

Networked governance and summit diplomacy:  
shaping the maternal, newborn and child health agenda

by

Clint L. Abbott

A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
in fulfilment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Global Governance

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2012

© Clint L. Abbott 2012

## **Author's Declaration**

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## **Abstract**

Diplomatic summits serve as critical opportunities for national leaders to interact and mobilize the political will needed to address the world's greatest challenges. Yet, summits have a checkered past with both successes and failures. Consequently, summit diplomacy has been equated with highly publicized photo opportunities for heads of government and grandiose communiqués with vague commitments that are never fully realized. Due to concerns about their effectiveness, legitimacy, and representation, summits are in a period of transition. These trends and challenges are especially evident in the G8, and scholars have recognized that the G8 summit has evolved to include more actors than the past. Although acknowledged as a potential site of networked governance, empirical evidence of such activity is limited. Research has yet to identify the actors involved, the structures of the relationships, and the impact of networked approaches on the preparatory process. This research specifically explores the question of how a global level network affects the priorities adopted by the G8.

Using the 2010 G8 Summit as a case to examine the increased prevalence of networked activity, this study focuses on the Summit's signature initiative: maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH). MNCH is a longstanding global problem and despite efforts such as the Millennium Development Goals, poor health outcomes persist in regions throughout the world. But to understand the selection and shaping of MNCH as the signature initiative of the 2010 G8 Summit, a mixed method approach is used. Social network analysis provides a detailed description of the actors involved in networked governance in summit diplomacy for the G8, and the structure of their relationships with one another. Qualitative data analysis of 63 in depth interviews of network members illuminates the rich and varied perspectives of the participants, which yields insight about why and how actors engage each other in order to achieve individual and collective goals.

The study demonstrated that networked governance contributed to the political prioritization and substantive policy content of summit agenda items, determined during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process. In the case of MNCH, while the network was found to include of a diverse range of state and non-state actors, a core group of bureaucratic, political, and NGO actors played a prominent role in the selection and shaping of the MNCH initiative. Yet, the role, values and contributions of actors within the network were contested by network members during the preparatory process, demonstrating that shared goals and norms were not a

dominant feature of the network. Moreover, the networked governance process has not entirely escaped the confines of geographical boundaries, given the most central actors in the network met face-to-face on a regular basis and were located in close geographical proximity. Actors from regions where MNCH problems persist most severely remained marginalized in the networked approach.

While financial capital is an essential ingredient for the MNCH programs and interventions proposed for the G8 initiative, social capital was a neglected factor that is critical for building the capacity to generate new ideas and solutions. Actors within the 2010 G8 preparatory network for MNCH adopted various strategies to build and mobilize social capital. Specifically, a group of Canadian-based NGOs and an international organization formed a coalition in order to strategically advance the MNCH issue on the summit agenda. Conversely, government actors did not invest in developing and mobilizing social capital. Ultimately, informal strategies proved more valuable for breaking down hierarchical barriers and exerting influence than formal processes designed by government.

Networked governance was a key factor that contributed to the political prioritization and shaping of the MNCH signature initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit and increased the inclusiveness of the summit's preparatory process. However, while important, networked governance was not sufficient to fully explain the final outcomes – other factors such as domestic and global political contexts and the characteristics of the MNCH issue influenced the process and outcomes. Moreover, G8 summit diplomacy moved beyond being solely a state-based process in the case of MNCH, but the presence of a network of interconnected actors did not equate to better problem-solving. Although scholars and practitioners agree that integrated horizontal and vertical approaches are required for addressing the complexity of MNCH challenges, the networked approach failed to enable a move beyond conventional solutions to address the systemic nature of MNCH challenges. The findings of the study have important implications for policy and governance processes, where widespread cooperation among a network of state and non-state actors will be required for resolving intractable global problems.

## **Acknowledgements**

Many people made this research possible. I extend my most sincere gratitude and appreciation to all research participants and the following individuals in alphabetical order: Gerry Boychuk, Barry Carin, Peter Carrington, Rod Dobell, Peter Heap, Weldon Epp, John English, Paul Heinbecker, Eric Helleiner, Jenny Hill, Arif Lalani, Michele-Lee Moore, Gordon Smith, Harry Swain, Ramesh Thakur, Trish Van Berkel, and Jodie Walsh. I also thank friends and family for their support throughout the degree.

The following agencies and organizations provided generous financial and in-kind support that was critical to all stages of the work: Balsillie School of International Affairs, Cadieux-Legér Fellowship Program, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ontario Graduate Scholarship Program, Social Science and Humanities Research Council, University of Waterloo, and University of Victoria Centre for Global Studies.

I extend a special note of appreciation to Douwe Verboom for inspiring my thinking about life.

## **Dedication**

To my father, Keith Lawrence Abbott, who taught me the meaning of *als ik kan*.

## Table of Contents

List of figures.....	xi
List of tables .....	xii
List of abbreviations .....	xiii

### Chapter 1 Introduction ..... 1

1.1	Characterizing the problem.....	1
1.2	Research goals and objectives .....	6
1.3	Research contributions.....	7
1.4	Background in G8 Summit Diplomacy .....	9
1.4.1	Trends in diplomacy .....	10
1.4.2	Summit diplomacy: the G8.....	11
1.4.3	Conceptual framing – the G8 and global governance.....	15
1.5	Networked governance .....	16
1.5.1	Defining network and networked governance .....	17
1.5.2	Networks and porous borders .....	19
1.5.3	Collaboration versus conflict in networked governance.....	20
1.5.4	Social capital in networked governance .....	21
1.5.5	Networked responses to complex global problems .....	23
1.6	Networked governance and summit diplomacy.....	24
1.7	Outline of dissertation.....	25

### Chapter 2 Maternal, newborn and child health..... 27

2.1	History and status of MNCH .....	27
2.2	Maternal versus child health .....	31
2.2.1	Child Health.....	33
2.2.2	Maternal Health .....	34
2.2.3	Shaping the MNCH field .....	36
2.3	Barriers to progress .....	38
2.3.1	Data collection and records.....	38
2.3.2	Finances and investments .....	39
2.3.3	Leadership, political commitment and fragmentation .....	40
2.3.4	Issue framing.....	41
2.4	MNCH: From multiple actors to networks .....	42
2.5	Conclusion .....	44

### Chapter 3 Methodology and Methods ..... 46

3.1	The Research Paradigm .....	46
3.2	The Research Context.....	47
3.2.1	Canada and the 2010 G8.....	48
3.2.2	Global political context during summit preparatory process.....	49
3.2.3	Domestic political context during summit preparatory process .....	52
3.3	Research design and methods .....	54

3.3.1	Case study selection.....	54
3.3.2	Data collection using mixed methods.....	56
3.3.2.1	Interview process and timeframes.....	56
3.3.2.2	Participant selection and population boundaries.....	57
3.3.2.3	Participant observation.....	59
3.3.3	Social network analysis.....	60
3.3.3.1	Key assumptions.....	61
3.3.3.2	Terminology.....	63
3.3.3.3	Data collection.....	64
3.3.3.4	Classifying actors by occupational levels.....	66
3.3.4	Whole network analysis.....	66
3.3.4.1	Network visualization.....	67
3.3.4.2	Centrality.....	67
3.3.4.3	Degree centrality.....	69
3.3.4.4	Betweenness centrality.....	69
3.3.4.5	Eigenvector centrality.....	70
3.3.5	Structural equivalence.....	71
3.3.5.1	Measuring structural equivalence.....	71
3.3.5.2	Hierarchical clustering.....	72
3.3.5.3	Partitioning actors.....	74
3.3.5.4	Block visualization.....	74
3.3.6	Ego-centric network analysis and social capital.....	75
3.3.6.1	Social capital.....	76
3.3.6.2	Network Size.....	78
3.3.6.3	Compositional quality.....	78
3.3.6.4	Homophily.....	79
3.3.6.5	Heterogeneity.....	80
3.3.6.6	Structural Holes.....	81
3.3.7	Qualitative data collection and analysis.....	84
3.4	Limitations and trustworthiness.....	86
3.4.1	Logistical constraints.....	86
3.4.2	Trustworthiness and credibility.....	88
3.4.3	Research bias.....	90
3.4.4	Ethical considerations.....	91
3.5	Conclusion.....	92
<b>Chapter 4 The contested role of networked actors.....</b>		<b>93</b>
4.1	Overview of agenda setting process.....	94
4.2	Network Composition.....	100
4.3	Network Structure.....	105
4.3.1.1	Characteristics of network members.....	110
4.3.1.2	Organizations and organizations types.....	110

4.3.1.3	Geography .....	112
4.3.1.4	Gender .....	115
4.3.1.5	Specialization .....	115
4.3.1.6	Occupational position.....	116
4.4	Important Actors and Contested Roles .....	117
4.4.1	Centrality: identifying important individuals .....	118
4.4.2	Summary of central actors within the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process ...	124
4.4.3	Structural equivalence.....	125
4.4.4	Networks of similarity .....	132
4.5	A closer examination of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH .....	133
4.5.1	The contested role of the coalition.....	135
4.6	The role of individuals and leadership.....	140
4.7	Summary .....	142
<b>Chapter 5 Building and mobilizing social capital.....</b>		<b>144</b>
5.1	Reasons, Resources and Strategies for Networked Governance .....	144
5.1.1	Coalition strategies .....	145
5.1.2	Medical/technical association strategies.....	148
5.1.3	Governmental strategies .....	149
5.2	Social capital.....	157
5.2.1	Network size .....	158
5.2.2	Network compositional quality.....	159
5.2.3	Homophily .....	161
5.2.4	Heterogeneity.....	165
5.2.5	Structural holes .....	168
5.2.6	The trends of social capital .....	171
5.3	Conditions – Enablers and Constraints.....	172
5.4	Conclusion .....	178
<b>Chapter 6 Addressing MNCH: The promise of networked governance .....</b>		<b>179</b>
6.1	Getting on the agenda: participants’ perspectives .....	180
6.1.1	The nature of the forum .....	181
6.1.2	The nature of the problem.....	182
6.1.3	Global politics.....	183
6.1.4	Domestic politics and priorities .....	186
6.2	Getting on the agenda: towards a framework for political prioritization .....	188
6.2.1	Strength of actor support.....	189
6.2.2	The role of ideas .....	191
6.2.3	Political contexts.....	193
6.2.4	Issue characteristics .....	194
6.3	Networked governance: insufficient but important .....	197
6.3.1	Reflections on networked governance challenges .....	198

6.3.2	Reflections on networked governance benefits .....	203
6.4	Conclusion .....	206
<b>Chapter 7 Conclusion and implications.....</b>		<b>208</b>
7.1	Meeting objectives .....	211
7.1.1	Objectives 1& 2: network structure and actor roles .....	211
7.1.2	Objective 3 and 4: the development and mobilization of social capital .....	214
7.1.3	Objectives 5: Political prioritization and networked governance .....	215
7.1.4	Objective 6: Mixed methods.....	216
7.2	Key implications of the research .....	219
7.3	Limitations and opportunities for future research.....	223
7.4	Concluding remarks.....	227
<b>References.....</b>		<b>229</b>
<b>Appendix I: Interview guide .....</b>		<b>251</b>
<b>Appendix II: Social network analysis - expanded survey .....</b>		<b>253</b>
<b>Appendix III: Multi-sector occupational position list .....</b>		<b>254</b>

## List of figures

Figure 2.1 Trends in global maternal mortality rates (1980-2008)	29
Figure 2.2 Trends in mortality rates for children under 5 globally and by region	30
Figure 3.1 Hierarchical clustering of Jaccard coefficient matrix	73
Figure 3.2 Illustrative example of an ego-centric network	76
Figure 3.3 Illustrative example of a structural hole	82
Figure 4.1 Important dates in Phase One and Phase two of 2010 G8 Summit agenda-setting process for MNCH	97
Figure 4.2 Timeline of key events leading up to 2010 G8 Summit	98
Figure 4.3 2010 G8 MNCH Network	107
Figure 4.4 2010 G8 MNCH network of sampled actors only	108
Figure 4.5 2010 G8 MNCH network ties among actors by organization type	109
Figure 4.6 Reduced graph of the network for the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative.	126
Figure 4.7 Reduced graph of the network for the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative with block importance and tie strength	128
Figure 5.1 Reasons for engaging in networked governance interactions from multiple actor perspectives	145
Figure 5.2 Strategies for networked engagement in 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH	156
Figure 5.3 Frequency distribution of ego network size	159

## List of tables

Table 3.1	Research participants by organization type .....	59
Table 3.2	Brokerage opportunities based on Burt's (1995) structural measures. ....	84
Table 4.1	People important to MNCH policy development by organization type .....	111
Table 4.2	Top 10 organizations important to MNCH policy development by actor count ....	111
Table 4.3	Top 10 organizations important to MNCH policy development by count of incoming nominations of actors by organizations.....	112
Table 4.4	People important to MNCH policy development by geographic location (top 10 represented by network actor count) .....	113
Table 4.5	People important to MNCH policy development by occupation position level.....	117
Table 4.6	Freeman's in-degree centrality top 20 values .....	119
Table 4.7	Freeman's betweenness centrality top 20 values.....	121
Table 4.8	Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality top 20 values .....	123
Table 4.9	Freeman degree centralization values for the six most central blocks in the G8 MNCH reduced network .....	128
Table 5.1	Average number of important contacts by organization type.....	159
Table 5.2	Compositional quality for 2010 G8 MNCH individual networks based on MNCH expertise .....	160
Table 5.3	Homophily results for 2010 G8 MNCH network by attribute.....	161
Table 5.4	Homophily E-I Index values of actors by organization types within G8 MNCH network for organization type attribute. ....	163
Table 5.5	Homophily E-I Index values of actors by occupation position levels within G8 MNCH network for occupation position level attribute.....	164
Table 5.6	Mean Blau's Heterogeneity Index (BHI) values for 2010 G8 MNCH network by attribute.....	165
Table 5.7	Blau's Heterogeneity Index (BHI) by organization type for occupation position level and organization type .....	166
Table 5.8	Top 10 most heterogeneous actors within the G8 MCNH network by occupation position level .....	167
Table 5.9	Top 10 most heterogeneous actors within the G8 MCNH network by organizational type .....	167
Table 5.10	2010 G8 MNCH preparatory network actors with high brokerage potential. ....	170
Table 5.11	2010 G8 MNCH preparatory network actors with low brokerage potential .....	170
Table 6.1	Shiffman and Smith (2007) framework for the determinants of political prioritization as applied to safe motherhood and G8 MNCH cases .....	197

## List of abbreviations

APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BHI	Blau's heterogeneity index
CCMNCH	Canadian Coalition for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ( <i>Canada</i> )
FCI	Family Care International
FCWD	Fourth World Conference for Women
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
LDC	Least developed country
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MNCH	Maternal, newborn and child health
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official development assistance
OIC	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
ORS	Oral rehydration solution
PCO	Privy Council Office ( <i>Canada</i> )
PMO	Prime Minister's Office ( <i>Canada</i> )
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PMNCH	Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health
QDA	Qualitative data analysis
SMI	Safe Motherhood Initiative
SNA	Social network analysis
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN	United Nations

UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund (originally United Nations Fund for Population Activities)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund (originally United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund)
WHI	Women's Health Initiative
WHO	World Health Organization

## Chapter 1 **Introduction**

### **1.1 Characterizing the problem**

Summit diplomacy is currently at a crossroads. As nations have grappled with how to govern complex global problems, a common response has involved turning to summit diplomacy. Consequently, the number and scope of summit meetings has increased in recent decades (Melissen, 2003; Mehta, 2007). Yet, despite the growth, this one-time bastion of traditional state-based international relations has received increasing scrutiny with regards to the effectiveness of routine meetings of state leaders.

Many existing multilateral summits have been perceived as ineffective and ill-equipped to manage the complexities of contemporary global challenges (Murphy, 1994; Reinicke, 2000; Simmons & Oudraat, 2001; Nayar, 2002; Melissen, 2003). In particular, summit diplomacy has been subjected to pressures from those outside of the various processes, with calls for increased accountability, legitimacy and representation in these governing fora.

The G8 summits represent a microcosm of the broader challenges in summit diplomacy. The G8 has been criticized on multiple fronts. Firstly, the membership composition of the G8 summit process has been challenged as the summit process has evolved from discussions and action statements that were initially limited to G8 members, to those that now affect a wide range of nations and people, with limited involvement of representatives from those affected groups (English et al., 2005; Linn & Bradford, 2007). Therefore, the decisions have been perceived as lacking legitimacy (Cooper, 2004; Berridge, 2005). Secondly, there is an expectation from the public for concrete and measurable results at the end of the yearly G8 summits, particularly as costs have risen in recent years. For example, the 2000 Okinawa G8 Summit was estimated to cost US\$750 million (Dobson, 2007). Yet, at times, the G8 leaders have committed to actions that have never been fully implemented. This disconnect between the expectations and actual achievements of the G8 summits has led to questions of the authenticity of the group's intentions and the accountability of the entire process to achieve targets and goals (Cooper, 2004; Berridge, 2005). Thirdly, the G8 summit process largely occurs behind closed doors, which is deemed necessary for ensuring open discussions among leaders (Bayne, 2005). However, this practice creates tensions with the concept of transparency

that is a prominent part of political discourse in Western nations as a principle of democracy (Putnam, 1984).

