest in the architects whose work was orientated towards and expanded the conceptual territory of utopia. This thesis aims to contribute a re-articulation of what utopia *is* and *does*, through an analysis of the real/unreal spaces and social processes in which it operates. The question of what *is* utopia is an ontological question that interrogates the composition of a 'virtual object'¹⁷ through an analysis of the symptomology of the present oriented towards a possible-impossible future.

In this way, it is also important to note what the utopia of this thesis is not — as a point of differentiation and to contextualize this argument. For instance, it is not the utopia of totalizing and restrictive models imposed from above, nor the utopia of the unrealizable visions of the future (both of which, however, may have merit in different contexts or as speculations to provoke a social question or a new way of seeing). Rather, the utopian process proposed by this thesis argues for a shift in perspective that views migration as a political act that confronts reality through a set of emergent social and spatial practices that embody the possibility and necessity for change.

The focus of this thesis is on conceptual utopias that are grounded in real/lived struggles and emerge as a process, from the hopeful and critical practice that represents a conscious or unconscious desire for an alternative. This perspective on utopia relates to what David Hoy defines as 'critical resistance': "the intent to contest the status quo *and* bring about radical (utopian) social change."¹⁸ This understanding of utopia is a result of a feedback loop between practice and theory engaged in the real and unreal; a kind of praxis that reflects critically upon the conditions of lived experience to inform a different view on how the world could be otherwise.¹⁹ In this sense, the nature of reality and existence encompass not only what 'is' (or 'was') but also the potential for it to become 'other.' This makes utopia a place not elsewhere or outside of reality, but a way of being in and relating to the world — a perspective which has its origins in Heideggerian phenomenology and is interpreted by Henri Lefebvre, as it pertains to conceptions of dwelling and everyday life.²⁰

The general interest guiding the work involves understanding what utopia *is* has evolved alongside a contextual analysis of social phenomenon such as migration as a complex and urgent social/spatial challenge. This thesis hypothesizes and seeks to argue that migration is a social and spatial process that can inform us about utopia through an analysis of its material and lived effects. This entails a conviction that the individuals who are forced to subsist on the edges of society (and the marginal spaces they occupy) are central in the struggle to resist established systems of power relations (both physical and abstract) that limit and confine the potential for life and the spaces in which life dwells. This is not to say that people migrate because they desire to resist or change the status quo, for many, the circumstances that result in their displacement are beyond their control. The struggle for the (im)migrant is to have free movement yet when they are denied that freedom because of their lack of sovereignty or status they are

forced to seek out alternatives and openings within their current situation to gain access to an unknowable future. In other words, the conditions of their insecurity force them to find or create alternatives for life. In doing so, these individuals are imagining and shaping other possibilities; in effect, they are engaging in a ‘virtual’ or ‘utopian’ process.

This position is informed by Henri Lefebvre’s method of building theory around a ‘virtual’ or ‘possible-impossible’ object through a ‘theoretical hypothesis.’²¹ It is a hypothesis that is meant to define and realize utopia as a ‘virtual object’ that is part of an ongoing project through the method he refers to as ‘transduction.’²² In *The Urban Revolution* Lefebvre hypothesizes that the virtual object is “urban society [...] that is a possible object, whose growth and development can be analyzed in relation to a process and praxis (practical activity).”²³ He observes, through means of “deduction and induction,” symptoms and effects of ongoing transformations in time and space toward this hypothesized object.²⁴ Lefebvre’s position argues that utopia exists within and outside of reality; in order to see and understand it you have to look at the structural conditions of the present as well as ongoing processes of transformation.

Lefebvre’s view is in opposition to many conventional understandings of utopia that set it apart from the real and instead, place it in the realm of fantasy. His method illuminates and critiques the forces and systems that foreclose utopian possibility and create a “blind field”²⁵ in the present, instead, he looks to real spaces of everyday life that are open to it. As such, Lefebvre’s utopia is one of political struggle or ‘critical resistance.’ It is resolutely disruptive to totality, and the totalizing forces that restrict possibility or create myths of a status quo; it is inherently transgressive of ideological boundaries and limitations; it is creative and transformational by illuminating truth through lived experience.

The guiding belief of this thesis is that it is of the utmost importance for representations of migration to not reinforce or uphold the violence of the state and its borders, but instead contribute to their undoing. Accordingly, the ways we, as architects, or anyone with a stake in free movement, discuss, represent or design in relation this phenomenon must contextually respond to this range of causes, trajectories and experiences of displacement and the struggles therein, while maintaining an understanding of a connection to larger systems of power. The work aims to critically reflect on these barriers produced by borders that confine, oppress and refuse sovereignty and self-determination, and in doing so, bring light to the utopian process produced by those who resist dispossession and displacement — who are, in their everyday actions, creating the foundations for the possibility of a different world. The *Spectre of Hope* that guides this perspective is not grounded in a particular vision or naive hope for a better future, rather the real actions and projects that are being undertaken by individuals and groups largely left out of our political imaginary.

Research & Methods

Before diving into the material of this thesis, it is important to explain the perspective and interests that inform the approach to the topic as well as the motivations and objectives behind the research. This is to say that the subsequent methodology utilized has not existed in its current form from the beginning of the work. Rather, it has been developed, informed and tested by the questions, challenges, wrong-turns and lessons-learned throughout the process creating this document.

Who's writing?

As an architect-in-progress, I bring a perspective to this thesis that is bracketed by a specific, evolving and expanding 'expertise' on the materials and processes that go into the production of built space. However, in talking about migration as the social context for this thesis, I believe that architecture, and architects, are fundamentally ill-equipped to speak directly to the lived experiences of (im)migrants, let alone design for their unique experience, within the bounds of normative modes of practice. This is because these norms are established and controlled by overarching political bodies and ideological systems of power that are often implicated in and benefit from the production of spaces of exclusion and marginalization for these individuals. As Nathaniel Coleman states:

Architecture can do little more than re-inscribe alienation into the built environment as something of a repetition compulsion. In doing this, architecture largely elaborates on its own cultural irrelevance: characterized by social emptiness, or a general lack of ethical purpose beyond technocratic proficiency, economic reductionism or novel extravagance.²⁶

As such, there is a certain amount of trepidation that comes with the idea of representing or theorizing about the phenomenon of migration from the perspective of someone operating within the realm of what is deemed 'architecture.' This has compelled me to question and define for myself what the role of an 'architect' can be and to ask: What stake can an architect have in social movements? What kind of tools or methods of practice, unique to this perspective, can be utilized to bridge connections and solidarities with social struggles effectively and responsibly?

This requires an acknowledgment that people situated within a social struggle hold a form of knowledge through lived experience that can speak more truth than any so-called 'expert' could in creating counter-spaces of inclusion or formulating an epistemology around a social phenomenon. Too often the focus is on a 'lack' or 'need' of 'design solutions' to solve the problem of the so-called 'migration crisis' forgetting (im)migrants have a wealth of experiences and capabilities of their own and that what is required are the resources and space to express political and human agency that is only truly possible once the barriers have been exposed and transgressed or dismantled. Therefore, acknowledging the expertise and limitations of the perspective of an architect-in-progress, there is a motivation for this thesis to express to an audience with an interest in our built environment on one hand, how the practice of architecture is fundamentally influenced by socio-political processes that can reproduce structures of power and systems oppression, but on the other hand, how there is potential for space to be a medium of social change through transformative use that reveals these structures and systems deemed logical and natural as ideological.

The work aims to dignify the complexity and importance of lived experience and spatial use establishing an analytical framework to understand how both overt and underlying forces operate and to illuminate counter-spaces that represent a virtual/utopian process toward possible alternatives. Ultimately, to render these complex processes comprehensible and thus further the idea that these concrete actions and spatial practices have utopian potential.

Who is the audience?

Because of the perspective from which this thesis is written, it is directed mainly toward an audience of architects — those who are responsible for conceiving of

built space but also are often uncritical of the processes behind its production. I believe that the work of the architect can serve and strengthen these resistance-based movements through mindful research, representation and responsible ally-ship that is informed by an approach to practice that refuses to remodel or reproduce systems of inequality in the built environment. This work aims to demonstrate for architects how a utopian framework might be enacted as an alternative/transformational form of practice and to challenge the perception of the architect as to what is possible.

Theoretical Methods: Thesis Matrix (See Fig. 0.10, 0.11, 0.12)

The established objective of this work is to analyze and represent the phenomenon of migration and borders as a kind of symptomology of a utopian process of transformation that is ongoing in the present. The analytical framework attempts to break apart, reframe and reveal this social process as both a product of the conditions that constitute the present and anticipatory of a virtual condition. The theoretical method driving this analysis operates within Henri Lefebvre's central thesis on the social production of space and utilizes his spatial triad(s) to facilitate the contemplation of mental, physical and social dimensions of space, as well as highlight its mutable nature in relation to a multi-scalar phenomenon.

Before beginning to describe the various aspects of these triads it is important to contextualize the present phenomenon in a historical timeline to illustrate its orientation towards the future.

Historical Context: Space-Time Axis of the Urbanization of Society (See Fig. 0.4)

Lefebvre argues in *The Urban Revolution* that the urban phenomenon represents a transition or process towards total planetary urbanization. On this space-time axis we are in a present critical phase where modes of production associated with past industrial or agrarian societies are being subsumed by urban phenomenon. This phenomenon produces new spaces at different levels of society and these spaces are mediating representations of a changing mode of (re)production.


To interpret the present phenomenon for its orientation toward a virtual future condition, Lefebvre offers different theoretical lenses or triads.

Discourse/Narratives of (Urban) Space: (See Fig. 0.9)

The trialectic of *myth*, *ideology*, and *utopia* is articulated in *The Urban Revolution*:

Myth could be defined as a non-institutional discourse (not subject to the constraints of laws and institutions), whose elements are taken from the context. Ideology would consist in an institutional discourse justifying and legitimizing (or criticizing, refusing and refuting) existing institutions but unfolding through them. Utopia would transcend the institutional by making use of the myth, the problematic of the real and the possible-impossible.²⁷

Lefebvre's trialectic, *myth*, *ideology*, *utopia*, overlaps with his contemporary Jacques Lacan's three psychoanalytic orders respectively: *symbolic*, *imaginary*, *real*. Both theorists attempted to use these conceptual triadic lenses to understand some truth about the present through a study of the everyday. However, as McKenzie Wark argues, in Lacan's triad:




SPACE-TIME AXIS OF THE URBANIZATION OF SOCIETY

Figure 0.4 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003) & *The Production of Space* (1974/1991), and Derek Gregory's *Geographic Imaginations* (1994)


LEVELS (NIVEAUX) OF (URBAN) PHENOMEON

Figure 0.5 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003)




TERRITORIAL SCALES (ÉCHELLE) & READINGS OF (URBAN) PHENOMEON

Figure 0.6 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003) & Neil Brenner's *The Urban Question as a Scale Question* (2000)




DIMENSIONS OF (URBAN) PHENOMENON

Figure 0.7 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003)




ELEMENTS OF (SOCIAL) SPACE


Figure 0.8 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* (1974/1991)



DISCOURSE / NARRATIVES OF (URBAN) SPACE


Figure 0.9 Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003)





THESIS MATRIX - DIMENSIONS

Figure 0.10 Thesis Matrix illustrating the dimensions of space examined in the thesis. Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003) & *The Production of Space* (1974/1991)



THESIS MATRIX - LEVELS

Figure 0.11 Thesis Matrix illustrating the levels of space examined in the thesis. Referencing Henri Lefebvre's *The Urban Revolution* (1970/2003) & *The Production of Space* (1974/1991)




Figure 0.12 Three Dimensional Thesis Matrix. Sides Folded up to a point oriented on a timeline pointing toward a *Virtual Object*, a possible/impossible future outcome based on the conditions that constitute the *Critical Zone* of the Present.




Figure 0.13 Inter-related scales/levels of space from Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* (1974/1991)

The real is always something terrible, formless, lawless, which the symbolic order tries to shield from awareness, but which keeps slithering in, unbidden, nonetheless. [...] In Lefebvre the real is the fulcrum of action rather than the apprehension of terror. [...] It is by attempting to transform everyday life that the contours of the real are revealed. The real is not entirely formless, even if its forms are not an order they reveal themselves in the clear light of day. The encounter with the real, because it is active, informs the imaginary. From the struggle in and with the real emerges an imagining of what might be possible. The object of study for both Lacan and Lefebvre is in a sense always everyday life, but in Lefebvre study is a stage in the project of transforming it.²⁸

These discourses of space are used in this thesis to identify the origins of spatial practice (myth) relating to borders and migration, determine how they are reused or appropriated in the present by ideological systems of domination for the purpose of service a contemporary mode of production (capitalism). As Wark describes, Lefebvre believes that space does not only represent hegemony but that it can also be transformed through appropriation by social conditions of everyday life that *détourne* or transform the symbolic meaning or myth of practice towards a possible or virtual future. Therefore, to engage with the phenomenon of the present as a utopian process requires an analysis that embodies this potential of the real or the everyday as a dynamic (utopian) discourse.

Elements of (Social) Space: (See Fig. 0.8)

These discourses of space, *myth*, *ideology* and *utopia*, are superimposed or interrelated to elements or levels social space, which Lefebvre describes as the following:

Spatial practice, which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practice ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society's relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance.

Representations of space, which are tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to 'frontal' relations.

Representational spaces, embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces).²⁹

Within these elements or levels of (social) space there are associated dimensional aspects that fill these spaces with content and meaning depending on the social context.

Spatial practices are associated with a particular society belonging to moment in time and their practices that form routes, networks or patterns of analogous places at multiple scales from local to global. The activity or movement between society and space is *perceived* or *physical*.

Representations of space are associated with (dominant) institutions that belong to and shape a particular society. Representations in the form of plans, maps, systems, signs, etc that mediate *conceived* or *mental* activity to assign or impose a functional or productive purpose to space.

Representational spaces are associated with the everyday *lived* or *social* activity that moves between reproduction and transformation of space, either by abstracting or fragmenting a mode of production or by exposing or revealing how space is conceived to impose order thus opening up the possibility for a differential space and society.

Lefebvre's triads could be viewed as articulating the same kind of dialectical methodological framework that orients a social phenomenon and associated space (totality) along a timeline or path towards a virtual future, however within his different texts he extends or expands these triads to align with different contexts of analysis. This thesis interprets Lefebvre's conceptual triad of social space from *The Production of Space* as an extension and more generalized expansion of the conceptual descriptions of discourse/narratives of space (*myth, ideology, utopia*) as well as the levels, scales and dimensions he articulated in his earlier text *The Urban Revolution*.

Levels, Scales and Dimensions: (See Fig. 0.5, 0.6, 0.7)

The geographic scope of this thesis was chosen to reflect the multi-scalar reality that is the contemporary phenomenon of migration. While it is impossible to describe this contemporary phenomenon in its totality, it is necessary to reflect upon the relationship between logics and politics of power and processes of transformation as they translate across scales to illustrate a clearer picture of what 'virtual object' this utopian process is oriented towards.

To briefly explain, the metrics used to define the scope of this analysis are based

on Henri Lefebvre's methodological concepts of "levels and dimensions" used to analyze what he called the "urban phenomenon." He argues:

Such concepts can help to establish distinct codes, either juxtaposed or superimposed, for decrypting the message (the urban phenomenon considered as message). They serve as lexical items (readings) in urban texts and writing, or maps, and as "urban things," which can be felt, seen, and read in the environment.³⁰

Lefebvre discusses scale in his work in two distinct ways, the first being level in the sense of hierarchies or orderings of social reality within this critical phase of the present, and the second being scale in its territorial sense. This thesis has identified these distinct but interrelated categories in the sense that levels are embedded and intertwined in scales (See Fig. #). They are both constituted of and constituted by each other, their relationship is dialectical.

Lefebvre distinguishes three levels in which he analyzes the urban phenomenon. The *global* level G, the *mixed* level M, and the *private* level P (the level of habiting).³¹ He associates level G with dominant power exercised through political strategy, which he identifies at two ends as 'neoliberalism' (power encroaching over public space) and 'neo-digrisme' (power encroaching over private space). Level M is associated with the mediating or intermediary level, which he identifies as spaces in or of the city, that is, urban functions in relation to a surrounding territory or internal functions. Level P is associated with habitation in the private realm, which again can either reproduce dwelling as the logical activity or as an activity with a latent desire for an alternative mode of social and spatial reproduction and society. From these descriptions it is clear there is a relationship between Lefebvre's later identified levels of Social Space in *The Production of Space*. That level G is an expression of a particular society's *spatial practices*, level M is an expression of mediating *representations* of spaces that functionally impose order or are reshaping the social process, level P is expressed by the *representational* space of social activity that can confirm or oppose the privatization and alienation of everyday life. These levels exist on a space time axis which illustrates how they are in a productive and transformative relationship with an ongoing social process.

In terms of territorial scale, Neil Brenner argues that Lefebvre refers to multiple 'scales' or 'échelles' including: "the body, the local, the urban, the regional, the national, the supranational, the world-wide (mondial) and the planetary."³² This thesis has focused primarily on three scales, the regional/'supranational' Europe/EU, the national/'supraurban' France and the urban/local Paris. These scales do not entirely align with the G, M, P levels but they are related to the constitution of the territory, particularly in dimensional aspects.

Along with the levels of social reality, Lefebvre also highlights the importance of describing the 'dimensions,' which refer to "not the size but the essential properties of the phenomenon."³³ Dimensional aspects of a phenomenon include the *symbolic* (abstraction of social relationships, past and present), *paradigmatic* (a set or system of oppositions), and *syntagmatic* (a sequence, or path). The *paradigmatic* dimension is useful to describe the *topological* properties of the phenomenon (as the analytics and politics of space) that form it through a set or system of distinctions or differences.³⁴ This is evident in how Lefebvre describes the levels in terms of either confirming or contradicting/contrasting the social order.

In the context of this thesis these dimensions can be used to describe the relationship between ideological orderings of space, for instance through borders,

(a product of abstract social relationships established in hierarchies of power) and the social use of that space by processes of migration; the properties of which can be described in relation/opposition to each other topologically. An analysis of these dimensional aspects of the phenomenon of migration are nested within each of the three scales outlined in this thesis.

In the context of the territorial scales of analysis of this thesis *Europe*, *France* and *Paris* are analogous symbolic containers that are a product of past and present social relationships, practices, mythologies or societies. They operate simultaneously as outcomes of social relations.³⁵

Empire, *State* and *Urban* are analogous descriptions that represent paradigmatic dimensions of the present phenomenon of migration and borders. *Empire* is associated with the paradigm of world-order driven by imperialism and certain dominant conceptions of the human in the past but with new associations to modes of production in the present. *State* is associated with the paradigm of globalization and the defining power of the nation-state under neoliberalism. *Urban* is associated with the paradigm of planetary urbanization which describes the multi-scalar dynamic of ‘implosion-explosion’ whereby urbanization processes both deterritorialize and reterritorialize social relations across geographic scales creating new centralities and uneven development.³⁶

Crisis, *Emergenc(y/e)* and *(R)evolution* are analogous description of the *syntagmatic* sequence or path that emergence in the conflict or contradiction between the mode of production that reproduces and maintains the symbolic scalar containers through spatial mediations (borders) and the social forces that undermine or expose their ideology. This path, however, can be re-oriented by social activity that reveals or exposes the path as an imposed order through contradiction. This contradiction inherently contains the possibility of a different path.

Readings: (See Fig. 0.6)

Lefebvre identifies three possible and total readings a “highly complex phenomenon” with multiple “lexical items” (contradictions and conflicts) associated with it in *The Urban Revolution*:

“There is a morphological reading (practiced by the geographer and possibly the urbanist). There is a technological reading, practiced by the administrator, the politician looking for a means of intervention. There is a reading of the possible (and the impossible) that provides us with an image of the variations of finite existence—that of the human being—supplied by urban life in place of the traditional unity that encloses “drives” and values within its narrow boundaries.”³⁷

Within the thesis this phenomenon of the present is represented by a series of ‘cartographies’ that illustrate these three readings respectively for both the way space mediates by imposing dominant order, as well as being appropriated by social conditions that are representational of a differential or virtual space and society. These readings are associated with each territorial scale: Europe > Morphological, France > Technological, Paris > Possible/Impossible.

Structure of the book

Organized into three parts, this book nests these conceptual principles within three distinct but interrelated scales to analyze the contemporary phenomenon of migration and borders through a utopian lens. The analysis uses architecture as a

physical, spatial and social lens to critique, deconstruct and represent the complex dimensions of the contemporary phenomenon of migration and the discourses of *myth*, *ideology* and *utopia* at these particular scales, and to speculate on the positive, productive and transformative aspects of migration in resistance to borders and creation of a virtual condition through movement and use of space.

Part One: *EU-Topia, a Crisis of Empire*

The first part of this thesis establishes a broad theoretical groundwork for conceptualizing borders both historically, in the origins of their social meaning and world-making capacity, and today, in their heterogenous actual and virtual forms. This analysis speculates on the relevance of a modern definition of utopia in its potential to become a theoretical tool to analyze and critique spatial formations tied to social phenomena. The specific case study of migration in Europe is used to understand utopia in its direct correlation to the occupation and transgression of borders. This thesis argues that utopia is an ongoing process of social critique and transformation insofar as new ways of dwelling in space that differ from and challenge a prescribed social norm can transform its meaning and the power dynamics that shape it over time. To analyze this spatial function of borders in Europe, Lefebvre's trialectic of *myth*, *ideology*, and *utopia* is used alongside a series of topological representations of migration in relation to different types, technologies and apparatuses of borders that *push*, *pull*, and *pause* moment.

Part Two: *France, a State of Emergenc(y/e)*

The second part of this thesis focuses on scale of France, to identify the problems with the current system of spatial technologies and infrastructures of the state used to restrict movement. First, looking at the policies of asylum seeking and how those policies reflect values that further translate into how France physically "welcomes" or excludes populations in its cities using Derrida's notion of 'Hostipitality' to illustrate the *Spatial Practices* of the state. Following this, is an analysis of multiple infrastructural technologies of the border from mobile checkpoints to detention centres to the emergence of informal encampments. The border infrastructure and related technologies are expressed as *Representations of Spatial-Temporal Division and Enclosure* as the ideological strategy of the state and dominant power mediated through space. The final section aims to illustrate the dialectical nature of a country both in a state of *emergency* in terms of a crisis of power and ideology, but also the *emergence* of new possibilities through resistance that is *Representational* of a utopian process.

Part Three: *Paris, an Urban (R)evolution*

This third section approaches this phenomenon of the present at the scale of the city, in the context of Paris. The work positions the built environment of the city as a dynamic medium by which social and spatial conditions, divisions and enclosures are practiced, enforced and reproduced as well as contradicted, refused and contested. The analysis is divided into three parts, the *perceived* relationship to walls and gates embodied in the urban form, the *conceived* representations of power these boundaries and thresholds represent and enforce, and the *lived* conditions of social division and enclosure that negotiate the built environment. The thesis concludes with a visual narrative that examines specific sites of migrant occupation within the city centre in recent years. This analysis aims to express aspects of the migrant experience in this context and provide spatial evidence of both state violence through displacement and lived conditions of resistance.

ENDNOTES – INTRODUCTION: A SPECTRE OF HOPE

- 1 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “Counter-Empire” in *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 213.
 - 2 The World Health Organization, “Migrant Health,” 2015, http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/health_of_migrants/en. **quoted in** Thomas Nail, “Introduction,” in *The Figure of the Migrant* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 1,
 - 3 This thesis aligns with Lefebvre’s hypothesis as opposed to Castell’s critique that Neil Smith lays out in the Foreword of *The Urban Revolution*.
See: Neil Smith and Henri Lefebvre, “Foreword,” in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xviii.
 - 4 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 213.
 - 5 Ibid, 213.
 - 6 Thomas Nail, *The Figure of the Migrant*, 3.
 - 7 Ibid, 2.
 - 8 Ibid, 3.
 - 9 Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, ed., “Foreword,” in *Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People*, (Paris, France: UNESCO Publishing / New York, NY; Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2007), ix.
- “According to Article 13-2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.’ But the right to leave is not complemented by a right to enter; one may emigrate, but not immigrate. From a human rights point of view, we are faced with an incomplete situation that sees many people being deprived of their right to emigrate by an absence of possibilities to immigrate. It is therefore worth envisaging a right to mobility: in a world of flows, mobility is a resource to which everyone should have access.”
- 10 Harsha Walia, “About this book,” in *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press/Institute for Anarchist Studies. 2013), 16.
 - 11 “UNHCR Statistics - The World in Numbers,” *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, accessed February 5, 2018, <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.
 - 12 UN Refugee Agency, “Young and Innocent,” accessed July 8, 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1e8.html>, **quoted in** Harsha Walia, *Undoing Border Imperialism*, 41.
 - 13 Harsha Walia, *Undoing Border Imperialism*, x.
 - 14 Daniel Trilling, “Five myths about the refugee crisis,” *The Guardian*, June 5, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis>
 - 15 Obstacles such as the “Third Safe Country Agreement” or the European requirement for migrants to biometrically register at their first “safe” arrival country through Eurodac.
 - 16 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 213. *Emphasis added
 - 17 The virtual object being a kind of utopia identified by Henri Lefebvre, that is not an ideal depiction of society to come, but rather a possible-impossible future of society that is imbedded and emerging from society today.
See: Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*.
 - 18 David Hoy Couzens, *Critical Resistance: From Post-Structuralism to Post-Critique* (London: MIT Press, 2004), **quoted in** Natasha King, “Introduction,” in *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2016), 8.
 - 19 Ibid, 8.
 - 20 Lefebvre discusses Heideggerian philosophy in relation to dwelling and everyday life.
See: Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 81-82.
 - 21 Ibid, 5.
 - 22 Ibid, 5.
 - 23 Ibid, 3.
 - 24 Ibid, 5.
 - 25 See: Henri Lefebvre, “Blind Field,” in *The Urban Revolution*.
 - 26 Nathaniel Coleman, “Introduction,” in *Lefebvre for Architects* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 5.
 - 27 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 105.
 - 28 McKenzie Wark, “The Things of Things,” in *Beach Beneath the Street: The Everyday Life and Glorious Times of the Situationist International* (London, UK; New York, NY: Verso Books, 2015), 84.

- 29 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 33.
- 30 Ibid, 77.
- 31 Ibid, 78.
- 32 Neil Brenner, "The Urban Question as a Scale Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of Scale," in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 24.2 (June 2000), 368.
- 33 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 86.
- 34 Ibid, 87-88.
- 35 Neil Brenner, "The Urban Question as a Scale Question," 367.
- 36 Ibid, 369.
- 37 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 114.

EUROPE, A CRISIS OF EMPIRE

Part One



EUROPE

a Crisis of Empire

The drastic increase in global migration in recent years is representative of an irrepressible desire for free movement in a world where insecurity, displacement and expulsion are on the rise, yet this imperative has met resistance from the dominant powers that draw and define our global borders. Once a symbol of unity, a utopian future of a “borderless world” that globalization could bring, Europe, and the EU, has increasingly fortified its boundaries against so-called ‘outsiders’ with one of the world’s most complex infrastructure of physical borders, immigration policies and weaponized security measures. Amplified border militarization, incarceration and surveillance have significantly affected people who, legally have the right to cross borders to apply for asylum under international law, but are increasingly subject to a multitude obstacles preventing them from exercising this right.¹

Even after crossing into European territory, many people are still struggling to find the promised “better life.” In addition to physical barriers that prevent movement, individuals who are perceived to be “outsiders” (often with precarious immigration or labour status) increasingly face social barriers and discrimination due to a rise in nationalist rhetoric, racism and xenophobia in European society.

In an article reporting on the conditions of young women in the Calais migrant camp on the North coast of France, Salwa, 25 years old, from Sudan stated:

I crossed the sea to come here, to search for a good life in France, but I had a big shock here, and I'm left with a very negative picture of France. When I was a child I thought Europe would be a paradise. I thought of safety, health, and democracy. In Sudan there was death and horrible things. There was no life there, but it's only slightly better here.²

The myth of Europe as a *eutopia*, a “better place” of free mobility, is contradicted by the lived experiences of an increasing number of people who encounter violence at, within and as a result of its borders and the institutions of power they represent.

In reality, individual nation-state borders did not disappear in the 1990s with the Schengen Agreement, which gave EU citizens free internal movement as well as increase economic, trade and labour freedoms. As many researchers have noted, the border has instead been transformed, distributed, expanded and fortified³ to the point where it has “inscribed itself at the center of contemporary experience.”⁴ Our reality, our modes of (re)production, our social identities and subjectivities are defined in relation to these processes/practices of bordering.

With the pervasiveness and diversity of borders, border technologies and practices, Marxist philosopher, Étienne Balibar, observes that “Borders are vacillating... they are no longer at the border.”⁵ Externally, Europe has reinforced its boundaries at its Mediterranean, eastern and northern edges with militarization

Figure 1.1 & Figure 1.2 (Opposite page)
Razorwire vs. people. Mural Artwork by Blu.
Morocco, 2012.

by private border enforcement agencies (Frontex — officially, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, created in 2004), and through the use of biometric identification technologies at border crossings (EURODAC — European Dactyloscopy System, operating since 2003). The growing fortification of the edges of the continent deters or prevents asylum seekers from applying for refugee status in interior European countries and resultantly affects their ability to exercise their fundamental human rights.

Beyond its external borders, the EU secures and expands its foreign (imperial) influence through economic, political, environmental and so-called “humanitarian”⁶ interventions and statecraft to preserve its self-image as a benevolent superpower. However, these efforts mask the military, surveillance and war measures that are deployed to promote “security” by managing and controlling the movements of people towards Europe.

Internally, many nation-states within the EU have reinstated borders in the physical form of checkpoints, barbed-wire fences, detention facilities and camps. Alongside these physical infrastructures are other bordering technologies such as the surveillance and policing of marginalized and racialized people in everyday public spaces and institutions, which create invisible barriers, exclusions and divisions. Furthermore, access to free mobility for people who reside in EU member states is limited based on various factors and intersections of socio-political relations, logics and ideologies that discipline, divide, enclose and control the movement of people in uneven ways.

As Harsha Walia, a South Asian activist, writer and educator argues “Simultaneously, the reinforcement of physical and psychological borders against racialized bodies is a key instrument through which to maintain the sanity and myth of superiority of Western civilization.”⁷ In this way, the border has not only been internalized within the nation-state through institutions or border technologies but also through the perceptions and practices of its subjects.

Europe has historically been at the centre of what is now deemed the “migration crisis” as it has imposed forced displacement and migration through various means (settler-colonialism, imperialism, war, indentured work, enslavement, human trafficking, etc) in order to gain wealth and power. However, today it is positioning itself as the victim of the crisis and therefore erasing the history of capitalism, empire and white supremacy it has perpetuated and through which this crisis has emerged. The EU has failed to acknowledge its responsibility for creating the structural conditions that produced the ‘migration crisis’ and has instead shifted the blame upon those who face insecurity and violence; therefore, turning migration into a domestic security issue rather than an issue with broader historical and systemic factors. As Natasha King describes, “The ‘human crisis’ that was a problem for migrants became presented as a ‘migrant crisis’ that was a problem for European governments.”⁸ In this way, the so-called “migration crisis” can be re-conceived as a series of “intertwining crises,”⁹ having as much to do with the immigration policies and borders drawn up by European institutions and other regimes of power as it does with events outside the continent that forced people to move.

Together these crises represent a larger *Crisis of Empire* in which the borders of Europe are abstract representations of hegemonic powers that (at multiples levels and dimensions within society) enforce ideologies of imperialism and naturalize false perceptions that have fuelled perceptions of fear and acts of violence against (im)migrants (both those with or without status who dwell in European territory). As Negri and Hardt argue, “[Europe] has in fact always been in crisis, and this crisis has been one of the motors that has continuously pushed towards Empire.”¹⁰ This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the violence impacting

(im)migrants is not an inevitable result of their movement or circumstances, but the result of the use of border systems by the state (or arguably vice versa¹¹) to structurally regulate and maintain the identity and power dynamics of European space.

It is essential to shift the narrative around migration, to ask why people are being forced to move, to question the logics that make (im)migration a problem at the scale of a crisis, and to examine how global regimes of ideology and power are implicated in these mass population displacements at multiple levels through the strategic transformation of the border. Moreover, it is important to situate the border within a global politics and view the function of the border as displacement and imposition of order and power rather than security.

Chapter Outline

As established in the introduction, the theoretical method driving this analysis operates within Henri Lefebvre's central thesis on the social production of space and utilizes his spatial triad(s) to facilitate the contemplation of the physical, mental and social dimensions of bordered space. Lefebvre's methodology is useful to render comprehensible the qualities of space that are beyond the senses, including the invisible power dynamics behind its production, maintenance and transformation. By conceptualizing space as being a product of both mental and physical processes that operate at multiple scalar levels within society, it becomes possible to understand and critique the modes and means of its (re)production in the present, as well as isolate the forces, tensions, conflicts or contradictions that can inform perspective on the possibilities of societal transformation.

Part One of this thesis outlines a broad theoretical groundwork for conceptualizing the abstract borders at the global level of Europe and beyond (as a functional space of Empire) in their respective dimensions of myth, ideology and (E)u-topia. The position this thesis aims to defend is that the idea of a particular world-order structured by a global regime of borders is not sustainable in the present due to the reality of acute inequality it has produced. By analyzing the current conditions of migration and borders in Europe, it becomes possible to critique the way society responds to social change by studying the spaces in which these forces interact or conflict with one another.

The following chapters will present an analysis that tracks these transformations in historical and contemporary bordered space to support the hypothesis that human mobility is a dynamic form of 'critical resistance' against an Empire that thrives on ideologies of permanence and stasis through flexible forms of domination. This hypothesis positions migration as a part of a virtual/utopian process of social critique, which occurs through the use of bordered space in ways that differ from, challenge, transgress, or refuse a prescribed social norm. Over time this critical praxis is transforming bordered space materially as well as in meaning and power. It is important to identify these spaces of resistance and their relationships across a totalizing global scale if we are to discern the latent future or possible utopia through everyday struggles within and against the existing world order.

1.1 Boundaries of Myth examines the border for what it is physically or *symbolically*, as an object/space that emerges from a given context. This analysis emphasizes that the border is a product of a social context and is thus a *spatial practice* that expresses an inherent meaning, thus making the border a product of a division that exists and transforms socially rather than an *absolute, natural* or a-historic object.

1.2 Boundaries of Ideology examines the border for how we know or mentally conceive of it through abstract representations, discourse, objectified plans and

paradigms that justify (or refute) its social function. Examining how powerful regimes and institutions such as the European Union conceive of or imagine the *abstract space* of Empire, and materially enforce order through technologies and apparatuses of borders, which control, manage or manipulate processes of mobility.

1.3 Boundaries of EU-Topia examines the border by engaging with the lived situations of mobility that confront, contradict or expose the its underlying logic. This analysis highlights new representational uses of its spaces produced by those who interface with it and presupposes that the border, beyond a two-dimensional line on the map, contains space, both real and virtual, that can be experienced, occupied, used and transformed. Moreover, this chapter describes the ideological dimension of the border *topologically* based its contemporary material and territorial formations and their relationship hierarchies of power and process of mobility that interface with it at a macro-level. These mapped topologies represent specific functional dimensions of the border in juxtaposition with certain lived moments of migration, where the social mobility experiences the effects of the border: the *PUSH* (Topologies of *Displacement*), the *PULL* (Topologies of *Borderless Europe*), and the *PAUSE* (Topologies of *Fortress Europe*). This analysis seeks to represent ongoing processes of migration that impacted by different materializations/territorializations of the border.

ENDNOTES – 1.0 EUROPE, A CRISIS OF EMPIRE

1 *Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that:*

(1) *Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.*

(2) *This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.*”

See: United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” December 10, 1948. <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>.

2 Eleanor Ross, “Inside France’s Biggest Refugee Camp, Girls Are Trapped With No Hope or Escape,” *Vice: Broadly*, Aug. 12, 2015, https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/ae5pdp/inside-frances-biggest-refugee-camp-girls-are-trapped-with-no-hope-or-escape.

3 Étienne Balibar, “Europe as Borderland,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 27 (2009), 190–215, quoted in Reece Jones, “The European Union: The World’s Deadliest Border,” in *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2016) 17.

4 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, “Preface,” in *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), vii.

5 Balibar, Étienne, “The Borders of Europe,” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation*, trans. J. Swenson, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 217–18, quoted in Harsha Walia, “What is Border Imperialism?,” in *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2013), 51.

6 M. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); D. Chandler, “The road to military humanitarianism: How the human rights NGOs shaped a new humanitarian agenda,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23(3) (2001), 678–700, quoted in Glenda Garelli, Alessandra Sciarba and Martina Tazzioli, “Introduction: Mediterranean Movements and the Reconfiguration of the Military-Humanitarian Border in 2015,” *Antipode*, 50, no. 3 (March 6, 2018), 664–667.

7 Harsha Walia, *Undoing Border Imperialism*, 40.

8 Natasha King, “Introduction,” in *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2016) 1.

9 “*i.e. the crisis of displaced populations, the crisis of the policies that govern mobility across European borders, and the Eurozone crisis (European debt crisis) with its effects on migration.*”

Glenda Garelli, Alessandra Sciarba and Martina Tazzioli, “Introduction,” 662.



10 Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. “1.1 World Order,” in *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 4.

11 Thomas Nail inverts this framework:

“Instead of looking at borders as the products of societies and states, it looks at states and societies as the products of the mobile processes of bordering.”

Thomas Nail and Eugene Wolters, “The Figure of the Migrant, an Interview with Thomas Nail,” *Critical Theory*, December 1, 2015, <http://www.critical-theory.com/the-figure-of-the-migrant-an-interview-with-thomas-nail/>.

See also: Thomas Nail, *Figure of the Migrant*; Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*.



BOUNDARIES *of Myth*

Contemporariness is, then, a singular relationship with one's own time, which adheres to it and, at the same time, keeps a distance from it. More precisely, it is that relationship with time that adheres to it through a disjunction and an anachronism. Those who coincide too well with the epoch, those who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not contemporaries, precisely because they do not manage to see it; they are not able to firmly hold their gaze on it.

— Giorgio Agamben, *What is the Contemporary?*²¹

The eternal struggle of human societies to realize a utopian vision for the future is a result of the limits and boundaries that have been created unconsciously, or rather without “recognition”, in our perceptions of what is possible or impossible. To be “contemporary,” as Agamben argues, one must see beyond the abstractions of the present, to expose the implicit contradictions within the structural and systemic conditions that underly and reinforce it. This chapter will examine the dominant perceptions, myths and practices that are embodied and expressed in our social and physical borders of Europe to investigate how to read/interpret the totality of this contemporary phenomenon that constitutes our world-order, as well as to discover emergent possibilities within, against and beyond our existing modes of production.

The Blind Field of the Present

As Walter Benjamin argues, history is viewed most often as an “inventory of humanity’s life forms and creations organized in an endless series of facts and events that congealed into the form of things.”²³ Similarly, Henri Lefebvre argues, by organizing time and space into fragments, periods, objects and typologies, we “emphasize the divisions, the internal character of each mode of production, the consistency of each mode as a totality [...]”²⁴ However, these constructed spatial-temporal organizations only appear rational and divisible because they are defined outside of their time. Lefebvre states, “[...] the transition becomes unintelligible at the very moment when their individual intelligibility becomes most evident.”²⁵ Thus, it is difficult to distinguish moments or events that separate the old from the new in the present as paradigm shifts are usually only perceivable in hindsight.

A historian may study the diachronic movement of time along an axis using methods of *regressive* (“from the virtual to the actual, the actual to the past”²⁶) and *progressive* (“from the obsolete and completed to the movement that anticipates that completeness, that presages and brings into being something new”²⁷) analysis to conceive of a temporal causality of a phenomenon, and a semiotician may attempt to describe a phenomenon by reducing it to a single system of “signs and significations” present at a moment in time.²⁸ Lefebvre argues

Figure 1.3 (Opposite page) *Space-time axis of the process of complete urbanization.* (titled by thesis author) Henri Lefebvre, “From the City to Urban Society,” *The Urban Revolution*.

Figure 1.4 (Opposite page) *First and Second Critical Phase on the Space-time axis of the process of complete urbanization.* (titled by thesis author) Henri Lefebvre, “Levels and Dimensions,” *The Urban Revolution*.

that both of these methods of analysis do not fully constitute knowledge of the phenomenon itself, rather they are 'Blind Fields.' The fragmentations, divisions, and simplifications these distinct methods introduce can obscure and diminish the differential conditions, conflicts and contradictions the transitional moments the present contains.⁹ He argues that we are actively blinding ourselves by trying to interpret or conceive of our reality through an abstracted and ideological lens:

Blindness, our not-seeing and not-knowing, implies an ideology. These blind fields embed themselves in re-presentation. Initially, we are faced with a presentation of the facts and groups of facts, a way of perceiving and grouping. This is followed by a re-presentation, an interpretation of the facts. Between these two moments and in each of them, there are misrepresentations, and misunderstandings. The blinding (assumptions we accept dogmatically) and the blinded (the misunderstood) are complementary aspects of our blindness.¹⁰

Blind fields change throughout time just as a sign can change in meaning, however, the paradox of existing in the present is that we are surrounded by the blind field as a "region of force and conflict"¹¹ yet we do not have adequate means to conceptualize the ongoing processes of transformation. Europe, as a sign or symbol, means something different today than it did at the time when nation-states agglomerated into a unified political and economic territory. Viewed through semiotics, Europe is a concept or sign that is composed of a signifier (a certain physical or material form or territory) and signified mental association. Signs are in constant flux as material forms or spatial practices, and mental associations or representations are socially transformed. The blind field of the present has to do with the distance and abstraction between the concept, with origins in another time and social context, and the representation of that concept today that is in an ongoing transformation. In other words, the tools or concepts we use to describe what Europe is are "reductive of emerging reality"¹² of what Europe is becoming as a virtual object associated with an ongoing social transformation. As Lefebvre argues, "We no longer see that reality; we resist it, turn away from it, struggle against it, prevent its birth and development."¹³ One particular way of understanding a concept such as Europe is by identifying what constitutes boundaries or limits, therefore understanding Europe as defined by its borders.

Borders have come to define almost every aspect of modern life as metaphysical spaces that are practiced and lived but not seen for the values or motivations they represent. These values are often represented and communicated through institutions or regimes of "territorial, political, juridical and economic" power.¹⁴ However, this perception of bordered space, or lack thereof, is a result of an implied *ideology* that puts *myth* to use to "blind," by creating a void to be filled with "misinformation and misunderstanding."¹⁵ So, how is one to grasp at understanding this social space of the border as a contemporary phenomenon that constitutes a larger world-order that we are blind to in the present? If we want to reimagine our relationship to borders and understand how our pre-dominant perceptions and practices tend towards a certain imaginary or world-order, we need to dispel contemporary illusions, "...of substantiality, naturalness and spatial opacity (that) nurtures its own mythology,"¹⁶

As Étienne Balibar argues, only once we can grasp at these structural conditions, can we begin to reposition ourselves to our reality and see virtual futures latent within the present:

...if we are to contribute to changing the world in its unacceptable, intolerable aspects — or (and perhaps this comes down to the same thing) to resist the changes occurring in that world, which are presented to us as inevitable — we need to overturn the false simplicity of some obvious notions.¹⁷

There are two aspects to the analysis of myth that Lefebvre outlines, which will be addressed in this chapter: “The search for the elements of the myth” that come from another time or situation and “the determination of their re-use in another context.”¹⁸ The border is continually moving and changing, as is our social relationship to it. By distinguishing differential practices that constitute the border and contemporary phenomenon of mobility, it becomes possible to see contemporary shifts in our society’s perception of our boundaries. This analysis aims to describe our conceptual and social conditions that contextualize what a border *is*¹⁹ as a space of *myth* in the present.

The Border as a Perceived Space

The term *border* originates from the Proto-Indo-European root *bherdh-*, meaning “to cut, split, or divide.”²⁰ What is unequivocal in its definition, and evident in its existence throughout human history is that the border enacts what Thomas Nail calls a “process of social division.”²¹ This process is ongoing, but certain moments or events appear to define the symbolic context of a border. As we have stated before, linear history, which establishes divisions between periods of time, has obscured the fact that this process has been continuous and evolving, leading to several false perceptions of the border, of which we will explore.

Borders are fundamentally contextualized and defined by the limits of human perception, both of our social and physical environment. It is difficult to imagine *being a border*²² but we enact the process of bordering from the moment we arrive into the world as human beings. As Gayatri Spivak argues:

“Humans, before they are reasonable, as infants access being human through a perception of the body as being bordered; these borders being both permeated for pleasure and respected against violation.”²³

We can, therefore, consider that all other interactions with the border as a social and spatial concept stem from this initial confrontation with the limits that exist in our own bodies. These are the boundaries to our senses that filter the ‘atmospheres,’ ‘sensations’ or ‘aesthetics’²⁴ of our environment, and in turn, informs our perception. As we mature and become socialized, both as individuals and as a society, we form habits, practices and eventually language to elucidate or represent social relationships between the bodies, things and forces that construct our environment. These relationships determine whether we take in information or close ourselves off to it as a practice of inclusion and exclusion. Alongside our perception of our external environment, within our bordered bodies, we establish our relationships to our own identity, which defines who we are in relation with things or situations outside ourselves.

Before the introduction of immaterial conceptual and ideological thought, which manipulates how we see ourselves and our environment, our understanding of what we see is symbolic, or rather what we see has meaning before we describe it in words. In *Ways of Seeing*, John Berger describes this ongoing and evolving perceptive process of taking in the sensations of the material world and situating oneself within it:

Seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak. But there is also another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. Each evening we see the sun set. We know that the earth is turning away from it. Yet the knowledge, the explanation, never quite fits the sight.²⁵

The act of seeing can create meaning without representing or defining that meaning conceptually. Social practices are established and evolve as we develop new ways of seeing. Berger drew on ideas from Walter Benjamin's essay entitled *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, arguing that through reproduction, classical art in a modern era detaches from the social reality of its original context, in other words, it takes on new meaning.²⁶ In the same way, our contemporary perception of the border is removed from the context or social landscape in which it emerged, a paradigm shift that has replaced the associative meaning, now re-produced as an ideological apparatus, a space representing and fulfilling a different conceptual function.

This foundational understanding of what a border *is* — as an object of perceived meaning — makes it difficult to consider the concept of a “world without borders,” because that would be a pre-social world. In this sense, the world has been bordered for as long as humans have been capable of relating to each other and our environment through perceived limitations or boundaries between social and spatial difference. As Thomas Nail states in *Theory of the Border*, borders have always been actively produced and maintained, whether they are physical walls or social divisions.

Therefore the distinction between natural and artificial borders posed by early border theorists cannot be maintained. This is the case not because borders today are radically different than they used to be, but because throughout history 'natural' borders as borders were always delimited, disputed, and maintained by 'artificial' human societies. A river only functions as a border if there is some social impact of it being such (i.e., a tax, a bridge, a socially disputed or accepted division). Additionally, so-called artificial borders always function by cutting or dividing some 'natural' flow of the earth or people (who are themselves "natural" beings).²⁷

Nail argues further that, “Accordingly, society is first and foremost a product of the borders that define it and the material conditions under which it is dividable. Only afterwards are borders (re)produced by society.”²⁸ We, therefore, produce borders based on the existence of what he calls a “delimited social field.”²⁹ Thus, the history of the border is a history of its re-production — a social response to the perception of existing borders or spatial practices that either maintains the ongoing processes division or changes them in some way through the creating new associations to them (ideologies).³⁰

The Border as a Myth

We have established that our borders of today are a result of a palimpsest of social divisions, historically. The creation of mythologies and cultural narratives to interpret that history gives the border symbolic meaning. In this sense, myth is a way to re-tell (re-produce) the creation of something new (a new perception,

a new way of seeing), making it bound up with ontology. We re-tell the history of *being* by practicing. In this sense, the border is an object of *myth* constructed by a particular society and practiced as a process of social division in relation to a specific context. The border is both a social product of society as well as being socially (re)produced, as Nail states, "...the border is both constitutive of and constituted by society."³¹

To develop the concept of *myth* further, Lefebvre states that, "Myths, corresponding to a certain age, are defined not by the nature of their figures and characters but by the fact that they respond to the questions and problems of a particular society."³² They are pre-conceived narratives or stories that combine various "lexical items"³³ (i.e. perceivable 'atmospheres,' 'sensations' or 'aesthetics') associated with a specific phenomenon. "The myth has filled a void: knowledge that is oriented toward and by practice."³⁴ In this sense, myth and ideology are closely related, as myth is the substance of meaning that gives purpose to and legitimizes the tools of ideology — institutions of power that represent these myths and symbolic meanings back to us. In this way, our view of reality is obstructed by manufactured representations to reproduce a certain order to society, thus limiting the possibilities of life to a certain rationality which creates an uneven division or distinction between modes of "thought, action and life."³⁵

Throughout history, the border has contributed to shaping the world-order in many ways — ranging from an idealized representation to a real and violent entity. Different societies have distinct relationships with their own space/environment, thus have produced their spatial divisions accordingly. Not only does the border produce a division in space to delineate difference but to also define the identity and relationship between the places and people on either side.³⁶ A settled society may have put up fortified and defensible walls around their city, whereas a nomadic society may have had a more temporary relationship to the land they occupied. The perception of borders, however, defines each society, as it is a spatial product of a certain mode of production, a spatial and temporal paradigm. Henri Lefebvre's timeline of societies and their respective spaces produced by their particular spatial practices and modes of production illustrates this point (See fig. 1.3 & 1.4). In the transition between these periods, the contemporary modes of production enter a period of crisis in which Lefebvre argues, "[...] oppositions are initially complementary, then contradictory, then conflicting."³⁷ This is perhaps a way to look at the contemporary phenomenon of migration in relation to borders. Migration was once a necessary part of globalization, now it reveals the inherent contradictions in this mode of production, thus leading to a contemporary period of crisis.

Borders have never had the exact same function; they are continually changing shape both in their physicality as well in their effective role in controlling mobility through inclusion and exclusion. Changes in their functional role within society (how the border controls movement) in turn reflects a change within the society itself (how society moves).

Étienne Balibar describes a profound shift in the understanding of 'border' as a concept, which redefines them beyond a demarcation between spaces of difference to a functional space of socio-political meaning that produces social division effectively and materially.³⁸ Balibar points out it is an impossible paradox to define what a border *is* objectively without addressing the context from which it derives its meaning because by definition a border is a 'definition,'

"to mark out a border is, precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify in general is nothing other than to trace a border, or assign boundaries or borders."³⁹

This perspective reframes the question of *what is a border?* by making it “historically contingent” as a fundamentally changeable product of a dynamic social process, “foremost involving people and their everyday lives.”⁴⁰ Or rather, the border is a result of particular spatial practices of a society that establishes active relationships (relative to absolute) between “boundaries” and “named places.”⁴¹ This is to say, that borders do not mark the edges of a natural or absolute divide between territories or things; instead, the division comes into being through the social production (and re-production) of its boundaries.⁴²

The Border as a Spatial Practice

According to Lefebvre, ‘spatial practices’ are social practices that create a particular physical order or structure to a society’s space and lived reality through the establishment of “routes, networks, patterns and interactions” that create dialectical interaction between “places and people, images with reality, work with leisure.”⁴³ Lefebvre asserts in *The Production of Space* that social relationships are established by spatial practices, through the demarcation (production and reproduction) of boundaries, stating, “every social space, then, once duly demarcated and oriented implies a superimposition of certain relations upon networks of named places.”⁴⁴

These spatial practices also result in various kinds of space that influence or deter a person’s perceptions and actions based on their inclusion or exclusion of access through the defined boundaries of that particular space. Lefebvre states that “Each mode of production has ‘produced’ [...] a type of city, which ‘expresses’ it in a way that is immediately visible and legible on the environment, by making the most abstract relationships—legal, political, ideological—tangible.”⁴⁵ The practices that produce these types of spaces “can be revealed by ‘deciphering’ space and have close affinities with perceived space, to people’s perceptions of the world, of their world, particularly its everyday ordinariness.”⁴⁶ Some of the types of spaces Lefebvre outlines include:

1. *Accessible space for normal use. Such use is governed prescriptively — by established rules and practical procedures.*
2. *Boundaries and forbidden territories — spaces to which access is prohibited either relatively or absolutely.*
3. *Places of abode. (Dwelling)*
4. *Junction points: these are often places of passage and encounter; often, too, access to them is forbidden except on certain occasions of ritual import.*⁴⁷

Lefebvre’s understanding of spatial practices makes it possible to consider the role of the border in society by examining how its physical effects are perceived. Thomas Nail argues if we want to understand what a border *is* with the aim to reveal their “mutable and arbitrary nature,” we need to begin by “destabilizing them according to the very thing they are supposed to control: movement.”⁴⁸ In this way, Nail illustrates we can look at the border, not as a product of the “states” and “societies,” rather, these are products of evolving practices of “bordering.”⁴⁹ This evolutionary and relational process can be revealed by exposing contradictions that exist socially and spatially in the movements of people across borders, and the moments when the conception of that space is contradicted by the inclusionary/exclusionary practices that occur within it.

Spatial practices can transition in meaning as society changes. As Lefebvre points out, rural space once has a different meaning in a pre-industrial society than it does today in an urbanizing society. In this way, Europe and its borders had a different meaning before its agglomeration into a union; the practices of bordering reflect a different society. He argues that to define the properties of

this transitional period, we need new concepts that embody the possibilities or virtualities of differential lived conditions that oppose, contradict or conflict with the status quo of the present.

The Border as a Differential Space

The spatial practices that produce the border enact a “process of social division” in the space “in-between” the two sides that touch two different states or territories.⁵⁰ This “in-between” space of the border is as real as the spaces, concepts or things situated on either side. It is where the ideology of division materializes in order to functionally support (produce/reproduce) the myth, identity, or social perception of the places on either side to maintain a conceived power dynamic. The spatial practices mediate between the conceived and lived by keeping the representations of the border (produced by institutions) and spaces of representation (places in which people dwell) together, yet apart, to maintain or reproduce a social division.

This in-between space has always existed to mediate access to territory. However, today, the border is undergoing a profound shift in its material effects in response to changing social conditions that are threatening the myth (of Europe) it functionally supports. The *Crisis of Empire* is a result of Europe’s ideological response to modify the social structure that produces/reproduces the border to preserve its own mythology, so that socially the border takes on a new ideological function to maintain or ‘re-tell’ the myth. The objective purpose of the border, to control movement, has never changed, but the ideologies that inform its functioning have. Ideology creates the way one may interface with the border, or rather, controls the social implementation of the border as a tool, technology or apparatus. Depending on who passes through it/occupies it, the border functionally responds. The dynamics of social inclusion/exclusion have changed, and this transformation relates to new materializations of the border to suit new social demands on the myth.

Spatial practices of the border occur within the border and are not just practices that produce the border. Moreover, they are not just practices of division but also about connection, encounter and movement across space. Balibar describes this change as a “thickening of borders into zones where people indefinitely dwell.”⁵¹ He states that “[...] the quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted [...] This means that borders are becoming the object of protest and contestation as well as of an unremitting reinforcement [...]”⁵² The border has become an accessible yet closed, exceptional yet indeterminate space, a place to dwell (camp), a junction point (checkpoint, a detention cell). Those who are excluded from crossing its boundary (due to their particular identities, race, religion, age, ability, gender, sexuality or processes of mobility) are caught within the extra-territorial space of the border, to prevent them from changing the mythology of Europe by becoming a part of it. Furthermore, the territory of the border has expanded within the edges of Europe to limit access to democratic space and social acceptance of refugees and (im)migrants. As Michel Agier states, the border has become a place of uncertainty where there are moments when “people no longer know at all clearly who they are or where they are [...],” and yet as a result of this condition, there are “moments of social and identity potential.”⁵³ Within this indeterminate space, new social activities and spatial uses of the border are contradicting its intended function, creating new significations of the border as an emergent differential space. Moreover, as Lefebvre states we must remember that blind fields “are open to exploration; for the understand that they are virtuality, and for action they are possibility [...],” however, he argues there is also “[...] an enclosure to break out of, a consecration to transgress.”⁵⁴

To establish a contemporary understanding of the border (both as a concept and real space) beyond the field of blindness and abstraction which surrounds it in the present requires that one must not only look to the technical definition or signification of the border to understand its role in society but to engage in the lived conditions of borders. It is essential to examine the power structures under which they operate and the technologies that produce their form, function, and engender their effects. Moreover, it is necessary to engage with how these power structures and ideologies are enacted through designed representations of the border and within the representational lived space. The following chapter will expand upon this definition of the border by showing how it operates through institutions and regimes of power to enact a process of social division.

ENDNOTES - 1.1 BOUNDARIES OF MYTH


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 - 17 Étienne Balibar, "What is a Border," in *Politics and the Other Scene*, translated by Christine Jones, James Swenson and Chris Turner (London, UK: Verso, 2002), 76.
 - 18 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 104.
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 - 23 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak Interview." *Vimeo, Berliner Gazette*, 20 June 2018, vimeo.com/191283038.
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 - 26 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Illuminations* (London: Cape, 1970).
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 - 28 Ibid, 4.
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 - 30 "None of these borders is in any sense given but (re)produced through modes of affirmation and contestation and is, above all, lived."
- Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh UK, 2009), 1, quoted in Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 7.
- 31 Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 4.
 - 32 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 103.
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 - 34 Ibid, 114
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- 45 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 24.
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- 47 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 193.
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- 54 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 31.

Der Cosmography.

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hernach angezeigt wird. Was aber Lands vber dem Mare Mediterraneum ligt gegen
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BOUNDARIES

of Ideology

The previous chapter examined what a border *is* through an analysis of the practices associated with its production and maintenance. This analysis led to the understanding that the spatial practice of border-making is one that associates meaning to physical space through an acknowledgement or perception of relative social, material and environmental temporalities. The border, and space in general, is therefore political in nature and constantly evolving as a result of cultural shifts and power dynamics in society that redefine its context. In this way, to create a border, whether it be a fence between properties or a wall between nations, is to make use of preconceived myths, which are embodied in everyday practices of a particular society. Through this division, the border (in)directly asserts and ideology about how its internal space should function, and the very condition of life that should exist on either side of a divide.

This chapter seeks to understand how the border *is* the way it is by examining what it *does*, or rather, how it enacts, embodies or represents this ongoing process of social division and (re)production associated with the contemporary phenomenon of migration. A study of ideologies — conceived ideas or discourse about our reality, our relationship to each other, with our environment, and the mediation of power therein — will help to illustrate the epistemological boundaries or limits to the functional role of borders in our society both historically and today. The over-arching enquiry concerns how borders assert meaning in space as well as society, and to what or whose benefit the abstract representation of ideology and power positively serves or negatively oppresses. Ultimately, this investigation aims to question and critique the ways in which the border — with its relational cultural meaning, mythology or signification — sustains hierarchical imaginaries, ideas, relations of domination, power structures or world-orders and how processes of social mobility have the potential to reveal and contradict its ideological underpinnings.

The following questions guide this investigation: How do the borders at the scale of Europe functionally and affectively represent and mediate ideology to produce and legitimize a world-order (Empire) controlled by a dominant, hegemonic and dispersed forms of (bio)power (level G) in relation to social processes of migration (level P), which represent a conflict of contradiction to that image of world order? What myths or perceptions does this contemporary world-order (re)produce or maintain through the border (or vice versa, what world-order(s) does the border (re)produce by enacting a process social division)? How are the processes of mobility affected by this ideology? And, in what way does migration conflict with or contradict it through spatial interactions with the border?

What is Ideology?

