BORDERS & BARRICADES

A Study of the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in Hong Kong

by
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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

ABSTRACT

Amidst the global rise of resistance against crises and discontent, space performs an elementary role in pursuing changes to the status quo. Hong Kong's administrative boundaries have been in continuous shifts throughout the process of British occupation and now from the impending expiration of the city's Special Administrative Region status in 2047. Between appearing and disappearing borders, Hong Kong is suspended in entangled states of impermanence. Increasingly, political mechanisms are proposed to diminish the city's border with China. The Extradition Law Amendment Bill introduced in 2019 is one of the latest examples of such a mechanism that challenges the threshold and identity of Hong Kong.

This thesis studies the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement by contextualizing its spatial practices within Hong Kong's spatial narrative and postcolonial identity. In the opening chapter, this thesis correlates the latest social movement with the city's physical and legislative borders, highlighting the spatial implications of the proposed extradition law. The following chapter positions the movement and the proposed legislation as a border within the chronology of Hong Kong's historical protests, highlighting the continuity of spatial practices by both the state and the people of Hong Kong. Finally, the Movement is dissected to understand specific mechanisms used as counter-borders for challenging control in politicized spaces. Through this investigation, this research intends to highlight the inherent intertwined relationship between space, control and time in the pursuit of societal change.

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To my supervisor, Marie-Paule Macdonald, thank you for your perspective and direction. This thesis was very close to my heart, and at times difficult to articulate. Thank you for being open and for your utmost patience throughout the process. To my committee Tara Bissett, Adrian Blackwell, Miles Gertler and Kearon Roy Taylor, thank you for your insights and valuable feedback.

To my family, thank you for continual support, an unforgettable life in a beautiful city, and for bringing me to my first protest.

To my friends, thank you for listening to my rants, for the supportive and encouraging comments, and for the company as I worked on this thesis during the pandemic.

To those who fought and continue to fight for freedom for Hong Kong, Uyghurs and justice for the Tiananmen Massacre, thank you for displaying courage and strength that continue to inspire me.

And to others who resist in other battles for social equity, justice, and the environment, thank you for fearlessly standing up.

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THE PLOT


HKFP


HKFP

The world watched as millions flowed between the looming towers. At once, a heavy shroud of black cloaked the face of the streets in Hong Kong. The winding mass was turbulent and far from quiet as it continued to proceed through the city in the afternoon and into the evening, shouting "Five demands, not one less!" (五大訴求, 缺一不可). The protest march glistened as smartphone flashlights rippled through the moving crowd of anger, passion, and hope. Months later, the same protest had diffused throughout the city, defending its post-colonial border.

Globally, activism is increasing as colonial and authoritarian systems are being challenged. With active participation in the public, public spaces are transformed to serve their intended yet often restricted purpose. The concept of public spaces and their limitations in the contemporary neoliberal world has been the question of much discourse between architects and planners. While designed solutions may improve conditions of disparity in public spaces, planned, designed, and constructed public spaces merely sit within the boundaries of existing systems rather than topple them. Certainly, the temporal restraints of designed public spaces also come as a limitation in circumstances where the need for change cannot afford it. The most recent protests in Hong Kong reveal the case where exists the urgency for the creation of public spaces in non-democratic settings, outside of the designed and designated uses and thresholds, for activism, for the fight for self-determination, for the preservation of identity, and for place-making.

This urgency is not unfamiliar to the rest of the world, as the advent of violent policing and misinformation has rejected many democratic processes and shielded public voices that could inherently represent the sentiments of many societies. It is the same urgency where many countries and regions have witnessed increasing measures where activists, artists, journalists, and other critics of governance are being held captive or are seeking asylum or refuge elsewhere. The violent crackdown on the public and its participation in

Figure 1.1 (previous top) Protesters filled the street on June 9, 2019, marching against the proposed extraditional law amendment. Image by Isaac Yee.

Figure 1.2 (previous bottom) The same street that was once filled with protesters, a year after the Anti-ELAB Movement. Image by Isaac Yee.

Figure 1.3 (opposite top) Hong Kong prior British Occupation. Image by author.

Figure 1.4 (opposite bottom) In 1842 China surrenders Hong Kong Island to Britain. Image by author.

politics is widespread—whether it be in Thailand or Hong Kong. The sense of urgency is increasing, and truly, public spaces are diminishing.

The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) Movement in Hong Kong highlights a turning point in the history of the city and the nature of its public spaces. Urgency sends the public to participate in processes to reclaim public spaces while facing heavy policing and the shifting political future of the accessibility to public spaces in Hong Kong. The movement stands out in the post-colonial era of Hong Kong at a scale that exceeds any other movement since the handover of control from the British to China. The following thesis explores the spatial movements, strategies and tools in the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (Anti-ELAB) Movement through the lens of the shifting spatial narrative of Hong Kong's public sphere related to ideas of border and identity.

BORROWED SPACE

The fate of Hong Kong has been long in discourse amongst its residents and governments throughout generations in its shifted domain between successive occupations and governance of the British Empire and China. Likewise, for generations, Western and Chinese imperialism has been resisted by the people of Hong Kong in the ongoing fight against dispossession, exploitation, and erasure. Under rivalling and subsequent imperialist regimes, Hong Kong is now subsumed under its neoliberal interests, limiting the opportunity for building Hong Kong's individual political future. The accumulative effects of neoliberal and political interests escalate the struggle of the people of Hong Kong in finding place in the city's fate as the city's border with mainland China becomes increasingly porous simultaneous to the diminishing border to its promised autonomous and democratic future.

Figure 1.5 (opposite top) In 1860 Kowloon was surrendered to Britain. Image by author.

Figure 1.6 (opposite bottom) In 1898 the region between Kowloon and the Shenzhen River along with Lantau Island and 200 other islands were leased to Britain. Image by author.





Increasingly, the perforation of the border and the adulteration of the definition of Hong Kong's framework for governance has been an increasing cause for concern since the mid-2010s[1]. However, this is not the first time questions related to the border have been contested in the history of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's character has long been known as the in-between. Without effort, despite many of colonial-influences having given way to contemporary market interests, residues left behind from the colonial era can be found. The history of the former-British colony is ingrained in the material fabric but also in the immaterial aspects of Hong Kong—whether it be the colonial era *tong-lau*'s[2] (唐樓), the *cha chaan teng*[3] (茶餐廳) culture or the language. Life itself in Hong Kong is a constant passive reminder that the city continues to exist as a threshold in a complex narrative. It is seemingly suspended in a threshold between time going forward and of the past; between China and itself; not quite one or the other; bordered in and bordered out.

The 2019 Anti-ELAB movement came at a time when this very threshold was challenged, suspending the city's future in uncertainty. Nevertheless, this predicament was not unfamiliar to the soil of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's suspended condition begins with its birth as a port and its progressive expansion in size and scale. Beginning as a humble fishing island, Captain Charles Elliot of Britain seized control through an invasion in 1839.[4] Elliot had taken a significant role in leading negotiations with the officials of the Qing Dynasty. In 1841, Hong Kong was officially ceded to the British through the Convention of Chuenpi and the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, ending the First Opium War. Elliot's acquisition of Hong Kong was essentially an operation of controversy. When news reached Britain, the then foreign secretary questioned Captain Elliot for devoting efforts to securing a "…'barren island with hardly a House upon it' that had no chance of ever being a great 'Mart of Trade'…"[5]. Britain deemed Elliot's role as the negotiator so inadequate

Figure 1.7 (opposite top) In 1951 the Frontier Closed Area is established after the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949. Image by author.

Figure 1.8 (opposite bottom) In 1980 Shenzhen is established as a Special Economic Zone. Image by author.





that he was demoted. The British expected a claim over a port similar to that of Macau, one which may perform as an essential international commerce and trade centre. It was a significant motivation in the Opium War, prior to which the Qing imperial court had limited any Western merchants except the Portuguese to conduct business exclusively in Canton year-long, in a time where trading relied on water-based transportation.

Indeed, any reflection today on the sentiments of Lord Palmerston or Queen Victoria at the time—who wrote that Elliot had "…completely disobeyed his instructions and tried to get the lowest terms he could."—would seem mystifying. The small village soon proved both wrong as it soon rose to become critical competition for the region. Eager for more of China's southern coast, the British Empire fought China again in 1856, triggering the Second Opium War, later joined by the French Empire. In 1860, combined Western forces bested Qing efforts, and the signing of the Convention of Peking ceded more land to the British. Thus Hong Kong grew to include the Kowloon Peninsula, just opposite the harbour from Hong Kong Island and approximately 1.5 times larger in area. Then in 1898, the rural area between Kowloon and the Shenzhen River, along with a collection of islands—called the New Territories together—was ceded to the British to be enclosed to join the adjacent British-colonial area with negotiations of the Second Convention of Peking. Consequently, the next and final location of Hong Kong's inland border shifted North, and Hong Kong's final form took shape between the waters—the Shenzhen River, the harbour, and the sea—though not permanently. All three zones were leased to the British for ninety-nine years, making 1997 the expiration date of the colonial era; and the beginning of a history of a city suspended in the temporary, as borrowed space.

By this point, Hong Kong had caught up as the "Mart of Trade" the British desired, levelling with Macau and Canton and surpassing both as a financial centre. In the coming

Figure 1.9 (opposite top) In 2010 the Frontier Closed Area is reduced. Image by author.

Figure 1.10 (opposite bottom) In 2012 West Kowloon High-Speed Railway Station opens, linking Hong Kong as a destination. Image by author.



decades, Hong Kong escaped the position as the shadow of Shanghai, as the Communist Party's gripping conquest of Shanghai sent an exodus of various people, from filmmakers and fashion designers to merchants, to the capitalist island of colonial Hong Kong. Very soon, Shanghai was stripped of its ties to the world as populations from other regions of China escaped the violence of starvation and war. Shanghai was experiencing erasure of its characterizing qualities, though some distinctive landmarks by the Bund remained. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation branch on the Bund, which was once one of the most luxurious bank buildings, was forced to be surrendered to the Communist Party and used as the office of municipal officials. Perhaps this is how Hong Kong became what lives in the nostalgia of many. It is a city of immigrants and a safe haven that is an amalgamation of different cultures. Though life was difficult for most in the British-run city, for some that remained, it was a place of hope and life.

As the expiration of British Hong Kong neared, Shanghai's fate was one that some thought would become the model for what could happen to Hong Kong. Some thought Hong Kong would be left untouched for its economic value. Simultaneously, others believed that the strong anti-colonial beliefs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would cease Hong Kong through invasion in lieu of formal brokerage in the transfer of control. The population was divided in its polarity as anxiousness took over many in preparation for what ensued.

With discussions of the city's fate, so began the end of the epoch of Hong Kong as borrowed space, and thus began a new one—on borrowed time.