Acting in response to the criticisms and the perception of dwindling influence and effectiveness, the G8 has begun to engage with other state actors beyond the core eight nations (Bayne, 2005; Gstöhl, 2007) both during the summit event, but particularly in the preparatory process before the event. Furthermore, non-governmental actors have been included in government led consultation processes, and transnational advocacy organizations and celebrities have begun to target and attempt to influence G8 leaders before and during summit events (Cooper, 2008b). As a result of these changes in the number, breadth and type of actors involved in the G8 summit process, the fora appears to be a potential site for networked governance.

A limited body of research has discussed the connections among multiple types of actors within the G8 system. Hajnal (2007) documented the horizontal connections among G8 government officials, such as sherpas and Ministers at official meetings and conferences, and described how networks of bureaucratic task forces, working groups and experts groups have proliferated during the preparatory process of the G8 summit (Hajnal, 2007). However, this work primarily focused on listing government official events and provided little elaboration on the interactions among those actors in developing summit agenda initiatives, and whether interactions involved actors beyond the conventional summit bureaucracy.

Slaughter (2005) contends that the G8 has become a site of networked governance, but similar to Hajnal (2007), this analysis concentrated on the horizontal connections among government officials, such as Finance Ministers. Yet, a networked governance process that would address the legitimacy concerns of the G8 is likely to involve actors beyond the state, such as NGOs, academics, and foundations. Recent research by Gstöhl (2012) moves beyond the narrow perspective proffered by Slaughter (2005), arguing that the G8 summit process is marked by the presence of horizontal relationships among government actors from G8 and non-G8 countries, vertical relationships among G8 governments and international organizations, and public-private partnerships (Gstöhl, 2012).

However, the existing research on networked governance in the G8 summit process does not address two primary concerns. Firstly, the scholarship provides a general understanding of the types of actors involved in the networks, such as, inter-governmental

bureaucrats and international organizations (Slaughter, 2005; Gstöhl, 2007; Hajnal, 2007). But the analysis does not analyze the differences in the structure of relationships among the actors involved in the governance networks and carries an underlying assumption that all actors within the network are involved to the same degree. By not engaging with analytical techniques such as social network analysis, scholars and practitioners alike have been unable to explain specifically who contributes to the shaping of the G8 summit preparatory processes and their role within that process.

Secondly, previous research on networked governance in general has demonstrated that transnational governance networks can shape the allocation of resources, the coordination of action, the diffusion of norms, and channel influence to steer actors to specific goals (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Andonova et al., 2009). If networked governance is known to shape ideas, norms, and decisions about resource allocation in other areas of global governance, and the G8 summit process is an area of growing network activity, important questions are raised about the implications of networked governance on the G8 agenda setting process and potential lessons could be learned by bridging the networked governance and global summit diplomacy literature.

Within the G8 process, it remains unclear how and why topics are prioritized, given the long list of intractable global problems. In fact, scholarship on G8 summits has neglected to document the agenda selection process for any type of issue. By failing to address this gap, the global governance literature on summitry is unable to explain how political prioritization occurs within a forum such as the G8. But without adequate empirical research that specifically explores how ideas, knowledge, and influence move through a possible G8 summit network, the implications of networked governance for summit diplomacy are not well understood.

One important concept that networked governance research has highlighted is the importance of social capital in generating innovative policy ideas, solving complex problems and achieving goals (Lubell & Fulton, 2008; Huppé & Creech, 2012). For the purpose of this discussion, social capital is defined as the social resources that an actor can procure from their relationships with other actors, which may provide ideas, knowledge, support, and information that when mobilized, helps the actor to accomplish specific goals (see for instance Flap, 1991; Erickson, 1996; Burt, 1997; Lin et al., 2001). The conclusion by networked governance scholars is that actors that can draw on a diverse range of social capital will be more likely to

be exposed to new ways of thinking and new or different capital to implement those new ideas (e.g. Huppé & Creech, 2012). Given that solving the world's most intractable problems requires that forums such as the G8 summit move beyond the status quo approaches, it is possible that social capital will be one critical ingredient in the agenda-setting processes of such forums. Yet, an analysis of the social capital present in the G8 summit process does not exist.

To reiterate, scholars have recognized that within summitry, and specifically within the G8, networked governance is increasingly important. Yet, analyses that have considered the structure of the networks, which actors are involved, how and why these actors are able to shape the political prioritization of issues, and the social capital that actors may draw upon to accomplish this prioritization has been more limited. From approximately 2005 to 2009, discussions among former and current diplomatic practitioners, as well as actors from civil society, industry, and academia explored G8 summit reform (Heap, 2008). A response from these discussions was the need for a networked approach in the summit process. With the G8 increasingly characterized by networked processes and recognizing that these networked processes are important in shaping ideas, norms and decisions about resource allocation, all eyes were focused on Canada as they planned the 2010 G8 summit event. Therefore, the 2010 G8 summit provided an important opportunity to consider the remaining questions and analytical gaps surrounding networked governance in the G8 preparatory process. Moreover, with Canada hosting the G8 summit, the event was timely and accessible for this study.

While a range of issues were considered for the 2010 G8 summit agenda, Canada selected maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) as the “signature initiative” of the summit. Such a designation indicates that the host nation will take a leading role in coordinating the G8's efforts to plan and implement initiatives to address the issue. Thus, this topic became a focal point of summit planning activity within Canada.

With more than 340 000 mothers and 8.8 million children dying each year, and 90 percent of those deaths occurring within 68 developing nations, MNCH has been described as a problem deserving of global attention (Black et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, two main challenges prevented global progress on this complex issue. Firstly, scholars and practitioners have recognized that two previously distinct policy areas – material health and child health – need to be integrated and “horizontal” approaches adopted to

address systemic concerns. However, in practice, previous attempts to address MNCH had leaned towards “vertical” approaches – emphasizing individual interventions such as immunizations, mosquito nets or micronutrients. The vertical solutions, while making measurable differences for specific individuals, have a limited impact on preventing further mortality or illness for the broader population.

Secondly, the issue of MNCH has been a relatively low political priority at the global level compared to other health issues such as HIV/AIDS, which are generally treated as distinct from maternal and child health. Some components of MNCH have received international attention or support from donor countries over the past several decades, but the support is sporadic. One consequence is that several partnerships and institutional linkages have formed around MNCH issues, but a clear institutional leader has yet to emerge for the governance of global MNCH.

Therefore, when the 2010 G8 Summit process led to the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative, it was unclear how and why the subject had finally achieved global political prioritization. Specifically, questions remained about whether the political prioritization of MNCH was the result of an emergent networked governance approach within the G8 summit preparatory process. Additionally, given the apparent need to move past entrenched vertical approaches to MNCH, the role of networked governance in enabling a new approach for addressing the long-standing systemic problems required further investigation.

To summarize, the nature of the problem is that summit diplomacy is facing challenges, particularly with regards to the legitimacy of the processes as a forum for solving the world’s most serious problems. But as the actors involved in summit fora grapple to address such criticisms, other actors have been engaged or have inserted themselves into summit processes, including NGOs, industry, and celebrities. Numerous summit fora exist, including the G8, G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). But the G8 has increasingly served as a forum where both the broader critiques of summit diplomacy have been pinpointed, and the interest in the potential of networked governance has emerged. With descriptive and anecdotal evidence of networked governance beginning to characterize the G8 summit process, both scholarly and practitioner expectations were focused on a potential increased “uptake” of a networked governance approach for the 2010 summit process.

Therefore, 2010 represented a meaningful opportunity for exploring potential networked governance. Finally, the topic of MNCH was selected for the in-depth focus of the research as it emerged as the signature initiative for the 2010 G8 summit agenda. MNCH is a complex challenge that requires global efforts to develop novel, integrated approaches and political commitment to achieve substantial progress. The 2010 G8 Summit offered one avenue to garner that political commitment and provided a forum in which actors can develop innovative solutions. But how a networked approach contributed to placing MNCH on the G8 Summit agenda and how it determined what the MNCH initiative would involve required further investigation. Therefore, this research focuses on the 2010 G8 Summit and its handling of the MNCH agenda item as a case of networked governance.

## **1.2 Research goals and objectives**

The purpose of this research is to explore the degree to which the preparatory process of the G8 summit can be characterized as a form of networked governance and to examine how networked governance shaped the political commitment towards an issue in this global governance forum. The main research question is: how does a global level network affect political prioritization and governance of issues within the G8 summit process?

In addressing the research question and by examining the selection and development of the signature initiative (MNCH) in the 2010 G8 Summit hosted by Canada, this study concentrated on the following seven objectives:

- 1) To determine whether state-based organizations had ties with a network of actors beyond the G8 states and to identify the characteristics of the actors and attributes of the network structure and relationships involved in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process;
- 2) To establish which actors or organizations played a central role in the 2010 G8 summit preparatory process;
- 3) To examine the concept and measures of social capital to understand how actors became involved in and influence the summit preparatory process;
- 4) To develop a theoretical understanding of the reasons, resources, and strategies that actors utilized to engage in the summit preparatory process and ensure the political prioritization of MNCH issues;

- 5) To understand the role of networked governance in addressing complex global challenges such as MNCH;
- 6) To apply a mixed method approach to examine networked governance, summitry, and MNCH.

### **1.3 Research contributions**

Through a combination of social network analysis (SNA) and qualitative data analysis (QDA), the research findings will show that, during the 2010 G8 Summit, diplomatic practices were not solely state based; rather, the summit preparatory process involved an array of networked actors. Chapters four, five, and six highlight three main arguments. Firstly, although both the SNA and QDA provide clear evidence that a networked approach to the 2010 G8 Summit process emerged, the role of different actors and organizations within this network were actively debated during the summit preparatory process. In particular, some of the federal government bureaucratic actors argued during the summit preparatory process that the selection of the MNCH as a signature initiative and the details of that agenda item were largely controlled entirely by a single government department – the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). At the same time, other actors argued that it was a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who were serving as the most central and important actors.

Secondly, each type of organization adopted different strategies to shape the 2010 G8 Summit agenda and the preparatory process. The findings reveal that while the NGOs used several formal and informal strategies to build and mobilize social capital successfully, the government did not develop a successful, formal strategy that built or mobilized any new forms of social capital; rather only informal strategies appeared to lead to clear policy outcomes.

Lastly, the research demonstrated that the 2010 G8 Summit provided a venue to mobilize political, financial, and social capital important to advancing global MNCH. However, the informal criteria used to deem an issue “summit worthy”, along with the framing of the issue as an achievable summit initiative proved to favour simplicity over complexity. MNCH is a complex issue area that requires major systemic changes in order for mortality rates in many economically poor regions and countries to be decreased. Yet through the

networked process, many of the actors involved in the summit process, especially the host country, favoured and advanced approaches that would yield short term measurable successes. This leads to the conclusion that networked governance and the inclusion of diverse of actors in the selection and shaping of the 2010 G8 Summit MNCH initiative did not result in the promotion of innovative approaches to MNCH that would transcend the current governance of the issue area. As noted earlier, the shift towards networked governance in the agenda-setting process of the G8 summit process raises the potential for actors to access and exchange diverse forms of social capital. However, while the network did increase the overall capital in the G8 summit process, which may account for why and how MNCH was politically prioritized as a signature initiative, it did not result in a fundamentally different type of outcome than these summits usually generate.

Collectively, these three arguments demonstrate a new understanding of networked governance in summit diplomacy. Previous scholarship in networked governance and policy networks has tended to treat networks as constellations of vertically and horizontally connected actors that are interacting with shared norms for the purpose of a shared goal (Witte et al., 2000; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008) . Given the focus on the idea of an informal body collectively working towards a unified vision, the literature implies that conflict and contestation does not occur within networks. This research shows how a diverse array of interconnected actors seeks to advance the issue of MNCH, but accomplish this only through contestation and compromise. Different actors employ alternating strategies and mobilize resources in order to ensure it is “their” vision of resolving MNCH that is taken into account in the G8 summit process. Thus, networked governance is a mechanism for a variety of actors to shape a G8 summit preparatory process.

Furthermore, the literature on summit diplomacy has historically focused on the roles of states and state leaders, although it has begun to recognize the role of actors beyond state governments. However, summit diplomacy scholars have not conducted extensive empirical research on the preparatory process. Likewise, scholars have also not brought together the concepts of networked governance with the analytical tools provided by social network analysis to determine the structure of the network of actors that contribute to the preparatory process. Therefore, this research seeks to bring depth to a phenomena not well studied thus far for summit diplomacy.

Additionally, previous work by Shiffman (2007a, 2007b) and Shiffman and Smith (2007) developed an initial framework for the analysis of the determinants for the political prioritization of global health initiatives. Their framework includes four foundational elements: actor power, the role of ideas in portraying an issue, the political contexts surrounding an issue, and the characteristics of a particular issue (Shiffman & Smith, 2007). This research builds on their exploratory work in the maternal health field and responds to their calls for further empirical research to identify factors that are important in the political prioritization of MNCH. This research also allows for a reflection as to the developments in the maternal health field since their work was published in 2007.

Finally, this study makes a methodological contribution to the social network literature, both by using a mixed method approach that included rich qualitative analysis and social network analysis. Shiffman and Smith's (2007) research utilized a qualitative process-tracing method that involved archival research and interviews. However, this research goes further than Shiffman and Smith (2007) by providing a deeper analysis through the use of a qualitative-quantitative approach that adds further rigour to determining how global health issues are framed, prioritized and shaped. While social network analysis is useful for identifying the actors involved in a summit preparatory process and the structure of relationships among them, it provides little insight into understanding how or why certain actors may be central within the structure or the perceptions of the effectiveness and influence of certain actors by others. The analysis presented in this discussion shows that combining the social network analysis and qualitative data analysis methods allows for greater insight than could be achieved if only a quantitative or only a qualitative approach were used to understand networked governance and how issues such as MNCH are politically prioritized and shaped within diplomatic summit processes.

#### **1.4 Background in G8 Summit Diplomacy**

Prior to moving to discuss MNCH and networked governance, a more thorough examination of summit diplomacy and global governance is needed. International diplomacy in general is shifting away from being merely a hierarchical and state controlled activity towards involving non-hierarchical interactions among state and non-state actors and organizations. Summit diplomacy, in particular, follows this trend, largely in response to critiques about the

accountability, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the summit groupings (Berridge, 2005; English et al., 2005). Specifically, the G8 Summit process has been recognized as involving a growing cadre of actors (Kirton, 1999; Hajnal & Kirton, 2000). Yet, the trends for the preparatory process are less well understood, despite the preparatory process being critical to the success of the summit and the final policy positions negotiated among member and non-member states. Empirical analysis of networked governance in the preparatory process of a G8 summit is urgently needed. Without such an understanding, scholars and practitioners cannot be clear on who is shaping global summitry processes and the mechanisms that these actors employ to accomplish their goals.

#### *1.4.1 Trends in diplomacy*

Research focused on summitry needs to first consider wider macro level changes occurring within the field of diplomacy more generally. Traditional diplomacy has been defined as “the art of resolving international difficulties peacefully”; “the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of accredited representation”; and “the management of international relations through negotiation” – which touch upon purpose, agency and function respectively (Melissen, 2005, p. 5). These characterizations reflect state dominated processes and the hierarchies present in societies and politics that were dominant until recent decades (Gregory, 2008). The ‘club’ model of diplomacy refers to diplomatic practices in which state officials from one country meet with counterparts from another country, in a way which has been characterized by hierarchical methods, exclusivity, low transparency and with a focus on treaties (Heine, 2008).

While state diplomats and embassies continue to be an instrumental aspect of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and relations, some argue that the club model of diplomacy has been surpassed by networked practices with minimal hierarchy, largely due to the forces of globalization and the apparent weakening of Westphalian sovereignty (Heine, 2008). Within this new networked model, the traditional nodes, such as diplomatic staff within embassies and at headquarters, are connected with actors not traditionally part of diplomatic processes, such as representatives from local or global civil society organizations and transnational businesses (Henrickson, 2005; Riordan, 2005). However, it is not just the amount and type of nodes that have changed; it is the process by which interactions take place. Official, vetted, written

communication has given way to more diffuse, informal methods that embrace the latest technological developments, such as “blogging”, “tweeting”, and the formation of social communities using web based platforms such as Facebook<sup>1</sup>, known as guerilla diplomacy (Copeland, 2009). This postmodern era of diplomacy rests on principles of openness, transnational cooperation and collaboration, and participation with dialogue occurring among state and non-state actors (Reinicke, 1998, 2000; Hocking, 2005; Melissen, 2005).