In order to answer some of these questions, it is necessary to develop an operative

Figure 1.5 (Opposite page) *Europa Regina*, Sebastian Münster's Cosmography, 1588.

understanding of ideology, a term and concept with its own mythology or history of meaning. As literary theorist Terry Eagleton illustrates in *Ideology: An Introduction*, ideology has an almost endless list of definitions that are often incompatible with one another or are so over-defined that everything can be ideological, and it can cease to mean anything at all.¹

Eagleton theorizes that the multitude of definitions stems from two divergent lineages of thought in particular. One branch, based in the modernist tradition, is preoccupied with epistemological questions, with the nature of ideas, or of “true and false cognition, with ideology as an illusion, distortion and mystification.”² The other branch, based in a post-modern tradition, is concerned more with sociological questions relating to “the function of ideas within social life than with their reality or unreality.”³ However, both intellectual positions can inform us about ideology as questions about the nature and veracity of our belief systems — how we know or can understand our reality — are often tied to changing power dynamics or perceptions of power in society and its respective space.

Yet, it is often disputed what kind of reference or relationship ideology has with power. A common answer to that question is that ideology legitimizes power, as Eagleton argues:

A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself. Such ‘mystification,’ as it is commonly known, frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions. In any actual ideological formation, all six of these strategies are likely to interact in complex ways.⁴

However, there are a few difficulties with this understanding of how ideology works. As Eagleton argues, “For one thing, not every body or belief which people commonly term ideological is associated with a *dominant* political power.”⁵ To this end, a “neutral” formulation is required on the question of whether the “intersection between belief systems and political power [...] challenges or confirms a particular social order.”⁶ From this perspective, ideology relates to a “set of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order.”⁷ However, herein lies a problem with defining the social boundaries of ideology in relation to dispersed forms of power.

If we are to understand power to exist in more nuanced, fragmented and dispersed ways within society, as philosophers such as Michel Foucault do, then ideology could be considered as “co-existent with everything,” and this would empty it of its political significance.⁸ Yet, to limit the idea of power to hierarchical or dominant institutions such as the state, “would be an ideological move, obscuring the complex diffuseness of its operations.”⁹

Eagleton argues that “[ideology] is forceful and informative only if it helps us to distinguish between those interests and power conflicts which at any given time are fairly central to a whole social order, and those which are not.”¹⁰ To make this distinction it is necessary, then, to contextualize ideology and be specific about the relational conditions of power that exists between people and their environment for the production of certain lived effects. In other words, it is

important to identify the functional relationship of ideology to a particular society and its space. The usefulness of ideology, as a discourse, is relative to how it can be understood to translate or relate to a lived context.

This brings us back to the question of real/unreal epistemological truths, and how ideology functions to manipulate or mediate these real conditions of existence through “false consciousness” as a way to produce a particular social or spatial order. The previous chapter addressed the topic of Lefebvre’s “blind field” as being a concept that describes the conditions of the present, which “obscure constitutive sociospatial relations”¹¹ through ideological “misinformation and misunderstanding.”¹² However, what Louis Althusser, a French Marxist philosopher, uniquely contributes to the concept of ideology is the notion that it is not only “false consciousness,” but that in addition to “misrepresenting” reality, ideology relies on reality and lived experience in the “positive” sense, as a basis for its own conception.¹³

“However, while admitting that (ideologies) do not correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illusion, we admit that they do make allusion to reality, and that they need only be ‘interpreted’ to discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary representation of that world (ideology = illusion/allusion).”¹⁴

In order to be effective, ideologies have to draw from an inherent social perception of reality (embedded in the social discourse of myth and spatial practices) and as Eagleton argues, “must conform to some degree with what they know of social reality from their practical interaction with it,” hence why ideology can only be defined as functional to a particular society/space.¹⁵ Ideology is thus, “[...] true in its empirical content but deceptive in its force, or true in its surface meaning but false in its underlying assumptions.”¹⁶ Moreover, in this sense, ideology is a “performative contradiction,’ in which what is said is at odds with the situation or act of utterance itself.”¹⁷

This exploration of ideology beyond descriptions of being either true or false but rather an illusion/allusion to reality is proposed by Althusser in his book, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. Specifically, he defines ideology as a “representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”¹⁸ These representational forms of ideology can range from the syntax of our language to communications in our media, from art to our built environment. Representations mediate social relations at multiple levels, and cannot be defined as either concretely true or false, rather, as Eagleton interprets from Althusser, ideology is “a particular organization of signifying practices which goes to constitute human beings as social subjects, and which produces the lived relations by which such subjects are connected to the dominant relations of production in society.”¹⁹

Finally, within his spatial triad, Henri Lefebvre proposes that ideology is mediated through *representations of space* which are conceived of by institutions such as the state, or any political organization, as a form of linguistic or semiotic discourse to “justify and legitimize” (or “criticize, refuse and refute”) their existence by “unfolding through them.”²⁰ It is through these representations that everyday practices are made to be “self-evident”²¹ as part of the status quo. In this way, ideological representations of space produce an abstract boundary or division that mediates between myth (physical/material conditions) and utopia (the possible-impossible conditions of life and difference). Again, this mediation occurs at multiple levels (Lefebvre’s G, M & P) that don’t necessarily directly align with scales of society; rather, they are relational within and across scales.²² While the nature of reality is often controlled by dominant power, Lefebvre leaves open

the possibility (impossibility) of it shifting through conflicts and contradictions, which oppose or resist the status quo, renegotiate the boundary or border that is an ideological representation.

The ideological apparatus of the border is where conceived spatial and social separations become materialized and enforced. Now that we have outlined some of the fundamental aspects of ideology, we next need to investigate how the border functions as a mediating apparatus of social and spatial separation materialized through everyday practice to (re)produce world-order — both conceptually, historically, and through totalizing forces of Empire in the present.

The Border as an Ideological Apparatus

As has been stated before, ideology is neither contingent on a centralized or dispersed form of power, rather it is mediated through many apparatuses and is constantly being (re)produced and (re)contextualized by the social dynamics, perceptions and practices of the present. As such, it is important to begin by establishing, through Negri and Hardt's conceptual framework, that the present world-order does not exist "spontaneously" out of "the interactions of radically heterogeneous global forces," nor is it a result of direct communication with one single centralized power "transcendent" to these forces "guiding the various phases of historical development according to its conscious and all-seeing plan."²³ This analysis of what the border *does*, as an ideological apparatus, aims to contextualize the contemporary politics of borders to a global system of power and repression with historical roots in imperialism, colonialism and other systemic forms of violence through 'othering.' Specifically, to illustrate that ideological institutions and apparatuses that constitute Empire are systemically maintained and complicit in violent practices that benefit the totalizing order of the present. Rather than being wholly "spontaneous" or "transcendent" borders are contingent and responsive (*illusion/allusion*) to how we perceive ourselves as a society within the world, and who/what is included/excluded from that process. Thus, borders are constantly shifting, functionally and materially, in response to changing paradigms of power in society to preserve and maintain hegemony. To move beyond or transform the present order, analysis and critique of the border as an ideological apparatus can inform what Negri and Hardt call an "[...] ontological basis of antagonism — within Empire, but also against and beyond Empire, at the same level of totality."²⁴

At the most conceptual macro-level, Lefebvre's level "G" representing the globalization of the state/dispersion of power, the border functions within a global infrastructure/system of social relations that transforms "individual imaginary" into the "imaginary of a subject" of a particular world-order through what Althusser defines as the "Ideological State Apparatus."²⁵ Borders make this world-order more established and absolute through the nation-states, transnational institutions and regimes that give them power, but in the process, they also make the forces behind their production, including the negative and violent effects, more opaque and abstract. Often that violence affects those who are excluded in the imaginary world-order of these institutions. In other words, as Étienne Balibar argues, "The state [...] is, among other things, a formidable reducer of complexity, though its very existence is a permanent cause of complexity (we might also say of disorder), which it then fails to reduce."²⁶ The border creates this order through the abstraction of reality and the real social conditions of existence, which would contradict or undermine the authority of the state through which it is created.

The ideology behind the border is particularly absent when perceived in its modern cartographical representation as a line on a map. This marginal depiction of the border bears no obvious evidence of a "producer" or "production

process,” making it easily perceived as “atemporal and therefore non-produced — that is, metaphysical.”²⁷ However, as Althusser states, “Ideology never says I am ideological.”²⁸ Moreover, from Lefebvre, “Ideology carries no flag, and for those who accept the practice of which it is a part it is indistinguishable from knowledge.”²⁹ Ideology is a map, and the border is made with a specific bias or interest in representing a particular aspect of reality, but in so doing it also creates abstraction and blindness for the viewer that can be complicit in maintaining a false sense of reality or purposefully not reveal certain truths over others.

The representation of the border as a neutral line on a map intentionally obscures a vast and complex history behind the production of our current world-order. This history is marked by different regimes of meaning and power enforcing order on global space by establishing an imaginary set of rules and agreements to legitimize certain territorial claims, while “misrepresenting” or falsifying others. Ideology reduces the complexity of time/history and space by putting forward universal or unitary interventions, representations or other linguistic productions of reality that self-validate while dissolving contradiction, layered identities or multiple meanings of a place and the people who exist there.

The legitimacy of these interventions is reliant on the effectiveness of their communication. To be “effective,” as a functional tool for hegemony, ideology and its representations have to be both “imperceptible” enough to dodge critique and contradiction and communicate “affectively” enough as to shape reality.³⁰ This relates to how Étienne Balibar attributes the “productive power” of borders to their associated sense of ‘spatiality,’ which he argues, “is implicit in every territorial construction of citizenship as a collective ‘identity,’ a system of rights and duties, normative principles and capacities.”³¹

How then does the border communicate ideology in spatial terms? Unlike ideology in the form of semiotic language or relational meaning which has the potential to change more fluidly, or even images which can be manipulated in a different context³², the ‘spatiality’ of borders produces a new image of subjectivity — a ‘spectacle’³³ that enforces boundaries, through manufactured representations (*illusions*), that define who belongs or can participate in society by referring (*allusions*) to the real conditions of lived experience. As Kanishka Goonewardena argues, ideology or “‘ideas’ — about worldview [or] cosmology,” are largely ineffective without an “aesthetic,” which alludes to the “realm of the senses.”³⁴ In this way, the lived relationship to space produces a more concrete and affective association between the individual or society and an institution or regime of power by “aestheticizing” politics or materializing, and territorializing the dominant regimes or modes of production with which they operate by connecting them to a sensation associated with a society’s particular practices or myths. Ideology, communicated spatially, inherently has affective qualities to it that are experienced through the mediation of perception or interactive use of a physical apparatus that represents a power dynamic. Within space, situations or meanings can always change to preserve the dynamic in response to conflicting or counter-hegemonic uses of the space, things like the state of exception/emergency, which will be examined later on, is an example of this phenomenon.

As with images, architecture, and space more generally, it communicates a message that has been detached from its source to create a perception. The image or the sensation of space aestheticizes complex situations into narratives or perceptions that can only be understood through one lens; they transform the diachronic, the history that has led to the present, into a synchronic or fragmented image, a blind field which makes invisible the complexities that constitute the present, limiting the possibility of imagining alternatives. As John Berger states:

An image is a sight which has been recreated or reproduced. It is an

*appearance, or a set of appearances, which has been detached from the place and time in which it first made its appearance and preserved — for a few moments or a few centuries. Every image embodies a way of seeing. [...] Yet, although every image embodies a way of seeing, our perception or appreciation of an image depends also upon our own way of seeing.*³⁵

In this way, perception or myth is used by ideology to create a unified way of seeing alongside the creation of a blind field of invisible aspects of reality. For example, as Negri and Hardt argue, the population that makes up a nation-state isn't a product of "a dynamic collective creation," but rather a "founding myth" used (by a dominant group or regime) through practices of bordering and social division to establish a symbolic identifying relationship to a place.³⁶ The use of myth "homogenizes" the place and "purifies" its image by blocking out conflicting or contradicting differences that exist within it, and instead filling that void with fabricated ideas or visions of how the world should be.³⁷ This social division produced by borders is both physical and mental, which blocks out certain things, ideas or people that do not maintain or produce the imagined order. The effects can be read in the aesthetics of space and the social interaction they facilitate, and you can see who is excluded or included by the nature of the space, rather than asserting who is controlling it first and attempting to read their intentions. The new subjectivity produced by borders is a result of a process of consolidating and fabricating the terms of both the current conditions of a social context and an imagined world to come.

Under the ideology of Empire, as a unitary/totalizing force, borders have been given an a-historical, universal or mythologized narrative of necessity to the status quo. Representations of society's space and the border itself have historically operated in this unitary way, to fabricate world-order. As Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson state:

*From the liminal experiences of ritual societies to the delimitation of land as private property, from the fratricide of Remus by Romulus at the mythological foundation of Rome to the expansion of the imperial limes, these stories speak of the productive power of the border—of the strategic role it plays in the fabrication of the world.*³⁸

As Mezzadra and Neilson argue, this concept was first employed by Renaissance-era philosophers like Pico della Mirandola and Giordano Bruno, the concept of *Fabrica Mundi* describes how representations of the world on a map also effectively produce it.³⁹ Images of the world and its fabricator *homo faber fortune suae* ("man as master and creator of his own destiny") a body labouring to shape the world, were used by these Renaissance thinkers as a means to liberate "man" from the perceived "subjugation of natural and transcendent forces."⁴⁰ These representations suggested an imagined paradigm shift in society's symbolic relationship to its "natural" borders and boundaries whereby it was conceived that the labour of "man" could be harnessed to transform society and overcome perceived limitations. These images of the world produced from that context are records of how Western cultures saw the world and increasingly became conscious of their ability to shape the world through an awareness of oneself in space and time/history.⁴¹ The utopianism of *Fabrica Mundi* and *Homo faber* is ideological as it presents a particular future vision of world-order that is grown out of projections of an ideal (world-order, and image of "man" largely associated with an image of white, western man or woman, see Fig. 1.5) already embedded in the perceptions of a particular society and its spatial practices.⁴² It is not a counter-hegemonic

utopia, imagining something new or possible outside of the present, rather it is maintaining an existing status quo by making invisible or abstracting the parts of that society, which are contradictory or conflicting to a unitary vision. *Fabrica Mundi* is about establishing a particular narrative of the “self” through the forcible and often violent exclusion of the “other,” which in turn defines an ideological boundary that limits and controls the possibility of alternative narratives to grow and transform society.

In essence, Empire is a world-order project with a new ontological basis rooted in the spatial practices of a particular society where sovereignty is controlled by transnational institutions beyond the individual states. It is an extension of the idea that the productive labour of “man” can liberate society from the subjugation of external forces, but instead, Empire is the liberating concept that re-makes the world under a unitary image and reduces the power of the individual nation-state. However, as much as an ideology is destructive of old ways of seeing, and that destructive process is perceived as a positive liberation from the past, it is also a violent process of creation that produces new conceptions of the world through abstraction that ultimately maintain and (re)produce power, as Henri Lefebvre illustrates:

“What did war produce? The answer is: Western Europe – the space of history, of accumulation, of investment, and the basis of the imperialism by means of which the economic sphere would eventually come into its own. Violence is in fact the very lifeblood of this space, of this strange body. A violence sometimes latent, or preparing to explode; sometimes unleashed, and directed now against itself, now against the world; and a violence everywhere glorified in triumphal arches (Roman in origin), gates, squares and prospects.”⁴³

As Negri and Hardt state, historically, Empire has been “... presented as a global concert under the direction of a single conductor, a unitary power that maintains the social peace and produces its ethical truths. And in order to achieve these ends, the single power is given the necessary force to conduct, when necessary, ‘just wars’ at the borders against the barbarians and internally against the rebellions.”⁴⁴ War and crises are, in effect, a translation of a historical function of borders and their relationship to world-making — their overdetermination and extension of influence into other territories, war for the purposes of peace, justified by institutions. This violent history of colonialism and imperialism has helped to concentrate power, wealth and property in the hands of a select few in addition to reinforcing social divisions between the Global North and South.

Contemporary Bordering Institutions

Today, powerful institutional bodies such as the European Union (United Nations, World Bank, etc) conceive of this abstract global space of Empire through technologies and apparatuses of borders, which enforce political ideologies to control or manipulate processes of mobility through the inclusion/exclusion of bodies in space in an active and often violent manner. Individual bodies are continuously represented and filtered through the lens of this global system as included or excluded from spaces, states, or territories that are designated by the apparatus of the border. Whether materialized in physical space, inscribed on a map, or internalized within a body, Reece Jones argues, borders institutionalize the myth that “people fit neatly into categories, these categories fit neatly into homelands and that these homelands unambiguously should determine each individual’s fate on the earth.”⁴⁵

Within these categorizations, borders also represent and impose legal designation and codification of physical space as a means to shape new and flexible forms of domination. For instance, neoliberal capitalist globalization has intensified processes of domination through the enclosure, exploitation, expulsion (through dispossession/destruction of land) and impoverishment of populations. This ideology behind the border preserves privilege and opportunity for some by limiting access to resources and movement for others. Moreover, this legality of the border can be transformed to create exceptions that preserve its power.⁴⁶

The so-called 'migration crisis' is a phenomenon that relates to this contemporary paradigm of borders and their ideological function to manage the inclusion/exclusion of bodies in space. Institutions are created to coordinate and mediate power differences among nation-states as well as to establish regimes, sets of norms and exceptions to deal with a particular issue. These ideological regimes are protected and fostered within and outside of particular organizations and often disguise more overt exercises of power to produce particular outcomes. As Negri and Hardt argue, power is also exercised through biopolitics, "The control of society over individuals is not conducted only through consciousness or ideology, but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society biopolitics is what is most important, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal."⁴⁷

The functional existence of borders can be interpreted as casting an illusion of world-order; however, that serves as a response to the reality that there is an innate human desire for mobility. Their function is to manipulate and control the movement/flow of people, ideas, and things across territories as a means to preserve the myths and power structures that benefit from the world order. This is to say, then, the myth of Europe is produced and reproduced by its own borders. However, borders also functionally respond to different kinds of mobility that are considered antagonistic to the status quo or that refute their ideology. They adapt by processing or deterring (im)migrant bodies from altering their function and perception, often through violent means.

As a society, we produce space in such a way that it reflects a particular moment in time; this means that obsolescence is inevitable when our society evolves beyond its own narratives and myths. Ideology maintains the relevance of its function in society by reproducing power in physical space through invented things, ideas and concepts utilized by institutions to define and legitimize their real/affective boundaries in the present. Ideology is embodied in borders as they are a product of our social imaginary and are thus open to further change or destruction through a shift in narrative produced by differential use.

Ideology functions through borders to mediate power and produce outcomes. Yet those outcomes are often violent and exclusionary. How does migration critique that function through refusal, appropriation, or transformation of the space? How does that affect the power dynamic at a larger scale? The following chapter will explore this conflict and contradiction of the border at the scale of Europe and represent some of these functional aspects of the border as an apparatus of Empire in the present.

ENDNOTES - 1.2 BOUNDARIES OF IDEOLOGY

- 1 Terry Eagleton, "What is ideology?," in *Ideology: An Introduction* (London, UK: Verso, 2007).
- 2 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, 3.
- 3 Ibid, 3.
- 4 Ibid, 5-6.
- 5 Ibid, 6.
- 6 Ibid, 6.
- 7 Ibid, 6-7.
- 8 Ibid, 8.
- 9 Ibid, 7.
- 10 Ibid, 10.
- 11 Neil Smith and Henri Lefebvre, "Foreword," in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xii.
- 12 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 30.
- 13 Louis Althusser, "On Ideology," in *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, translated by G. M. Goshgarian (London, UK: Verso, 2014), 256, quoted in Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," *Antipode* (January 28, 2005), 51-52.
- 14 Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, 256, quoted in Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," 52.
- 15 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, 14.
- 16 Ibid, 16-17.
- 17 Denys Thmer, *Marxism and Christianity* (Oxford, 1983), 26. Quoted in Ibid, 24.
- 18 Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, 162, quoted in Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," 47.
- 19 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, 18.
- 20 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 105.
- 21 Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, 189.
- 22 For a discussion of these levels see: Goonewardena, Kanishka. "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics." *Antipode*. January 28, 2005. 62-67.
- 23 "The problematic of Empire is determined in the first place by one simple fact: that there is world order. This order is expressed as a juridical formation. Our initial task, then, is to grasp the constitution of the order being formed today. We should rule out from the outset, however, two common conceptions of this order that reside on opposing limits of the spectrum: first, the notion that the present order somehow rises up spontaneously out of the interactions of radically heterogeneous global forces, as if this order were a harmonious concert orchestrated by the natural and neutral hidden hand of the world market; and second, the idea that order is dictated by a single power and a single center of rationality transcendent to global forces, guiding the various phases of historical development according to its conscious and all-seeing plan, something like a conspiracy theory of globalization."
- Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "1.1 World Order," in *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 3.
- 24 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 21.
- 25 Althusser, Louis. "On Ideology," *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. Translated by G. M. Goshgarian. London, UK: Verso, 2014. 176.
- 26 Étienne Balibar, "What is a Border," *Politics and the Other Scene*. Trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson and Chris Turner. London: Verso, 2002: 76.
- 27 Henri Lefebvre, "Plan of the Present Work," in *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, US: Blackwell, 1991), 68.
- 28 Louis Althusser, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, 172, quoted in Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," 47.
- 29 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 9.
- 30 Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1990), quoted in Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," 47.
- 31 Étienne Balibar, "Europe as Borderland," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, volume 27 (2009), 190.
- 32 See: John Berger; Sven Blomberg; Chris Fox; Michael Dibb; Richard Hollis, *Ways of Seeing* (London, England : British Broadcasting Corporation : Penguin Books, 1973).

- 33 See: Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, translated by D Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1967/1995).
- 34 Kanishka Goonewardena, "The Urban Sensorium: Space, Ideology and the Aestheticization of Politics," 47.
- 35 Berger, John; et al, *Ways of Seeing*, 9-10.
- 36 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 113.
- 37 Ibid, 113.
- 38 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, "Preface," in *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 8.
- 39 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 8.
- 40 Ibid, 7.
- 41 Berger, John; et al, *Ways of Seeing*, 10.
- 42 Frank Cunningham, "Triangulating Utopia: Benjamin, Lefebvre, Tafuri," *City*, Volume 14, issue 3 (2010), 273-274.
- 43 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 277.
- 44 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 10.
- 45 Reece Jones, *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2016), 167.
- 46 See: Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
- 47 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 27.



BOUNDARIES

of EU-topia

The previous two chapters attempted to conceptualize the contemporary border regime through an analysis of what a border *is*, as a spatial practice in an ongoing process of social division, and what a border *does*, as a mediating representation of power formalized and (re)produced in space. This analysis emphasized that social perceptions of the border are contextualized by a particular society's dominant myths and practices, which change and evolve as a political and social process. Institutions attempt to control the process of social division, or the process of societal change in general, by asserting particular power dynamics in society through borders. In other words, these physical and mental dimensions of the border establish, through the built environment, a functional and affective relationship to lived social, political, economic and environmental conditions, and act as apparatuses or representation of power, which abstract or fragment the meaning of social and spatial division. This research aims to examine how the production of bordered space — its perception, conception, construction, occupation, and transformation — is intricately tied to systems of power, and in this relationship, the border mediates social movement as a function of maintaining or reproducing a particular world-order. This chapter introduces the concept of *EU-Topia*, a concept that embodies an attempt to encompass the contemporary phenomenon of borders and migration in Europe to orient it as an ongoing process of transformation that is re-shaping the meaning and form of Europe.

Europe is a socially produced space, a concept or symbol with a perceived social meaning, and conceived organization that mediates that meaning and communicates it through various mediums. In this sense, the border is a spatial representation of Europe. Today, however, there is a crisis *at* the border, described as a crisis *of* migration. However, this is a crisis *of* the border and the world-ordering logics and dynamics of social (re)production it represents. In this way, the so-called 'European migration crisis' is a false description of a contemporary phenomenon, which emphasizes that the figure of the (im)migrant, the refugee, the asylum seeker — more generally, the person who crosses borders and enters spaces designed to keep them out or limit their humanity — is responsible for the 'crisis.' Instead, this (mis)representation is continuously constructed and circulated as a part of a dominant political imaginary used to justify the strengthening of borders and controls and to mediate blindness of the real phenomenon of the present. Migration is a product of that world-order, both in the way movement is "positively" *pulled* by the seemingly endless expansion of economies and markets into new territories and "negatively" *pushed* due to the conditions that cause forced displacement and dispossession of land and resources.¹ However, migration is a symptom and not the cause of the crisis itself.

The work thus far has tried to demonstrate that, in fact, the perceived image of 'crisis' is a productive apparatus of Empire (as the paradigm of global-level hegemonic power in the present) in the way it is has been mobilized as a conceptual tool or spectacle to define, represent and legitimize the mediating

Figure 1.6 (Opposite page, top image) *Untitled*. Image description: The borderfence in Ceuta, Spain early morning 7. September 2016. The fence is a 6 meter high parallel fence towards Morocco keeping migrants and refugees out. The fence has barbed wire, watchposts, sound sensors, motion sensors, lights, cameras, patrolling guards on foot, in cars, in the hills, at sea in boats. It was first built in 1993, raised height in 1995 and 2005 to what it is today. Photo by Rasmus Degenbol.

Figure 1.7 (Opposite page, bottom image) *Untitled*. Image description: The newly erected border fence at the Hungarian-Croatian border on the 7th November 2015 outside Croatian city Torjanci. Hungary sealed off the border to Croatia after the flow of migrants rerouted into Hungary from Croatia arriving from Serbia. Photo by Rasmus Degenbol.

spatial-temporal practices of bordering and (im)migration control to facilitate the (re)production of world-order. However, these practices come at the expense of marginalized and insecure populations. Moreover, in addition to intentionally problematizing, de-legitimizing and criminalizing certain forms of mobility as 'illegal' or 'clandestine,' the dominant contemporary discourse and representations of borders invent new social categories, divisions and exclusions to maintain the conditions of sovereign power.² The production of new legal statuses for (im)migrants to solve the "problem" of migration has created new demands for more significant bureaucratic administration, institutions, technologies and spaces for migration management and border control that further entrenches this ideology.³

To expand on this point, within this crisis, there have been major reforms to the border that represents the state or dispersed institutions of power or global level processes that conceive of world-order. Not as hierarchical ordering institutions that conceive of total global world order but as institutions that operate at the global level at various scales to mediate power and control processes of social mobility. The illusion of these reforms is that they aim to "solve" the problematique that is framed as "clandestine" or "illegal" migration posing a security or moral threat to the concept of Europe itself as well as the institutions of power that conceive of and reproduce it as a concept. In reality, these techniques or bordering strategies used to solve the crisis only serve to expand and reproduce Empire. Empire being the paradigmatic dimension of a global level phenomenon of the present, encompassing the transition from colonial/imperial practices of bordering that related to the nation-state to contemporary practices that are increasingly privatized and militarized.

This intensified network or infrastructure of borders, which we will delve more deeply into in the following chapters, strengthens Empire and improves its ability to accumulate more power, wealth and resources. Therefore, this so-called "migration crisis" allows for the state to invent "new solutions" or reforms the spatial practices of borders, these changes actually represent the intensification of the status quo as well as the distancing of these practices from social or lived reality. In order to reproduce the myth of Europe, these global level bordering strategies need to make invisible counter-hegemonic social forces that reveal the inherent contradiction of this crisis. This contradiction is that it is not a crisis of migration but *a Crisis of Empire*.

In this way, the present is an extension of a historical continuum of bordering practices. Historically, the border has always operated as the formalization of this process of social division in space and society. However, the ideological role of the border in that process has transformed with the changing hierarchies of power and social conflicts of its time, which has influenced the creation of new forms, technologies and spaces of division to exploit and expand new territories to shape world-order.

Empire can be considered as the ideological regime of power under which borders are (re)produced and legitimized today as spaces that mediate power. As a global phenomenon, Empire is defined by Negri and Hardt as the transition from an imperialism, which is enacted by individual nations states, to a "new order that envelops the entire space of [...] civilization', where conflict between nations has been made irrelevant, the 'enemy' is simultaneously 'banalized' (reduced to an object of routine police repression) and absolutized (as the Enemy, an absolute threat to the ethical order)."⁴ For instance, clandestine or forced migration is perceived as an 'enemy' to Empire as it is a social phenomenon that contrasts the myths of Europe perpetuated and mediated by spatial representations (borders). As such, the 'migrant' has become a scapegoat figure to blame for the instability of the status quo, for problems with the economy, or national security. This instability, as we have stated before, is one of the driving forces of Empire as it causes destruction

and violence, which impacts racialized and economically subjugated people, to make room for the maintenance and (re)production of dominant power served by forces or systems of white supremacy and neoliberal economic expansion.

Today, the border is one of the many functional apparatuses of communicating and distributing power within and beyond the nation-state. To understand this phenomenon, Harsha Walia argues for an alternative analytical framework of “border imperialism,” which re-conceptualizes the way borders mediate power, she states that “Border imperialism depicts the processes by which the violences and precarities of displacement and migration are *structurally* created as well as maintained.”⁵⁵ Johan Galtung categorizes violence in the form of direct or structural, “Whereas in the first case these consequences can be traced to concrete persons or actors, in the second case, this is no longer meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently unequal life chances.”⁵⁶

This cycle of crisis and reform perpetuates direct and structural violence at the site of the border, and increasingly, the effects of the border have entered into the spaces of ‘everyday life.’ The impacts of this violence are primarily felt by marginalized people who are forced to cross or dwell in bordered space due to conditions of displacement, dispossession of land and resources, insecurity or expulsion from their place of origin. Their forced migration is a result of multiple factors that construct and sustain the imaginary of Empire, including colonial and imperial histories as well as their ongoing extension into the present, capitalist accumulation and impoverishment, and the decimation of the environment due to climate change and (un)natural disasters. In this way, (im)migrants or people fleeing from conditions of insecurity, are not a cause of the ‘crisis’ but are made ‘illegal’ by the border and its criminalizing laws, technologies and controls that reinforce the status quo.

Violence is structurally built into the world-order under Empire, this ideological system of power relies on the regulatory control of the movement of people to manage the inclusion/exclusion of bodies that do not fit within the dominant (western/white) imaginaries or structures of society. In this way, Empire is a logical structure that shapes the concept of Europe based on a particular imagining of who belongs and who is ‘other.’ Similarly, Walia argues that “Lived experiences of otherness are shaped by imaginings about who is entitled to protection *from* the nation-state because they represent the national identity, and who faces violence *by* the nation-state because their bodies are deemed not to belong.”⁵⁷

However, Empire, as this world-ordering system of power, is perpetuated by borders that do more than just exclude someone from a territory. If the border does not entirely exclude an (im)migrant they may be forced into certain positions of insecurity, surveillance, social/labour precarity and exploitation by border apparatuses, which prevent them from actively playing a role in re-shaping imaginaries or possibilities of a different society but exploit their life and labour to reproduce the world-order itself. For instance, undocumented migrant labour is a more invisible type of border violence. Walia argues that this contradiction is a function of border imperialism, and the state relies on creating an unequal structure of citizenship/sovereignty to “expand a pool of disposable migrant and undocumented labor that lowers the wage floor for capitalist interests without disturbing the normative whiteness of the nation-state.”⁵⁸ Therefore borders are not just open or closed but differentially include or exclude what or who passes through.

The militarization and weaponization of the contemporary ‘border regime’ — an infrastructural network composed of bordering technologies and

practices that produce spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures to manage and control migration — is conceived as a necessary response to a perceived threat or ‘crisis’ affecting the security of the state, its governing institutions and population. Contemporary theorists refer to the ideology of this broad sweeping and multi-scalar militarization of borders and associated problematization of migration as a “politics of protection,” which on the one hand ideologically reinforces the authority of the state to protect its citizens as well as forms of mobility deemed ‘acceptable’ or beneficial to reproducing power dynamics (i.e. the movement of capital and the exploitation of mobile insecure populations as a labour force).⁹ On the other hand, the intensification and expansion of the border regime (both inside and outside of the nation-state) functions to deter and control movement deemed ‘unacceptable’ based on ideological distinctions that categorize certain forms of mobility — ultimately obscuring the real political context and power dynamics that produces and maintains the structures or conditions for displacement and forced migration in the first place.¹⁰ As these theorists argue in a collaborative article entitled “New Keywords: Migration and Borders,” the binary logic of the border regime effectively criminalizes asylum claimants if they do not certify as “genuine” refugees “[...] by positing a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ as a condition asylum seekers have to meet in order to be counted as legitimate, the refugee protection regime de-legitimizes the majority of migratory moments.”¹¹

With all of this, it is essential to recognize that the so-called ‘migration crisis’ is not new but an escalation of ongoing violence through interconnected racial, political and economic systems of control and oppression inscribed in our governments, institutions and the built environment. As geographer, Reece Jones argues, “the border is a site of the founding violence of the sovereign power,”¹² and “Border making as a violent founding act of separation also gave rise to an idea of civil society based on private property and enclosures, which are the keystone to the uneven developed landscapes of the spatiality of capitalism.”¹³ Sovereign power, its governmental logics and institutions are in a continuous and ongoing cycle of production, negotiation of contradiction, and re-production of ‘crisis’ to juxtapose against an idealized image of society. This somewhat utopian image (but primarily ideological), rooted in concepts of *fabrica mundi* — a historical practice of trying to shape an ideal society — and situated in opposition to problematized forces of ‘crisis’ — scapegoats and figures of conflict or contradiction — has continuously pushed Empire forward. This generative and violent process occurs at the site of the border through the production of political subjectivities, social divisions, categorizations, separations, exclusions and enclosures. The existence of differential identities or counter-uses of these spaces is disciplined and controlled to maintain a conceived or imagined order.

The violence impacting (im)migrants and other marginalized groups is not an inevitable result of their movement or circumstances, but the result of the use of spatial practices and bordering processes as ideological ‘security’ measures to structurally regulate and protect the identity and power dynamics of European space. In addition to multiple binary divisions that manage inclusions and exclusions, separations and enclosures, hierarchies, structural orderings or “assemblages”¹⁴ such as race, class, gender, ability, nationality, religion, culture, sexuality, and so on buttress the global border regime. These structures of categorization and subjectification result in or relate to differential understandings of humanity — what Alexander Weheliye describes as “humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans”¹⁵ — limiting the sovereignty of individuals in their assertion of their rights to social security, autonomy and their ability to equally participate within society.

In summary, the borders of Europe are abstract representations or apparatuses of the state, transnational institutions and dispersed regimes of

power, which naturalize false or manufactured representations of the ‘other’ to enforce and (re)produce uneven social divisions and enclosures in a multitude of hierarchical and overlapping ways, thus creating a structural condition of inequality to maintain order. As Reece Jones argues, “[...] borders and lines on maps are not a representation of pre-existing differences and between peoples and places; they create those differences.”¹⁶ That is to say, these differences and divisions emerge through the strategic use of borders, and other spatial practices, to assert power and governmental controls, from the level of global world-order to the level of everyday life. Ultimately, by masking the conflict between the dominant political imaginary and reality or between the ideological function of borders and their resultant lived effects, the underlying structural conditions continue to be asserted, maintained and distributed in the (re)production of world-order. For this reason, we should re-frame the contemporary phenomenon, not as a ‘migration crisis’ but as a historical and ongoing *Crisis of Empire* in which multiple crises, real or perceived, are revealed to be the result of the inherent instability of their ideological foundations as world-ordering or nation-state-building projects.

Effectively, these antagonisms between the *conceived* and *lived* conditions of existence are illustrative of a virtual or possible paradigm shift in the world-order of society, which relates to the process of social division and its mediation through bordered space. This thesis identifies the virtual object of this crisis and the contemporary phenomenon of migration at a global level as *EU-topia*, a *representational* space of an ongoing utopian process of transformation of European society. *EU-Topia* is a possible-impossible or *differential space*¹⁷ that emerges from the contradictions that exist in the abstract and homogenizing space of Empire and its respective structures and systems by which it is maintained, which conflicts with the people and life that requires an alternative. As Henri Lefebvre states, “a new space cannot be born [produced] unless it accentuates difference.”¹⁸

EU-Topia as Method

The third section of the three parts of this thesis attempt to produce a reading (in text and visual form) of the contradictions and conflicts of this contemporary phenomenon of socio-political transformations, that the space of the border mediates at different scalar levels. The current global migration patterns that we are witnessing are the result of both contemporary and historical forces of power and repression: colonialism, imperialism, slavery as well as land destruction, exploitation of natural resources and other environmental effects that have had repercussions on imaginings of world-order under Empire today. A reading of the spatial impacts of this global phenomenon is the lens by which we can understand the current status quo or spatial order of European society. This is an attempt to see the present without constructing blind fields or abstracting the phenomenon through a narrow reading.

Henri Lefebvre identifies three possible and total readings a “highly complex phenomenon” with multiple “lexical items” (contradictions and conflicts) associated with it in *The Urban Revolution*:

*“There is a morphological reading (practiced by the geographer and possibly the urbanist). There is a technological reading, practiced by the administrator, the politician looking for a means of intervention. There is a reading of the possible (and the impossible) that provides us with an image of the variations of finite existence—that of the human being—supplied by urban life in place of the traditional unity that encloses “drives” and values within its narrow boundaries.”*¹⁹

The end chapters of the three parts will loosely focus on each of these readings, *morphological*, *technological*, and *possible/impossible*, respectively. This chapter will attempt to create a *morphological* reading at this macro-scale of Europe through a series of maps that depict sites and situations unique to this phenomenon. This analysis aims to conceptualize a totalizing phenomenon at a vast scale by inferring dialectical relationships between a distinct set or system of elements (“lexical items”) that constitute the paradigm (Empire/hegemonic world-order), imposing order at a global level, and the social forces of migration that reconstruct these components (borders) to form a *syntagmatic* structure, a *differential space*²⁰ or path a towards “possible/impossible” or “virtual” future.²¹ This formed syntagmatic structure of *EU-Topia* illustrates the relationship between the conflicting or contradicting movements, and opposing legitimacies that confront one another to produce a crisis: the mobility and dynamics of the border as an evolving apparatus or representation of power, and the mobility of people who transgress, refuse or refute its power to claim their own by creating a *representational space* within/against/beyond.

This chapter describes these dimensions *topologically* through a series of maps that represent aspects of the contemporary material paradigm of the border at the macro-scale of Europe. This approach is informed by Henri Lefebvre’s analysis of the urban phenomenon in which he observes, “Distinctions and differences concerning the topological properties of [urban] space, properties that theoretically constitute a network or system of pertinent oppositions (paradigm).”²² He argues that “The introduction of topology (analytic considerations of topoi [named-places] in the mental and social space) can help us remain focused on the philosophical scope of these conceptions while eliminating any traces of philosophizing, that is, speculative, attitudes.”²³ While maps always have a particular bias, topologies can be a useful representational tool for identifying the existence of these different “lexical items” that make up the abstract condition of totality.

The paradigmatic, a set or system of oppositions to be analyzed topologically concern specific functional dimensions of the border in juxtaposition with certain lived moments of migration, where the body experiences the effects of the border: the *PUSH* (Topologies of Displacement), the *PULL* (Topologies of ‘Borderless Europe’), and the *PAUSE* (Topologies of ‘Fortress Europe’). These topologies are relevant because they describe the motion or ongoing transformation of borders a conceived mediation of power in relation to the motion of people whose material and lived existence opposes or contradicts the systems of power they represent.

These three topologies of *EU-Topia* correspond to three dimensions of the border, it’s *overdetermination* (expansion beyond the edges of territory into everyday life and territories beyond Europe), *transgression* (the instances where the border is open), and *fortification* (the instances where the border is closed or encloses), which might appear contradictory but refer to the different ideological dimensions that support the different aspects of the myth of Europe in response to certain forms of contradiction of migration. The myth of Western benevolence is expressed through the *Displacement* of the Empire is supported by transnational interventions under the ideology of spreading democracy, peacemaking, freedom and humanitarianism. The myth of a *Borderless Europe*, supported by an ideology of inclusion, which is contradicted by the movement of migrants that are excluded from that narrative. The myth of a *Fortress Europe* being supported by an ideology of exclusion, which is contradicted by movements of migrants who refuse and transgress the border.

These maps show different aspects or conditions in relation to the larger framings of *push*, *pull* and *pause*, the idea is that there could be identified

relationships inferred between them, although this is not explicitly analyzed as part of the thesis discussion, they are more broadly thematic representations of ongoing processes of conflict, contestation of the bordering processes that produce world order. Migration is the source of contradiction for the mode of social (re) production that maintains the myth of Europe; as such, new borders are produced to confront that contradiction in different ways. Some borders are explicitly militarized walls, while others are more ephemeral, but with no less violent effects.

CARTOGRAPHY I

Topologies of EU-Topia


PUSH

Topologies of Displacement

This series of maps describe different dimensions of the condition of displacement to illustrate the role Europe and other foreign powers play in destabilizing countries and communities in the Global South, causing displacement and forced migration, both in the present and as a result of a historical continuum of *Border Imperialism*.²⁴ This mass migration is a result of the ideology of the border extending beyond the territorial boundaries of Europe and the expulsion/displacement that results from direct or structural violence. Largely, the blame has been attributed to those who are migrating across borders rather than the dispersed network of power, which exerts control over mobility and life through borders. The EU redefined its borders in the interests of expanding the reach of Europe as an Empire in itself to accumulate wealth and resources, and today it is faced with the effects and continues to operate in efforts to preserve the current status quo. Part of the right to move is the right to stay, in this way, borders not only contain territory and population but also disrupt and reshape territory and resultantly displace population.


This framing aims to argue that people have always moved, but migration today is completely influenced by transnational asymmetries of power and the ways in which contemporary borders mediate this condition. On the one hand borders cause forced displacement and control migration through various factors that *push*, in this sense everyone moves for a variety of reasons, but the legacies of colonialism and imperialism have created vast asymmetries in the world-order, which impact how people move and why people experience different degrees of precarity or insecurity in their movement, particularly racialized black and brown people. People who face the most insecurity are largely moving from rural areas in the Global South, they are people who have been colonized and continue to experience colonialism in different forms mediated by a border regime. Precarity of economics, conflict, war and climate change are all bound up together and are accelerating, intensifying and expanding the effects on migration.

The first map, *Imperial Dis(placement)*, identifies the condition of structural displacement in the colonial/imperial presence and occupation of countries in the North, West, part of Central and part of East Africa as well as part of the Middle East. There are multiple aspects to this form of displacement that include most predominantly the loss of a sense of place, the connection between a community to its ancestral land through colonialism and imperial wars and foreign military occupations. These events not only displaced cultures but accumulated wealth and resources for the colonizers or imperial powers.



IMPERIAL DISPLACEMENT (1400 - 2015)

Figure 1.8.0



TIMELINE OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM & IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST (1400 - PRESENT)

Figure 1.8.1

1492 - 1650: Period of exploration and early European colonization of the North and South Americas, and some African and Asian territories

1884 - 1885: The Berlin Conference/the Congo Conference. Europeans carve up Africa into slices

1914 - 1918: World War I

1920: League of Nations forms

1922: Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire

1939 - 1945: World War II

1947: Indian/Pakistani independence. The beginning of the steady decline in the British empire. Beginning of Cold War.

1960-1963: Most European colonies and protectorates in Africa and the Caribbean become free nations

1970: At an international conference, the major economic powers of the world abolish the "gold standard," thus initiating a new period in economic speculation

1973: Oil Crisis


1979: Islamic revolution in Iran

1989: Berlin wall falls – start of the period of contemporary "Globalization"

1991: Break up of the USSR. The collapse of the Cold War system


1996-2000: Explosion of the Internet changes the rules and accelerates the pace of global interaction

The second map, *(In)direct Displacement*, identifies the conditions of direct and indirect internal displacement due to conflict and climate change. These are forced expulsions that vary in degrees of violence. People forced off their land/property due to war or climate change. Both forces of conflict and climate change create direct displacement but are connected to indirect causes. Wars and conflicts are often instigated by foreign involvement by proxy, and climate change is a planetary phenomenon with the largest polluters being countries in the Global North or industries in the Global South connected to the Global North.



EXISTING IDP - 2015 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.1




NEW CONFLICT IDP - 2015 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.2




EXISTING IDP - 2016 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.5



NEW CONFLICT IDP - 2016 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.6




EXISTING & NEW IDP - 2015 (TOTAL)

Figure 1.9.3




NEW DISASTER IDP - 2015 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.4




EXISTING & NEW IDP - 2016 (TOTAL)

Figure 1.9.7




NEW IDP - 2016 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.8




EXISTING IDP - 2017 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.9




NEW CONFLICT IDP - 2017 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.10



EXISTING & NEW IDP - 2017 (TOTAL)

Figure 1.9.11



NEW DISASTER IDP - 2017 (PROPORTIONAL)

Figure 1.9.12


The third map, *Transnational (Dis)placement*, identifies conditions of transnational displacement. They are illustrating both the displacement of funds, as humanitarian aid to support displaced communities in the Global South and where those funds are placed. Often borders are constructed through transnational agreements; countries agree to solve a “problem” of migration for Europe in exchange for funds or investment of some kind. Moreover, one could look this as a transfer of wealth to the Global South that was initially extracted through the border imperialism illustrated in the first map.

NEXT BABYLON




PERCENTAGE OF INTERNATIONAL AID FUNDED - 2015 (COUNTRIES ON MAP)
Figure 1.10.1


Europe, a Crisis of Empire




TOP 10 DONOR COUNTRIES - 2015
Figure 1.10.2




- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Kuwait
- Germany
- All other funding




- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Canada
- Kuwait
- All other funding




- United Arab Emirates
- Saudi Arabia
- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- All other funding




- United States of America
- European Commission
- United Kingdom
- Central Emergency Response Fund
- Japan
- All other funding




- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Japan
- Germany
- All other funding




- United States of America
- Japan
- Saudi Arabia
- Germany
- Switzerland
- All other funding




- United States of America
- European Commission
- United Kingdom
- Germany
- Netherlands
- All other funding



- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Japan
- Central Emergency Response Fund
- All other funding



- United States of America
- European Commission
- Germany
- Japan
- United Kingdom
- All other funding



- United States of America
- United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Central Emergency Response Fund
- Private (Individuals & Orgs.)
- All other funding

TOP 10 RECIPIENT COUNTRIES - 2015
Figure 1.10.3

PULL

Topologies of Borderless Europe


This series of maps describe different dimensions of 'Borderless Europe.' The conflict or contradiction between the myth of a 'Borderless Europe' that it supports inclusion while it is contradicted by the movement of migrants who are excluded from that narrative. These maps show the results of the conditions of displacement and the directions migrants are pulled and how that creates a distribution of migrant populations within Europe. What is visible here is the movement of people, and what is invisible are the barriers to that movement by which it is shaped. What we see here is the movement that confronts, contradicts and transgresses the borders that represent the myth of Europe.

The fourth map, *Desertion & Exodus*, describes the density of asylum seekers (emigration) and asylum applicants (immigration) per 100,000 inhabitants as well as the total numbers. It generally shows where people are leaving and where they are going.




ORIGIN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2015

Figure 1.11.1




DESTINATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2015

Figure 1.11.2




ORIGIN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2016

Figure 1.11.4




DESTINATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2016

Figure 1.11.5



TOP 25 IMMIGRATION & EMMIGRATION - 2015 (TOTAL)

Figure 1.11.3



TOP 25 IMMIGRATION & EMMIGRATION - 2016 (TOTAL)

Figure 1.11.6




ORIGIN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2015

Figure 1.11.7



DESTINATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS - 2017


Figure 1.11.8



TOP 25 IMMIGRATION & EMMIGRATION - 2017 (TOTAL)


Figure 1.11.9

The fifth map, *Routes & Hubs*, describes the migration movements towards Europe that originate from North, West, part of Central and part of East Africa, as well as part of the Middle East. These movements imply borders or barriers that are not visible in this map but are inferred in the changing directions of movement over time as certain gateways to Europe become closed off.




ROUTES & HUBS (2015-2016)

Figure 1.12.0



ROUTES & HUBS - 2015

Figure 1.12.1



ROUTES & HUBS - 2016




Figure 1.12.2



ROUTES & HUBS - 2017


Figure 1.12.3

The sixth map, *Hospitality & Hostility*, describes the discrepancy between the perception of migration as a crisis and reality of the relatively low numbers of people given asylum in Europe and the number of people deported or denied asylum. Europe is perceived as a “better place” by those migrating towards it; however, this myth is exposed by the reality of the asylum system as well as the growing nationalist and white supremacist rhetoric against (im)migration.





HOSPITALITY & HOSTILITY - 2015

Figure 1.13.1



HOSPITALITY & HOSTILITY - 2016

Figure 1.13.2



HOSPITALITY & HOSTILITY - 2017


Figure 1.13.3

PAUSE

Topologies of Fortress Europe

This series of maps describe different dimensions of 'Fortress Europe.' In contrast to the image of a 'Borderless Europe,' the EU has perhaps one of the world's larger and most complex infrastructures of borders to deter, prevent, control and recirculate unwanted migrants. The Schengen agreement made internal borders less strict but also made the external borders became increasingly militarized. Amnesty International estimates that, between 2007-2013, before the crisis, the EU spent almost €2bn on fences, surveillance systems and patrols on land or at sea.²⁵ With the proliferation of migration in and towards Europe, there have been more border controls added in different forms. They are creating difficulty for people to access safe and 'legal' entry to the continent.

The seventh map, *Border Militarization*, illustrates the security-driven approach to the internal and external fortification of Europe. This does not solve the structural issues that cause people to be displaced and forces them to move towards Europe; rather, this creates greater instability in many of the countries of origin. The external borders of Europe not only been fortified, but the border has been pushed outward further as a preventative measure.



BORDER MILITARIZATION

Figure 1.14.0



1 Ceuta & Melilla / Spain - Both extend fences in 2005.

Ceuta - 8.3km x 6m / 6.3km border

Melilla - 10km x 6m / 9.6km border



2 Greece / Turkey - Completed 2012

12km x 4m / 206km border



5 Hungary / Serbia - Completed 2015

151km x 4m / 151km border



6 Hungary / Croatia - Completed 2015

300km / 329km border



3 Bulgaria / Turkey - Completed 2015

201km x 3m / 260km border



4 Calais, France / U.K. - Extended 2015

Fencing: 1km x 4m



7 Ukraine / Russia - Scheduled for Completion 2018

Ditches: 180 km

Fencing: 40km

Fortification obstacles: 500



8 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania / Russia - Scheduled for Completion 2018

Estonia - 1.6km (110km planned) x 2.5m / 294km border

Latvia - 23km (90km planned) x 2m / 276km border

Lithuania - 44.6km x 2m / 227km border



9 Austria / Slovenia - Completed 2016
3.7km x 2m / 330km border



10 Slovenia / Croatia - Completed 2015
200km / 670km border




11 Norway / Russia - Completed 2017
200km x 4m / 196km border







12 Macedonia / Greece - Completed 2016
33km x 2.5m / 246km border

Figure 1.14.1 - 1.14.12 European Border Walls (current & opposite page)

The eighth map, *Border Deaths*, illustrates the ways in which the border permanently stops movement, showing missing migrants and border deaths. This map shows the effects of border violence through the fortification of Europe, which makes it more and more difficult for migrants to access their fundamental human right to asylum.





BORDER DEATHS
Figure 1.15.0






BORDER DEATHS - 2015

Figure 1.15.1



BORDER DEATHS - 2016

Figure 1.15.2



BORDER DEATHS - 2017

Figure 1.15.3

The ninth map, *Border Zones*, showing detention centres and major “hot-spots” of arrivals or encampments across Europe. Places of formal detention and informal or abandonment. These are border zones where movement is paused indefinitely and contained with enclosed spaces that operate as an infrastructure to recirculate or expel for profit.



Figure 1.16.1: 1970-2000



Figure 1.16.2: 2000-2005



Figure 1.16.3: 2005-2010



Figure 1.16.4: 2010-2015

ENDNOTES - 1.3 BOUNDARIES OF EU-TOPIA

- 1 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, "Counter-Empire," in *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000), 213.
- 2 See: Schinkel, Willem and Marlou Schrover, "Introduction: the language of inclusion and exclusion in the context of immigration and integration," *The Language of Inclusion and Exclusion in Immigration and Integration, Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36:7 (2013), 1124.
- 3 Casas-Cortés, Maribel, Sebastian Cobarrubias, Nicholas Paul De Genova, Glenda Garelli, Giorgio Grappi, Charles R Heller, Sabine Hess, Bernd Kasperek, Sandro Mezzadra, Brett Neilson, Irene Peano, Lorenzo Pezzani, John Pickles, Federico Rahola, Lisa Riedner, Stephan Scheel and Martina Tazzioli, "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," *Cultural Studies*, Volume: 29, Issue: 1 (2015), 5.
- 4 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, 6, quoted in Walter Benn Michaels, *The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the end of history* (Princeton University Press, 2004), 171-172, quoted in Wikipedia contributors, "Empire (Hardt and Negri book)," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Empire\(HardtandNegribook\)&oldid=921811259](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Empire(HardtandNegribook)&oldid=921811259) (accessed October 20, 2019).
- 5 Harsha Walia, "Introduction," in *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2013), 5.
- 6 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (1969), 170-1.
- 7 Harsha Walia, *Undoing Border Imperialism*, 63.
- 8 *Ibid*, 74.
- 9 Casas-Cortés, et al, "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," 16.
- 10 *Ibid*, 17.
- 11 *Ibid*, 18.
- 12 Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones, "Rethinking borders, violence, and conflict: From sovereign power to borderscapes as sites of struggles," *EPD: Society and Space* (California: Sage Publishing, 2019), 4.
- 13 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013) 27-59, quoted in Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones, "Rethinking borders, violence, and conflict," 4.
- 14 See: Alexander Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014)
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FRANCE, A STATE OF EMERGENC(E)/(Y)

Part Two



FRANCE

a State of Emergenc(e)/(y)

The immigrants have the greatest right to live in France. They are the representatives of dispossession and dispossession is at home in France, as it is in the majority and almost universal. The immigrants have quite notoriously lost their cultures and their countries, without being able to find others. And the French are in the same situation, and hardly more secretly.

With the equalization of all of the planet in the poverty of a new environment and a purely mendacious intelligence about everything, the French — who have accepted this without much resistance (except in 1968) — are ill-advised to say that they no longer feel at home because of the immigrants! They have reason to no longer feel at home, it is true. This is because, in this horrible new world of alienation, there is no one other than immigrants.

— Guy Debord, *Notes on the “immigrant question”* (1985)¹

[...] And yet we are told that such movement is unprecedented, that it represents a crisis, a flood, a disaster. We are told that there are two kinds of humans, natives and migrants, and that these must struggle for supremacy.

We are told not only that movement through geographies can be stopped but that movement through time can be too, that we can return to the past, to a better past, when our country, our race, our religion was truly great. All we must accept is division. The division of humanity into natives and migrants. A vision of a world of walls and barriers, and of the guards and weapons and surveillance required to enforce those barriers. A world where privacy dies, and dignity and equality alongside it, and where humans must pretend to be static, unmoving, moored to the land on which they currently stand and to a time like the time of their childhood—or of their ancestors’ childhoods—an imaginary time, in which standing still is only an imaginary possibility.

Such are the dreams of a species defeated by nostalgia, at war with itself, with its migratory nature and the nature of its relationship to time, screaming in denial of the constant movement that is human life.

Perhaps thinking of us all as migrants offers us a way out of this looming dystopia. If we are all migrants, then possibly there is a kinship between the suffering of the woman who has never lived in another town and yet has come to feel foreign on her own street and the suffering of the man

Figure 2.1 (Opposite Page) Author’s Image, *Place de la République*, August 11, 2016

who has left his town and will never see it again. Maybe transience is our mutual enemy, not in the sense that the passage of time can be defeated but rather in the sense that we all suffer from the losses time inflicts.

— Mohsin Hamid, *In the 21st century, we are all migrants* (2019)²

This next section of the thesis, *Part Two: France, a State of Emergenc(y/e)*, argues that the targeted exclusion and violence impacting (im)migrants and other marginalized social groups through the ‘Crisis of Empire’ and the reshaping of borders across Europe relates strongly to the events and spatial phenomenon under a ‘State of Emergency’ in France. These evolving bordering processes and political apparatuses that control movement — whether they are physical spaces, infrastructures, technologies, institutions or exceptional militarized/weaponized powers — are instrumental in constructing and mediating a narrative of French identity. These borders are conceived by ideological institutions of power to mediate an image of “France” as a symbolic concept that embodies a particular mythology and is situated against or in opposition to the presence of migration, which is perceived to be a source of conflict or contradiction to the mode of social (re) production of France, from which they are fundamentally excluded. ‘Emergency,’ in the same vein as ‘Crisis,’ is a spectacle mediated by the border to legitimize these dominant institutions and sources of political power at multiple levels by scapegoating the social phenomenon that opposes or reveals its ideology.

However, as many scholars have argued, the border is not only a site of the (re)production of power through violence but a site of “generative struggles where alternative subjectivities and agencies” or modalities of existence are shaped by the people who dwell within this indeterminate and in-between zone.³ While there is an *emergence* of new technologies that diffuse and militarize borders in complex, sophisticated and exceptional ways, there has been a historical and ongoing *emergence* of actions of critical resistance and refusal. These actions have challenged the de-politicization and naturalization of the border (and the existence of those who dwell within it) by producing a range of new forms of political discourse (directly or indirectly) around issues at the intersection of borders and migration.

This section investigates a few questions: What is the potential of these new uses, occupations and appropriations of these indeterminate spaces to undermine and upend their power by exposing the contradictions that underpin them? How can the differential use of space necessitate demands for radical inclusion — or rather — reimagine new political potentials of inclusion on different terms, not defined by the current political status quo or perceptions of ‘human’?

Migration, as a social phenomenon, can be a lens into these invisible political processes that produce the abstract spaces of borders and spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures within society — a way of seeing or (mis)reading space and social processes within/against/beyond the ideological blind field of the present. A reading which has the potential to transform ‘problematization’ and abstraction into a tool for inquiry, flipping it on its head, to reveal social phenomenon as a source of contradiction, which can open up the possibility for transformation.

For a brief aside before beginning, and to re-align the arguments of the thesis, this framing attempts to explore the perspective of this thesis that the Emergency in France is an extension of the paradigm of Crisis in the present, that perpetuates a particular mode of social (re)production through spatial mediations of the border. Empire is the world-ordering paradigm that this expanding border regime pushes towards through crisis. However, arguably, Empire is a concept rooted in a historical continuum of a particular mode of social reproduction, its

extension into the present, however, could be viewed as a ‘Global’ paradigm, representing the globalization and dispersion of the power of the nation-state and the increasing privatization of spaces of everyday life.

So in effect, *Part One* described the syntagmatic path or process of Europe > Empire > Crisis which align respectively with: a mythic image or concept of Europe, an Empire as an ideological structure or system that imposes order over social (re) production, and Crisis a utopian process that embodies a conflict or contradiction pushing towards a possible or impossible future that either transforms these modes of social reproduction or continues to reform and develop new technologies that push toward the expansion of Empire. Crisis, from the view of the dominant institutions that conceive of world-order, is fabricated as migration, whereas the root of the crisis is the world-order itself and the borders and spaces that mediate this mode of social (re)production.

Part Two describes the syntagmatic path or process of France > State > Emergenc(y/e) which align respectively with a translation of the previous section onto the scale of France, however in this case ‘State’ refers to the extension and translation of Empire into the present, as a globalization of the state under neoliberalism. Moreover, Emergenc(y/e) reflects on the dual sides of the ‘crisis’ in France, on one hand it represents the emergence of new technologies to control movement and on the other hand migration as a social phenomenon represents the utopian process to reveal or expose and undermine these technologies. From the perspective of the institutions that conceive of France as a concept and mediate that concept through borders, migration is an emergency that is disrupting the status quo because of its transgression of borders. However, it is the aim of this thesis to describe this disruption as a utopian process oriented towards a different society altogether.