> *In borrowed space, on borrowed time—that was how Hong Kongers saw their fate.* [6]

Figure 1.11 (opposite) 2047 will mark the end of "One Country, Two Systems". Image by author.



BORROWED TIME

When it came time to settle the specifics of the transfer of control, it fell to Britain to obtain good arrangements for Hong Kong. In December of 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, solidifying the forthcoming fate of Hong Kong. This transitional time for Hong Kong prompted a trend to emigrate from Hong Kong in fear of the ensuing epoch of the capitalist city in the hands of a communist government despite the arrangements promised in the declaration. Others rushed to obtain British National Overseas passports. As the clock struck 12 on the first of July, those who remained in the city lived with the sense of hope that the Sino-British Declaration seemed to have granted.

It may be said that much of the political imaginaries that existed in the last two and half decades in post-handover Hong Kong owe its narrative to the "ground rules" that the Sino-British Declaration provided. The sealed agreement coined the term "One Country, Two Systems", a constitutional concept adopted to allow Hong Kong to maintain separate economic, legal and legislative systems from that of mainland China. Under this concept, Hong Kong (and subsequently Macau) was established as a Special Administration Region (SAR), defining it within the governmentality of mainland China as a zone of exception[7]. The declaration thus settled the fate of Hong Kong was settled for the 50 years following 1997 and derived the Hong Kong Basic Law—the city's constitution.

The Hong Kong Basic Law prescribed several basic principles to be maintained or developed in Hong Kong post-handover. It states that: Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy with independent judicial powers; socialist principles—like that of the mainland—shall not be practised in Hong Kong, and that the capitalist system—as practised in its colonial era—shall remain; laws that were

Figure 1.12 (opposite) British and Chinese millitary march across the stage at the handover ceremony in Hong Kong. Photo by Paul Lakatos.

in force—the common law, ordinances, equity laws and customary laws—shall continue to be maintained; and Hong Kong shall ultimately select its own post-handover governor—called the "Chief Executive"—and members of the legislature—called the Legislative Council (LegCo)—through "universal suffrage".[8] The constitution was signed by the Chinese president Yang Shangkun in 1990.

These were the conditions under which Hong Kong was promised that its people shall continue to live the same way, for the most part, for 50 years until 2047. Once again, Hong Kong finds itself existing in a position with an expiration date. The Declaration effectively bought Hong Kong time, loaning the city time before the reconciliation of governmentality. It, along with the new constitution, pointed to a hopeful potential for some that would progress in a direction different to that of politics on the mainland—universal suffrage.

The goal of universal suffrage, as stated in the Hong Kong Basic Law, eventually became the anchor to much of public discourse and debate in the years following the handover as it remained unfulfilled. Today, citizens of Hong Kong remain unable to vote for their Chief Executive, and the election remains an exclusive, closed process for legislature members and selected personnel from corporations and industries. Discrepancies of reality between the stated agreement and with the attempted introduction of subsequent policies in the post-handover SAR legislature have rendered Hong Kong's post-handover narrative into one of constant battle.

> *When the snow starts melting, it melts quickly.*
> *—Chris Patten*[9]

THE CATALYST

The freedom in Hong Kong as a result of the post-colonial constitution is a distinct quality that the people of Hong Kong enjoy relative to their neighbours across the Shenzhen River border. It was a rare corner of freedom; Google, Facebook, and Instagram, social media platforms that most of the world enjoy, are unavailable to the North of Hong Kong's border. It is one of many distinctions that describe life in Hong Kong as a SAR. So when Hong Kong's legislature proposed a bill that blurred this very distinction between mainland China and Hong Kong as defined through the "One Country, Two Systems" concept, it was met with uproar.

A MURDER IN TAIPEI

In 2018, a young couple from Hong Kong—Poon Hiu-Wing and her boyfriend Chan Tong-Kai—went on a getaway to celebrate Valentine's Day, which concurred with the Lunar New Year. The couple travelled to Taipei on February 13th and was scheduled to return on the 17th. As families across Asia celebrated the first day of the Lunar New Year on the 16th, Poon and Chan returned to their hotel room with a large new suitcase to pack their shopping after visiting the night market. As the couple prepared for their return the next day, a violent argument broke out. Poon was strangled to death during the argument and disposed of inside the newly purchased suitcase early the next morning. Chan returned later to the hotel and withdrew some cash through Poon's ATM card before boarding a flight later that night to Hong Kong. Once in Hong Kong, Chan withdrew another 19,200 Hong Kong Dollars from Pool's account. Meanwhile, Poon's parents, concerned about her whereabouts when she failed to return home, reported her missing to the Hong Kong police. Suspicion quickly mounted, and Poon's parents travelled to Taiwan in search of their daughter, while the Hong Kong police interrogated Chan a month after Chan's original trip with Poon. The interrogation amounted to

Chan's confession to the murder, and the Hong Kong police notified the police in Taipei with relevant information.

While Chan Tong-Kai had confessed to the murder, it was soon clear that there was a legal break. Chan could not be charged with murder under Hong Kong law unless it took place in Hong Kong—Chan could only face trial in Taiwan for the murder of Poon. The Hong Kong law allows for the extradition of suspects to face trial in jurisdictions with extradition agreements with Hong Kong—Taiwan was not among those jurisdictions. Hong Kong could only persecute Chan for pleading guilty to money-laundering-related offences for using Poon's ATM card. On one hand this realization brought despair to Poon's parents, while on the other, Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive, saw the opportunity to meld and integrate Hong Kong with the mainland as expected of her (and other past Chief Executives) from Beijing.

THE EXTRADITION LAW AMENDMENT BILL

With the legal gap made highly visible through the murder case and the ongoing agenda to integrate Hong Kong with the mainland[10] Chief Executive Carrie Lam saw the opportunity. Together with the Secretary of Security, John Lee Ka-Chiu—a former police officer and the elected Chief Executive in 2022—proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance. The proposed amendment suggests the removal of geographical restrictions, meaning suspects in Hong Kong would qualify to be extradited to any jurisdiction in the world—including mainland China.[11] The Security Bureau submitted the proposal to the Panel on Security of LegCo by February.

The proposal allowing the possibility of extradition to courts on the mainland immediately prompted apprehension and alarm. In addition, the list of crimes related to the amendment included those beyond serious crimes like murder or drug offences; it also included perjury and

obstruction of justice, criminal damage, immigration offences, gambling, and fraud—and the aiding and abetting of the listed offences. While it was made clear that political offences are explicitly excluded, many were sceptical of the proposal, understanding that rarely are political individuals directly charged with political offences—rather, they would be charged on the bases of corruption, tax evasion or other unrelated offences, which are listed as the eligible crimes for extradition.[12] Another characteristic of the amendment proposal was the veto power of the Chief Executive, and given the method by which they have been elected, it would mean that this exceptional power may be utilized should Beijing demand the extradition of an individual. In addition to the potentiality of the proposed amendments, many commented on the attempt to bypass traditional legislative processes with haste, allowing a public consultation period of only 20 days.

DISAPPEARANCES

For years, in addition to being a haven to those escaping the revolution, Hong Kong had also been one for political dissidents from mainland China. It was clear through the presence of these individuals in Hong Kong that the "One Country, Two Systems" concept was, in fact, in place, securing the border of Hong Kong's temporary fate. Yet, the unease of the Hong Kong public was not unwarranted. The rattling drama from recent cases of mainland security on Hong Kong soil is among other factors that raised concern for the melding of Hong Kong and mainland judicial systems through the proposed amendment.

In 2015, five men with connections to the Causeway Bay Books became missing persons within several months.[13] The bookstore—owned by Mighty Currency Media, a publisher that specialized in publications about Chinese politics—sold books that have previously been banned on the mainland by the Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology on indecent accounts of the lives of China's leaders—including

one by Chang Kuo-Tao one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party as well as a colleague and competitor to Mao Zedong. These publications also became popular amongst visitors to Hong Kong from across the Shenzhen River. The five men later appeared in the custody of mainland authorities and were said to be under investigation in one case, citing a hit-and-run case from ten years ago. In another case, Xiao Jianhua, a businessman acquainted with senior leaders on the mainland, was abducted from a hotel suite. After overcoming Xiao's security team, the abductors placed Xiao in a wheelchair with a blanket over his head and transported him to a vehicle. Hong Kong authorities provided a vague statement that Xiao had left through a "boundary control point". Xiao remains in the custody of the police on the mainland.[14]

With the absurd circumstances through which these extraditions occurred, many—including those traditionally pro-Beijing—were sceptical of the extradition law. For many, especially those who have criticized the governance of Hong Kong and China throughout generations, the proposal was not acceptable; and when it came down to speaking up against it, it was only a matter of doing what they have always done—protest.

Figure 1.13 (opposite) Protesters occupy roads of Admiralty, adjacent to the government headquarters. Photo by Kris Cheng.

Notes

1 Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. 2020. *Vigil: Hong Kong on the Brink.* Columbia Global Reports. 36.

2 The vernacular typology unique to the Southern regions of China, characterized by a lower portion that is set-back from the face of the upper—which either overhangs or is supported by columns—creating a covered condition for the rain-prone climate. In colonial times, tong lau's in Hong Kong also served as tenement housing for many who fled mainland China during the Cultural Revolution.

3 Cafes or diners that often serve affordable meals, often frequented by blue-collar workers and the middle class. Many dishes are a mix of Western-Chinese components.

4 Little, Becky. "How Hong Kong Came Under ' One Country, Two Systems' Rule." History.com, last modified September 3. Accessed February 10, 2021. https://history.com/news/hong-kong-china-greate-britain.

5 Wasserstrom. *Vigil.* 25.

6 Wasserstrom. *Vigil*. 29.

7 Ong, Aihwa. 2006. *Neoliberalism as Exception*. Duke University Press.

8 Wasserstrom. *Vigil.* 30.

9 Wasserstrom. *Vigil.* 36.

10 Dapiran, Antony. 2020. *City on Fire: the Fight for Hong Kong.* Scribe Publications. 15-16.

11 Cheng, Kris. 2019. "Hong Kong's new one-off China extradition plan seeks to plug legal loophole, says Chief Exec. Carrie Lam."Hong Kong Free Post, February 19. Accessed Narcg 27, 2021. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/02/19/hong-kongs-new-one-off-china-extradition-plan-seeks-plug-legal-loophole-says-chief-exec-carrie-lam/.

12 Dapiran. *City on Fire*. 17.

13 Zheng, Vivienne. 2016. "The curious tale of five missing publishers in Hong Kong." Hong Kong Free Press, June 8. Accessed January 3, 2022. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/01/08/the-curious-tale-of-five-missing-publishers-in-hong-kong/.