However, it must be recognized that a broadened version of diplomacy is not practiced by all nations. For example, d’Hooghe (2005) argues that Chinese leaders continue to rely on hierarchical state controlled diplomacy and have not permitted the engagement of independent actors - domestic or internationally based. Therefore, some nations continue to hew a more traditional approach to diplomacy.

#### *1.4.2 Summit diplomacy: the G8*

Summitry can be traditionally defined as a diplomatic tool that involves face to face meetings between heads of state or heads of government. While history demonstrates that diplomatic relations between nations have long included official, and sometimes ad hoc, meetings between leaders, Winston Churchill has been recognized as giving the word “summit” a political and diplomatic meaning in 1950 (Melissen, 2005). The term “summit diplomacy” can be found in literature dating back to the 1960s, and multiple examples of the concept were recognized – from meetings between the U.S. and Soviet presidents to institutionalized meetings within the United Nations (Galtung, 1964). Traditionally, the concept has been considered a realist approach to managing the relations among nation states. However, the field of summitry, or summit diplomacy, has grown to encompass much more in recent years, with the amount and scope of summit level meetings having increased substantially in recent decades (Mehta, 2007). The field of summitry includes emergent regional organizations and groupings such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with other groups such as the Commonwealth and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Just as various actors have gained influence and power in all areas of global governance, summit diplomacy has evolved to include non-state actors, such as NGOs, and multinational

---

<sup>1</sup> For an example, see the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s blog site at <http://blogs.fco.gov.uk/roller/>.

businesses, before, during and after the actual summit meetings (Melissen, 2003). The net result is that a definition of summit diplomacy today must encompass broader notions of collaboration reflective of the multiple varieties of summit meetings and structures that are part of global governance.

The origin of the G7 dates back to 1973, when the US Treasury Secretary George Schultz invited his counterparts from Great Britain, France and West Germany to a private meeting at the White House Library, and in 1975 the first G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) summit was hosted in Rambouillet, France (Putnam & Bayne, 1987; Hajnal, 2007). The impetus behind the G6 was that the world economic system was experiencing severe shocks, which included the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate monetary system, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, the first enlargement of the European Community (EC), and an economic recession within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Dobson, 2007; Hajnal, 2007; Bayne & Smith, 2010). Thus, the original “raison d’être” of the Group was macroeconomic and financial policy coordination, with sovereign interests of each member serving as a guiding principle. The G6 met again in 1976, and Canada was included to balance the European membership (Bayne & Smith, 2010). Subsequent yearly meetings, or summits, occurred and with time the structure of the meetings became increasingly formalized. With the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was accepted as a member, resulting in the designation of G8 (however, the G7 has persisted at the Finance Minister’s level). Now, however, the G8 summit process is under significant pressure and it faces an uncertain future as a consequence of the consolidation of the Leaders’ G20 (Smith & Heap, 2010).

At the core of the G8’s work is an annual summit of heads of government and state, along with the extensive preparation involving teams of ‘sherpas’ and ‘sous-sherpas’ from the foreign ministries and treasuries of member countries (Penttilä, 2003; Slaughter, 2004a; English et al., 2005; Gstöhl, 2007). A notable feature that distinguished the G8 from other regional summit structures such as the OAS or ASEAN is the lack of a permanent secretariat. The G8 does not have a budget or constitution, and in many ways remains an informal inter-governmental network of the world’s richest and most powerful nations. As stated by Hajnal (2007, p. 2), the G8 is “an unorthodox international institution”.

As aforementioned, summitry processes have experienced drastic changes and are still rapidly evolving. Evolutionary changes go beyond membership and include shifts in scope and working methods, notably the extensive networking that occurs during the preparatory phase. However, as the process has evolved from discussions and action statements that are limited to members, to those that transcend borders, cultures, identities, and wealth, the legitimacy of the G8 summit has been challenged (Slaughter, 2005). The initial focus of the G7 discussion in the 1970s focussed on economic cooperation and coordination (Bayne & Smith, 2010). Yet G8 discussions over the past two decades have grown to include a myriad of global issues, such as nuclear security, biological and chemical weapons, migration, human rights, trafficking of humans, and regional problems facing specific nations such as Columbia and Iran (Gstöhl, 2007). As well, the summit agendas have also tackled an increasing number of social policy and human welfare issues, including health, development assistance, education, environment, safe drinking water and sanitation, and poverty reduction. Herein lies part of the challenge to the G8's legitimacy – summit outcomes or communiqués that target global issues may imply roles, responsibilities, and impacts for nations that were either not part of the discussions, or briefly consulted at a summit side event. Furthermore, non-member nations may also either be key players in solutions due to such facts as their relative economic size or regional role, or they may be adversely affected by proposed actions. The result has been calls for these nations to be consulted or included as “equals” in the discussions (Payne, 2008).

Possibly in response to calls for greater inclusion, the hosts of G8 summits in recent years appear to have created working relationships with non-member countries, civil society organizations, and other non-state actors (Dobson, 2007). For instance, starting with the 2001 Italian summit, groups of African leaders were invited as guests for portions of the summit, and starting in 2003 the major emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) were included in some of the summit proceedings (Bayne & Smith, 2010). Civil society organizations have received different treatment. Scholte (2004) argued that unlike the World Bank, which created official joint committees with civil society practitioners, the G8 has not been responsive to civil society organizations. Hajnal (2002) classified three phases of the relationship between the G8 and civil society: ignoring, mutual recognition, and issue specific engagement, and concluded that while there has been a growing recognition of the importance of meaningful engagement and partnerships among “responsible” civil society

groups and members of the G8, this relationship is still in embryonic stages. At recent summits, the G8 has also engaged with, and been engaged by celebrity actors such as Bono, who, not without controversy, have been recognized by some as achieving a form of diplomatic status (Cooper et al., 2002; Cooper, 2007).

While new actors are part of the summit process, power asymmetries are prevalent. It has been the summit host country that appears to control the agenda and the invitations of non-members. Typically, non member countries, individuals, or representatives from international and regional organizations are not invited to be full participants in the relevant summit; rather they are invited to join only certain discussions at the initiative of the host country and as agreed by other members (Gstöhl, 2007). But as pressure has mounted to make the summitry process a more legitimate institution of global governance by addressing representation and accountability issues, debate has ensued about who should be involved at various stages of the summit process.

Scholarship has focused mostly on capturing the evolution of summit membership, the relationship between non-governmental actors and member countries, and analysis of delivery on commitments (e.g. Kirton, 1999; Hajnal, 2007). Repeatedly, it has been emphasized that summit diplomacy involves more than the highly publicized summit event. Although the summit event presents an important opportunity for interaction among leaders, there has been widespread recognition of the critical role of the summit preparatory processes (e.g. Bayne, 2001). The preparatory process provides a political space for the interaction of the densely interconnected network of bureaucrats, business, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that lead the preparatory planning, research, and formal and informal negotiations of governance arrangements and agreements. Yet, the dynamic interactions and significance of this network itself has been largely ignored. For the purpose of the proposed research, the term networked approaches in summitry will involve relationships and the flow of resources among various actors, including: government – government (both domestic and international levels), government – civil society (e.g. academia, NGOs, think tanks), government-private actors, and government-international organizations.

### 1.4.3 Conceptual framing – the G8 and global governance

As described earlier, the shifts in diplomacy and the relevance of summitry have been analyzed in scholarship. Much of this body of literature remains connected to neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalism concepts and focuses on state to state interactions (Putnam & Bayne, 1987; Ikenberry, 1993). For example, Ikenberry (1993) viewed the G7 as a site of governance that required reform to ensure a coherent, concentrated form of institutional power while Putnam and Bayne (1987) examine the role of summits as a space where the sovereignty-interdependence dilemma is addressed through institutional collective action. Less explicitly, some summitry scholarship uses assumptions related to world polity theory, whereby there is a central focus on the institutional character of transnational development (Boli & Thomas, 1999). World polity theory recognizes such phenomena as the globalization of culture, an increasingly independent transnational legal framework, and the shaping of the actions of individuals, states, firms and other actors by global institutions, principles and values (Brown, 1992; Thomas, 1994; Ruggie, 1998; Boli & Thomas, 1999).

Much of the global governance literature argues that a multiplicity of actors beyond the state, for instance NGOs or epistemic communities, affect states or state processes such as treaty negotiations (e.g. Haas, 1992; Price, 1998; Betsill & Corell, 2008). The literature often uses factors such as complex interdependence or globalization to explain why the trend is occurring (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 1989; Scholte, 2000). These concepts from global governance scholarship have converged with ideas presented in recent summit literature, wherein scholars such as English *et al.* (2005), Cooper (2008a), and Hajnal (2002) have argued that actors other than states do matter with respect to summitry. Studies have recognized the rising role of non-state actors, or “pressure groups” with specific interests (such as business, labour, agriculture, etc.) within delegated and networked processes of international economic diplomacy or decision-making (see MacDonald & Woolcock, 2007). Yet, ultimately, most of this research isolates specific categories of actors, such as celebrities or NGOs.

This literature remains limited because while it has begun to highlight the role of the individual, it has neglected to empirically analyze how the micro level interactions of individual are an important part of macro level change. Yet, previous research outside of global governance has demonstrated that conversations between individuals can provide the catalyst for larger system change (e.g. Collins, 1988; Westley, 1990). Therefore, the research

presented here explores the micro level interactions within the networks, specifically the flow of ideas and the alterations of policies that are affecting the macro level of summit diplomacy. From this perspective, a constructivist approach provides a meaningful lens to consider the summit process itself as a factor influencing the positions, policies and consequent actions of the actors. When diplomacy and negotiations are viewed through a constructivist lens, it is recognized that the interactions between individuals are not solely a functional process to solve a technical problems; rather the process is a constructive and constitutive dynamic that affects both the actors and the outcome (Lose, 2001). The literature generally has underplayed the importance of networked processes within summit diplomacy, and has failed to recognize the complex, multidirectional interactions among the different actors and the effects on the process and outcomes.

This challenge points to the need for considering the whole system, rather than just the interactions of one type of actor (e.g. a celebrity) with the state. The G8 summit processes have been evolving and each host country may create new procedures and mechanisms for consulting or interacting with non-member countries and non-governmental actors. Likewise, the NGOs, business actors, and non-G8 countries also may devise strategies to access or influence the summit process. The implication is the possibility that both the actors inside and outside the process may increasingly interact with each other and mutually shape their understanding of situations and ideas on how to proceed in achieving their objectives. Yet, empirical research has been limited in this area, which in turns affects the ability of scholars to rigorously explain the dynamic changes that result from the continuous interactions of multiple actors and understand the implications for summit diplomacy practices.

### **1.5 Networked governance**

Four trends within the networked governance literature are challenged by the research presented here. Firstly, it is demonstrated that the emergence of porous borders and the role of communication technology within networked governance remains contested within the literature. This is evident as much of the global governance literature emphasizes the increasing irrelevance of geographical boundaries, while social network and summit diplomacy literature highlights the importance of trust building and face-to-face interactions respectively. Secondly, the assumption that networks implicitly foster collaboration and cooperation is

discussed and it is argued the empirical research is required to support the numerous claims and explore situations when collaboration has potential to turn into conflict within networked governance. Thirdly, the lack of connection between theories of social capital and network governance is discussed and it is explained that this research fills a gap in analyzing the measurement and mobilization of the social capital of individuals within the 2010 G8 MNCH network. Lastly, it is illustrated how networked governance is often posited as a panacea for solving complex global challenges, in part due to their flexibility and ability to foster innovation. Yet, there are few empirical cases documenting and analyzing how these benefits are actually accrued through a networked approach. The case of MNCH within the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process provides such a case.

### *1.5.1 Defining network and networked governance*

Defining the term ‘network’ is difficult. Due to multiple disciplines focusing on networks, the literature reflects numerous typologies and utilizes different terminologies. However, all definitions have commonalities, such as the presence of nodes, or connection points, and linkages among these nodes. Thus the concise definition of a network offered by Batten *et al.* (1995, p. viii) will be adopted – “a set of objects tied together in a connective structure of links.” It is recognized that networks demonstrate patterns of horizontal and vertical relationships and a flow of resources, information and/or knowledge among the nodes (e.g. Slaughter, 2004b; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Kahler, 2009). Furthermore, this research rests on the premise that substance of networks amount to more than the sum of their parts and networks themselves are a form of social organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

The term governance is also vague and imprecise as it may refer to, *inter alia*, change in the meaning of government, the structures and processes by which private corporations are managed, or the distribution and structure of political and economic power (Rhodes, 1997). Within traditional international relations literature, governance has been primarily associated with the state. However, global governance literature conceptualizes governance as the general society-centred coordination activities and a variety of public-private interactions (Pierre, 2000). For the purposes of this research, governance will refer to sustained “coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational

organizations” (Pierre, 2000, p. 4) and “channels through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued and policies pursued” (Rosenau, 1995, p. 14).

Merging the concepts of networks and governance has resulted in field of networked governance. However, the concept of networked governance is often described vaguely, cited as poorly understood and highly in need of empirical research (Uzzi, 1996; Jones et al., 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008). The inclusion of governance into the network lexicon results in a focus that involve institutions, authority structures, and cooperation among actors outside of the boundaries of formal entities such as international institutions or a transnational corporation to allocate resources and coordinate action (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Kahler, 2009).

More specifically, networked governance is conceived to include the presence of three of more actors from state and non-state organizations with a focus on both individual and collective public goals, and the existence of a common discourse, and dense, voluntary exchanges of resources (Mitchell, 1973; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Andonova et al., 2009). Networks for governance are differentiated in this study from the connections that may already exist among governmental bureaucrats or people within an organization. Some scholars posit governance networks as a governance entity, or an actor with governing “authority” (Ingram et al., 2005; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006), but this research employs the view that networked governance is a part of a governing process (Andonova et al., 2009). Furthermore, networked governance both sustains and challenges conventional governance practices and structures (Kahler, 2009).

The emergence of the concept of networked governance can be linked to more general trends in international relations such as the diffusion of political authority, the fragmentation of public sphere, the challenges to statehood and the shifts from government to non-hierarchical and often non-territorial spheres of authority (e.g. Picciotto, 1997; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Simultaneous with the emergence of network discussions in the global governance literature are several separate discussions of networks as increasingly dominant macro structures in all aspects of social life. For instance, the disciplines of public policy, business and organization studies, sociology, and geography all are experiencing an increased focus on the role of networks. To some, networks are seen as alternatives to market forces, or hierarchical organizational structures (e.g. Uzzi, 1996; Lewis, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Kahler, 2009).

Regardless of the disciplinary focus, the field of networked governance is receiving increasing amount of attention from both practitioners and scholars.

### *1.5.2 Networks and porous borders*

Networked governance literature (e.g. Castells, 2000) emphasizes the ability of networks to render geographical borders as meaningless. Primarily, scholars point to the growing role of information technology in making international networks feasible (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Castells, 2008). Furthermore, sociological research, such as that by Wellman (2001), argues that society, communities and interpersonal relationships are being transformed by “computer-supported social networks”. The conclusions imply that digital connections suffice for effective networking. But while Raustiala (2002) also recognizes that technological innovations have contributed to the development of networks, he also argues that the geographic distribution of networks is uneven, mirroring the asymmetrical distribution of the impacts of globalization.

Scholars also highlight the importance of trust in building networked governance relationships (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, empirical evidence that demonstrates *how* the trust building occurs, and *how* geographical borders are crossed is limited within the governance literature (for an exception, see Lubell & Fulton, 2008).

Global governance literature more broadly echoes the argument that advances in communication technologies and globalization have reduced geographic barriers (Stanbury & Vertinsky, 1995; Albrow, 1996; Scholte, 2000). In fact, borders have become viewed as so porous that some claim that nations are experiencing a “death of distance” (Cairncross, 2001) or “end of geography” (Heine & Thakur, 2011).

In contrast, the summit diplomacy literature has long highlighted the value of face-to-face meetings (Putnam, 1984; Putnam & Bayne, 1987; Weilemann, 2000) and suggests that virtual relationships are insufficient for building enough trust to negotiate governance agreements (Brown, 2002; Porter, 2012). It is not clear from the scholarship whether this remains true only for the leaders interacting at a summit, or if the same value is placed upon face-to-face meetings among the other actors involved in the preparatory process for any summit.

Therefore, bridging these areas of governance literature reveals a contradiction and it remains unclear whether, or to what extent, geography matters. Yet, if geographical boundaries have become irrelevant, research has yet to fully explain how actors within a network are able to cross geographical boundaries adequately enough to develop trusting relationships. Social activism research has demonstrated that computer-supported social networks have been instrumental in mobilizing geographically dispersed people for successful campaigns (Juris, 2005). While advocacy campaigns do take place during and before G8 Summits, the preparatory process involves far more and requires more than just galvanizing support; rather, complex negotiations that create a policy agenda and then detail the initiatives and programming that will be implemented within broader governance structures is required. It is not known whether networked governance in summit diplomacy will permit an exchange of diplomatic information and resources across geographical boundaries and serve as an effective mode of organization. This research will address this gap, examining the influence of location and proximity on the structure and dynamics of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory network for MNCH.