To clarify, Europe > Empire > Crisis is a syntagmatic path of the utopian process of the present, its relationship to France > State > Emergenc(y/e) is paradigmatic. They are both describing the same totalizing phenomenon of borders and migration but at different scales. Within these scales of analysis borders in their various forms as topologies, infrastructures/technologies or as contested lived spaces are understood to be mediating between the Global level/world-ordering practices, and differential Private level/habiting/everyday practices that can both confirm or reinforce the world-order or contradict and reveal the ideologies mediated by borders.

The Problematization of (Im)migration & The Spectacle of Border (Re)Enforcement

As Marlou Schrover and Willem Schinke argue, the “problematization of (im)migrant issues” has become part of the ‘spectacle,’ defined by French Marxist theorist and Situationist International founding member, Guy Debord, as “a social relationship between people that is mediated by images of collective self-representation.”²⁴ This ‘spectacle’ abstracts and blinds us from the systemic ways in which our social reality relates to our spatial practices and, by extension, the representations of those practices through mediating ideological manipulation that distance dominant social imaginary from lived experience. The ‘problematization’ of fabricated, interwoven and conflated issues diffuse sovereign power through the expansion of the ‘border regime’ in different levels and dimensions of society. In this way, many scholars argue that the spectacle is not the product of the state alone but instead various mediating actors, movements, and discourses — the border being a pivotal site of this process and negation of different social and political forces:

Every form of border produces its own spectacle, its own representations. When we speak of the border spectacle, we emphasize the need to be aware of these various moments and forms of production and of the power-knowledge networks that constitute the border regime and give rise to their public

*image.*⁵

Along these lines of inquiry, geographer and anthropologist, Nicholas De Genova, highlights an essential aspect of the role of the border in contemporary society, arguing that the border spectacle is, “the enactment of exclusion through the enforcement of the border,” which effectively and resultantly produces migration as an uneven social category with different degrees of disciplinary controls applied to “selected migration steams and bodies” and in the process of making these figures visible they are also made “governable.”⁶ In other words, the spectacle of the border allows for the exploitation of visible or perceived human difference (communicated through abstract representation) in service of perpetuating and legitimizing a dominant imaginary. The border produces this spectacle in unique ways. It is continuously in a state of motion or flux to respond to changes in its political context and conflicts with sources of contradiction by enforcing a division through ‘problematization.’

In this way, the “Immigrant Question,” is frequently raised as a topic of political debate within Western countries like France today, with a variety of perspectives or sources contributing to a spectacle of border enforcement that problematizes (im)migration in different ways and for different purposes.

While there is increasing pressure for Western countries to provide humanitarian aid and refuge for victims of the so-called ‘migration crisis,’ the root causes of forced migration are given little attention, as is the underlying political nature of inequality, alienation or dispossession. This leads to debates over who deserves asylum, what are the limits to hospitality, who is human and therefore, who deserves access to human rights? Rather than confronting the hostility embedded in spatial practices of bordering, liberal nation-states are complicit in perpetuating displacement, expulsion and social division, through their use of the (im)migrant simultaneously as a scapegoat figure of ‘crisis’ and a recipient of benevolent humanitarian aid as a “gift of freedom,”⁷ a symbolic gesture that reinforces the authority of the state to place conditional limits on hospitality. Such examples of liberal discourse, which seek to reform the (im)migration system rather than address the root causes, only serve to entrench these practices as the status quo further.

In addition to liberal discourse, many right-wing, nationalist, and populist extremist groups have mobilized around anti-immigrant rhetoric⁸ based on excluding cultural difference. In France, the National Rally political party (previously named National Front) has had increased success in the polls in the most recent election on an anti-immigration platform. The party’s leader, Marine Le Pen, has compared (im)migration to historical barbarian invasions as a metaphor for a form of cultural warfare, saying, “Without any action, this migratory conflict will be like the barbarian invasion of the fourth century, and the consequences will be the same.”⁹

Along with the encouragement of discriminatory and false narratives of ‘cultural invasion’ by nationalist groups, there has also been a widespread perception that many who cross international borders are “economic migrants who wish to take unfair advantage of its prosperity.”¹⁰ According to artist and activist Ai Weiwei, whose work has recently centred on the “migrant crisis,” “Implicit (in this argument) is a refusal to acknowledge that through globalization, certain states, institutions and individuals have greatly profited at the direct expense of those in many parts of the world who are vulnerable and increasingly exploited.”¹¹ This process of exploitation acts like a feedback-loop for capitalist expansion, which creates a variety of conditions of insecurity and displacement (from economical to environmental), and externalized border regimes that force people to move, often into precarious (labour) situations that reinforce and reproduce borders. Even the

state criminalization of people ‘irregularly’ crossing borders feeds back into profits for security markets and private prisons.¹² Moreover, many public and private institutions have vested interests in these markets as sources of profit.

As Debord argues, the “Immigrant Question” is “raised by the economy [...] and discussed as spectacle.”¹³ In particular, the media and other sources of political discourse frequently create perceptions of a threat due to widespread image circulation, exaggeration of events and false information.¹⁴ In this way, the perceived connection to terrorism strengthens fear associated with (im)migration. As Thomas Nail argues in *A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks*, in the “nationalist imaginary” in Europe today the so-called “Migration Crisis” and the “Terrorism Crisis” have become a combined set of issues rooted in this perceived threat that the figure of the (im)migrant brings against the security (cultural identity or economic stability) of the individual nation-state, and the greater European Union.¹⁵ While it is not a new connection, Nail and others argue that the fear of the ‘other’ has been repurposed and exacerbated in a post-9/11 era, where (im)migration controls and anti-terrorism security practices are combined interests of the nation-state.¹⁶ This has been the case recently in France due to the perceived conflation of an influx of people crossing borders into the country and the Paris attacks in January and November of 2015 and Nice in 2016. Nail argues that after the attacks what was only an “implicit” association of migration with terrorism in France, became “explicit” under the declaration of a national state of emergency.¹⁷

The topologies in the previous chapter attempted to describe some of these overarching conditions of inequality and their relationship to the border and its function to *Push* and *Pull*, compelling people to move as well as creates obstacles and barriers that *Pause*, affecting mobility on a global scale. Schrover and Schinkel similarly illustrate that migration is subject to control internal to the nation-state; these controls have different linkage to different problems, contradictions or crises of sovereign power or dispersed institutions of governance. These forces converge at the site of the border but are also connected to other borders and sites of struggle. They argue that this linkage represents an “expanded *field of problematization*, which delimits the scope of the discursive space in which problematization occurs.”¹⁸ This discursive space is topological as it represents the border as a strategic nexus point for governments and institutions to achieve control over “‘areas of joint gain,’ such as the linkage of social cohesion, safety, criminality and terrorism, to migration.”¹⁹

In research on problematizations of migration, four topoi have been identified: economic, humanitarian, endangering and cultural. [...] In the economic topos the emphasis can either be on the benefit of migrants to the host society (mostly as workers), or migrants can be portrayed as competitors in the labour market and as persons likely to become a public charge. The humanitarian topos is used in a comparative sense: no country wants to be accused of being less humanitarian than neighbouring countries, but no country wants to attract migrants with too much humanitarianism either. The endangering topos presents migrants as a threat to social order, cohesion, sovereignty and security. The cultural topos presents migrants as fundamentally different from the ‘home’ population. This can be seen as an asset, but it is usually presented as a problem.²⁰

In this way, the “expanded *field of problematization*” and the spectacle of the border influences perceptions of (im)migration to strategically maintain and expand sovereign power. This is a critical perspective because it positions the site of the

border as a strategic point of the state and other institutions of power to reproduce and control social imaginary and through spatial ordering tactics. The particular historical deployment of the 'state of emergency' in France demonstrates the productive use of the border and (im)migration control to create a perceived threat (or benefit) of the 'other' to resolve different areas of crisis and contradiction strategically.

A State of Emergency

Three main legal provisions grant the French government exceptional powers in certain circumstances, the distinctions between them concern the distribution of those powers amongst the police, military or other legal authorities:

- *Article 16 of the Constitution provides for "exceptional powers" (Pouvoirs exceptionnels) to the President in times of acute crisis.*
- *Article 36 of the Constitution regulates "state of siege" (État de siège).*
- *Act of 3 April 1955 allows the President of the Republic to declare a "state of emergency" (État d'urgence).²¹*

All of these laws reflect the values of French society at a specific point in time, to deal with a specific crisis, to maintain the power, principles and identity of the state from forces that would undermine it. A state of emergency has been declared six times in the country's history: In 1955, 1958, and 1961 related to events during the Algerian Revolution. In 1984, relating to the revolts in the overseas territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia.²² In 2005, related to (im)migrant revolts (first, second and third-generation) in Paris' suburbs.²³ Most recently, in 2015 after the terror attacks, and up until 2017 when new counter-terrorism laws replaced the declaration.²⁴ Léopold Lambert draws a link between the origins of these state interventions and the problematization and marginalization of particular social groups by these exceptional actions:

These examples highlight the connection between the history of the state of emergency and the history of colonialism—whether historical colonial subjects (Algeria), assimilated colonial subjects (overseas departments/collectivities), or metropolitan colonial subjects (banlieues, or suburbs, inhabited largely by second- and third-generation immigrants from former French colonies). The logic behind this link is clear: France suspends the rights that it claims as indispensable principles—enshrined in slogans like "the country of human rights" and "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—when confronted by its colonial subjects, who are understood as fundamentally outside of the notion of "national identity," a concept so often deployed by politicians across the political spectrum.²⁵

Much as the 'migration crisis' draws attention away from the root causes of displacement due to the violent externalization of the European border regime, the declaration of a 'state of emergency,' within France in particular, misdirects the attention from a more widespread 'crisis of the nation-state.' This false perception and problematization of the (im)migrant or marginalized 'other' as a threat to national security is part of a more significant problem in nationalist politics, which deals with what Nail calls the "dual failure of the nation-state," both "a failure to adequately address the needs of an increasing population of people without citizenship" and, "the failure to put a stop to terrorism."²⁶ Moreover, as Schinkel and Schrover argue, "Between 1945 and 2005, migration increased, as did the

rights of citizens and the interest of states in withholding rights. The state's role shifted from control of the borders of the nation-state to control the borders of 'society.'²⁷

The declining power of the nation-state in a globalizing economy has led to a rise in nationalist and protectionist rhetoric as well as austerity measures used to mask a more insidious underlying ideology of xenophobia, racism, hatred and violence toward the 'other,' which are social divisions that underpin the foundation of the modern nation-state through a history of colonialism and imperialism. As Nail argues, these kinds of responses to migration draw on imaginaries of national, racial purity, or white supremacy, as well as a fear of change that governing bodies exploit in order to "justify increased border securitization against the two perceived common enemies confronting European nation-states: migrant cosmopolitanism and Islamic terrorism."²⁸ Thus, the "expanded field" or "linkage" that Schinkel and Schrover identify between the figure of the migrant the "endangering topos" aims to resolve the 'crisis' of the nation-state.²⁹ These underlying logics and protectionist rhetoric create the illusion that it is acceptable and even necessary to dehumanize the 'other' by conflating anti-immigration policies with anti-terrorism policies to strip certain people of rights or a political voice for the greater goal of protecting and expanding the power of the nation-state.

However, migration has not always been negatively perceived to be detrimental to the interests of France, nor is all migration into the country treated the same today. Legality and illegality are shifting and fluid concepts that evolve alongside spatial practices of bordering. Part of rethinking this framing of contemporary 'crisis' or 'emergency' is by critically reflecting on the history of human mobility and border in relation to the dominant perception of migration today. People have always moved, and movement has shaped, reinforced, and undermined paradigms of power.

Nevertheless, many histories of human migration, driven by the expansion of trade, colonialism and imperialism and were not explicitly understood as "migration" at the time, nor were the people who moved problematized in the way they are today. The problematization of migration — as a contemporary issue responsible for, or linked to, other societal issues — has emerged alongside the ideological categorizations or social divisions of 'migrants,' as a population to be controlled or managed, and 'citizens,' as a population that is supposedly 'native' to the modern nation-state. This contemporary condition, in turn, represents how the border has become the centre of everyday life, controlling and managing the perception of mobility at multiple points of contention or 'emergency' that are perceived as a threat to entirely imagined conditions.

As Jane Freedman writes in an article titled *The French "Sans-Papiers" Movement: An Unfinished Struggle*:

This issue of illegal or clandestine immigration is not a new one — throughout French history there has been clandestine immigration and sporadic periods of regularization of illegal immigrants. Indeed at one point, illegal immigration was viewed as completely necessary for the functioning of the economy. In the postwar period politicians freely admitted that they could not control all immigration and that to attempt to do so would be to reduce the number of immigrant workers available for French industry, hence weakening France's economic performance.³⁰

What Freedman illustrates is De Genova's concept of "Differential Inclusion," which describes how violence underlies inclusion as well as exclusion, both being productive aspects of the border.

Differential inclusion describes how inclusion in a sphere, society or realm can involve various degrees of subordination, rule, discrimination, racism, disenfranchisement, exploitation and segmentation.³¹

Social perceptions change depending on the historical relations to migration at the time. Even though the criminalization and illegalization of migration under a 'state of emergency' is the status quo today, it has not functionally enhanced security nor prevented people from crossing borders, instead it is about shifting the "expanded field of problematization" to maintain a perception that the government is in control and symbolizing the state's resolve to protect national security. This process of societal change is made visible or legible through alternative uses of space that counter, resist or refuse the established order, thus expressing a condition of social tension. This conflict creates the potential for something new to emerge, but more importantly through a reading of space, and its use, it becomes possible to understand and critique the underlying conditions and social tensions that exist between different groups of people and how this division is reproduced and maintained by the state or dominant power structure.

A State of Emergence

The delineation binary categorization of (im)migrant and native, foreigner and national, or other hierarchical categories or "assemblages,"³² is necessary for the (re)production of social relations of a capitalist, colonial and imperial domination under Empire. Under the purview of Empire, (im)migrants are a necessary exception to maintain this rule, and the border is the apparatus that exercises power to reinforce this social division and keeps the machine of the nation-state running. Debord makes it clear that the implicit rejection/dependency of (im)migrants in the creation of French identity, which he says is now lost, is falsely preserved through a definition and (re)production of the 'other.' The French 'crisis' or 'emergency' is a product of the state's inability to sustain a myth of what it means to be French when that identity has been 'dispossessed.'³³

The border has become the mediating image, or rather, an abstract representation of the limits and boundaries of European juridical order, within and outside of the nation-state; it functionally and effectively enforces the interests of power by controlling the movement of people and capital. The many forms the border takes are part of a more extensive infrastructure that regulates and maintains the identity and power dynamics of European space or territory. This idea of a "Europe" or a "France" that the border promotes conflicts with its social reality in which (im)migrants and other marginalized groups are fundamentally excluded (or included through exclusion) from sovereignty and democratic representation. We are in a 'critical zone'³⁴ or phase where lived effects of its logics continuously challenge the power of the border to include/exclude to maintain the status quo, and not just in indeterminate or exceptional spaces but spaces of everyday life.

This second part of the thesis interrogates the multitude of spatial practices, forms, technologies and infrastructures of borders used by the state to control and restrict movement and specifically movement that contradicts the logic of the state communicated through the space of the border. This analysis examines explicitly abstract border systems and networks as they are produced in France as a response to (while simultaneously reproducing) the 'migrant crisis,' in relation to discourse on the symbolic origins of a 'state of exception' or 'state of emergency,' as well as drawing connections to its material forms and lived effects that either reinforce or contradict the foundational ideologies. Using mapping tools and other representational methods to navigate the changing and emerging border and migration management technologies and thinking through different

ways of spatializing migration in relation to these transformations to highlight, “the diverse practices by which mobile subjects negotiate and contest shifting forms of domination and exploitation.”³⁵

As Schrover and Schinkel argue, a problematized binary is often the lens through which we see (im)migrants; seen for the problems they “create” and the problems they “have.”³⁶ Moreover, the exploitation and subjugation of their identity reproduce social order and power dynamics. However, this framing ignores how their existence is also a source of transformation, of possibility, of exposing and challenging the status quo to create a more radically inclusive system.

Many scholars are beginning to develop new approaches to framing the phenomenon of migration in such a way as to shed light on the “multifarious practices of ‘subjectivation’ through which migrants challenge these devices on a daily basis giving rise to relations at practices that facilitate their mobility as well as often unstable ways of staying in place.”³⁷ Moreover:

[...] recent work on borders aims to reach beyond the underlying basic binary logic of structure/agency in order to demonstrate how at the border there is no single unitarian organizing logic at work. Instead, the border constitutes a site of constant encounter, tension, conflict and contestation. In this view, migration is constituted of the border as a site of conflict and a political space. It is the excess of these forces and movement of migration that challenge, cross, and reshape borders, and it is this generative excess that is subsequently stabilize, controlled, and manage by various state agencies and policy schemes as they seek to invoke the border as a stable, controllable and manageable tool of selective or differential inclusion. From this arises a theoretical challenge not only to describe migration as an active force, but to also understand and accommodate how migration intervenes into the very centre of our production of theory.³⁸

In response to the problematization of migration by the spectacle of border (re)enforcement, this analysis aims instead to problematize the border and its complexity as a part of a larger regime, accounting for multiple dynamics of power and biopolitical controls that produce bordered space. Moreover, as Reece Jones argues, problematizing the border reinterprets it “not only as a site of the production of sovereign power but also of resistances and struggles.”³⁹ This position aims to bring light to the struggles in bordered space while not being naive to the real violence of these spaces and the productive nature of power that infiltrates them in complex and abstract ways. The work highlights the productivity of the border in communicating a political ideology in contrast to the ‘utopian process’ by which that ideology is confronted and exposed by counter uses of bordered space.

Chapter Outline

France, a State of Emergenc(y/e) is an analysis of the border regime in France and attempt to spatialize the political conditions, conflict and contradiction of borders and migration under a ‘State of Emergency’ and the ‘utopian process,’ or possibility/impossibility of alternative ways of being and making space through counter-politics of critical resistance and refusal at the scale of the nation-state.

The following chapters seek to illustrate the dialectical nature and inherent contradictions of a country both in a state of *emergency* in terms of a crisis of sovereign power, but also argue that there is an *emergence* of new spatial topologies that illustrate this paradox and possibilities through resistances and struggles of (im)migrants who navigate and undo its borders. In effect, they are appropriating the *contradictory* bordered space and manipulating it to render it un-functional or dysfunctional, and thus *differential* to its intended purpose. Architectural and

spatial analysis serves to render these patterns, trends and behaviours legible, thus identifying them as activities of *critical resistance* within a utopian process of social transformation. The analysis seeks to identify this ongoing process by which the state enforces or maintains a particular order through multiple border apparatuses and the social forces of conflict and contradiction that become visible and legible through the alternative use of space.

2.1 Spatial Practices of 'Hostipitality' examines perceptions of migration — looking at the policies of asylum and how those policies reflect values that further translate into how France physically “welcomes” or excludes populations in its cities through practices of “Hostipitality” as outlined by Jacques Derrida. Moreover, how these practices operate in an exceptional capacity to limit complexity in the space of a nation-state.

2.2 Representations of Emergency: Border Infrastructure and Technologies examines the conceived network of internal borders — looking at spaces of detention, incarceration, policing and militarization through an analysis of how the perceptions and values of the state translate into an infrastructural network that manages movement. This analysis particularly focuses on a technological reading of the infrastructural network borders in the form of mobile surveillance and spaces of detention that represent both an ideology of protection (a designated system that manages migration and asylum) but they are experienced as punitive spaces of incarceration and separation.

2.3 Representational Space of Emergence: Encampment examines the lived spaces of the border, particularly looking at the emergence of informal encampments in the north of France and what they represent in terms of an *emerging* spatial practice that counters state border authority, despite the abandonment these spaces represent. Their physical manifestation represents a paradox that is both a result of the violence of borders but also a utopian process of critical resistance.


ENDNOTES – 2.0 FRANCE, A STATE OF EMERGENCE/(Y)

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 - 7 See: Mimi Thi Nguyen, *The gift of freedom: war, debt, and other refugee passages* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2012).
 - 8 Groups like *Les Identitaires* (formerly the *Bloc Identitaire*) with its youth wing *Génération Identitaire*. Founded in 2003.
 - 9 *Russia Today*, “Le Pen Compares Migrant Influx to Barbarian Invasion of Rome,” September 16, 2015, <https://www.rt.com/news/315466-le-pen-migrant-barbarian-invasion>, quoted in Reece Jones, “Conclusion, Movement as a Political Act,” *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2016), 168.
 - 10 Ai Weiwei, “The refugee crisis isn’t about refugees. It’s about us,” *The Guardian*, February, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/02/refugee-crisis-human-flow-ai-weiwei-china?CMP=share_btn_tw (Accessed February 12, 2018).
 - 11 Ai Weiwei, “The refugee crisis isn’t about refugees. It’s about us.”
 - 12 Harsha Walia, “What is Border Imperialism?: Displacements and Secured Borders,” in *Undoing Border Imperialism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press/Institute for Anarchist Studies, 2013), 58.
 - 13 Guy Debord, “Notes on the ‘immigrant question.’”
 - 14 Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, “Introduction,” 1131.
 - 15 Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol. 16, No. 1 (2016), 158.
 - 16 See: Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises.”
- See also: Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, “Introduction,” 1135.
- See also: Khursheed Walida, *Securitization of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11*, Edited by Gabriella Lazaridis and Kursheed Wadia (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
 - 17 Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises,” 158.
 - 18 Willem Schinkel and Van Houdt, Friso, “The double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism: citizenship in contemporary governmentality,” *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 61, no. 4 (2010), 696-715, quoted in Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, “Introduction,” 1126.
 - 19 Rod A. W. Rhodes, “Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability,” *Buckingham: Open University Press* (1997).; Alexander Betts, “Conceptualising Interconnections in Global Governance: The Case of Refugee Protection,” *Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre* (2006), quoted in Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, “Introduction,” 1126.
 - 20 Harald Bauder, “Immigration debate in Canada: how newspapers reported, 1996-2004,” *International Migration & Integration*, vol. 9, no. 3, (2008), 289-310; “Media discourse and the new German immigration law,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2008), 95-112, quoted in Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, “Introduction,” 1130.
 - 21 Wikipedia contributors, “States of emergency in France,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=States_of_emergency_in_France&oldid=876016396 (accessed April 8, 2019).
 - 22 Léopold Lambert, “Architecture of the State of Emergency,” *The Funambulist*. Feb. 10, 2017. <https://thefunambulist.net/architectural-projects/architecture-state-emergency-france-harvard-design-magazine-2016> (accessed April 8, 2019).
 - 23 Khursheed Walida, “Regimes of Insecurity,” 92.

“In France, four months after 9/11, the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin introduced the loi de sécurité quotidienne ‘law on daily security’ which was packaged as anti-terror legislation while containing elements aimed at young people from the vast outlying housing estates of France’s major cities (les jeans de banlieue), in particular young Muslims of migrant descent who were portrayed as a security threat rather than as casualties of socioeconomic deprivation.”

 - 24 Léopold Lambert, “Architecture of the State of Emergency.”
 - 25 Léopold Lambert, “Architecture of the State of Emergency.”
 - 26 Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises,” 160.

- 27 Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, "Introduction," 1133.
- 28 Thomas Nail, "A Tale of Two Crises," 165.
- 29 Harald Bauder, "Immigration debate in Canada: how newspapers reported, 1996-2004," *International Migration & Integration*, vol. 9, no. 3, (2008), 289-310; "Media discourse and the new German immigration law," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2008), 95-112, quoted in Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, "Introduction," 1130.
- 30 Jane Freedman, "The French 'Sans-Papiers' Movement," *Migration and Activism in Europe Since 1945*, edited by Wendy Pojmann (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 88.
- 31 Mezzadra et al. 2014, 25, quoted in Casas-Cortés, et al, "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," 25-26.
- 32 Alexander Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 3; 8.
- 33 Guy Debord, "Notes on the 'immigrant question'."
- 34 "At this moment, the effects of implosion-explosion are most fully felt."
- Henri Lefebvre, "From the City to Urban Society," *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 14-15.
- 35 Casas-Cortés, et al, "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," 10.
- 36 Willem Schinkel and Marlou Schrover, "Introduction," 1126.
- 37 Casas-Cortés, et al, "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," 8.
- 38 Ibid, 15.
- 39 Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones, "Rethinking borders, violence, and conflict," 1; 3.



SPATIAL PRACTICES of “Hostipitality”

“Before even beginning, we could end our reflections here in the formalization of a law of hospitality, which violently imposes a contradiction on the very concept of hospitality in fixing a limit to it, in determining it: hospitality is certainly, necessary, a right, a duty, an obligation, the greeting of the foreign other (l’autre étranger) as a friend but on the condition that the host, the Wirt, the one who receives, lodges or gives asylum remains the patron, the master of the household, on the condition that he maintains his own authority in his own home, that he looks after himself and sees to and considers all that concerns him (qu’il se garde et garde et regarde ce qui le regarde) and thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the household, oikonomia, the law of his household, the law of place (house, hotel, hospital, hospice, family, city, nation, language, etc.), the law of identity which de-limits the very place of proffered hospitality and maintains authority over it, maintains the truth of authority, remains the place of maintaining, which is to say, of truth, thus limiting the gift proffered and making of this limitation, namely, the being-oneself in one’s own home, the condition of the gift of hospitality.”

— Jacques Derrida, *Hostipitality* (2000) ¹

While hospitality is generally associated with a certain openness and reception of strangers as welcomed guests through acts of altruism and generosity, Jacques Derrida, in a criticism of Immanuel Kant’s arguments in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*² on the ‘cosmopolitan right’ and ‘law of unconditional hospitality,’ describes how these notions are intrinsically problematic as they are full of internal contradictions and limitations.

Beginning with the word ‘hospitality,’ Derrida illustrates how the common latin root of ‘hostis’ refers to the reception of the stranger as either a guest or an enemy, which is an “aporetic contradiction” that implies a latent condition of hostility underlying acts of hospitality.³

For Derrida, hospitality and hostility are related (he described the dual condition as *Hostipitality* or *Hostipitalité*), because to welcome a stranger as a guest into one’s home, or a foreigner into one’s country, the host, or sovereign, must define and control the conditions of the stranger’s welcoming to re-assert their ownership or justify their authority over that space (from an individual property to the territory of a nation-state) as it is conceived by them. In this way, Derrida illustrates how “Hospitality is a contradictory concept and experience in itself,” a paradox that is “possible only on the condition of its impossibility, producing itself as impossible.”⁴

As Kant attempts to theorize, hospitality must be unconditional to be considered genuine. He believes in the goals of cosmopolitanism, and its ability to

Figure 2.2 (Opposite page) “This is not a prison”, This photographic work on the confinement of undocumented foreigners in administrative detention centers and premises was commissioned by the Cimade to 3 independent photographers, Olivier Aubert, David Delaporte and Xavier Merckx.

offer the same to everyone through liberal democracy. However, for Derrida, this is nearly impossible as the concept is tied to the host's ability to control the stranger to avoid the risk of the stranger subverting the authority of the host, whose power is tied to their ownership of property. These limits to hospitality are inherent to the concept of the state itself and the myth it promotes of benevolence or "philanthropy" that is actually a mask that hides the fact hospitality is ideologically used as a form of control. In other words, practices and spaces of welcoming are actually mediating "an obligation, a right and a duty all regulated by law."⁵

Mustafa Dikeç, argues in his article entitled "Pera Peras Poros Longings for Spaces of Hospitality" that:

[...] the notion of hospitality, simply because it is almost always taken for granted as implying a desirable quality, invites critical reflection. It is, perhaps, not always liberating and emancipatory, but, on the contrary, may conceal an oppressive aspect beneath its welcoming surface. If so, a critical investigation is necessary to reveal what it conceals, and to perhaps reconceptualize the notion.⁶

This chapter aims to mobilize Derrida's critiques of hospitality to analyze the internal contradictions, limitations and exceptions of the promise of universal welcoming in the context of asylum in France today. In particular, the work examines the conditions by which hospitality turns into hostility in contemporary systems and spaces of (im)migration, asylum and humanitarianism, which are defined by a liberal ideal of welcoming marginalized and displaced people but are controlled by the governing laws of Western states that are invested in and benefit from their continued oppression and suppression to expand domination.

Contradictions & Limitations of 'Hospitality'

The first part of this chapter investigates the limits and boundaries of mythologized spaces and practices of universal hospitality that are, in fact, conditioned by hostile rules, ideologies, laws, and border politics, as well as enforced in a variety of scales — from the nation-state to the individual. Arguing that these limits are exposed or revealed by sources of contradiction, in this case, migration, which can present as a conflict to the host that has conceived of the right to hospitality as something that is governed by rules and laws as opposed to something that can be transformative.

Spaces of the hospitality claim, in part, to fulfill the moral imperative of the host to the stranger; however, the hostile and oppressive part of this gesture is the analogous imperative of disciplining and controlling the stranger to follow and conform to the laws of the household. These rules are often applied to the stranger before they arrive and without their democratic input. This metaphor is perhaps most visible in the way the so-called 'migration crisis' has been framed as both a humanitarian crisis (appealing to the moral imperative of hospitality while failing to actually follow through on this promise) as well as a security crisis (appealing to the hostile gesture of fortifying borders against a potential threat that is not actually the treat it is made out to be). These perspectives result in the transformation of the stranger (someone unknown) into the 'other' (someone perceived to be different) or a figure defined by their subjectification. In the context of a perceived humanitarian or security crisis, the figure of the 'migrant' signifies a constructed fear of the unknown. In this way, the 'migrant' as 'other' is perceived before arrival to be a source of crisis, conflict and contradiction. This perception is mediated by the spaces and systems supposedly 'designed for their care' as a guest, which are, in fact, perpetuating their precarity, insecurity and experiences of violence. As Manuel Hertz argues, "The care of others more often than not

transforms into the governing of others.”⁷⁷

Today, it is clear there is a disjunction between Kant’s ‘unconditional law of unlimited hospitality’ and hospitality as a practice that is always already conditional to the authority of the host upon the enactment of the gesture. As Mustafa Dikeç argues, it appears that spaces of supposed hospitality are designed to “[prepare] for the coming of the stranger.”⁷⁸ They are created in anticipation of the stranger’s disruption to the status quo of the household or nation-state, rather than in anticipation of their need(s) for care or the desires they could bring with them that could reshape the relationship between host and guest for the better. In this way, for Derrida, hospitality “does not arise from the ‘love of man as a sentimental motive.’ The image and narrative of hospitality portrayed by nation-states and other hegemonic institutions of capitalist, colonial and imperial domination co-opts the aesthetic of benevolent welcoming and the promise of liberal freedom and democracy to conceal the reality of hostile, violent and uneven structuring processes (both historical and present) that buttress their power and world-order.

These hostile preparations, precautions or protective measures (protecting the host/household from the guest), although arguably have always been in existence in one form or another, are now taking the form of weaponized security technologies and responsive border systems implemented, with increasingly violent effects and in a mobile capacity, away from the physical site of the border between nation-states or territories. While still maintaining the image that they receive asylum seekers, nation-states are investing in bordering spaces and technologies to limit the number of people who claim this human right on what they define as their territory.

These contradictory spaces of *hostipitality*, are often mystified or fetishized by architects and related design disciplines who inadvertently abstract and reinforce the authority of the state to provide conditions of controlled care, or what Jonathan Darling calls “compassionate-repression,”⁷⁹ by designing ‘better solutions’ to welcome newcomers. These ‘solutions,’ while providing better immediate shelter and aid for some, are fundamentally complicit and strengthen this uneven dynamic rather than critically reflect the problem, which has to do with how spaces of hospitality structurally reproduce historical and ongoing failures and violence of the state.

In this way, the myth of the nation-state is perpetuated by practices and spaces of benevolence that create an illusion of welcoming, which allows the state to go unquestioned for the ways in which it is responsible for displacement and the need for asylum through the perpetuation of trans-national asymmetries of power.

Hospitality and hostility are used or mediated — through asylum and (im) migration policies as well as multiple forms of bordering spaces and technologies of ‘humanitarian’ reception, detention and encampment — to shape a perception of the host, and their ideologies that structure their household, as well as a perception of the stranger or guest and their ‘otherness.’ This narrative is set in opposition to violence, through humanitarian aid as a spectacle of benevolence to disguise not only complicity in violence but the historical and ongoing use of predatory/punitive measures against the stranger to buttress power. As historian and theorist, Mark Wigley, observes, the aesthetic of space can conceal its relationship to ideology and power:

Our supposedly horizontal world is actually defined by historically unprecedented peaks of concentrated wealth and opportunity for an extreme minority. Political life increasingly takes the narrow form of managing the optics of these spikes, an aesthetic struggle to either expose

or conceal them, along with all their implications in terms of economic, ethical, and ecological justice.¹⁰

As a result of these fundamental conditions and limitations, hospitality is always in a state of transformation; it is a concept, or conceived representation of dominant power, that morphs to respond to present contradictions and power dynamics while maintaining the authority of the state to govern. Therefore, Derrida states, “We do not know what hospitality is [...] In appearance, a performative contradiction which bids welcome by acknowledging that we do not know what ‘welcome’ means[...].”¹¹ Therefore, as Diçek argues, Derrida’s “elaboration is on the dimension of ‘not-knowing’ as an essential part of the notion of hospitality.”¹²

This not-knowing [non-savoir] is not necessarily a deficiency, a disability, a shortcoming. Its apparent negativity, this grammatical negativity (the not-knowing) would not signify ignorance but would remind the mind only that hospitality is not a concept that readily lends itself to an objective knowledge.¹³

In this way, hospitality becomes definable only when it reaches its limit and the mask that promises peace and freedom turns to reveal the hostility behind Janus’ face. This limit, and the topology implicit in the “performative contradiction” or ideology of hospitality is exposed when the perception of the host changes — when the welcomed guest becomes an enemy who disrupts the authority of the host and the established norm of the household.¹⁴ Often this comes as a surprise to the host, the promise of peace that the myth of hospitality brings blinds them to their complicity in upholding a fundamentally violent structure. The stranger or welcomed guest becomes an enemy, a scapegoat for the failures of the host to secure and control their household. It is at this point when the guest is perceived to challenge the host’s power that the host uses exceptional measures outside the delimited rules of the household (or rather, fundamentally underlying them) to exclude or remove the guest from their protection. In this way, the subjectification of the ‘stranger’ as ‘other’ is bound with the conditions of hospitality.

In the case of France, ‘emergency’ is therefore always an underlying condition of its mask as a democratic state that outwardly appears to participate in providing the right to asylum, but inwardly has many barriers and limitations to that promise being carried out.

This topological condition is illustrated clearly by Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, Seyla Benhabib:

The rights of foreigners and aliens, whether they be refugees or guest workers, asylum seekers or adventurers, indicate that threshold, that boundary, at the site of which the identity of ‘we, the people’ is defined and renegotiated, bounded and unraveled, circumscribed or rendered fluid.¹⁵

This topology implies that at the site where hospitality is mediated, the border, that there is potential for its rules and laws to be transgressed. We will return to this at the end of the chapter.

‘Hostipitality’ & the State of Emergency

As was discussed in the introduction to *Part Two*, the ‘State of Emergency’ is an exceptional practice that expands the ability of the state and its supporting institutions to enforce its physical and juridical boundaries, to include/exclude,

and intervene in the lives of its population (and populations outside state territory) in an effort to maintain national identity and hegemony regardless of the violence that results. Leopold Lambert defines it, “[The State of Emergency] is an extraction of an institution [the state] from the laws that have constituted it.”¹⁶ Regarding the state’s hospitality of the ‘stranger,’ the ‘State of Emergency’ allows for the adaptation of laws of hospitality to apply conditional limits and controls on their freedom as a stranger/guest or even subject of the state if they are perceived to be a potential threat to the status quo.

In the case of the (im)migration detention centre or camp, these spaces of ‘hostipitality’ move the moral/ethical demands and responsibilities elsewhere (through privately run prisons, or humanitarian NGO run camps) into indeterminate spaces outside of everyday life and outside of the law as an exception, in order to avoid confrontation with the ‘other’ that would expose the ideology of the state that conceives of the dehumanization and exploitation of the (im)migrant or the marginalized ‘other’ as fundamental to how modern systems of power operate.

Italian Philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, conceptualizes the phenomenon of the ‘State of Exception’ in his book titled *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*.¹⁷ Agamben writes that, “The decision [on the exception] reveals the essence of the State authority most clearly.”¹⁸ He argues first and foremost that there is a fundamental division between qualified human existence and bare life reduced to mere biological life, ‘bios’ and ‘zoe.’¹⁹ This distinction produces or rather implies a condition of sacredness associated with life outside of society defined by the state or sovereign power. He refers to this form life not subject to or given political rights, solely defined by biology with no political status or rights, as ‘bare life.’

The figure of ‘homo sacer’ embodies this condition of ‘bare life’ as the “central figure of modern politics,”²⁰ as a figure “who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed*.”²¹ ‘Homo sacer’ represents any person excluded from the law and its protection, but whose very exclusion, through the ‘sovereign ban,’ is itself a legal action under the authority of the state. In this sense, the legal state of exception is a mechanism that produces ‘bare life’ and in doing so, produces the sovereign. In other words, the sovereign and the figure of the ‘homo sacer’ represent the “paradox of sovereignty” at two ends of a spectrum — excluded through inclusion and included through exclusion — occupying a ‘zone of indistinction’ between life and death, or inclusion and exclusion.²² As Agamben argues:

*At the extreme limits of the order, the sovereign and homo sacer present two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.*²³

In this view, as James Johnson argues, “[...] the jurisdiction of the law establishes itself through the production of political order based on the [exclusion/inclusion or exploitation] of human life,” and “the law is a force that includes the bare life, which is ironically bound to and abandoned by said law.”²⁴ Moreover, the enactment of the exception excludes/includes both the sovereign and ‘homo sacer’ in a state of indefinite suspension as a relational condition, as, Johnson argues, “Homo sacer’s ban is in the relation of exception. Politics includes homo sacer only to the extent that [they are] devoid of economic and physical power and human rights.”²⁵

The sovereign can create a state of exception by declaring an emergency, violating the foundational laws of the state. These actions become legitimized because they aim to protect the status quo conditions (the state itself) that allow

for the rule of law to be carried out. Rather, as Agamben argues, the sovereign ruler can suspend the law because of “the fact that the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridicial order.”²⁶ Moreover:

*The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and [while] maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule.*²⁷

Similarly, as we have come to see through Derrida, the conditional limits of hospitality are fundamentally built into authoritative systems of governance. The state of exception is not exceptional as much as it is an enforcement of the underlying ideologies that (re)produce the state or sovereign power.

The state only provides limited hospitality, predicated on a system of control, so as to only meet the ethical demands of being perceived as a benefactor of freedom and security, but no further, as it cannot concede power to the guest in fear that they will take over, or abuse the hospitality of the nation-state.²⁸ For this reason, asylum and refugee policies offer only the bare minimum of protection. Hospitality is no longer a guarantee as the stranger or foreigner is considered antagonistic towards the state before their arrival and therefore cannot be welcomed unconditionally as a guest.

As John Darling argues in *Becoming bare life: asylum, hospitality, and the politics of encampment*, nation-states’ asylum programs are an example of “compassionate repression’ through which the act of distinction, of aiding the exceptional case, allows for the wider exclusion from the political sphere of a greater part of the population as *homo sacer*.”²⁹ Furthermore, he argues:

*This is precisely the relation instilled by biopolitics [...] here, every gesture is conditioned by the power of the sovereign and each gesture acts to reproduce that power, just as each gesture of the guest acts to recreate a positioning of sovereignty for the host.*³⁰

In *Homo Sacer*, Agamben’s conceptual argument draws from Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘biopolitics,’ the political control and optimization of life for the use of the state, or “the zone in which human life become the target of the structural power of the state.”³¹ The state or sovereign conceives of itself as made of a particular subject of life (bios), defined by its population or citizens rather than territory. It is thus responsible for the life and health of its population under a social contract whereby there is an “agreed balance between the concession of people’s freedom in exchange for various forms of security.”³²

As Agamben theorizes, “[...] it can be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”³³ The population of a state becomes the metric that it can deploy for its interests, and the state perceives that which dismantles, disrupts or contradicts the status quo from which it draws power to be an existential threat. Thus, it produces, through an act of social division, the subject of ‘homo sacer’: a form of life which removed, excluded or killed without impunity, to maintain its power. This subjectification of life through the enactment of the state of exception allows that state to justify its ideological prioritization of citizen life at the expense or exploitation of the ‘other.’ In this way, the ideological construct of the state always-already imply a form of exclusion, just as hospitality always already implies hostility because to welcome a guest implies the act of welcoming validates their existence within the household thus inferring as a stranger they would be unwelcome.

However, as Alexander Weheliye argues in *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human*, Foucault’s

understanding of biopolitics and Agamben's mobilization of his theoretical framework fails to recognize that the disciplinary violence of the state is not merely biological, but frequently depends on an anchoring of political hierarchies and "racializing assemblages"³⁴ onto human 'flesh.' In this sense, 'bare life' can equally imply political/social death through violence and suffering, not just biological mortality.³⁵ Moreover, to extend this idea in relation to the concept of hospitality, the limitations of welcoming are predetermined in the conception of the law of the household, which imagines its order based on who is included or excluded.

These philosophers, Weheliye argues, have neglected to theorize racialization as the primary mechanism for articulating "a set of sociopolitical processes that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans."³⁶ In this way, Weheliye emphasizes the importance of centring race and other applied hierarchies on human 'flesh' in discussions of modern politics, not only to understand these systems of power better but to recognize the emancipatory potential of 'bare life,' a tradition he inherits from black feminist scholar Hortense Spillers.³⁷ Moreover, he argues this perspective requires the disruption of the notion of humanity — that is synonymous with the paradigm of white, western, cis-gendered, property-owning/bourgeois "Man" — as a necessary category, following the work of Sylvia Wynter.³⁸

Weheliye exhibits how Agamben's perspective on the exception (which he inherits from Carl Schmitt's *The Nomos of the Earth*) is particularly problematic, in the way he generalizes the conditions of exception and 'bare life,' failing to see how there is a graduated degree of violence and terror inflicted upon differentiated bodies, or 'flesh' onto which "racializing assemblages" have been applied. Similar, Mezzadra and Neilson argue that viewing the phenomenon of the border solely a product of state power, governmentality or sovereignty fails "fully account for the complexities of the system of differential inclusion that characterizes current migration regimes."³⁹

Agamben imagines the 'zone of indistinction,' as the zone in which conditions that separate bare life and other modes of life becomes indistinguishable, that bare life in the instance of the camp, eradicates "divisions among humans that are predicated along lines of race, religion, nationality or gender because it creates an 'irreducible zone of indistinction' that debases social and political markers and is normalized within the political order."⁴⁰ He writes:

What characterizes modern politics [...] that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life — which is originally situated at the margins of the political order — gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter a zone of irreducible distinction.⁴¹

While Agamben argues that the state of exception may be foundational to modern society and indefinite in the rule of law today (marking the holocaust as the moment in time when the exception became the rule), Weheliye illustrates how he fails to see that the state of exception is not an exception that began a but a continual process, continually produced to discipline bodies through various relational, political structures that hierarchically order humanity. In this way, the potential of violence or hostility signals the existence of underlying violence in the foundations of the law, sovereign power and mode of governance. The camp, for example, is not the enactment of the exception but the externalization of the violence at the root of the myth of modern society.

Weheliye's arguments will become of particular importance in the coming chapter on encampment, as he argues that much of Agamben's framework

“neglects or actively disputes the existence of alternative modes of life alongside the violence, subjection, exploitation, and racialization that define the modern human.”⁴² An examination of these alternative modes of life for their emancipatory potential requires a more “layered and improvisatory understanding of extreme subjection if we do not decide in advance what forms its disfigurements should take on.”⁴³

As Jonathan Darling argues:

Agamben’s central alternative to this positioning is to call for a politics beyond such an imposition of the sovereign ban. What we might see this achieving, viewed through a hospitable lens, is the gesture towards a sense of the unconditionally hospitable, a hospitality to all those singularities beyond the state. In doing so, this radically demonstrates the bare life potential of the citizen/host, and highlights their privileged, yet unstable, positioning. This is the fullest sense in which we might see the radical acceptance of all life as potential bare life, all life as a potential host and a potential guest at once and the same time, positioned differently and contextually in multiple ways. In this fashion, we might again view Agamben’s suggestion of a life not bounded by biopolitical fracture as precisely the very grounding point for his new sense of ethics emerging from the camp. Here, he generates a sense of unconditional hospitality as an ethics emergent from the rejection of distinction, both as a biopolitical means of division and as a means of sifting and sorting various guests to find those deemed ‘worthy.’⁴⁴

However, as was already illustrated in this chapter, unconditional hospitality is an impossibility and a paradox. The conditions of hospitality always subsume the unconditional laws of hospitality. As such, ‘absolute’ hospitality would suspend all ethical and juridical discrimination. Therefore, as Darling argues, Agamben’s response is not only an “impossibility” but also rules out the possibility of changing the politics that govern the decision of the sovereign ban.⁴⁵ Necessarily, politics of critical resistance must look beyond the present, orientated towards demands to come, not just anticipating the future but incorporating a politics of the ‘not-knowing’ in the present to expose the topology of contradiction. Weheliye’s idea that bare life or ‘the flesh’ has emancipatory potential could relate to the possibility of hospitality not defined by law but a reciprocal process.

Agamben provides a lens through which to critique the state for its exclusion of bare life from the political sphere, but he calls to move beyond the decision entirely whereas Derrida (and arguably Weheliye) calls for the importance of the decision, of ‘not-knowing’ so that we can move forward with an open and questioning mind.

Weheliye poses the profoundly insightful question, “Why are formations of the oppressed deemed liberatory only if they resist hegemony and/or exhibit the full agency of the oppressed?”⁴⁶

We should, therefore, consider the state of exception as an ideological position that abstracts understanding of the border and positions it as inevitably as a site of violence — if everything is the exception, then violence is depoliticized and cannot be meaningfully critiqued.⁴⁷ It is important to not view the phenomenon at the border in an abstract way, but a series of differentiated and relational phenomenon and hierarchical political assemblages with the generative potential to highlight the multifaceted “ways in which borders are also sites of new political possibilities rather than the only mechanism of division and exclusion serving sovereign power.”⁴⁸ Not that the borders themselves should be fetishized objects of utopian potential but rather to see them as spaces where the utopian process is

enacted, and new politics are produced through a relational understanding of the forces at work.

The Origins of Dependency

Immigrants are either valued for what ‘they’ bring to ‘us’ — diversity, energy, talents, industry, and innovative cuisines, plus a renewed appreciation for our own regime, whose virtues draw immigrants to join us — or they are feared for what they will do to us — consume our welfare benefits, dilute our common heritage, fragment our politics, and undermine our democratic or cosmopolitan culture. Both responses judge the immigrant in terms of what she will do for or to us as a nation.

— Bonnie Honig, *Ruth, the Model Emigrée: Mourning and the Symbolic Politics of Immigration* (1999)⁴⁹

The third part of this chapter examines the origins of this relationship between the host and the stranger through the lens of freedom and dependency — drawing from the work of Mimi Thi Nguyen in *The Gift of Freedom*. Questioning the definitions/problematisations of the figure of the (im)migrant and how they relate to governing practices of ‘hostipitality’ and exception as they are changing and adapting to responses to new social mobilities today. In particular, examining the contemporary passages between the conditions of displacement, forced migration and refuge, as well as the changing “diasporas”⁵⁰ of (im)migrant populations fleeing situations ranging from war and conflict to climate change and dispossession of land, “to grasp something of the structures of feeling and social forms through which encampment [and other technologies and border spaces], appearing precisely at a moment of emergency, receives and rescues the ontologically destitute other with violence and power.”⁵¹ Moreover, examining how this liberal image of rescue, hospitality or welcoming justifies acts of violence and imperialism in the name of freedom, or how the aesthetic and material preparations for the arrival of the ‘stranger’ masks the governing practices and ideologies that discipline and control their movement and maintain their condition of insecurity.

In addition to defining the condition of *bare life* by excluding the figure of *homo sacer* outside the law, Agamben also examines the relationship of “ethical dependency beyond political recourse.”⁵² Under these circumstances, the displaced person put into a situation of insecurity and dependency is outside of any legal status or citizenship to access their rights. While their reliance on the state that creates their condition of insecurity may be counter-intuitive to their collective liberation, it is one of the only means for survival.

Mimi Thi Nguyen’s (2012) book, *The Gift of Freedom: War, Debt and Other Refugee Passages*, contextualizes the origins of this situation of insecurity/dependency by examining the internal contradictions and limitations within liberal rhetoric of ‘freedom’ promoted by the imperialism of the United States. Nguyen theorizes, “[...] the significant ways in which liberal war and liberal peace as conjoined operations proceed under the signs of exception and emergency, and which are neither.”⁵³ She identifies an extension of this logic at a more global scale where “military” or “humanitarian” interventions are “described through beneficence and defense, and at the same time demand occupations and dislocations of racial, colonial others in the name of the human, through invocations of peace, protection, rights, democracy, freedom, and security.”⁵⁴ The “gift” offered by nation-states to individuals and other nations, deemed lacking in freedom (a concept defined and controlled by an imperialist imaginary), is a narrative produced through “an assemblage of liberal political philosophies, regimes of representation, and

structures of enforcement that measure and manufacture freedom and its others.”⁵⁵ The gift of freedom is an indeterminate passage between the host and the guest. Rather, the gift is limited based on certain factors that transform it into a contract or a debt through what Nguyen calls an “economy of exchange” between the giver and the recipient when the host changes the rules of their space and creates a relationship of perpetual dependency.⁵⁶ In this way, as Michel Foucault suggests, “liberal government proposes to manufacture freedom, and in turn, that freedom is never anything more than a “relation between governors and governed.”⁵⁷ This relation is controlled and policed through various bordering practices and laws.

Over half the world’s refugees today are fleeing wars and imperial interventions waged, instigated, fuelled or funded by western nations⁵⁸, as well as adverse effects of colonialism, and climate change, primarily the responsibility of greenhouse gas production through actions of western nations. To expand on the last point briefly, it is not just that western powers are responsible for more substantial emissions and, thus, the effects of climate change. Rather, these nations have the wealth and resources to diversify their economies and use more sustainable energy because they rely on cheap sources of energy in manufacturing-based economies in more impoverished nations. Impoverished nations experience many environmental effects for the benefit and prosperity of the wealthier nations. China and its devastated landscapes that occur from the high-tech industry or countries in Africa used for access to mining precious minerals for that technology are examples of this relationship. Moreover, these kinds of interventions in impoverished nations support the prosperity of the intellectual economy of wealthy nations.

People who are displaced by climate change or related events are often not formally recognized as refugees and thus are often unable to receive asylum. Moreover, asylum seekers can also experience different treatment based on their nationality, for instance when their country is considered to be relatively safe an asylum seeker may not qualify for refugee status, or if a country is a high priority, such as Syria in recent years, the asylum process may be accelerated for that individual.⁵⁹ For western states to recognize or legitimize these specific conditions that force their migration would be to acknowledge their complicity and responsibility for creating those conditions of insecurity and undermine their authority to provide or deny hospitality.

Moreover, temporary foreign workers with precarious status experience another kind of insecurity and have very few advantages when it comes to applying for status even if they have worked in that country for several of years.

This idea that a refugee or (im)migrant owes their freedom as a debt to the hospitality, compassion and humanitarianism of a nation-state which (directly or structurally) produced their condition of insecurity under the guise of “peace-making” or “economic development” is a fundamental contradiction in the systems of asylum/hospitality today. Imperial interventions in many cases come intending to promote peace, freedom and development in what are perceived to be “less free” or “less developed” states but have the effect of disciplining their population by enforcing order over their life and space. As Mustafa Dikeç argues, “Obtaining an abstract right of hospitality is not a guarantor of treatment compatible with human dignity, just as bearing abstract rights (e.g. human rights) does not guarantee tolerable treatments.”⁶⁰ Within these spaces of hospitality, the guest is given water, food, and health care, but they are also contained to that space, without the freedom to move or the ability to express themselves politically as participants in society.

The Spaces of ‘Hostipitality’

The fourth part of this chapter relates these aforementioned theoretical concepts to real spaces that embody the contradictions of *hostipitality*. These spaces, briefly introduced and situated in the context of France, will be analyzed further in more detail in the next chapters. This thesis argues that the notion of universal hospitality is a myth, an impossible yet symbolic gesture, a narrative of welcoming on the basis that Europe or western society is a ‘more free’ place. This myth, within the current context of asylum in Europe, is contradicted by the effects of repressive ideological systems that conceive of borders and technologies of spatial-temporal division and enclosure that place a limit on the welcoming of strangers. If citizenship and legal status are “the concepts by which many nation-states and liberal democracies understand the political agency and rights of people,”⁶¹ then this logic is in confrontation with a growing population group that sits outside of this system of justice, forcefully excluded/expelled, made ‘illegal’ or criminalized. These systemic issues are integrated and perpetuated in designed spaces that are often pushed into the fringes of society away from centrality or public domain where differential power dynamics between individuals, groups and other social arrangements define the politics of society. The politics of these systems can, therefore, be read in the spatial effects upon life. In this way, it is essential to consider the boundary, the border and the politics that produce them. To look beyond, similarly to how Derrida argues, we should consider the impossible decision of hospitality so that we can move forward and orientate ourselves towards demands and desires to come.

As Thomas Nail argues,

*Europe’s current crisis is that it is increasingly forced to choose between its pretensions of liberal democracy—based on the idea of universal equality—and the fact that its provision of those rights is absolutely limited by territorial, political, legal, and economic borders. The real crisis is that one cannot have both. Thousands of years of history have demonstrated this thesis, but the 21st century will force us to realize it.*⁶²

France is a nation-state that has sidestepped its responsibility in creating this crisis of displacement or dispossession through its colonial history, so-called ‘humanitarian’ interventions, wars, and other forms of border imperialism. This condition has, in turn, led to the country self-restricting certain rights it claims as essential principles — “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”— to increase executive and police power under a state of emergency and its normalization in everyday life. Not only does the declaration of a state of emergency target non-citizens, but it undermines the existing basis of human rights in general by demonstrating those rights are subject to the state and not universally applicable.

These theoretical approaches provided by Derrida and others on the concept of hospitality are highly insightful when thinking about migration from an architectural or infrastructural perspective. The contradiction of *hostipitality* is enacted and made functional through restrictive asylum procedures and policies that deny human rights and dignity, but it has also translated into the tendency to limit the ‘welcome’ of newcomers within spaces of *pause* such as retention/detention centres and camps. As Manuel Hertz describes these spaces take on multiple characteristics:

These spaces have the characteristics of welcoming humanitarian spaces where lives are saved, they are also conceived of as spaces of control where aspects of the refugees’ lives are supervised by other institutions. Lastly, they are depicted as spaces of destitution and misery. These three ways of representing and describing refugee camps do not exclude one

*another, but often co-exist or complement each other.*⁶³

These spaces of detention and encampment operate as ‘technologies’ or ‘apparatuses’ of control and access, a threshold, which maintains state authority through the management of refugees and asylum seekers in multiple, overlapping or relational ways. Within France today, these spaces have produced a landscape of internalized spatial and temporal borders, both divisions and enclosures, where the individual is placed in-between the qualified and bare life to be processed. Within these spaces of *pause*, created as the state’s response to the obligation of hospitality, the most inhospitable and hostile violence takes place. In these spaces, the stranger is in effect, criminalized and punished before receiving welcome as a guest. Moreover, the violence of these spaces is not always overt, most often perceived as benign and necessary to the functioning of the state.

These designed spaces not only place a limit to the ‘welcoming’ of migrants through segregation, containment and surveillance, but in doing so, they also reinforce a perception of (im)migrants as ‘stranger’ or ‘other’ to functionally fuel myths and fears that translates into further hostility even after they have been formally ‘welcomed.’ Moreover, the rhetoric of ‘welcome’ is also a logic used by the state and media propaganda to mobilize marginalized communities against each other as the perception of limited welcoming forces groups into competition with one another. The heightened perception of scarcity and competition that results from more people being ‘welcomed’ creates the fear that others will have to wait longer and makes it more difficult to bridge solidarity between different groups fighting for access to security and autonomy. This condition also has the effect of deterring people from seeking asylum in particular places if they know there are more obstacles to their resettlement.

Within these waiting zones for people seeking safety and asylum, the fundamental aspects of sovereignty and human rights to space are absent. Instead, these places are purposefully indeterminate, both in their exceptional logics and in their functional aesthetics in built form. They assert conditional limits both socially and spatially to the welcoming of migrants to maintain the state’s authority, and to block potentials that emerge from access to democratic representation. These places create a condition of bare life and dependency upon the state for protection, thus reinforcing the power of the state to determine biopolitical life and death.

The next chapter examines these various bordering technologies and spaces in more detail, questioning why they are built and how they function, and speculating on the emerging strategies within and beyond these spaces.

ENDNOTES - 2.1 TECHNOLOGIES OF "HOSTIPITALITY"

- 1 Jacques Derrida, "HOSTIPITALITY," translated by Barry Stocker with Forbes Morlock, *Angelaki*, 5:3 (2000), 4. Originally published as "Hostipitalité," *Cogito* 85 (special issue *Pera Peras Poros*, ed. Ferda Keskin and Önay Sözer), 1999, 17-44.
 - 2 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," *Kant's Political Writings*, edited by H. Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970 (1795)).
 - 3 Jacques Derrida, "De l'hospitalité," *Calmann-Lévy* (1997a), 45, quoted in Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras Poros Longings for Spaces of Hospitality," *Theory, Culture and Society* (SAGE Publications, 2002), 229.
 - 4 Jacques Derrida, 'Hostipitalité', F. Keskin and Ö. Sözer (eds), *Pera Peras Poros: atelier interdisciplinaire avec et autour de Jacques Derrida*. Istanbul: YKY, 1999a. 20. Quoted in Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras," 229.
 - 5 Jacques Derrida, "HOSTIPITALITY," 4-5.
 - 6 Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras," 228.
 - 7 Manuel Hertz, "The Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara," in *From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara*, edited by Manuel Hertz (Zürich, Switzerland: Lars Müller Publishers and ETH Studio Basel, 2013), 9.
 - 8 Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras," 227.
- Here he references an excerpt from T.S. Eliot's *Choruses From 'The Rock'*
- 9 See: Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life: asylum, hospitality, and the politics of encampment," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, volume 27 (2009), 649-665.
 - 10 Marc Wigley, "Extreme Hospitality," *Constant: New Babylon. To Us, Liberty* (Berlin, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2016), 124.
 - 11 Jacques Derrida, "HOSTIPITALITY," 5.
 - 12 Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras Poros," 229.
 - 13 Jacques Derrida, 'Hostipitalité', F. Keskin and Ö. Sözer (eds), *Pera Peras Poros: atelier interdisciplinaire avec et autour de Jacques Derrida* (Istanbul: YKY, 1999a), 26, quoted Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras Poros," 230.
 - 14 See also: Giorgio Agamben, "The Paradox of Sovereignty," *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 15.
"The topology implicit in the paradox is worth reflecting upon, since the degree to which sovereignty marks the limit (in the double sense of end and principle) of the juridical order will become clear only once the structure of the paradox is grasped."
 - 15 Seyla Benhabib, "Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in the Global Era," *Social Research* 66 (3) (1999), 736, quoted and emphasis added in Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras Poros," 241.
 - 16 Léopold Lambert, "State of Exception," *Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence* (New York, NY: dpr Barcelona, 2012), 19.
 - 17 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*.
 - 18 Ibid, 16.
 - 19 Ibid, 9.
 - 20 James Johnson, "Being and Becoming Human: Weheliye's Radical Emancipation Theory and the Flesh and Body of Black Studies," *EHJ*, Volume IX: Issue II (2017), 29.
 - 21 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 8. (emphasis in original)
 - 22 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 15-30.
 - 23 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 84
 - 24 James Johnson, "Being and Becoming Human," 30-31.
 - 25 Ibid, 31-32.
 - 26 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 15.
 - 27 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 18.
 - 28 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 650.
 - 29 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 659.
 - 30 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 656.
 - 31 James Johnson, "Being and Becoming Human," 29.
 - 32 Léopold Lambert, *Weaponized Architecture*, 19.
 - 33 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 6.
 - 34 Alexander G. Weheliye, "Assemblages: Articulation," *Habeas viscus: racializing assemblages, biopolitics, and black feminist theories of the human* (Durham : Duke University Press, 2014), 46-52.