14 Dapiran. *City on Fire*. 24.

THE WALLS


Hail
hunger
strike
fare

A CITY OF PROTEST

Public life has undergone a transformative history through shifts in power and control. For now, the public sphere maintains colonial levels of accessibility; and protests, when permitted, are common and essential phenomena in contemporary urban life. This is a portion of public life that the "One Country Two System" concept has preserved in the wake of Hong Kong's handover. Despite the suggestion that life in Hong Kong would remain the same after 1997, it was not without battles. The implication of premature integration with the mainland through the proposed extradition law is not the first mechanism of its kind in Hong Kong. Similar is the practice—or perhaps in a way, tradition and culture—of participating in protests. While the protests related to the extradition law captured the world's attention, they were but the latest iteration of an ongoing progression of political protests and paralleling policing that extend decades into Hong Kong's history. The chronicle of protests in Hong Kong highlights how events of resistance transform spatial orders of the public sphere both as imposed by the government and that which the people of Hong Kong have adapted over the years in fights for change.

DISRUPTING THE COLONY

With the influx of refugees coming from the mainland at the northern administrative border, Hong Kong was under extreme pressure in the 1960s. Migrants from the communist North gathered in shantytowns, often without work and in extreme poverty. As Hong Kong continued to grow to become an important financial and trade centre, it exploited many of the refugees who did find work in sweatshop conditions without fundamental labour rights.[1] When the Star Ferry Company, the main transportation across the Victoria Harbour connecting the Hong Kong Island to Kowloon, proposed a ten-cent fare increase, a young So Sau-Chung appeared at the ferry pier in Central.

Figure 2.1 (opposite) A protester wearing a jacket saying "Join hunger strike to block fare increase". Photo by South China Morning Post.

South China Morning Post

Vol. XXII No. 80. HONGKONG, THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1966 Price 30 cents.

Army Called Out: Mobs Go On Rampage

WILD RIOTS IN KOWLOON

Many Casualties: Tear Gas Fired By Police

Thousands of berserk rioters have recked the Kowloon peninsula in the worst utbreak of violence in the Colony since 956.

The huge riot, which tore Nathan Road part from Mongkok to Salisbury Road, saw ars and buses burnt, buildings ransacked nd set on fire, and street installations ipped out of the ground.

Violence wracked the peninsula for six hours. t 1.30 am, a general curfew was declared — only e second in Hongkong's history.

The only confirmed report f police firing on the de-onstrators was shortly fter midnight at the junc-on of Soy Street and Nathan oad. Police said five shots ere fired but no-one was hit.

At 3 am police reported the ot had been broken. Govern-ent called in the Army at 1.30 n to put down the violence. At press time, however, they d not gone into full-scale tion.

Eye-witnesses described than Road as a battleground. The damage had not been unted. It ran into millions of llars.

Wild Fighting

The injured had also not been unted. Although hospitals re-rted only ten injured—no dead hundreds more were wounded wild fighting between riot lice and thousands of youths.

t began as a peaceful de-nstration outside the "Star" rry against planned ferry fare creases.

It ballooned within an hour the rioters took over Nathan ad.

Tear gas was the only effec-e measure of control.

The riot developed as thou-nds of wild youths moved ong Nathan Road from both ds.

Hundreds of riot police battled control the outbreak. About 000 Auxiliary Police were lled in as the situation orsened.

Then at 1.30 am, as the four-d-half-hour curfew was de-ared, it was also announced the rmy was moving.

The Mongkok Fire Station s attacked. The Power station Waterloo Road was stoned.

Rioters set fire to Shaw's Build-ing in Fife Street and the Old Mongkok Station. These were brought under control.

The Mongkok telephone build-ing was under siege for an hour.

Stones smashed windows in the President Hotel.

The Mongkok Shui Hing de-partment store was looted twice and reports of isolated looting were still reaching police at press time.

Cars were overturned and set on fire all along Nathan Road.

At 3.45 am police were shooting at looters near Al-hambra Building in Nathan Road. British Army units were also actively patrolling Nathan Road.

Buses were wrecked and burn-ed.

At 3 am, a police report said the situation was coming under control. Packs of rioters still roamed and isolated incidents flared throughout the peninsula.

For more than four hours Nathan Road was literally cover-ed in a cloud of tear gas.

Eye-witnesses said the riot ballooned so quickly it was hard to believe it was spontaneous.

It grew from about 100 de-monstrators at the Salisbury Road end of Nathan Road to more than 2,000 by the time it had reached Whitfield Barracks.

The mob was largely youths.

The Director of Marine sent a message to ships due in Hong-kong today notifying them of the situation in Kowloon and of the curfew and warning them that in the interest of safety they should not put their crews or passengers ashore in Kowloon for the time being.

These three pictures capture some of the violence of the riots. Top left: A squad of masked riot police fire a salvo of tear gas shells into the advancing de-monstrators. This type of police action broke up many of the rioting crowds but in some instances the tear gas was accidentally blown towards people trap-ped in buses and cars. Above: A man resists police attempts to remove him. Left: A group of demons-trators mill round the Yaumati Government School at the corner of Nathan Road and Public Square Street. The man in the foreground has just thrown a rock at the school windows.

Quiet Demonstration Was Start Of It All

Hongkong's worst riots for ten years began as two peaceful demonstrations outside the "Star" ferry terminal in Tsimshatsui and the Shamshuipo ferry terminal.

About 40 placard-carrying youths marched from the "Star" ferry. They were

The mob from the "Star" Ferry was shouting and jeering at about ten lorry-loads of fully armed police, which converged

out of control and had con-centrated in separate groups.

Police were trying to contain at least three mobs.

Helicopter Drops Leaflets

At 2 am a helicopter began dropping leaflets in the Yau-mati area. The leaflets, in Chinese and English, issued by the Hongkong Govern-ment, read:

"The Government has not

"Staging hunger strike. Opposing fare increase" read his banner. So's protest followed months of campaigning by Elliott Tu, an urban councillor and social justice advocate that gathered signatures opposing the increase. Thus, the strike quickly gained public support, and many joined the hunger strike. The growing protest led to the arrest of So the following day for refusing to leave the pier, while many more gathered on the opposite side of the harbour in solidarity and demanded So's release. With the growing crowd at the peaceful strike, the British Hong Kong police were quick to increase policing. Attempts to arrest the crowd led to days of violent friction between protesters and the police riot squads.[2] Just after midnight, two days after the beginning of So's hunger strike, a curfew was declared. The protesting collective disbanded then, while "…thousands of heavily armed troops and riot police patrolled the deserted streets of Kowloon, under its second night of curfew"[3] The clashes led to multiple injuries and arrests, including the death of a protestor and injuries to three others via gunshot by the police. Despite these repercussions, the protest did attain its initial goal. In the weeks following, the government increased the Stary Ferry Company fare to only first-class tickets by five cents, while Tu was officially condemned before a commission of enquiry for inciting the protests through her campaign.

Yet the 1966 Star Ferry riots were only the beginning of the embodiment of the pressure in Hong Kong as it rested on the edge of the communist regime. Less than a year later, with the development of Mao Zedong's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments diffused into Hong Kong. And Tu's campaign for groups disadvantaged in Hong Kong and her criticism of the handling of the Star Ferry riots remained in the minds of communities in Hong Kong. This quickly spawned conversations regarding issues of workers' rights in the Colony. In early 1967, Li Ka-Shing—who eventually became Hong Kong's wealthiest man—the owner of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Company, presented new

Figure 2.2 (opposite) The front page of the South China Morning Post on April 7, 1966. Photo by South China Morning Post.

conditions for its workers, which decreased wages and level of job security. When workers protested and demanded negotiations with management, Li's company retorted through the termination of some six hundred employees.[4] The aggressive response prompted strikes and protests that once again escalated to clashes between the protesters and police across neighbourhoods in Kowloon. The protests also evolved to heavily focus on the colonial authorities as pro-Beijing groups joined and coordinated gatherings. Strikes and violence were widespread for several months, including terrorist bombings. Revolutionary messages were broadcasted, and posters were plastered condemning the British authorities.[5]

The clashes and violence in 1966 and 1967 became Hong Kong's worst instances of unrest and violence since the Second World War. It spotlighted issues like poverty, insufficient education, housing, and absences of labour rights. The labour rights riots resulted in the government's reassessment of these issues and its comprehensive response—including the reduction of maximum working hours and new employment legislation that introduced improved safety standards and employment contract protections. In the years that followed, reforms were also introduced to provide public housing programmes, compulsory universal education, and support for social welfare and medical services. However, the legislative reforms countered the success of the progressive changes in this view. In the latter part of 1967, the colonial administration fortified laws that governed the "breach of the peace" and assemblies in public spaces. Such laws related to the maintenance of public order and the control of organizations and assemblies were consolidated in the Public Order Ordinance of 1967, stipulating that all public meetings require a license from the police commissioner upon approval of an application and other limits on public spaces.[6] In other words, the police had the power to prohibit public gatherings should they deem it a matter of public order. This legislative reform also granted police the authority and capacity to arrest persons they believe are in

"unlawful assembly" should they determine that it may lead to a breach of the peace. The legislative was a crackdown on unauthorized protests, thus, writing the new imposed norm for Hong Kong's public.

A PROTEST TRADITION

> "…there were the tents, and they were put up with Hong Kong money"[7]

Amidst the anxiety of the 1980s as Hong Kong went through negotiations of the Declaration and the related selection process of the LegCo, something far more urgent on the mainland shrouded the Colony in 1989. Increasingly, literary discussions debated the political future of China. It was also a time of frustration as food prices rose, and it became clear that those who were well-connected to the government profited through a new policy that catalysed economic growth.[8] Student protests stretched across China, and the Colony perched on the edge of a movement led many Hong Kongers to donate goods and funds to support the protesters. When Beijing imposed martial law, 600,000 people marched in Hong Kong in solidarity with the students in Tiananmen Square on May 22nd,1989. The rally included prominent figures from the business and entertainment sectors of the city, gaining much attention from the public. Less than a week later, rumours that military involvement in the clearance of Tiananmen Square was impending, bringing forth 1.5 million people to the streets of Hong Kong in protest of the crackdown. It was the largest protest in Hong Kong then, and marchers were still waiting to begin the 15-kilometre march as the first group of protesters arrived at the end of the route. The participants varied in age from elderly in wheelchairs to toddlers riding shoulders of parents. Music performances, organized by performing arts students and local, Canto-pop stars, reverberated through the streets along with the chanting of slogans.