### *1.5.3 Collaboration versus conflict in networked governance*

Aside from the difficulties associated with the limits of geographical distances, the networked governance literature tends to assume collaboration and cooperation are inherent within networks. For example, Keck and Sikkink (1998) claim that networked governance increases opportunities for dialogue and exchange, which ultimately leads to norm convergence among actors. March and Olsen (1995) argue that networked approaches enhance cooperation and Hajer and Versteeg (2005) suggest that intercultural collaboration is a positive outcome that stems from governance networks. Considine (2005) takes this further, arguing that network governance represents a breakthrough in governance arrangement that ensures coordination for complex problem-solving may be optimized.

However, the work of scholars such as Brans (1997) asserts that further attention needs to be applied to the dynamics of conflict and power within networks. Similarly, Kahler (2009) contends that networks are too often represented as consensual arrangements, which neglects the internal power asymmetries. Robins *et al.* (2011) recognizes that while coordination and collaboration may be likely, these characteristics do not guarantee that desired outputs and

outcomes will be realized. Collectively, these three distinct contributions demonstrate that it cannot be assumed that relations among actors will be more cooperative in networks than they would be in the absence of networked governance, nor are the networks able to ensure that complex problems will be better addressed than conventional governance structures.

One particular challenge the conclusions about cooperation and collaboration is that much of the networked governance literature has focused on “like” units; that is, networks of transnational NGOs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) or networks of inter-governmental actors (Slaughter, 2004b). But, in recent summit diplomacy the networks appear to involve “non like” units with potentially dissimilar interests, positions, and policy approaches. It is conceivable that substantial variation in interests could exist within a network of diverse actors with different cultural backgrounds, values and ideologies, especially when the actors are trying to ensure that their nation’s or organization’s policy position is reflected in the G8 summit initiative. Therefore, it is unclear whether the insights from the literature on “like” units will be meaningful for “non like” networked governance, and whether networked governance in summit diplomacy follows as cohesively and collaboratively as networked governance arrangements in other political arenas.

#### *1.5.4 Social capital in networked governance*

Social capital is important to summit diplomacy. Social capital is the social resources used by an actor to accomplish specific goals and societal benefits, and may come in the form of ideas, knowledge, support, and information. Social capital can be latent until an actor engages the social resources to obtain a specific outcome (Lin, 2001).

Two major theoretical perspectives of social capital exist. The first concentrates on the individual and their ability to access and gain material or instrumental benefits (see Burt, 1982; Flap, 1991; Burt, 1992; Erickson, 1996; Lin, 2001). As argued by Burt (1997), a person’s location within a particular social structure, such as an organizational hierarchy, will influence their ability to achieve returns related to their education, seniority and intelligence. Lin (2001, p. 19) stated the premise of social capital is “investments in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace” and is related to an actor’s connections and access to resources within a network. This perspective illuminates that an individual’s relationships is a potential source of power in the form of resource control (Burt, 1992).

A second perspective of social capital focuses on how groups, communities or societies develop and maintain social capital as a collective asset (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). Socio-cultural factors, such as trust, social integration, social norms and rule of law, are key to this conception of social capital (Borgatti et al., 1998). Putnam (1995, p. 664) defined social capital as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”.

Wellman (1988) argued that the differences between these two major perspectives are the unit of analysis – the individual versus the group. With respect to summit diplomacy, the role of individuals has been at the forefront of previous analyses. For example, in Byman and Pollack’s (2001) historical analysis of five individual heads of state, the authors demonstrate a causal effect between the personalities of individual leaders and the behavior of their international counterparts. Similarly, Dallek (2007) and Martin (2007) point to the importance of individuals in establishing successful diplomatic relations. If personalities truly make the difference, then summits may indeed provide an opportunity for interpersonal relationships to develop, an exchange of information to take place, and a building of understanding of the various viewpoints that need to be considered in multilateral governance. Therefore, this research will build upon the version of social capital purported by Burt (2001) and Lin (2001), with a focus on the individual perspective of external relationships.

However, if the networked governance literature is examined for how it uses the concept of social capital, it is apparent that most networked governance scholars have adopted the Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) perspective. For instance, Huppé and Creech (2012) contend that the development of social capital is instrumental to achieving overall effective network governance. Likewise, Lubell and Fulton (2008) describe network structures as representations of entire social capital investments. While these approaches may be appropriate for comparing social capital between or among networks, they provide limited insight for how social capital is built and mobilized within a single network. One exception is provided by Kahler (2009) who refers to a notion of “social power”, a characteristic of defined by the number of network relationships for a specific actor. Yet, simply relying upon the number of relationships to determine power and capital provides a narrow view, given that other research has shown that social capital can be shaped by the quality and diversity of relationships, along with the structural position of an individual actor within a network (Burt, 1983; Borgatti et al.,

1998). Therefore, this research will use analytical techniques such as social network analysis to bring to bear the role of individuals' social capital in networked governance in summit diplomacy.

#### *1.5.5 Networked responses to complex global problems*

Networks have been recognized as a coordinating body for activities with both positive and negative impacts, ranging from terrorist cells (e.g. Duffield, 2002; Kahler, 2009; Kenney, 2009) to transnational advocacy groups aiming to protect the environment (Khagram, 2004; Bäckstrand, 2006). But, regardless of the positive or negative goals, those advocating the use of governance networks highlight that the benefits involve the ability of networks to promote change and innovation (Sabel et al., 1987; Benner et al., 2004; Lubell & Fulton, 2008), offer flexibility in governance arrangements (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Raustiala, 2002; Slaughter, 2004a; Klijn, 2008), increase efficiencies (Powell, 1990) and bridge divides to address today's increasingly complex global governance problems (Kenis & Raab, 2003; Lewis, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Huppé & Creech, 2012). Recently, their lack of accountability (Slaughter, 2004a) and the potential threat that networks pose to institutions of representative democracy (Sørensen, 2005) has also brought attention to their weaknesses.

However, some scholars have embarked upon empirical research to examine whether cases of networked governance indeed provide these many benefits. Howlett (2002), in a study of Canadian public policy-making, found that the positive outcomes were possible but were strongly linked to the structure, membership, and resource flows within the network. Considine and Lewis (2007) examined networked governance in Australia and concluded that networked approaches were able to explain innovative policy outcomes more than hierarchical positions – that is, an actor's network mattered more than their occupational level within the government bureaucracy. But, the authors also stressed the importance of the structure and type of network in realizing expected networked governance benefits (Considine & Lewis, 2007). Finally, Huppé and Creech (2012) argued that while networked governance arrangements are critical to solving complex problems, success hinges upon the presence of knowledge brokers.

The case was previously made in this chapter that summits themselves are evolving to include a range of actors, notably during the preparatory process. While Slaughter (2003) recognized various summit groupings such as the G8 and the once proposed G22 as examples

of transgovernmental networks, this conceptualization does not consider a broader range of actors and interactions (i.e. more than governments). The reasons used to describe why networked governance has emerged correspond to the very reasons cited for recent trends in new diplomacy; that is, their prominence has been driven as a response to issues of representation, accountability and effectiveness in existing institutions and fora (e.g. Slaughter, 2004a; Bäckstrand, 2006).

However, while the benefits of networks have been clearly stated, rigorous empirical evidence that supports these claims and demonstrates whether networked governance is better able to cope with complex problems than traditional, state-based governing approaches is limited. As will be described in depth in chapter two, MNCH constitutes a complex global problem. Thus, MNCH provides a meaningful case to examine the promise of networked approaches and the effectiveness in creating more than the incremental changes associated with simplistic solutions of the past.

## **1.6 Networked governance and summit diplomacy**

This chapter has argued that addressing the global challenge of reducing maternal, child, and newborn mortality and improving their overall health requires integrated approaches supported by political commitment. After the inclusion of MNCH in the MDGs little progress was achieved, and the 2010 G8 Summit provided another opportunity within global governance to politically prioritize the issue and develop novel solutions. While it will be important in the years to come to track how effective the G8's efforts are in solving the problem, it is critical to understand which actors and organizations have contributed to the G8's efforts. A review of the literature on summit diplomacy demonstrated that while networked approaches have been emerging in various areas of global governance in general, trends in summit diplomacy to include a greater variety of actors to ensure legitimacy have created the conditions in which networks are possibly shaping the preparatory process for G8 summits. However, in reviewing the networked governance literature, it becomes clear that several gaps remain, including whether scholarship can explain the relevance or necessity of face-to-face meetings in an era of virtual communication technologies that diminish the impact of geographical borders, the collaborative nature of actors within a network if those actors come from diverse organization types, how social capital is mobilized by political actors, and whether networked governance

approaches truly are better at grappling with the complexity of MNCH than traditional governance arrangements.

Having reviewed the summit diplomacy and networked governance literature and having established the research question and objectives, the next section outlines the organization of the dissertation.

### **1.7 Outline of dissertation**

This chapter set up the proposition that networked governance may be a feature of G8 summitry, which may improve the legitimacy and efficacy of the forum. Using the 2010 G8 Summit as a case of potential networked governance, this study will focus on the presence and structure of network relationships and the dynamic interactions of networked actors in the political prioritization and shaping of the signature initiative – MNCH. It then outlined the research question and objectives, the major contributions of the research to scholarship, and articulated the core argument that will be developed in the chapters that follow. It asserts that the influence of networked governance in preparatory processes for summit fora such as the G8, for MNCH or other issue areas, remains poorly understood. Moreover, the ability of a networked approach to address a complex global problem such as MNCH requires further investigation.

Chapter two will review the literature on MNCH examining the history of developments in maternal health and child health and previous global efforts and networked approaches to address MNCH. The chapter demonstrates the complexity in governing MNCH, including managing the challenges of insufficient financial resources, competition between maternal and child health agendas, sporadic political commitments, a growing set of actors, and weak and incoherent governance architecture. With the growing set of actors arises the opportunity for networked governance, although it remains unclear whether this approach would be better able to respond to the complexity than traditional governance structures. As such, fragmented and continued tensions among actors that advocate vertical or horizontal approaches are contributing to the lack of sustained progress in MNCH. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that a lack of knowledge exists on the actors that contribute to the governance and political prioritization of MNCH.

Chapter three provides a discussion of the case study, which is the 2010 G8 Summit hosted by Canada, and explains the domestic and global context in which the research took place. The mixed method approach is then introduced, including a detailed description of social network analysis (SNA) and the corresponding tests and of the qualitative data analysis (QDA) used in this study.

Chapter four begins with a description of the network structure that shaped the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH. This chapter provides empirical evidence that networked governance affected agenda setting and issue shaping during the summit preparatory process – evidence not yet available in the summit diplomacy and networked governance literature. Additionally, the analysis demonstrated a large constellation of actors were connected to the summit preparatory process for MNCH and that the most central actors were located both within government and within a coalition of NGOs - a clear indication of the non-traditional actors engaged in the summit preparatory process. Finally, it is asserted that the roles and influence of non-traditional actors, such as the NGO coalition, are highly contested within the summit preparatory process.

Having established the structure of the network, chapter five describes how the actors within the network build and mobilize social capital through varying strategies, thereby accessing different resources. The mobilization of social capital is both supported and constrained by certain governing conditions, which are discussed in detail.

Chapter six explains why MNCH was selected as the signature summit initiative and explores the role of domestic and global factors in affecting the ability of various actors to influence the political prioritization of MNCH. A conceptual framework from global health governance is applied. Moreover, the chapter examines the effectiveness of the network approach to address the root of the systemic problems underlying MNCH.

Finally, chapter seven summarizes the main findings, conclusions and recommendations. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the study, along with a discussion of future research possibilities follows.

## **Chapter 2 Maternal, newborn and child health**

This chapter will explore the literature relevant to maternal, newborn and child health governance and illuminate the complexity of the challenge with which a network of actors engaged during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process. Governance is important to MNCH and public health delivery as it refers the structures and processes that affect the coordination and coherence of approaches to achieving health care objectives. The chapter will show that the complexity in the governance of MNCH stems from a history of insufficient financial capital, historically competing agendas between maternal and child health, a lack of a sustained political commitment at the global level which is further supported by incoherent and uncoordinated institutional architecture, and a growing cadre of actors who do not have clearly defined roles and responsibilities with respect to global health governance. The result is that scholarship thus far has been unable to substantively conceptualize who the central actors are in the governance domain and how the relationships are structured. Likewise, the mechanism by which the actors shape the agenda and contribute to the formulation of policies and programs is not well understood. In making this argument, the chapter reviews the history of maternal and child health governance, the barriers to progress, and the importance of networked governance to the future of maternal, newborn and child health.

### **2.1 History and status of MNCH**

Maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) is a relatively new term that merges distinct, yet interrelated public health fields. As with many areas of health, a multitude of problems, interventions, metrics and policy approaches shape and define the field. Numerous risk factors contribute to the poor health and low survival rates of women and children. These include systemic problems such as poverty, gender discrimination, political instability, and environmental degradation (Curtis et al., 2005). More specific contributing factors include lack of access to safe drinking water and sanitation systems, inadequate nutrition, susceptibility to infectious diseases, and insufficient basic health institutions and services for pregnant women and newborn children. Additionally, each particular subset of MNCH has distinct causal factors. For example maternal death may be directly caused by haemorrhage, obstructed

labour, hypertensive disorders or unsafe abortions, or linked to complications from malaria, HIV/AIDS, anaemia and diabetes (Ransom & Yinger, 2002; Khan et al., 2006).

Maternal and child mortality rates – a frequently cited indicator of the problem – have become a dominant focal point for policy and attempts to generate political attention to address the related causal factors (AbouZahr, 2001). While accurate and reliable data remains a problem, recent research using advanced global statistical models estimated that in 2008 there were approximately 342,900 maternal deaths and 8.8 million deaths of children younger than five years (Black et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010). Challenges associated with MNCH remain relevant to all countries. However, the field has become predominantly framed as a social policy issue for developing countries. Of the total number of maternal and child deaths worldwide, 90 percent occur within 68 developing countries which have been identified as priorities by the “Countdown to 2015 for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Survival”<sup>2</sup> (Bhutta et al., 2010). Over 50 percent of the total maternal deaths in 2008 occurred in six countries – Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and Pakistan (Hogan et al., 2010).

Global aggregate statistics demonstrate that substantial progress has been made to reduce maternal and child mortality rates (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). The 2008 estimated maternal mortality rate of 342,900 is a 35 percent reduction from WHO annual aggregate estimate of 529,000 from between 1990-2003 (WHO, 2005; Hogan et al., 2010) (Figure 2.1). The estimated absolute number of child deaths has also decreased from 12.5 million in 1990 to 8.8 million in 2008 (Bhutta et al., 2010; Black et al., 2010). But as Figure 2.2 illustrates, using data from the 1970 to 2003 time period, aggregate global trends mask substantial variation in progress among various countries and regions. In many of the *Countdown to 2015* priority countries in Africa, less progress has been made in decreasing the maternal and child mortality rates as compared to other regions. Moreover, the rate of the reductions have started to level off, and in some areas death rates have increased (Bhutta, 2000; Claeson & Waldman, 2000; Bhutta et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010). The mortality rates in children younger than five years in 17 of the 68 *Countdown to 2015* countries have been labelled as achieving no progress

---

<sup>2</sup> Countdown to 2015 for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Survival is an independent international initiative that was established in 2005 and is a collaborative arrangement between multiple agencies (UN agencies, NGOs, academics, foundations, governments, health-care professional associations). See <http://www.countdown2015mnch.org>.

(Bhutta et al., 2010). Countries with rapid economic development, such as Brazil and China, have consistently made progress in reducing maternal and child death rates. Yet economically poor and least developed countries (LDCs), notably those countries in south Asia and sub-Saharan Africa with large gaps between rich and poor groups, have struggled to improve MNCH beyond initial gains during the 1990s (Hill & Pebley, 1989; Claeson & Waldman, 2000; Campbell, 2001; World Health Organization, 2005).




Figure 2.1 Trends in global maternal mortality rates (1980-2008) (adapted from: Hogan et al., 2010)




Figure 2.2 Trends in mortality rates for children under 5 globally and by region (1970-2003) (adapted from: WHO, 2005)

The status of internally generated domestic health expenditures and external funding has been noted to directly affect health outcomes (Pitt et al., 2010). MNCH related activities comprise a distinct target area of official development assistance (ODA) and in 2008 all developing countries received a cumulative total of \$US 5.4 billion in ODA from bilateral donors, multilateral donors and global health initiatives (GAVI Alliance and Global Fund) (Pitt et al., 2010). While funding for MNCH activities increased by 105 percent from 2003 to 2008, the proportion of funding for MNCH activities in relation to the total funding allocated to all health activities has remained unchanged during this same period (Pitt et al., 2010). Different reasons may contribute to explaining this lack of change. One interpretation is that MNCH is not a higher priority than other health related issues within the international development community. When compared to specific infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis, MNCH, especially the maternal health component, has historically not received comparable global attention from governments, international organizations or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The lack of attention is due in part to the diffuse

nature of the problems and causal factors, the lack of awareness of the magnitude of the problem until recent decades, and the lack of institutional leadership (Mahler, 1987; Shiffman & Smith, 2007). However, the lower prioritization may also be a reflection of the relatively low number of deaths compared to other health issues.