- 35 Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas viscus*, 35.
- 36 Ibid, 4.
- 37 Weheliye mobilizes black feminist scholar, Hortense Spiller's use of term 'flesh' in his arguments.
- Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987), 65-81, referenced in Ibid, 5.
- 38 Ibid, 22.
- See: Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation — An Agument," *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 3, no. 3 (2003), 257-337.
- 39 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, "Fabrica Mundi," *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 24.
- 40 James Johnson, "Being and Becoming Human," 36.
- 41 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 9.
- 42 Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas viscus*, 1-2.
- 43 Ibid, 2.
- 44 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 656.
- 45 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 657.
- 46 Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas viscus*, 2.
- 47 "[...] theorization of sovereign power precludes meaningful resistance because any perceived threat can be neutralized through the use of the exception, a time and space where power relations are replaced by violent relations. For this reason we caution the conceptualizations of the relationship between borders and violence proposed by the literature on sovereign power and the state of exception could help to produce the effect they critique: a de-politicization of this very relationship, which is naturalized, devoted of historicity and situated far apart, outside history."
- Reece Jones, "Spaces of refusal: Rethinking sovereign power and resistance at the border," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 102(3) (2012), 686, quoted in Chiara Brambilla and Reece Jones. "Rethinking borders, violence, and conflict," 4.
- 48 Ibid, 6.
- 49 Bonnie Honig, "Ruth, the Model Emigré: Mourning and the Symbolic Politics of Immigration," D. Campbell and J.M. Shapiro (eds), *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 188, quoted in Mustafa. Dikeç, "Pera Peras," 242.
- 50 Saskia Sassen, "Why 'migrant' and 'refugee' fail to grasp new diasporas," *Open Migration* (2016), <https://openmigration.org/en/op-ed/why-migrant-and-refugee-fail-to-grasp-new-diasporas/>, (Accessed Aug. 26, 2019).
- 51 Mimi Thi Nguyen, "The Refugee Condition," *The Gift of Freedom: War, Debt and Other Refugee Passages* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012) 36.
- 52 Jonathan Darling, "Becoming bare life," 652.
- 53 Mimi Thi Nguyen, *The Gift of Freedom*, xi.
- 54 Ibid, xi-xii.
- 55 Ibid, 12.
- 56 Ibid, 6.
- 57 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 63, quoted in Ibid, 6.
- 58 "UNHCR Global Report 2010," *United Nations High Commission on Refugees* (2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/gr10/index.html#/home> (Accessed April 15, 2019).
- 59 Forum Réfugiés - Cosi. "DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC NATIONALITIES IN THE PROCEDURE: France," *Aida: Asylum International Database / Eida: European Council on Refugees and Exiles*. <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/asylum-procedure/treatment-specific-nationalities> (Accessed April 15, 2019).
- 60 Mustafa Dikeç, "Pera Peras Poros," 235.
- 61 Thomas Nail, "A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol. 16, No. 1, (2016), 159.
- 62 Eugene Wolters Interview with Thomas Nail, "The Figure of the Migrant, An Interview with Thomas Nail," *Critical Theory*, (2015), <http://www.critical-theory.com/the-figure-of-the-migrant-an-interview-with-thomas-nail/>
- 63 Manuel Hertz, *From Camp to City*, 9.

	MOLDAVE	0	21	17/04/05 à 15
	Congolais	8	22	17/04/05 à 15
X	Comorien	7	23	01/05/05 à 15
X	CONGOLAIS (RDC)	7	24	03/05/05 à 15
		6	25	29/04/05 à 15
		6	26	
X	AFGHAN	5	27	01/05/05 à 15
X	ALGERIEN	5	28	18/04/05 à 14
X	Bosniaque	4	29	18/04/05 à 14
X	ROUMAIN	4	30	18/04/05 à 14
X	Marocain	3	31	25/04/05 à 14 ^h 05
X	Tunisien	3	32	25/04/05 à 14 ^h 15
X	MOLDAVE	2	33	27/04/05 à 14 ^h 15
X	TCHETCHENE	2	34	01/05/05 à 15 ^h 05
X	ROUMAIN	1	35	30-04-05 à 09 ^h 45
X	ROUMAIN	1	36	18/04/05 à 14 ^h 15
X	MINIEN	1	37	

REPRESENTATIONS *of Emergency*

Contemporary infrastructure space is the secret weapon of the most powerful people in the world precisely because it orchestrates activities that can remain unstated but nevertheless consequential. Some of the most radical changes to the globalizing world are being written, not in the language of the law and diplomacy, but in these spatial, infrastructural technologies — often because market promotions or prevailing political ideologies lubricate their movement through the world. These stories foreground content to disguise or distract from what the organization is really doing.

— Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space* (2014)¹

The key argument of this chapter is that contemporary borders are *Representations of Emergency* as the paradigm of the present viewed at the scale of France and in relation to the infrastructure of borders that constitutes the country's internal and external boundaries and the illusion of order. The contemporary paradigm of *Emergency* encompasses the systems of power within a globalizing world that ideologically conceive of individual technologies within an infrastructure of borders to mediate or impose geopolitical order on society and to enable the reproduction of hegemonic power. However, this paradigm also encompasses *emerging* practices, ideas and strategies of life that embody the possibility of a future different from the current path of conceived order of societal (re)production and therefore challenge the mediating logics and functions of borders that make that future impossible. Arguably, this social use of space, which contradicts or conflicts with dominant imposed order, has the potential to transform mediating *representations of space* into *representational spaces* by using them differently than their conceived purpose. The process of social (re)production behind the *Emergency* is and has been ongoing, but is made particularly intense or visible in the present as migration is a social phenomenon that interacts across scales and levels of society and contradicts or reveals what the "organization is really *doing*."² In this way, the paradigm of *Emergency* is not so much the exception or a break with the past; rather, it is a continuation of social and spatial practices underlying the modes of reproduction in the present and is employed in response to sources of conflict or contradiction that reveal this underlying structure.

In effect, this chapter is a reading of the function of a global infrastructure of borders in the context of France, to illustrate how borders are changing and adapting regarding new demands of social mobility in a globalizing world with extreme inequality. This reading aims to demonstrate how this relationship between migration and borders is illustrative of a utopian process that is transforming the paradigm of *Emergency* and orienting it on a different or divergent syntagmatic path than the one conceived by and through the existing power structures of society.

The infrastructural network of borders within France is composed of both concrete forms of physical walls and enclosures, as well as implicit or invisible

Figure 2.3 (Opposite page) "This is not a prison", This photographic work on the confinement of undocumented foreigners in administrative detention centers and premises was commissioned by the Cimade to 3 independent photographers, Olivier Aubert, David Delaporte and Xavier Merckx.

security and regulatory practices that discipline and control socio-political relations to facilitate the ongoing (re)production of world-order and society. This border infrastructure imposes, circulates and (re)produces the paradigm of Emergency through ideological *representations of spatial-temporal division and enclosure* — a conceptual description that attempts to encompass, while not homogenizing, an ever-growing host of intensifying and diversifying border enforcement practices, technologies, and apparatuses that mediate political ideology and other socio-economic forces to shape society and fortify geopolitical order through the control of populations. As Brian Larkin argues, “What distinguishes infrastructures from technologies is that they are objects that create the grounds on which other objects operate, and when they do they operate as systems [...] matter that enables the movement of other matter.”³ In this way, the border infrastructure contains and connects different border technologies that function to mediate, expand and intensify a particular paradigmatic social and spatial order in different ways and across levels and scales of society.

This framing of the infrastructure/technology dynamic is also informed by Thomas Nail’s description of the “cellular” condition of the border as both an “enclosure” and a “linkage,” which relates to the border technology operating as an enforcement of a division, a separation or an enclosure in space and time.⁴ He states, “the cell divides human life into individual lives,”⁵ and “once an enclosure contains separate individuals, linkage is able to bring them together without unifying or homogenizing them. The link is not simply a connection; it is a nonelastic, rigid connection that both brings individual enclosures together and holds them apart.”⁶

Moreover, the temporal dimension of the conceptualization of borders is informed by Mezzadra and Neilson who state that these spaces produce a “compression, elongation and partitioning of time,” used by administrative bodies as a technology of “control, filtering, and selectivity,” which in turn results in the lived effects of “waiting, withdrawal, and delay by compelling subjects to negotiate their way among different administrative and labor market statuses.”⁷ This condition of “enclosure” and “linkage” relates to the relationship between technologies that produce a border infrastructure in France today; however, the conditions of enforcement and the resultant lived effects differ depending on the functional characteristics and contexts of these individual bordering technologies. This way of describing the border infrastructure is used here to illustrate how populations are controlled by borders that both mediate or manage social mobility spatially and temporally, in terms of physical separation as a barrier or and enclosure and the duration of time that separation occurs.

These technologies of the border functionally control and regulate contradiction by forcing it into a space of ‘pause’ or a ‘waiting zone,’ which reinforces division by immobilizing and imprisoning difference or contradiction through spatial and temporal separation from the resources and “rhythm”⁸ of everyday spaces of social (re)production. In our contemporary social context, the boundaries of borders in their social function is expanded by ideological institutions of power that use them to mediate or manage social mobility in more nuanced ways that just inclusion or exclusion. As will be described further into this chapter and its sub-chapters, borders differentially include and exclude to manipulate and control mobility in service of reproducing power under this paradigm of Emergency.

Structure

As a brief summary, this introduction 2.2.0 illustrates how the contemporary paradigm of Emergency in France relates to contemporary border spaces and strategies mediate and manage social mobility and migration at the scale of a

nation-state. This is an extension of the framing of *Part One* where the Crisis of Empire at the scale of Europe relates to the border spaces and strategies that mediate and manage mobility and migration in terms of (re)producing a world-order. Emergency is not so much a distinct separation from the mode of producing borders in the past; rather, it more so has to do with the emergence of new forms and functions of borders that relate to the transformation or ideological shift in the role of the state and dispersed forms of power in shaping a global order and managing processes of social mobility within it. Furthermore, the global order is not so much defined by individual nation-states but rather the processes and infrastructures that connect and disperse power across the globe.

There are two parts to this analysis that follows this introduction, the first 2.2.1 is an analysis of the border infrastructure and what power dynamics and relations constitute it and then a separate chapter 2.2.2 that follows on the technologies or different material and spatial instances that represent these power dynamics and functionally impose order in different contexts. This distinction between border infrastructure and technologies is made to illustrate that the contemporary phenomenon of Emergency in France operates at different levels, but that these levels are related in that they represent globalization of the state and dispersion of power. The infrastructure of borders translates conceived order from level G downward, the technologies that make up the infrastructure are the mediating spaces or strategies implemented at level M, and the level P relates to the lived conditions of migration that interact with the mediating borders either confirming or contradicting their function. This level P interaction is described in 2.3 in the context of encampment in Calais.

The surveillance and detention are examples of border technologies that represent this paradigm of emergency, the expansion of borders internal and external to of the limits of the state. These are ‘infrastructural technologies’ in the way Keller Easterling refers to them because they are connected, if not directly, indirectly in their support of global strategies to manage migration and (re)produce hegemonic world-order.

The Spatial Mediation of Emergency in France

It is difficult to conceptualize this spatial phenomenon in a totalizing manner as borders are continuously changing in response to shifting forms of sovereign power and modes of governance in relation to changes in social mobility. Often these border technologies function in a manner that transcends the centralized control of the state — what Keller Easterling calls *Extrastatecraft* (involving activities not directly tied to a particular nation-state, organization or institution). Moreover, Easterling’s concept of ‘Extrastatecraft’ describes how infrastructural space is increasingly the result of “multiple, overlapping or nested forms of sovereignty, where domestic and transnational jurisdictions collide.”⁹ This relates to how Lefebvre’s levels of G, M and P overlap within the border, which functions to mediate global order onto social life as well as respond to changes in social mobility that impact its ability to function within different scalar contexts.

In the context of France and the declaration of a State of Emergency, it appears that borders are not expanding in sheer number, but also the intensity of their enforcement of social division. This phenomenon of emergency relates to the larger crisis (of Empire) in how borders represent the dispersion or globalization of state power and an extension world-ordering practices, which today is continuously (re)produced, abstracted and fragmented by a neoliberal political economy. Borders and bordering technologies are increasingly privatized, constructed by independent corporations for profit, and managed by police or military or even everyday people who intentionally or unintentionally become

complicit in enforcing the border. This is particularly the case for architects who may have the intention of improving conditions of border spaces like camps or detention centres (prisons) but are rather reproducing and abstracting hierarchical systems of power and oppression.

The relationship between an individual migrating and seeking asylum from a state as a fundamental human right is managed or mediated by these borders and bordering strategies do not actually operate to fulfilling the moral duty of hospitality of the state, but rather they ideologically function to secure the industries or institutions that conceive of the border itself. If certain social movements are perceived to be a threat to these institutions or processes of reproduction by revealing their underlying ideologies, then it is in their interests to heavily control it.

In this way, the contemporary global border-scape represents *spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures* that are a product of multiple, disparate elements, contradictory or conflictual conditions and shifting forces of “both governmental and sovereign forms of power” that are also “under the current pressures of capitalism and globalization.”¹⁰ Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson define these forces as ‘assemblages of power,’ a perspective that situates the border in relation to “transnational and denationalized formations of economy, politics, culture, and power.”¹¹ The ‘assemblage’ is a method of theoretical examination that brings together seemingly disparate factors, elements or conditions to be seen in relation to each other, not as directly comparable, but as interconnected within a larger system or infrastructure.

Similarly, in her book, Easterling contemplates French philosopher Michel Foucault’s notion of an “apparatus’ or a ‘system of relations’ that he called a *dispositif*,” stating:

For Foucault a dispositif was ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions — in short, the said and much as the unsaid.’¹²

The phenomenon of Emergency in France is a product of various ‘assemblages of power’ that conceive of and mediate global order through various border apparatuses or technologies, or more generally as they have been defined in this chapter, *representations of spatial-temporal division and enclosure*.

Furthermore, the concept of a “dispositif” relates to what Henri Lefebvre calls, a “paradigmatic dimension” of society and the phenomenon of the present that constitutes a “set or system of relations and oppositions,” which relationally uphold, legitimize or (re)produce a status quo.¹³ In addition to the Emergency in France, represented by various bordering technologies that control movement and impose order, there is an Emergence of social forces that reveal, expose, refute, transgress, or transform this imposed order through direct opposition or contradiction by virtue of existing. In this way, the total view of the paradigm of the present encompasses both *Emergency* and *Emergence*. The product or virtual outcome of the conflict or tension between these two could be viewed as the “syntagmatic” dimension of the phenomenon of the present, which Lefebvre describes as being a “sequence (or path).”¹⁴ This path could be described as the path of the contemporary (urban) phenomenon toward a possible-impossible future.

From these perspectives we can infer that the contemporary paradigm of borders is defined by the conflict between the abstract illusion of a coherent spatial-temporal order of a nation-state, (which today is continuously (re) produced, abstracted and fragmented by a neoliberal political economy) and a

contradictory lived reality of division, inequality and violence that compromises the legitimacy of the illusion, and forces it to continually change and innovate on new technologies to expand the border infrastructure and domain of control. As Brian Larkin observes, “[...] liberalism is a form of government that disavows itself, seeking to organize populations and territories through technological domains that seem far removed from formal political institutions.”¹⁵ Therefore, borders function to mediate various forms of power and ideology, they represent “a conglomerate of political relations that designate a changing system of unequal power structures that delimits which humans can lay claim to full human status and which cannot”¹⁶ This “changing system” is the paradigm of the present.

Fragmentary border technologies that operate in an exceptional, flexible and mobile capacity form the dispersed infrastructural regime across French territory (and beyond) today to prevent this conflict from becoming visible by controlling complexity and contradiction. These technologies function in distinct but connected ways to produce this illusion of order, but in particular, through the enclosure, suspension and circulation of marginalized and clandestine populations within its fluid and dynamic infrastructural network.

This introductory chapter, and the sub-sections explore how some of these infrastructural spaces, apparatuses and technologies of the border functionally and effectively mediate or represent the ideologies and imaginaries of these dispersed socio-political and economic forces, governing institutions and regimes of power. Moreover, the research examines how these border technologies establish connections and relationships that strengthen their functionality through unitary and efficient circulation of social division as well as abstracting the sources of power through fragmentation. Building on some of the analysis of the epistemological boundaries of ideology in chapter 1.2, and the work here delves more deeply into the various bordering typologies and technologies in France today, as well as to begin identifying sources of contradiction, lived experiences and emerging strategies of social life which expose the ideological underpinnings of these spaces — a contradiction which opens up possibilities for transformation. Within the context of this work, infrastructures of borders are representative of, and reveal through analysis, forms of ideology that are at the foundation too systems of power that produce world-order.¹⁷ But infrastructures also exist in forms separate from their functionality (i.e. hospitality can have altered purposes), as was discussed in the previous chapter, it is, therefore, important to identify distinctions and differences between border technologies as well as relational connections to an underlying system. As Larkin argues:

Given the ever-proliferating networks that can be mobilized to understand infrastructures, we are reminded that discussing an infrastructure is a categorical act. It is a moment of tearing into those heterogenous networks to define which aspect of which network is to be discussed and which parts will be ignored. It recognizes that infrastructures operate on different levels simultaneously, generating multiple forms of address, and that any particular set of intellectual questions will have to elect which of these levels to examine. Infrastructures are not, in any positivist sense, simply ‘out there.’ The act of defining an infrastructure is a categorized moment. Taken thoughtfully, it comprises a cultural analytic that highlights the epistemological and political commitments involved in selecting what one sees as infrastructure (and thus causal) and what one leaves out.¹⁸

The aim of defining these infrastructures of borders is not to justify or legitimize reforms to them, but a political act that acknowledges the violence of these spaces

ENDNOTES - 2.2.0 REPRESENTATIONS OF SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DIVISION & ENCLOSURE

- 1 Keller Easterling, "Introduction," *Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space* (London, UK: Verso, 2014), 15.
- 2 Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft*, 15.
- 3 Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," *The Annual Review of Anthropology* (2013), 329.
- 4 Thomas Nail, "Cell," in *Theory of the Border* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 92.
- 5 Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 88.
- 6 Ibid, 92.
- 7 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, "In the Space of Temporal Borders," in *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 132.
- 8 Mezzadra, Sandro and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*, 149.
See also: Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time, and Everyday Life* (London, UK: Continuum, 2004).
- 9 Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft*, 15.
- 10 Mezzadra, Sandro and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*, 189-190.
- 11 Ibid, 189-190.
- 12 Keller Easterling, *Extrastatecraft*.
- 13 Henri Lefebvre, "Levels and Dimensions," in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 88.
- 14 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 88.
- 15 Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," 328.
- 16 James Johnson, "Being and Becoming human, Weheliye's Radical Emancipation Theory and the Flesh and Body of Black Studies," *EHIJ*, Volume IX: Issue II (Spring 2017), 42.
- 17 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979* (New York: Picador, 2010), 70, quoted in Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," 328.
- 18 Brian Larkin, "The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure," 330.



BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE

Spatial-Temporal Division & Enclosure

We've established thus far that the border, as a representation of ideologically conceived spatial-temporal division and enclosure in a paradigm of Emergency, maintains and (re)produces an illusion of status quo that is constructed based on the philosophical belief that life and human activity can be encapsulated into a world-order, a system, or a (super)structure.¹ The 'urban illusion,' as Henri Lefebvre refers to it, is designed to control the imaginary of society, shaping its consciousness through a secret project, "The worst utopia is the one that remains unnamed. The urban illusion belongs to the state. It is a state utopia: a cloud on the mountain that blocks the road. It is both antitheory and antipractice."² Within this imagined utopia (which is the opposite, or antithesis of the utopia process), the border is ideologically conceived as a necessary spatial technology to functionally mediate and regulate practices and processes of mobility as well as impose symbolic order to social relations in space across scales of land or territory and between different nation-states or social groups. The logic of social division, exclusion or isolation is represented as natural, absolute and apolitical by this infrastructure of borders, or what Lefebvre refers to as a "technostructure" designed to reach "optimal efficiency [...] by allowing logic and strategy to conceal themselves from view — and strategy to appear logical, or necessary."³

Furthermore, Lefebvre argues 'urbanism,' as a discipline, is a representation of an ideologically organized society of "controlled consumption" necessitating spatial (re)production.⁴ In response to the question of "What is urbanism?" Lefebvre argues that it is:

A superstructure of neocapitalist society, a form of "organizational capitalism; which is not the same as "organized capital"— in other words, a bureaucratic society of controlled consumption. Urbanism organizes a sector that appears to be free and accessible, open to rational activity: inhabited space. It controls the consumption of space and the habitat. As superstructure, it must be distinguished from practice, from social relationships, from society itself.⁵

To clarify this above quote, Louis Althusser argues, from a Marxist historical materialist position, that infrastructure is the base and above it is a superstructure:

[...] Marx conceives the structure of every society as constituted by 'levels' or 'instances' articulated by a specific determination: the infrastructure or economic base (the 'unity' of the productive forces and the relations of production) and the superstructure, which itself comprises two 'levels' or 'instances': the political-legal level (law and the state) and the ideological level (the various ideologies: religious, moral, legal, political, and so on).⁶

In other words, the contemporary infrastructure of borders mediates a top-down

Figure 2.4 & 2.5 (Opposite page, top & bottom image) "This is not a prison", This photographic work on the confinement of undocumented foreigners in administrative detention centers and premises was commissioned by the Cimade to 3 independent photographers, Olivier Aubert, David Delaporte and Xavier Merckx.

abstract superstructure, as an organizational system that imposes control upon lived social relations. The infrastructure of borders is a designed networked space, composed of various technologies, to mediate this system by limiting potentials of spatial use and inhabitation to “rational activity” that conforms to and reproduces a power dynamic conceived within the abstract superstructure. In this way, the infrastructure unifies an imposed mode of production as an organizational strategy or system, and relations of production or social activity that reproduces and maintains this system.

Our contemporary society’s superstructure, its laws and ideologies, is made material or concrete in borders as a representation of spatial-temporal division and enclosure. The production of borders is controlled by the state and dispersed forms of power, and it responds to social “consumption” or use of space that is representational of inherent or latent desires within society. Space, as a mediator of ideology at the superstructural global level, is used to shape and control that desire by controlling how space is used, or the possibilities of life within space. Life or spatial use that conforms to this order and in effect, confirms or reproduces the superstructure through the use of the base/infrastructure. However, spatial use has the potential to transform the functionality of space to mediate or impose order to control its consumption, therefore reducing the effectiveness of the superstructure to impose or maintain order.

In Lefebvre’s identified levels of this phenomenon, this movement looks like as a syntagmatic system or path, when the social use of space confirms and reproduces the global organizational order (impossible):

$G > M > P, P > M > G$

However, when it is in contradiction, this movement could look like (possible):

$G > M > P^1, P^1, M^1, G^1$

Where ‘1’ refers to the introduction of difference, that limits the reproducibility of the status quo and has the potential to transform the dynamics of social (re) production through conflict and contradiction, exposing the illusion of the impossible syntagmatic path and the aspects of social life it excludes.

What constitutes the abstract space of the infrastructure is much more complex than a hierarchical or transcendental system, rather the mode of production or superstructure is embedded in multiple levels of society from public to private space, and therefore is mediated by conditions of those spaces.

As Henri Lefebvre states, space is broken up and abstracted to facilitate the reproduction of power dynamics that underpin this infrastructural space of movement and flow:

The movement glimpsed here is that between consumption in the ordinary sense, consumption necessitating the reproduction of things, and the space of production, which is traversed, and hence used and consumed, by flows; it is also the movement between the space of production and the space of reproduction, controlled by state power and underpinned by the reproducibility of things in space, as of space itself, which is broken up in order to facilitate this.⁷

This is to illustrate the changes to the superstructure occur through transformations in everyday life that impact the ability of space, or the infrastructural base, to mediate and control the social relations of production. In reality, this syntagmatic

path oriented toward a virtual future is a mixture of both the possible-impossible. Hence why utopia is defined by a process within this thesis, as a tension between the abstraction of space and the existence of difference in concrete spaces of everyday life that exposes contradiction and creates the potential for abstract space to turn into differential space that thus transforms the relationship between the superstructure and infrastructure.

The Composition of the Superstructure and Mediation of the Border Infrastructure

In today's world, the way borders mediate ideology and power is much more complex than just the inclusion or exclusion of difference. Moreover, ideological superstructures do not just take the form of the state or centralized power. Within our contemporary society and modes of social (re)production, power is much more dispersed and abstract, and borders function in different ways to support this. In this way, to understand the composition of the abstract superstructure of society, its political and ideological composition, one can examine how these translate into concrete lived effects through space.

There are fundamentally going to be transgressions of the border, and differences that expose its logic, and this is reflected by the function of borders. One of the central contradictions of borders is that they are 'polysemic'⁸: being both closed and open depending on whether the movement passing through them reinforces or transgresses their mediation of power; therefore having relative meaning, functionality and resultant lived consequences for different people, or people whose differences are designated by this condition. This essential function of the border produces uneven social division and relativistic democracy — expressed in the inherent limitations, conditions, and exceptions of practices of hospitality. Rather than solely including or excluding (im)migrants in unilateral ways, Mezzadra and Neilson argue that contemporary border technologies and political apparatuses function by “filtering, selecting, and channeling migratory movements.”⁹

Interactions with the state, the financial/labour markets and a host of other institutions of power (re)produce this uneven spatial-temporal order. For instance, borders in France are, on the one hand, characteristically fortified and heavily guarded to protect national security, culture and identity. On the other hand, they are porous, making them increasingly transgressed and transformed by the deregulation and expansion of global financial markets. In this way, the state expresses the effects of this duality in the limited provision of hospitality and social security to bolster a perception of benevolence. Meanwhile, the financial markets often create conditions of insecurity and exploitation through labour practices that take advantage of those with limited sovereignty. As Stephen Castles describes, this is a situation of ‘differential exclusion,’ “[...] in which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labour market) but denied access to others (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political participation).”¹⁰ Moreover, as Mezzadra and Neilson summarize:

Most important, Castles maintains a view of the labor market as an integral “area of society” to which migrants are admitted in opposition to other social institutions from which they are excluded. In other words, the differentiation in differential exclusion describes the uneven accessibility of various areas of society to migrants, but leaves these areas themselves intact and discrete, at least regarding issues of migrant access. The labor market, for instance, remains nationally bounded and migration answers its established modes of differentiation rather than unsettling them by introducing new temporal, internal, and transnational borders that cut between and across national limits.¹¹

Amongst these conditions and activities of centralized and dispersed forms of power the figure of the (im)migrant, the asylum seeker, refugee — or more generally and pervasively the alienated, subjugated or marginalized ‘other’ — is forced to navigate and dwell within the liminal spaces, in-between and indeterminate zones of the border, as they are denied access to, or excluded from representation and participation within this imagined society to various degrees. This interior ‘borderland’¹² defines, controls and circulates populations as well as being in a constant state of flux — its function and material conditions are transformed by the movement between the lived social used that is then communicated from the infrastructure to the superstructure, and then the superstructure transforms the infrastructure to respond. For instance, mechanisms of bureaucratic management and administration in the asylum process or (im)migrant labour classify and control individuals who are defined as their legal status. These bureaucratic controls can have drastic material effects on the lived circumstances of those waiting to receive asylum or aid.

This process of enforcing order over bodies is what Michel Foucault calls ‘bio-power,’ “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.”¹³

As Léopold Lambert illustrates, through the lens of Michel Foucault, the organization of society today is less about disciplining the individual body and more about regulating and controlling the notion of ‘self’ as a subject under a system as a means to reproduce that system:

What is used to be known as the panopticon is the paradigm that Michel Foucault establishes for the disciplinary society, appropriating the design originally created by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century. In fact, this circular prison in which the centralized form of power can easily supervise every actions of the prisoners situated in the perimeter, was a paradigm for the society between the end of the 18th century and our era. Foucault’s thesis was that society’s scheme that we progressively enter into is much more interested about control than discipline. The mode of surveillance is shifting from a transcendental mode — centralized proctor, symbolizing an entity like a government or an institution — to a complete immanent mode in which each member of the society is supervising the ensemble of the other members while being supervised himself.¹⁴

In the particular case of the State of Emergency in France, institutions are given extra powers to enforce the law that transcends the relationship between the state and the individual. Today, the problematization of (im)migration in the imaginary of French (European and Western society) has materialized in the form of ‘precautionary’ measures that are temporarily enacted in an exceptional capacity to control mobility. These measures, often bureaucratic rather than physical barriers, make it more difficult for certain people to enter a defined territory or legal jurisdiction to gain access to resources, representation and hospitality from a nation-state or institution. Moreover, these barriers are often constructed by ongoing legacies of what Alexander Weheliye calls “racializing assemblages” or the “socio-political processes that discipline humanity into different genres of social status using western, property owning white man as the paradigm.”¹⁵ These barriers represent interconnected categories of subjugation, that are not comparable but relational in how they characterize a hierarchy of social existence through different structures. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the acceptance of refugees or (im)migrants into a country is often dependent upon how well they conform to a certain standard of human.

Since 9/11 Western states have sought to increase and integrate ‘securitization’ measures within the processes and management of (im)migration and asylum as these individuals, and more broadly ethnic minorities, have been linked in the imaginary of society as a potential terrorist threat against the nation-state.¹⁶ In addition to the (in)security of the nation-state, questions have emerged in regard to the regulation of the labour markets and the role of the (im)migrant therein, whereby “mechanisms of exploitation and subjugation contrast but also complement the more familiar images of exclusion and expulsion”¹⁷ in the (re) production of order and power. These ‘precautionary’ or ‘preventative’ measures deployed on behalf of the state and the market, as well as other institutions with vested interest in maintaining hegemonic order, have had predatory lived effects on individuals who are most vulnerable, or whose security is conditional based upon them conforming to a process that maintains the system of power. As Michel Agier argues, modern nation-states have made themselves:

*[...] the ‘protectors’ of their populations against the harmful effects of this globalization, targeting its weakest expression: the bodies of the least protected migrant (economically and legally) and of refugees, or again their descendants, considered increasingly often as ‘foreigners’ even within national boundaries. With unequal weapons, the public authorities track and harass individuals in a ‘clandestine’ situation, or whose appearance and phenotype (what in France is called their *faciès*) evoke this underground foreign ‘infiltration’. This wider sense of ‘border policing,’ mobilized against individualized targets, acquires a major place, even if it contains all the remains of the meaning of the nation-state in terms of projection of citizen.¹⁸*

In the same way that the identity of the ‘other’ is subjected to or manipulated by ideology, bordered space acts as a void to be filled by a representation of the state or other forces, to enact or mediate this process of inclusion/exclusion. Spatially, this contemporary paradigm of control through social division is reinforced in places like detention centres and camps at the most extreme, but it can also be mobilized in an exceptional capacity within everyday places, institutions and organizations — effectively transforming any place into a border ‘checkpoint.’¹⁹ Borders and border technologies are, therefore, both ‘ubiquitous and heterogenous’²⁰ as well as ‘polysemic’²¹ and ‘polymorphous.’²²

Human Geographer, Claudio Minca, in his article *Geographies of the camp*, argues that a spatial theory of the camp (and arguably within this context, border technologies in general) is necessary to understand this paradigm of borders: “camp spatialities determine in a crucial way what happens ‘inside,’ but they also affect the production of the political geographies outside the camp. The camp is double-edged, liked barbed wire. We are indeed all affected by the presence of camps.”²³ The pervasive infrastructure of borders not only controls with life within its enclosures but also outside in the so-called “free” space of social (re)production.

For this reason, the ubiquity of the border today means that subjects who are produced or defined by the border are often complicit in reinforcing or enacting the systems of control or governmentality that maintain division. This observation is not meant to place blame upon an individual for seeking asylum by conforming to a process, but to illuminate the nuanced ways this system of privilege and oppression, inclusion and exclusion, is (re)produced within society and not solely a product of direct state or market interventions. As Étienne Balibar argues the active differentiation of individuals into subjects of social division functionally reproduces order:

Today's borders (though in reality this has long been the case) are, to some extent, designed to perform precisely this task: not merely to give individuals from different social classes different experiences of the law, the civil administration, the police and elementary rights, such as freedom of circulation and freedom of enterprise, but actively differentiate between individuals in terms of social class.²⁴

Again, this is not to generalize that lived conditions within these spaces of division and enclosure are all the same, that they function for the same purposes, or that there is a complete lack of agency to be had within these spaces. The differentiation of types and functions can often abstract and mask their underlying linkages as an infrastructure that operates in an exceptional capacity connected to other global processes. While the upcoming chapters divide these technologies based on their characteristic functions and logics that support an illusion of order or condition of exception, the lived experiences within them are multiple, constantly affected by their relationship to forces and actors that do not necessarily conform to the logic or ideology mediated by the infrastructural network itself. For instance, as Manuel Hertz argues (in reference to Agamben's 'state of exception' as "the biopolitical paradigm of the West"):

[...] the camp is the spatial manifestation, and central mechanism, of the state of exception, which has come to define the political structure of our Western world. [...] The same rules and logics of the camp can therefore be identified within the holding areas of our airports or the banlieues of our cities. Here, Agamben comes dangerously close to generalization. Even if it is true that the biopolitical operations of our society are active in refugee camps as well as in slums or detention centres, the individual problems that are triggered by each of those cases remain unrecognized, and the specific nature of a refugee camp seems more opaque than ever. It appears that refuse camps are rarely considered to be an independent category. Instead, although central, they seem to be conditioned by, and referenced through, other seemingly similar spacial categories.²⁵

What Hertz illustrates here relates to the epistemological problem with defining the boundaries of ideology in general. If everything becomes ideological, the term loses its operative capacity. In the same way, if everything becomes a border, a product of fragmented technologies of bio-power and governmentality, what can genuinely oppose or transform the contemporary paradigm? It is, therefore, essential to refer to actual conditions of lived experience in an analysis of the present, rather than to speak in general terms about ideology itself — a problem that Lefebvre critiques with the field of urbanism, which becomes ideological through the abstraction of everyday conditions.

What this chapter has outlined is the relationship or movement between the infrastructure and the superstructure, a relationship defined by imposing order and controlling the function of a space of the border, and the relationship that the infrastructure of borders has to control migration to maintain the hegemonic power of the superstructure. This next section on border technologies illustrates how variations of borders and technologies operate within this infrastructure to differentially mediate and manage migration. First outlining the difference or relationship between infrastructure and technology and then focusing on describing specific border technologies of surveillance and detention that represent differential mediations of power to control migration.

ENDNOTES – 2.2.1 BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE: SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DIVISION & ENCLOSURE

1 Henri Lefebvre, “Urban Illusions,” in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 152.

Relating to this quote by Lefebvre:

“The philosophical illusion arises from the belief on the part of philosophers that they can enclose the world in a system of their own devising.”

2 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 163.

3 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 158.

4 “The movement glimpsed here is that between consumption in the ordinary sense, consumption necessitating the reproduction of things, and the space of production, which is traversed, and hence used and consumed, by flows; it is also the movement between the space of production and the space of reproduction, controlled by state power and underpinned by the reproducibility of things in space, as of space itself, which is broken up in order to facilitate this.”

Henri Lefebvre, “Contradictions of Space to Differential Space,” in *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, UK & Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1991), 354.

5 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 164.

6 Louis Althusser, “Base and Superstructure,” *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, translated by G. M. Goshgarian (London, UK; New York, NY: Verso, 2014), 53.

7 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 354

8 “Yet, they attempt to do this while preserving to the utmost the symbolic sources of their popular legitimacy. This is why they find themselves in the contradictory position of having both to relativizing and to reinforce the notion of identity and national belonging, the equation of citizenship with nationality.”

Étienne Balibar, “What is a Border,” *Politics and the Other Scene*, trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson and Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2002), 81-82.

9 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, “In the Space of Temporal Borders,” in *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 165.

10 Stephen Castles, “How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity.” *New Community* 21 (3) (1995), 294, quoted in Mezzadra, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 162.

11 Stephen Castles, “How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity.” *New Community* 21 (3) (1995), 294, quoted in Mezzadra, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 162.

12 See: Michel Agier, *Borderlands: Towards an Anthropology of the Cosmopolitan Condition* (New York: Wiley, 2016).

See also: Étienne Balibar, “Europe as Borderland,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, volume 27 (2009), 190-215.

13 Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality Vol.I* (Paris, France: Éditions Gallimard, 1976), 140.

14 Léopold Lambert, “Architecture of Safety,” *Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence* (New York, NY: DPR Barcelona, 2012), 27-28.

15 Alexander Weheliye, “Assemblages: Articulation,” *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Duke University Press, 2014), 45-52, quoted in James Johnson, “Being and Becoming human, Weheliye’s Radical Emancipation Theory and the Flesh and Body of Black Studies,” *EHIJ*, Volume IX: Issue II (Spring 2017), 25.

16 See: The European Union in International Affairs. *The Securitization of Migration in the EU: Debates since 9/11*. Lazaridis, Gabriella and Khursheed Wadia ed. (London, UK: Palgrave and MacMillan, 2015).

See also: Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks,” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* Vol. 16, No. 1 (2016).

17 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*, 146.

18 Michel Agier, *Borderlands*, 48.

19 See: Thomas Nail, “Checkpoint I,” *Theory of the Border* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016).

20 Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, 84.

21 Ibid, 81.

22 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 187.

23 Claudio Minca, “Geographies of the Camp,” *Political Geography* 49 (2015), 80.

24 Étienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, 81-82.

25 Manuel Hertz, “The Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara,” in *From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara* (Baden, Switzerland: Lars Muller Publishers, 2013), 8-9.



BORDER TECHNOLOGIES

Surveillance & Detention

Expansion and Intensification of the Border

What constitutes this expanded and intensified border infrastructure are representations of its abstract political ideology in the form of various fragmented border technologies that mediate power by controlling social mobility. However, power is not just hierarchically imposed from above; rather, it is (re)produced through spaces across scales and levels of society. Therefore, a border technology is something that functionally mediates an ideology of spatial-temporal division or enclosure, managing migration, identity, social relations and the general (re) production of power dynamics within and throughout society.

These border technologies have not only divided and reconstructed physical spaces and territories; they have also divided populations according to the legitimacy of their mobility and existence within them. The individuals who move through or transgress spaces of the border at the edge or centre of a nation-state are controlled by forces that seek to preserve or (re)produce power and the illusion of order. They become an unwilling ‘other,’ ‘bare life’ included through exclusion, forced into an enclosure to legitimize and normalize a practice and perception. The resultant ‘us vs them’ dynamic creates interior and exterior subjects who are forcibly made to become symbolic “vessels” for “moral narratives”¹ and ideologies mediated by borders and other political apparatuses. In this way, the illusion of order, conceived of by powerful gatekeepers, is mobilized and enforced within society itself through modes of governance or ‘governmentality’² within everyday practices and spaces.

Centralized powers, institutions and other disciplinary controls sort such individuals into symbolic categories and hierarchies of socio-political relations — ‘citizens’ or ‘non-citizens,’ ‘legal’ or ‘illegal,’ ‘qualified’ or ‘bare life.’ These controls are represented and enforced by the information outlined in documents and records, such as the passport or visa, which identifies individuals based on photographic images and biometric data. These representations connect people to particular places or symbolic identities as a subject included or excluded from a space or territory. Moreover, identification documents limit the mobility of individuals by confining them based on a perceived connection to a larger identifying group. These documents respond to changes in social mobility by constantly transforming to maintain social order, demonstrated by in the ways definitions and legal policy referring to (im)migrants or other marginalized groups has changed over the years. Notably, the differentiation between humanitarian and political refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants after WWII led to the introduction of different documentation and processing measures, “temporary protection visas, off-shore processing, and protection zones for IDPs.”³

These policy changes are driven by an ideological positioning to benefit both the security and symbolic image of the nation-state, which has physical impacts in the production of spaces of the border that holds these individuals in spatial and temporal waiting zones. Mezzadra and Neilson refer to this relationship as “Pre-

Figure 2.6 (Opposite page) “This is not a prison”, This photographic work on the confinement of undocumented foreigners in administrative detention centers and premises was commissioned by the Cimade to 3 independent photographers, Olivier Aubert, David Delaporte and Xavier Merckx.

emptive refolement,”⁴ whereby the figure of the “‘illegal’ migrant has become the driver of innovations in the sphere of border and migration control.”⁵ The border, as a technology within this mode of societal (re)production, is a dynamic and mobile medium and in a “state of permanent recomposition before shifting circumstances and never fixes a definite form.”⁶ Furthermore, they argue that:

As long as there have been passports, border control, and national labor markets, there have been subjects who flaunt these systems. The figure of the “illegal” migrant emerges on the world stage in the wake of tumultuous transformations of capitalism that began to unfold in the early 1970. [...] Central to the emergence of this figure was a marked shift in public and policy discourses, a new international institutional environment for the generation of knowledge about and the forging of strategies to manage migration, a reorganization of labor markets to accommodate processes of informalization and flexibilization, and disruption and multiplication of migratory routes and patterns across geographic scales.⁷

In today’s world, as activist Syed Hussan states, “Everyone has immigration status.”⁸ The subjects produced by social division can find themselves in a situation of dependency, what Lefebvre calls “controlled consumption”⁹ that reinforces a system at two ends through the habitation of space as a means of social exchange rather than social use. On one end, individuals rely upon their classification and situation of privilege and inclusion that allows them to benefit from their status or supposed “freedom.” On the other end, facing oppression and exclusion, these individuals are waiting to earn or access those privileges of inclusion to gain agency, security and representation. These two ends resultantly reproduce the system through lived activity and interactions with border technologies that legitimize their underlying ideological and political purpose. However, border technologies also transform and adapt to changes in social life and mobility, to absorb, divide or exclude it as an expression of domination or power over life. We can see these changes in real time occurring today. Border technologies facilitate the expansion and intensification of a larger border infrastructure that contains and controls social relations and mobility. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate some examples of border technologies and how they are functionally mediating this condition of spatial-temporal division and enclosure to reproduce power dynamics and suppress contradiction through the management of (im)migration in the context of France and the material/spatial paradoxes of the state of emergency.

Technologies of Surveillance: Spaces of Precaution / Predatory Spaces

What is common to many of these contemporary border technologies is that they embody an ideological fear of an abstract threat to national security that conflates otherness with terrorism, disrupting the security and authority of the nation-state, sovereign or other forms of dispersed power. Technologies of surveillance are invoked under the illusion of being *precautionary* measures to monitor, prevent and deter perceived threats that have the potential to disrupt the status quo. These precautions relate to what Derrida refers to as “preparations for the arrival of the stranger.” They anticipate the possibility of unknowable situations, conflict or contradictions and create flexible and exceptional safeguards to prevent crisis, re-establish state power and authority to govern, while maintaining and reproducing the illusion of order. However, in doing so, these measures paradoxically create pre-determined scapegoat figures to be associated with crisis.

Therefore, part of maintaining and reproducing this illusion is the forceful

illegalization and criminalization of unauthorized mobility through exceptional and unjust measures. As Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson argue, “Many refugees and asylum seekers, indeed, are subject to processes of illegalization, often even before they enter countries that are considered privileged migration destinations.”¹⁰ In this way, the transformation, exclusion and containment of individual identities by this global border regime is a *predatory* response to changes in mobility that are perceived to impact the status quo or balance of power before the truth of this perception can be verified. Obstacles and barriers are designed to identify difference as a threat and diminish the legitimacy and humanity of those seeking security, freedom and asylum. In doing so, these technologies of surveillance actively reinforce the legitimacy of the system itself to control the conditions of hospitality or inclusion, to dictate the law and define the terms and conditions of its own authority to do so.

As Jane Freedman argues, in France:

[...] even those immigrants who are in a regular situation with legal residence permits find themselves often in a state of ‘potential illegitimacy,’ whereby they become suspect and feel insecure in their status. This insecurity of even legal residents is reinforced by political reforms and discourse that has undermined the automatic renewal of ten-year residence permits, thus fragilizing the status of those immigrants in possession of one of these cards. This potential illegitimacy even hits the children of immigrants, who have themselves been born in France and who have French nationality, by a continual process of ethnicization of social relations and of increasing discrimination and stigmatization of immigrants.”¹¹

Therefore, as much as these border technologies are used to monitor mobility through surveillance passively, they also are used to affect mobility through more permanent measures of control that can alter status and freedom. The border (re) produces social division through the monitoring and control of individuals who have been made into subjects with limited freedom based on their identification within or outside a system. Infrastructural space embodies this ideology of social division and enclosure that is no longer explicitly tied to a centralized power or formalized space, rather it is essential to the mode of production of contemporary society and subsequently takes on many forms.

In particular, Thomas Nail argues in *Theory of the Border* that the ‘checkpoint’ is a border typology that functionally materializes and represents this ideology of spatial-temporal division and enclosure by enacting surveillance and control through border enforcement taking place at any point in space or time.¹² First, through “the isolation of a point in the flow of space-time,” then through the “inspection,” which formalizes social division by verifying the validity of the subject and their mobility passing through that point.¹³ The inspection is the aesthetic and effective enactment of the border, both as a spectacle and as a lived experience of violence that aims to prevent or discourage contradictory forms of mobility. The mobility or ephemerality of the ‘checkpoint’ itself allows it to surveil, respond to, and intervene in changes that might disrupt the status quo of social motion; moreover, it establishes new connects with other formations of border technologies that strengthen the global infrastructure of borders. In this way, Nail argues, “The aim of the checkpoint is not to maintain static borders (homeostasis), but to maintain a dynamic equilibrium (homeorhesis), and, when possible, expand this equilibrium.”¹⁴

In this way, surveillance is no longer a static border technology that monitors movement but a dynamic and active component in a larger infrastructure

of borders that represents and contributes to the controlled reproduction of social order. These mobile spaces and technologies that enact division to anticipate and respond to, as well as manufacture, perceived crises, oppositional or contradictory identities and forms of mobility by intervening and confining their movement to a controlled path — or otherwise, redirect or limit that path.

Moreover, surveillance border technologies are enacted as a measure of *precaution* for security but often exhibit *predatory* and exceptional behaviour under an omnipresent paradigm of emergency. This inherent paradox is made visible in the tension between processes of social mobility and migration in France and the presence of technologies of surveillance to control movement and operate outside normative understandings of the law to enforce a spatial-temporal division or enclosure to maintain order.

In particular, the police are an example of an extra-legal surveillance technology that reacts to contradiction, intervenes by re-establishing a division and reproducing or promoting the security interests of the state. As Nail argues, the preventative function of the police patrol checkpoint is to render the border visible as an aesthetic spectacle of border enforcement by representing the potential for the criminalization of movement that threatens the security of the state.¹⁵ In this way, “[...] the patrol does not need to directly coerce or enclose but can simply deter crime by its oscillating presence to and fro. The police patrol now functions more elastically—appearing in greater frequency and number according to the shifting crime potentials to produce an equilibrium.”¹⁶ Moreover, often, these temporary measures are later inscribed into law, as we have seen with past State of Emergencies in France that led to security reforms.

The ‘checkpoint’ as a categorical typology of the border, is no longer preventative and defensive, the visibility of the police creates an illusion of safety and precautionary action, but it also actively masks and abstracts offensive and predatory surveillance and interventions of police patrol that reproduce social division by isolating, excluding, and criminalizing certain groups. While (im)migrants are often detained at border crossings, many are turned over by local police forces co-operating with border enforcement agencies. This can lead to ‘double punishment,’¹⁷ whereby permanent residents who are convicted of certain crimes are penalized by the criminal justice system as well as administrative immigration system, meaning people can be stripped of their status if convicted, which is often the result of profiling and over-policing certain racialized populations. Without even a criminal conviction or warrant, racialized (im)migrants and refugees are more likely profiled, arrested and charged, and this, in turn, makes them disproportionately subject to deportation. In this way, the criminal in-justice of the state becomes a technology of (im)migration management and control. Sanctuary (city) movements call to end this co-operation between municipal police services with border enforcement agencies.

The mobile and visible enforcement of the border by police, as well as invisible surveillance, not only monitors mobility but functional manages to reproduce division by rendering it visibly different or ‘illegal.’ On the one hand, the visibility of the police patrol and surveillance establishes its power as a deterrent to crime, and on the other, the patrol renders visible “deviant” forms of mobility.¹⁸ Moreover, the data collected by this surveillance activity is recirculated by various state and non-state institutions that use it to reinforce and legitimize the ideological “precautions” and effectively reproduces the system through mediating ‘information’¹⁹ or expert representations of reality that illustrate the potentials for crime through suspicions and patterns based on identified subjects behaviours. The police use tools such a video cameras to surveil populations, they document biometric information such as fingerprints, mug shots, and video footage of their activity, they use tactics to intervene in social mobility such as profiling and

carding, and these activities are in turn supported by legal policies and laws that facilitate “correct circulation.”²⁰

By rendering social division visible, these mobile border technologies also effectively reproduce the various institutions that conceive of social order across scales and levels of society. This particularly being the symbolic illusion of a cohesive state of France, which is made secure and definable through the establishment of its “defensible limits.”²¹ Meanwhile, policing reinforces these state institutions in a feedback loop, “the latter guarantees a place for the former, which in turn guarantees the place of the latter’s free flow of commerce and wealth.”²²

This function is not only carried out by the institutions but by the participants within them, as Henri Lefebvre argues:

The production of space is not new in itself. Dominant groups have always produced a particular space, the space of the old cities, of the countryside (and what will become the “natural” landscape). What is new is the global and total production of social space. This enormous expansion of productive activity is carried out on behalf of those who invented it, manage it, and profit from it. Capitalism appears to be out of steam. It found new inspiration in the conquest of space — in trivial terms, in real estate speculation, capital projects (inside and outside the city), the buying and selling of space. And it did so on a worldwide scale. This is the (unforeseen) path of the socialization of productive forces, of the production of space itself. Capitalism, to ensure its survival, took the initiative in this. The strategy goes far beyond simply selling space, bit by bit. Not only does it incorporate space in the production of surplus value, it attempts to completely reorganize production as something subordinate to the centers of information and decision making. [...] This strategy overwhelms the “user,” the “participant,” the simple “inhabitant.” He is reduced not only to merely functioning as an inhabitant (habitat as function) but to being a buyer of space, one who realizes surplus value. Space becomes a place where various functions are carried out, the most important and most hidden being that of forming, realizing, and distributing in novel ways the surplus of an entire society (generalized surplus value within the capitalist mode of production).²³

Therefore, one of the primary functions of surveillance (and the border, more generally) is to establish and reproduce the boundaries of social life as a productive cycle that expands and intensifies the functional power of the border to mediate order.

This is seen in France in the manner in which social borders are created so as to control mobility within the country and the inclusion/exclusion of non-nationals. The administrations and institutions of the nation-state process data collected in mobile surveillance checkpoints. The data is processed according to policies that are informed by practices of surveillance in a feedback loop that recirculates data as information that turns into more efficient and effective surveillance practices.

The administrative processing of data on the movement of populations in and out the nation-state inform decisions on (im)migration and refugee acceptance quota as well as policies that affect or deter movement such as the Dublin Convention and Third Safe Country Agreement. These policies, in turn, have spatial impacts through the creation of detention facilities and camps, which are often regulated by third party security services as well as “humanitarian” groups. The externalization of hospitality is observable in the form of a deportation regime that disciplines and recirculates mobility to limit the responsibly of the

nation-state to welcome and include difference, by relocating the responsibility of hospitality elsewhere.

These technologies of surveillance and control are made operational within everyday spaces, but, as we will examine next and in the following chapters, they are also formalized within spaces of detention/incarceration as well as tested in informal spaces of encampment to develop more efficient and effective ways to control movement and recirculate populations within an infrastructure of borders.

Technologies of Detention: Spaces of Protection / Punitive Spaces

Technologies of Detention primarily focus on contextualizing the “formal” spaces of (im)migration detention in France; however, these spaces are increasingly in-formalized as the role of the state in managing migration is abstracted and fragmented. The boundary between “formal” detention and “informal” encampment is increasingly blurred, but this does not mean that the space of a camp is any less productive as a technology in the global border infrastructure. Rather, as the work has tried to demonstrate thus far, these are conjoined operations in a spectrum of active and passive enforcement of the contemporary paradigm of spatial-temporal division and enclosure.

In addition to circulating and separating movement, these border technologies are a part of a more extensive infrastructure made up of spaces connected in a “cellular”²⁴ carceral regime, which is embedded in many dimensions and scalar levels of society — from everyday exploitative capitalist and labour relations²⁵, to normalized state violence and imperialist power dynamics. This border infrastructure not only affects the mobility of (im)migrants and people who cross, navigate and negotiate this network of borders and border technologies, rather the logics that define it are foundational to our mode of social (re)production as a society.

Whereas technologies of surveillance are used as *precautionary* measures to prevent, react to and intervene in patterns of mobility as a form of surveillance and regulatory control, these carceral spaces of detention are designed under the ideology of separating the population of a nation-state from a perceived threat, a source of crisis, contradiction or emergency. Furthermore, ideologies of nationalism, protectionism, and austerity measures fortify these spaces, which intentionally function to deter, exclude and contain the perceived sources of conflict both for the *protection* of ‘citizens,’ as well as for the so-called “humanitarian” protection of those ‘non-citizens’ detained or enclosed informal detention centres or informal encampments. Spaces of (im)migration detention are designed to socially (re)produce spatial-temporal borders by separating (im)migrants and other marginalized groups from the resources and support of their social networks — transforming them into controlled or deportable subjects with limited legal rights so that they become ‘bare life,’ socially excluded from sovereign protection.

Yet, this division, much like the *predatory* division created by technologies of surveillance and control, results in unequal, unjust and *punitive* spatial conditions for those enclosed — even if they are not formally incarcerated in a detention centre. The conditions of limited access to hospitality force people seeking asylum into different or informal enclosures, whether they are physical spaces of encampment or legal/bureaucratic categorizations. Moreover, the conditions of poverty or other forms of marginalization force people into similar and often overlapping situations of insecurity and dependency. As was discussed in previous chapters, the exception is not so much exceptional but rather the normative violence that is foundational to the functioning of the state and ideological orderings of society. While these spaces are mostly hidden from the public eye, their visibility comes

in the form of media representation and information that often depicts them through a “spectacle of border reinforcement” and punishment, which Mezzadra and Neilson argue, is an invocation of “an active process of inclusion through illegalization.”²⁶ This spectacle aims to deter or marginalize certain groups and forms of mobility, but people have and will always move, this representation only ensures that more controls restrict their movement making it more clandestine and dangerous, which in turn reinforces the perception of the subject and their movement as ‘illegal.’

The *predatory* and *punitive* effects of these carceral border technologies represent a larger exceptional, yet normalized for many, process and structural condition of indeterminate waiting, which again is prevalent not just in the formal spaces of detention but in airports, seaports, train stations, or other ports of entry, as well as potentially enacted in everyday spaces and institutions. These spaces are defined by their qualities and relationships to different state authorities and institutions but are primarily differentiated through the duration of the suspension of law as a mechanism of exception and exclusion to maintain sovereign power over a period of time as well as regulating the temporal processes within and outside these spaces. This suspension of law takes place in a multitude of spaces associated with the regulation of mobility: from the “gates” or entrances into the territory at the border, to the places of finite processing such as detention centres or waiting zones, to the places of indeterminate and in-formalized waiting such as the camp.

The questions driving this investigation have to do with understanding and drawing linkages to how these different border technologies and power dynamics manage movement and maintain perceptions of difference to reinforce and reproduce borders and ideological systems of power. Moreover, to investigate where/how lived experience within these spaces of detention contradicts and overturns the ideologies and logics represented and enforced in these bordered spaces.

Carceral Logics of Detention

Before addressing the specifics of (im)migration detention in France, it is important to acknowledge and examine how the paradigm of spatial-temporal division and enclosure, which has produced and maintained an infrastructure of borders, is connected to a carceral regime. The history and contemporary practices of detention are intertwined with a history of incarceration, policing and surveillance as well as the involvement of many state and non-state experts in a diverse and complex use of legal provisions and exceptions to control, repress, separate and enclose (im)migrants and other marginalized groups.

Detention is not just physical spaces of incarceration but an infrastructure that functionally contains or “includes” difference through exclusion, separation, indeterminacy, waiting and so on — the political figure of the “illegal” migrant is, in fact, an invented construct of state bureaucracies or their international counterparts that process identity through an ideological lens of criminality.²⁷

The figure of the “illegal” migrant, as we understand that politicized subject today, emerged in the wake of capitalist transformations that unfolded in the late 1960s to early 1970s. This historical shift was related to the political and ideological project of Neoliberalism to secure and regain the wealth of the capitalist class by offering deregulation and tax cuts to corporations, as well as disciplining workers, reducing their power, and pitting them against each other through austerity measures. (Im)migration reforms brought in new populations of exploitable workers with limited status and legal rights as well as pushed towards increased globalization and accelerated the movement of labour and goods around

the world. As Mezzadra and Neilson argue, this moment in history, “marked a shift in public policy discourses, a new international institutional environment for the generation of knowledge about and the forging of strategies to manage migration, a reorganization of labor markets to accommodate processes of informalization and flexibilization, and a disruption and multiplication of migratory routes and patterns across diverse geographical scales.”²⁸

Today, a lot of contemporary discourse differentiates between the space of a prison, which is associated with criminal law and the space of an immigration detention centre, which is related to administrative law. The emergence of various new technologies, spaces, and institutions of detention, waiting, separation, holding and containment has been narrowly understood as an independent phenomenon rather than being connected to systems of control present elsewhere in society. This framing creates a distinction between criminals and migrants, which is used as a principal argument of many (im)migrant activist groups to support the idea that migration is not a criminal act.

Moreover, Giorgio Agamben makes a distinction between the prison and the camp, arguing that the prison is a part of the normative status quo, and the camp (in his argument he refers to (im)migration detention centres as a type of camp) is the exceptional case that makes the validation of the status quo possible.²⁹ In his view, the prison is a normative solution to a problem; a detention centre is an exceptional solution that denies the incarcerated prisoner access to representation, agency, and human rights that would otherwise be afforded to a citizen. However, Agamben identifies that the state of exception, associated with the sovereign power of decision over life (and death³⁰), has become the rule in today’s society. This is evident in the many ways criminal (in)justice, (im)migration laws, labour and national security practices are bound together and reproduce each other. Biopolitics is both negative/restrictive in the effects of controlling and creating ‘bare life’ and positive/constructive in the effects of reproducing state or sovereign power through the use of bordering technologies.