Since 1989, Hong Kong has hosted vigils annually to pay tribute to the Tiananmen Massacre on the 4th of June. The platform focused on supporting democracy in China. It explicitly demanded the release of all dissidents, the re-examination of the official state narrative of the protests in 1989, and the end to the one-party rule to develop a democratic China. The scale of the protests in Hong Kong in solidarity with students on the mainland highlighted the concern of the Jointed Declaration signed only several years earlier. The colonial government, therefore, drafted the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance to incorporate the protection of rights of freedom of opinion, expression and association, and peaceful assembly.[9] These rights come to form a crucial development of Hong Kong's unique official identity—the "Hong Kong Core Value"—which explicitly defined itself as not-communist or "mainland value".[10] These were made clear in Patten's term as the last governor through his attempts to reform Hong Kong's accessibility to political freedoms to curb pessimism owing to Hong Kong's impending return to China.

Indeed, the pessimistic sentiments were not without grounds. Soon after the handover, the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-Hwa, and his administration proposed the enactment of Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law in February of 2003, an article stating the need to enact security measures to protect the state in the case of threats.[11] It reads as follows:

> The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the PRC government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.[12]

Tung's proposal to enact this article provided anti-subversion

Figure 2.3 (opposite top) Protesters assemble in a rally in support of the student movement in China in 1989. Video still via South China Morning Post.

Figure 2.4 (opposite bottom) The annual vigil commemorating the Tiananmen Massacre on June 4, 2019 in Victoria Park. Photo by Dickson Lee.

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 2003 VOL LIX No.181

500,000 take to the streets

Protesters assemble in Victoria Park yesterday afternoon in the shadow of the Hong Kong flag. People were still arriving at the Central Government Offices at 9pm last night, six hours after the first marchers set out from Causeway Bay. Photo: Martin Chan

laws proposing changes such as increased police powers and changes associated with grounds of threat in Hong Kong like that of the central government of the People's Republic of China (PRC).[13] The proposal caused many public concerns related to press freedom and the freedom of speech and expression[14], the right to trade unions, human rights organizations and religious groups—especially those already targeted on the mainland.[15] For many, the proposed bill was a political mechanism for controlling and curtailing civil society and its societal freedoms.[16]

The proposal also came at a time when general discontent peaked. Many saw that the inadequate administration had failed to address various issues related to the property market crash, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic to which it was the epicentre, and housing and employment issues.[17] In response, media outlets such as *Apple Daily*, the local newspaper, and pro-democracy organizations encouraged the public to protest the bill and Tung's administration on the anniversary of the city's handover. The result was a convocation of more than 500,000 protestors on the streets of Hong Kong, in a march that began in Victoria Park, and was the largest demonstration since the 1989 Tiananmen rally in post-colonial Hong Kong[18]. The large-scale opposition led Tung to withdraw the bill later that year.

Every year since, Hong Kongers have gathered in the peak of the city's humidity and heat on the evening of June 4th, in a vigil event commemorating the Tiananmen event in Victoria Park, and July 1st, in a march for universal suffrage and other demands traversing Hong Kong Island, much like that of 2003. Both assemblies have become an essential part of Hong Kong's public life and a practice to honour Hong Kong's unique identity, which protected its freedom of speech, expression and the right to protest.

Figure 2.5 (opposite) The headline of South China Morning Post on July 2, 2003. Image by South China Morning Post.

IN THE MOOD FOR PROTESTS

The 2003 protest against Article 23 was merely the beginning of Hong Kong's battle. In the years leading up to the 2019 anti-ELAB protests, Hong Kongers have fought hard against the encroachment on their freedoms and post-colonial identity. Architectural memory as embodied through colonial heritage sites is contested as Hong Kong's government attempted to suppress the historical values of its former power. Such acts of "organized amnesia"[19] favouring urban growth and modernisation became motivations for protests in Hong Kong. One of the various sites that experienced this imposed amnesia was the Star Ferry Pier and Queen's Pier.

In 1999, a proposal for land reclamation along the harbour front of Hong Kong Island was announced. While the plan went through public consultation, the demolition of the Queen's Pier building was not disclosed in the consultation. Hence, when this plan was announced, students, environmentalists and civic action groups expressed opposition to the plan—for reasons related to public space, history, and identity. Various forms of resistance occurred, such as music performances, city tours and protest demonstrations. Spatial experts, like architects and planners, proposed alternative plans. Nevertheless, the government was not persuaded. Demonstrations attempted to prevent its erasure on the eve of the demolition in 2007; police arrested protesters and an impromptu order to remove the pier's clock tower was given overnight. The demolition of the pier remained undeterred despite a hearing held by the Antiquities Advisory Board that voted that the Queen's Pier as a Grade 1 classification—a listing that required the preservation of the pier. The site was an important memory of Hong Kong's identity, and an important politicized space where anti-colonial-government demonstrations took place. It was a historical place of public assembly, expression and protest—such as that opposing the ferry fare increase. Maggi Leung's study of heritage sites in Hong

Kong suggests that this very sense of local identity and civil confidence motivated government control. [20] Organized amnesia to reduce spaces of negotiation is favoured when civil empowerment in history can amplify civil societies, threatening Hong Kong's new sovereign power.

> "Somehow everything comes with an expiry date…If memories could be canned would they also have expiry dates?"*[21]*

More recently, the Curriculum Development Council recommended compulsory courses on "Moral and National Education", proposing its curriculum entitled "The China Model" in 2011. The curriculum that criticized "Western self-defined universal values of freedom and democracy" caused widespread alarm, with critics arguing that it was comparable to "brainwashing". Secondary students led by Joshua Wong, created Scholarism, which, along with groups led by concerned parents and teachers, organized campaigns against the plan. The Central Government Liaison Office responded to their protest in July saying 'all education is, to some extent, designed to brainwash," and the proposed national education was "necessary brainwash".[22] Students of Scholarism thus began a hunger strike outside the entrance to the government headquarters. Seeing secondary students expressing their firm opposition, university students also boycotted classes in solidarity. Prior to the commencement of the new school year, 120,000 people joined in a protest outside the government headquarters, occupying its adjacent roads and streets. The overwhelming opposition expressed in space drove the government to announce the National Education curriculum as one that is optional, leaving schools to decide on its implementation.

Two years later, the decision on Chief Executive election reforms from Beijing motivated a new format of protest in Hong Kong's history—the Umbrella Movement. Scholarism's rise in through the anti-National Education drives them to play a major role in the 2014 occupy movement. In the year prior, Benny Tai YiuTing, an academic from the


金鐘逾10萬人集會
U HEAR THE PEOPLE SING
S26我唔走
蘋果日報
APPLE DAILY
一起撐下去

University of Hong Kong faculty of law, proposed that civil disobedience as protest was necessary should electoral reforms fail to meet expectations. Tai collaborated with Chan Kin-man, a Chinese University of Hong Kong academic, and Reverend Yiu-Ming to organise the protest in a group named "Occupy Central with Love and Peace". When the reforms were announced, designed to ensure only Beijing-approved candidates were eligible to run for office, the city was prepared for the Occupy protest. While Tai's group planned the protest for the October holiday, student groups, including Scholarism, staged class boycotts in late September. Students protested outside the government headquarters, the same area they had two years ago, and expanded to adjacent areas as police dispersed the crowd. The students' sit-in eventually was joined by members of the public, commencing Occupy Central before the scheduled dates. Police attempted to disband the crowd with pepper spray and tear gas despite protesters remaining peaceful. This central part of the city was transformed into a peaceful, self-sustaining village of protesters, blocking off circulation on the major roads. For seventy-five days, protesters built barricades that enclosed the occupied zone equipped with studying spaces for students, shower tents, public washrooms, Wi-Fi connection and areas where volunteers advocated and translated for international press. The village disrupted important flows of the city's core, and the court ruled it an unlawful assembly. The village was dismantled in December after police contravened in the peaceful occupy zone. Umbrellas, used to block tear gas and pepper spray used in the violent clashes in the police's destruction of the village's borders, thus became the movement's symbol.

Figure 2.6 (opposite top) Protesters holding umbrellas at the police line during the Umbrella Movement. Photo by Alex Ogle.

Figure 2.7 (opposite bottom) Photo of the front page of Apple Daily on October 5, 2014. It reads "Together we persist." Photo by author.

The stark resemblance between the British police during the Star Ferry hunger strike that began as a peaceful protest and the post-handover Hong Kong policing in the peaceful Umbrella Movement—whether in the extension of ordinances related to public space or the heavy-handed, violent methods—points to the suggestion that the mechanisms that control Hong Kong remain the same,


UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE; ELECTION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE
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2019
HONG KONG BASIC LAW
one country, two systems
(1997-2047)


C ORDER
INANCE
NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW
FULL (RE)INTEGRATION
WITH MAINLAND CHINA
MORAL AND
NATIONAL
EDUCATION
(2012)
EXTRADITION
LAW
AMENDMENT
(2019)

and proxies for such power have just changed. Despite escaping the state as a colony of the British Empire, the same colonial-era governmentality has continued. Freedom in public space is one that is only accessible through the fine print, with multiple exceptions. While Hong Kong has enjoyed many freedoms that are not available to the public on the mainland, the catalysts and corresponding protests in Hong Kong's post-colonial era are embodied reminders of the tangibility of the border with China.

BORDERS AND EXCEPTIONS

For years as a British colony, Hong Kong discussed its fate as its British border dissolved, and the same is occurring as the city arrives at a mid-point in its time as a SAR under the One Country Two System administration. The domain of Hong Kong as a city is in continuous fluctuation, from the surrender of Hong Kong Island to Britain in 1842, the Kowloon and the New Territories and surrounding islands, to its handover in 1997. Today its identity and space are tested at and within its administrative boundaries, which will formally dissipate in 2047.

The "border" has often been a reference to the jagged line that encloses what is named "Hong Kong". Yet borders hold various implications beyond their cartographic definitions, and their functions surpass the space around this line. Importantly, borders have constantly been subject to shifts, appearing and disappearing as political spaces are dispersed or rearranged. Such changes occur not only at the administrative boundaries; borders also act in other spaces and technologies where borders have superimposed themselves on various scales. In the matter of a governing body, borders are important spaces bound to sovereign power and governmental practices. Borders are infrastructures of control, and "…activities before the border, at the border, across the border and behind the border are all crucial

Figure 2.8 (previous) Diagram of the One Country, Two Systems constituion with proposed legislation along a spectrum. Image by author.

elements in effective border control."[23] Spatially, borders are the embodiment of dynamics for which mechanisms for control are necessary. They are mechanisms that order the dynamics between law, capital, labour, political power, and subjects without necessary emergence in the form of walls[24] or other permanent structures.