While external funding remained proportionally the same until 2008, the world subsequently faced the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Research has yet to determine the precise impacts of the GFC on MNCH. However, projections and models have predicted increases in poverty, hunger and child deaths in developing countries (Anderson et al., 2011). Furthermore, economic shocks have been noted to have a significant, disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations because they can decrease trade and ODA flows, which in turn could slow or reverse improvement trends in maternal and child survival (Anderson et al., 2011). As many developing countries have vulnerable economies, and internally generated financing comprises an average of 85 percent of total health funding (Pitt et al., 2010), the GFC could potentially lead developing countries to rely more heavily on external funding. But traditional ODA and funding from multilateral health institutions such as the WHO is not likely to increase from current levels in light of the GFC. Funding contributions from private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are on the rise though, and have exceeded the core funding of the WHO (Cohen, 2006; Okie, 2006). The proportions, overall amounts and specificity of funding from different sources remains to be determined, but the increase in actors and their respective agendas have serious governance implications. As argued by Cohen (2006), the increase in stakeholders has resulted in “architectural indigestion”, whereby the lack of coordination between donors and health agencies, and the prevalence of ad hoc approaches has taken resources away from addressing health issues. Moreover, policy making within global health has been recognized as lacking in institutional processes and is being affected by competition among the numerous global and national actors involved (Reich & Takemi, 2009).

## **2.2 Maternal versus child health**

A review of the history of MNCH reveals that the maternal and child portions of the field have not always been closely linked or given equal policy attention. In fact, tensions have been noted to exist between maternal focused and children focused programmes, resulting in

counterproductive competition for political attention and financial resources (WHO, 2005). Moreover, within the child and maternal components, further tensions remain among the focus on specific diseases (referred to as vertical approaches) versus comprehensive health care (referred to as horizontal approaches). Recognizing and seeking to understand these tensions is important for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the tensions are embedded in a historical context of how the issues of both child health and maternal health have been managed. Secondly, the shift to a field with a combined scope has resulted in a greater number and diversity of actors within the policy community. This may bring advantages, such as the strength gained from greater numbers (e.g. expertise, advocates) and challenges that include fostering productive and cooperative relations among individuals with specialized and potentially entrenched interests. However, further knowledge is required about how these new interactions are shaping policy and contributing to goals and objectives (Reich & Takemi, 2009). Thirdly, research on the intersection between national and international agenda setting in health policy demonstrates ambiguity due to overlaps in institutions and actors (Reich, 1995). Recent research on the political prioritization of maternal health developed a framework that demonstrated the importance of the power of the actors involved in the process, the ideas used to portray an issue, the political context surrounding the issue and the characteristics of the particular issue (Shiffman, 2007a, 2007b; Shiffman & Smith, 2007). However this framework has not been applied to the linked field of MNCH, nor has it been used to evaluate the impact of new actors in the field and the renewed focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Finally, while the debate between the vertical disease-specific approaches and the horizontal health system approaches may never be fully resolved, individual and hybrid approaches continue to be advanced by governments, NGOs, medical/technical professionals and foundations. The relative influence and tactics employed by actors to shape policy and advance their preferred position on each side of the debate is poorly understood and yet, is increasingly likely to have an impact on the future direction of MNCH.

### 2.2.1 *Child Health*

Global strategies to address childhood health, specifically famine and disease, date back to 1946 with the creation of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund<sup>3</sup> (UNICEF, 2010). From the 1950s to the 1970s, strategies were predominantly vertical in their approach. That is, they were disease specific, employed technical solutions, and were not always exclusively designed as child health programmes (Claeson & Waldman, 2000). By the late 1970s, global child health initiatives were gaining international momentum with support from an array of international organizations, NGOs and government agencies. The focus during this period was primarily on combating deaths that were the result of infant diarrheal dehydration, with efforts focused on oral rehydration solution (ORS) programmes (Justice, 2000). In 1982 UNICEF launched the "Child Survival Revolution" initiative with the objective of reducing mortality rates in children under five by concentrating on ORS and immunization against major diseases such as tuberculosis, tetanus and diphtheria (Grant, 1986; Justice, 2000). The added focus on immunization linked with the WHO's "Expanded Program on Immunization", initiated in 1977. During the 1984 Bellagio conference "Protecting the World's Children" a policy shift occurred from being disease-specific and immunization focused to emphasizing overall child mortality (Joseph, 1984). From this period onwards, a mix of people-centred, community based strategies and disease specific approaches have co-existed, albeit tensions remain between advocates on each approach (Hill & Pebley, 1989). Moreover, most of the programming derived from ODA funds remained focussed on vertical programmes which include vaccine delivery (Lawn et al., 2007).

Child health has often been regarded as a top priority policy area for development. This is due to multiple factors including strong multilateral institutional leadership (e.g. UNICEF), support from key NGOs and foundations such as Rotary International and the Rockefeller Foundation, issue champions which included former World Bank president Robert McNamara, large national government programs, and landmark international conferences such as the 1990 World Summit for Children (Reich, 1995; Justice, 2000). The G8 Summit has also historically played a role in directing attention to global health – every summit meeting since 1996 has included discussions on a variety of health problems and initiatives (Labonté & Schrecker,

---

<sup>3</sup> The official name for UNICEF has now been altered to the United Nations Children Fund. However, the acronym remains unaltered.

2004; Lawn et al., 2007; Reich & Takemi, 2009). Yet, G8 efforts have been broad in scope, such as commitments towards the development of international infant and child survival goals. The global focus on child health received a further political boost with the Millennium Declaration, specifically with Millennium Development Goal (MDG) four, which set a target of reducing mortality in children younger than 5 years by two-thirds (UN, 2000). The related field of maternal health was addressed with its own goal (MDG 5), which is discussed in the upcoming section on maternal health.

In addition to these organizational factors, symbolism in politics, including the positive, relatively conflict free image of child survival, has contributed to child health being prioritized over adult health issues (Reich, 1995). As argued by Claeson and Waldman (2000), politicians have found child health to be an agenda item that meets little opposition as a cause. The scientific community has also played a role in keeping child health on the international policy agenda, notably with the pivotal volume on “Child Survival” edited by Mosley and Chen (1984). This volume presented a strategic framework that was instrumental in including both social and biological variables for child survival (Claeson & Waldman, 2000). While many challenges remain in further improving the health and welfare of children globally, the child health policy literature is largely in agreement that well-coordinated global efforts have resulted in substantial improvements in child survival in many regions of the world.

### *2.2.2 Maternal Health*

The field of maternal health has not witnessed a similar degree of success or captured nearly the same amount of political attention as child health. Unlike the positive image of protecting children, maternal health has a conflicted history, with struggles over divisive issues such as family planning and abortion (Kaeser, 1998). The field has distinct challenges and defining characteristics when compared to child health. Maternal mortality, which has been defined as the “death of women during pregnancy, childbirth, or in the 42 days after delivery” has a long history of global initiatives and policy (Hogan et al., 2010, p. 1609). Reference to maternal mortality dates back the 1930s within work by the League of Nations Health Section (AbouZahr, 2003). However from the 1930s until the 1970s, maternal health or motherhood issues have often been treated as a subset of broader reproductive, population, and primary health care policies and programmes. Advances during the 1970s and 1980s in statistical

survey techniques and data collection led to an increased understanding in child mortality, but new data collection and analysis for maternal health remained neglected.

However, in 1985, a study by the WHO and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) established new estimates for maternal mortality rates in developing countries, revealing new insights about the extent and scope of the problem, including that approximately 500,000 maternal deaths were occurring annually (WHO, 1986; AbouZahr, 2003). Based on the WHO data, Rosenfield and Mayne (1985) published a seminal paper, whereby they argued firstly that the maternal component of maternal and child health initiatives was being widely neglected. Secondly, the authors claimed that the causes and potential remedies for maternal deaths were distinct than those for newborns and children, and thus, the separation of the two subjects as separate policy areas ensued.

One important outcome from Rosenfield and Mayne's (1985) research is that the new statistics and information mobilized certain actions within the international community. For instance, in 1987 Halfdan Mahler, the Director General of the WHO, published a call for action for the Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI), justifying the program based on the maternal mortality estimates. In line with Rosenfield and Mayne (1985), Mahler (1987, p. 668) characterized maternal mortality as a "neglected tragedy" and highlighted contentious issues, such as illegal abortion causing 25-50 percent of the total maternal deaths. The SMI, launched at the International Safe Motherhood conference in Nairobi on February 1987, was linked to the WHO's Health For All Strategy, which emphasized a comprehensive approach to reproductive health. A SMI Inter-Agency Group was formed to guide future work, which included WHO, UNFPA, World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), The Population Council and Family Care International (FCI). Collectively, these efforts can be understood to have constituted the first wave of efforts to increase the attention devoted to maternal health.

While international political momentum appeared to be gaining for maternal health in the late 1980s, child health initiatives continued to receive greater amounts of attention. The attendee list of international conferences in the respective fields illustrates this point – the 1989 World Summit for Children included heads of state, UN agencies and NGOs, while the 1987 Safe Motherhood conference was not largely attended by people of the same rank (AbouZahr, 2003). Additional international conferences, including the 1994 International Conference on

Population and Development (ICPD) and the 1995 Fourth World Conference for Women (FWCW), attempted to raise support for maternal health and contributed to the re-framing of safe motherhood in a comprehensive reproduction and women's health context with linkages to human rights (AbouZahr, 2003). This rights-based paradigm shift constituted a second wave of efforts. It opened up the possibility of the use of treaties and legal mechanisms to obligate countries to address maternal health issues. Further efforts were made by the SMI Inter-Agency Group to increase the prominence of maternal health on the international agenda. A key success was the agreement to devote World Health Day 1998 to safe motherhood, which resulted in the World Bank issuing a Call to Action<sup>4</sup>, which was supported by U.S. First Lady Hillary Clinton and World Bank President James Wolfensohn (Kaeser, 1998).

Since the 2000s, the number of initiatives, agencies and organizations addressing maternal health issues has proliferated at the global level— a notable entrant includes the White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood. As with child health, the Millennium Declaration provided a substantial boost to maternal health – the goal of MDG 5 is to reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three-quarters and achieve universal access to reproductive health by 2015 (UN, 2000, 2011). As stated earlier, initiatives to garner political attention for maternal health have fallen short of the expectations of the founding individuals and organizations (Shiffman & Smith, 2007). Moreover, an understanding of the diversity of actors and initiatives that are substantially contributing to maternal health policy is needed. While research illuminates how and by whom maternal health initiatives and policy were shaped from the 1980s to the early 2000s, it remains less clear how new alliances and partnership based organizations, in addition to renewed political commitments to try to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, are re-shaping the field.

### 2.2.3 *Shaping the MNCH field*

The history of the child and maternal health fields reveals a complicated story. Child health campaigns and initiatives have been successful at capturing domestic and international political attention while those focusing on maternal health have struggled to achieve the same level of success. Historically, maternal health often fell intentionally or unintentionally under the child

---

<sup>4</sup> A “call to action” is a formal declaration that is a frequent practice by international organizations to mobilize member states to prioritize certain initiatives. The international organization releasing the “call” may enlist high profile political figures to lend support and draw attention to the issue.

health umbrella, yet statistics and analysis of various cases in many developing countries have revealed it to be a neglected area that required distinct solutions. Thus, governments, international organizations, NGOs and partnerships concentrated on generating political will and raising capital for specific projects and global initiatives for child health and maternal health as separate fields. The academic literature paralleled this trend with research examining either maternal or child health policy challenges separately, arguing that each has distinct sets of problems and solutions (e.g. Rosenfield & Maine, 1985). Yet paradoxically, a more recent trend has purposely re-linked the separate fields into a meta-field labelled maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH). The complete phrase maternal, newborn and child health and the acronym MNCH gained prominence in the late 1990s and 2000s. The term can now be frequently found in the titles of academic journal articles (e.g. Bennett & Ssengooba, 2010; Pitt et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2011).

The re-joining of the fields is in part due to the promotion of ideas about holistic health care, referred to by several different but overlapping approaches, such as horizontal health systems, continuum of care, and comprehensive integrated approaches to health care (e.g., WHO, 2005; Filippi et al., 2006; Kerber et al., 2007). Advocates of these approaches argue that the various specific health challenges and determinants of health are inextricably linked and comprehensive health system approaches are the only way that further substantial gains can be made in maternal and child survival rates (Bhutta, 2000; Claeson & Waldman, 2000; Kerber et al., 2007; Mwalali & Ngui, 2009). Yet while the language of integration and connectedness has permeated into the discourse of MNCH, donor agencies have demonstrated a preference for vertical approaches that focus on individual illnesses and interventions (AbouZahr, 2003). Furthermore, until the work developed by Kerber et al. (2007) was released, a framework to guide the development and implementation of policies and programmes that adopted an integrated paradigm did not exist. While vertical approaches have achieved substantial early results in child survival, fragmented service delivery is viewed as ineffective in reducing maternal mortality and further diminishing child mortality rates beyond current levels (AbouZahr, 2003). Ultimately, there is not a clear consensus among the various actors within the MNCH field as to the financial and political feasibility of balancing the approaches.

## **2.3 Barriers to progress**

The previous sections have described how substantial global progress has been made overall to increase maternal and child survival. Yet, smaller gains have been experienced during the past decade compared to the advances from programs enacted from the 1970s to 1990s. Barriers to making significant advances can be classified into two types of challenges: a) paradigmatic challenges, and b) specific categorical challenges. Paradigmatic challenges include how maternal, newborn and child health strategies are framed, delivered and embedded within larger economic and social systems. Some approaches emphasize the need to address the vulnerability of pregnant women, while others advocate for a full cycle approach to MNCH such as the “continuum of care paradigm” (Filippi et al., 2006). This later paradigm stresses the need to integrate and balance a continuous spectrum of health care, from the pre-pregnancy stage to early childhood, and the community level to institutional hospital settings. However, barriers fall within broader paradigms. For instance, inadequate operational management is cited as the main barrier to implementing integrated health care packages in developing countries (Kerber et al., 2007). The lack of analytical research in how to scale small scale community level interventions to larger populations is also acknowledged (Filippi et al., 2006). Many of the challenges identified within the literature relate to four key areas: data, finances, political commitment and leadership, and framing (WHO, 2005). Elements of these challenges have been mentioned in previous sections, but they are detailed below in distinct sub-sections to enhance the clarity of the discussion.

### *2.3.1 Data collection and records*

The availability of reliable and valid epidemiological data in developing countries has increased substantially in the past two decades. However, the margins of error for some data sets, such as deaths due to abortion, remain high due to under-reporting, misclassification and lack of methodological quality (Khan et al., 2006). Data collection and record keeping is a major problem – the WHO (2005) estimated that as much as two thirds of the global maternal and child deaths are not being reported necessitating the high use of estimations. The research by Hogan *et al.* (2010) revealed that 21 countries had no maternal and child health data for the 1990-2008 period. High quality data is viewed as being essential to understanding target areas for specific vertical approaches and to inform policy makers of the success of specific

programmes (Bhutta et al., 2010). Continuous advances are being made in data collection, analysis and estimation, and while challenges remain, the problems are not insurmountable provided that international agencies can forge effective relationships with domestic counterparts that are most closely positioned to service delivery. The focus by governments, NGOs, UN agencies, foundations and health-care professional associations on data to prioritize interventions to deliver the greatest results within set budgets. The risk is that interconnected programmes with peripheral importance risk being marginalized in favour of those that make headlines.

### *2.3.2 Finances and investments*

The Millennium Declaration represented a global commitment to address poverty related development issues. Financial investments, both domestically and internationally, in health systems and initiatives are essential to achieve the ambitious MDGs. The MNCH field had previously been recognized as lacking international financial priority (Filippi et al., 2006; Bhutta et al., 2010). MNCH initiatives compete for financial resources with high profile infectious disease campaigns, including HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis programmes. While competition may be prevalent among agencies delivering services, many of the infectious diseases comprise a substantial portion of the contributing factors to maternal and child deaths. Yet, regardless of how funding is allocated, it has been argued that in order to achieve MDG 4 and 5, a six-fold total increase in MNCH funding is required by 2015 from 2003 levels (WHO, 2005; Filippi et al., 2006). Tensions also remain as to the approach to funding. The majority of MNCH champions advocate linking initiatives within existing larger pools of funds for overall health sector development. Yet, against the advice of many, efforts also continue to create parallel stand alone funding mechanisms for specific MNCH causes (WHO, 2005). This later approach has been argued to divert limited domestic financial flows to health in developing countries (Bhutta et al., 2010). The challenge remains to create policies and programmes that result in increased service delivery with a costs distribution structure that is sustainable and involves commitments from domestic and international actors.