Therefore, this conceptual framing, which differentiates between the prison and the detention centre, forecloses the potential for solidarity between migration and prison abolition, to dismantle an overarching carceral regime, which created the conditions for the criminalization of (im)migration, because it doesn’t clearly acknowledge and challenge how detention/encampment is a tool or technology of state power to maintain and reproduce social divisions and borders. Harsha Walia provides an excellent case for this argument:

When we say migrants are not illegal we are ignoring that illegality and criminality are both productive regimes [...] rather, there is no such thing as a criminal [...] When we say migrants are not criminals we are reproducing the concept that there is a division between innocent and criminal rather than understanding how these are subjects produced by the state [...] We don't oppose prisons because they are full of innocent people, we know they are not essentially about crime, rather they are essential to resolving the crises and contradictions of land, labour and state capacity.³¹

Today there are differences in degree but not a stark dichotomy between criminal and administrative detention. Much incarceration is a result of crimes of poverty and other social divisions that maintain hierarchies and exclusions based on structures of class, race, gender and other such disciplinary controls that divide humanity to reproduce power. This is exhibited in the over-representation of racialized and marginalized people in prisons. In turn, this over-representation informs the over-surveillance and policing of these communities, where there are

often undocumented people or people who have precarious immigration status. Moreover, many (im)migration detainees are incarcerated in prison facilities if there are no available spaces within local detention centres and even within formal detention centres there are limited or even fewer resources or social/legal support for detainees.

This perspective bridges solidarity between prison abolitionist movements and migrant justice movements, while the idea that migrants are not criminals aims to challenge the negative perceptions, it can end up reinforcing the idea of criminality. More generally, this kind of framework that seeks to understand the nuanced ways crises, emergencies and scapegoated figures are used to reproduce power dynamics by legitimizing institutions of power to resolve these problematics and inequalities that they are in fact responsible for upholding.

These carceral logics are embedded in social relations at many levels and dimensions in society, and the laws produced by these underlying ideologies conceive of and construct illegality in ways that reproduce power through the suppression, oppression and exclusion of difference or contradictions to power. Furthermore, the reproduction of social division and enclosure creates a feedback loop, whereby marginalized groups are punished before committing a “crime” or put in situations that criminalize them. Moreover, in these punitive spaces of the border, victims are blamed for their own deaths, seen as passive capital punishment rather than an intentional killing by the state.

As was briefly mentioned before, (im)migrants often experienced something called “Double punishment” or “Double Penalty” (*double peine* in France³²) defined by Cera Yiu of No One is Illegal Montreal as:

[...] the unjust policy used against non-citizens who face deportation after already being punished by the criminal justice system. Non-citizens include people who have had permanent residency since childhood, who may have little to no connection to their country of origin, and who have already established lives and families in [their settlement country]. Like citizens, they must go through the criminal justice system and complete their sentence, while facing the added consequence of being permanently removed from [their settlement country], regardless of what it might mean for their families, their safety, their ability to integrate into their country of origin, and the emotional hardship of being expelled from the country. Simply put, non-citizens who commit a crime can be subjected to a “double punishment” through the collaboration of punitive criminal and immigration laws. The policies surrounding Double Punishment are racist and create a two-tier justice system in which immigrants face far more disastrous consequences for committing crimes than citizens.³³

In France, in particular, it can be very difficult for detained (im)migrants with criminal records to challenge expulsion decisions. According to the Ministry of the Interior, this is because they have only 48 hours to appeal deportation orders, which are often carried out a short time before weekends and not translated into the detainees’ language.³⁴

This punishment of threatened deportation can have further punitive consequences for families who are separated, in addition to the psychological trauma of awaiting deportation³⁵, and physical punishment through the environmental conditions of detention and incarceration.

The differentiation between criminal and administrative detention has created the false necessity to advocate for new forms of incarceration rather than the dismantling of the carceral regime itself. In particular, there have been calls for proposals from architects for the design of better “humanitarian detention

centres”³⁶ that take migrants out of “prisons.” These alternatives and liberal reforms to detention are a part of a historical practice of transforming exception into law (or rather exposing how the exception is foundational to law itself), and even if they are put forward in the “humanitarian” interests of “protecting” detainees they can work against the interests of greater freedom and liberation from border and carceral regimes. These reforms do not push towards utopia or a better society (we must ask: better for who?); instead, they strengthen an infrastructure of borders through abstraction and multiplication by re-inscribing social division, carceral and state power in society and the built environment. Therefore, any analysis of spaces of detention as a border technology needs to acknowledge and bridge solidarity between these struggles of prison abolition and ending (im)migration detention with a holistic understanding of the injustice of the carceral regime. As Irit Katz argues:

*The ever-expanding vocabulary that describes camp spaces—detention centers, reception facilities, refugee camps, hubs, hot spots, jungles—fails to camouflage their rise as part of the same framework in which people’s freedom and rights are restricted.*³⁷

The rest of this chapter provides an overview of detention practices and technologies within France connecting these spatial practices to a larger ideology about immigration detention as a function of state borders; to link the technologies of administrative detention to the operation of mobile and temporal borders, policing and security practices of the nation-state. This analysis aims to begin to bridge the gap between practice and theory by illustrating the paradoxical reality of these spaces, which are imagined to be *protective*, securing the reproduction of capitalist and state power, but have *punitive* effects that lead to the reproduction of insecurity and violence for those marginalized and excluded from sovereignty and self-determination.

The expansion and fragmentation of border technologies used to carry out the function of enforcing spatial-temporal division and enclosure facilitate the reproduction of power dynamics that underpin this infrastructural space of movement and flow.

Historical Continuum of the Institutionalization of Immigration Detention in France

The State runs all detention/reception facilities within France, but there is a fragmentation of authorities of state and non-state actors (NGOs and other humanitarian organizations), with different legal jurisdictions, involved in their operations, including the interior ministry (deportations), ministry of defence (provision of deportation escorts and security guards), ministry of justice (management of accommodations and catering), ministry of health (health services).³⁸ As Nicholas Fischer argues, this fragmentation of authorities accounts for conflicts in the management of detention centres.³⁹ The differential and often complex and contradictory use of legal provisions by different authorities within detention centres is both a source of “humanitarian” *protection* of detainees as well as *punitive* repression.

In the article entitled, “Bodies at the border: the medical protection of immigrants in a French immigration detention centre,” Fischer explains how immigration detention emerged out of informal police practices of locking up (im)migrants for deportation. These practices became formalized in the 1970s when immigration control was developed in France. However, it was at the same time that practices of detention submitted to various forms of monitoring and

legal provisions that continue to this day.⁴⁰ Particularly, when immigration control was developed, new actors organized to intervene in and regulate these processes and facilities by advocating for “the creation of legal provisions protecting certain categories of foreigners from being deported.”⁴¹ Although these calls for reforms by human rights advocates and lawyers aimed at closing these detention facilities, they ended up having the counter-effect of institutionalizing detention or *rétention* into law. As Fischer states:

*This did not mean that the originally informal practices were simply formalized. In the process, detention centres were transformed, various legal provisions were added and material devices were designed to monitor the enforcement of confinement a dynamic that was only to increase in the following years, and which accounts for the presence of various forms of expertise inside the centre.*⁴²

Since 1981, the year France adopted its initial law to introduce immigration detention, the country has passed over 30 immigration laws.⁴³ In 1984 the human rights organization, *Cimade*, was allowed into detention centres to monitor the conditions and provide social work, ultimately reporting this collected data to the French Ministry of Social Affairs to propose changes and reforms to detention.⁴⁴ Since 1984 several more NGOs have been given access to monitor detention centres in this way⁴⁵, as well as medical professionals who perform consultations on detainees, which can inform decisions on their eventual deportation.⁴⁶ This is an example of introducing new technologies of surveillance and control is what Michel Foucault refers to as “neoliberal governmentality” that, “[...] constantly corrects and re-frames the top-down disciplinary interventions of the state institutions by including independent monitoring and control in their very organization, even as they perform repressive tasks.”⁴⁷ This effectively re-inscribes and entrenches detention and incarceration as a coherent system of power and logic of the state to socially reproduce borders, divisions and enclosures in society through its diverse and multiple institutions rather than through a central assertion of power. Fischer further argues:

*The legalization of centres de rétention went along with their progressive professionalization a set of dedicated experts was added to their everyday management for the legal and medical relief of detained immigrants. This process itself encouraged the evolution of centres from precarious, emergency camp-like devices to perennial institutions. More generally, this evolution calls for a few remarks on the role of independent critique and of the reference to the ‘rule of law’ in the transformation of detention centres. As discussed above, public denunciation of detention had an important impact on the legal and material organization of the centres, but it did not limit its development. On the contrary, it accompanied and in many ways sustained it. In this case, the obligation to look after the migrants and to protect them while planning to deport them was integrated to the very organization of rétention.*⁴⁸

This process of transforming informal practices of encampment into formalized and institutionalized detention centres is still ongoing today. As was previously mentioned, contemporary refugee camps are used as testing grounds for new ways to monitor and control movement and flow of populations, in addition to improving the provision of “humanitarian” aid. It is a fine balance that ideologically aims to reproduce social divisions and infrastructures of borders to manage migration more efficiently through formal access to limited resources without

building substantive access through infrastructure. We will return to examine this process later on in the chapter on encampment.

Contemporary Asylum/Reception Procedure

In a previous section, we outlined some of the legal regulations and authority interventions that affect the asylum process in Europe and how that has had spatial/territorial implications on the movements of people, in particular, how economic and humanitarian (im)migrants face different systems and regulations on their movement. Regulations such as the Dublin II Accords that prevents mobility across mainland Europe and force asylum seekers to apply at their point of origin, as well as the Safe Third Country Agreement that classifies certain forms of movement as acceptable or not under the asylum system.

In theory, all EU member states operate under the same asylum policy, but in reality, the treatment of asylum seekers is different from country to country. In France, there are different standards and qualifications of what constitutes an acceptable asylum claim. The asylum procedure can be complex, lengthy (or too short for certain appeals processes), and can present many barriers. As Khursheed Wadia argues, rather than a last option, detention and deportation are “commonplace instruments of procedure.”⁴⁹ Furthermore she states, “While the purpose of detention centres is to hold migrants just prior to their deportation [...] detainees have found increasingly they are not at the end of the asylum or investigation of their case and hence ‘awaiting imminent removal’ but at the start of the process of at an appeal stage. This means that detainee are often held for long periods of time in prison-like conditions [...]”⁵⁰


An asylum claim begins with a registration either (See figure 2.7):

- *On the territory;*
- *At the border, in case the asylum seeker does not possess valid travel documents to enter the territory, including when they are placed in a waiting zone. In this case, the person makes an application for admission to the territory on asylum grounds;*
- *From an administrative detention centre, in case the person is already being detained for the purpose of removal.*⁵¹

This initial step prioritizes people who already have existing family connections in France or who are privately sponsored.

The asylum process itself is divided into two main categories. The “Regular Procedure,” which offers better rights’ guarantees, and the “Accelerated Procedure,” mainly for people who ask for asylum in a retention (detention) centre, who have a pending expulsion from French territory, which is a faster process but with less guarantees.⁵² There is also the Dublin Procedure (applied to all asylum seekers to confirm that France is the responsible country under the Dublin II regulation), Admissibility Procedure (applied to all asylum seekers to confirm they meet admissibility requirements) and Border Procedure (applied to asylum seekers arriving through a port of entry, separate from other procedures as it refers to the conditions by which the person has entered the territory).⁵³

Once they have submitted their asylum application, the current average wait for “Regular Procedure” applicants is between 16 and 19 months.⁵⁴ During this time, asylum seekers cannot work or access social welfare services such as income support, government housing.⁵⁵ This forces many asylum seekers into informal encampments and municipally or privately run shelters that are often located within detention centres.⁵⁶ The housing insecurity many face can also create barriers for their applications as they must have a fixed address in order to



ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN FRANCE
Figure 2.7

make a claim, as well as access the healthcare system.⁵⁷

Recently the French government has made improvements in its response to asylum seekers, including offering French classes and paying a financial subsidy to local Parisians who put them up in their own homes.⁵⁸ This is, however, taking away the responsibility of the state to provide homes for displaced persons and putting the responsibility upon individuals and private organizations. However, the majority of asylum applications are not approved. In 2014, France only approved 22 percent of asylum claims (the average approval rate in the EU was 45 percent).⁵⁹ Moreover, people with different countries of origin have different acceptance rates within France, for instance, Eritrea has a very low acceptance rate, while Afghanistan and Syria have a much higher rate.⁶⁰

For these reasons, most people seeking asylum within Europe avoid applying in France. What also factors into the decision to stay or leave France is whether the individual has an established community in the country as a source of support. For instance, there is a much larger Syrian community in Germany, whereas France is a more frequent destination for West African, Sri Lankan and Bangladesh populations.⁶¹

French President François Hollande agreed to welcome 30,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2016 (0.002% of the 13.5 million displaced at that time⁶²), to receive refugee status and a permit for residence within three months.⁶³ This is an example of using hospitality as a way to shape perception. When a country like France outlines clear preferences for certain groups of asylum seekers, this can deter people from applying or seeking aid within that country to bypass the Dublin regulations.

Beyond asylum conditions, refugee settlement conditions can have many barriers, such as access to education and the labour market. Once a person has been able to get refugee status within France, they still face limitations on freedom and mobility. (Im)migrant groups face antagonizing relationships with police, racial discrimination, poverty, and other forms of social exclusion due to underlying conditions of structural inequality.

Contemporary Detention Typologies & Conditions

There are two main types of detention facilities in France within the national immigration and asylum framework (*disposition nationale d'accueil*): the LRAs (*locaux de rétention administrative*), in which detainees may be held for up to 48 hours, and the CRAs (*centres de rétention administrative*), in which detainees may be held for 45 days, after which time they may be released or deported, though in exceptional yet common cases detainees may be held for up to six months.⁶⁴ This increase, in what was a relatively low detention period compared to other EU member states, happened in 2018 in response to the “migration crisis,” new legislation was introduced that doubles the detention limit to 90 days and reduces the time frame to apply for asylum from 120 days to 90 days.⁶⁵ There are 24-25 CRAs across mainland France and overseas departments, with a total capacity of roughly 1800 people, the largest maximum capacity of 240 people in the Mesnil-Amelot centre.⁶⁶

LRAs are created permanently or for a temporary fixed term by a prefecture, and they are used exclusively to the administrative detention of non-citizens when they cannot immediately be transferred to a CRA.⁶⁷ There are 26 LRAs in France and overseas departments, about 1,900 foreigners have been detained in LRA in 2017, of which 1,200 on the mainland and 700 overseas.⁶⁸

In addition to LRAs and CRAs, there are also between 13-67⁶⁹ permanent holding areas or waiting zones (*zones d'attente*) in airports, seaports, railway stations as well as temporary holding areas in places like hotels.⁷⁰ The

zones d'attente are used to detain non-citizens who are refused entry into France at a port of entry. Typically people are held for a maximum of eight days with exceptional cases up to 26 days in these bare-minimum facilities.⁷¹ 9,450 persons were detained in a waiting zone in 2017, and 5,371 in the first 7 months of 2018.⁷²

Waiting Zones intrinsically carry out this condition of a state of exception as a mobile checkpoint/cellular border as any space can be transformed into a carceral facility to carry out the function of spatial-temporal division and enclosure. A recent report by the Global Detention Project states that:

*According to civil society, academics, and jurists, French authorities entertain a “legal fiction” that strictly speaking, waiting zones are not located on French territory and that foreigners are only “maintained” and not “retained” or “detained.” But observers argue that French law does apply to the “zones d’attente.” According to CESEDA Article L211-1, the French Border Police (PAF) “hosts” non-citizens who do not meet conditions to enter France or another Schengen state; who apply for asylum at the border; or whose transit is interrupted because they do not meet requirements to travel to a non-Schengen destination.*⁷³

The number of places in French detention centres has almost doubled over the last decade as the number of detainees increased from 20,488 in 2004⁷⁴ to 46,000 in 2017,⁷⁵ 42 percent of whom were held in overseas territories⁷⁶ (by way of comparison, in the United Kingdom, during the year ending in March 2018, approximately 29,000 people “entered detention”).⁷⁷ In 2017 there were 14,859 deportations according to figures from the Directorate General of Foreigners in France (DGEF), and this figure rose by 20 percent in 2018.⁷⁸

The opening of 450 more places in detention centres is scheduled for 2019⁷⁹, with the country budgeting more than 116.31 million Euros to maintain and expand its detention system as well as an additional 30.99 million Euros for the removal/expulsion of detainees.⁸⁰

As was described earlier in this chapter, there is little difference between criminal incarceration and administrative detention. The report presented by the Global Detention Project identifies the deplorable physical and psychological conditions within French CRA detention centres. Citing the 2017 Controller-General for Places of Deprivation of Liberty (CGLDL) report, which describes:

*[...] deplorable hygiene conditions, cramped facilities, prison-like security, a lack of respect for private life, a lack of access to open air (or restricted access depending on the availability of police staff), random access to medical treatment — both physical health care and mental health care — overly restrictive communications practices, and a near absence of activities in detention.*⁸¹

Most health care providers and security/police in detention centres come from backgrounds in criminal prisons.⁸² Furthermore, many police officials come directly from police academies with little training, and those with more experience, “soon after they integrate teams of other guards, the new recruits often change their behaviour and become less sensitive to the plight of detainees.”⁸³ The CGLPL reports that:

[...] many of those who are attracted to police work feel alienated at having to work in closed environments when they had originally expected to serve on police missions related to judicial or public security issues. As a result, there is a high rate of absenteeism as well

*as staff turnover in immigration detention facilities — something that inevitably negatively impacts detention conditions, as there are insufficient staff to supervise open air recreation in some centres, and more frequently in waiting zones.*⁸⁴

The key concerns brought forward by the Global Detention Project report about the conditions within French detention centres include:

- *New legal provisions double the maximum length of immigration detention to 90 days and allow for the re-detention of people shortly after being released from a previous stay in detention.*
- *The new provisions fail to prohibit the detention of accompanied children, contrary to recommendations from national and international human rights bodies.*
- *A new asylum law adopted in 2018 lacks important safeguards for people seeking protection, which observers fear could lead to widespread detention of asylum seekers.*
- *Increased recourse to videoconferencing presents serious obstacles to mounting effective detention appeals.*
- *In the overseas territory of Mayotte, which deports thousands of people annually, there are exceptions in the application of immigration law, limiting procedural safeguards and leaving people vulnerable to abusive detention conditions.*⁸⁵

In closing of this chapter, it is necessary to reiterate the importance of creating connections and understanding between struggles to build support for people who are displaced, divided and enclosed through various forms of structural violence. Moreover, it requires a framework that reflects upon the many ways in which power operates, to understand deeply how these struggles are connected. The boundary between the detention centre and the camp is being blurred. Detention centres are being designed to be more “welcoming,” whereas the camp is being designed to be a space of control. In bridging the next discussion on encampments, it is important to tie together how the immigration detention system in France relies on the exceptional conditions in camps to reproduce and re-inscribe state power of spatial-temporal division and enclosure on the built environment.

ENDNOTES – 2.2.2 TECHNOLOGIES OF DETENTION

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Governmentality or the “problem of government” – that is, “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be the best possible governor?”
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 - 12 Thomas Nail, “Checkpoint I,” in *Theory of the Border* (Oxford Scholarship Online, September 2016), 110-137.
 - 13 Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 113.
 - 14 Ibid, 111.
 - 15 Ibid, 121.
 - 16 Ibid, 121.
 - 17 Cera Yiu, “What is double punishment?,” *Solidarité sans frontières | Solidarity Across Borders | Solidaridad sin fronteras* (2013), <http://www.solidarityacrossborders.org/en/solidarity-city/solidarity-city-journal/what-is-double-punishment>. (Accessed Aug. 26, 2019)
 - 18 Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 122-124.
 - 19 Ibid, 155.
 - 20 Ibid, 121.
 - 21 Ibid, 138.
 - 22 Ibid, 138.
 - 23 Henri Lefebvre, “The Urban Illusion,” in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 155 -156.
 - 24 *Technologies defined by conditions of enclosure and linkage to create complex systems of controlled mobility that “identify, confine and temporalize human movement.”*
Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 88-109.
 - 25 “One way of conceptualizing the links between the system of administrative detention and the shaping of labor markets is to describe the detention center as a ‘decompression chamber’ that equilibrates, in the most violent of ways, the constitutive tensions that underlie the very existence of labor markets.” Here Mezzadra and Neilson refer to the practice of “benching” Indian IT workers as a way to separate them from the national labour market. They compare this practice to the detention of “illegal” migrants and the temporal regulation practiced in detention camps.”
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 149-150.
 - 26 Ibid, 145.
 - 27 Ibid, 142.
- See also: Harsha Walia, “‘Migrants are not Criminals’: Challenging Movement Carceral Logics that Foreclose Solidarity,” *De-carceral Futures Conference*. Queen’s University (May 9, 2019), <https://law.queensu.ca/news/de-carceral-futures-conference-keynote-address-may-9-2019?fbclid=IwAR0V9ufGOV7faIKUFp7G.Giv9ktr06ZD8D855t3e44sZT8jiZuymFjikLdaU>
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- Stuart J. Murray, "Thanatopolitics," *Bloomsbury Handbook to Literary and Cultural Theory*. ed. J.R. Di Leo (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 718–19.
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- 35 See: Rachel Aviv, "The Trauma of Facing Deportation," *The New Yorker* (March 27, 2017), <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/the-trauma-of-facing-deportation>
- 36 Léopold Lambert, "When the ACSA and the Steel Lobby Invite You to Design a 'Humanitarian Detention Center,'" *The Funambulist Blog* (October 26, 2017), <https://thefunambulist.net/architectural-projects/when-the-acsa-and-the-steel-lobby-invite-you-to-design-a-humanitarian-detention-center>
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- 38 Khursheed Wadia, "Regimes of Insecurity: Women and Immigration Detention in France and Britain," *The Securitization of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia (New York, NY: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2015), 98.
- 39 Nicholas Fischer, "Bodies at the border: the medical protection of immigrants in a French immigration detention centre," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (2013), 1166.
- 40 Nicholas Fischer, "Bodies at the border," 1166–1167.
- 41 Ibid, 1167.
- 42 Ibid, 1167.
- 43 F.N. Buffet, "Rapport n° 716 (2014–2015) fait au nom de la commission des lois, déposé le 30 septembre 2015, Projet de loi relatif au droit des étrangers en France: Annexe 4 - Les lois sur l'immigration depuis 1980," Sénat, 30 September 2015, <http://www.senat.fr/rap/14-716/14-716.html>
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- 44 Nicholas Fischer, "Bodies at the border," 1167.
- 45 Including: Assfam-groupe SOS solidarités, Forum réfugiés-Cosi, France Terre d'asile, La Cimade, Ordre de Malte, and Solidarité Mayotte
- 46 A key argument of Fischer's article: "the complex dynamics of medical protection for detained immigrants who face deportation, but who may not be removed if they suffer from a serious illness that cannot be properly treated in their country of origin."
- Nicholas Fischer, "Bodies at the border," 1167–1168.
- 47 Ibid, 1168.
- 48 Ibid, 1168.
- 49 Khursheed Wadia, *The Securitization of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11*, 97.
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63 Anais Renevier, "Non, Merci! Why Refugees Avoid France."

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66 Forum Réfugiés – Cosi, "Place of Detention: France," *Asylum Information Database/European Council on Refugees and Exiles (AIDA/ECRE)*, <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/detention-asylum-seekers/detention-conditions/place-detention>

67 Global Detention Project, *Country Report Immigration Detention in France*, 41.

68 The total number of LRA is not stable and permanent as these detention facilities can be created upon a decision of the Prefet.

Forum Réfugiés – Cosi, "Place of Detention: France," *Asylum Information Database/European Council on Refugees and Exiles (AIDA/ECRE)*, <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/detention-asylum-seekers/detention-conditions/place-detention>

69 Global Detention Project, *Country Report Immigration Detention in France*, 41.

70 This number is difficult to confirm as there is no public data available on the exact number of waiting zones in France and their capacity.

These are not formally designated as detention centres, but asylum seekers cannot leave these areas (except to return to their country) until an authorization to let them enter the French territory or a decision to return them is taken.

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83 Ibid, 55.

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

85 Ibid, 55.

CARTOGRAPHY II

Detention in France



Figure 2.8 & 2.10 (opposite page fold) "This is not a prison", This photographic work on the confinement of undocumented foreigners in administrative detention centers and premises was commissioned by the Cimade to 3 independent photographers, Olivier Aubert, David Delaporte and Xavier Merckx.



LEGEND
OF DETAINEES IN 2015

2000
1500
1000
500
100


DETENTION TYPOLOGY

- Centre de rétention administrative (CRA)
- Dark Pink: 96 expelled from France 2015
- Local de rétention administrative (LRA) (Max Detention = 48 hours)
- Permanet Zone d'attente (ZA) (Max Detention = 24 days)
- Temporary Zone Retenu (ZTA) (Max Detention = 24 days)

OTHER ANNOTATIONS

- Localities where the representation in the 2015 map could not fit
- Off-shore shipping/transit routes

French Regions




DETENTION IN FRANCE (MAP & INDEX)

Figure 2.9 (index Figure 2.11)




01



Les Abymes, Guadeloupe

Typology: CRA
 Address: Site du Morne Vergain, 97139 Les Abymes, Guadeloupe
 Operating Period: 2005 - Present
 Management & Services: Police aux frontières, Police Nationale/Police des Airs et Frontières PAF
 Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
 Estimated Average Detention Period: 4 days (2015)
 Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
 Demographics: Adult women and men
 Capacity: 40
 Number of Detainees: 363 (2015)
 Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
 NGOs With Access: La Cimade
 General Conditions: Detention in degraded conditions and particularly poor medical follow-up.
 Sanitation & Food: 5 showers + 3 toilets; 1 medic two hours everyday
 Collective Spaces: Canteen with TV, free access for men, on demand for women; Secure outdoor courtyard, accessible only on demand and in presence of the police

02



Bordeaux, Gironde

Typology: CRA
 Address: Commissariat central, 23 rue François-de-Sourdis, 33000 Bordeaux, Gironde
 Operating Period: 2003. Re-opened June 2011
 Management & Services: Police aux frontières (UEL); Police aux frontières (UGT: unité de garde et de transfert)
 Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
 Estimated Average Detention Period: 14 days (2015)
 Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
 Demographics: Adult Men
 Capacity: 20
 Number of Detainees: 292 (2015)
 Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
 NGOs With Access: La Cimade
 General Conditions: CRA completely renewed in 2011 after a fire has damaged the detention centre in 2009
 Sanitation & Food: 2 showers and 2 toilets; 3 nurses on site everyday, 2 doctors part time
 Collective Spaces: Canteen with 2 TVs; One TV room; 20m² secured outdoor patio with table-soccer game, free access
 Issues: Inadequate Medical Care (2014)

03



Cayenne, French Guyane


Typology: CRA
 Address: Route nationale 4, 97351 Matoury, French Guyane
 Operating Period: 1995 - Present
 Management & Services: Police aux frontières
 Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
 Estimated Average Detention Period: 2.3 days (2015)
 Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
 Demographics: Adult Men & Women
 Capacity: 38 (26 Male, 12 Female)
 Number of Detainees: 1306 (2015)
 Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
 NGOs With Access: La Cimade
 General Conditions: In December 2014, works have been started to improve detention conditions in the centre
 Sanitation & Food: 9 showers + 16 toilets; 1 medic on site everyday in the morning until 3 pm; The medical unit is separated and not easily accessible for persons detained, only with a police escort
 Collective Spaces: 12 rooms with no proper beds (concrete platforms with wood planks and tatami); 2 secured outdoor courtyards closed during the night



04

Le Chaudron, La Réunion

Typology: CRA
Address: Rue Georges Brassens, 97490 Sainte-Clotilde, La Réunion
Operating Period: NA
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 14 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men
Capacity: 6
Number of Detainees: 0 (2015) * Even though no placements in the detention centre have been reported, 70 removals after arrest have occurred according to La Cimade. See Assfam, Forum réfugiés-Cosi, France Terre d'asile, la Cimade and Ordre de Malte, Centres et locaux de rétention administrative, Rapport 2014 (Administrative detention centres and facilities, Report 2014)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: La Cimade
General Conditions: The detention centre is located next to the airport in the premises of the police station. Foreign national being deported are rarely detained (0 in 2014, 3 in 2013) because they are being deported immediately after they have been arrested
Sanitation & Food: 2 showers and 2 toilets; Nurse or doctor on demand
Collective Spaces: 2 rooms with 3 beds, TV and air conditioning in each; 1 kitchen with free access; 1 outdoor courtyard of 40 m² with 1 tennis table game



05

Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais

Typology: CRA
Address: France Terre d'Asile, Boulevard du Kent, 62903 Coquelles, Pas-de-Calais
Operating Period: 2003 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières, Police Nationale/Police des Ais et Frontières PAF
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 8 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 79
Number of Detainees: 2679 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: France Terre d'Asile
General Conditions: The detention centre is divided into 3 zones. It has been opened 15 years ago and is dilapidated. Numerous technical problems have been reported. The detention centre is the closest one to Calais.
Sanitation & Food: 3 to 4 showers per zone and 1 toilet per room; Toilets regularly clogged; 1 nurse on site everyday + 4 nurses and 2 doctors part time; Rats and cockroach found in collective areas; Poor qualitative and quantitative food provided
Collective Spaces: 2 to 5 beds per room (25 rooms + one confinement room); 1 TV per zone; 1 collective space with table-soccer game and a phone box; Outdoor courtyard, free access
Issues: Inadequate Hygiene & Recreation (2014)



06

Hendaye, Pyrénées-Atlantiques

Typology: CRA
Address: 4, rue Joliot-Curie, 64700 Hendaye, Pyrénées-Atlantiques
Operating Period: 2008 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières, Police Nationale/Police des Ais et Frontières PAF
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 19 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 30 (24 Male, 6 Female)
Number of Detainees: 320 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: La Cimade
General Conditions: The detention centre is located within the police premises. It has the particularity to be located at the border with Spain
Sanitation & Food: 2 nurses 6/7 days, 1 doctor part time; Access to hygiene products; Perishable products such as fruits are forbidden
Collective Spaces: 15 rooms of 20m² with 2 beds in each; TV room and board games; Outdoor courtyard with a table-soccer game and basketball field, free access

Centres - Border Technologies

Lille Lesquin, Nord




Typology: CRA
Address: 2, rue de la drève, 59810 Lesquin, Nord
Operating Period: 2006 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 9.1 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Trafficked Persons
Demographics: Adult Men & Women, Unaccompanied Minors
Capacity: 112
Number of Detainees: 1697 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Ordre de Malte
General Conditions: Many transfers from the Coquelle detention centre have been observed, thus increasing the number of persons detained in Lille-Lesquin. No family has been detained in this centre for 3 years now
Sanitation & Food: 45 showers and toilets; 2 nurses, 4 doctors; Poor qualitative food, no halal food
Collective Spaces: 42 rooms with 2 to 4 beds; 180m² hallway with a bench and a fountain; Outdoor courtyard with a table tennis and a playground slide
Issues: Inadequate Medical Care (2014)

07




Lyon-Saint-Exupéry, Rhône



Typology: CRA
Address: Poste de police aux frontières, Espace Lyon-Saint-Exupéry, 69125 Lyon aéroport, Rhône
Operating Period: 1995 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 13 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers
Demographics: Adult Men & Women, Minors
Capacity: 112
Number of Detainees: 1950 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: The detention centre is located in a former low cost hotel. Isolation and humidity problems are regularly encountered. Works are regularly done to improve conditions. Video conferencing for interviews with OFPRA is available and used as well for detainees from Nimes detention centre.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 3 nurses and 1 doctor but no permanent access to the medical unit
Collective Spaces: 28 rooms with 4 beds and 1 TV each and 1 confinement room; 2 collective rooms with 3 tables tennis; 2 outdoor courtyards (1 big, 1 smaller) partly planted with grass, free access

08




Marseille (Le Canet), Bouches-du-Rhône




Typology: CRA
Address: 26 boulevard Danielle, Casanova, 13014 Marseille, Bouches-du-Rhône
Operating Period: 2006 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 16 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 136
Number of Detainees: 1769 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: The detention centre has been designed as a prison, there is no free circulation (police escort). A "free circulation zone with controlled access" is being constructed. Detention conditions are degraded: leakage (sometimes floods of common areas), bad isolation, dirtiness, etc. Video conferencing for interviews with OFPRA is available and used as well for detainees from Nice detention centre.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 4 nurses and 3 doctors; Regular self-aggressive situations have been reported to protest against detention conditions (especially food) and ill-treatment from police officers: self-injury and hunger strikes; Detainees often complain about difficulties to shave properly and keep themselves clean
Collective Spaces: 69 rooms with 2 beds per room; TV room, canteen and walking zone, free access during the day; Outdoor courtyard covered by wires, free access during the day
Issues: Inadequate Food Provision (2014), Recreation (2013), Freedom of movement within facility (2013)

09



Le Mesnil-Amelot (CRA 2, 3), Seine-et-Marne




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


Typology: CRA
Address: (2) 6 rue de Paris 77990 Le Mesnil-Amelot; (3) 2 rue de Paris 77990 Le Mesnil-Amelot, Seine-et-Marne
Operating Period: 2011 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: NA
Estimated Average Detention Period: 13 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 2 x 120, including 40 places for women and families (2 facilities)
Number of Detainees: 3749 (2015) (1685 in CRA 2, 1764 in CRA 3)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: La Cimade
General Conditions: The detention centre is geographically close to 3 prisons. Therefore a number 10% of detainees are ex-prisoners. Detention conditions are precarious: poor hygienic conditions, deteriorating infrastructures, limited equipment (not replaced when not functioning any more), dirtiness, no activity proposed.
Sanitation & Food: 2 showers and 4 toilets for 20 people; 6 nurses, 5 doctors and 1 psychiatrist twice a week; Sheets are changed once a month; No food or hygienic products for babies and children are provided to families
Collective Spaces: 120 rooms with two beds in each of the 2 buildings + 1 confinement room per building; 2 collective spaces of 16.5m² per building with 1 TV; 1 80m² courtyard per building, free access; Playground for children
Issues: Inadequate food provision (2013)

Metz-Queuleu, Moselle



11




Typology: CRA
Address: 2 rue du Chemin vert, 57070 Metz Queuleu, Moselle
Operating Period: 2009 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 13.3 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women, Minors
Capacity: 98
Number of Detainees: 875 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Ordre de Malte
General Conditions: Since the beginning of 2014, asylum seekers (including detained asylum seekers from Strasbourg Geispolsheim) can have their interview with OFPRA conducted through videoconferencing.
Sanitation & Food: 4 showers and 4 toilets per building; 3 nurses and 2 doctors consulting on demand; Several cases of suicide attempts reported
Collective Spaces: 7 buildings of 14 rooms each in which there are 2 beds; Canteen and TV room in each building; Large outdoor courtyard separated in two zones (men and women/families) with a playground for children and football and basketball fields

Nice-Alpes, Maritimes



12



Typology: CRA
Address: Caserne d'Auvare, 28 rue de la Roquebillière, 06300 Nice, Maritimes
Operating Period: 1986 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 8 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men
Capacity: 38
Number of Detainees: 1309 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: The detention centre is dilapidated and deteriorated. Shared areas are dirty and problems with the air conditioning and the heating have created difficult conditions of living. Several cases of personal belongings having been stolen have been reported.
Sanitation & Food: 8 showers and 9 toilets; 1 nurse every day and 1 doctor part time during the week; Insufficient quantity of food, no halal food : issue of many tensions between the detainees and the police
Collective Spaces: 7 rooms with 7 beds in each; 1 shared room with a TV, free access during the day; 1 outdoor secured courtyard. Nothing in there. Ongoing works to put wires above.



13



Nîmes, Gard

Typology: CRA
Address: Avenue Clément Ader, 30000 Nîmes, Gard
Operating Period: 2007 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 13.3 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Woman, Minors
Capacity: 66
Number of Detainees: 1410 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: The detention centre is a recent building, built on two floors. The detention conditions are similar to those in prison and detainees report that dirtiness, boredom, lack of intimacy, stress and tensions prevail. The heating is not functioning well therefore temperatures are quite low in winter.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 1 nurse everyday and 1 doctor everyday during the week; Detainees often complain about difficulties to shave properly
Collective Spaces: 64 rooms with 2 beds each; 2 TV rooms and 2 rooms with a table-soccer game; 1 fenced courtyard built in concrete with a tennis table




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


Palaiseau, Essonne

Typology: CRA
Address: Hôtel de police, Rue Emile Zola, 91120 Palaiseau, Essonne
Operating Period: 2005 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 13.3 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Non-Immigration-Related Administrative Detainees (2013)
Demographics: Adult Men
Capacity: 40
Number of Detainees: 689 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: France Terre d'Asile
General Conditions: The detention centre is closed to a prison. 32% of the detainees in 2014 were former prisoners. In addition a lot of detainees are under the Dublin procedure. The detention centre is never full.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 1 nurse everyday, 1 doctor 2 half-days a week
Collective Spaces: 20 rooms with 2 beds each + 1 confinement room; 1 TV room and 1 collective room with a TV and a table-soccer game; 1 outdoor courtyard



15



Palais du Justice, Paris

Typology: CRA
Address: Site du Palais de Justice, Dépôt 3, quai de l'Horloge, 75001 Paris
Operating Period: 1981 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 9 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers (2008)
Demographics: Adult Women
Capacity: 40
Number of Detainees: 593 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: ASSFAM
General Conditions: Most detainees are women from Roumania and Bulgaria arrested for soliciting (racolage). No specific procedure is in place for victims of trafficking. No alternative to detention are proposed.
Sanitation & Food: 6 showers and 6 toilets; 3 doctors and 8 nurses
Collective Spaces: 14 rooms with 2 to 4 beds in each; 1 collective room with a TV and 1 console; 1 tiny courtyard

Pamandzi, Mayotte



16




Typology: CRA
Address: DDPAF/Centre de rétention, BP 68 Lotissement, Chanfi Sabili, Petit Moya, 976615 Pamandzi, Mayotte
Operating Period: 2015 - Present
Management & Services: M. le Préfet de Mayotte. Ministère de l'Intérieur + Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2016)
Estimated Average Detention Period: NA
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 136 (+12 Z.A)
Number of Detainees: 995 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Government
NGOs With Access: Solidarité Mayotte
General Conditions: Overcrowded centre with poor, but improved, detention conditions. Forced removals before the intervention of the JLD occurred on a daily basis
Sanitation & Food: 1 sanitation area for families and 1 for men and women; 1 medic presents on site. 26 rooms: 10 rooms with 4 beds (Families) and 16 rooms with 6 beds. 15 toilets + 2 people
Reduced mobility and 15 showers + 2 For people with reduced mobility
Collective Spaces: 3 shared rooms (1 for men, 1 for women and 1 for families); 1 canteen; 1 outdoor courtyard for all with a playground for children, free access.

Paris-Vincennes (CRA 1, 2, 3), Val-de-Marne



17




Typology: CRA
Address: Site I, II et III ENP, Avenue de Joinville, 75012 Paris
Operating Period: 1995 (CRA 1), 2010 (CRA 2 & 3)
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 15 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers (2008)
Demographics: Adult Men
Capacity: 60+58+58 (three facilities)
Number of Detainees: 3769 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: ASSFAM
General Conditions: NA
Sanitation & Food: 10 showers and 10 toilets per building (3 buildings); 3 doctors, 8 nurses everyday
Collective Spaces: 2 to 4 beds per room; 1 collective room with a TV and 1 console; 1 fenced courtyard with a tennis table

Perpignan, Pyrénées-Atlantiques



18



Typology: CRA
Address: Rue des Frères voisins, Lotissement Torre Milla, 66000 Perpignan
Operating Period: 2007 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2007)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 8.3 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men, Minors
Capacity: 46
Number of Detainees: 966 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: Recent building, clean and well maintained facilities.
Sanitation & Food: 3 showers and 3 toilets per building (5 buildings); Nurses everyday and 1 doctor 3 times a week
Collective Spaces: 23 rooms with 2 beds in each; 1 TV room; 2 outdoor courtyards built in concrete with a football field and a tennis table




19



Plaisir, Yvelines

Typology: CRA
Address: 889, avenue François, Mitterrand, 78370 Plaisir, Yvelines
Operating Period: 2006 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 11.1 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers
Demographics: Adult Men
Capacity: 26
Number of Detainees: 385 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: France Terre d'Asile
General Conditions: The detention centre was supposed to close in 2013 but in December 2014 it was announced that it was not a plan anymore. The detention centre is located within the premises of the police station. The direction to the CRA is indicated nowhere. In June 2014, violent acts against two detainees have been reported. Video conferencing for interviews with OFPRA is available.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 1 nurse everyday and 1 doctor 2 half-day in the week; Detainees are not allowed to bring food nor plastic bottle in their room; Meals are taken under the surveillance of a police officer
Collective Spaces: 14 rooms with 2 beds per room; 1 canteen with a TV and a table-soccer game; 1 108m² fenced outdoor courtyard (also covered with wires)
Issues: Inadequate: Outdoor Exercise; Mistreatment Complaints (2014)



20




Rennes, Ille-et-Vilaine

Typology: CRA
Address: Lieudit Le Reynel, 35136 Saint-Jacques-la-Lande, Ille-et-Vilaine
Operating Period: 2007 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 10.5 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers
Demographics: Adult Men & Women, Families
Capacity: 70, including 12 for women & families
Number of Detainees: 968 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: La Cimade
General Conditions: The detention centre is composed of 7 buildings.
Sanitation & Food: 16 showers and 18 toilets; 1 nurse everyday and 1 doctor 3 half-days a week
Collective Spaces: 29 rooms with 2 beds per room + 2 family rooms for 4 to 8 people; 1 confinement room (set up in 2014); 1 collective room with TV and a table-soccer game; 1 collective room per building with TV; 1 fenced and opaque outdoor courtyard with a basketball field and greenery areas.



21



Rouen-Oissel, Seine-Maritime

Typology: CRA
Address: Ecole nationale de police, Route des essarts, 76350 Oissel, Seine-Maritime
Operating Period: 2004 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 11.4 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 72, including 19 for women and families
Number of Detainees: 1019 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: France Terre d'Asile
General Conditions: The detention centre is located in the Londe-Rouvray forest, within the premises of the police station. No direct public transportation lead to the detention centre. The building is old but is globally well maintained even though there are regular water leaks (certain rooms are particularly moist). The heating is not functioning well in collective areas.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 3 nurses
Collective Spaces: 14 rooms with between 2 and 6 beds + 2 confinement rooms; In the "men area" there are 1 table-soccer game, 1 table-tennis game and 2 rooms with TV; In the "women and family area" there is a 40 m² room for children with toys and a tennis-table game. There is also a TV room; In each area there is a small fenced outdoor courtyard

Sète, Hérault




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


Typology: CRA
Address: 15, quai François Maillol, 34200 Sète, Hérault
Operating Period: 1993 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 9.3 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers
Demographics: Adult Men, Minors
Capacity: 30
Number of Detainees: 412 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Forum réfugiés-Cosi
General Conditions: The detention centre is dilapidated. Works have been done in 2014 to improve insulation and plumbing (there was not all the time hot water) in particular. There are cockroaches in detainees' rooms.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 2 nurses and 1 doctor on demand; Meals are tenced and detainees complain that food is insufficient. No halal food.
Collective Spaces: 13 rooms with 2 beds and 1 room for 4 people; 1 collective room of 50 m² with TV and a table-soccer game; 1 fenced, covered and opaque courtyard of 47m²
Issues: Inadequate Food Provision (2014)

Strausbourg-Geispolsheim, Bas-Rhin



23




Typology: CRA
Address: Rue du Fort, 67118 Geispolsheim, Bas-Rhin
Operating Period: 1991 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2008)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 15.9 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative), Asylum Seekers
Demographics: Adult Men, Women
Capacity: 31
Number of Detainees: 435 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: Ordre de Malte
General Conditions: Since 2014 the detention centre only hosts men.
Sanitation & Food: 12 showers and toilets; 3 nurses and 2 visits of a doctor per week
Collective Spaces: 4 areas (3 for men and 1 for women closed on 21 May 2014); 15 rooms with 2 beds + 1 room for disabled persons; 1 collective room with TV; Large outdoor courtyard with 1 table-soccer game and 2 table-tennis games, free access all the time

Toulouse-Cornebarrieu, Haute-Garonne



24



Typology: CRA
Address: Avenue Pierre-Georges, Latécoère, 31700 Cornebarrieu
Operating Period: 2006 - Present
Management & Services: Police aux frontières
Facility Security Regime: Secure (2013)
Estimated Average Detention Period: 16.5 days (2015)
Categories of Detainees: Undocumented migrants (administrative)
Demographics: Adult Men & Women
Capacity: 126
Number of Detainees: 1026 (2015)
Custodial Ownership: Ministère de l'Intérieur de l'Outre-mer et des Collectivités Territoriales
NGOs With Access: La Cimade
General Conditions: The detention centre has been built in 2006. The buildings dilapidate quickly: problem with the heating, insulation and breaks in the walls. It is 15° in winter in the rooms. Video conferencing for interviews with OFPRA is available and used as well for detainees from Hendaye, Bordeaux, Sète and Perpignan detention centre.
Sanitation & Food: 1 shower and 1 toilet per room; 2 doctors and 3 nurses part time; Perishable products are forbidden; Several severe cases of psychological distress have been reported leading in some cases to suicide attempts
Collective Spaces: 5 areas (3 for men, 1 for women and 1 for families; 61 rooms of 12m² (up to 20m² for family rooms); 1 TV room; 1 200m² fenced and covered outdoor courtyard per area
Issues: Inadequate temperature (2014)



TECHNOLOGIES OF ENCAMPMENT

Spaces of Emergency / Emergent Spaces

As the past few chapters have illustrated, there has been a proliferation of borders in response to the perceived ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’ of migration in recent years. This border infrastructure mediates an ideology, which purposely controls and imposes order on movement through various technologies and apparatuses which functionally represent and enforce spatial-temporal division and enclosure. To reiterate, this is not merely a humanitarian crisis, as these host countries have more than enough resources to offer support to the supposed ‘influx’ of people migrating to Europe. This is, in fact, a fabricated condition of resource scarcity. Furthermore, this is not merely a security crisis, as the (im)migrant has been transformed into an ‘other’ or a scapegoat figure to distract from the complicity of Europe its constitutive nation-states and dominant institutional powers in the direct and structural conditions of violence, which caused their displacement.

This is a crisis that originates in the contradictions of political ideologies, economic systems and power dynamics that cause people to be forcibly/physically displaced and socially expelled, as well as strategically “[...] circulated, suspended and separated from society.”¹ This is a crisis that signals the fundamental instability and asymmetric of the state-project and larger world-order of Empire and the process of globalization itself.

An emerging, expanding and intensifying assemblage of technologies, apparatuses and spaces of ‘emergency’ (including but not limited to: walls, barbed-wire fences², “cellular”³ enclosures, policing and surveillance tactics and biometric identification systems) make up this contemporary paradigm and global infrastructure of borders. These various material and spatial conditions — rather than being a neutral or a-political framework for the regulation of movement — functionally differentiate, divide and enclose humanity to various degrees; therefore producing conditional subjects, asymmetrical social relations and hierarchies that stratify and restrict access to fundamental so-called ‘cosmopolitan’ human rights of mobility, hospitality and freedom. This uneven social division mediated by these bordering spaces and technologies is functional to the reproduction of world-order. Moreover, these evolving border technologies that constitute a larger infrastructure are the spatial mechanisms that enforce control and exploit these mobile and insecure populations to that aim.

A significant spatial condition that has emerged from the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of recent years — although arguably an evolution of spatial practices rooted in a historical continuum that we’ll return to shortly — has been the active biopolitical containment as well as passive, “necropolitical abandonment”⁴ of forcibly displaced people into encampments and enclosures of various degrees of formality and humanitarian assistance from the state.

The ‘refugee camp’ at its most basic level is, according to the UNHCR definition, is “any purpose-built, planned and managed location *or* spontaneous settlement where refugees are accommodated and receive assistance and services from government and humanitarian agencies.”⁵ ‘Refugee’ under this definition is an “individual forced to leave their country in order to escape persecution as outlined

Figure 2.12 (Opposite page, top image) *Untitled*. Image description: Two migrants walk in the buffer zone at the Calais camp known as the Jungle on April 19, 2016. A new area clearly separates the Jungle from the freeway. This buffer zone makes it easier to spot migrants trying to get near the fence where trucks leave for the UK. Photo by Rasmus Degnbol.

Figure 2.13 (Opposite page, bottom image) *Untitled*. Image description: Workers maintain the fence at the edge of The Jungle in Calais. A migrants bikes past. Photo by Rasmus Degnbol.

in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”⁶ These definitions encompass as well as exclude spatial and lived conditions.

We see today, camps ranging from top-down state-run detention centres and private prisons to so-called ‘humanitarian’ reception centres and temporary housing solutions to makeshift bottom-up camps. However, these spaces cannot be reduced to these typologies alone, the spectrum of formality and informality is only one reading of what constitutes the present political and spatial phenomenon of encampment.

This range of camp typologies is illustrative of the diversity of state bordering technologies and apparatuses used to mediate and control movement. As much as borders are proliferating they are also fragmenting, making it much less clear how they function to reinforce the status quo, a dominant power or ideology.

It can be argued that camps (and other bordering technologies described in previous chapters) represent and enforce “complementary infrastructural frameworks” for mobility, which, Irit Katz argues, “[...] facilitate the combination of the (unequal) movement of goods and capital on the one hand, and strict control over the movement of people and labor on the other.” This dual-sided infrastructure is not politically neutral; rather it creates uneven potentials for life and individual autonomy through the disciplinary control, containment, circulation and exploitation of mobility as a means to (re)produce world-order. In this way, the spaces, territories, nation-states or other institutions that constitute our contemporary paradigm, normally perceived as fixed, are in a continuous state of transformation. Thomas Nail argues that states and territories are in a “process of territorialization,” whereby movement dynamics constantly reshape space.⁷ These camps are a part of a mobile, dynamic, expanding and intensifying infrastructure of borders that is engaged in this political process that is in constant tension with changes in social mobility that have the potential to confirm or contradict the status quo.

As the work will explore further, some of these spatial formations and those who dwell within them are constitutive of the contemporary paradigm of world-order (reinforcing and abstracting the neoliberal political economy through their movement) and others are in contradiction, while most are somewhere in between. Of importance to this work is the development of a methodology and framework to discern the ways in which contemporary forms of social movement engage with the (re)production of space, and to identify how these camps, as representations of a fabricated ‘emergency’ or ideology of spatial-temporal division and enclosure, are also representational of emergent strategies and emerging forms of life (and death). This framework argues that the tension between camps as spaces of emergency and camps as an emergence of new representational space demonstrates a utopian process.

Some key questions guiding this analysis: What does the contemporary phenomenon of social mobility abstract or reveal about the mobile infrastructures of borders that represent ideological processes of social oscillation, systems of domination, subjugation, oppression and violence, which, in turn, (re)produce world-order? What can this reading of the spaces that constitute the present inform us about the controlled (re)production of the ideological and real boundaries of our society? Moreover, what can the conflicts and contradictions of contemporary migration in these spaces reveal about a utopian process?

(Re)Conceptualizing the Camp

We begin by considering how the camp is spatially constituted and its existence within a larger infrastructure of borders. The camp can be broadly understood as

a border technology. It is a space of isolation, separation from spaces of 'everyday life,' where people are processed, contained, controlled, cared for, violated, dehumanized. However, the camp is a concept that lacks a clear or fixed definition due to the evolution of its purpose in response to the shifting political forces affecting the meaning of the spatial formation and its function within society.

As many scholars have argued, encampments appear to be everywhere today, encompassing multiple spatial typologies, scales and gradations of permanence. Presently, there are more than 1000 (refugee) camps in over 60 different countries around the world with over 12 million inhabitants.⁸ However, what we are witnessing today is not an isolated phenomenon triggered by the so-called 'migration crisis,' arguably 'migrants' have always existed but today have, once again, emerged as a dominant figure, a scapegoat that represents the most undesired and threatening form of mobility in relation to our current modes of social (re)production.⁹ While this figure of the migrant is perceived as a threat, it is also an essential social category or division that is exploited in the process of societal reproduction. Therefore the spaces of the border that this figure occupies are productive spaces even though they are perceived to be outside the normative everyday political spaces of social reproduction.

This phenomenon is representative of broad-sweeping globalization and the strategic use of the camp as a technology within a larger infrastructure of borders, which is, in turn, composed of multiple and differential technologies of spatial-temporal division and enclosure that represent relational practices of dispersed or dislocated governmentality under a political economy of neoliberalism. Resultantly, the camp is in a state of perpetual transformation and recomposition before a convergence of social forces, which prevents it from having a defined or consistent spatial-temporal form; a deliberate abstraction and spectacle that has contributed to its proliferation. As Katz argues:

Because many camp spaces are temporary and ephemeral due to their materiality and legal definition, the global infrastructure of camps is ever changing. Yet, similar to other global infrastructures, the infrastructure of camps constitutes an inseparable part of today's interstate relations: it is a built network that reproduces the uneven global divisions between territories, populations, and recourses; it comprises the architecture of circulation that processes the mobility of unwanted populations; and while most of it is created and functions as part of an encompassing institutional arrangement, it is also "pirate" and informal in parts.¹⁰

Up until recently these spaces of encampment, particularly for displaced people fleeing insecurity, conflict or environmental disasters, have been largely externalized from the EU through various spatial-temporal bordering tactics and interstate agreements, keeping the appearance that the 'crisis' is 'elsewhere,'¹¹ rather than being a foundational condition upon which our world-order is constructed. These mobile populations end up being suspended, their movement and life paused, contained in enclosed spaces on their journeys to reach a safer place. In the case of more institutional reception and detention centres and refugee camps, some are transferred involuntarily and indefinitely while awaiting decisions on asylum applications, appeals on deportation orders, or while countries make policy agreements on (im)migration and refugee resettlement. Others can end up living in camps for years and even decades, resulting in these camps effectively becoming permanent-temporary "urbanized" centres.¹² Furthermore, As Katz describes, this indeterminate, temporal and mobile condition is a defining feature of the contemporary infrastructure of borders and camps:

The fact that displaced populations are not only suspended in this global infrastructure of camps but are also transferred within it is not only due to the migrants' own efforts to move and improve their reality but also because their containment is achieved by enforced mobility within the system. While camps contain people for various periods of time, they do so while simultaneously making these people more mobile, through dispersals, transfers, demolitions, deportations and biopolitical ordering mechanisms. The internal ongoing movement within the camp infrastructure allows easier control of the individuals that are held and processed within it.¹³

While the majority of displaced people are residing in camps located within the 'Global South' in countries or territories adjacent to their place of origin, in recent years there are a growing number of people on the move toward and within Europe. This has resulted in the proliferation of the camp, in its manifold of formal and informal spatial typologies, on European territory. Often in cases like the Calais region in Northern France, the isolated site of study in this chapter, where there is a "bottleneck" condition at a major transit area, multiple typologies of institutional and makeshift camps appear (and disappear) within short distances from each other, suggesting that they are conjoined operational spatial typologies in a larger infrastructural network of borders.¹⁴ This is to say that, where there is a 'emergent' form of social mobility that conflicts with the controlled infrastructure of borders, perceived to be an 'emergency' by the state or governing institutions, there are likely new border technologies implemented as a response.

What is clear from this brief description is that the camp, as a spatial phenomenon, is that it crystallizes and represents multiple social issues as well as complex and dynamic political and economic forces. They are not spaces outside the everyday, rather they, like their occupants, are differentially included and excluded in ways that reproduce the world-order. Therefore, readings of these spaces must necessarily grapple with a relational understanding of these conditions rather than constructing generalized comparisons or direct causalities.

We've established a working theory of how camps function within today's society to mediate power and ideology and functionally reproduce world-order alongside other border technologies, which compose a larger infrastructure that manages mobility. This theory will be tested in an analysis of the encampments in Calais.

The Paradigm of Emergenc(y/e) in Calais

Based on the theoretical framing of camps within an infrastructure of borders it is clear that today the spatial phenomenon of the camp is a product of the myths, ideologies that impose order and lived 'utopian' struggles that contradict (or confirm) and expose (or abstract) that order. Largely we are blind to the myths and ideologies that produce the contemporary problematic, an unresolvable condition of the present when viewed within the so-called 'Blind Field of the Present.'¹⁵ However, this thesis hypothesizes that the lived conditions and experiences can embody strategies to see beyond the present. The presence of (im)migrants at once necessitate the existence of the spaces of encampment because their presence contradicts the logic of the contemporary mode of social reproduction, at the same time their existence is a source of exploitation for this mode of reproduction to expand, multiply and abstract the border infrastructure through their expulsion.

Multiple institutional and makeshift typologies of camps that have emerged in recent years in the Nord-pas-de-Calais department in France, which is characteristic of other "bottleneck spaces"¹⁶ in Europe, where (im)migrants are

managed and contained at major border-crossings. However, in contrast to the camps within sub-saharan Africa or at crossing points on the Mediterranean, Calais often represents one of the last legs of (im)migrants journeys, particularly those aiming to get to the UK. Therefore, those arriving at these camps have had to endure and overcome — with little, if any, assistance — many obstacles that are strategically designed to prevent them from getting to this point in their journeys. The following text will briefly outline the series of recent events that have taken place in the region that have shaped the spatial conditions of encampment. The subsequent reading of these events will examine the strategies of ‘emergency’ that reproduce the border, and the “emergent strategies”¹⁷ of those living in camps. This conflict hopes to show this condition of emergence in contrast to emergency. The use of the term emergence and ‘emergent strategies’ here is partially inspired by the work of Adrienne Maree Brown who describe emergence as being “the way complex systems and patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions.”¹⁸ Also inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s argument about the ‘urban strategy’ which implies the development of a new political strategy to approach a problematic, being migration in this context.¹⁹ This emergence is also two-sided, the emergence of technologies that respond to conflict and contradiction by studying and creating data and deriving strategies to exert control, and then the emergence of life in spaces that are designed to restrict it.

Camps and life within them is not entirely controlled or free, formal or informal, but a mixture of both, and the relationships of that mixture determine the conditions for spatial reproduction. The (im)migrant can be constitutive of the regime of social reproduction (status quo) by desiring to get the status defined by that system, but can also build community outside, creating the potential for a different path within the midst of struggle, a new form of life that is not depended upon the cycle of reproducing the state or the institutions of governance and economy, but creating the conditions for the sustaining of different forms of life, within/outside/beyond.

To develop a political theory of space, that centres the figure of the migrant, the marginalized or racialized ‘other,’ rather than viewing their lived experience as the exception, a product of the mode of social reproduction, we must centre their experience within a transformative politics that can be viewed outside the lens of the state but in relation to a confluence of political processes. We can do this by looking at the occupation of space and the conflicts and contradictions that necessitate a differential or virtual space that we can’t explicitly imagine or design, but know is needed and is possible/impossible based on a material reading of the conditions of the present.

The Oscillating Timeline of Encampment & (Im)migrant struggles in the Calais Region

Calais is a port city that is located on the north-east coast of France. It is a transit hub on one of the highest traffic sea routes in the world. The 35-km channel between Calais and Dover sees more than four hundred commercial ships and ferries cross each day.²⁰ Moreover, the region is considered to be a ‘hotspot’ in relation to migration in Europe as it is on the external border of the Schengen ‘free-travel’ zone. As Irit Katz argues, “While these camps often serve as a jumping point to illegal border crossings, they are also the state on which the struggles against border apparatuses themselves and their consequential exclusionary spaces often take place.”²¹

The recent timeline of encampment in the region shows the tension between the political forces that control movement through multiplying and

intensifying technologies and struggles of those dwelling in camps to survive, resist and overcome these controls. This tension is expressed in the different typological forms of camps and other bordering technologies present in Calais, as well as the various functions of these spaces that represent a spectrum of controls and struggles. While the associated drawings and text describe some of the spatial conditions of the encampments, it is not so much the particularities of the spaces that of each camp that is of importance to this point of the investigation (these particularities will be discussed in more detail in the final section on the camps in Paris that focuses more on the lived dimension). An attempt to fully describe and categorize these innumerable details of the spatial conditions is doomed to failure and is not particularly useful to the purposes of this stage of the thesis argument.