The operations of Hong Kong itself are defined by border mechanisms that mediate regimes—of Britain and China—and levels of production in both its life as a colony and post-handover. While it was clear that the capitalist and communist regimes of China and Britain were at odds throughout the history of Hong Kong, the city's border remained permeable and porous. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the British government established the Frontier Closed Area. The area was intended to serve as a buffer zone along the administrative border at the Shenzhen River as a method to limit illegal border crossing.[25] Despite this, Hong Kong still received an influx of immigrants and struggled to meet demands for water. By 1960, British officials began importing water from Dongjiang through Shenzhen. While the British rejected expressions of communist and anti-colonial sentiments influenced by China, an "exception" is made at the border to accommodate the functionality of Hong Kong. This eventually built a dependency and became a part of China's economic reform that required foreign exchange.[26] Years before the expiration of the lease over Hong Kong, the existence and operations of Hong Kong were linked to that of China, through the mechanism of a selective border with exceptions. That is to say, the integration of Hong Kong had long been appointed prior to the handover.

In the 1980s, China began developing zoning technologies, the rezoning of national territory to optimize cities for capitalization as part of its plans to open its markets.[27] Aihwa Ong describes such technologies as exceptions. Such exception is the same technology that allowed for Hong Kong's maintenance of its relative freedom as a SAR through


PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL COMPLEX
CROSS-BORDER COACH LOUNGE
CROSS-BORDER COACH TERMINAL
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE CENTRE
MALL


MAINLAND CHINESE JURISDICTION
ARRIVALS CIRCULATION
DEPARTURES CIRCULATION
AUSTIN MTR STATION
CUSTOMS (DEPARTURES)
WEST KOWLOON HIGH-SPEED RAILWAY TERMINAL
CUSTOMS (ARRIVALS)
AIRPORT EXPRESS SUBWAY STATION
KOWLOON MTR STATION

administrative exception. The very definition of Hong Kong as a constitutional and legal exception is a border in and of itself. Since its establishment, however, there have been multiple attempts to puncture this barrier through the introduction of exceptions to the SAR's constitution.

The proposed anti-subversion bill in 2003 and the proposed National Education curriculum are examples of the exception that attempts to establish alternative norms in the SAR and its border, norms in disparity with that which is promised in the Declaration—for example, on political, expression and protest freedoms. However, a prominent perforation and exception to Hong Kong's border are the West Kowloon High-Speed Railway Station. The station is part of a plan to link Hong Kong to the railway line that connects Guangzhou and Shenzhen and may be seen as a mechanism to penetrate Hong Kong's border for political integration. Border technologies such as the Frontier Closed Area that limit movement through distance are quickly diminished as the railway diminishes distances between China and Hong Kong territories. More importantly, however, the West Kowloon Station is also a subterranean extension of the Chinese border within the administrative boundaries of Hong Kong. Stationed at the lower levels of the station complex is the Chinese customs point, from which Chinese laws are enacted.

The shared checkpoint is an exception to Hong Kong's constitutive border—One Country, Two Systems—puncturing and diminishing its definitions.[28] "[I]t's hard to know where Hong Kong stops and China begins," *The Guardian* writes as the terminus completes construction.[29] The obscured distinction between Hong Kong and Chinese space had been troubling for residents and critics in the eight years of its construction as there were increasing ties of the local administration to Beijing. The attempts to introduce various policies related to integrating education and security laws in previous years highlight this station as another method of imposing or diminishing Hong Kong's

Figure 2.9 (previous) Exploded view of publicly accessible circulation pathways adjacent to the West Kowloon Railway Terminal. Image by author

border. The physical infrastructure, in this case, realizes the implications of the dynamic permeability of borders in favour of sovereign power. Physically, an exception has announced itself, imposing a puncture in the border mechanism of the Hong Kong Basic Law established by the One Country Two System concept.

Borders as methods of control extend beyond attempts to establish Chinese sovereign power through political ties and integration with China; mechanisms for establishing such power have long been embedded in the control of public spaces in Hong Kong. The Public Order Ordinance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is a barrier establishing spatial order in response to threats to the British sovereign power by limiting activities in public spaces. Relative to the statement that promised Hong Kong universal suffrage, the principles of this ordinance had been generously implemented in the anti-ELAB demonstrations. Given the ordinance was founded in response to the clashes caused by failed attempts of the police to disband protests, its laws act as mechanisms to reinforce sovereign power in a time the public had little confidence. By authorising power to the police, assembly in public spaces can be heavily scrutinised and controlled, with unlawful assemblies defined loosely as the congregation of three or more persons who conduct themselves in "provocative" manners that police believe would lead to "breach of peace".[30] Such police authority continues to protect the power and control of the Hong Kong government, regulating the flows and dynamics of the accessibility to public space. Police power effectively borders the public sphere and public spaces. And like other borders, they are interfaces of conflict in sites of contention and protests.

HONG KONG'S SPATIAL STRUGGLES

Figure 2.10 (next) Indication of the spatial arrangements at the West Kowloon Railway Terminal as a space of resistance in the Anti-ELAB Movement. Image by author.

The *Basilica*, *Capitolium*, *Theatrum* and *Templa* are only some of many elements that define Roman cities. While structures like *Aquae Ductus* performed infrastructural


PROTESTORS GATHER AT DESTINATION
CHINESE
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WHAT THE PROT
POLICE CHECKING TRAIN TICKETS BEFORE LETTING PASSENGERS THROUGH
WATER-FILLED BARRIERS


TOURIST
HOTOS OF
EST MARCH
PLAINING
OURIST
EST IS FOR
PROTESTORS WALK TOWARDS OTHER ROADS AND OCCUPY PATHS
MORE PROTESTORS THAN ANTICIPATED JOINED THE PROTEST MARCH; LARGE CROWDS ARRIVING THE SITE PUSH THROUGH POLICE TAPE.


1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY FOUNDED
HK FRONTIER CLOSED AREA ESTABLISHED
PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE WRITTEN
LABOUR STRIKE/ ANTI-COLONIAL PROTESTS
STAR FERRY FARE INCREASE PROTESTS
DEFEND DIAOYUTAI ISLANDS MOVEMENT
TIANANMEN SQUA
PROTESTS AND CONCERT
ANNUAL VIGIL &


2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS
ANDOVER
FRONTIER
CLOSED AREA
REDUCED
NATIONAL
SECURITY
LAW
EXTRADITION
LAW
AMENDMENT
PROPOSED
ARTICLE 23
PROTESTS
ANTI-NATIONAL
EDUCATION
PROTESTS
ARE
OCCUPY
CENTRAL
ANTI-ELAB
MOVEMENT
WEST-KOWLOON
STATION BUILT
ANNUAL JULY 1ST MARCH
DEMONSTRATION FOR TIANANMEN EVENT
TIANANMEN
VIGIL BANNED


RICE VERMICELLI


狼英下台

networks, social and commercial networks collect at the *Forum*. It is a space of exchange and discourse of social and political life. Public spaces as a traditional medium for the public sphere is continuously challenged in Hong Kong. In addition to legislative control and policing of available public spaces, truly "public" spaces are increasingly rare in the highly capitalized landscape of the city.

In favour of commodifying space in Hong Kong, public open spaces average at around 2.7m^2 per capita, with older urban areas or city centres such as Mong Kok at 0.6m^2 per capita. In contrast to other Asian cities—such as Singapore at 7.5m^2 per capita, Seoul at 6.1m^2 per capita or Tokyo at 5.8m^2 per capita[31]—Hong Kongers are significantly underattended. In addition, the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines (HKPSG) from the government include in its statistics spaces that are privately owned.[32] Venues open to the public, provided and managed by the private sector, are rationalised as mechanisms to mitigate the intensity of developments in urban areas. However, much of such spaces are inaccessible, with heavy surveillance and strict regulations on its utilization. Accordingly—and given the disparities in the voting system favouring private sectors over individuals—the city is systematically internalised with the privatisation of the physical public sphere. Mike Davis, from the North American perspective, criticises this hostility of urban fortifications in cities.[33] Likewise, privately owned public spaces in Hong Kong have become a method for control, impacting social mobility and favouring profitability over inclusivity and accessibility. In the neoliberal climate of Hong Kong, privatisation has become mechanism to isolate and border those who are privileged.

Figure 2.11 (previous) Timeline depicting major protests and related legislation. Image by author.

Figure 2.12 (opposite top) Under the HSBC headquarters, domestic workers in Hong Kong occupy space on their day off. Photo by Jessica Hormas.

Figure 2.13 (opposite bottom) Tents set up at the occupation site of the Umbrella Movement. Photo by Vincent Yu.

The systematic fortification of the neoliberal climate of Hong Kong thus results in spatial practices founded in reclaiming the physical public sphere. Bruyns and Nel represent this practice in the term "lateral-privatisation":

> … born from the coupling of binary concepts of [i] privatisation—as 'rights to' and claim 'over'

> space for specific means—with [ii] working with states of impermanence, as an iterative process of claiming and reclaiming any accessible spaces for periods of time.[34]

Bruyns and Nel describe in their publication lateral-privatisation as a practice performed by foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong. On Sunday mornings, foreign domestic workers that attend to many families in Hong Kong gather below the pedestrian bridges and on the streets of Central. [35] Cushioned by flattened carton boxes, the workers take over the public spaces in a collective picnic beneath the shadow of luxury stores and five-star hotels or under the HSBC headquarters. Through lateral-privatisation, the domestic workers transform these public spaces into temporary zones of social interaction. In the context of the marginalisation of foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong—facing low wages, the lack of labour laws and mistreatment from employers[36]—the occupancy of public spaces that would otherwise restrict such activities. The agglomeration of these individuals effectively produces a state of exception that both fortify against and negotiates with the city and its neoliberal operations. Such concept may be applied to the protests, occupations, and marches of the Anti-ELAB Movement that filled streets, overpasses, university campuses and bridges, barricading spaces of the city, rigorously reclaiming space and imposing presence. Thus, lateral-privatisation is a method to counter and act as a "border" to disrupt flows to the spatial networks of the interiorised, private city.

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DRAWING THE LINE

Against the backdrop of the densely packed tower of Hong Kong, protesters are photographed (Fig. 3.1), filling a stretch of Kennedy Road in Wan Chai in a march that extended from Victoria Park to the Government Headquarters in Admiralty. Like most streets, Kennedy Road's typical street section would have depicted clear pedestrian sidewalks and roads. On June 16, 2019, however, this stretch of Hong Kong became a site of contention in response to the Extradition Law Amendment Bill. On this day, two million people—almost a third of the city's population—marched through Hong Kong Island in one of the city's largest protests.[1]

Merely a week prior, more than a million people, three-times the anticipated participants, had protested against the Bill on the same streets. Despite the turnout, Chief Executive Carrie Lam's administration released a statement rejecting protesters' demands and announced the continuation of the Bill's reading. Frustrated protesters then organized to assemble on the day of the reading on June 12 to assemble in Tamar Park and surround the Legislative Council before pro-Beijing representatives entered the building. By 11am, the Legislative Council had announced that the session was cancelled, but protesters remained as they demanded the withdrawal of the Bill. Slowly as the day proceeded, the peaceful occupation expanded as more protesters arrived, and the barricades they constructed shifted outward. A police line was established, and when protesters sought to expand their border towards it, the police responded with pepper spray and tear gas. The protest unfolded to become a violent scene to disperse the protesters; although police had conceded later that only 5 had rioted, they deployed 240 rounds of tear gas and 42 rubber bullets and sponge grenades.[2] The excessive response from the police thus catalyzed the largest protest in the post-colony.