### 2.3.3 *Leadership, political commitment and fragmentation*

Sustained political commitment and leadership are critical to the further advancement of MNCH causes. Yet, as argued by the WHO (2005), a clear understanding of how domestic political support is generated for MNCH does not exist. International organizations and donor countries have demonstrated some “political will” and leadership for components of MNCH over the past three decades, yet it has been sporadic. Analysis of early work in both the child and maternal health areas demonstrate clear champions that provided essential leadership to mobilize resources and draw attention to the need for coordinated action. Champions included both organizations such as UNICEF for child health initiatives and individuals from the academic/practitioner and government communities. But, with the substantial increase in the number and type of actors involved with MNCH work, including the emergence of multi-actor partnerships, the location and mode of leadership is no longer clear.

While child health is regarded to have an “institutional home” within UNICEF, maternal health remains governed by an assemblage of public and private coalitions, trilateral partnerships and working groups. The WHO does play an important role. It provides leadership by its housing of the Partnership on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) and coordinates and publishes important research such as the 2005 report entitled “World health report: making every mother and child count” (WHO, 2005). However, institutional politics, organizational rigidity and the perseverance of “siloed” approaches within the UN system have prevented the WHO from becoming a central institutional home for both child and maternal health.

International commitments to MNCH and calls for action continue, yet the dynamics behind the campaigns and their effectiveness is poorly understood. A fragmented institutional system exists. Recent additions to the landscape include, *inter alia*, the World Bank’s Reproductive Health Action Plan, the Women’s Health Initiative (WHI), the UN Secretary General’s Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health, and the International Alliance for Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health (Cohen, 2011). More recently, the G8 has attempted to assert itself as a relevant actor in global health. Yet, the G8’s focus has predominantly been on vertical approaches, including the promotion of disease-specific interventions such as immunization, HIV/AIDS programs, and malaria prevention (Labonté &

Schrecker, 2004). In addition, the G8 provided support to the MDGs through the final communiqués released for their summits.

While the G8's initiatives are laudable and encouraging, translating the commitments into domestic implementation and sustained action remains a challenge. Every country has political dynamics, institutional factors, economic realities, geography, and culture nuances that present opportunities and constraints for maternal and child health. As argued by Shiffman (2007b), progress for getting MNCH issues onto the national political agenda may relate to the level of interest from the national government, the emergence of champions in national legislatures, the state of health funding and the presence of an active civil society. The combination of these factors, which comprises the policy environment, dictates the specific items, such as programs for breastfeeding, micronutrients, or safe abortion, that ultimately become prioritized on the institutional agenda and those that get dropped.

#### *2.3.4 Issue framing*

As activity within the global health policy and governance domain has increased, attention has also been growing on how specific issues are framed. The history of maternal health reveals several attempts by NGOs, multilateral agencies, some governments and partnership organizations to reframe the issue to increase the political support for the issue. Most of the framing efforts from this set of actors has been through a development lens with normative and ethical underpinnings (Labonté & Gagnon, 2010). However, due to the overlap of health issues that are not necessarily specific to mothers, newborns and children, such as HIV/AIDS or malaria, multiple overlapping lenses may exist. Consequently, the positioning of MNCH programs is often unclear and they have been recognized as lacking a clear vision with policy efforts have been labelled as inconsistent (WHO, 2005). Many donor country governments have framed global health as a foreign policy issue. Research indicates security and economic interests have been the primary motivator for decisions, while ethics and rights-based arguments have played a lesser role (Labonté & Gagnon, 2010; Kickbusch, 2011). Furthermore, the recognition that MNCH consists of more than technical problems with direct, identifiable “fixes” creates a framing challenge to those designing marketing campaigns, with the risk of messages becoming lost within larger intractable poverty debates.

Beyond internal framing tensions, the goals of improving global MNCH come under the rubric of international relations and thus, domestic foreign policy. However global MNCH represents a multifaceted challenge that requires moving beyond a traditional realist lens. While maternal and child health are areas that are not directly tied to state interests, Labonté and Gagon (2010) point out that while necessary, ethical arguments alone are insufficient for advancing global health issues as part of foreign policy. They emphasize the need for legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms under a rights-based regime. Kruesmann and Timmermann (2009) make the case, based on the UN Human Rights Council, that the death of women from preventable pregnancy and child birth complications represent a violation of a fundamental human right (UNHRC, 2009). Yet, rights-based arguments have had trouble gaining traction. Cohen (2011) argued that even recent commitments to the Millennium Development Goals made by U.S. President Obama went beyond altruism and charity and were linked to domestic economic and security interests in an interdependent world.

While the current status of funding and political commitment creates a challenging environment to make progress on MNCH, this section demonstrated how the long history of stymied financial inputs, poor availability of data, limited political support, and debates about issue framing has created a complex context in which any current MNCH efforts will now occur.

#### **2.4 MNCH: From multiple actors to networks**

As noted earlier, the number and type of actors involved in global health policies and programs have increased dramatically in the past few decades. With this increase in the number of type of actors, new types of relationships have developed, including formal and informal alliances, coalitions, partnerships and networks. While the structure of these arrangements affects what flows among members, which can include information and financial resources, it remains unclear if this new landscape of actors is contributing to improvements in policy outcomes.

Networks are cited as being an important development in the shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1997; Castells, 2000). Global health policy and governance is experiencing dynamic change and can be conceptualized as sets of public and private, local and global, or social and organizational embedded systems (Snijders & Doreian, 2010; Blanchet & James, 2011). Within the MNCH field, policy and decision making are no longer

solely focussed on the state, and non-state actors play an important role in policy design, programme financing and delivery and project evaluation (Tantivess & Walt, 2008).

The shifting architecture of global health governance and financing, namely the prominence of foundations with vast financial resources and the emergence of public-private partnerships (PPPs), means that there is a new dynamic being created between foreign policy and the efforts of non-states actors in the health sector (Cohen, 2006; Kruesmann & Timmermann, 2009; Kickbusch, 2011). This dynamic is further complicated by donor countries increasingly relying on international and domestic NGOs for program implementation. However, it remains undetermined within the literature whether NGOs are merely acting as a conduit to deliver services more effectively than domestic government agencies, or if they are more deeply entwined in policy design processes. Furthermore, empirical evidence is lacking to indicate if MNCH sector PPPs in developing countries are actually improving the health of women and children. As argued by Baru and Nundy (2008) in the case of India's health sector, partnerships between state and non-state actors have intrinsic asymmetries and the multiplicity of actors have resulted in detrimental fragmentation and ultimately a loss in programme effectiveness.

While a large literature exists on the notion of "policy networks", which attempts to explain and illustrate the complexities of policy making within a web of interconnected relationships among various actors (see Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Pappi & Henning, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000), a network focus is largely absent in the MNCH scholarship. The work of Tantivess and Walt (2008) provides an important contribution in their examination of the role of policy networks in scaling-up antiretroviral treatment (ART) in Thailand. While they raise caution about the limited applicability of their research findings, Tantivess and Walt (2008) argued that the Thailand government does not have a monopoly on either health policy agenda setting or the development and implementation of specific ART health policies. Their research demonstrated an important role for non-state actors, such as HIV NGOs, medical practitioners and scientists in developing specific policies and they found that these various network actors provided different types of resources through relationships that depended on factors such as trust and recognition.

Ngoasong (2011) also employed a network lens in his research on global health and HIV/AIDS policies in Cameroon. The author explained the emergence of a new policy

dialogue and transfer “space”, which existed in the form of transcalar networks of global, national and local global health practitioners. Ngoasong’s (2011) work is largely theoretical and he acknowledged the need for empirical studies to assert his claims that the use of civil society organizations does not guarantee effective health governance and that transformational processes, such as community participation, pushed by some network members will not be realized in the absence of domestically sustainable health care funding.

Finally, Blanchet and James (2011) provide an important contribution to the global health field by evaluating the use of social network analysis (SNA) in health systems research. They argue that a properly conducted SNA can improve understanding how ties among actors can affect the transfer and diffusion of innovations and how the position of an actor within a network can affect their relative influence. While these works represent advancement in the global health field from a networked perspective, none specifically address the issue of MNCH.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Substantial progress has been made over the past several decades to reduce global maternal and child mortality rates. Yet, progress has slowed over the past decade and mortality rates remain high in some regions and many countries. Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 include specific commitments related to MNCH. However, the prospects of achieving these two goals remain low as compared to other MDGs. The global MNCH field is marred by problems of governance that are further confounded by stymied financial flows during period of economic turmoil as witnessed during the GFC.

The MNCH field now contains multiple types of actors proposing and advancing a range of solutions and interventions. Financial capital is being supplied to economically poor countries and specific projects by donor agencies, global initiatives and private foundations. spurts of leadership have been provided by international institutions, countries, political leaders and philanthropists. Furthermore, networks and alliances containing multitudes of actors are actively involved in the governance of MNCH. Despite, and in part due to this cacophony of efforts, the governance of MNCH lacks coherence, is increasingly fragmented, and is challenged by sparse and unreliable data. Vertical approaches continue to be dominant policy approaches, despite the well recognized need for comprehensive integrated approaches

to MNCH and health care delivery. This may be partially explained by a preference for proven, measurable and easily fundable “fixes” which incrementally address simple problems, as compared to attempting innovative approaches, which require long term financial commitments, to address deeper underlying systemic issues which represent complex problems. Furthermore, tensions, albeit diminished, continue to exist between champions and advocates of child health versus maternal health. Consequently the problems are framed in ways that are not always effective in generating the political and social capital necessary to advance next generation solutions.

The literature set on MNCH is gradually being populated by rigorous analysis of the complexity of the field and the associated political challenges. However, questions remain about MNCH governance, the roles of the various actors, and the effectiveness of a global forum such as the G8 in acting as a catalyst to advance progress in the field. Individual, national and global leadership is important to generating political will. But, it remains unclear as to how MNCH becomes and remains a political and financial priority on the global arena. Furthermore, the forces by which policies are shaped and the problems framed as simple versus complex remain largely undocumented and sparsely analyzed.

## Chapter 3 **Methodology and Methods**

This chapter provides a description of the methodological foundations that guided the research. The chapter begins with a discussion on the epistemological and ontological assumptions that formed the basis for the selection of a mixed-method approach. Next, an explanation of the research case study context is described and the methods for both the data collection and the two main data analyses are defined, including social network analysis and qualitative data analysis. The chapter closes with a discussion that acknowledges limitations of the mixed method approach.

### **3.1 The Research Paradigm**

This study explores the emergence and presence of social networks as part of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process and seeks to understand how decisions and policies were shaped by various government and non-governmental actors involved in the process.

Recognizing a researcher's own ontology is important as it reveals the philosophical beliefs about the structure and nature of social reality, which in turns guides knowledge creation and development (Blaikie, 2010; Stout, 2012). This research was guided by constructivist theory with the aim to interpret, understand and reconstruct the socially constructed views of actors actively involved in a substantive policy and governance process. Ontological assumptions of dynamic existence, relativism and context specific social construction were important foundations for the research. Using Stout's (2012, p. 2) description of a *differentiated relational* ontology, this study was conducted with the perspective that "the human being is an evolving unique expression of a complex, relational, multidimensional source". Thus, it is accepted that the social constructions are alterable, may or may not be shared between individuals or across groups, and individuals both shape and are shaped by their surrounding environment.

The epistemological approach of the research is both subjectivist and interpretivist. An interpretivist position emphasizes the role of agent and structure and recognizes that dialogue and probing will encourage a deeper understanding in the co-creation of data between the researcher and research participants (Grix, 2002). Subjectivism recognizes that the researcher is interactively linked with the subject of study and participants involved (Denzin and Lincoln,

2007). While human interpretation enables a form of reality to be constructed, it is not possible to determine an absolute or objective value of reality (Riley, 2000). Much of the knowledge derived from the research resulted from transactions between researcher and participants. Throughout the data collection phase of the research, the researcher held a fellowship position within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This position involved interacting with a numerous individuals on various policy projects that were responsibilities of the fellowship beyond this study. Some of these individuals also ended up being participants in this study. Thus, human interaction played a role in a form of reality constructed within this context. It is also accepted that the research is bound to place and time as it will be constructed within a specific socio-cultural context. This position is particularly important given that the researcher was a staff member of the federal government during a portion of the study.

### **3.2 The Research Context**

The Group of 8 (G8) summit has been convened annually since its origins in 1975 (Hajnal, 2007). Member countries of the G8 include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition to the core members, the European Union (EU) participates in the annual summit process (Lee, 2009). For certain elements of each Summit, other state and non-state actors may participate at the discretion of the host country. The annual summits are attended by the heads of state or heads of government of the member countries and the events typically are between two to three days in length. Advisory and support staff, such as *sherpas* and *sous-sherpas*<sup>5</sup>, from each member country participate in various capacities for the duration of the summit. Each year, the hosting and chair responsibilities rotate amongst the member countries. The selection of priorities and themes for the summit agenda are led by the host country and usually only include “intractable international problems, which cannot be settled at lower levels” (Bayne, 2005, p. 3). The summit is typically concluded with a communiqué or a Chair’s Summary, which may include declarations, statements, and action plans on key issues discussed at the event (Hajnal, 2007).

The annual G8 summits are preceded by an extensive preparatory period that formally starts for the host country when the chair responsibilities are assumed. In reality though, the

---

<sup>5</sup> The term *sherpa* is used for the personal representative of a country’s leader for a summit process. A sherpa has a important and privileged role before and during summits as they are typically the only individuals other than the leaders that attend key meetings between leaders (Hajnal, 2007).

preparatory process may begin more than a year in advance of the convening of the summit (Hajnal, 2007). In part, this lengthy preparatory process is a consequence of the nature of the issues and the schedule. That is, given that each member country is aware of the chair rotation schedule and given that many pressing global issues are discussed at multiple summits or link to international initiatives with fixed milestones (e.g. the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)) there is an enduring nature to the policy and planning process surrounding a single summit.

The summit preparatory process varies depending on the host country's political system, bureaucratic structure, and the personal preferences and predispositions of the politicians and bureaucrats leading the process (Hajnal, 2007). Domestic politics and national interests inevitably influence the shaping of summit agendas, creating pressure to balance short-term thinking over longer term perspectives (Mann, 2010). As a result of these forces, the preparatory process for summits has been recognized as being "both an art and science" (Carin et al., 2010, p. 10). While the summit deliberations often receive the bulk of media attention, the preparatory process is a critical component of the G8 system. It is during this stage many components of the "problems" are analyzed and elements of solutions are assembled. Conventionally, the process involves discussions among key actors within member governments, non-member governments and international organizations (Hajnal, 2007). As the G8 process has matured, the system includes a mix of institutionalized and ad hoc meetings that occur before the summit. These include ministerial fora, sherpa meetings, sous-sherpa meetings, task forces, and working groups (Hajnal, 2007). Increasingly, non-state actors, such as NGOs, charitable foundations, and corporations, have been included in various elements of the planning leading up to the summits (Bayne, 2005).

### *3.2.1 Canada and the 2010 G8*

Canada hosted the 36<sup>th</sup> G8 Summit on June 25-26, 2010 in Huntsville, Ontario and the fourth G20 Summit convened with heads of state and government on June 26-27, 2010 in Toronto, Ontario. This was the first time that the G8 and G20 meetings had been held consecutively – an opportunity that arose from a movement initiated by some global leaders to expand the role of the finance ministers G20 and develop a more inclusive and representative membership to the G8 for the purpose of coordinating action to manage the global financial crisis (Woods, 2010).

While the role, relevance and relationship between the G8 and G20 summits is still evolving (see Smith, 2010), the focus of the 2010 G20 agenda was on international economic cooperation and the 2010 G8 concentrated on development (including maternal, child and newborn health), international peace and security, and environmental protection (G8, 2010b; G20, 2010).

The development of priorities for the 2010 G8 Summit began well in advance of the Summit. On June 19, 2008, over two years prior to the 2010 G8 Summit, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that the 2010 G8 Summit would be held at the Deerhurst Resort in Huntsville, Ontario and that discussions would focus on three themes: i) open markets and free trade; ii) action against global warming, and iii) freedom, democracy and the rule of law (Prime Minister of Canada, 2010a). Development was added as a fourth summit theme in July 2009 (Guebert, 2010). A refined and more specific approach was later announced. On January 26<sup>th</sup>, 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2010, p. A13) stated, in a newspaper opinion article, that during its presidency of the G8, Canada would concentrate on human welfare and would “champion a major initiative to improve the health of women and children in the world’s poorest regions”. This commitment was reaffirmed in a speech by the Prime Minister at the World Economic Forum (Prime Minister of Canada, 2010b). Later referred to as the “Muskoka Initiative”, Prime Minister Harper’s focus on women and children’s health (later categorized as the maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) signature initiative) became a prominent topic in national and international media (e.g. Boseley, 2010; Lunn, 2010; The Canadian Press, 2010; Travers, 2010) As the preparations and planning proceeded, debates over the substantive content of the initiative ensued – the reasons for which are described in the sections below.