What is meant to be productive or affirmative about the argument at this stage is the translation or movement between the camp as a representation of the state or dominant ideology of ‘emergency,’ of spatial-temporal division and enclosure, and the camp as a representational space that contains emergent strategies of life (and death). Particularly how the timeline of events illustrates the tensions between these two opposing but relational political conceptualizations of the camp, arguing that this tension is the utopian process. This is a reading of the technologies that either enforce encampment as a measure of mediating control or technologies are used by those living in the camps as an emancipatory strategy of survival. From this reading can be discerned what political motivations are mediated by the enforcement or use of technologies of encampment. Although it is not always possible to trace the causality, it is possible to identify and discuss the forces that create and reproduce this cycle of displacement and encampment. This oscillating timeline of encampment and (im)migrant struggles in Calais is described here as well as visually in an accompanying series of maps and drawings. These only show a single reading however, the analysis that follows attempts to enact a methodological framework to interpret the utopian process of transformation that occurs between these spaces and events and the use of technologies to mediate political ideology and alternative imaginaries of life.

A Technological Reading of the Utopian Process in Calais

Reflecting on the conditions of encampment in the Calais region from the perspective of a ‘utopian process’ we can identify two relational aspects that interprets these spaces in the context of a larger phenomenon of migration management and the reproduction of borders/world-order, the camps as Spaces of Emergency, the camps as Emergent Spaces. Spaces of Emergency and Emergent Spaces are concepts used here to describe the tension and mixture of political forces expressed in camps. Irit Katz description informs this approach, where she describes camps as expressing both “power over life” and “power of life”.²² Effectively power is expressed through the political and ideological mediation of space to either control spatial consumption or activity or be transformed by lived or social use. This is to say that power dynamics in society can be confirmed, legitimized or strengthened by controlled spatial use, either by limiting access by establishing a (spatial-temporal) division or controlling activity within a boundary (enclosure). The other side of this statement is the implication that if power dynamics can be confirmed or reproduced by spatial use then they can also be transformed through spatial use that contradicts or transgresses its controlled divisions or boundaries that have been ideologically established and mediated. In this case, lived experiences begin to create representational politics through spatial use. This political tension exposed by life in the camps is described in the Encampment Diagram (See Fig. 2.14) which will be explained throughout the remainder of this chapter with specific examples identified in the context of Calais.

Power over life: Spaces of Emergency

Camps, interpreted as Spaces of Emergency, represent political forces that are a mixture of what Claudio Minca calls “custody, care and control.”²³ These are political forces and ideologies that conceive of and impose and imagined order. This is, on one hand, an active process that shapes the conditions of hospitality and hostility, and general management of migration, through direct forms of control and violence. On the other hand it is a passive process that shapes the condition of neglect and abandonment through structural forms of control and violence.²⁴ Both of these are expressions of “power over life” that are represented by the material and spatial conditions in encampments as a response to the perception of migration as an ‘emergency.’

These political forces have been interpreted by Michel Foucault and Achille Mbembe as *biopolitics* and *necropolitics* respectively. They are not necessarily binary or oppositional forces rather they constitute a relational or dialectical political dimensions of social and spatial processes of (re)producing dominant power over life.²⁵ A continuous cycle of the creation and destruction of camps in Calais and across Europe represents the mixture of both of these political processes mediated through various border conditions and technologies.

For Foucault, “[...] biopolitics alludes to a historical shift towards the use of power to protect, regulate and manage the life of the legitimate population.”²⁶ In this way, biopolitics is the optimization of life, or life made operational for the use of the state, or institutional and dispersed forms of power, to create, maintain and reproduce a defined spatial and social order. Population is used in interest of expanding power through various channels, but in relation to management of migration, biopolitics is expressed through the circulation of a mobile and insecure population through an infrastructure of borders that encompasses various technologies and apparatuses including formal detention/reception centres and informal camps.

Moreover, biopolitical strategies include the introduction of asylum as a legal process that people have to conform to in order to become a subject optimized for the use of the state, within the labour force for instance, and also qualifying them for the protection of the state. Part of how the camp functions to control population for their use within a larger system of the state is by introducing various tactics of forcing people towards systems and procedures to ‘qualify’ their life, such as receiving humanitarian aid or shelter and being directed toward processes of asylum.

However, as was discussed on the chapter on ‘Hostipitality,’ these systems are by no means benevolent or welcoming toward the stranger, rather their existence is a form of spectacle that distracts from the many designed obstacles and barriers that block a person’s access to hospitality, as well as the many asymmetrical limitations placed upon a person’s humanity through conditional welcoming, which are conceived as necessary for the host to maintain power of their household.

In this way, the humanitarianism and state presence in many contemporary encampments for (im)migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons makes them appear as apolitical or neutral. However, the structures behind encampment are fundamentally political and violent as they are intended to address the biological needs of the body through authoritative custody (although they deeply fail in this regard), while purposefully neglecting the sovereignty and autonomy of the individual; what Johnathan Darling calls “compassionate repression.”²⁷

On one hand, the state has forced migrants into formal spaces of encampment or containment, providing aid or generally controlling their mobility and autonomy within a spatialized legal procedure. In this way, a particular subject is bio-

politically optimized for the use of the state or dominant power. However, on the other hand, this reproduction of power through the control of life is also met with an accompanying debilitation of subjects who cannot fit within that system, these subjects are abandoned both socially through marginalization and exclusion, as well as literally killed in the countless cases of border deaths in recent years. Particularly in Calais, numerous people have died trying to overcome many forms of these violent borders while trying get to the UK.²⁸

This second 'use' of this controlled population relates to the necropolitical aspect of 'power over life'. While modern biopolitics is understood to 'make live and let die'²⁹ necropolitics can be seen as the complementary process, to 'make die and let live,' a theoretical framing developed by Mbembe that, "was in part a reaction to the inadequacy of biopolitics to conceptualize the more extreme cases of body regulation, while life was not so much being governed, as much as death itself was being sanctioned."³⁰ In this way, life in the camp is also de-optimized by necropolitical processes that impose power over life through mediating material and spatial conditions of abandonment, structural violence and neglect that force people toward conditions of precarity and insecurity.

To describe the situation of emergency in Calais in regard to the mixture of biopolitical and necropolitical controls and general application of power over life in the camps, one must begin by describing the context that has created the situation in Calais both in terms of the immediate context as well as the forces that drove people on the move to this particular nexus point. Often migrants are perceived to have chosen their material conditions of insecurity and therefore are viewed to be disruptive of the status quo, whereas in reality they have been forcibly circulated within this system and infrastructure of borders, and their precarity is part of reproducing the status quo.

The situation of formal/informal encampment in the Calais is a result of the region becoming an external border of the EU after France signed the Schengen Agreement in 1985 as the UK was only a partial signatory and did not give up the sovereignty of its borders. In the late 1990s there was an influx of people trying to cross the border and this bottleneck condition of border crossing resulted in a series of informal settlements.

Their movement was, and continues to be, a result of various causes of displacement and forced migration as well as the legal procedures, mechanics and general border technologies that control their mobility. Upon arrival on EU territory, many migrants are forced to become biometrically identified and then formally registered to validate their mobility, allowing them to seek asylum and receive aid from the state. In this way, new arrivals only become subjects worthy of protection when they are able to be controlled through identification. By not cooperating with the biopolitical processes of the state under the Dublin II procedure, which stipulates migrants have to register at their arrival country into the EU and cannot apply anywhere else within 12 months³¹, they could face punitive carceral consequences and potential deportation.³² While many chose not to register at their first arrival country in hopes of reaching a more preferred destination, many do follow this procedure. However, the bureaucratic delay between biometrical identification and formal registration through an interview process that identifies the nature of the asylum claim creates problems for many migrants in arrival countries who effectively had no place to stay during this time.³³ Only once their asylum claim is lodged can they receive shelter in various reception centres.³⁴

Even though there is formal access to these places of 'hospitality' there are substantive barriers to that access that are not accounted for, or deliberately ignored, in the procedure laid out by the state. NGOs and volunteers step in to provide shelter and care, however, many migrants effectively find themselves

abandoned by the state.

To solve this problem of the increased number of people living informally on the streets of arrival countries, many are coerced by police and border authorities to move on, forcibly displacing them and preventing them from following the procedure. They are forced to move on to more inland EU countries to apply elsewhere or wait out the 12 month period in a state of precarity.³⁵ During this time, they are effectively living undocumented and in a condition of extreme insecurity as any interaction with authorities could increase their chances at deportation, yet they have very little means to subsist as any work they could acquire would be deemed 'illegal.' This illustrates that the asylum procedure is not always a compassionate assistance, often it is the police or other authorities who enact this process through violence, and through a deliberate restriction of resources that would otherwise guide people through the process, like legal aid or translation assistance. In this way, abandonment is a measure of control that allows the state to kill without impunity as Agamben describes in *Homo Sacer*.³⁶

This cycle of biopolitical control and necropolitical abandonment repeats itself over and over again in the context of Calais, whereby formal camps and shelters are created to aid a growing population of displaced people, but access is limited. This situation in turn creates a multitude of informal settlements and camps that become a security problem for the region. These makeshift camps are dismantled and populations are dispersed or formally enclosed within a designated area. As the conditions deteriorate once more new technologies of control are implemented to impose control. However these technologies, while including some, exclude others and force them into a condition of informality once again. This cycle suggests that the control of movement and application of power over life through mediating border technologies is actively produced and reproduced in response to changes in social life. This cycle is an ongoing process of maintaining and reproducing the conditions of dominant power.

Before describing events and spaces in this timeline in more detail it is relevant to introduce here the counter-cycle by which the utopian process emerges in response to forces and spaces that inflict and impose power over life. This counter-cycle is mediated by the emergence of spaces that demonstrate the "power of life."³⁷

Power of Life: Emergent Spaces

As with biopolitics and necropolitics, there are two political aspects or dimensions to life in camps that can be identified as a mirrored political response against forces and hierarchies of oppression. The first being 'natalpolitics,' an invented term derived here from Irit Katz's use of Hannah Arendt's concept of 'natality,'³⁸ and as a companion term to the already established concept of 'thanatopolitics,'³⁹ both used to describe this condition of "power of life"⁴⁰ within camps. Neither of these conceptualizations are descriptions of strategies that aim to make the conditions of life in camps a novelty, something to be studied in order to produce a model of reform for a 'better camp.' Rather, these are conceptual positions on the formation of life and death to be viewed in relation to the political forces that exert power over them, in order to develop a better understanding of this process of social and societal transformation in a way that centres lived experiences. Instead of looking at camps as spaces devoid of life ('bare life'), where life becomes an object of control and manipulation, can we look at camps as places where life creates new political subjectivities that resist control and appropriate spaces and technologies that are conceived to mediate oppressive and exclusionary power dynamics. These lived conditions in camps may not explicitly bring about capital 'R' Revolutionary change and be entirely emancipatory in that way, but rather, they model social relations and "emergent strategies"⁴¹ that can point towards an alternative way of

making society that does not rely on remodelling the hierarchical and exclusionary relations of control and power imposed upon life by the state or superstructure. Arguably, by viewing life in camps beyond the limiting perception of Agamben's 'bare life' it opens up more possibility to see new strategies emerging in these spaces.

As Katz describes natality in this way, as a politics of birth and hope:

*Natality is the ontological condition of the political actor as a beginner who realizes his human freedom to begin something completely new through action.*⁴²

This politics can be expressed in a range of activities, but in general, natalpolitics speaks to the emergence of life, strategies of life, the solidarities that bridge life, and new political identities or subjectivities that are created through mutual connections through struggle, resistance, community formation and maintenance of reciprocal social relations. Natalpolitics can be seen as a political practice embodied in the life and representational spaces of life that emerge in spaces designed for its control or abandonment. In camps this can be seen in how people use their own resourcefulness to create spaces, both physical and symbolic, often these are seen as models of existing spaces, particularly models of the urban, but rather they signal the possibility of a different process than how abstract and fragmented urbanized space is produced in cities today.

Henri Lefebvre refers to a similar process through the concept he uses called "autogestion," to describe a situation where, "Each time a social group (generally the productive workers) refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, or life, or survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to master its own conditions of existence, autogestion is occurring... [it is a] practical struggle that is always reborn with failure and setbacks."⁴³

Jane Freedman illustrates how the *Sans Papiers* movement re-appropriate illegality as a measure of control into as a radical form of life that contradicts, reveals and exposes the structural violence of borders and immigration policy in France:

*The collective mobilization of the sans-papiers in France can be seen as an attempt to overcome some of their insecurity through a creation and redefinition of a collective identity, based on the status of illegality. It might be argued that despite the many external and internal difficulties experienced by the movement, its very existence has brought about a change in the experience of foreigners living in France without legal residency papers. Rather than existing in an individual state of illegality and insecurity, they have become politically active and have acquired a means of engaging politically with the French authorities. The very reclamation of an identity as sans-papiers can be seen in itself as a militant action, an attempt to replace the more negative terms used to describe this group of people, and to denounce those truly responsible for this situation, not the immigrants themselves, but the French state that has made them illegal.*⁴⁴

In this way, the power of life to enact a utopian process comes from the development of new political imaginaries in relation to lived experience.

As necropolitics is the complementary or constitutive companion of biopolitics, 'thanatopolitics' can be understood in relation to 'natalpolitics.' Beginning first by posing a question: what can absence teach us about life? There is an ongoing cycle of construction and destruction of encampments. They

reach critical points where the city cannot allow them to remain otherwise the contradiction will become too obvious. Yet, even as these spaces and the people who dwelled there are gone, there is a void left in the once again empty space that is in fact full of questions about what happened to the life that was once there.

Thanatopolitics is a contested term, used here tentatively and in relation to this framework of discussion. It is a term that has been used in opposite ways, sometimes as an extension of biopolitics⁴⁵ and sometimes as an opposition framework to the ways in which death is made productive by the state or dominant power. Used there, the term relates to Stuart J. Murray's definition, who views 'thanatopolitics' as a politics of death in defiance the direct or structural forces of control by which it was caused.⁴⁶ Again, this is not just literal death, although examples Murray cites are suicide bombers and hunger striking inmates⁴⁷, but viewed in context of migration this politics can be expressed how (im)migrants refuse to conform to the processes of asylum, or refusing to be contained in shipping container shelters that will biometrically identify them to control their mobility and freedom. This is a political refusal of the biopolitical and necropolitical material and spatial conditions that exert power over life through a mediation of control and abandonment. Through this act of refusal a tension is reveal between the logics of these spaces and systems of control and the exclusionary means by which they operate.

Particularly, Murray speculates on the "productive bafflement of death as a way to interrupt, to momentarily suspend, or to meaningfully subvert biopolitical logic through thanatopolitics."⁴⁸ He argues that to see humanity in death, rather than death as a "negation of life,"⁴⁹ is a way to subvert the use of death (and life) in service of reproducing a juridical order, which is often the case when media representation of migrants blames them for their own deaths and for putting themselves in situations of precarity. Viewing political agency in death, allows one to turn the gaze back upon the systems that caused death, as well as strengthen political agency within life and the formation of community and expression of autonomy within/against/beyond the systems of control and abandonment. For this reason, both frameworks of 'natalpolitics' and 'thanatopolitics' should be held together in an analysis of the political possibilities of within/against/beyond the controlled conditions of encampment and borders more generally.

Murray states:

Reckoning with the dead, then, is the effort to account for our own complicity in a regime that delivers death to some in the name of prosperity and life for others. Thanatopolitics would expose the fault-lines of biopolitical logics. It would attend to the rhetorical conditions in which the dead, the dying, and the dispossessed might rise up and speak. This is not to exalt suicide or other violent forms of biopolitical death, but to better understand the force of these events and to demonstrate how the biopolitical conception of life is deeply duplicitous, and ultimately represents a failed, illegible, and hypocritical form of ethical and political life.⁵⁰

As a political framework, 'thanatopolitics' can reveal ideological assumptions and qualifications of life, death and humanity and how they are expressed through mediations spatial and material representations of borders. Moreover, this framework is exhibited by many migrant justice movements who centre their discourse around raising awareness of border deaths and the ways in which borders passively allow or actively condone the dehumanization of the 'other' through political control and abandonment that causes various degrees of social and biological death.⁵¹

SPACES OF EMERGENCY

Politics (ideology) that impose order through emergency technologies of control and the appropriation of everyday life

Biopolitics

(Re)producing dominant power through the use of technologies that create life, populations, subjectivities, social divisions and enclosures (citizen & non-citizen), legalities and illegalities

Necropolitics

(Re)producing dominant power through the use of technologies that create death, or subjectivities defined by death as a measure of control. The right to kill and the right to impose social death (bare life) suspending life.

EMERGENT SPACES

Politics (counter-ideology) that expose order through appropriation of technologies of control by everyday life

Natalpolitics

Transforming/dismantling dominant power through the use of technologies to create new political subjectivities and spaces, the use of bordered spaces that contradicts or resists the ideologies of control represented by that space

Thanatopolitics

Transforming/dismantling dominant power through the use of technologies resistance through a politics of death, resisting 'care' through hunger-strikes, or refusal to be biometrically identified to access 'care' through humanitarian aid.

PARADIGM OF EMERGENC(Y/E) DIAGRAM

Figure 2.14

Returning to Weheliye's question, "Why are formations of the oppressed deemed liberatory only if they resist hegemony and/or exhibit the full agency of the oppressed?"⁵² These political and social formations of life and death in camps often do not express full agency or autonomy, but through existing in relation to spaces and material conditions of control they reveal inherent contradictions and failures of the state ideology. This tension is exposed by the topological threshold between emergency (reinforcing and reinscribing power over life in space) and emergence (expressing alternative social formations through spatial use) that is constantly being reinvented and re-spatialized or re-territorialized in the camp as a utopian process. Therefore, the frameworks of politics that are centred around life and death in these spaces of biopolitical control and necropolitical abandonment allow various degrees of action to be seen as an expression of political opposition, revealing a tension between the ideologies that produce these spaces and the internal desires and humanity of those dwelling in these spaces that goes unrecognized or is purposefully excluded.

The Utopian Process in Calais

The phenomenon of encampment in Calais is representational of a utopian process. Camps are not entirely spaces of control devoid of life, nor are they liberatory spaces of autonomy. They are not solid borders but rather something in between, they represent a threshold between the possible and the impossible. The movement between emergency and emergence is made visible in these spaces through the tension between spatial and material representations of power and representational use of space that transforms the effectiveness by which that power is enforced. The following description of the cycle of encampments in Calais identifies how these spaces were shaped by violent direct biopolitical actions and passive necropolitical inactions as well as moments of action by life within these spaces by why which these tensions are revealed or exposed. This is a more direct description of these conditions on the ground that attempts to mobilize the framework generally described above to illustrate how these encampments in Calais are both representations of emergency and representational spaces of emergence, and finally to argue for the relevance of this framework to architecture.

The Sangatte Red Cross camp, opened in September 1999, was one of the first humanitarian camps for migrants constructed in the region. It was created as a result of the bottleneck condition at the border and the introduction of juxtaposed controls that monitored movement across the channel.

When the centre closed in 2002, many of the migrants hoping to gain entry into the United Kingdom formed a number of makeshift camps around the port of Calais and Euro-tunnel entrance. The material conditions of those living in informal camps expressed the lack of adequate asylum services available in France that would allow them to stay there. People did not choose to live in camps but rather that choice was manufactured through systems of control and abandonment expressed through various structural barriers that prevent access to resources and shelter, particularly for those who were undocumented. Instead many had no choice but to live in these conditions in hope of being able to seek asylum in the UK, which for various reasons was more of a desirable option. These reasons include having direct ties to the UK, such as having family already living there, or indirect ties such as speaking English or coming from a former colony of the British Empire.

The informal camps were constructed out of donated and found materials, and were located in various squats in abandoned buildings or former industrial sites around the city. Their temporary and makeshift aesthetic condition demonstrated the lack of support from the prefecture. However, the material conditions of these

informal camps also expressed compassionate and collaborative community-driven organization between those living in the camps and local charitable groups or volunteer organizations. Many of the tents, shelters and other resources were donated or self-constructed to create livable alternatives to formal shelters or reception centres.

These informal camps were tolerated by the city for various periods of time, but were viewed as a disruptive threat rather than as a product of a structural problem with the asylum procedure. As the conditions worsened this drew more volunteers looking to help. However, because these camps, including the later main 'Jungle,' lacked formal UN status as a refugee camp this limited what these NGO organizations could do.⁵³ Moreover, in addition to systems that criminalize migration, those who aided people in crossing the channel could be criminalized as human traffickers. MSF (Medical Sans Frontier/Doctors Without Borders) was one of the few formal organization that worked in the camps, however most other groups were local volunteers, faith-based institutions or volunteers coming in from other countries to offer their labour to improve conditions for those living in the camps. Other groups included *HelpRefugees*, *Care4Calais*, *Calais Migrant Solidarity* and *Save the Children*. The influx of volunteers helped to reshape the perception of those living in the camps, and through heightened media representation, created a stronger visible critique of the failures of the French government.

Because volunteer groups and camp inhabitants were largely decentralized, both coming and going over short periods, this created a highly collaborative and non-hierarchical community building, but also made it difficult to maintain, because as media representing dwindled so did material and financial supports.

The precarity in the camps was a result of the mixture of a lack of resources provided by the state, the over-policing and surveillance of the activity through various channels, as well as the material and social temporality of the presence of aid and community building. Despite this, camp inhabitants were able to create self-organized infrastructure to support life, particularly in the main 'Jungle,' where you could find retail, restaurants, a church, mosques, community centres (See fig. 2.15, 2.16) and generally the workings of a self-sustaining community. The people living in the 'Jungle' created the conditions for hospitality that was denied to them by the state, but instead of a hospitality predicated on control and 'othering' it was established through reciprocal relationship building an actions that expressed the humanity and autonomy of the individual to be able to make a home or a semblance of a home in a precarious setting.

This act of making a home in a place in which life is made to be precarious is an act of contradiction that exposes the systems that design the conditions of controlled abandonment. This prerequisite condition of migration — the need to constantly be able to make and remake home as the conditions by which migration is circulated, suspended, and spectated from society make it difficult to establish a sense of place, identity and belonging. Moreover, this general but pervasive phenomenon of alienation is becoming more and more presented in everyday spaces within society, and while migration can appear to be a strategy to adapt to this new condition, and develop innovations based on interpretations of life within the camp, the condition of encampment should rather be seen as something that exposes the underlying structures so that they can be dismantled, not reformed. This structure of alienation is caused by the prevailing and hegemonic political ideology under neoliberalism that translates into spaces that reproduce hierarchical, precarious and oppressive conditions, limiting and controlling the possibilities of social life to activity that only reproduces this power dynamic. Sites like the camps in Calais represent both the conditions of control as well as emergence of activity that subverts and exposes that control and creates the potential for alternative modes of social reproduction not through innovative



Figure 2.15 (top image) Calais Good Chance Theatre at London Southbank Centre. Photo by author. July, 2016.

Figure 2.16 (bottom image) Calais Good Chance Theatre at London Southbank Centre. Photo by author. July, 2016.



forms or aesthetics but through innovative and emergent strategies of life.

As a response to the formalization of alternative relations of life in the camp the state intervened to prevent these camps from becoming permanent and interfering in the controlled process of asylum. These interventions involved the dismantling of several informal camps, squats and 'jungles' that had formed around the city and grew in size around 2015 when the influx of migration was highest. (See fig. 2.17-2.20 for maps and a timeline of settlements) Eventually authorities relocated populations of those settlements into formal detention/reception centres as well as one main large 'Jungle' located east of the port and main highway. This was the infamous Calais 'Jungle' that existed between 2015-2016. In this way, the conditions in the 'Jungle' were a result of the violence of the state in dismantling other camps and forcing people into a contained area, moreover it was also a result of the humanitarian response. As Natasha King describes, "Few had wanted to move to the new jungle, seen as a ghetto created

by the state to assert greater control and undermine the self-determination of the people trying to cross.⁵⁴ It was both a product of the violent emergency response by the state and authorities that unmade and remade a space of containment as well as the emergence of strategies to work around these controls by those living and working in conjunction with the inhabitants in the camp.

Authorities responded to this persistence of community building of the people living there with attempts to undermine this autonomy. As King describes, “From October, the CRS [French border security agency: *Compagnies républicaines de sécurité*] started daily patrols inside the jungle (under the pretence of providing ‘security’ to jungle ‘volunteers’), and ad hoc roadblocks at the jungle’s entrances which sometimes prevented people from leaving or entering.”⁵⁵

Moreover, there were several material/spatial state interventions that aimed to assert “power over life” in the camp. The first example is the militarized fence placed along the highway to prevent people from crossing to reach the port or Euro-tunnel at Coquelles that was built around the same time as the increased patrols.⁵⁶ This was described as a protective measure as many migrants were killed by fast moving cars, but it was also meant to control and prevent them from accessing the port or Euro-tunnel to the UK.

The second example is the strategic flooding of the land around the Euro-tunnel entrance to prevent migrants from trespassing.⁵⁷ This flooding came after the announcement that the authorities planned to partially close the ‘Jungle’ in January 2016. The southern part of the camp was dismantled between February and March 2016, containing between 1000 to 3500 people.⁵⁸

The third example is the alternative housing that was provided to house the displaced inhabitant in the form of the 125 shipping containers that also were installed in January 2016 in the ‘Jungle’ by a French company called Logistics Solutions, “[...] known for its expertise in building military facilities.”⁵⁹ This formalized camp called the Camp d’Accueil Provisoire (or, “temporary welcome centre/camp”) and was managed by the non-profit group La Vie Active (specializing in social work with elderly people and people with disabilities).⁶⁰ It was a preliminary intervention alongside the accommodation at the Jules Ferry Centre for women and children, before the camp began to be fully dismantled. However, these accommodations were limited in number, not fully housing all those who were displaced in the southern portion of the camp. Moreover, in order to access these units, migrants had to be biometrically identified, which became a barrier to some who needed to stay undocumented to reach the UK.

With the increase in militarized state presence in the camp, many migrants and people in solidarity began organizing protests to oppose the conditions of controlled life in the jungle and demanded that the border be opened. These protests however, had the opposite effect and resulted in increased police repression. In her book, *No Borders*, documenting her time in the Calais camp, King illustrates that these protests expressed contradictory or conflicting visions. On one hand, they appealed to the state to provide better, more humane care, on the other hand they wanted to border to open and allow free movement, therefore undermining the state itself. King believes that the “paradoxical” nature of these demands were a reason why the protests did not bring about significant change.⁶¹

Rather than providing proper solutions and humanitarian care for those living in the ‘Jungle,’ these state interventions had the effect of increased the material precarity and insecurity of those living in the camp. The most significant ways life was improved in the camp was through community organization. Even still, life in the camp was fundamentally violent and dehumanizing. People faced poor physical and mental health and suffered from serious trauma. However, it is also important to recognize, despite the conditions in the camp that exerted power and control over life to various degrees of violence, it was also a place that

expressed the potential of humanity to come together in solidarity within/against/beyond the material and spatial controls that perpetuated insecurity.

The 'Jungle' closed permanently in November 2016. During its closure, migrants were placed on buses and taken to asylum centres at unknown locations across the country. The so-called 'problem' for the state was redistributed elsewhere. Today, what remains are few small isolated structures, and memories of the site documented through various organizations that were involved in it during its lifetime. Moreover, there is still a significant presence of migrant encampments in the region that face the same conditions of precarity but none that have reached the size of the 'Jungle' since its closure.

While the material conditions of the camp and those who lived in there are gone, during its lifetime architects and other spatial partitioners were involved in preserving the memory of the site.⁶² These documentations have suggested that we can learn from encampment. Some have tried to take these lessons of makeshift and informal encampments in Calais and beyond and use them as justification for a novel design solution, and while a diversity of tactics to make these spaces more humane and livable for those in this precarious situation are important, there is potential for these efforts to abstract the root causes, asymmetries of power and structural violences the spaces represent and reproduce through the control of life. Arguably, what is most important to learn from Calais is that these places should not exist, and this is a lesson that does not require a design exercise to learn, but rather an interrogation of the structures and systems of power that create these places and force people into a situation of control, abandonment and insecurity. For architects, it is important to take a deep look into how the profession is complicit in or can be co-opted by these systems, to evaluate our goals, our effectiveness at achieving them and how they can be co-opted or manipulated outside of our control. The majority of architectural work is complicit in making contributions to this violent system through various means of spatializing and materializing ideologies of control and asymmetrical power relations, or providing the means for these systems to appropriate the built environment to carry out a mediating function. To acknowledge that this is normative to the profession we can begin to develop more tactical means to address these issues. In this way, what can be learned from the life in the camp is the ways in which communities came together in solidarity and built relationships despite the structural barriers designed to prevent and control the emergence of alternatives. Modelling these strategies within our practices is a way to participate in this utopian process as a radical endeavor, but what is of primary importance is promoting the centring and connecting the lived experiences struggles to understand the ways in which systems of oppression operate and create asymmetrical power dynamics through space itself as the first step toward action.

This framework is a way of seeing the relationship between the political and ideological forces that produce "power over life" through material and spatial conditions of encampment and the lived conditions of these spaces that reveal or expose these forces through a multitude of means ranging from conflict and contradiction, resistance and refusal, occupation and appropriation. While the lived experience and situation in camps in Calais have not had drastic effects that have completely transformed power dynamics across levels, scales of society, the life within them is representational of new strategies to construct space and social relations that does not enforce or control movement or reproduce the dynamics that have created the situation of encampment in the first place.

The relationship revealed by conditions of tension between a Space of Emergency and the Emergence of Space is the utopian process. It's a process without a predetermined outcome, the impossibilities and possibilities are in constant renegotiation. The power and politics of life and of death as opposed to the power and politics over life and death are inherently critical of the oppressive conditions in these camps and bordered spaces, this critique is expressed through the use of space, and thus can be read spatially.

ENDNOTES - 2.2.3 TECHNOLOGIES OF ENCAMPMENT

1 Irit Katz, "The Global Infrastructure of Camps," *MoMA: Insecurities*, Medium (2017), <https://medium.com/insecurities/the-global-infrastructure-of-camps-8153fb61ea30#we05419ql>

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3 See: Thomas Nail, "The Cell," *Theory of the Border*, 88-110.

4 See: Thom Davies, Arshad Isakjee and Surindar Dhesi, "Violent Inaction: The Necropolitical Experience of Refugees in Europe," *Antipode* Vol. 49, No. 5 (2017).

Necropolitics being the regulation of death as a form of structural violence and political control that 'makes die or lets live.'

5 UNHCR, "UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps," *UNHCR*, Geneva (2014), 12, quoted in Irit Katz, "Between *Bare Life* and *Everyday Life*: Spatializing Europe's Migrant Camps," *Amps: Architecture, Media, Politics, Society* (October 2017), 1.

6 Peter Grbac, "Civitas, polis, and urbs Reimagining the refugee camp as the city," *Refugee Studies Centre*, Working Paper Series No. 96 (2013), 6.

7 Nail refers to this as "a process of territorialization" in which movement creates territory.

Thomas Nail, *The Figure of the Migrant*, 42.

8 Irit Katz, "The Global Infrastructure of Camps"

9 Thomas Nail centres his political theory and reinterprets a history of political power from the perspective of social movement, he defines the Figure of the Migrant as the central figure in this process rather than the exception.

See: Thomas Nail, *The Figure of the Migrant* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

10 Irit Katz, "The Global Infrastructure of Camps"

11 See: Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "Europe Keeps Asylum Seekers at a Distance, This Time in Rwanda," *The New York Times* (September 8, 2019), <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/europe/migrants-africa-rwanda.html>

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12 See: Manuel Hertz, "The Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara," in *From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara*, edited by Manuel Hertz (Zürich, Switzerland: Lars Müller Publishers and ETH Studio Basel, 2013).

13 Irit Katz, "The Global Infrastructure of Camps"

14 See: Irit Katz, "Between *Bare Life* and *Everyday Life*: Spatializing Europe's Migrant Camps"

15 Henri Lefebvre, "Blind Field," in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

16 See: Irit Katz, "Between *Bare Life* and *Everyday Life*: Spatializing Europe's Migrant Camps," 3.

17 See: Adrienne Maree Brown, "What is Emergent Strategy," *Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds* (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2017).

18 Nick Obolensky, *Complex Adaptive Leadership: Embracing Paradox and Uncertainty* (Burlington, VT: Gower, 2014),

quoted in Adrienne Maree Brown, *Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds*, 22.

19 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 135-150.

20 "Guidance: Dover Strait crossings: Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS)," *Maritime and Coastguard Agency*. (2014), www.gov.uk/government/publications/dover-strait-crossings-channel-navigation-information-service-cnis quoted in Natasha King, "The Struggle for Mobility in Calais," in *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2016), 102.

21 See: Irit Katz, "Between *Bare Life* and *Everyday Life*: Spatializing Europe's Migrant Camps"

22 Irit Katz, "From spaces of thanatopolitics to spaces of natality: A commentary on 'Geographies of the camp'," *Political Geography*, 1-3.

23 Claudio Minca, "Geographies of the Camp," *Political Geography* 49 (2015), 75.

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25 M. McIntyre and H J Nast, "Bio(necro)polis: Marx, surplus populations, and the spatial dialectics of reproduction and 'race'," *Antipode* 43(5) (2011), 1472, quoted in Thom Davies, Arshad Isakjee and Surindar Dhesi, "Violent Inaction: The Necropolitical Experience of Refugees in Europe," *Antipode*, Vol. 49 No. 5 (2017), 1269.

26 Lemke T., *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction* (New York: NYU Press, 2011), quoted in Thom Davies et al., "Violent Inaction," 1267.

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
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
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- 30 Thom Davies et al., "Violent Inaction," 1267-1268.
- 31 Article 13, Council Regulation No. 604/2013. quoted in Thom Davies et al., "Violent Inaction," 1273.
- 32 Thom Davies et al., "Violent Inaction," 1273.
- 33 Article 13, Council Regulation No. 604/2013), quoted in Thom Davies et al., "Violent Inaction," 1273.
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- 36 See: Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
- 37 Irit Katz, "From spaces of thanatopolitics to spaces of natality," 1-3.
- 38 Ibid, 1-3.
- 39 See: Stuart J. Murray, "Thanatopolitics"
- 40 Irit Katz, "From spaces of thanatopolitics to spaces of natality," 1-3.
- 41 Adrienne Maree Brown, *Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds* (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2017).
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- 44 Jane Freedman, "The French "Sans-Papiers" Movement: An Unfinished Struggle," in *Migration and Activism in Europe Since 1945*, edited by Wendy Pojmann (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
- 45 Irit Katz, "From spaces of thanatopolitics to spaces of natality," 1-3.
- Here Katz appears to equate camps as de-humanizing spaces with thanatopolitics.
- 46 Stuart J. Murray, "Thanatopolitics," 203-207.
- 47 Ibid, 718-19.
- 48 Ibid, 205.
- 49 Ibid, 205.
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- 61 Natasha King, *No Borders*, 125.
- 62 See: C. Hanappe, P. CHombart de Lauwe enseignants avec L. Malone photographe, "La leçon de calais" (Octobre 2015), <https://www.actesetcites.org/jungle>
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CARTOGRAPHY II

Encampment in Calais





THE OSCILLATING TIMELINE OF ENCAMPMENT & (IM)MIGRANT STRUGGLES IN THE CALAIS REGION

1985: France joins four other countries as the original signatories of the Schengen agreement, becoming an external border of the region as the UK was only a partial signatory, not giving up sovereignty over its borders.

1994: the UK and France begin implementing juxtaposed controls at the Eurotunnel Entrance at Coquelles outside Calais, meaning people were checked prior to crossing.

1999, September: Opening of a humanitarian emergency shelter and reception center in Sangatte

2002, Nov. - Dec.: closure of the center of sangatte migrants continue to reach Calais and its region and try to organize, despite the repression

2003, Feb.: Treaty of Touquet signed between France and Great Britain (common controls, readmission agreements) meaning immigration checks at all ports along french coast and Belgium.

2009, Sept.: Dismantling of the Pashtun jungle (camp organized by Afghan migrants of Pashto origin)

2013 Sept. - 2014 May: Victor Hugo Squat & CMS - Calais Migrant Solidarity

2014 May - 2015 Feb.: Victor hugo moved to PortaCabins outside city, then this was closed, when occupants moved to new Jungle against wishes

2014 April - 2015 Mar.: Tioxide Camp

2015, Jan. - Mar.: Opening of the Jules Ferry Centre, “silent eviction” of the jungle

2015 Mar - June: Closure of squat jungle camps, moved into main camp

2015, Oct.: setting up reception and orientation centers (CAO) to respond to the “migration crisis” in Calais

2016, Jan.: clashes between police and migrants near the jungle, pro and anti-migrant protests. Introduction of the containers.

2016, Feb.: Belgium, fearing an influx of migrants, decides to temporarily restore controls at its borders with France

2016, Feb.-Apr.: Disarming the southern part of the Jungle. Migrants continue to stream.

2016, Sept.: Announcement of the Interior Minister B. Caseneuve, the dismantling and closure of the Calais Jungle

2016, Oct.: Closure of the Jungle

2017, end of: Several hundred migrants live scattered in Calais and in the surrounding cities (Grande-Synthe, Dunkirk, etc.)

2018, Jan.: Visit of the President of the Republic, E. Macron, to Calais. They announce the State’s responsibility for the distribution of meals to migrants.

2018, Apr.: Several UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs denounce the unhealthy living conditions of the majority of migrants in northern France and the intimidation of volunteers and migrant aid associations






Figure 2.17 (first map) Encampment in Calais Region

Figure 2.18 (second map) Encampment in Calais

Figure 2.19 (third map) Calais 'Jungle' - January 2015

Figure 2.20 (fourth map) Calais 'Jungle' - November 2016








2015/09/10



2016/06/07



2016/08/22

2016/10/24

2017/05/09

Figure 2.21 Satellite images of the Calais 'Jungle' (2015-2017)

PARIS, AN URBAN (R)EVOLUTION

Part Three

PARIS

an Urban (R)evolution

In many ways, the final section of this thesis is a repetition of the two that preceded it. This thesis has been describing a contemporary phenomenon that proliferates across scales, levels and dimensions of society, that combines “near and distant orders.”⁷¹ This phenomenon encompasses the mode(s) of (re)production of society in the present, and it is embodied in and revealed by the transformation of social, spatial and temporal conditions, material traditions and cultural forms. This phenomenon is defined by spatial practices, the physical marks and symbolic traces of human life left on our world, and the forces of ideology, power and political activity that conceive of and control the process by which these spaces represent and enforce order. These physical marks and traces examined in the context of this thesis are borders, and they take on many forms and functions in the present, which make them and their association to this phenomenon a problematic that is difficult to interpret. Moreover, these border spaces are designed to carry out a function of control that is fragmented and abstracted to hide the process behind their (re)production. For this reason a relational ‘trialectical’ approach was taken in the organizational structure of the thesis, with the goal of seeing it through a lens that centres lived experience in relation to an ongoing utopian process of transformation.

Part One looked at borders topologically, describing relationships between border functions and formations to conditions of mobility, to reveal their relationships at a global scale. The analysis described how borders work as a spatial system that responds to and control processes of mobility by representing the interests of Empire, a condition of global power, to functionally reproduce the illusion of world-order.

Part Two broke apart this infrastructural network of borders to understand how it carried out the function of representing and enforcing spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures. This network controls mobility by fixing it to a defined path, or suspending it through various border technologies and apparatuses. This investigation ended with an analysis centred around the conditions of life within the space of the border, specifically the camp in Calais. Makeshift camps, such as the ones at Calais have proliferated around Europe, however they are not independent spatial formations, rather they are a part of an infrastructure of borders that controls, defines, disrupts and circulates the conditions of mobility and life. Within these spaces there is life that demands alternative political conditions of free movement with/against/beyond the paradigm of controls and violences that restrict movement in the present. This analysis proposed a methodological framework to identify these camps as representations of a fabricated ‘emergency’ as well as to identify emergent strategies or emerging forms of life (and death). The tension between emergency and emergence and associated spatial and lived outcomes reveals or exposes a utopian process.

This third section approaches this phenomenon of the present at the scale of the city, in the context of Paris. The work positions the built environment of the city as a dynamic medium by which social and spatial conditions, divisions and

Figure 3.1 (Opposite page) Ivan Chitchevlov, *Metagraphie: Mappemonde Métropolitaine*, 1953.

enclosures are practiced, enforced and reproduced as well as contradicted, refused and contested. Cities are increasingly becoming bordered. This bordering looks like many things: the fencing-off and privatization of public spaces, the design of buildings with multiple layers of access, the planning of banlieue neighbourhoods, or generally the policies that promote increased security practices both as direct violent policing and passive policy-making that promotes gentrification, pushing marginalized and insecure populations further and further out of the centre. These multiple representations of borders not only serve the internal interests of the city, but they are also connected to a network of dispersed and global forces of power. The design of cities promotes their protection and preservation as an object of myth within a larger illusion of world-order, but the consequences are predatory and punitive for those not considered in the mythology; excluded from having representation and agency in the political process of shaping the city and society.

Many designers, professionals and experts feel compelled to create solutions, a “positivist” approach that “clings tightly to scientific facts and methodology,”² to promote the production of spaces that include rather than exclude, but by seeing this phenomenon as a problem with a solution, we fail to see the scope and origins of the problematic itself. If we wish to align ourselves with a utopian process, to change society, we need to be paying more attention to the conditions that produce and enable the production of borders in our cities, and how these borders function to exclude. Going even further, we must ask ourselves how the production of architecture is complicit in reproducing systemic inequality.

As Keefer Dunn argues, “Altruism is right and necessary in a society predicated on fear, but we must go beyond asking ourselves ‘what can we do as architects to improve people’s lives?’ to also ask ‘what can we do as architects to end the systemic inequality that ruins lives in the first place?’”³

Moreover, if we want to orient our practice in the direction that supports movements for social change, we need to understand the struggles and barriers faced by those excluded from accessing their right to the city. It is the overarching belief and meta-argument of this work that the role of the architect, in addition to refusing to re-inscribe the violence of the border onto the built environment, is to make visible, through spatial reading, the kinds of violences that are invisible and normalized; to advocate for a different way of seeing space in relation to society.

In the spaces of the city the status quo is less efficiently reproduced because the existence of difference complicates how power is enforced or maintains a certain order. The social tensions expose the inefficiency of the system of social reproduction. In the space of the border, process by which power is enacted, represented or inscribed in space is more direct and straightforward, whereas when a border is inscribed in a public space in the centre of the city there is more potential for conflict and contradiction to reveal and resist that process. The analysis of this chapter, and effectively the thesis itself, aims to develop an understanding of the problematic of bordering. Specifically, the focus here is on the city of Paris, which is interpreted through three lenses, centred around the relationship between the past, present and future, which produce an image of the contemporary phenomenon and the ongoing utopian process. This reading of the phenomenon of migration and borders at the scale of the city identifies both the *evolution* of modes of production embedded in and mediated by the urban that alienate difference as well as *revolutionary* strategies of everyday life that impact the continuation of the status quo through the *appropriation* and *détournement* of space.

The first lens, *Perceived, the Wall & the Gate*, interprets how we see the city in the ‘Blind Field of the Present’. This lens offers a perspective of the city and the (re) production of borders within it in relation to a historical continuum. The analysis

examines the origins to the problematic in the Wall and the Gate, objects with both real and virtual conditions, and how they relate to and can help interpret the barriers and thresholds that exist in the city today.

The second lens, *Conceived, the Map & the Drift* interprets how the city is conceived, what political forces and institutions shape the borders in the city in the present, and how the presence of migration in the city navigates and exposes those forces spatially. The analysis examines the representation of the tension between forces that make up the problematic, the Map and the Drift, and how they are strategies that impose and détourne/transform order respectively.

The third lens, *Lived, the Impossible & the Possible* interprets how to see the utopian process in-between the outcomes of the conflict and contradiction of the problematic, or rather the spaces between events that reveals the transformative utopian process. The analysis examines the virtual space in between the events in the cycle of occupation, destruction and transformation of camps, this space being one of impossibility and possibility that orients toward a different society.

ENDNOTES - 3.0 PARIS. AN URBAN (R)EVOLUTION

1 Henri Lefebvre, "Urban Form," in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 130.

2 Ibid, 62.

3 Keefer Dunn, "Radical Praxis: Activism Within and Beyond Architecture," *Medium* (Nov. 13, 2016), <https://medium.com/@KeeferDunn/radical-praxis-activism-within-and-beyond-architecture-a91f9f2f8e2a>

PERCEIVED

the Wall & the Gate

This chapter will examine some historical perspectives on Paris and its development in relation to a utopian process, extracting from these perspectives a view on the ongoing transformation of the city that can be read in the material and spatial conditions. Particularly of interest is the relationship between historical objects of walls and gates and the present formations of barriers and thresholds in the city. The city's current form is the result of a continuous cycle of bordering. Many of these past borders now appear as artifacts that have different symbolic meaning and functional purpose that deviate from how they were originally conceived. This chapter looks at how the historical transformation of walls and gates in Paris was an outcome of the tensions between the political ideologies, or visions of the city these spaces represented, and how they were contradicted by social use and lived experience that imagined or required a different future condition. These changes did not occur with a single event that marked a break between the past and the present but rather occurred through a utopian process of struggle and contestation.

The Myth of Modernity

At the beginning of the 19th century Paris was still deeply impacted by its historic ties to a medieval past. These ties were inscribed in the morphology of the city and the characteristics of its social, economic and political structure(s). These conditions appeared to drastically change in 1848, which to many historians, “seemed to be a decisive moment in which much that was new crystallized out of the old.”¹

In *Paris, Capital of Modernity*, David Harvey argues, as the main thesis of the book, that one of the myths of modernity is that it constitutes a radical break with the past, instead “the alternative theory of modernization (rather than modernity)[...] is that no social order can achieve changes that are not already latent within its existing condition.”² Harvey drew this perspective from Marx and Saint-Simon who held that, “[...] no social order can change without the lineaments of the new already being present in the existing state of things.”³ The myth of modernity, that it was an abrupt break with the past and its traditions, is unsatisfactory, because it offers no explanation as to why the change happened, or from which catalysts it resulted. Harvey finds it is necessary to address these complex geographical patterns and processes at work in the evolution of Paris in order to understand the nature and trajectory of its modernization.

The motivations of this thesis share Harvey's perspective — to understand how the current material and spatial conditions of migration in the city of Paris are a result of a historical and ongoing process that is related to contemporary mode(s) of social (re)production. This process or phenomenon of the present can be understood through Lefebvre's trialectic: the myths and spatial practices of the past that remain in the present, the ideological forces shaping the present towards a particular trajectory, and the utopian process of lived social interactions with

Figure 3.2 (Opposite page) Raval, Marcel and J.-Ch. Moreux, “Plan des Barrières de Paris,” *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux 1756–1806*. Paris: Arts et Metiers Graphiques, 1945.



Figure 3.3 Arcades. Photo by author, August 2016.

ideological and mythical conditions that produce a different outcome, an emergent representational space with a possible-impossible path or project towards a virtual or unknown future condition.

Harvey's reading of the historical transformation of Paris challenges the dominant and totalizing assumptions of a city becoming "modern" and instead addresses this period through a perspective that takes into account multiple lenses of reading this transformation from its materiality, spatiality, social life and economic conditions.⁴ His analysis attempts to formulate a more nuanced understanding of this period between 1830-1848 made up of an analysis of influential representations of Paris produced at that time (such as Balzac and Daumier's depictions of Parisian life in that era) as well as a materialistic study of the historical make-up of the city divided into individual chapters on topics starting with spatial relations, moves through distribution (credit, rent, taxes), production and labour markets, reproduction (of labour power, class and community relations), and consciousness formation to set the space in motion as a real historical geography of a living city.

Harvey fills out this materialistic analysis with a descriptive concern for how a 'utopian,' or rather ideologically motivated, narrative of the 19th century, manifested both consciously and unconsciously in artistic, spatial and cultural forms, intersected with real world conditions to shape the evolution of places produced by a modernizing Paris. He argues alongside other Marxist philosophers (like Walter Benjamin and Henri Lefebvre) that, "we do not merely live in a material world, but that our imaginations, our dreams, our conceptions, and our representations mediate that materiality in powerful ways."⁵ This is to say that the material conditions that emerged in the 19th century Paris were not a break with the past that reshaped a 'utopian' future, rather the changes were ideologically motivated based on an evolution of previous modes of (re)production.

Moreover, as Harvey explains:

I have much more faith in the inherent relations between processes and things than to be satisfied with that. I also have a much deeper belief in our capacities to represent and communicate what those connections and relations are about. But I also recognize, as any theorist must, the necessary violence that comes with abstraction, and that it is always dangerous to interpret complex relations as simple causal chains or, worse still, as determined by some mechanistic process. Resort to a dialectical and relational mode of historical-geographical inquiry should help avoid such traps.⁶

Harvey's relational framework for analysis of the modernization of Paris follows the path set out by Walter Benjamin and his concept of the 'dialectical image' in the *Arcades Project*.⁷ Benjamin used this dialectical way of seeing to describe the configuration of the past and the present with the political orientation of de-mystifying the process of societal transformation, particularly by exposing the dominant political and ideological forces, which naturalize capitalism, or generally the present mode(s) of social (re)production, as an instrument that shapes the collective dream or wish image of society. This is to say that within quotidian space the dominant ideologies and modes of production are reproduced and made logical, natural or rational through everyday social activity.

Benjamin's intention with the *Arcades* was to construct a "materialist philosophy of the history of the nineteenth century," that encapsulated the collective consciousness of the epoch through the use of visual phenomena.⁸ Benjamin critiqued the mode of conceptualizing history as a "inventory of humanity's life forms and creations,"⁹ because it minimizes the constant effort

of society in the production of these commodities and spaces that shape its own existence. He used a method of creating a ‘dialectical images’ to reveal or interpret the unconscious or invisible processes and forces of the production of French society in the 19th century. These images were presented as a series of ‘convolutes’ that assembled multiple descriptions of related material conditions and spatial phenomenon identified within the epoch.

As Rolf Tiedemann argues, Benjamin’s ‘dialectical image’ is a method of mythical reconstitution of history: “dialectical thinking had the task of separating the future-laden ‘positive’ element from the backward ‘negative’ element, after which a new partition had to be applied to this initially excluded, negative component so that, by a displacement of the angle of vision a positive element emerges anew in it too — something different from that which was previously signified.”¹⁰

This is also effectively Henri Lefebvre’s approach of the trialectic, with the conceptual and theoretical process being the identification of a virtual object of the present phenomenon of urbanization as opposed to seeing this process in a re-reading of history. The argument of this thesis is that by looking at the lived conditions in the present you can identify tensions that represent a division or a contradiction between the logic and order to space. The lived conditions in everyday spaces, beyond reproducing dominant power and logical order, also can be representational of a different space, a possible-impossible future.

By viewing Paris as having undergone “modernization” (as opposed to a radical break with the past) in the mid-nineteenth century it reframes ‘utopian’ or ‘visionary’ projects like the work of Haussmann as being more strategic and part of a larger imperial project that responds to and attempts to control real conditions. Also interesting is Harvey’s insistence to focus on Haussmann’s forgotten predecessors (such as César Daly), and on the ‘utopian’ visions (such as Fourier and Saint Simon) that become obsolete with the defeat of the 1848 revolution. The scale at which these projects operated, such as the phalanstery and the arcades, were in disjunction with the scale of the rapidly transforming city. Only large infrastructural projects like railroads and the Haussmann boulevards could approach this new urban condition, driven by economic and political imaginaries and forces, and create a space-time compression strong enough to facilitate faster and greater communication in the city.

This myth of a break with that past was important for Haussmann as Harvey describes:

He needed to build a myth of a radical break around himself and the Emperor—a myth that has survived to the present day—because he needed to show that what went before was irrelevant; that neither he nor Louis Napoleon was in any way beholden to the thinking or the practices of the immediate past. This denial did double duty. It created a founding myth (essential to any new regime) and helped secure the idea that there was no alternative to the benevolent authoritarianism of Empire.¹¹

Harvey’s alternative theory of modernization and Benjamin’s concept of a dialectical image are both historical materialist framings of social phenomenon on a space-time axis. The concept of a utopian process for this thesis represents an application of a similar materialist position, but instead of looking back at past social and societal change this thesis attempts to see this process as ongoing within the present. Moreover, the concept of a utopian process as a theoretical framework attempts to read both the historical context of the myth of spatial conditions and how they are being transformed or appropriated by new modes of production or




Figure 3.4 Examples of Barrières (1785 - 1789), Designed by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux. Author Unknown, Date Unknown.




Figure 3.5 Porte St. Denis (1672 - 1676), designed by François Blondel, photo by author.

Figure 3.6 Porte St. Martin (1674 - 1675), designed by Pierre Bullet (student of Blondel), photo by author.

Figure 3.7 *Turgot Map of Paris* detail of the Faubourgs Saint-Martin & Saint-Denis in the southeast isometric perspective map of the city of Paris as it appeared in 1734-1736. Drawn by Michel-Étienne Turgot.

This detail in particular highlights the border condition between city and suburb/country at that period of time, demarcated by the portes: Saint-Martin and Saint-Denis.

Figure 3.8 Champs-Élysées Arc de Triomphe (1806 - 1836), designed by Jean-Francois-Therese Chalgrin, photo by author.

power dynamics that transform their meaning and function for an ideological purpose. In addition to being appropriated by dominant power, these spaces of the present (borders being the focus of this thesis) are also appropriated by emergent social conditions (migration), which orients their symbolic meaning towards a different path not defined by an evolving mode of production and domination, but rather one of revolutionary possibility for change.

To explain this connection between Harvey and Benjamin's arguments in more detail, right now migration is perceived to be a crisis or emergency, a source of conflict that disrupts the status quo. However, as this thesis has stated earlier, this image of crisis is an ideological fabrication mediated by borders, which are used to abstract and reproduce power dynamics at multiple levels of space and society, that are often the root cause of forced migration. In a similar way to how the 19th century was perceived to be a break with the past, migration today is perceived to be a break in how social movement has occurred previously, a break which ideologically justifies the intensified and violent differential inclusion/exclusion regulated by borders and their institutions, which scapegoat irregular migration as a threat to security. In this way the phenomenon of the present and its relationship to the past and future can be read through a material analysis of borders and how they function and transform.

In the context of Paris this history of borders, the cycle of their creation, destruction and transformation has aligned with their contemporary modes of social (re)production as well as social conflict, crisis and revolution. As we will see in the following description of walls and gates, constructed events that represented radical breaks in power dynamics did not completely destroy these social divisions, rather they were (re)appropriated and transformed in meaning and function as an extension or (r)evolution of their original context. In this way these spaces legitimize their functional and ideologically driven purpose by connecting back to and preserving a myth, that myth being Paris, a city within a global context. These changes with borders in the city of Paris today, however, represent a new context for the city within an urbanizing society that will be examined in the chapter after this one.

The following reading of the *barrières* of Paris describes the historical continuum of the border within the city and the border struggles that have shaped and redefined the boundaries of the myth of Paris extending into the present.




Figure 3.9 Main building, The Royal Saltworks (Saline Royal) at Arc-et-Senans (1774 - 1779), Designed by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, photo by author.

Figure 3.10 Ornament detail expressing function, The Royal Saltworks (Saline Royal) at Arc-et-Senans (1774 - 1779), Designed by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, photo by author.

Figure 3.11 Entry gate, The Royal Saltworks (Saline Royal) at Arc-et-Senans (1774 - 1779), Designed by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, photo by author.

Figure 3.12 Plan, The Royal Saltworks (Saline Royal) at Arc-et-Senans (1774 - 1779), Designed by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, General Plan of the Saline de Chaux (Revised plan). [Ledoux, L'Architecture, pi. 16.]




Figure 3.13 Prieure et Berthault, “Barrière de la Conférence incendiée, le 12 juillet 1789,” 1802. Paris Bibliothèque national de France, Estampes. Source: Lyonnet, Jean-Pierre. *Les Propylées de Paris 1785-1788* Claude Nicolas Ledoux, Honoré Clair, 2013. 12.

Figure 3.14 Postcard of “Le Rond-Point de la Villette, vers le Canal” with bus terminal pictured, unknown author, unknown date.

The Barrières of Paris: A Historical Continuum of Borders

and Border Struggles

There have been several ring walls built around Paris. These walls were created for social, economic and aesthetic purposes to define the edges of the city symbolically and to make that edge functional. Moreover, the walls and monumental gateway entrances served as a material representations of the identity of the city by expressing the wealth and power of the city, state and ruler; establishing the division between inside and outside, between country and city, as well as in the sense of controlling the mobility of people, capital, goods and resources in and out of the city — the inclusion and exclusion of which effectively (re)produces the identity of the city.

Within and outside these walls there were, and are still today, divisions, hierarchies and stratifications of social life that result from different political and ideological forces, such as divisions between neighbourhoods, the division of the river seine between the left and right bank, and socio-economic divisions that have generally aligned wealth with West and poverty with East.

As the city expanded, due to population and economic growth, these walls were absorbed into the urban fabric, their symbolic meaning and functions changed. While the walls physically disappeared their absence remained present in the morphology or shape of the city. Often roads would take the place of the void left behind by the wall, and many artifacts of former walls and gates remained in the city — their function and symbolic meaning evolved as the city changed around them. (See fig. 3.13, 3.14)

The particular example of the *Ferme Générale* wall and the gates designed by Charles-Nicolas Ledoux are of importance to this thesis as a reading of its spatial and social transformation arguably demonstrates a complex historical utopian process full of contradiction and contestation, the traces of which are present today, and the legacy of spatial practices of bordering can be seen in the conditions of migration on the site of one of the barrières still standing.

The Ferme Générale Wall & the Propylées de Paris

The typology of the city gate or porte originates from the tradition of ancient Rome during the Augustan era where simple city gates began to be replaced with triumphal arches as a form of spectacle and propaganda to shape a perception of the city's strength and imperial power under the authority of the sovereign ruler.¹² In addition to being physically monumental in scale the ornamentation on these arches often displayed allegorical imagery of battles and conquests by the ruler.¹³ The first application of the triumphal arch in Paris was in the 1670s, implemented by Minister of Finances, Jean Baptiste Colbert, for King Louis XIV, as a series of free-standing gateways¹⁴ (See Fig. 3.5, 3.6) located just outside a new promenade that replaced the medieval walls and their adaptations up till that point, which acted as an open boundary line of the city.¹⁵ Since these triumphal gates were placed in an open free-standing condition within the city without a defensive wall, their function was no longer to serve as security apparatuses but to symbolically separate the city from the countryside.¹⁶

At the end of the 18th century, between 1785 and 1789, in the last years of the Ancien Régime, the architect Claude-Nicolas Ledoux designed and constructed sixty-two unique barrières or gates to create a new city limit. (See Fig. 3.4) The design of the wall and gates filled the void of the boundaries that were

no longer defined after the demolition of the medieval city fortifications. This lack of a defined boundary eventually made it difficult for the state to collect tolls and taxes on people and goods moving in and out of the city.

The *Ferme Générale* was organized by the King to collect taxes and tolls on his behalf for the royal treasury. This corporation would become a major factor in the accumulation of wealth from public revenue by the French monarchy before the revolution in 1789. The wall and the gates became the most prominent spatial apparatuses through which that wealth was channelled.