Following the violent clashes, five demands were developed by protesters:

1) Full withdrawal of the extradition bill
2) Retracting the classification of the June 12 protest as a "riot"

Figure 3.1 (opposite) Along Kennedy Road, protesters gathered at a rally on June 16, 2019. Photo by Jin-Cong Wong.


STUDENTS'
STRIKE
AGAINST
CHINA
EXTRADITION
中學生
罷課
6.12
添馬公園
街頭學習・成為公民
青年反修例
關注組
DEMOVANILE
X
全港中學生
反修例關注組
X
香港飛志

3) Amnesty for arrested protesters
4) Establish an independent commission of inquiry into police brutality
5) Dual universal suffrage[3]

The basis of these demands shaped the goals of the movement as it evolves in adaption to the spatial policing tools that worked to disrupt the protests.

DISSECTING A MOVEMENT

The Anti-ELAB Movement occurred over a long span of time, and the essence of its demands remained active in discourse amongst some Hong Kongers and activists in the city and overseas. This thesis focuses on the related spatial resistance that happened within Hong Kong and defines the length of this movement based on the classification of its development. For ease of examination of a lengthy movement that involved thousands of demonstrations, it is dissected into two classes, strategies and tactics, referring to Michel de Certeau's definitions in his book *The Practice of everyday life*:

> *I call a "strategy" the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an "environment." A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper (propre) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, "clienteles," "targets," or "objects" of research). Political, economic, and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model. I call a "tactic," on the other hand, a calculus which cannot count on a "proper" (a spatial or institutional localization), nor*

Figure 3.2 (opposite) Poster sharing plans for student strike on June 12 at Tamar Park, adjacent to the Legislative Council building. Image via public domain.

> *thus on a border-line distinguishing the other as a visible totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with respect to circumstances. The "proper" is a victory of space over time. On the contrary…a tactic depends on time—it is always on the watch for opportunities...*[4]

De Certeau describes that strategy as manipulation or speculation of power relationships through a space that serves as its base. In contrast, tactics are manipulations that are determined by the absence of locus. Although De Certeau describes this distinction with reference to powers as in the government or corporations and "the weak" as in individuals, this thesis trusts that a highly privatised polity (that is both in terms of its management of urban spaces and administrative processes) to have similar aims in managing power relationships. That is, the locus De Certeau describes in reference to the state or privatized entities—such as, the space within the administrative border of Hong Kong, both in its physical and legislative forms—is countered by the principles or demands of the Movement, or "counter-strategies" used to resist that of the polity. Accordingly, "tactics" refers to not only physical artefacts used in space but also space itself as versatile tools for sustaining given strategies depending on changing conditions.

The Movement is dissected through the two categories into which nests different elements. Strategies as the anchoring approaches to the Movement include its networks and spatial organization, while tactics as variable, versatile elements employed as needed include target spaces and various tools and artefacts. Consequently, the beginning and "end" of the protest are constrained through the spatial

elements as defined by these elements as they appeared in the region of Hong Kong. Other demonstrations and acts of resistance beyond the timeline of contentious spatiality are not considered in this study and are considered extensions of the resistance beyond the scope of the Movement. Together the strategies and tactics used in the Movement form a framework and language for spatial resistance.

STRATEGIES: THE ANCHORING PRINCIPLES

THE NETWORK

As strategies used in policing in the form of legislation have been covered in previous chapters, this section focuses on the strategies of protesters. When it came to organizing various gatherings for the Movement, unlike the Umbrella Movement—which was primarily planned and led by its organisers Benny Tai, Reverend Chiu Yiu-Ming and Chan Kin-Man—the Anti-ELAB Movement was largely leaderless. Other than authorized protests coordinated by the Civil Human Rights Front—the same organiser for the annually 1st protests—the Movement organised itself through open discussions in the virtual public sphere. The virtual public sphere referred to here are the spaces available through the internet for expression through text, images or videos. For protesters, online forums like LIHKG—a Hong Kong-based forum similar to reddit—and mobile messaging apps like Whatsapp or Telegram were common means for sharing information about upcoming protests and conditions at ongoing protest sites.[5] Protesters also utilised more localised mobile functions such as AirDrop for sharing information. The widespread utilisation of technology to access the virtual public sphere allowed not only the multiplication and reproduction of visual information of protest spaces in the

Figure 3.3 (next) Locations at which demonstrations related to the Anti-ELAB Movement occured are mapped to show mobilization of the Movement. Image by author.




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

CENTRALIZED NETWORK



DISTRIBUTED NETWORK



DECENTRALIZED NETWORK



DECENTRALIZED-DISTRIBUTED NETWORK

form of images, but also provided the ability for protesters to act anonymously.

"Leaderless" in this sense refers to this lateral network of actors with equal agency diffused through the use of the virtual public sphere for the discussion of spatial activities in its physical counterpart.

This strategic organisation can be described by borrowing Paul Baran's network theory models from "On Distributed Communications Networks". The theory explores the virtual communication networks through actors called "nodes". Such nodes act as switches that route information through its connection with others. Baran describes three forms of networks: the centralized network, where nodes are connected to a single hotspot, from which they are managed; the decentralized network, where a hotspot manages nodes that become sub-level centres for other nodes; and lastly, the distributed network, where nodes do not converge at any given central node. The theory describes that the former two models, where node or switch connections converge, have problems maintaining connections in the face of technical issues. Nodes that connect at central switches thus fail to perform as actors when any central switch fails. Baran conceives of a distributed network that resolves this issue, as the network employs no centralized switches, whereby "unmanned" nodes can use alternative connections in the network should any fail to perform.[6]

Given the prevalence of technology and social media in the network of protesters of the Movement, Baran's models provide a comprehensive representation of the relationship between actors and sites of resistance. In Hong Kong's last significant social movement, the Umbrella Revolution, with primary leaders and two main occupation sites, its network is highly centralized both in terms of organization and space. The Anti-ELAB Movement may relate more closely to Baran's conceived distributed model; however, this model suggests that nodes are singular actors. To illustrate the collective nature of protests—especially in

Figure 3.4 (opposite top) The three network models desribed by Paul Baran, the centralized network, decentralized network and distributed network. Image recreated by author.

Figure 3.5 (opposite bottom) The hybrid model of the Decentralized-Distributed Network. Image by author


還我真相

the mobilization strategies used in the later phases—an adaptation is made to create the decentralized-distributed model. The central node describes the aims or cause of the Movement, which are inherently tied, to which nodes are connected, representing various sites of resistance in virtual or physical space. These nodes are connected and extend as centres to other connected nodes to describe the network between protesters. Effectively, virtual networks allowed the development of distributed sites of resistance in alternative locations during the "Blossom Everywhere" phase. Baran's concept for versatility and stability is effectively enacted, contributing to the duration of the Movement. Spatial tactics, such as Lennon Walls or brick barricades, also act within this network as "unmanned"—that is, not necessarily requiring the presence of protesters in its vicinities—nodes as mobile borders.

The virtual networks provided by the virtual public sphere, such as social media and online platforms, thus act as important infrastructures to the physical public, similar to the urban infrastructures of Hong Kong and their performance for the production of capital. That is, in spaces with high levels of surveillance and policing, the creation and reclamation of politicised public spaces depend highly on virtual networks. At once, through strategic mobilization in the virtual public sphere, distanced physical spaces are bridged, tethered together by the alternative narrative and identity that protests seek to build.

SPATIAL MOBILIZATION

Figure 3.6 (opposite) Supporters of the movement gather at a shopping centre in Sha Tin. Photo by Nora Tam.

Figure 3.7 (next) Frequency of protests over time. Image by author. Data retrieved from https://hongkong.liveumap.com

Through the leaderless network, strategies for spatial mobilization were developed to counter that of the police. As the police displayed an abundance of tactical tools, principles that guided the movement of protesters in space was required. These spatial mobilization strategies can be distinguished into three stages, the first being a traditional form of strategy, and the latter two strategies developed



	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	40	41	42	43	44	44	45	46
	Jun			Jul					Aug					Sep					Oct						Nov	
Mall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	3	2	12
Lunch Street Assembly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18
Infrastructure (Strike)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	5	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Memorial (Street/Subway Station)	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	3	0	7	3	0	0	10	0	44	1
Lenon Walls	0	0	0	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	8	2	5	0	13	0	0	2	0	0	20	0
Subway Station/Bridges	0	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	1	5	4	0	6	2	12	7	7	2	2	5	7	2	6	4	24	7
Street March	0	1	0	3	4	12	3	3	0	1	0	6	1	0	1	2	0	0	21	7	21	7	6	0	9	6
Public Spaces Assemblies	2	2	9	13	8	2	13	2	6	29	17	74	17	5	6	22	18	3	13	51	39	26	45	20	18	19

Centralized Mass Demonstrations

Be Water



47	48	49	50	51	52	53	1	2	3	4	5	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	14	15	16	17	18	18	19	20	21	22	23
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1	27	3	0	2	27	10	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	6	39	4	0	0
15	21	33	41	59	10	6	5	27	33	5	0	0	0	6	7	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	1	6	0
24	2	1	0	2	5	0	0	0	1	0	20	24	22	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
0	0	0	8	10	2	9	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	0	2	0
0	1	2	1	2	9	4	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	8	8	16	3	22	35	0	11	5	8	34	0	15	6	15	4	2	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	5	4	3	1	4	3
4	1	6	6	4	14	10	13	3	2	1	1	0	3	4	4	3	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	5	0
9	22	23	51	43	25	9	9	11	17	21	6	1	11	14	12	0	2	1	4	2	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	0

2020

Blossom Everywhere

named by protesters for intercommunication and networks for solidarity.

(1) Centralized Mass Demonstration

The earliest protests and acts of resistance occurred at traditional target spaces related to sovereign power or Hong Kong's historical protest traditions and practices. These demonstrations have clear singular spatial targets. These include the early marches that stretched from Victoria Park across the Hong Kong Island, targeting the government headquarters. This strategy involves large concentrations of participants. This proved to be very successful in drawing awareness in the early stages of the protest that conformed to the practice of obtaining approval as outlined in the Public Order Ordinance. However, as proceedings related to the proposed Bill continued to be delayed and not withdrawn despite the turnouts of these protests, another strategy was needed.