### *3.2.2 Global political context during summit preparatory process*

Five external political factors are relevant to the context in which the preparations for the 2010 G8 Summit occurred, which include: the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), ongoing summit reforms, shifts in the global geopolitical and economic landscape, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and Canada’s interest in seeking a key role in other international fora.

Firstly, the GFC, or *Great Recession*, began in 2008 and quickly became a dominant priority for international relations. The GFC placed pressure on governments, international organizations and institutions with different consequences. Prior to the GFC, international relations scholars had been debating the retreat or weakening of the state by examining the significance and effects of, *inter alia*, the reduction of trade barriers, the deregulation of national industries, and the globalization of national economies (e.g. Patnaik, 1992; Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996; Weiss, 1998). The outcomes and implications of the GFC remain contentious. Some scholars and practitioners anticipated a significant rupture in the dominant culture of deregulation and fiscal austerity (Klein, 2008; Stiglitz, 2008). Others have argued that the GFC has actually resulted in a retrenchment in neo-liberalism and market oriented approaches (Peck et al., 2012).

Yet, as states were implicated in the factors that led to the GFC, many domestic and international governance processes have been, and continue to be, re-examined (Peters et al., 2011). The GFC provided a renewed purpose for global leaders to collectively manage the crisis, although the interest grew to include the G20 rather than the narrow grouping of the G8. Conversely, while the GFC led to a need for governments to exhibit leadership, it could be argued that in some cases the magnitude and reach of the GFC greatly hindered the capacity of governments to respond to the crisis (Moshirian, 2011). Furthermore, governments faced the challenge of satisfying domestic concerns that may have conflicted with the goals of economic globalization and international cooperation, such as the creation of domestic jobs which may require protectionist policies.

Secondly, in addition to the circumstances surrounding the GFC, the G8's future was insecure due to evolutions in global governance. Discussions had arisen prior to the GFC regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the G8, with much focus on a membership structure that was no longer representative (English et al., 2005; Heap, 2008; Smith & Heap, 2010). Given that the G8 and G20 summits were being held consecutively for the first time, some speculation existed that the G8 needed to prove its continued worth rather than be replaced entirely by the G20. It could be hypothesized that it would not be in any host nation's interest to be the host of the summit that was deemed futile for future international cooperation. That is, leaders and those involved in the preparatory process within Canada could be expected to want to avoid the G8's last meeting to occur on its "watch".

Thirdly, major global geopolitical and economic changes have occurred since the G8 was formed in the 1970s. These changes include the rise in economic power of countries from the Global South such as Brazil, India, China, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the European Union. These “rising” countries are increasingly recognized as possessing institutional and structural power and they have become influential voices in global governance (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Fuchs, 2005). Furthermore, the process of globalization led to a world in which people and nations are increasingly economically, politically and socially interdependent. Interconnections among nations, societies and people have increased at a rapid rate and include the exchange of technical and scientific information, increased capital flows across borders and among transnational businesses, and pronounced migration. The governance of global affairs has stretched the boundaries of the Westphalian sovereign state system, notably the growing recognition of the non-state actors as legitimate contributing voices to decision making fora (Boli & Thomas, 1999; Forman & Segaar, 2006).

A fourth factor shaping the global political climate in which the 2010 G8 Summit was to occur involves the UN High-level plenary meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, which was scheduled for September 20-22, 2010 (UN, 2010). The objective of this MDG meeting was to accelerate progress on all MDGs by the target date of 2015. Goal 4 of the MDGs involves reducing child mortality and Goal 5 involves improving maternal health (UN, 2000). Recognizing that the G8 countries could collectively contribute to achieving two of the MDGs in which the least amount of progress had been achieved thus far provided a powerful motivation to consider this issue as a Summit discussion topic.

A fifth concern relates to the Canadian Prime Minister’s reputation as a leader in international relations by both a global and domestic constituency. Canada, under Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s leadership, was seeking a bid for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council (to be determined in October 2010 after the G8 Summit). One factor in gaining favourable votes for the bid can involve a country’s attempt to address issues that matter to nations casting the votes. The issues highlighted by the MDGs provide insight into the issues that matter to a number of nations, particularly the Global South, some of whom were also members or participants in the G20. Therefore, a link arguably existed between the perceived success of Canada’s role in hosting the two summit events and their Security Council bid (Campion-Smith, 2010).

### *3.2.3 Domestic political context during summit preparatory process*

The political context within Canada at the time of the summit preparatory process had recently undergone a shift on the ideological spectrum. From 1980 to 2004, Canada was governed by majority governments - a situation where the governing party holds over 50 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. In 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin and the Liberal Party of Canada formed government with 20 seats short of a majority (Pammett & Dornan, 2004). Less than two years later parliament was dissolved, an election was held, and Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada were elected with a minority government (Pammett & Dornan, 2006). It had been 13 years since the Conservative Party governed the country. However, the Conservative Party's hold on power was weak as it was 30 seats short of a majority. In 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party were re-elected with yet another, albeit slightly stronger, minority government (Pammett & Dornan, 2009). Thus, for the duration of the G8 summit preparatory period and the 2010 Summit itself, Canadian politics were characterized by a polarized, uncertain electorate and a government in a constant battle for an improvement on its minority position.

The minority government situation had the potential to shape and be shaped by the decisions and outcomes of the G8 Summit. While journalists, politicians and political strategists were arguing that a new right wing political realignment was emerging in Canada (e.g. Laycock, 2001; Behiels, 2010), Prime Minister Harper had yet to convince the electorate in Canada that he and his party were able to effectively govern the complex issues facing Canadian society from a centrist position. Stephen Harper's formal political career began when he was elected as a Member of Parliament in 1993, representing the now defunct Reform Party of Canada. Since this time, Harper's policy positions have been viewed as fiscally and socially conservative, and his ideology has been seen to align with Christian "values" (Johnson, 2006; Mackay, 2006; Behiels, 2010).

Thus, the dual summits could be regarded as an opportunity to showcase leadership on a myriad of issues and potentially demonstrate moderate conservatism that could help broaden the appeal of the Conservative Party. While the G20 was emerging as the forum in which economic and financial leadership could be showcased, this would, arguably, dovetail with long standing fiscal conservative values and images of traditional diplomatic power. The G8,

on the other hand, afforded an opportunity to focus on global challenges other than the GFC. Although the G8 had historically discussed a wide range of security, economic, environmental and social issues, the transformational period in summitry, linked to the emergence of the G20, meant that the role and relevance of the G8 was open to re-definition (Smith, 2010). It is in this context that a “motherhood” and development issue was selected as the signature initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit.

The “new” Conservative Party of Canada (2003-current), and its precursors which included the Canadian Alliance (2000-2003), the Reform Party of Canada (1987-2000) and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (1942-2003), have upheld a range of positions on issues of “moral conscience” (e.g. abortion, same sex rights, euthanasia) (Johnson, 2006). Historically and generally, the Progressive Conservative Party has been found to avoid political partisanship over certain contentious social issues by regarding them as matters for private decision making (Farney, 2009). However, individual Members of Parliament (MPs) have frequently voiced individual, socially conservative positions on social issues that may, in some cases incorrectly, be assumed to stand for official party policies. The emergence of the Reform Party of Canada, which replaced the Progressive Conservatives as Canada’s major right-wing party in the early 1990s, resulted in a renewed interest in reopening debates on moral conscience issues. Consequently, abortion and same-sex marriage became issues that received frequent attention in the media coverage surrounding Canadian politics from the mid 1990s onwards (see for e.g. Delacourt, 2004; CBC News, 2006; Palmer, 2008). During his tenure of the leader of the Opposition, Harper officially acknowledged that Conservative Party members had a diverse range of deep personal convictions on moral conscience issues (Johnson, 2006). Prime Minister Harper has permitted MPs to vote freely on such matters according to their positions and in consultation with constituents in their ridings. Regardless of the official Conservative Party stance, abortion became a divisive issue, especially during recent elections.

The relevance of this issue of moral conscience came to play an important role, at least domestically, for the host country’s signature initiative. When Prime Minister Harper first announced that the 2010 G8 Summit would focus on maternal health in developing countries, few details were provided (see Harper, 2010). However, the topic of abortion soon became a focal point when pressure was placed upon the government of Canada to provide details on the

substance of the initiative and the media reported that funding through the signature initiative would be funnelled only to supporting organizations that did not provide support for abortions. Clarification was provided on March 16 2010, with Foreign Minister Canon declaring that the G8 maternal health initiative "does not deal in any way, shape or form with family planning" (Campbell, 2010). This statement resulted in a public outcry and heated debates within the House of Commons. The Harper administration's decision was taken by some to indicate the re-opening of the abortion debate within Canada (Webster, 2010a). As a consequence, the 2010 Summit signature initiative on maternal, child and newborn health became entangled in the political left's long standing hypothesis of "hidden-agendas" by those within the Conservative Party. Ultimately, the domestic political debates, in conjunction with the global political factors described in the previous section, provided an important context in which the G8 Summit was held.

### **3.3 Research design and methods**

The research was designed based on three main aspects: i) case study selection; ii) a mixed method approach; and iii) data collection and analysis for each specific method, including ego-centric social network analysis, whole social network analysis and qualitative data analysis. Each of these aspects is described in detail below.

#### *3.3.1 Case study selection*

This dissertation uses a case study approach to explore the nature of actor interactions, the patterns of influence and the process of policy formation during the preparatory phase of the 2010 G8 Summit. Rather than seeking multiple cases in which constant and alterable variables are identified, this study recognizes that hundreds of variables may exist within one case (Yin, 1994). Thus, the case was selected based on it representing a meaningful and purposeful area for comparing and challenging existing theories of networked governance, as opposed to generalizing findings to other cases (Yin, 1994). Case study research of this type is an iterative process that involves a dialectical relationship between empirical data and theories (Bryman, 2001). Consequently, throughout the research process, a two-way flow existed between observations made in the field and existing theoretical explanations for similar patterns.

Recalling from chapter one, a multitude of different summit fora exist which could represent sites of networked governance. The G8 was selected for this study because it: a) represents a microcosm of the challenges in summit diplomacy, b) has been identified as involving networked relationships, and c) has received increasing scrutiny regarding its legitimacy as a summit forum.

The 2010 G8 Summit involved discussions on many important and pressing global issues, including development aid accountability, food security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and environmental sustainability (G8, 2010b). While any one of these areas may have been suitable for an in-depth exploratory study, the 2010 G8 Summit initiative on maternal, newborn and child health is a valuable case for four primary reasons. Firstly, the initiative was given a prominent position in the 2010 Summit as the “signature initiative” and was flagged early on by Prime Minister Harper as an area in which he personally wanted to advance progress. Secondly, the issue area appeared to display characteristics that fit within the tenets of global governance, an overarching conceptual paradigm of this research. For instance, the literature on the governance of MNCH showed that multiple actors and scales were involved, ranging from governments and international organizations, to NGOs and foundations, to individual champions. With such a wide range of actors, the sources and location of power has the potential to be diffuse and dynamic. Furthermore, efforts to improve global MNCH to date have involved collective action, informal networks, and both top-down and bottom-up activity, as described in a previous chapter. Thirdly, the issue area involved both domestic and global political forces, and had a complexity and depth suitable to the epistemological approach adopted in this study. Lastly, the data for the MNCH initiative was more readily accessible than the data for other initiatives, such as nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, MNCH as a 2010 G8 summit agenda item was feasible to research.

It is recognized that the patterns and trends observed within the 2010 G8 summit MNCH case may not necessarily be replicable with other issues addressed by the G8 or other summit fora. It is expected that each issue would generate different networks that are dependent on the characteristics of the issue. For instance, the preparatory process for developing an initiative to combat nuclear proliferation would likely predominantly involve governmental actors due to the sensitivity of the topic from a security perspective. Conversely, issues such as food security or climate change may involve large, diverse networks, with a

degree of overlap in the actors. However, the development of the MNCH initiative during the 2010 G8 Summit provided a meaningful vantage point for exploring the role of networked governance due to the profile of the issue, the longstanding networks involved in the issue at a global level, and the complexity of the issue.

### *3.3.2 Data collection using mixed methods*

This study utilized a mixed method approach for the data analysis, combining quantitative social network analysis (SNA) with qualitative data analysis (QDA). Throughout the research stage, relevant “official” documents such as the summit communiqué, along with, media articles were included in the qualitative data collection. But the primary method for data collection for both the SNA and QDA focused on a two-part interview and participant observation techniques. The interview process and timeframes are described in the first part of this section. The second section contains a discussion on participant selection and population boundaries. The final and third section describes the participant observation process utilized.

#### *3.3.2.1 Interview process and timeframes*

Interviews were used in this research to collect data for both major methods – QDA and SNA. The first part of each interview involved a structured survey to collect SNA data, while the second part of each interview involved a semi-structured approach, providing an opportunity to explore open-ended questions and to examine participants’ perspectives on the G8 MNCH preparatory process (see Appendix I: Interview guide). The interview guidelines and procedures were approved prior to the data collection to meet the University of Waterloo’s Research Ethics procedures. The format and questions were tested prior to data collection through practice interviews with five federal government public servants. The feedback was utilized to refine the questions.

Interviews typically lasted 60-90 minutes, with approximately 30 minutes devoted to the structured SNA survey. Two types of interviews were conducted: in person interviews and telephone interviews. Logistics, such as geographic location, were the determining criteria for which type of interview was used and preference was given to in-person interviews. With participants’ consent, interviews were recorded and then transcribed. In total, 63 interviews

were completed, 58 of which were done in person (92 percent) and 5 were conducted over the telephone (8 percent).

The majority of the data collection took place from January 2010-July 2010, with ongoing follow-up interviews carrying into November 2011. From October 2009 to July 2010, the researcher held the Government of Canada's Cadieux-Leger Fellowship, which involved working within the Policy Research Division of DFAIT during that timeframe. From October 2009 to January 2011, informal interviews were conducted, along with document analysis, and participant-observation within DFAIT to develop an understanding of the G8 Summit preparatory process. It was during this time that the case study for the research was selected based on the factors described previously. Throughout the period of the research fellowship, the researcher was also responsible for ongoing operational projects within DFAIT, unrelated to the G8 Summit. This experience shaped the researcher's understanding of government processes, but also helped to build a reputation and trust with other individuals, some of whom were later involved in the MNCH initiative and were participants in the study. Then, in January 2010 the formal data collection period began.

#### 3.3.2.2 Participant selection and population boundaries

The boundary of the population for the study was based on an individual's substantive involvement in the G8 MNCH initiative. While the 2010 G8 Summit and preparatory process covered many different topics and involved numerous actors, only those individuals whose professional duties connected them to the G8's focus on MNCH policy were included in the study. Participants included junior and senior government officials from various departments of the Government of Canada (e.g. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ministry of Finance, Canadian International Development Agency), government officials from G8 and non-G8 nations, and mid to executive level actors from non-governmental agencies, international organizations, foundations, and research agencies that were interacting with the Canadian government.

The first interview participants were federal government public servants and were identified by a combination of the following: a key informant in CIDA, government organizational charts of federal government agencies, and a key informant in DFAIT. The initial interviews focused on actors within government since it was known that government

officials were central to the preparatory process. Given that each interview focused on identifying the network of actors involved in the initiative, each interview served to create a roster of actors to be sampled. This technique is practiced within social network research with hidden populations that lack clear boundaries (Burt, 1980; Frank, 2011). The method is known as a snowball sampling, or chain referral technique, whereby participant selection was not randomized. Snowball sampling is widely used in studies where information is considered sensitive and “insiders” are required to locate “hidden” people within a study (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Spreen, 1992; Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Frank, 2011). This study was well suited to a snowball sampling technique as no documented accounts existed detailing the membership of a network for the 2010 G8 MNCH preparatory process.

Document analysis of media publications could be used to identify some of the high profile actors, such as Minister and Members of Parliament within the Government of Canada and spokespersons for non-governmental agencies. However, this technique could not reveal the low visibility actors that contributed to the G8 MNCH preparatory process, especially within government departments. The use of snowball sampling for SNA raises methodological challenges, including the creation of bias related to the initial “seeds” chosen during the first sample waves and the verification of potential participant eligibility (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Johnston & Sabin, 2010). The challenges associated with snowball sampling and an acknowledgement of the potential for bias is discussed separately in section 3.4.3. Ultimately, through the use of this sampling technique, actors both within and outside of government were identified, which totalled 314 individuals.