Ledoux was commissioned to design the tollgates, which controlled access to the city at various points along the continuous wall of enclosure. The wall was about 3.5m high and over 22km long.¹⁷ Following the interior of the wall was a 12m wide peripheral road that not only allowed for better surveillance for tax collectors but also provided an external route around the city for heavy traffic, avoiding the added congestion to internal city streets.¹⁸ Outside the wall, there was also a 100m wide no-build zone with heightened security to deter smugglers.¹⁹

Ledoux took a different approach for the *barrières* that appeared to break with this triumphal arch tradition. The origins of his experimentation with a new typology can be seen in the gatehouse entrance at the Royal Saltworks, built between 1774 and 1778. The Saltworks was a utopian vision of a model city that elevated and celebrated the architecture of industrial spaces. (See Fig. 3.9 – 3.12) The design of the entrance of the Saltworks was pavilion-like, which resonated with the design of the future *barrières* that not only functioned as a tolled entrances but also contained living quarters for the gatekeepers and guards.²⁰

Ledoux tried to elevate this gatehouse type to a monumental level, like the industrial spaces at the Saltworks, by using classical forms in modern recompositions.²¹ He referred to his *barrières* as the “Propylées de Paris.”²² As Natalie Nanton argues, his contemporary source of inspiration may have been the 18th-century French architect and archaeologist Julien-David Le Roy’s imaginary reconstruction of the Propylaea, named after the Athenian acropolis gatehouse.²³

The aesthetic represented or communicated the function of the gate (See Fig. 3.10), not as monuments to wars and conquests of the state conveying imperial power, but monuments to a vision of the city itself. When compared with the utopian plan for his ideal city of Chaux (The Royal Saltworks), Ledoux’s vision for Paris was about expanding rather than enclosing the city, the barriers were meant to function as a gateway between the city and the countryside that projects the vision of the city outward.²⁴

Ledoux’s vision, however, would not align with the actual conditions of inequality the effective border condition would exacerbate, which was illustrated by the events of the French Revolution. His *barrières* took on a different symbolic meaning, as monuments to “fiscal oppression and tyranny and were targeted as such during the first days of rioting at the start of the Revolution.”²⁵ (See Fig. 3.13) The French people did not share Ledoux’s utopian vision, and “resented these *barrières* because they were costly to construct and were put into function at a time when the city was suffering a severe economic crisis.”²⁶

During the construction of the gates, landowners in the suburbs whose properties were consumed by the project complained of feeling incarcerated within their own city.²⁷ In addition, Parisians argued about the wall’s negative ramification on their health, believing its construction diminished the amount of sunlight and circulation of fresh air into the city centre.²⁸

The *barrières* were “looted, set on fire and half demolished,” and by 1789, forty-six out of the fifty-five were significantly damaged.²⁹ Many of the *barrières* were rebuilt, and by the time the enforcement of taxation at entry was suspended on May 1, 1791 they changed once again in their social perception, from “monuments of oppression to triumphal monuments of liberation.”³⁰



Figure 3.15 Public Square in front of Stalingrad Rotonde. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.16 Stalingrad Rotonde. Photo by author, August 2016.

The Ferme Générale wall remained the city limit until 1859, and the majority of the *barrières* were demolished with the Haussmanization of Paris between 1853 and 1870.³¹ Today, only four out of the sixty-two survive: *Barrière d'Enfer*, *Barrière du Trône*, *Barrière de Monceau* and *Barrière de la Villette*.

What is interesting to note is that even though the wall and the gates had an oppressive fiscal function during the *Ancien Régime*, through their occupation and appropriation during the revolution their social value and meaning transformed, they once again became symbolic of Ledoux's utopian vision for Paris, or rather an evolution of that vision in a context transformed by their original presence. Bertrand Barere de Vieuzac, a member of the committee of the new French Republic, the *Comite de Salut Public*, that decided the fate of many of the monuments of the *Ancien Régime*, argued for their preservation and transformation into monuments commemorating the events of the Revolution.³² He stated, Paris would be called the "city of one hundred gates" with each signifying "a triumph or revolutionary epoch."³³ This inverted meaning of the gate relates to this underlying theory within the thesis that social struggles can (re)appropriate sites and spaces of oppression or at the very least reveal through their presence the direct conflict or contradiction of their ideological function.

While Barere's vision wasn't carried out, one of Ledoux's *barrières* was reconstructed in 1945 to act as a monument to the battle of Stalingrad in WWII and also served as a bus terminal (See Fig. 3.14), and in 1987 the area around it was revitalized by architect Bernard Huet as a public square with the former *Barrière de la Villette* as the focal point.³⁴ (See Fig. 3.15, 3.16)


The *Barrière de la Villette* is one of the four gates designed by Ledoux that remains in the city. Once a tollgate, a symbol of the accomplishments of the revolution, an artifact leftover in the urban fabric, renamed as a historical architectural monument to the battle of Stalingrad, it has now become a point of struggle, a site of the border in the city. This historical wall and gate is not only important context for this thesis for what it can teach us about the production and transformation of space in the past. In the present, a remaining artifact has become the nodal point of the migrant encampments in Paris. This suggests that the border has not entirely disappeared from the city, rather it has been transformed. This lens offers a perspective of the city and the contemporary (re)production of borders within it in relation to a historical continuum that will be extended into the present in the next chapter.

ENDNOTES - 3.1 PERCEIVED, THE WALL & THE GATE

- 1 David Harvey, "Introduction: Modernity as a Break," in *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 3.
- 2 David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity*, 1.
- 3 Ibid, 16.
- 4 We can see this myth of modernity perpetuated today with visions of urban transformation that imagine a future Paris not as a capital of modernity but a capital of capital itself, a cosmopolitan centre in market globalization.
- 5 Ibid, 18.
- 6 Ibid, 18.
- 7 See: Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- 8 Rolf Tiedemann and Walter Benjamin, "Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the Passagen-Werk," in *The Arcades Project*, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 929.
- 9 Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, 14.
- 10 Ibid, 936.
- 11 David Harvey, *Paris, Capital of Modernity*, 10.
- 12 Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery: Considering Claude-Nicolas Ledoux's *Barrières* as Gateways Between the City and Countryside," *Queens University* (February 2007), 35.
- 13 Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 13.
- 14 Porte Saint-Antoine (1671-1672), Porte Saint-Denis (1672-1676), Porte Saint-Bernard (1673-1674), and Porte Saint-Martin (1674-1675).
- 15 Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 13.
- 16 Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 39.
- 17 Anthony Vidler, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux: Architecture and Social Reform at the End of the Ancien Regime*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1990) 211, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 5.
- 18 Vidler, Anthony. *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux: Architecture and Social Reform at the End of the Ancien Regime*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1990), 210, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 5.
- 19 Michel Gallet, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux 1736-1806*, Paris: Picard (1980), 21, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 5.
- 20 Spiro Kostof, *The City Shaped*, London, UK: Thames and Hudson Ltd. (1991), 268, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 39-41.
- 21 Ibid, 43.
- 22 Ibid, 39.
- 23 Ibid, 44.
- 24 Ibid, 27.
- 25 Ibid, 63.
- 26 Ibid, 63.
- 27 Ibid, 6.
- 28 Ibid, 6.
- 29 Anthony Vidler, "The Rhetoric of Monumentality: Ledoux and the *Barrières* of Paris," *AA Files: Annals of the Architectural Association School of Architecture*, no. 7 (September, 1984), 16, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 63.
- 30 Ibid, 64.
- 31 Ibid, 7.
- 32 Barere, Betrand. "Rapport fait au nom du Comite de Salut Public, sur la suite des evenements du siege d'Ypres, et sur les monuments nationaux environnans Paris. Convention Nationale," *Seance du 13 Messidor l'an 2*, Paris: De l'Impr. Nationale (1794), 3. quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 69-70.
- 33 Barere, Betrand. "Rapport fait au nom du Comite de Salut Public, sur la suite des evenements du siege d'Ypres, et sur les monuments nationaux environnans Paris. Convention Nationale," *Seance du 13 Messidor l'an 2*, Paris: De l'Impr. Nationale (1794), 3. quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 69-70.
- 34 Huet, Bernard "Place Stalingrad: A Project of Urban Reconstruction in Paris." *Composicion Arquitectonica*, *Art & Architecture*, vol. 9 (May, 1992), 20, quoted in Natalie Therese Nanton, "Architecture of the Periphery," 70.

CARTOGRAPHY IV



the Wall & the Gate




BARRIÈRE D'ENFER




BARRIÈRE DE CHARTRES



BARRIÈRE DE SAINT MARTIN



BARRIÈRE DU THRÔNE





THE WALLS & THE GATES OF PARIS

Figure 3.18 (current & opposite page)



Figure 3.19 *Map of the boundaries of Paris, by author.*



CONCEIVED

the Map & the Drift

The Boundaries & Thresholds of the Present

Drawing inspiration from the patterns reflected in the historical events that transformed the ‘Wall’ and the ‘Gate’ typologies, this chapter will examine contemporary examples of urban spaces that function as boundaries or borders. Moreover, the chapter will explore emergent thresholds or gateway conditions revealed by the tension between these urban ideological strategies that impose order on the map of Paris and strategies of life, which ‘détournes’¹ or reimagines the map of Paris, through what this work interprets as a ‘psycho-geographic’² method of ‘drift,’³ to reveal an ongoing utopian process occurring in the city today.

The present urban formations of boundaries and borders functionally and strategically control mobility and life in the city and correspond to the politics and power dynamics of a local, national and global context of uneven geographical development. The first part of this analysis, *The Map: Topologies of the Urban Phenomenon*, examines, the Boulevard Périphérique as well as the ‘banlieues’ as two expressions of contemporary boundaries that represent the present urban phenomenon. These examples, interpreted in relation to their symbolic origins as well as the political conditions that make them dominant or “hegemonic projects,” represent a pattern of ideological urban (r)evolution(s) to counter, control and disperse divergent social movements born out of inequality.⁴ One could view these patterns as a part of a historical and ongoing cycle of “counter-revolutions” imposed on urban space and life through the planned renovations, expansion and intensification of these border conditions.⁵ Moreover, these transformations often appear under the guise of making the city “better,” but their underlying logic of structural violence and control of mobility is exposed by the presence of life, which interrogates the inherent paradoxes and contradictions of these so-called ‘utopian’ visions; life that asks the question: “better for whom?” The *Grand Paris* project is examined to look at how the logics that govern the production of borders in urban space in the present extend into speculations on the city’s future development, how architecture plays a role in this process, and how the ideology behind this vision for the city uses bordered space to differentially include/exclude life.

The second part of this chapter, *The Drift: Encampment as a Psycho-geographic Détournement of the Urban Phenomenon*, uses the analysis of the patterns of uneven development in the contemporary examples of urban boundaries in Paris to inform a perspective on the tensions between the spatial conditions of makeshift (im)migrant encampments on the streets of the city in the past five years. The work argues that these encampments crystallize and condense the spatial and temporal conflicts that are continuously occurring at various boundaries of the city as a part of the urban phenomenon. Moreover, these encampments connect to the struggles at borders that control movement globally. These spaces are not the same or directly comparable but a part of a relational network of bordering conditions that express logics of social division and spatial domination as a part

Figure 3.20 (Opposite page, top) *Carte du département de la Seine indiquant les modifications de circonscriptions territoriales nécessitées par l’extension des limites de Paris*, Charles de Mourguès Frères, 1859.

Figure 3.21 (Opposite page, bottom) *New Babylon-Paris*, Constant Nieuwenhuys, 1963.

of the contemporary phenomenon of planetary urbanization and social (re) production. The camp is not an exception to the rule or logic of this urbanizing society; rather, it is another border technology that controls the possibilities and mobility of life as an essential property of this phenomenon. However, what is exceptional about these encampments is that they are increasingly proliferating at the hearts of cities like Paris, which are the centres of the social reproduction of the urban phenomenon. The presence of camps reveals a gap between the myths of cities like Paris and the reality of inequality that upholds these myths. The political conditions of life in these spaces, therefore, can inform us about the possibility of bridging solidarities between different social struggles and movements that experience and are affected by the structural violence of borders, both locally and globally.

The idea that a city, as a global cosmopolitan centre, brings together difference is a perspective or myth that is blind to the structural conditions that spatially and temporally divide and enclose to maintain and reproduce a certain kind of asymmetrical urban condition. Rather than bringing together differences, cities are increasingly adopting “neo-colonial” and “neo-imperial” tactics to impose order over life.⁶ These conceived spaces of the city functionally stratify and exploit the division of life through political and economic mechanisms of “uneven development.”⁷ Moreover, these spatial representations of hegemonic and dominant power aesthetically communicate a spectacle or illusion of border enforcement, which effectively legitimizes and reproduces the myth of the city that strengthens the sources of power.

The analysis seeks to demystify these spaces and develop an understanding of the underlying, invisibilized structural violence and political factors behind the perception of the presence of migration as a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’ in the city. To also identify the political significance of people in these spaces beyond their stigmatized perceptions as a humanitarian or security problem. To understand their use of spaces designed to keep them out as a condition that reveals a tension between ideology and reality, a tension that has the potential for generating a possible-impossible transformation as a utopian process.

Moreover, this tension arises from the massive gap between the alleged principles of cosmopolitanism, of the French Republic or Empire and the lived inequalities and barriers people experience when trying to access the promises of this illusion. Therefore, the problematic of this contemporary mode of social reproduction is that it is blind to, fails to or is purposefully unwilling to address these inequalities that result from its inherent contradictions. The city does not come to terms with the symbolic origins of this conflict in its colonial past, and persistent neo-colonial present, which is the true origin of the ‘crisis’ and the current “spatiality of injustice.”⁸

The work aims to illuminate the topological formation of borders on the Map of Paris and describe how this urban spatial-temporal order reflects a global world-order. In addition to observing the evolution of boundaries that counter certain conditions of life with multiplying and abstracting technologies, which fix it to a path of movement, the work views life itself as continually pushing against, through and around the status quo; finding new ways to survive and resist the conditions of displacement, dispossession and dehumanization these borders produce.

In this way, the urban level mediates and mixes the top-down forces and strategies imposed by dominant hegemonic powers as well as the bottom-up social movements that respond to the spatial conditions that represent those forces.⁹ This tension is the utopian process, and the work describes this process through a method theoretically defined by Guy Debord as the ‘dérive’ or ‘drift’ to reinterpret the map of the city through the ‘psychogeographic’ lens that focuses on life that

has been excluded from its narrative. This life has been forced into bordered and controlled spaces, yet its presence ‘détournes’ these spaces by developing ‘emergent strategies’ to create the potential for new ‘situations,’¹⁰ thresholds and possibilities for survival within/against/beyond the contemporary mode(s) of social (re) production that shape the city and society.

In summary, the *Map* describes the contemporary ideological inscription of order onto Paris, the *Drift* describes the utopian process of navigating that order.

The Map: Topologies of the Urban Phenomenon

The organization of the city, its urban form, is a result of years of history, politics and design that impose so-called ‘utopian’ visions and urban monuments onto the reality of the city to control its development. The previous chapter looked at the historic transformation of the walls and gates of Paris and how they were reshaped and redefined by the political tensions between the ideologies of power and lived social struggles. Today, the borders of Paris are not as defined or visible as the walls, which enclosed the city in the past. However, the new borders and boundaries are no less present in the structuring of life in the city. Instead, they have progressively become more abstract and multi-functional — “differentially excluding” life through various technologies of spatial-temporal division and enclosure, which create, “the uneven accessibility of various areas of society [to migrants], but leaves these areas themselves intact and discrete.”¹¹

The conceptual and material organization of space and society in the city functions to reproduce the status quo in different dialectical ways. Different topologies of this urban phenomenon can be seen on the map of Paris. One such topology describes how the shape of the city radiates from the centre to the periphery, and from the periphery to the centre as a continuous cycle of spatial (re)production. To generally describe this dialectical relationship between the centre and the periphery in the present: neo-colonial/imperial¹² and neoliberal practices expand the centres of the global market economy by extracting wealth, labour and resources from impoverished nations. These practices result in the displacement and dispossession of their populations through the creation of direct and structural conditions of violence and insecurity through forces of conflict and environmental change. Displaced populations are then forced to migrate into cities to survive, which have become centres of wealth and resources because of their expansion of influence on peripheral states. These cities then reproduce these bordering processes to internally mirror this externalized cycle of displacement, pushing people away from the centre through spatial tactics of expulsion such as encampment, incarceration or gentrification that then reshape the conditions of the centre and the periphery.

As Henri Lefebvre argues:

*Formerly, the entire metropolitan land area played a central role with respect to the colonies and semicolonies, sucking up wealth, imposing its own order. Today, domination is consolidated in a physical locale, a capital (or a decision-making center that does not necessarily coincide with the capital). As a result, control is exercised throughout the national territory, which is transformed into a semicolony.*¹³

It could be argued that this dialectical relationship between the centre and periphery manifests through a process of “implosion-explosion”¹⁴ that controls mobility and life and activity in and out of the city through fragmentation and uneven development as a process of re-concentrating power in the centre.



Figure 3.22 La Villette. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.23 La Defense. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.24 Les Halles. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.25 Pompidou Centre. Photo by author, August 2016.

This is perhaps an extension of the phenomenon described in the diagram of “power over life/power of life” outlined in the chapter on encampment in Calais. The city can read as a biopolitical, state-building project that expands the dominance of the state through the control of life represented by the design and enforcement of spatial-temporal divisions and enclosures. This is the city “making live and letting die,” making a vision or identity of the city stronger by exploiting and extracting the resources of life elsewhere. The city can also be read as a necropolitical, neo-colonial project that alienates and abandons life. This is the city “making die and letting live,” expelling life from centres to the periphery to make the city identity or myth stronger. This is reflective of the dual trajectory of urban planning, the logic of ‘social mixing’ and cosmopolitanism that creates life through the control of population, life in the dominant image of the city, and the logic of ‘urbicide’¹⁵ and urban ‘renovation,’¹⁶ which expels life from the centre, creating social insecurity or biological death. In this way, the view that the city as purely a space of eternal economic growth is blind to the processes of exploitation, extraction and alienation that maintain that image, as an ongoing process with the origins in primitive accumulation.¹⁷

What we are witnessing today in Paris is the spatialization and territorialization of this dialectical condition between the centre and the periphery. Two border examples, the Boulevard Périphérique and the ‘banlieue’ reflect the logics of this dialectical process as spaces of urban division (reflecting neo-imperial processes) and urban enclosure (reflecting neo-colonial processes), and the third example of the planned Grand Paris project highlight the extension of these processes into the future development of the city and “urban society.”¹⁸ Each border condition embodies a strategic plan to “improve” and strengthen the dominant image of the city, but there are many complex and hidden exclusionary logics invisible in the design of these spaces and their relationship to global socio-political and economic forces. These examples are highlighted to identify patterns of this urban phenomenon that can be seen in relation to the patterns of spatial control of migration in the city today in the second part of this chapter.

Boulevard Périphérique, or Urban Divisions

Perhaps the most apparent border condition in the city is the Boulevard Périphérique, a highway ring road that separates the centre from the suburbs, that is considered to be the contemporary equivalent of the fortified walls that used to enclose the city.¹⁹ The boulevard specifically replaced the Thiers fortifications, built in 1844, that previously occupied the same space. This boundary would not appear to be as defensible as were the historic walls, but it effectively participates in an evolution of the function of its historical counterpart, signifying an extension of the border function into the present urban fabric.

The boulevard, beginning construction in 1958, was a part of a post-war modernization plan for Paris conceived by Charles de Gaulle. This plan also included the mass demolitions of the neighbourhood of the Marais as well as the new constructions of les Halles and the Pompidou centre as new symbols of modernity. However, this utopian vision for the city failed to include everyone in the reimagining of the city centre and its limits. These massive urban renovations also came with direct and indirect population displacements. Many working-class, impoverished, marginalized and racialized people were effectively removed from the 13th, 14th and 15th arrondissements and pushed out toward the peripheral ‘banlieues’ or suburbs. With these displacements came the introduction of social housing beyond the city limits to contain the population the centre wanted to exclude. These spaces had their own strategic bordering function and associated social problems, which will be elaborated on further into this chapter.

Following the destruction of the Thiers wall in 1920 and before the boulevard construction the vacant land was claimed by squatters and effectively became a threshold, a representational space that served the needs of people the city had left behind.²⁰ More recently, the ‘Petite Ceinture,’ the former circular rail line on the interior of the Périphérique boundary experienced a similar situation with makeshift encampments.²¹ These examples show how voids in the urban fabric can transform from spaces without visible meaning into centralized spaces that represent a collective social struggle and the need for an alternative. Effectively the demolition of the border wall opened up the possibility of a new threshold for social life. However, this condition did not last long, or rather, it was effectively moved elsewhere.

The boulevard was planned along this land as a solution to alleviate traffic congestion in the city and was completed on April 25, 1973, under the presidency of Georges Pompidou. It promoted mobility but created immobility by differentially controlling or allowing access to the city. In a study of the new “Fortress Paris,” Leopold Lambert illustrates how the entrances to the city along the boulevard have differing characteristics of accessibility, and that those differences often align with the socio-economic conditions of their adjoining neighbourhoods.²² (See fig. 3.37) In the western and wealthier suburbs, for instance, the boulevard goes underground, whereas in the poorer neighbourhoods the boulevard is either above or cuts through the urban fabric. These conditions can be seen as welcoming or defending the entrances to the city, a way of protecting the identity of the city centre from the outer suburbs, a more subtle way of bordering. This border not only symbolically communicates a vision for the city it also communicated who is or is not included in that vision, spatially represented by the asymmetry of access, which further perpetuates the cycle of social inequality and uneven development.

Banlieues, or Urban Enclosures

Much like the Boulevard is connected to a historical continuum of urban division around the limits of Paris, the ‘banlieues’ are the extension of a historical spatial practice of ‘enclosure’ into the present. As Mustafa Dikeç argues, “the history of *banlieues* is inseparable from the history of France’s post-war economic and political transformations; nor is it separable [...] from France’s colonial history. [...] it is important to see them in a context of larger political and economic dynamics, and in relation to France’s colonial past and post-colonial [neo-colonial] present.”²³

‘Banlieue’ means suburb but is generally a term that has a negative association with low-income neighbourhoods that have characteristic social housing buildings in the form of tall tower structures, and long block buildings. These suburbs were primarily constructed during the “trente glorieuses” — “the 30 years of economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization from the end of the Second World War to the economic crisis of the 1970s.”²⁴ The majority of the social housing projects or “grande ensembles” were built in the 1960s as a fast and affordable solution to the housing problems created by the accelerated urbanization, such as the “shanty towns” or “bidonvilles” that occupied the void of the demolished Thiers wall.²⁵ Moreover, these housing estates were built in the periphery of the city because this land was affordable.

While many of the designs for social housing were emblematic of modernist utopian visions they were designed with an exclusionary logic embodied in the architecture, urbanism and infrastructure that cut these communities off from each other, limiting social life, cutting them off from the city centre and limiting accessibility into the city. Exclusion also took the form of the limited maintenance of these buildings over time that has contributed to their deteriorating conditions. These conditions have had the effect of instigating a new




Figure 3.26 Place Pablo Picasso, Noisy le Grand - Núñez Yanowsky Manuel. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.27 Picasso Towers, La Defense - Émile Aillaud. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.28 Le Palacio d'Abraxas, Noisy le Grand - Ricardo Bofill. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.29 Parc des Courtilières - Émile Aillaud. Photo by author, August 2016.



Figure 3.30 Development: De L'Entrepôt au Quartier! Boulevard MacDonald Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.31 Development: Rosa Parks. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.32 Development: Ville de Pantin. Photo by author, August 2016.

round of redevelopment and expulsion by devaluing the land again and creating the potential for “valourizing” it through renovation.²⁶

Today, these neighbourhoods or ‘cités’ host, among others, a significant population of (im)migrant and first/second generation French North and West Africans. The exclusionary logics embedded in the spatial forms of the banlieues is deliberate to prevent the life within these suburbs from changing the image and myth of the city by trapping it within an enclosure. In many ways, Paris, as the capital of France, projects an image of what French nationalist identity is, so while the principles of liberty, equality and freedom are the values/myths under which that identity is defined, those principles only apply to those who can get access to the centrality of the city.

The banlieues territorialize issues of structural racism, inequality, asymmetries, and otherness. In this way, the fear of the racialized (im)migrant other, that is rooted in a colonial imaginary has today become a scapegoating tactic for a perceived security or terror threat. This can be seen particularly in the case of the SUZ (Sensitive Urban Zone) map being misidentified during the Paris attacks as ‘no-go zones,’ areas of potential threats.²⁷ (See fig. 3.38) This map, rather, identifies the inequality between neighbourhoods in Paris and the suburbs, areas for potential ‘urban renewal,’ a kind of border that is less visible than the defined peripheral edge of the city limits but is effective in creating social division and exclusion. Even amongst ‘cités’ there is massive inequality between the West and the North. The West being home to the financial hub of la Defense (See fig. 3.23) and the North being a more industrial / low-income residential area.

The way these banlieues or ‘cités’ are designed, to create inequality through complex and structural ways that is represented in the forms of the buildings, neighbourhoods and their connections, through transit. These ‘cités’ deny their inhabitants a right to the city, a right to the centrality of the city and its resources and this contributes to adverse social conditions and structural problems, mass unemployment, discrimination and repression.

However, despite the “spatiality of injustice”²⁸ in these spaces they also contain life which expresses a counter-logic against these conditions, and signals perhaps new political formations emerging in the banlieues. Particularly, looking at revolts in 2005, when tensions between the order and the struggle were at their highest this conflict also expressed the desire for an alternative, a change, which emerged from the struggles of the people living in the banlieues themselves, but also connected to struggles elsewhere.

Grand Pari(s), or Urban Alienation

The production of new social divisions, borders and boundaries in Paris does not signify independent breaks between the past, present and future, rather these imposed visions for the city are always in response to a perception of social difference, rooted in a historical continuum, and an ideological justification for that social condition to be dispersed, divided or displaced over and over again to reproduce the myth of the city and logics that justify the exclusionary spatial phenomena representing dominant imaginaries of power.

The Grand Paris plan or ‘Métropole du Grand Paris’ first proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy on 2007 and written into law in 2014, is a new comprehensive master plan and project to expand the boundaries of Paris once again — to re- envision the administrative structure and urban form of the city and the suburbs as one all-encompassing metropolis. However, this plan does not represent an inclusive ‘utopia’ for everyone in the city. The promise of eternal economic growth through urbanization blinds one from seeing the exploitation and alienation of social life that is an inherent part of producing this vision for urban transformation.

Sarkozy launched the project, not with overarching policy or plan to guide the process of urban transformation, rather he created a speculative architectural competition, named the Grand Pari(s) (a play on Paris and 'pari', to place a wager or bet²⁹) to orient the vision of a future Paris. This project gambled on the potential of imaginative architectural representation to create regional unity and mask an underlying reality in which urban development fundamentally results in the dispossessing of certain inhabitants in the city who are perceived to weaken this conceived unifying identity. In many ways, this competition created a *tabula rasa* over previous plans for the city created by the Île-de-France and local communes. Grand Paris contradicted the research and critique these plans represented, although having flaws of their own, and instead opened the door for a new form of centralized state governance and capitalist speculation to drive development.³⁰

The Grand Pari(s) competition projected a spectacle of a future eternal economic growth and urban expansion. Ten star-architects were bought on to contribute to this spectacle by visualizing and diagnosing this utopian future of the city. Competitions are a common practice in France, with some of the more famous examples being the Centre Pompidou, the Institute du Monde Arab and Parc de La Villette.³¹ (See Fig. 3.22) However, Grand Pari(s) was not just a discrete city-scale project, but rather, a mega urban-scale project, a neo-Haussmanization³², that connected processes of urbanization with the world-ordering strategy of turning Paris into a centre of the global economy.³³

While many of these design concepts were nuanced in their analysis and diagnosis of the present, the competition itself was more of a propaganda measure as the outcome was already pre-determined.³⁴ The competition naturalized and justified neo-liberalization of growth in the city³⁵ by creating an illusion of a democratic and flexible process³⁶, while masking the underlying structural violence and socio-spatial injustices upon which growth is built. As Theresa Enright argues, "While the *Grand Pari* creations provide new and innovated ways to see the city, the conditions of such creativity mean that they are put into the service of a state-sponsored ideology of mobilizing space for capital gain."³⁷

Moreover, these representations did not break from the traditions of urban growth that have resulted in the exploitation and alienation of social life, instead they contributed to an evolution of the abstraction, fragmentation, and depoliticization intrinsic to this process. The logic of accumulation represented spatially through disciplining, controlling and displacing populations deemed incompatible with the 'vision' of the city and the French Republic is carried forward today with urbanization in relation to a global context. In this way, the architect or urban planner plays a symbolic role in this process of reframing and abstracting the ideologies behind urbanization by masking them with reifying aesthetic representation, as Enright argues, "the very notion that Paris *could* look very different from the way it does today is a critical manoeuvre that is necessary to spur change."³⁸

Part of the logic behind the plan was to introduce a new urban identity for the city, and this included transforming the suburbs which were perceived to be a source of conflict. Two years after the revolts in the banlieues, Sarkozy's plan represented a counter-revolt to control the conditions of life that organized collectively against the state. In this way, the Grand Paris plan and its inherent problems and exclusions are representative of a "counter-revolutionary"³⁹ project that designs the de-centralization of urban life in areas perceived to be a potential threat to the status quo of social reproduction. In this way, mega-projects and large urban renovations⁴⁰, "de-democratize city building"⁴¹ and entrench spatial-temporal divisions and enclosure conditions born out of neo-colonial and neo-imperial logics and driven by late capitalist modes of accumulation, in the built



Figure 3.33 Development on Boulevard Macdonald near Rosa Parks Station. Photo by author, August 2016.

Figure 3.34 Development on Boulevard Macdonald near Rosa Parks Station. Photo by author, August 2016.




Figure 3.35 Grand Paris. Rogers Stirk Harbour + Partners. 2008-2013.

environment to reproduce “social and spatial injustices.”⁴²

Part of implementing these globalized neoliberal strategic plans is the effort of disrupting places and turning them into spaces. Mixed-use zoning is one such strategy that operates under the illusion of “social mixing”⁴³ and desegregating neighbourhoods of low socio-economic status like the ‘banlieues,’ but have the effect of “colonizing”⁴⁴ these places. Enright argues, the problem with this process of urbanization is that, “Defining the global [city] solely in terms of flows of capital and world-city status misses other important shaping mechanisms such as colonization, labour, social networks, informal economies and everyday practices that also contribute to the construction of metropolitan Paris.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, she states, “what the architects fail to adequately address is an account of how the global metropolis is itself productive of inequalities, and the more fundamental and structural ways in which uneven development is created through public and private investment.”⁴⁶

In this way, the urban is a dynamic medium with inherent borders and social exclusions that challenge those borders. It is conceived to defend against threats to the mythology and the ideological logics used to justify or legitimize it are represented by the internalized bordering processes that alienate life and difference from the centre. The Grand Paris plan represents not only proposed spatial conditions for eternal economic growth, but also what that growth looks like, informed by logics of differential exclusion and inclusion. In other words, architecture and speculative urban visions of the future are used as counter-revolutionary forces to secure a perceived image of the city and promote a certain direction for growth through spatial injustice. The following section takes these lessons and uses them to identify the tension between the counter-revolutionary process of bordering in the city and the production of new thresholds of resistance.

These patterns of dispersion and centralization in the uneven development of the urban fabric of Paris are visible in the patterns of (im)migration in the city in recent years. The city and state wants to maintain a centralized identity and push contradiction to the periphery. The existence of camps is a result of the city not accepting or including (im)migrants in the city, limiting their access to the right to the city. If the city truly did embrace difference, the camp, as a spatial bordering typology, would not exist. So by virtue of the camp’s existence a tension is revealed between the current dominant modes of social reproduction expressed in processes of urbanization, and the conditions of life that are excluded.

In this way, the utopia of the city is a revolutionary process, composed of social revolutions against the restrictive plans imposed on the order and counter-revolutions that reproduce and expand and abstract those borders. It is an ongoing cycle that connects to the similar processes occurring elsewhere in the world. As Stefan Kipfer argues, “[...] Lefebvre’s understanding of urban revolution as a global convergence of struggles against neo-imperial capitalism, a convergence deeply feared by the architects of counter revolution [...].”⁴⁷

The new borderland has increasingly become the streets and the public spaces of the city, where the conflict between myth and reality is most legible. These spatial practices represent “counter-revolutionary strategies of ‘recolonization’ in the specific racialized and neo-colonial sense of the term.”⁴⁸ Destruction of the self-made infrastructures and socio-spatial relations of resistance relates to the colonial expansion of territory of domination and exploitation. These populations are dispersed and decentralized from their self-made centres, then put into new controlled enclosures such as public housing, incarceration, or racialized social space. This process reflects and reproduces a neo-imperial world-order, thus its critique is multi-level, the struggle for the right to the city connects struggles near and far.




Figure 3.36 Diagram of the historical process of détournement, Henri Lefebvre

The Drift: Encampment as a Psycho-geographic Détournement

of the Urban Phenomenon

Détournement is not yet creation. It prepares the way for it, appropriation moves forward. [...] At the moment of détournement, new aspirations appear, transposing the earlier form whenever it reveals its limitations in the face of new practices and languages. At a given moment, détournement exhausts itself, and the form that has been used collapses, either because something new has been created or because the decline overwhelms its creative capacity [...]. The variations on the form, the new combinations and their elements, no longer satisfy demand. This is (generally) followed by production, the utopian moment. It is a reactive utopia, however, for the new occupants of the old space imagine that they can adjust to it, adapt it or adapt themselves, introducing modifications that appear extraordinary to them and that later are shown to be negligible. At the same time, they project transformations, and one day utopia is embodied in an innovative spatial practice. [...] Détournement assumes that space (the edifice, monument, or building) possesses a certain degree of plasticity. A hardened and signified functionality prevents détournement by fixing space, by restricting it in the form of a sign-thing. [...] As a transitional, functional, and paradoxical moment, détournement is as distinguished from conservation as it is from creative production. During an interim moment, it marks the period when domination ceases, when dominated space becomes vacant and lends itself to other forms of domination or a more refined appropriation. When détournement is too successful, it becomes stabilized and, as a result, the possibility of new production implies a kind of failure of détournement. Although necessary, it is no longer sufficient once the requirement for novelty appears through the confrontation of practices and languages. An illusion of the historical process could be represented as follows: (See Fig. 3.36)

— Henri Lefebvre, *Toward an Architecture of Enjoyment*⁴⁹

In the second half of this chapter on the contemporary boundaries and thresholds in the urban fabric of Paris, the work moves on to examine the phenomenon of (im)migrant encampments on the streets of Paris over the past five years. The first part of this chapter was set up to frame these encampments in relation to the urban phenomenon, described through the examples of urban divisions and enclosures related border struggles that exist in the city today as well as being a part of a historical continuum of walls and gates. The analysis takes this map of Paris and reinterprets the material, spatial and territorial conditions as representations of multi-level and multi-dimensional political forces. In a way, the Grand Pari(s) project represents a transformation of the map, an appropriation and recolonization of the urban form and alienation of life from everyday spaces that directs the urban phenomenon towards an imaginary future. This is a form of 'détournement' that reproduces power and modes of domination by creating the potential for new fragmenting and abstracting representations of the logics and ideologies behind the re-conception of space and the map. It is a moment before creation, but that potential for creation is born out of the extension of the present forms of social reproduction and domination into the future.

What is of interest is the form of *détournement* that embodies the potential for the creation of a differential space, changing the path of the future, a virtual object that emerges out of the lived strategies that negotiate or navigate the contradictions of the present as a mode of transduction. What this work will argue is that the makeshift encampments are representational spaces of a possible-impossible future that can be situated as a foil or critique of the dominant modes of social and spatial reproduction and their extension into the future.

As the earlier chapter on Calais revealed, camp space itself is not an active alternative or revolutionary model for the future. The existence of camps is a result of power structures and modes of domination that make displacement, social abandonment, exclusion and control of mobility natural or justifiable to reproduce the status quo. However, the existence of camps at the heart of Paris contrast the established norms or expectations of urban life created by the myth of the city. The proliferation of camps in this space is therefore perceived as an 'emergency' in the same way the 'migration' is perceived to be a crisis to the myth of a global Empire. The tension expressed by the proliferation of camps in European cities exposes the cracks or fallacies in the narrative of their existence. In other words, the process of societal change, or the utopian process, is made legible by life in the camps that confronts and negotiates state power expressed as a counter-revolutionary force against their 'atypical' or non-normative uses of space. It is not a utopian or revolutionary process toward a specific outcome that can be defined in the present, but a generative and ongoing process of *détournement* that exposes the contradictions of the present and prepares the way for societal change.

The work has described the historical and contemporary context of French post-colonial residents, (im)migrants, refugees, marginalized 'others' daily lives in a society structurally designed against them. Structural conditions of inequality and social division that have been materialized, spatialized and territorialized in the city through various bordering technologies embedded in multiple aspects that govern daily life. This Drift map (See Fig. 3.39) attempts to construct a new image of the city from the perspective of the life that renegotiates its borders and boundaries that contain it — examining how people create new centres or conditions of centrality outside the control and authority of the state that are representational spaces of a virtual future. These emergent spaces, strategies and methods of appropriation, refusal and resistance to forces of domination aren't alternatives, but rather, they create the potential for alternatives. Accompanying the map is a timeline of the encampments (See Fig. 3.40, 3.41), and the remainder

of this chapter will contextualize their existence and the cycle of their formation, demolition and transformation as a utopian process.

The Situationist International, a collective of artists and theorists operating out of Paris in the 1950s to 1970s, developed experimental methods to counteract and disrupt the spectacle of everyday life produced by a political economic condition that alienated life from space in cities. They tried to create alternative methods of interacting with the city by wandering around their urban environment and letting the possibilities of ambiances guide their movement:

In a dérive one or more persons during a certain period drop their relations, their work and leisure activities, and all their other usual motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there.⁵⁰

In this way, the presence of (im)migrants in the city could be considered as embodying the drift, they are in a state of displacement, being lost and excluded from the city and society. How can their presence be viewed as an emancipatory strategy, reflecting the possibility of transforming the city?

As described in the previous chapters, the camp as a border technology, has proliferated across Europe as a means to responding to an increasing number of people crossing the borders of the continent. Along their journeys people are being contained/detained and managed in camps, detention centres and processing facilities for displaced populations both within Europe as well as external transit countries. These encampments on the streets of Paris in recent years are a product of the broad-sweeping global infrastructure of borders, however, the lived experience of borders are more ephemeral, abstract and mobile than the hardline borders of nation-states.

Similar to the camps in the regions of origin for many of these refugees, the formal camps or reception and detention centres in Europe are located at the fringes, in isolated places outside of urban centres, denying people interaction with the rest of the population. The camps and holding facilities, which are opened by authorities to assist forced migrants and asylum seekers in their resettlement (or deportation), often hinder their ability to reach their preferred destination due to the strict controls placed upon them. An example of such, primarily being the Dublin II accords policies that forces asylum seekers to be biometrically identified at their first place of registration preventing them from applying for asylum in any other location, forces many to avoid interactions with the state by precariously crossing borders.

In contrast, many spaces of resourcefulness and agency for refugees and (im)migrations exist beyond state-run camps. These makeshift spaces take form in many different ways but represent an overall condition or struggle for an alternative. Calais was such an example, but as was evident in the analysis of that space, its existence was still subject to many controls.

The typology of the camp has been re-appropriated or détourned and used in an informal fashion by people as they make their way through Europe. These makeshift camps, while employing a similar strategy to an institutionalized refugee camp, are different due to their location, context and dynamics of agency in their production. This resistance to being transferred into closed facilities is an active refusal to be separated from the rest of the world, stripped of identity, humanity and suspended for an unknown period in a remote location.

This phenomenon of creating centrality in a space designed against it can be described as a form of “Resistive Architecture,” which Leopold Lambert describes in his book *Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence* as the following:

*The ensemble of architectural apparatuses defined by either, their legal status or their physicality as a resistance towards the normative establishment. These architectures are not defined by belonging to a revolutionary manifesto but rather to a state of continuous or evanescent resistance emitted directly from a system's interiority.*⁵¹

These makeshift camps are designed, fabricated and inhabited by displaced populations waiting to access hospitality of the state. What is unique or significant about the camps in Paris is that, rather than being hidden from the general public on the outskirts of the city, these camps are directly in the heart of the city. These camps appropriate the urban environment, thus, instead of hiding the 'problem' by locking people away in remote places, these spaces make the situation visible and by doing so turn it into a political issue.

While the makeshift camps may be symptomatic of the resourcefulness of the people who inhabit them or the people who extend their generosity, they nevertheless remain inadequate places for people to live. These camps are neglected spaces of improvised shelters and deplorable sanitary conditions, which cannot be praised as solutions by any means. However, unlike the closed 'detention' or 'reception' state facilities which impose isolation on those detained in them while denying them freedom, these makeshift camps are made by their own residents in resourceful acts of survival, and sometimes can become sites where displaced people recover their agency. It can be argued however, that the in-formalization of the camp in an urban setting is just a product of the border regime applied in a dispersed and self-regulated manner. However, in the argument of this thesis the process is utopian in how the conflict between the normal order of the city and the migrant population is forcing new forms of resistance to develop and reshape imaginaries.

In opposition to these spaces the state responds through bordering, policing and security tactics. These spaces compress the processes of social reproduction from multiple scales and sources of power. While state-created camps usually endure for long periods of time, makeshift camps often exist for only short periods, sometimes only to be erected again in a different form or location. The creation of these spaces appears to be completely arbitrary, since they are constituted in unexpected times and places in relation to various social, economic and political conditions. However, where there is an enforced restriction of movement, camps will form. These camps, where people wait pending their departure for their next destination, often grow rapidly, becoming visible when a bottleneck forms due to border policies which temporarily or permanently block certain migration routes. It is at this point when the camp reaches a critical population, that the state intervenes and moves people elsewhere, into detention centres or shelters. In their place, fences, blockades, increased policing and other means of what Lambert calls "Weaponized Architecture."⁵² But this weaponization is not always overtly violent, but rather, strategic structural violence that perpetuates a cycle of displacement, and guides movement through the path outlined by an infrastructure of borders.

These encampments on the streets of Paris experience the border as a mobile checkpoint (as a border technology described in *Part Two*). The police surveil, discipline and control life in the camps, and deploy different strategies to do so. The system of asylum itself is system of policing people's rights to be where they are or where they are going. The condition of limbo so many people on the streets of Paris find themselves in is due to the bureaucratic process of waiting to get status, or waiting to get to Calais to cross to the UK to repeat the process. These mobile borders are activated and deactivated, responding to the conditions in the camps, collecting data, and keeping the population in a state of

displacement, preventing them from accessing resources and their right to the city. These conditions expose the underlying logics, that the state does not prioritize the inclusion or acceptance of migrants, rather it functionally works to exclude them, to keep them mobile and insecure.

While the previous 'jungle' camp in Calais, which existed for a few years was bulldozed in 2009, the appearance of new camps in the same area shows that the pressing needs of the displaced populations are stronger than state policies. Moreover, after the final closing of the migrant camp in Calais in 2016, this tactic of makeshift camps became all the more apparent in the city of Paris. While these makeshift camps differ in the duration of time they exist, in their location, in the displaced populations which create them and in the way they are constructed and function, they are all spaces created and used by people on the move, as temporary refuge on their journeys across Europe. The people in these camps are often supported by NGO activists and by volunteers from neighbouring communities, citizens who assist the refugees through various acts of solidarity and support.

The visibility of these places changes the image of the city and forces people to confront how their everyday existence is in conflict with or causes violence for others. If camps are needed to host migrants temporarily, they should not be in remote places but part of the civic environment. Most importantly, (im) migrants in vulnerable situations, need to be able to move forward instead of being trapped in temporary spaces of suspension and control.

The existence of encampments in Paris is a virtue of the fact that the city has exclusionary policies on the acceptance of (im)migrants, asylum seekers, refugees or marginalized 'others', the logics of which are expressed in other borders and boundaries within the city. The imagined alternative of the political Left is that the camp does not exist and the imagined alternative of the political Right is that the camp does not exist. But the process of creating these alternatives is expressed differently. The (liberal) Left would imagine that the camp would not exist because the state properly takes care of refugees through humanitarian aid, giving them shelter and resources. The Right would imagine a future where the camp would not exist because it would improve its ability to prevent, deter or control their movement by strengthening borders. Neither of these visions of the future really grapple with the inherent contradictions of the present expressed by the presence of camps. The (liberal) Left does not examine the inherent contradictions of humanitarianism that discipline and control someone's access to hospitality or their right to the city. As Stefan Kipfer argues, "the forcible desegregation and dispersal of subaltern groups does not bring emancipation, but new forms of political domination."⁵³ The Right does not examine the inherent contradictions of the cycle of producing and abstracting borders that has perpetuated the conditions of insecurity, which force people to move.

Life in the camp expresses a different vision for the future, one that does not imagine what an alternative would look like based on a particular ideological perspective imposed upon that life. Instead, life in the camp should be understood as representational of a process of social development, an ongoing 'détournement,' which negotiates these contradictions expressed in space. Architects are not equipped to say what is the virtual object of this process, however they can observe spatial patterns across scales of space and time, to describe or reveal this process as ongoing and relational. This utopian process is visible in the series of encampments that have happened, not only in Paris, but across Europe, in the hearts of cities that confront the exclusionary logics, which have been territorialized and spatialized in the urban fabric.

The following and concluding chapter of this thesis constructs representational images of this utopian process oriented toward a virtual future, and identifies the moments, events or situations of *détournement* that express or reveal the critical zone between impossibility and possibility.

ENDNOTES – 3.1 PERCEIVED, THE MAP & THE DRIFT

1 “Short for ‘détournement of preexisting aesthetic elements.’ The integration of present or past artistic productions into a superior construction of a milieu. In this sense there can be no situationist painting or music, but only a situationist use of those means. In a more elementary sense, *détournement* within the old cultural spheres is a method of propaganda, a method which reveals the wearing out and loss of importance of those spheres.”

Guy Debord, “Definitions,” *internationale situationniste*, no. 1, edited by Mohamed Dahou, Giuseppe Pinot Gallizio, Maurice Wyckaert (June, 1958), <https://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline//si/definitions.html>

2 “The study of the specific effects of the geographical environment (whether consciously organized or not) on the emotions and behavior of individuals.”

Guy Debord, “Definitions”

3 Or *Dérive*, “A mode of experimental behavior linked to the conditions of urban society: a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiances. The term also designates a specific uninterrupted period of *dériving*.”

Ibid.

4 Stefan Kipfer, “Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris,” *Antipode*, Vol. 48 No. 3 (2016), 616.

5 Stefan Kipfer, “Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris,” 604.

6 See: Ibid, 616.

See: Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Colonization and the New Imperialism: On the Meaning of Urbicide Today,” *Theory & Event*, 10.2 (2007).

See: Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Postcolonial Urbicide: New Imperialism, Global Cities and the Damned of the Earth,” *New Formations*, No. 59 (2006).

7 Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space* (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2008).

8 Mustafa Dikeç, “Justice and the spatial imagination,” *Environment and Planning A* 33 (10) (2001), 1785–1805, quoted in Mustafa Dikeç, “Revolutionary Geographies: Urban Unrest in France,” *Geography Compass* 1/5 (2007), 1203.

9 Henri Lefebvre, “Levels and Dimensions,” in *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 80.

10 “A moment of life concretely and deliberately constructed by the collective organization of a unitary ambiance and a game of events.”

Guy Debord, “Definitions”

11 “[...] a situation in which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labour market) but denied access to others (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political participation)” [...] In other words, the differentiation in differential exclusion describes the uneven accessibility of various areas of society to migrants, but leaves these areas themselves intact and discrete, at least regarding issues of migrant access.”

Stephen Castles, “How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity,” *New Community*, 21 (3) (1995), 294, quoted in Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, “In the Space of Temporal Borders,” in *Border as method, or, the Multiplication of Labour* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2013), 162.

12 See: Stefan Kipfer, “Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris,” 616.

See: Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Colonization and the New Imperialism: On the Meaning of Urbicide Today,” *Theory & Event*, 10.2 (2007).

See: Goonewardena, Kanishka and Stefan Kipfer. “Postcolonial Urbicide: New Imperialism, Global Cities and the Damned of the Earth,” *New Formations*, No. 59, 2006.

13 Lefebvre, Henri. “Urban Society,” *The Urban Revolution*, Translated by Robert Bonanno. Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 170

14 See: Lefebvre, Henri. “From the City to Urban Society,” *The Urban Revolution*, Translated by Robert Bonanno. Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003. 14.

See: Brenner, Neil. *Implosions/Explosion: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*. Berlin: Jovis, 2014.

15 See: Goonewardena, Kanishka and Stefan Kipfer. “Colonization and the New Imperialism: On the Meaning of Urbicide Today,” *Theory & Event*, 10.2, 2007.

16 See: Stefan Kipfer, “Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris,” *Antipode*, Vol. 48 No. 3, 2016.

17 Perelman, Michael. *The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000. Quoted in Goonewardena, Kaniska. “Colonization and the New Imperialism: On the Meaning of Urbicide Today.” *Theory & Event*, 10.2, 2007. Paragraph 4.

18 Lefebvre, Henri. “Urban Society,” *The Urban Revolution*, Translated by Robert Bonanno. Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003.

19 Lambert, Léopold. “# MAPS /// ANOTHER PARIS: THE BANLIEUE IMAGINARY,” *The Funambulist*, January 16, 2015. <https://thefunambulist.net/architectural-projects/maps-another-paris-the-banlieue-imaginary>


20 Wikipedia contributors, “Boulevard Périphérique,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index>.


<http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jan/05/life-shanty-town-paris-abandoned-railway-petite-ceinture> (accessed September 25, 2019).

- 21 Azadé, Annabelle. "Life in the new shanty town taking root on Paris's abandoned railway," *The Guardian*, January 5, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jan/05/life-shanty-town-paris-abandoned-railway-petite-ceinture>
- 22 Lambert, Léopold. "THE UNEQUAL ACCESS TO FORTRESS PARIS: DIFFERENT GATE TYPOLOGIES FOR POOR AND WEALTHY MUNICIPALITIES," *The Funambulist*, September 16, 2015. <https://thefunambulist.net/architectural-projects/the-unequal-access-to-fortress-paris-different-gate-typologies-for-poor-and-wealthy-municipalities>
- 23 Mustafa Dikec, "Revoluting Geographies," 1195.
- 24 Ibid, 1195.
- 25 Ibid, 1195.
- 26 "Valourization' is not reducible to profit-oriented residential gentrification, however. It also describes ways of 'upgrading' social housing or providing the infrastructural, security-related or symbolic condition for future private investments."
- Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 609.
- 27 Tony Todd, "Paris mayor to sue Fox News over 'no-go zones' furore," *France 24* (January, 2015), <https://www.france24.com/en/20150120-insulted-paris-mayor-sue-fox-news-over-no-go-zones-slur>
- 28 Mustafa Dikec, "Justice and the spatial imagination," *Environment and Planning A* 33 (10) (2001), 1785–1805, quoted in Mustafa Dikec, "Revoluting Geographies: Urban Unrest in France," *Geography Compass* 1/5 (2007), 1203.
- 29 Theresa Erin Enright, "Illuminating the Path to Grand Pari(s): Architecture and Urban Transformation in the Era of Neoliberalism," *Antipode*, vol. 46, no. 2 (2014), 383.
- 30 Theresa Erin Enright, "Illuminating the Path to Grand Pari(s)," 383.
- 31 Ibid, 386.
- 32 "The Haussmannesque reforms of regional redevelopment bolster the image of the president Sarkozy himself as a leader who is willing to take risks and 'think big,' an image he has been trying to fashion throughout his time in office. He self-indulgently capitalizes on the popularity of Grand paris to entrench the idea that he alone is capable of brining the plans to fruition, the sole one capable of piloting the city into the twenty-first century."
- Ibid, 390.
- 33 Sassen, Saskia. *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Quoted in Ibid, 385.
- 34 "Rather, the architectural exhibits primarily serve to elucidate decisions already made, allowing them to be seen in a softer and less controversial light."
- Ibid, 388.
- 35 Enright argues that, "imaginative representation is crucial to urban transformation, here acting to justify and naturalize the neoliberal reforms."
- Ibid, 382.
- 36 Ibid, 388.
- 37 Ibid, 384.
- 38 Ibid, 387.
- 39 Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 604.
- 40 See: Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris"
- 41 Theresa Erin Enright, "Illuminating the Path to Grand Pari(s)," 384.
- 42 Ibid, 384.
- 43 See: Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 604.
- 44 See: Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, "Colonization and the New Imperialism"
- 45 Theresa Erin Enright, "Illuminating the Path to Grand Pari(s)," 397.
- 46 Ibid, 397.
- 47 Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 605.
- 48 Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 618.
- 49 Henri Lefebvre, "History," in *Toward an Architecture of Enjoyment*, edited by Lukasz Stanek; translated by Robert Bononno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 97-98.
- 50 Guy Debord, "Les Lèvres Nues #9," *International Situationniste* #2 (December 1958), translated by Ken Knabb, *Situationist International Online*, <https://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline/si/theory.html>
- 51 Léopold Lambert, *Weaponized Architecture: The Impossibility of Innocence* (DPR Barcelona: New York. 2012), 35.
- 52 Léopold Lambert, *Weaponized Architecture*, 35.
- 53 Stefan Kipfer, "Neocolonial Urbanism? *La Rénovation Urbaine* in Paris," 618.

CARTOGRAPHY V

the Map & the Drift





SENSITIVE URBAN ZONES

Figure 3.38

Classification of SUZ from Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Prefecture de la Region d'Ile-de-France (2006)

The 157 Paris Sensitive Urban Zones are home to 1.3 million people. These territories of city politics, if they are all affected by social precariousness, yet present diverse realities. Their characteristics are classified into six homogeneous groups, three of which are particularly disadvantaged. These latter include half of the population living in SUZ.

Group A: Very Poor
25 SUZ, 200 000 inhabitants

Group B: Many Families
21 SUZ, 330 000 inhabitants

Group C: Families, Often Single Parent
16 SUZ, 103 000 inhabitants

Group D: Families, Often Single Parent
12 SUZ, 157 000 inhabitants

Group E: Intermediate
61 SUZ, 440 000 inhabitants

Group F: Near the Average Poverty Line
22 SUZ, 109 000 inhabitants

BOULEVARD PERIPHERIQUE
Fig. 3.37 (Opposite Page)

ASYLUM ORGANIZATION

Types of organizations from MigrEurope (2017)

CAFDA (coordination de l'accueil des familles demandeuses d'asile)

Assistance for asylum seekers with family (adults and minors), pregnant women (with a medical certificate). Offer legal and administrative support for asylum applications. Comprehensive social support.

OFII (l'office Français de l'immigration et de l'intégration)
Management of regular procedures alongside or on behalf of prefectures and diplomatic consular posts; the reception and integration of immigrants authorized to stay in France for a long time and signatories such as a Republican Integration Contract with the State; Reception of asylum seekers; assistance for the return and reintegration of foreigners in their country of origin.

FTDA (France terre d'asile)

Welcomes, informs and orients asylum seekers according to identified needs. It provides them with administrative and social assistance, from the beginning of the procedure to the granting or not of international protection. It assists asylum seekers seeking care in a reception center for asylum seekers (Cada) and assists them in preparing their application. In addition, France terre d'asile assists the first-time asylum seeker in his first administrative procedures by issuing a postal domiciliation, opening a postal account to receive the temporary waiting allowance, as well as the opening of rights to the PUMa and CMU-C (access to care).

DEMIE (dispositif d'évaluation des mineurs isolés étrangers)

In partnership with the Red Cross to evaluate the situation of unaccompanied minors, and the municipality reinforced the shelter units for this group. Further, specific needs of pregnant women and women with children are addressed through specific accommodation facilities

RECEPTION CENTRES

Types of "accommodation" arrangements from la Cimade (2019)

Reception/Sorting Centre:

CAES (centre d'accueil et d'examen de situation administrative)

Combined program: accommodation and access to asylum procedure. Then quick orientation to a centre adapted to the particular situation of the applicant.

Transit Centre:

CAO (centre d'accueil et d'orientation)

Created for the evacuation of migrants from the Calais camp and now used for evacuations from the Paris camps. Assignment to residence possible.

PRAHDA (programme d'accueil et d'hébergement des demandeurs d'asile)

Reception and assistance for people applying for asylum during the Dublin procedure.

Control Centre (Asylum Applicants):

CADA (centre d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile)

Accommodation and support for people seeking asylum through the normal procedure exclusively. Assignment to residence possible.

HUDA (hébergement d'urgence pour demandeurs d'asile)

Accommodation and support for people seeking asylum through accelerated and Dublin procedures. Assignment to residence possible.

Control Centre (Refugee Status):

CPH (centre provisoire d'hébergement)

Reception and accommodation for refugees and beneficiaries of protection subsidiary.


SAS (centre de transit pour réinstallés)

Reception and accommodation for people resettled from Middle-East, Niger and Chad.

Expulsion Centre:

DPAR (dispositif de <<préparation au retour>>)

Surveillance and expulsion of persons under house arrest under OQTF.




THE MAP & THE DRIFT

Figure 3.39

MIGRANT CAMP EVICTIONS

Figure 3.40 (Index: Figure 3.41)

20-May-15	Canal Saint Martin	229
02-Jun-15	Boulevard de la Chapelle	447
05-Jun-15	Église Saint-Bernard	250
08-Jun-15	Halle Pajol	100
11-Jun-15	Caserne de Château Landon	114
19-Jun-15	Jardins d'Éole	226
09-Jul-15	Halle Pajol	203
29-Jul-15	Halle Pajol	241
30-Jul-15	Jardins d'Éole	30
04-Sep-15	Square Jessaint	134
17-Sep-15	Quai d'Austerlitz	406
17-Sep-15	Mairie du 18e arrondissement	395
02-Oct-15	Porte de Saint-Ouen	45
23-Oct-15	Lycée de Jean Quarré	1404
30-Oct-15	Place de la République	85
13-Nov-15	Place de la République	276
23-Dec-15	Place de la République	321
23-Dec-15	Place Raoul Follereau	29
08-Jan-16	Place de la République	292
04-Feb-16	Boulevard de la Chapelle	398
07-Mar-16	Stalingrad	393
30-Mar-16	Stalingrad	985
02-May-16	Stalingrad	1615
04-May-16	Lycée Jean Jaurès	277
13-May-16	Jardins d'Éole	87
06-Jun-16	Jardins d'Éole	1855
16-Jun-16	Boulevard de la Chapelle	378
29-Jun-16	Halle Pajol	1139
22-Jul-16	Boulevard de la Villette	2598
17-Aug-16	Boulevard Stalingrad	796
16-Sep-16	Avenue de Flandre	2083
04-Nov-16	Boulevard Stalingrad +	3852
16-Dec-16	Avenue du Président Wilson	322
09-Mar-17	Porte de la Chapelle	200
09-May-17	Porte de la Chapelle	1610
07-Jul-17	Porte de la Chapelle	2771
18-Aug-17	Porte de la Chapelle	2459
30-May-18	Porte de la Villette	1017
04-Jun-18	Canal Saint Martin	973
04-Jun-18	Porte de Poissonniers	400





C *Église Saint-Bernard*



D *Halle Pajol*



E *Caserne de Château Landon*



F *Jardins d'Éole*



G *Square Jessaint*



J *Porte de Saint-Ouen*



K *Lycée Jean Quarré*



L *Place de la République*



M *Place Raoul Follereau*



N *Stalingrad*




Q *Avenue de Flandre*



R *Avenue Président Wilson*



S *Porte de la Villette*



T *Porte de la Chapelle*



U *Porte de Poissonniers*



RESEARCH DRIFT

Figure 3.42



Figure 3.43



Figure 3.46



Figure 4.44



Figure 3.47



Figure 3.45



Figure 3.48



Figure 3.49



Figure 3.50



Figure 3.51



Figure 3.52



Figure 3.53



Figure 3.54



Figure 3.55



Figure 3.58



Figure 3.56



Figure 3.59



Figure 3.57



Figure 3.60



Figure 3.61



Figure 3.62



Figure 3.63



LIVED
the Impossible & the Possible

*Between the avenue Simon Bolívar and the avenue Mathurin Moreau [G.-E. Debord and Gil J. Wolman] cross a prominence where a number of empty streets become entangled, a dismaying monotony of facades (the rue Rémy du Gourmont, rue Edgar Poe, etc.). Shortly thereafter, they suddenly come upon the far end of the canal (Saint-) Martin and unexpectedly find themselves facing the impressive rotunda by Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, a virtual ruin left in an incredible state of abandonment, whose charm is singularly enhanced by the curve of the elevated subway line that passes by at close distance. One thinks here of Maréchal Toukhachevsky's fortuitous projection, previously cited in *La révolution surréaliste*, of how much more beautiful Versailles would be if a factory were to be constructed between the palace and the water basin. Upon studying the terrain the Lettrists feel able to discern the existence of an important psychogeographic hub (plaque tournante) — its centre occupied by the Ledoux rotunda — that could be defined as a Jaurés-Stalingrad unity, opening out onto at least four significant psychogeographical bearings — the canal (Saint-Martin) boulevard de la Chapelle, rue d'Aubervilliers, and the canal de l'Ourcq — and probably more.*

— Guy Debord, “Gathering of Urban Ambiances by Means of the Dérive,” (*Les Livres Nus* #9, Nov. 1956)¹

The authorities wanted to avoid repeating past scenarios in which the camps had experienced an exponential increase in just a few weeks before being evacuated. “The goal was to act as quickly as possible before the camp became too big,” explained Patrick Vieillescazes, head of the regional prefect’s office. “The issue was to find accommodations. And, at the time, we had them.” On Wednesday, some 80 tents sheltering 160 people were counted in this camp, located between the Stalingrad and La Chapelle metro stations in the 18th arrondissement. But, as often during such operations, the number of people finally taken charge of was much higher.