(2) "Be Water"

Inspired by Bruce Lee, protesters borrowed the slogan "be water" to describe the principles to their next spatial strategy. The rise of police brutality in the excessive use of force and dispersal tools required protests to become more responsive. The "Be Water" principle calls for agile and mobile responses from protesters when moving through space due to shifting conditions that require protests to shift between the spaces they occupy. The swift movements through the city to find alternative spaces for dodging the police require a level of familiarity with the city. Unlike the Centralized Mass Demonstration, where a clear plan of action is available, "Be Water" requires place-based reaction and participation. At once, the Movement is decentralized through this principle. The terminology was also a slogan for solidarity.

(3) "Blossom Everywhere" (遍地開花)

> Towards the end of the Movement, protesters adopted the slogan "Blossom Everywhere" for its final shift in spatial mobilization strategy. Protests shifted to become smaller but more localized assemblies, that is, in settings not typically associated with historical protests and demonstrations. This strategy paralleled the distributed network of the virtual spaces, providing more independence to the assemblies. The knowledge of local areas—often of ones in which a protester dwells—lessened the dependence on transportation, improving protesters' safety and agency between arrests, police violence and transit closures.

These three principles formed the strategies that protesters followed in organizing demonstrations. Nested in the principles are a range of spatial tactics, some of which are more conventional, such as marches, and others, such as picnics, which were methods to passively resist without conforming to conventional police definitions of dissent.

TACTICS: THE ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS

TOOLS

Throughout the various phases of mobility strategies used by protesters, the Hong Kong police responded with various tools to subdue protesters. The increased policing of public spaces during the Movement led protesters to adopt their own tools to respond to the physical and chemical tools used by the police. For both parties, tools are physical artefacts that are used to inhibit or manipulate the mobility of the opposing group. For the police, this manipulation

01 BATONS

Police batons were used to overpower protesters, increasing distance.

02 RIOT SHIELD

Riot shields provided protection to police. When used collectively establishes a mobile barrier to curb mobility of protesters.



03 WATER CANON

Water canons, used with blue dye, marked targets and subdue protesters at long distances with high-velocity streams of water.

04 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR

Protective gear, including masks, provided protection from physical and chemical policing tools while remaining anonymous.



05 BARRICADES

Protesters built barricades with urban street furniture and everyday objects such as, bamboo, bricks, metal fences or umbrellas, to obstruct police mobility or daily operations of the city.



of mobility may refer to minimalizing the area of spaces being used by protesters or expanding police spaces of agency. In other words, in reference to the discussion of bordering and sovereign power in the previous section, policing artefacts that manipulate activities in space are tools for establishing the police as a mobile state border. The responding physical artefacts that protesters adopt thus are tools in establishing a counter-border that, in the case of this Movement, attempts to protect rights to expression and protest in the physical public sphere.

For the police, tools are formally designed objects and often imported, thus largely universally similar. The Hong Kong Police Force utilizes many of these tools that are also employed by police forces abroad. These tools target different ranges of distances to overwhelm protesters physically and chemically to prevent or inhibit political action and spatial mobility. At shorter distances, police used batons as extension tools to overpower protesters or create distance between themselves as a target. Riot shields are also utilized as a protection tool for the police and, when used collectively, form a mobile barrier at the police line to inhibit advancements by protesters to expand the occupied area. Chemical tools were also used to cause temporary irritation or impairment to bodily functions. Tear gas and pepper agents were extensively used to cause irritations to eyes and lungs and often affected multiple targets. Pepper agents were mainly used in two forms, as a spray at short distances, often at the police line; it can also be used at a distance as a projectile. Similarly, tear gas is often deployed through a projectile at a distance. Other non-chemical projectiles included beanbag rounds, rubber bullets, as well as live rounds in some cases. Additionally, to visually identify protesters, the police also utilized water canons in conjunction with blue dye, tinting protesters as they were hit by the high-velocity stream of water. Together these tools acted as methods for physical control to establish the police as a form of mobile border in spaces of resistance.

Figure 3.8 (opposite) Catalogue of tools used during the Movement. Image by author.

06 PROJECTILE ROUNDS



Police used projectile rounds as high-velocity non lethal tools to subdue targets at far distances.

07 TEAR GAS & PEPPER SPRAY

Pepper spray and tear gas are used to disperse assemblies and occupied zones by causing irritation to eyes and lungs.

08 BRICKS

A commonly found material, bricks were used as barriers to curb movement through different methods of stacking. When distributed in space, they are quickly stacked with minimal effort while effectively blocking paths.



09 UMBRELLAS

Adopted from the Occupy Central movement, umbrellas are effective tools for deflecting police projectiles. When used together, they produce barricades, preventing police advances



10 ANTI-TEAR GAS

Protesters respond to chemical weapons with common objects such as wet rags, traffic cones or wok covers to dissipate the effects. Some protesters use sport equipment like rackets to send away incoming chemical cannisters.

Facing these designed technologies that targeted their participation in the physical public sphere, protesters adopted a set of tools by adopting objects that were readily available or easily accessible. Learning from the response to police during Occupy Central, protesters once again used umbrellas as tools for protection singularly as well as collectively and for barricading. Depending on the target space, umbrellas were also useful tools in blocking police sightlines to minimize the efficacy and precision of police projectile tools. Barricading was an effective means to inhibit the advancement of the police line and to suspend the operation of infrastructure through occupation during city-wide strikes. Barricades obstructed police mobility by blocking off circulation spaces using materials found at the site of the protest, such as common street furniture like pedestrian street fences, bamboo—usually used for scaffolding—garbage bins, and bricks. Bricks were a particularly interesting material adaptation, not only for their inverted role that is often to delineate where pedestrians walk as a stacked arch but also for their sense of permanence when stacked into a low barricading wall within temporarily occupied spaces. The widely used stacked arch form also received a Beazley Design of the Year Award in 2020[7], and indeed, collectively, it served effectively as a barrier to prevent access to and through spaces. Barricades were important composite tools during city-wide strikes, aimed at interrupting operations of the city to hinder the capital exchanges that the city favours. Its function as a barrier and effectiveness in maintaining distances from the police also meant that the protesters needed tools for countering the projectile tools utilized by the police. Personal protective gears like masks, helmets—even those used for biking—gloves, goggles or even cling film over eyes were helpful in minimizing the effects of physical and chemical policing tools. Meanwhile, some would volunteer to handle tear gas canisters that land within the protest site with anti-tear gas tools—like traffic cones, bowls, wok covers and bottled water—as another line of protection of the protest space. Ultimately, as formally designed tools for controlling

Figure 3.10 (opposite) Catalogue of tools used during the Movement. Image by author.

Figure 3.9 (next) Students occupied the Polytechnic University when a city-wide strike is called. Police access is hindered by bordering the campus with barricades and use of other artefacts. Image by author.


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
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
HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY


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
HIGH SECURITY PRESENCE
GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS
STREETS
SUBWAY STATIONS
UNIVERSITIES
MALLS
YELLOW ECONOMY BUSINESSES
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
PARKS
LENNON WALLS
RESIDENTIAL UNITS
LOW SECURITY PRESENCE

mobility in space are not accessible by civilians, protesters utilize everyday resources, objects and materials to fashion tools for establishing their counter-border.

TARGET SPACES

The iterative development of the organization of various spatial strategies corresponded to a catalogue of targeted spaces as tactics employed in response to contextual conditions such as police activity. Tools for controlling movement within these spaces are employed, corresponding to the goals of different spaces. The widespread participation in the movement triggered a large range of protests in various spaces. These spaces can be divided into several categories; political spaces, symbolic spaces, other urban spaces and sites of solidarity. Political spaces refer to spaces that latently hold political sentiments, whether through their programmatic functions or previous public discourse. Symbolic spaces refer to spaces that hold alternative value to the city, for example, the Hong Kong identity. Other politicized spaces refer to spaces that are not inherently political outside of processes of resistance. And lastly, sites of solidarity refer to spaces of passive resistance that act as "unmanned" nodes of expression.[8] Protest as a form of bordering, as a result, establishes these spaces as forms of fortification—as vehicles for protesters' demands while keeping the police or state out. These protest spaces also attempt to produce punctures to Hong Kong's sovereign border, not unlike the ability of the West Kowloon high-speed railway station to physically puncture the space described in the "One Country Two Systems" concept.

Political Spaces:

1) Government Headquarters
   Part of the government headquarters, as the core of administrative functions of Hong Kong has always been a target of protests. The 2019 Anti-ELAB Movement targeted specifically the portion where the Leg-

Figure 3.11 (opposite) The visualization of shifts in politicized spaces in relationship to levels of activism and security through target space examples. Image by author.

islative Council Complex, where the reading of the proposed extradition bill occurred. Protesters targeted the exterior spaces adjacent to its entrance at one of the first protests in the Movement. Later, protesters stormed the building amidst anger related to the lack of a total withdrawal of the Bill and excessive use of force by the police.

2) West Kowloon High-Speed Railway Station
As a clear puncture point to the "One Country Two Systems" space, the railway terminal became a targeted destination of a protest march. As a point of entry for some Chinese tourists, protesters advocated for the movement by approaching these tourists and outlining the motivation for the protest.

3) Victoria Park
Plans for Victoria Park, as it was conceived in the colonial era, had always been to create an "orderly, recreational, and non-political" space.[9] Protests in the early 1970s related to the Defend Diaoyutai Islands Movement in the park heavily politicized the space as the clashes occurred over the approval of the protest—required through the 1967 Public Order Ordinance—with the British police. The clashes ultimately established a new spatial norm for Victoria Park, where a level of "tolerance" is given by the government for political activities within the space.[10] This suggests its default position as a gathering space for various protests, such as, the starting point to the 1989 and 2003 marches, as well as the annual memorial vigil for the Tiananmen Massacre and the annual protest marches on July 1st.

Other Urban Spaces:

4) Airport
As another point of access through the administrative border, protesters occupied the airport to increase the visibility of the Movement. This caused increased policing and security at the entrance, affecting the flow of the airport's operations.[11]

5) Malls
In the densely populated city, there are multiple malls even within one neighbourhood. As the "Blossom Everywhere" strategy came into effect, protesters began assembling at malls within their residential neighbourhoods, repeating the demands of the movement or singing "Glory to Hong Kong" the anthem composed by a supporter of the movement.

6) Bridges
Using different tools, protesters barricaded these spaces to halt circulation leading to certain areas. Bridges also provided good sightlines of the street from a higher elevation.

7) Universities
A large demographic of protesters in the Movement were students. Universities became important spaces for students to safeguard as spaces for discussion and acquiring knowledge. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University was also situated adjacent to the cross-harbour tunnel, one of the major routes to travel from Kowloon to Hong Kong Island. Likewise, the Chinese University of Hong Kong was adjacent to the Tolo Highway. Their proximity to these major infrastructural paths made for optimal spaces for an occupation to block these infrastructures during the city-wide general strike. As police arrived to ease the blockage caused by barricades built by protesters, the universities became major sites of violent clashes.