This evacuation is the 24th organized in Paris since June 2016, according to the regional prefect’s figures. The first, on June 2, 2015, already concerned a camp located under the La Chapelle elevated metro, a few hundred metres away. Some 500 people were evacuated. Over the last few days, on June 6, close to 1900 migrants were evacuated from the Jardins d’Éole camp, not far from the camp dismantled on Thursday. One month earlier, more than 1600 migrants were taken charge of from under the Stalingrad metro.

Faced with current overcrowding, at the beginning of the month, the Mayor (PS) of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, announced the upcoming creation of a humanitarian camp for refugees in the capital, slated to open by the

Figure 3.64 (Opposite page) Photo by author, August 2016.

end of the summer, with the site still to be determined.

— “Migrants in Paris: evacuation of a camp at La Chapelle”, *Le Parisien*, June 16th, 2016. (Translation)²

These two above quotes are descriptions of events on the same site in Paris approximate 60 years apart.

The Right to the City as a Utopian Process

The work of this thesis cyclically describes a symptomatology of the present political moment through the context of migration and borders at the scales of Europe, France and Paris. However, it should be noted that this analysis does not produce, or claim to provide, an objective solution or scientific diagnosis of the present; this project is speculative and oriented towards a possible-impossible future, one that cannot, as the work posits, be designed. Therefore, this thesis does not result in a designed practical solution to the so-called ‘migration crisis,’ but instead proposes a methodological or philosophical framework by which it may be interpreted and deconstructed. Such a framework presents the built environment as having a central stake, viewing it across scales, and contexts, as a dynamic condition made of complex, relational tensions between many forces, as opposed to being composed of static, self-referential, built forms. These forces, being political, economic or otherwise, inherently emerging outside the built environment (in the mental/conceived space of ideology and power) but are subsequently reproduced and expressed within it. Such a process links spatial production and transformation to social production and transformation, viewing spatial ordering and social use as an extension of ideological constructs. Thus, these processes of construction and destruction can be viewed as relationally utopian — processes fundamentally linked to societal transformation and criticism. In this way, one could view the proliferation of camps in the centre of Paris as an inherently spatial and social phenomenon, one that reflects the forces and evolution of the crisis at the scale of Europe, which ultimately comments on the historical continuum of bordering practices within society.

Henri Lefebvre argues we should approach the phenomenon of the present as an *oeuvre*³, a work in progress, not a product or fully formed object of scientific investigation. A process towards a virtual object.

Yet, the urban remains in a state of dispersed and alienated actuality, as a kernel and virtuality. What the eyes and analysis perceive on the ground can at best pass for the shadow of a future object in the light of a rising sun. It is impossible to envisage the reconstitution of the old city, only the construction of a new one on new foundations, on another scale and in other conditions, in another society. The prescription is: there cannot be a going back (towards the traditional city), nor a headlong flight, towards a colossal and shapeless agglomeration. In other words, for what concerns the city the object of sicken is not given. The past, the present, the possible cannot be separated. What is being studied is a virtual object, which thought studies, which calls for new approaches.⁴

There are observable patterns and conditions at the urban and lived scale of everyday life that are related to larger world-ordering forces. Architecture or architectural analysis can pose questions about the social tensions, conflicts or modes of production that constitute the present and can be used as a lens to observe the ongoing transformation of society.

Up to this point, *Part Three* has described dimensions of the urban phenomenon in Paris through the phenomena of borders, from past to present, analyzing how historical and ongoing events have registered in the material urban form and organization of social life of the city. Alongside the identification of bordering spaces (boundaries, spatial-temporal divisions, enclosures) within the urban form, threshold spaces have been analyzed as sites whose meaning and function transform through social and spatial phenomenon that conflict, contradict, and re-appropriate the border they transgress. The Stalingrad Rotonde, or the former Barrière de la Villette, is one such threshold space that has undergone many transformations throughout its history. The presence of this space in the contemporary city is a representational artifact, a material palimpsest of those transformative events, and evidence of an ongoing process. In this way, even a void, seemingly empty space, can contain an impression of the passage of time.

The last stage of this analysis connects this site to a future-oriented virtual condition by looking at it in relation to the larger forces that constitute the urban phenomenon of the present. Moreover, the analysis investigates what material and immaterial traces left on the site, orient it towards a virtual future. Similar to the way David Harvey argues that “no social order can achieve changes that are not already latent within its existing condition,”⁵ this investigation asks, what lineaments of the present orient toward a possible-impossible future? This is not to speculate on what that future will look like, but to speculate on what foundations for the future exist in the ongoing tensions and transformations of the present.

Once again, the site has taken on new meaning, this time as a nexus point of the so-called ‘migration crisis.’ It is a point where the myth of the city comes into contact with the lived effects of ideological bordering structures and systems, by which it is produced and maintained. The city has alienated life from the processes of the production and transformation of space, particularly life perceived to be different or ‘other.’ The dominant systems of power in the present perceive camps and those who dwell within them, in the city or otherwise, as a threat to a preferred narrative of the present, and conceived ‘utopian’ future. Thus, the camp’s presence in the city exposes the unsustainable and violent nature of these narratives making their existence in the city intolerable. Therefore, their presence exposes the ideology of an *impossible* utopia, which in turn, makes an alternative *possible*.

Public space, which promises a kind of democratic process rooted in a non-hierarchical social interaction or conflict, is becoming a rarity. This is to say that any space that is not already private is increasingly “colonized”⁶ by the state or other forms of power to become a space of “controlled consumption.”⁷ Moreover, any consciously designed space is always already a representation of interests of power. It controls activity by privatizing space such that it reproduces and maintains that power. Therefore, the act of occupying and reclaiming space through contradictory or differential social use, such as encampment, is a tactic of critical resistance born of necessity. This tactic can be understood to express ‘use-value’ or an inherent desire or need of social life, over ‘exchange-value,’ which maintains and reproduces the status quo.

It should be noted that camps are not to be viewed as alternatives to the status quo in and of themselves, but instead represent, in physical space and its social use, the failures and violence of the system in which they engage. By making this violence physical, we can read the problematic condition of contemporary society and are left asking the question, “why?” Why is this condition so prevalent, and why can it not be addressed? Why are the solutions presented woefully inadequate? It is in this way that encampments transform spatial representations of power into representational places that question and counter existing societal

structuring. For a brief moment, the camp challenges the preconceptions of spatial order and lays bare the undeniable and unavoidable social truth that needs to be addressed. With their construction and erasure, the city is left changed, for better or for worse.

This last analysis investigates and describes the utopian process in the situations, moments, or events that together constitute the city as an *oeuvre*, a collective and ongoing work or project that signals the potential of a different society through lived strategies that model new forms and social relations. This is particularly apparent in the moments of *détournement* that occur in-between the cycles of building/occupation, disruption/destruction and appropriation/transformation of camps. The presence of camps in the centre of the city is a disruptive event that articulates the invisible forces that make the condition of encampment manifest and speaks to larger power dynamics at work in the city. The organization of life in a collective encampment serves as a mutual confirmation of lived experiences and struggles. Those who dwell in this space have experienced the violence of borders and the state. It confirms that their struggle is not imaginary but real, and this reaffirmation of lived experience creates the potential of collective solidarity to work towards a common possible-impossible alternative — in other words, habiting or occupying space, despite its exclusionary or controlled design, is an act of engagement with the right to the city as a utopian process.

The right to the city, a vision promoted by architects, urbanists and advocates for inclusive and transformative urban life is and a concept that originated in the work on Henri Lefebvre.⁸ It is not about giving people formal access to the services of the city. For example, saying, “Refugees are welcome” is a symbolic gesture of hospitality that can mask the substantive barriers and hostilities that prevent someone from actually being welcomed. Rather, what the right to the city offers is a framework to engage with an ongoing process to expose, critique and to overcome the many ways in which access to resources of the city are continually stratified across so many exclusions, barriers, and borders. Such strata are designed into the built environment, which, in turn, mediates global level orders, asymmetries and ideologies of power. As Lefebvre states:

[...] the right to the city is like a cry and a demand [...] The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life.⁹

In this way, the right to the city is a part of a utopian process. It is a kind of social “imagination battle,”¹⁰ which can only be won by building understanding and support across the lived experiences created by these designed barriers. This includes identifying what it means to be in alliance with people who are displaced or alienated from the city and centrality, connecting their struggles with other struggles in the present, while not homogenizing solutions. Struggles for climate justice, anti-racism, decolonization, demilitarization, prison abolition, and many others, all of which are affected by forces and systems of violence designed into the spaces of the city and structures of society. The right to the city offers a way to engage with the understanding of how these struggles are connected through and across space to interrogate the underlying systems that necessitate the displacement of people and a denial of access to the resources of centrality. Therefore, this framework requires us to redevelop political, critical and transformative relationships to the utopian process of transformation found in the city. What this work aims to argue is that connections between social struggles for the right to the city in the present can be read spatially by observing patterns in spatial phenomenon and transformation.

'Jouissance,' or enjoyment, is another concept that Lefebvre also writes about¹¹, which relates to how this work frames the utopian process. By enjoying something outside of a normative desire, there is potential to create something new. In *Toward an Architecture of Enjoyment*¹², he argues that spaces of leisure are close to this process, but they also have the potential to be co-opted or appropriated by forces of domination. The migrant camp is clearly not a space of leisure or enjoyment, but a space where contemporary, normative desires and mythologies (nationalism, Empire) are embedded, abstracted and fragmented in spatial practices, which are exposed, revealed, contradicted and appropriated by alternative use. In this way, it is a space where the normative controls that limit what is possible are challenged and appropriated by differential social use. This differential use reveals something new about society, a latent and unfulfilled desire. Lefebvre talks about the appropriation of space in relation to enjoyment: "If someone succeeds in *détournement*, in turning something from its intended use, he gets closer to creation. But such redirection is not invention."¹³ People living in camps on the streets of Paris are not creating a utopia by occupying space on this site. They are creating the potential for change, for a virtual representational space, through differential use that contradicts and reveals the underlying ideologies and mythologies that produce and maintain that space — simply by persisting and refusing to become invisible.


The conclusion to this final chapter is structured around three moments of *détournement* in the lifecycle of a camp in Paris and contextualizes these phases in terms of their aesthetic, material and spatial formation as well as relating these conditions to larger political forces. As the urban phenomenon is becoming increasingly alienated from life, the right to the city is a revolutionary way to reconceptualize the evolution of urbanization that imagines the camp as a part of urban phenomenon, not an exceptional space outside of it, to see the struggles of life within the camp as transformative critiques of the present across levels of society.

Images of these spaces are accompanied by descriptions of these moments of *détournement* in their lifecycle. The accompanying text poses investigative questions about the material and immaterial conditions that influence their situations, how the site is transformed by and in-between these events, and the relationship between these changes to levels and dimensions of the urban phenomenon.

CARTOGRAPHY VI

the Impossible & the Possible





BUILDING / OCCUPATION

Figure 3.68 (Figure 3.65, 3.66, 3.67 opposite page)

Building/Occupation

Describes the *constructed situation*¹⁴ of encampment from the acts of building to the lived conditions of habiting.

What circumstances brought people here? Those who travel to Paris are under the impression that it is one of the best cities in the world, but find themselves sleeping on the streets. They have no choice; they are trapped in an administrative deadlock, where the state cannot, or will not, adequately address their needs for shelter. Many people arrived from now French-speaking countries, connected across time by colonialism and violence, where cultures and land were displaced in service of 'Empire.' While notions of imperialism may have faded from French life, its sphere of influence has not completely dissolved into time. Many here feel strange connections to France, and want to contribute to it, by being given the opportunity to make their lives better. No matter the country of origin, all come with common narratives of displacement. They come to escape war, poverty, the effects of climate change and political instability. They come from countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Syria, and Afghanistan. Many have faced incredibly dangerous conditions to arrive in Paris, and many more are hoping to make the journey onwards to the UK.

What are the circumstances that have created this situation? Social and economic crises, war, imperialism, climate disasters, connected and exacerbated across scales. These conditions have been imposed upon the people in their countries of origin, forcing their displacement and journeys towards Europe, where they meet various obstacles and barriers, as well as a repeated cycle of displacement, control and abandonment within the centres of cities. The state fails to respond in providing humanitarian aid and shelter adequately; moreover, bureaucratic processes force people to wait for extended periods without access to these services.

Why are camps in these locations? The camps are situated relatively near the asylum services, where people line up each day to get appointments. Many of those dwelling the camps are undocumented and cannot receive aid from the French government until they apply for asylum. Others are waiting in these camps until they can make their way to Calais. The majority have been located underneath the metro line #2 from la Chapelle to Jaurès stations, also including the adjacent park Jardins d'Éole and the Canal Saint-Martin.


What conditions are being detoured? An island between streets, a park, or a square are appropriated and occupied as a shelter: an encampment, a commons that serves the needs of people in these precarious circumstances of stasis, paused between and within a border. Their use of this bordered space has the potential to transform it into a threshold.

How is this space perceived in these moments? These encampments are seen as a threat to the city; spectacle, a problem to be solved, rather than real struggles and contradictions to the status quo. Moreover, the people dwelling within them are problematized as well, seen as data points, statistics, stripped of their humanity and categorized and classified by structures underwritten by hierarchies of race or status. State authorities target people perceived to be different, to have a different degree of humanity based on imagined status and qualifications of who belongs. This perceived difference is interpreted as a threat. Moreover, the difference in perception is revealed by the ways in which legality and freedom of movement are differentially constructed, the ways in which white, middle-class 'citizens' are able to move more freely or occupy public space speaks to how the border is a symbol of asymmetries of power.

What are the spatial/material conditions of the camp? Tents and basic necessities provided by humanitarian aid organizations and local volunteers. The area under the metro line provides shelter from rain and is an island between two lanes of traffic and between metro line stops. Lower traffic spaces along the canal become places of respite.

What is visible/invisible? Conditions of bare life and squalor are visible; the forces that pushed people here are not. The hopes and dreams of the people living in these spaces are made invisible; the policies and practices of the state are made visible by the control of these spaces.





DISRUPTION / DESTRUCTION

Figure 3.72 (Figure 3.69, 3.70, 3.71 opposite page)

Disruption/Destruction

Describes the constructed situation of undoing encampment from state-enforced evacuation and demolition.

What circumstances created this situation? The camps reach a capacity that is overwhelming and disrupting the conceived function of these spaces, i.e. in their limited controlled consumption as public spaces. Violence breaks out amongst people living in the camps due to interpersonal conflict, scarcity of resources, general insecurity, anxiety, confusion and fear due to the circumstances of uncertainty and tension. City residents complain, and police intervene.

Commentary on the relationship between the history of the site and the conditions today The site was a defensible fortification with an entryway that allowed or denied access to the city. The police raids fulfill that same fortifying function today, checking people's papers, sorting who should be taken to detention centres to be deported or who should be given hospitality and shelter from the state. These decisions are often made arbitrarily and unjustly.

What power dynamics do these events represent? These events represent the interests of the state to strategically control through direct interventions into a situation created through controlled abandonment.


What conditions are being détourned? The capacity of the street reaches a critical point where the state intervenes under the premise of hospitality, getting people resources and shelter, but use the police who create a criminal perception of the occupants, implying the illegality of their occupation, one that was ironically produced by state abandonment and ineptitude. The police use kettling tactics to induce fear, anxiety and confusion in order to control the people in the camps.


Where are people relocated? Often it is unclear where people are being taken. Some go to shelters if they are confirmed to have registered for asylum; others who are undocumented may be taken to detention centres.

What social perceptions are produced by these actions? The use of police creates a spectacle around the encampment that makes its occupants appear to be criminal, illegal or inhuman based on the way police and the state treat them. The police use disproportionate violence against peaceful people. In reality, these actions represent the lack of actual services to support them, which keeps them in a state of insecurity. To the political right, the presence of the police assures people of their security, dealing with the 'security crisis' that is migration. To the (liberal) political left, the raids of the camps are taking people to shelter, but this is just perpetuating the same conditions of control. The new humanitarian shelters overflow or provide inadequate care, and the cycle repeats itself.

How are the encampments removed? City sanitation services are involved in the destruction of the camps, clearing people's possessions while they are detained on the sides of the streets.

What is visible/invisible? Life is made to be visible as a spectacle of illegality and criminality; the enforcement of the border creates this spectacle by state authorities, which masks and makes invisible the structural and systemic injustice and violence. The policy of the state makes visible the open hostility towards foreigners and makes invisible their humanity.





APPROPRIATION / TRANSFORMATION

Figure 3.76 (Figure 3.73, 3.74, 3.75 opposite page)

Appropriation/Transformation

Describes the construction and appropriation of the former encampment sites into spaces of 'controlled consumption,' yet artifacts and the evidence remain from the former occupations.

What circumstances created this situation? After police raids and evacuations of the camps, the informal structures were dismantled and cleared. To prevent future encampments from re-forming in the same place, various fences and blockades were installed to keep the former public space private and inaccessible.

What power dynamics do these events represent? These new appropriations of space impose order onto the space but in a manner different from its original condition prior to the encampment. These interventions are designed for the purpose of preventing a specific social use of space.

What conditions are being détourned? The space that once contained a camp is now cleared, but the traces remain in the form of fences that block off the space from access until new inserted programming of playgrounds or basketball courts access to which is controlled by the city. Design competitions are launched to reimagine and reactivate the space at la Chapelle, transforming it into an urban farm, green-washing the events that occurred in this place, and repeating the cycle of displacement.

How is this space perceived in these moments? The perception of these spaces shifts from being accessible public space to inaccessible, controlled and surveilled spaces that differentially include and exclude based on their new programme or function. Thus the trace of the camp remains.

What are the spatial/material conditions of the sites? Different tactics are used to prevent access to these spaces. Metal fences, concrete bollards, draped fabric sheathing are examples of explicit barriers to occupations. Playgrounds and other inserted controlled social programming maintains the illusion that this is a public space while masking the ways in which this activity controls and limits the accessibility of this space to different publics.

What is visible/invisible? The people who once occupied the site are made invisible by their relocation to controlled areas of containment. What is now visible are the interventions by the state. However, the effects of the camp remain, invisible to the eye but perceptible in use.

The constructed situation or 'architecture' of these encampments is a product of a line that was imagined to be erased but was, in fact, abstracted and fragmented. This line is the border that divides society, one contained within each individual, reconstituted and redefined by our perceptions and practices as well as a collective imaginary. In an era of globalization where we are supposedly transcending borders and accelerating our interconnectivity, these encampments expose the reality that borders have become much more pervasive in society. The utopian process is the tension between the line and its undoing. The outcome is a possible/impossible future, a virtual object, a different society. Migration is a social phenomenon that reveals the potential for a different outcome, not through an invented solution or imagined design, but through lived interaction with contemporary space that embodies a desire and need for an alternative. In this way, migration is a social force that unravels the ideological threads of the border regime by contradicting and conflicting with its function. Dominant powers attempt to control this contradiction, and its potential to reveal and undo the line the border maintains. However, these innovations and abstractions of the border contain within them a reference or allusion to the phenomena they are trying to control.

This thesis is an attempt to go into the unconscious of architecture in order to understand the systems it has (re)produced, the structures and hierarchies of which architecture is generally the best representative rather than a source of opposition. This work speculates on the possibilities of a framework of analysis that uses an ideological structure or system of power and its material representation against itself, that unfolds through a shift in societal consciousness and spatial use. Migration was a specific social context that supported this discussion and investigation. However, as a framework for an alternative mode of architectural practice and critical theory, this work could be applied to many other phenomenon that challenges social order and the status quo mediated by space and its social use. The potential of this work lies in the framing that architecture is not actually an active force that can prevent or redefine anything as a solution or innovation.

Utopian visions within the realm of architecture have always been bound by something, whether it be the limits of artistic representation or social context of a particular time. Utopias are a part of societal transformation, but not as a thing to reach, rather, a way of seeing the conditions of the present to understand the process. The problem with how modernism approached utopia was that it tried to create the idea that there was a break between the past and the present and abstracted the process of social change and the ways in which the past present and future are all bound together. It tried to reach an idealized condition through the production of architecture. Nevertheless, these utopic or social drivers for change emerged out of the existing conditions that we cannot even for-see, a reality we cannot design. Utopia comes out of real lived conditions of tension and conflict; it is both a real and unreal thing, not something to aspire towards, but rather an embedded desire, something that allows us to critique and reimagine our relations to each other and the world around us. It is a constant progression toward a virtual future for which we have to keep reaching.

In this way, space is simply a palimpsest of socio-political relations and underlying motivations, whether they be in confirmation of the dominant socio-political modes of production or contradiction, through alternative needs and desires. Therefore, architects and urban thinkers/practitioners can read and interpret this social will through space and its use. We can read the shift in social use as being emblematic of a shift in societal values. Tracing this condition allows us to understand how our society reacts to external pressure through various phenomena, and its capacity to evolve along a different path. The tension between forces that impose order and those which reveal, expose, transgress, or undo order is played out in real physical space between people and their everyday lives. This

research presents a means to look behind the surface of the built environment and analyze the underlying conditions that produce and maintain it, and any possible forms of interaction it affords in turn. Space can provide evidence of ongoing social change, and architecture can be a critical lens with which to observe this phenomenon.

ENDNOTES - 3.3 LIVED, THE IMPOSSIBLE & THE POSSIBLE

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- 3 Henri Lefebvre, "The Right to the City," *Writings on Cities*, translated by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996) 149
- 4 Henri Lefebvre, "The Right to the City," 148
- 5 David Harvey, "Introduction: Modernity as a Break." *Paris, Capital of Modernity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 1.
- 6 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 21; 113.
- 7 Henri Lefebvre, *The Urban Revolution*, 2; 4; 164.
- 8 Henri Lefebvre, "The Right to the City," 147-159.
- 9 Ibid, 158.
- 10 Adrienne Maree Brown, "What is Emergent Strategy," in *Emergent Strategy: Shaping Change, Changing Worlds* (Chico, CA: AK Press, 2017) 30.
- 11 See: Henri Lefebvre, *Towards an Architecture of Enjoyment*, edited by Łukasz Stanek; translated by Robert Bonanno (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
- 12 Henri Lefebvre, *Towards an Architecture of Enjoyment*
- 13 Henri Lefebvre, *Towards an Architecture of Enjoyment*, 97-98.
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"A moment of life concretely and deliberately constructed by the collective organization of a unitary ambiance and a game of events."



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
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APPENDIX

Nowhere, to be Found

LEGEND

Date
 Events
 Project, Author
 Morphologies
 Location



TYPLOGIES

Social/Economic/Political

- ● ⊙ ⊕ Literature
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Architecture
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Urbanism

Cultural/Spiritual

- ● ⊙ ⊕ Literature
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Architecture
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Urbanism

Environmental

- ● ⊙ ⊕ Literature
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Architecture
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Urbanism

Technological/Scientific


- ● ⊙ ⊕ Literature
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Architecture
- ● ⊙ ⊕ Urbanism

Utopian Utopia
 Attainable Utopia
 Critical Utopia
 Model Utopia

NOWHERE, TO BE FOUND

Figure 4.0

This site analysis seeks to produce a historical catalogue of Utopias. Utopia is defined as a non-place. This presupposes that it is site-less in terms of being located in a physical space and moment in time. However, what this initial research attempted to uncover is the physical traces of Utopia that infiltrate everyday life by first identifying the origin of utopian ideas as a historical catalogue. Utopia explores the possibilities of architecture to provoke design and critical response through fiction. The goal of this site analysis was to cast a broad survey of historical utopias and test methods of categorizing the “data” in order to draw new connections between theoretical and design concepts and synthesize new ways of understanding the historical role of utopias in relation to their context.



UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.1 - 4.18

200000 BCE - 1602



GARDEN OF EDEN
UNKNOWN
[-200000 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

Biblical "garden of God", described in the book of genesis. Story of the Tree of Life & Adam/Eve.



AGES OF MAN
HESIOD & OVID
[-700 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

The stages of human existence on the Earth according to Greek and Roman mythology. Golden, silver, bronze, heroic, and iron ages.



TOWER OF BABEL
UNKNOWN
[-610 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

Story from the Book of Genesis of the origins of different languages. United humanity builds tower. God confounded speech and created different languages.



ATLANTIS
UNKNOWN
[-360 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

Fictional island described by Plato. An allegorical story of that describes "Ancient Athens", the embodiment of Plato's ideal state.



DE RE PUBLICA
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO
[-52 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

Socratic dialogue on Roman politics by Cicero. Skeptical method of opposing arguments.



THE MESSIANIC ECLOGUE
VIRGIL
[-42 BCE]



DESCRIPTION

Describes the birth of a savior figure, pre-Christian prophet.



KING ARTHUR'S CAMELOT
UNKNOWN
[1170]



DESCRIPTION

Fantastic capital of Arthur's realm and a symbol of the Arthurian world. Medieval fortress.



DE MONARCHIA
DANTE ALIGHIERI
[1308]




DESCRIPTION

Treatise on secular and religious power. The relationship between secular authority and religious authority. Defending the autonomy of Florence.



SFORZINDA
AUTHOR
[1400]



DESCRIPTION

Renaissance ideal city. Geometric layout of the city in an eight point star. Iconographic ties to magic and astrology.

HANGING GARDENS OF BABYLON
UNKNOWN
[-605 BCE]



DESCRIPTION
Gardens were a remarkable feat of engineering: an ascending series of tiered gardens containing all manner of trees, shrubs, and vines.

ROMAN CITY
UNKNOWN
[-500 BCE]



DESCRIPTION
Axial Streets, cardo & decamanus grid. Walled settlement, outpost of colonial rule

REPUBLIC
PLATO
[-380 BCE]



DESCRIPTION
On the order and character of the term Justice, the just city-state and the just man.

THE PEACH BLOSSOM SPRING
TAO YUANMING
[421]



DESCRIPTION
A story of a chance discovery of an ethereal utopia where the people lead an ideal existence in harmony with nature, isolated from the outside world.

THE CITY OF GOD
ST. AUGUSTINE
[426]



DESCRIPTION
A response to allegations that Christianity brought about the decline of Rome. Describes Christian philosophy.

DATONG
ZHOU DYNASTY
[907]



DESCRIPTION
Utopian view on Chinese world order.

UTOPIA
THOMAS MORE
[1515]



DESCRIPTION
A narrative depicting a fictional island society and its religious, social and political customs.

THE GOLDEN AGE
LUCAS CRANACH THE ELDER
[1530]



DESCRIPTION
This painting can be considered as an illustration to the Greek poet Hesiod's poetry, commonly known as The Golden Age. A time of eternal peace and prosperity.

CITY OF THE SUN
TOMMASO CAMPANELLA
[1602]



DESCRIPTION
A dialogue that describes a theocratic society, prophecy of a new world, unified and peacefully governed by monarchy.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.19 - 4.36

1624 - 1895



NEW ATLANTIS
FRANCIS BACON
[1624]




DESCRIPTION

A vision of the future of human discovery and knowledge, expressing aspirations and ideals for humankind.



LATIN AMERICAN CITY
CONQUISTADORS
[1650]




DESCRIPTION

Colonial plan for the new world, reviving the Roman town models. Create order in new settlements.



NEUF-BRISACH
VAUBAN
[1700]




DESCRIPTION

Fortified settlements commissioned as a fortress, the star-shaped complex of walls and ditches enclosed a rectilinear street grid of buildings.



CENOTAPH SIR ISAAC NEWTON
ETIENNE-LOUIS BOULLE
[1784]



DESCRIPTION

Immutable and totalizing architecture. Monumental geometric and spatial forms.



PHALANSTERE
CHARLES FOURIER
[1800]



DESCRIPTION

An all-encompassing living unit for one "Phalanx" of 1620 people. Family like social structure supporting free love, rejecting industrialization, manual labour.



JEFFERSONVILLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON
[1802]



DESCRIPTION

Based on the idea for a checkerboard urban pattern. A rectilinear grid of blocks would alternate between housing and park squares providing green frontage.



A CRYSTAL AGE
W.H. HUDSON
[1887]



DESCRIPTION

A pastoral story of a traveler and amateur naturalist.



FREILAND
THEODORE HERTZKA
[1888]



DESCRIPTION

a blueprint for an ideal market society. Has advantages of free markets without poverty. Abolishing the private ownership of land and freedom of co-operative at will.



MARIENBURG
CAMILIO SITTE
[1890]



DESCRIPTION

Unrealized master plan for a community, based on study of admirable aspects of medieval cities. Irregular street grid, knot like network of public squares.

SAVANNAH
JOHN OGLETHORPE
 [1733]




DESCRIPTION
 Based on the replication of an urban unit into blocks of housing surrounding a small green square or park. Leisurely traffic flow throughout the city.

IDEAL VIEW OF VIA APPIA
GIOVANNI BATTISTA PIRANESI
 [1750]



DESCRIPTION
 Piranesi's vision of the intersection of the Via Appia is piled high with mausoleums, gravestones, marble busts and body parts, and a stone Romulus and Remus.

ROYAL SALT WORKS
CLAUDE-NICOLAS LEDOUX
 [1775]



DESCRIPTION
 An attempt to rationalize industrial production and to reflect a proto-corporate hierarchy of labour. Informed by Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon.

NEW LANARK
ROBERT OWEN
 [1819]




DESCRIPTION
 A model mill in Scotland. Utilitarian design, free markets and free workers. Formulation of people's characters is to place them under proper influences.

HAUSSMANIZATION OF PARIS
EUGENE HAUSSMAN
 [1850]



DESCRIPTION
 Creation of network of wide boulevards in attempt to "ease" circulation. Various aesthetic and infrastructural guidelines.

CURIOUS REPUBLIC OF GONDOR
MARK TWAIN
 [1875]




DESCRIPTION
 A state in which all citizens have at least one vote, but where further votes could be acquired through education, which was provided by the state for free.

NEWS FROM NOWHERE
WILLIAM MORRIS
 [1890]



DESCRIPTION
 Future society of common ownership and democratic control of the means of production. Pleasure in nature and work.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU
 [1895]



DESCRIPTION
 Theory of the best way to establish a political community in the face of the problems of commercial society, argues against monarchs for sovereign people.

THE TIME MACHINE
H.G. WELLS
 [1895]



DESCRIPTION
 Popularized the concept of time travel using a vehicle that allows an operator to travel purposefully and selectively.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.37 - 4.54

1897 - 1924



EQUALITY/LOOKING BACKWARD
EDWARD BELLAMY
[1897]




DESCRIPTION

Nationalization of private property and the desire to avoid use of the odious term "Socialism," this political movement came to be known as "Nationalism".



LETTRES DE MALAISIE
PAUL ADAM
[1898]



DESCRIPTION

Transition from Naturalism and Symbolism in French Literature.



GARDEN CITY
EBENEZER HOWARD
[1902]




DESCRIPTION

A method of urban planning that was intended to be planned, self-contained communities surrounded by "greenbelts", containing proportionate areas.



CAPTAIN STORMFIELDS VISIT
MARK TWAIN
[1909]




DESCRIPTION

The story follows Captain Elias Stormfield on his extremely long cosmic journey to heaven. Used to show the common conception of heaven is ludicrous.



ROADTOWN
EDGAR CHAMBLESS
[1910]



DESCRIPTION

Linear-city scheme incorporating transit lines, infrastructure and buildings for all functions.



THE WORLD SET FREE
H.G. WELLS
[1914]



DESCRIPTION

History of humans' mastery of power and energy through technological advance, seen as a determinant of human progress.



CHICAGO TRIBUNE TOWER
ADOLF LOOS
[1922]




DESCRIPTION

The competition worked brilliantly for months as a publicity stunt, and the resulting entries still reveal a unique turning point in American architectural history.



A CITY FOR 3 MILLION PEOPLE
LE CORBUSIER
[1922]




DESCRIPTION

The centerpiece of this plan was a group of sixty-story cruciform skyscrapers built on steel frames and encased in curtain walls of glass.



RUSH CITY REFORMED
RICHARD NEUTRA
[1923]




DESCRIPTION

Modernist city of circulation. Collection of rules and planning ideals based on reactions to European and American cities. Rational layout.



NEW JERUSALEM
SAMUEL GOTT
[1902]



DESCRIPTION
An anonymous romance written in the time of Charles I, now first drawn from obscurity and attributed to the illustrious John Milton.



THE UNDERGROUND MAN
GABRIEL TARDE
[1904]



DESCRIPTION
Theory that man is the creature of his social environment. In the proper environment man can do all things - even overcome his own basic nature.



A MODERN UTOPIA
H.G. WELLS
[1905]



DESCRIPTION
The novel is best known for its notion that a voluntary order of nobility and "the problem of combining progress with political stability."



LA CITTA NUOVA
ANTONIO SANT'ELIA
[1914]



DESCRIPTION
His vision was for a highly industrialized city of the future, which he saw a vast, multi-level, interconnected and integrated urban conurbation, the "life" of the city.




CHRISTIANOPOLIS
J.V. ANDREAE
[1916]



DESCRIPTION
A protestant ideal city design, constituted on the principle of fear of God. Faith is scientifically fertilized, participation in service of faith.



CITE INDUSTRIELLE
TONY GARNIER
[1917]



DESCRIPTION
Hypothetical industrial city vividly detailed attempt to create a realistic urban ideal. Zoning of space.




MEN LIKE GODS
H.G. WELLS
[1923]



DESCRIPTION
A utopian society located in a parallel universe.



WE
EUGENE ZAMIATIN
[1924]



DESCRIPTION
an urban nation constructed almost entirely of glass, which allows the secret police/spies to inform on and supervise the public more easily. Bentham Panopticon



RADIANT CITY
LE CORBUSIER
[1924]




DESCRIPTION
Attempt to open the city up to light, air and nature while also achieving high densities. Park like ground plan and towers on pilots.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.55 - 4.72

1924 - 1949



WOLKENBUGEL (CLOUD LINK)
EL LISSITZKY
[1924]



DESCRIPTION

It comprised of identical horizontal skyscrapers featuring a precarious cantilever. The series of eight intended to mark major intersections of the Moscow.



METROPOLIS
FRITZ LANG
[1927]




DESCRIPTION

Metropolis is set in a futuristic urban dystopia and follows the attempts of characters to overcome the vast gulf separating the classes of their city.



TOWER OF 3RD INTERNATIONAL
VLADIMIR TATLIN
[1929]



DESCRIPTION

Tatlin's Constructivist tower was to be built from industrial materials, it was envisaged as a towering symbol of modernity.



BROADACRE CITY
FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
[1934]




DESCRIPTION

A total vision for the new American way of living, reacting to urban ills of the day. Based on 'usonian' lifestyle, dispersed and decentralized rural population.



CHICAGO
LUDWIG HILBERSEIMER
[1940]



DESCRIPTION

Modernist reaction to the industrialized city. Decentralized Chicago area relies on the separation of industry from residential and cultural areas.



ISLANDIA
AUSTIN WRIGHT
[1942]



DESCRIPTION

Islandia is a fully realized world, however it contains no magic, so it is much more a utopia than a standard fantasy.



LEVITTOWN
LEVITT & SONS
[1947]



DESCRIPTION

Built to accommodate returning soldiers to the suburbs with model houses. Traffic calming street design.



THE SUNKEN WORLD
STANTON COBLENTZ
[1948]



DESCRIPTION

A commander of an American submarine in World War I which is caught in a whirlpool which drags it to the bottom of the sea and finds Atlantis.



WALDEN TWO
B.F. SKINNER
[1948]



DESCRIPTION

Walden Two embraces the proposition that the behavior of organisms, including humans, is determined by environmental variables.

AFTERNOONS IN UTOPIA
STEPHEN LEACOCK
[1932]



DESCRIPTION
Humourist musings on utopia.

BRAVE NEW WORLD
ALDOUS HUXLEY
[1932]



DESCRIPTION
The novel anticipates developments in technology that combine profoundly to change society.

LOST HORIZON
JAMES HILTON
[1933]




DESCRIPTION
Origin of Shangri-La a fictional utopian lamasery high in the mountains of Tibet.

STAR OF THE UNBORN
FRANZ WERFEL
[1946]




DESCRIPTION
A fabulous journey through a world 100,000 years from our own, where mankind's deepest aspirations have been fulfilled.

COMMUNITAS 1
PAUL & PERCIVAL GOODMAN
[1947]



DESCRIPTION
Attempt to maximize and streamline functionality and productivity. Starkly divides the urban setting from nature and allows direct access across zones.

COMMUNITAS 2
PAUL & PERCIVAL GOODMAN
[1947]



DESCRIPTION
A variation on the scheme of Communitas 1. Proximity of the urban core to the farms and countryside, farms valued for educational and aesthetics and productivity.

DESERT CITY
ELIA ZENGHELIS
[1948]



DESCRIPTION
Related to Exodus, or the voluntary prisoners of architecture.

WATCH THE NORTH WIND RISE
ROBERT GRAVES
[1949]



DESCRIPTION
The novel takes place in a future society in which most post-medieval technology has been rejected, and a Triple Goddess religion is followed.

1984
GEORGE ORWELL
[1949]



DESCRIPTION
The novel is set in a world of perpetual war, omnipresent government surveillance and public manipulation, dictated by a political system. Dystopian.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.73 - 4.90

1956 - 1962




FORT WORTH
VICTOR GRUEN
[1956]



DESCRIPTION
Car-free pedestrian city centre design, revitalization plan. Businesses on a podium with ring road. Creation of a dense core with open plazas.



MILE HIGH BUILDING
FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT
[1956]



DESCRIPTION
Proposed skyscraper to be the tallest building in the world. "The Illinois".




BRASILIA
LUCIO COSTA
[1957]



DESCRIPTION
Capital city design, attempts to rectify regional inequalities. Inspired by radiant city with monumental administrative axis with residential blocks.



NEW BABYLON
CONSTANT NIEUWENHUIS
[1959]



DESCRIPTION
Series of paintings, sketches, texts, and architectural models describing a post-revolutionary society. A series of linked transformable megastructures.



OCEAN CITY
KIYONORI KITUTAKE
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
Metabolist proposal for a floating city of two concentric rings for residential and industrial uses and cultivation/production of special sea products.




TOKYO BAY
KENZO TANGE
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
Creation of an enormous central, infrastructural spine jutting into Tokyo Bay. Programmed with civic and business districts.




BRIDGE CITY
YONA FRIEDMAN
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
Experiment with space-frame structural systems, bridge over the English Channel with inserted industrial and commercial units. Mercantile bridge.



FUNNEL CITY
WALTER JONAS
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
A terraced megastructure to provide to its inhabitants introverted spaces, disconnected from the malfunctioning and contaminated metropolis.




CITY IN THE AIR
ARAATA ISOZAKI
[1960]




DESCRIPTION
Vertical cores that accommodate residences, "trees" provide "branches" that serve as lateral paths of movement from the cores. Multiplication of a "forest".

HAUPTSTADT
ALISON & PETER SMITHSON
[1958]




DESCRIPTION
Plan to rebuild the central business district in Berlin. Megastructural mat-building incorporating historical structures and new office towers.

STEREOMETRIC DOMES
DAVID GEORGE EMMERICH
[1958]



DESCRIPTION
Tensegrity, Structural Morphology, Morphogenesis, Convertible, Multifunctional, organic growth, standardized elements.

VILLE SPATIALE
YONA FRIEDMAN
[1959]



DESCRIPTION
The spatial city, which is a materialization of this theory, makes it possible for everyone to develop his or her own hypothesis.

MESA CITY
PAOLO SOLERI
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
A series of megastructural compounds on an arid highland. Featuring a residential, academic complex, administrative and public functions. Self contained.

AGRICULTURAL CITY
KISHO KUROKAWA
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
Contemporization of Japanese farm villages, incorporates high-density ideal within a rural setting.

DOME OVER MANHATTAN
BUCKMINSTER FULLER
[1960]




DESCRIPTION
Attempt to rectify the wasteful nature of the urban environment. Artificial environment, climate free city.

FLOATING CLOUD STRUCTURES
BUCKMINSTER FULLER
[1960]



DESCRIPTION
Proposed airborne habitats created from giant geodesic spheres that levitate by slightly heating the air inside above the ambient temperature.

HELIX CITY
KISHO KUROKAWA
[1961]



DESCRIPTION
Helical megastructures comprising the city allow for a plug-in style occupation of their levels. Levels proposed to be completely covered in gardens.

TOULOUSE-LE MIRAIL
CANDILIS, JOSIC, WOODS
[1962]




DESCRIPTION
Urban complex a manifestation of team 10's ideas. Large pedestrian deck serves as the "spine" of the complex.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.91 - 4.108

1963 - 1967




FRANKFURT
CANDILIS, JOSIC, WOODS
[1963]



DESCRIPTION
Urban infill replaces bombed area in central Frankfurt. "Mat-building", comprised of multiple platforms with programmed structures. Flexible network.




MOUND
PETER COOK
[1964]



DESCRIPTION
Multi-use center buried under a grassy hill. Sectionally stratified and features recreational areas, a coffee shop, shopping malls and an auditorium.




PLUG-IN CITY
ARCHIGRAM
[1964]



DESCRIPTION
Giant, highly adaptable diagrid space-frame megastructure. Programmed sections. Cranes atop of the frame with moveable modules.




CITY UNDER THE SEINE
PAUL MAYMONT
[1964]



DESCRIPTION
Plan for Paris that was based on cone-like cities. A hollow column hosts the technical infrastructures and from this column, a giant web unfolds into buildings.




MARINA CITY
BERTRAND GOLDBERG
[1964]



DESCRIPTION
Mixed use residential building complex that consists of corn-cob shaped towers and a raised platform.




TETRAHEDRAL CITY
BUCKMINSTER FULLER
[1965]



DESCRIPTION
Floating or land-based residential pyramid to accommodate one million inhabitants. Tetrahedral shape has the most surface per volume area.



THE OBLIQUE CITY
CLAUDE PARENT, PAUL VIRILIO
[1966]



DESCRIPTION
The idea was to tilt the ground in order to revolutionize the old paradigm of the vertical wall.




BLOW OUT VILLAGE
PETER COOK
[1966]



DESCRIPTION
Speculative proposal for mobile village using hovercraft, hydraulics and inflatable technologies.




LIVING POD
ARCHIGRAM
[1966]



DESCRIPTION
The living pod is a re-invention of the modernist machine aesthetic for living. The living pod is a self-inflating dwelling unit, an "appliance" for the user.

WALKING CITY
RON HERRON
 [1964]




DESCRIPTION
 Massive mobile robotic structures, with own intelligence, freely roam the world, moving to wherever their resources or manufacture abilities were needed.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER CITY
HANS HOLLEIN
 [1964]




DESCRIPTION
 dispensing with buildings altogether and declaring the forms of the land itself to be architectural statements—"everything is architecture."

UNDERWATER CITY
ARCHIGRAM
 [1964]




DESCRIPTION
 Plug in capsule homes connected by a megastructure located underwater.

SATELLITE CITY
MANFREDI NICOLETTI
 [1965]




DESCRIPTION
 Expands the existing city of Monaco into the sea using landfill. Semi-circular terraced amphitheatres with housing, parks and port functions.

FUN PALACE
CEDRIC PRICE
 [1965]



DESCRIPTION
 Megastructure whose primary function was improvised public performance. Inherently flexible with only the 3D grid as a fixed component.

RATINGEN-WEST
MERETE MATTERN
 [1965]



DESCRIPTION
 Proposed multi-functional expansion of Düsseldorf. Picturesque assemblage of towers and terraced housing. Utilizes natural forms and patterns.

LINEAR CITY
MCMILLAN, GRIFFIS, MILETO
 [1967]



DESCRIPTION
 Cross-Brooklyn Expressway megastructural linear city. Multi-layer with pyramid-shaped cross section, terraced dwellings, green pedestrian corridor.

LIVING BUBBLES
COOP HIMMELBLAU
 [1967]



DESCRIPTION
 Restless Sphere put in motion by its occupant in a public demonstration of pneumatic construction.

HABITAT 67
MOSHE SAFDIE
 [1967]



DESCRIPTION
 A model community housing complex composed of prefabricated concrete forms.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.109 - 4.126

1968 - 1974



INSTANT CITY
PETER COOK, RON HERRON
[1968]



DESCRIPTION

A mobile technological event that drifts into underdeveloped, drab towns via air (balloons) with provisional structures (performance spaces) in tow.



PNEUMACOSM
HAUS-RUCKER-CO
[1968]



DESCRIPTION

Living planet made of plastic, working as a light bulb plugged into the socket of the existing urban form and enjoy life in three dimensions.



CONTINUOUS MONUMENT
SUPERSTUDIO
[1969]




DESCRIPTION

Radical Architecture, earth spanning gridded network made of indeterminate material. Contains the entire population and connects to large monuments.



AERODYNAMIC CITY
ARCHIZOOM
[1969]



DESCRIPTION

Tower with aerodynamic form in the middle of the desert.



BABEL CANYON
PAOLO SOLERI
[1969]




DESCRIPTION

Paolo Soleri stands the metropolis on it's end.



STADT RAGNITZ
DOMENIG & HUTH
[1969]



DESCRIPTION

Mega-structure project developed for the city of Ragnitz in Austria. "Clusters" of spatial cells for dwelling.



SUPERSURFACE
SUPERSTUDIO
[1970]



DESCRIPTION

Alternative model for life on earth with continuous gridded plane and flexible program.



CAPSULE HOUSE
KISHO KUROKAWA
[1970]




DESCRIPTION

It is a prototype for architecture of sustainability and recycleability, as each module can be plugged into the core and replaced or exchanged when necessary.



EXODUS
REM KOOLHAAS
[1972]



DESCRIPTION


An extreme urban intervention in central london. Multi-functional monumental building features walls that separate the old city outside from the new within.

NOAHBABEL
PAOLO SOLERI
[1969]



DESCRIPTION
Hyperdense city designed to maximize human interaction and access shared to cost effective infrastructural services like water and sewage.

NO STOP CITY
ARCHIZOOM
[1969]




DESCRIPTION
Reaction to and a hyperlogical extension of rational consumer driven design. Infinitely tileable pattern of anonymous structures.

TRITON CITY
BUCKMINSTER FULLER
[1969]



DESCRIPTION
A concept for an anchored floating city that would be located just offshore and connected with bridges mainland.

ARCOSANTI
PAOLO SOLERI
[1970]




DESCRIPTION
North of Phoenix in central Arizona, the project intends to provide a model demonstrating Soleri's concept of "Arcology", architecture coherent with ecology.

EARTHSHIPS
MICHAEL REYNOLDS
[1970]




DESCRIPTION
Earthships can be built in any part of the world and still provide electricity, potable water, contained sewage treatment and sustainable food production.

CITY IN SPACE
RICARDO BOFILL
[1970]



DESCRIPTION
Development project for a major housing complex, conceived as forming a multifunctional neighbourhood inspired by a view of social factors of its time.

CONVENTION CITY
ANT FARM
[1972]



DESCRIPTION
A domed city in Texas with the sole purpose of using it to broadcast American political conventions. Responding to electronic aspects of political coverage.

HANDLOSER
RICHARD SNIBBE
[1973]



DESCRIPTION
A proposed mountain resort complex using crystal-like geometries to establish a series of settlements in a valley connected by a series of funiculars.

ZARZIS RESORT
CONSTANTINO DARDI
[1974]




DESCRIPTION
Proposed megastructure based on geometric experimentation and expression, early onset of postmodernism, end of visionary urbanism.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.127 - 4.144

1974 - 2008



EGG OF COLUMBUS CIRCLE
ELIA ZENGHELIS
[1974]



DESCRIPTION

The name for the Egg of Columbus Center is a reference to the story of how Christopher Columbus challenged his critics to make an egg stand on its tip.



HIGH RISE OF HOMES
JAMES WINES
[1981]



DESCRIPTION

"Vertical community" to "accommodate people's conflicting desires to enjoy the cultural advantages of an urban center, without sacrificing the private home."



LA VILLETTE PARK
REM KOOLHAAS
[1983]



DESCRIPTION

The proposed project is not for a definitive park, but for a method that - combining programmatic instability with architectural specificity - will generate a park.



DRAWINGS
LEBBEUS WOODS
[1994]



DESCRIPTION

Considers how built forms impact the individual and the collective, and reflect contemporary ideological conditions, and one contributes to world development.



MAHANAKHON
REM KOOLHAAS
[1995]



DESCRIPTION

Tower concept with a band of shifted, box-like elements breaks up the surface and creates terraces and balconies.



BENIDORM
MVRDV
[1998]




DESCRIPTION

An example of efficiency propose "rehabilitation" in this mecca of mass tourism and urban paradigm, at least in the origin of its explosive growth.



AMES POWER STATION
CRISTINA Y EFRÉN
[2002]



DESCRIPTION

A piece of the city totally covered with a membrane of roses, lights and honeysuckle shrouding and unifying them with a silhouette and a single common material.



DUSTY RELIEF/B-MU
R&SIE(N)
[2002]



DESCRIPTION

Collecting the dust (particles of carbon monoxide) of the city by an aluminium envelop and electrostatics system.




MASDAR
NORMAN FOSTER
[2006]



DESCRIPTION


A plan for an (ideally) carbon-zero community that will house a university, research and development SEZ and residential complexes within a walled city.

MACHINE ARCHITECTURE
NEIL DENARI
[1988]



DESCRIPTION
Seeks to escape the revolving door of ineffective and reactionary pseudo historicism by re-engaging with technology at the center for the strategy.

ZEEBRUGGE SEA TERMINAL
OMA
[1989]




DESCRIPTION
The ferry companies operating across the channel propose to make the crossing more exciting, making the terminal itself a destination.

UMEDA CITY
HIROSHI HARA
[1993]



DESCRIPTION
Character of a portico with the appearance of a floating city.

LA VILLETTE PARK
BERNARD TSCHUMI
[1998]



DESCRIPTION
Envisioned Parc de la Villette as a place of culture where natural and artificial are forced together into a state of constant reconfiguration and discovery.

PIG CITY
MVRDV
[2001]



DESCRIPTION
Raises questions about pork production and consumption through imagining a change in the built environment of production.

CRUISE CITY, CITY CRUISE
NL ARCHITECTS
[2002]



DESCRIPTION
Rethinks the relationship between Ships and the City. Cruise Ships in principle just parasitize on every city they call on.

SKYCAR CITY
MVRDV
[2006]



DESCRIPTION
Explores the relationship between infrastructure, architecture, and urban form. Pushes the physical and conceptual limits of city, circulation, and program.

TRIANGLE TOWER
HERZOG & DE MEURON
[2006]



DESCRIPTION
Sustainable tower that develops a new topography of a vertical city after removal of height restrictions in Paris.

WATERFRONT CITY
OMA
[2008]



DESCRIPTION
An artificial Island linked to four distinct neighbourhoods in Dubai. Optimistic future of urbanism dialogue between generic and iconic.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.145 - 4.162

2008 - 2009



HYDRO-NET SF 2108
IWAMOTOSCOTT ARCHITECTURE
[2008]



DESCRIPTION

Speculates that cities of the future will need to be evermore interconnected and yet also more self-reliant.



STACK CITY
BEHRANG BEHIN
[2008]



DESCRIPTION

Project employs the stack effect to moderate the temperature of the city, and to provide for some of its energy needs.



FLOODED LONDON
ANTHONY LAU
[2008]



DESCRIPTION

A "floating city" for the Thames Estuary, gives new life to decommissioned ships and oil platforms by converting them into hybrid homes.



THE BERG
MILA STUDIO
[2009]




DESCRIPTION

Geographic formation of an iconic attraction for the city of Berlin.



SIETCH NEVADA
MATSYS
[2009]



DESCRIPTION

An urban prototype that makes the storage, use, and collection of water essential to the form and performance of urban life.



SELF DEFENSE
STEPHANE MALKA
[2009]



DESCRIPTION

Modular complex, an alternative to the defiant lifestyle, by positioning itself in a state of insurrection. Parasite architecture creating spontaneous community.



HUALIEN BEACH RESORT
BIG
[2009]



DESCRIPTION

A beach resort housing complex in Taiwan, will consist of green "landscape stripes" that resemble mountains themselves.



RAPID RE(F)USE
TERREFORM ONE, TERREFUGE
[2009]



DESCRIPTION

The Rapid Re(f)use project supposes an extended New York reconstituted from its own landfill material.




ECO-POD
HOWELER + YOON ARCHITECTS
[2009]



DESCRIPTION


Eco-Pod proposes to stimulate the economy and ecology of downtown Boston with a temporary vertical algae bio-reactor and new public Commons.

FUTURE NORTH
TERREFORM ONE/TERREFUGE
 [2008]



DESCRIPTION
 Ecotarium bound biospherians dwell in the ex-Arctic landscape of tomorrow near the poles.

WATER FLUX
R&SIE(N)
 [2008]



DESCRIPTION
 1) Digitization of envelope 2) Scooping out hollows within 3) Water states and flows vary according to the seasons 4) Exacerbation of the climate 5) Reactivates

SUPERSTAR:MOBILE CHINATOWN
MAD ARCHITECTS
 [2008]



DESCRIPTION
 A conceptual response to redundant and increasingly out of date nature of the contemporary Chinatown.

AQUALTA
STUDIO LINDFORS
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 A series of images imagining how New York and Tokyo might look like in a few hundred years as a result of rising sea levels.

VARDO ARKS
CDMB ARCHITECTS
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 It sets a possible course for future development within the context of Global Warming and the effects greenhouse gases are having on the northern regions.

WHERE THE GRASS IS GREENER
TOMMORROWS THOUGHTS TODAY
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 A population has voluntarily separated themselves from the rest of society, and has taken up the mantle of sustainability in an extraordinary way.

URBAN FOREST
MAD ARCHITECTS
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 The building is a commercial high-rise whose form was inspired by the mountainous typology of the surroundings.

ZEPPELIN'S SWARM
HECTOR ZAMORA
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 Zeppelin Swarm includes a campaign to publicise a zeppelin fair that never really occurred and it spans from the participation of street artists and media.

CLOUD SKIPPERS
STUDIO LINDFORS
 [2009]



DESCRIPTION
 Community of adventurous who leave the Earth's surface to drift amongst the clouds in machine-like dwellings, self-sufficient and free of everyday life.

UTOPIA CATALOGUE : FIGURE 4.163 - 4.180

2010 - 2010



MULTIPLICITY
JOHN WARDIE ARCHITECTS
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

New developments hover and intersect the traditional urban fabric below, with self-sustaining urban development of hyper-density.



SILK ROAD MAP EVOLUTION
OFL ARCHITECTURE
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

Revive and regenerate the current layout of the silk road by means of a social, economic, political and architectonic redevelopment of the historic road.



LACE HILL OVER YEREVAN
FORREST FULTON ARCHITECTURE
[2010]




DESCRIPTION

Stitches the adjacent city and landscape together to support a holistic lifestyle, somewhere between rural hillside living and dense cultured urbanity.



GIANT WATER LILIES
THE WHY FACTORY
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

Making bold and slightly fantastical designs, a plan for the Thai city of Phuket are both beautiful and self-sustaining. Artificial islands convert energy.



SATURATION CITY
MGS ARCHITECTURE
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

Four key urban typologies; the park/garden, the CBD, the suburb and the coastline, are subjected to dramatic densifications in response to the 'flood'.



A NEW ANARCHITECTURE
TAYLOR MEDLIN
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

Tries to prove that it is not only possible to build in Antarctica with minimal external resources, but that it is also the beginning of a new era for the continent.



PLUG OUT
WORKAC
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

Proposal for a series of experimental new housing typologies, stacked in a 45-story building. Each roof is a different ecosystem.



HYDROGENASE ALGAE FARM
VINCENT CALLEBAUT
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

A conceptual transport system that would involve airships powered by seaweed. Farms in the ocean producing biofuel from seaweed.



MIGRATING FLOATING GARDENS
RAEL SAN FRATELLO
[2010]



DESCRIPTION

A family of dirigibles migrate within a city, moving towards areas where the heat island effect is greatest, and also seasonally.

RECOVERING BERLIN
PROTOCOL ARCHITECTURE
 [2010]



DESCRIPTION
 A radical plan for Berlin that would harness the geological power of earthquakes to strategically de-stabilize the physical landscape.

IP2100
ROOM11
 [2010]




DESCRIPTION
 An infrastructure spine as an instrument to connect Australia's regions to a sustainable metabolic system, initiating a symbolic relationship.

FLOATING GARDENS
ANNE HOLTROP
 [2010]



DESCRIPTION
 An artificial floating island containing gardens and a spa.

FOR ALL THE COWS
CTRLZ ARCHITECTURE
 [2010]



05 / VERTICAL CIRCULATION ///

DESCRIPTION
 Imagines the growth of interconnected social spaces and a completely transparent model of energy and production.

CASA PULPA
HODGETTS + FUNG DESIGN
 [2010]



DESCRIPTION
 Proposes as a hybrid solution to the endemic issues of waste disposal and housing production to be found in many poor countries.

VALDRADE
METAMORPHOSE
 [2010]




DESCRIPTION
 Symbol of an opposition between modernist city yesterday and the city 'ecologically correct' announced for tomorrow. New sustainable neighbourhood design.

URBANEERING BROOKLYN
TERREFORM ONE
 [2012]



DESCRIPTION
 Intensified version of Brooklyn that supplies all vital needs for its population. In this city basic functions are radically restructured to support life in every form.

HYDROSPAN BRIDGE COLONY
FUTURE CITIES LAB
 [2013]



DESCRIPTION
 A speculative proposal for the radical reuse and re-colonization of the bridge infrastructure.

ANARCITY
THE WHY FACTORY
 [2010]



DESCRIPTION
 Investigates and designs the anarchistic city. A city without governance and collectivity. A city without rules.