8) Transit Spaces
As protesters pursued their demands through strikes, transit spaces, including roads and tunnels, were barricaded in attempts to halt operations of the city. The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) stations also became specific sites of contention as police utilised tear gas in the interior spaces of stations.[12] After more violent incidents, protesters held memorials and placed offerings at MTR station exits.


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Symbolic Spaces:

9) Lion Rock
The Lion Rock spirit rose in the colonial era as a symbol of Hong Kong people. The idea was coined after a television documentary series named "Below the Lion Rock" featuring stories about the city's industrious people. The Lion Rock spirit thus refers to the perseverance of Hong Kongers. The name of the television series references the Lion Rock Hill, which sits between Kowloon and the New Territories, overlooking the city. In the Postcolony, this geographic symbol adopted another role as a place for protest and expression. During the Occupy Central movement, protesters hung a large banner on the Lion Rock, reading "I want real universal suffrage".[13] Likewise, the Lion Rock continues to be a symbolic landmark. During the 2019 Movement, protesters organized the "Hong Kong Way" creating a human chain by holding hands that stretched across the city. Part of this chain reached the top of the Lion Rock, some 495 metres above the city. The chain remained until the skies were dark, and as a new democracy banner draped over the rock, the summit was brightly lit by flashlights of protesters.

Spaces of Solidarity:

10) Lennon Walls
Lennon Walls are spaces that were also created during the Umbrella Movement. These are publicly accessible walls—for example, those of pedestrian tunnels—covered with posters and post-it notes writing the demands or words of encouragement. In the network of the protest, these become largely passive spaces for "unmanned" resistance. Pro-Beijing supporters would work to remove these spaces as new ones continue to be created.

11) Private Residential
Residents showed solidarity for the movement by singing the anthem of the movement, "Glory to Hong Kong", or echoing the demands out the window.

Figure 3.12 (opposite top) A banner reading "Establish real dual universal suffrage" draped on the Lion Rock. Protesters gathered around it in a human chain. Photo by Kevin Cheng.

Figure 3.13 (opposite bottom) A Lennon wall in a pedstrian subway. A plastic cover prevents pro-Beijing supporters from removing notes. Photo by Kris Cheng.

12) Commercial ("Yellow" Economy)
Local businesses were divided by their views on the movement, and protesters identified those that supported them as "yellow" businesses, the colour that represented pro-democracy supporters. Similarly, protesters researched businesses that are managed or owned by pro-Beijing corporations, or "blue" businesses, and established a boycott list. Thus commercial spaces are divided and politicized, with some "yellow" businesses also providing spaces for Lennon walls.

While protests at most of these types of spaces involved the use of physical tools to respond to police, some protests involved identifying loopholes in the legislation. For instance, protesters planned a gathering as a collective picnic to passively resist. By opting for an activity of everyday life en masse, protesters attempted to dodge the concept of perceived "threat" mentioned in the Public Order Ordinance.[14] Similarly, in the early stages of the Movement, some protesters also challenged the Ordinance, which provides an exception to religious gatherings[15], by singing Christian hymns during mass assemblies. The adopted strategies and use of tools in the Movement ultimately highlight the familiarity of protesters with Hong Kong's spaces, police's methods of control and prior protests.

Notes

1 "Hong Kong Protest: 'Nearly Two Million' Join Demonstration." 2019. BBC, June 17. Accessed December 2, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48656471.

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3 This referes to the election for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive.

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5 Mattingly, Daniel. 2019. "The Hong Kong protests have been going on for months. What explains this sustained action?" The Washington Post, September 30. Accessed October 12, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/30/hong-kong-protests-have-been-going-months-what-explains-this-sustained-action/

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8 It should be noted these categories are not exclusive to one another. Also, spaces are categorized based on protest history of Hong Kong prior to this movement. That is, some spaces may have crossed into other categories following the Movement.

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13 Blundy, Rachel. 2017. "Lion Rock spirit still casting its spell on Hong Kong." South China Morning Post. April 22. Accessed May 25, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education-community/article/2089601/lion-rock-spirit-still-casting-its-spell-hong

14 Lam, Jeffie and Linda Lew. 2019. "Strikes, class boycotts and 'picnics':how ordinary people across Hong Kong are mobilising to take action against extradition bill." South China Morning Post, June 12. Accessed May 25, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014108/strikes-class-boycotts-and-picnics-how-ordinary-people

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BEYOND THE LION ROCK


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In the final month of the Movement, passion and energy remained at high levels, despite the incoming transmissions of an unknown pandemic from the North. Protests picked up again due to discussions in Beijing about enacting the National Security Law, after months of few protests caused by fears of the mysterious virus. On the eve of the city's 23rd handover anniversary, the National Security Law came into effect after Beijing inserted the legislation into Hong Kong's constitution, bypassing the local legislature.[1] The security law criminalizes any acts of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces. With the law enacted, the government banned the widely used slogan from the Anit-ELAB Movement, "Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of our Times". Apple Daily, amongst other pro-democracy media outlets, and political groups have also been targeted. With ongoing development and changes related to the National Security Law, the Anti-ELAB protests could be the last of its type and scale in Hong Kong.

In a climate amidst an entanglement of crises and discontent, space performs an elementary role in changing the status quo. Hong Kong, as a politically and spatially unique environment, has challenged and revealed its relationship between space, control and change. Hong Kongers, marginalised by control from government and private powers, have displayed iterative developments in radical spatial practice in its post-colonial history. By reclaiming, appropriating and producing spaces, protesters fortified counter-borders in an attempt to access and protect their rights to expression, protest and space in the continual entanglement of imperialist, colonial-style spatial control.

In this thesis, the examination of the radical spatial practices of the Anti-ELAB Movement, in the context of a historical account of public spaces and protests, set out to reveal the spatial implications of establishing sovereign power in the subsequent governments. The introductory chapter uncovered Hong Kong's historical relationship with its border, highlighting fundamental concepts related to spatial

Figure 4.1 (opposite) Protesters hold up blank placards in response to the enactment of the National Security Law ban on a protest slogan. Photo by T. Siu.

legislation. The next chapter provided a focused account of protests and policing to examine the origins of spatial behaviours in protest. Finally, the direct examination of the Movement illustrated the different components inherited and invented as Hong Kongers addressed public spaces for resistance.

Initially, this thesis anticipated a detailed examination of the spatialities of policing and issues of police brutality through case studies. Ultimately, however, such a study may clash with the new National Security Law. Thus, the historical context related to protests and sovereign control was uncovered instead. This study illustrated valuable learnings related to how legislation shapes public spaces and makes valuable contributions, given the unique context of Hong Kong in terms of its administrative status and the immense potential in resistance movements due to its density. Hong Kong also presents the proposition that protests, as temporary and fluctuating spaces, build identity through time. Dissecting the movement within a narrative beyond its time uncovered the nuances and complexities of space and place in Hong Kong.

Changes to Hong Kong's spaces continue to develop with the impending expiration. While a movement of this scale may be scarce in Hong Kong's political future, there is significant room for studying the spatial complexities of protests for movements elsewhere. However, the case of Hong Kong provides meaningful considerations for developing networks for organizational and design processes. While legislation borders up and limits spaces in fights for societal change, spatial resistance continues to be essential "counter-borders" for change.

ONWARDS

The entanglement and continuity of the language of protest through time in Hong Kong's history suggest room to explore its continuity beyond the space of Hong Kong. The persistence in Hong Kong's battle for its public sphere is one that is relatable for many across Asian countries that today face similar powers that attempt to strip away democracy and the right to spatial political expression. Since Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Movement, similar struggles related to legislative limits on freedoms emerged in Thailand. Thousands protested in Bangkok against its government and the monarchy's role, defying bans on gatherings.
With the publicity of Hong Kong's protests in previous months, Thai protesters shed occupy strategies and borrowed Hong Kong's "Be Water" strategy for fluid gathering and subdue police targeting.[2] Thai protesters held umbrellas to shield themselves from tear gas and water cannons. After the arrests of protest leaders, protesters in Thailand took on the leaderless strategy used in Hong Kong, taking advantage of virtual spaces to plan action and increase spatial mobility.[3] At once, strategies and tactics used in spatial resistance are adapted and multiplied as a language at different scales in the fight for change. The transfer of spatial practices internationally suggests that there is room for the structural development of a language, perhaps with the involvement of spatial experts like architects. By understanding the complexities of forces that counter resistance, spatial experts can work towards societal changes by exploring beyond the confines of contracts, of capital and of remaining complicit with the status quo.

The extension of Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Movement is not limited to its strategies and tools. As Hong Kong experiences changes related to the consequences of the Movement, Covid-19 responses and the National Security Law, large numbers of people are emigrating from the city. Increasing limitations to spaces in Hong Kong means that there is a


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公道自在人心。
我哋係一班啱啱過嚟嘅香港人!
我哋將會係當日擺街站,
希望可以令更多人了解721警黑勾結事發經過。
當日會重溫「7.21鏗鏘集紀錄片」及文宣派發
歡迎任何人參與和討論
希望到時見到你哋!
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need to expand and find alternative spaces for expression and resistance. As the ban on the protest slogan is enacted, documentaries or works of art related to the protests have no place in Hong Kong. The film *Revolution of Our Times* by Kiwi Chow is an example of this condition. However, coinciding with the ongoing exodus movement, growing groups of recently emigrated Hong Kongers pooled funds to hold screening events at cinemas across the globe, including cities in Canada.[4] The documentary was also screened at the 2021 Cannes Film Festival. Similarly, a screening of a television documentary of the protests was held in Toronto on the anniversary of the violent clashes at a protest on July 21st in 2019. With growing groups of Hong Kongers abroad, alternative resistance spaces are emerging and multiplying. The absence of resistance in Hong Kong's spaces is countered by a new presence of political space elsewhere. The Anti-ELAB Movement was a turning point not only for Hong Kong's political narrative but also for emerging diasporic narratives abroad. Ultimately space is a fundamental vehicle for change through resistance. Moving forward, the study of these resultant diasporic spaces of resistance will be meaningful documentation for a comprehensive understanding and narrative of dislodged protest spaces. While the case of Hong Kong is one of misfortune, perhaps it serves as a lesson and a reminder to access and to create spaces of resistance, change and expression.

Figure 4.2 (opposite) A social media post by newcomers from Hong Kong. The post announces an event on the anniversary of violent clashes in a protest in Hong Kong. The event involves an information booth and screening of the documentary that captured the events of this particular protest. Anonymous image, public domain.

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