Attempts were made to interview individuals repeatedly nominated as an actor within the network. Ultimately, approximately 20 percent of the 314 actors within the MNCH network were interviewed (Table 3.1). For each participant, contact was initiated through email, often supported by a follow-up phone call. The email included a brief summary of the research study and an invitation to participate. Once individuals agreed to an interview, a more detailed summary of the study and a research ethics consent form was sent for their review. In the case of senior executives from government and non-governmental agencies, contact was initiated with executive assistants. On a few occasions, it was learned, post-interview, that invited participants had “vetted” the study, meaning that the participant had called my senior supervisors within DFAIT to verify the validity and worth of both the study and the researcher.

Table 3.1 Research participants by organization type

<b>Type of organization</b>	<b>Actors interviewed (#)</b>
Academic/research	4
Business	0
Federal Government political	6
Federal Government public servant	36
Foundation	2
International Organization	1
Media	0
Network/Alliance	1
Non-governmental organization (NGO)	11
Technical/professional medical association	2
Think-tank	0
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>63</b>

### 3.3.2.3 Participant observation

Participant observation was used throughout various stages of the data collection process in the study. As the researcher was actively engaged in projects within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade during the Summit preparatory process, opportunities arose that enabled participation in certain events and activities in “real time”. Participant observation is recognized as a method in which information can be gathered while the researcher simultaneously interacts with participants (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). This technique allows the researcher to “experience” the phenomenon under study and it encourages introspection by the researcher as to his/her relationship with the multiple components that comprise the study (Berg, 1989; Kearns, 2010). Unlike many formal research methods, participant observation does not adhere to systematic procedures (Kearns, 2010). Instead, detailed notes on actor interactions, context, and non-verbal actions are kept by the researcher as events unfold.

Participant observation was used for three distinct purposes in this study. Firstly, observation of the mannerisms, customs and speech of actors that were part of the G8 preparatory process enabled the researcher to develop an enhanced understanding of how to relate to participants and frame questions during informal discussions and formal interviews. Developing rapport has been recognized to enhance the success in obtaining research objectives by helping build a reputation within an organization that leads to individuals being

willing to participate in the study (Berg, 1989). Secondly, participant observation permits the identification of “gatekeepers” that may help facilitate securing formal interviews (Kearns, 2010). This technique proved especially important in the study as those individuals that proved to be essential for accessing several of the elite network actors were not in obvious locations within departmental organizational charts. Finally, participant observation was employed at both formal and informal events during the DFAIT fellowship. One formal event that was observed was an “outreach” meetings organized by DFAIT to engage broad actor groups within foreign embassies located within Ottawa. The event directed at the diplomatic community was conducted in Ottawa on June 7, 2010, involved presentation by three senior officials from DFAIT and was attended by approximately 120 individuals from foreign embassies. A second observed event included a research mission by DFAIT staff to interview academic specialists on summit related topics, which occurred on January 13, 2010 and involved two junior level DFAIT staff members that were tasked to conduct and record expert interviews with Canadian academics in Ontario. The content of these interviews were intended for “e-discussions” hosted by online by DFAIT that attempted to engage and solicit opinions on Summit agenda topics from the Canadian public and specifically university students.

Participant observation adds depth and richness to a study by its ability to produce data that cannot be obtained by conventional means (Jorgensen, 1989). However, the method is not without challenges. Subjectivity and bias, which are inherent in a method that relies on the perspective of the observer, must be recognized and addressed to enhance the validity of the research (Evans, 1988). Reliability, which relates to the “reality” of the data derived from the observations, must also be addressed. In the case of this research, the researcher recognizes that the findings derived from the observations are limited to the specific groups examined and may have limited to application in other contexts. An expanded discussion on the limitations and trustworthiness of the data collection methods is provided in Section 3.4.

### *3.3.3 Social network analysis*

Social network analysis (SNA) has been described as the study of patterned or structured interactions and resource exchange among individuals, organizations or other social entities and how network structures may facilitate and constrain the action of actors within the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Scott, 2000; Diani & McAdam, 2003). Underpinning SNA is the

recognition that the relationships of an actor within a given system may affect that actor's beliefs, perceptions and behaviour, and that patterned structures of social relations exist at various levels in society (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke & Yang, 2008). SNA has been employed in research applications that attempt to create models for describing social structure accurately and to provide insight about the causes and consequences of this structure (Marsden & Lin, 1982; Knoke & Yang, 2008). This first part of this section provides an overview of the key assumptions behind the use of social network analysis. This is followed by an overview of the SNA terminology that is used within the dissertation. The third section outlines how data was collected for the SNA. The final section discusses how participants were stratified by occupational position level, which is later used in the ego-centric and whole network analysis.

#### 3.3.3.1 Key assumptions

In conducting the SNA, this study relied upon five assumptions. Firstly, in keeping with previous SNA studies, this research is based on the assumption that by analyzing the structure of the relationships and determining the key actors in the network, the study will track the locus of ideas and influence. Secondly, the social network analysis results will not help determine how a policy issue is selected by the transnational actors, but once the issue is selected, SNA yields insight about who is working with whom on the issue. Thirdly, this study makes the assumption that when people participating in the SNA named individuals as "nodes" to whom they were connected (i.e. shared a "tie"), these relationships were based on their individual, professional positions not on their personal sentiments. That is, these relationships would only exist and be relevant to MNCH in the G8 Summit because of an individual's role in this issue area, or their role within their own organization. While some SNA studies have examined trust, kinship, or friendship networks that are entirely based on personal ties, this study adopts a similar approach to Ernstson (2011) in focussing on professional ties. Fourthly, SNA is used in this study to explore a dynamic, self-organizing, and informal network as opposed to a formalized, deliberate, and persistent network (Kickert et al., 1997; Lewis, 2006). Similar to the position by Lewis (2005, p. 2126) in her health policy research, the G8 Summit MNCH preparatory process is seen as a "complex network of continuing interactions between actors who use structures and argumentation to articulate their ideas". Finally, the network identified through this research does not have firm boundaries, yet will be treated as a

representative estimate of the whole network. As previously discussed, snowball sampling involves interviewing “seed” actors and subsequently interviewing the actors nominated by the “seed” actors. While attempts were made to conduct waves of sampling until network closure or saturation was reached, logistical constraints and non-responsive potential participants made complete closure impossible. Thus, sampling was conducted to the point of where diminishing returns occurred. That is, where either no new actors were nominated or any new actors were only nominated by one participant.

This study viewed networks as a real and observable phenomenon (Marsden, 1990; White & Houseman, 2002). That is, in approaching the study, it was believed that through observation and investigation, actors and relationships pertaining to specific professional goals and outcomes related to the MNCH G8 Summit initiative could be identified. Prior to collecting network data, it is imperative that the scale or unit of analysis is identified and used consistently throughout the study (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). While it was known through preliminary research that a variety of Canadian and non-Canadian government departments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations were involved in global MNCH initiatives, no specific or precise list of all the involved organizations and agencies existed. Thus, the unit of the individual was used in the study and it was recognized that each individual represented an organization, department or agency.

The G8 Summit preparatory process for the MNCH initiative was recognized to contain a dynamic set of actors that would be unique to the process and would continue to evolve as the 2010 G8 Summit approached. The use of longitudinal data as part of dynamic network analysis is an exciting nascent field. Yet, due to challenges with data collection, relatively few studies have included longitudinal analysis and most existing longitudinal studies have used small data sets (Doreian & Stokman, 1997; Kossinets & Watts., 2006). The case setting and logistics for this study did not permit repeat sampling of participants to document and map the evolution of the G8 MNCH network. Thus, the actor set and their relations should be viewed as a representative snapshot in time of the G8 MNCH network in the year leading up to the 2010 G8 Summit. The research emphasizes both the interactions among the actors involved in a policy process and their group affiliations.

### 3.3.3.2 Terminology

Networks have been described as relations linking defined set of nodes (Mitchell, 1969), or graphs consisting of sets of nodes and sets of links. Depending on the literature set, various interchangeable terminologies can be used to describe a node (actor) or tie (link, edge, path, relationship) (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For the purpose of this study the terms node and tie will be employed. The nodes of a network can vary depending on the type of study and unit of analysis and they typically represent individuals, groups or organizations. Within this study, nodes represent individual actors within professional organizations. Each actor has been assigned a numerical identification number to protect their anonymity.

Ties are the links between nodes through which tangible (e.g. money) or intangible (e.g. information, influence) resources flow (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In this study, ties between nodes can be formal or informal, frequent or infrequent, directed or undirected, and represent a specific exchange of information tangible (e.g. documents, formal commitments) and intangible resources (e.g. advice, opinions). Ties between nodes represent potential resource flows. That is, if Actor A and Actor B share a tie, it is assumed that A can share resources with B and vice versa. This study concentrates on ties that involve an ongoing flow or exchange of information relevant to the MNCH initiative, such as technical knowledge on specific health interventions, policy ideas, financial and project based commitments, and political support. While some studies separate out sub-categories of resource flows and construct multiple networks accordingly (e.g. communication networks are graphed separately from advice networks), this study uses a general approach to ties by using a standard question for all interviewees that inherently permitted some degree of interpretation.

Network data is represented in matrices - whereby the relationship between nodes can be denoted in binary terms (either present or absent) or in with weighted values (e.g. frequency of contact or strength of a relationship). In addition, attribute data can be used to allow the consideration of various node characteristics (e.g. gender, occupation type). While attributes may remain constant across different contexts in which an actor is involved, relations or ties may vary substantially as they are considered context specific (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982).

### 3.3.3.3 Data collection

To collect the social network data, an oral sociometric survey was conducted during each interview (see Appendix I: Interview guide; Appendix II: Social network analysis - expanded survey). The purpose of the name generator was to: i) generate a sociogram (ego network diagram) for each participant; and ii) record the connectivity among actors in a MNCH network. A standardized question was posed to all participants to generate names. The use of a standard question for all surveys help contribute to the robustness and dependability of the research (Shenton, 2004). The question was: “Please identify key people that you work with on maternal, newborn and child health as relevant to the 2010 G8 Summit. These can be people who provide you with information to do your work, help you think about complex problems posed by your work, or have influenced your thinking on maternal health. Please start within your own organization, and then move outwards to within the Canadian government, other governments, NGOs, etc”. This question format follows the approach widely used in the General Social Survey<sup>6</sup> and it is intended to solicit specific names of actors from the participant based on set parameters (Burt, 1984; Marsden, 2005). No limit was placed on the number of contacts that could be identified. The parameters included in the question are: the issue area (maternal, newborn and child health); the policy process and timeframe (2010 G8 Summit); the type of relationships (problem solving, decision making); the unit of analysis (individuals); and the range of actor types (domestic/international, various organization types).

Participants were cued during the oral survey by naming the ten organization types. This practice is similar to the position generator technique, in which pre-established categories are employed (see for example Lin, 2001). Participants were not pressured to come up with individuals in each organization type, rather the technique was used to encourage reflection on a wide set of actor types to ensure the network identified was comprehensive. Once the participant ceased nominating new actors, the qualitative component of the interview commenced.

During this social network survey, responses were entered into a hard copy of the survey, with participants able to verify their responses during the process. During telephone

---

<sup>6</sup> The General Social Survey (GSS) is a national level survey conducted in many countries including the United States and Canada. It was established in Canada in 1985 and involves telephone interviews of randomly selected residents. It includes a mix of qualitative and quantitative question on a focal societal topics and explores the perceptions of the interviewees (e.g time use, social networks, social engagement) (Statistics Canada, 2009).

interviews, the results were repeated back to the participants to obtain confirmation on the responses. Attribute data for the participants and the actors participants nominated were collected from two sources: responses during interviews and internet based research. In cases where details about the nominated actors could not be verified through these means, respective organizations were contacted for non-intrusive information (e.g. current position, geographic location). The use of interviews and follow up research on actors nominated, as compared to only using paper or electronic survey, enabled both ‘meso’ and ‘micro’ level approaches to capturing structural and attribute features (Carrasco et al., 2008). That is, interviews created the opportunity to collect ‘meso’ features such as network size, aggregated composition, and ego attributes, and ‘micro’ level characteristics, which included alter attribute characteristics (e.g. spatial location, organization representation), and details about the interactions between alters (actors identified by a participant) and the actor interviewed. The post interview follow up research on actors nominated, primarily served to enhance the ‘micro’ level attribute data on alters.

The social network data was analyzed for composition, structural equivalence, centrality and social capital. For all analyses, the relational and attribute data were coded into binary or numerical categories and every actor in the network was assigned a unique identification number. Social network analysis software, UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002) and ENET (Borgatti, 2006a) were used in this study. Two different data sets were used for the quantitative data analysis. The first data set consisted of the whole network of 314 individual actors. The social network survey nomination results were used to create this data set, which represents the domestic and international individuals important to the development of the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative from the perspective of the individuals interviewed. This network data set was used for compositional analysis and structural inferences of the G8 MNCH network. The second data set consisted of 79 individual actors. This smaller data set included the 63 actors interviewed, plus 16 other actors represented by proxy responses<sup>7</sup>. The 79 actor data set was used for structural equivalence and social capital analyses. The details of the various analytic routines and tests employed within each category and data set are described in the next section.

---

<sup>7</sup> Proxy responses are responses provided by collaterals for individuals that are not able to participate in the study. This method has demonstrated success in demographic and health sector research (Burnam et al., 1985; Bassett et al., 1990; Fowler, 2009) In this study the collaterals were in professional positions linked to the individual (e.g. spokesperson for the Prime Minister).

#### 3.3.3.4 Classifying actors by occupational levels

In order to classify network actors into distinct stratified levels, a categorical ranking of occupational positions/titles applicable to various sectors was created. Continuous and categorical occupation classification approaches are widely used in social science research and are typically based on socio-economic status scores, prestige ratings, or sociologically derived class categories (Goldthorpe & Hope, 1974; Luijkx & Ganzeboom, 1989; Ganzeboom et al., 1992; Goyder, 2009). The ranked list for this research contained six levels, with the first level indicating the highest occupational rank and level six indicating the lowest rank. The ranking system was developed by creating a list of the positions of all actors nominated in the network and then ordering them based on occupational prestige, decision making responsibility and hierarchy within an organization. While other six category occupation classification schemes have been developed (see Ganzeboom et al., 1989; Luijkx & Ganzeboom, 1989), the typology specific to this research has not been previously tested. Consequently, the ranked list was subject to an iterative expert review process that involved experienced current and former government officials as advocated by Ganzeboom and DeGraaf (1992).

The final ranked levels include, but are not limited to, the following occupational positions: level 1 (president, prime minister), level 2 (UN secretary general, minister), level 3 (deputy minister, CEO), level 4 (ambassador, chief of staff), level 5 (assistant deputy minister, director) and level 6 (manager, advisor).<sup>8</sup>

#### 3.3.4 *Whole network analysis*

A central objective in this research was to identify the structure and composition of the network of actors involved in the shaping of the signature initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit. Thus, this section focuses on the methods for whole network research, which utilized information about all 314 actors and ties within the 2010 G8 MNCH preparatory network for MNCH. The first part of this section discusses network visualization. The second section describes methods used to calculate the centrality of actors, including the details on three prominent types of centrality measurements. The third section discusses the detailed process of

---

<sup>8</sup> For a full list of all positions see Appendix III: Multi-sector occupational position list

examining the structural equivalence of actors within a network, which ultimately enables a reduced network to be produced.

#### 3.3.4.1 Network visualization

An important component of network data analysis is visualization, which involves presenting network data in a graphical format (Freeman, 2000). Visual representations of network data help develop insight into network composition and can be used to guide the selection of specific analytic approaches to the data. This study employed NetDraw (Borgatti, 2002) to produce two-dimensional visualizations of the networked relations among actors within the 2010 G8 preparatory process for MNCH. This software permits nodes (actors) to be assigned colours to indicate attributes, such as organization type, allows the directionality of ties to be represented by lines with arrows.

A spring-embedded layout procedure was employed for the spatial layout of the nodes within the graphs. This layout method positions nodes with high tie density near the centre of the graph, those with common ties in close proximity, nodes with few ties at the outer edges of the graph, and minimizes the amount of lines being crossed (Eades, 1984; Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991; Freeman, 2000). This method enhances graph legibility and helps to determine which nodes are more (or less) connected to each other. However, the spring embedder approach has limitations – it produces slightly different graphs each time the algorithm is used on an identical data set and the algorithm does not scale well as the size and density of a network increases (Brandes & Wagner, 2004). Consequently, visual graphs which employ a spring embedder algorithm should not be regarded as the “true” layout of the network.

#### 3.3.4.2 Centrality

The concept of centrality is a core structural attribute of social network analysis (Freeman, 1979, 1980; Borgatti & Everett, 2006; Brandes, 2008). Centrality measures are employed to evaluate the structural importance of an actor, or as stated by Knoke and Burt (1983), the ‘aggregate prominence’, of actors in a network. Simply put, centrality measures identify key players who may be able to access more information, possess higher status, power, prestige or influence over others (see for example Coleman, 1973; Burt, 1982; Bonacich, 1987).

Bavelas (1948) pioneered the concept of centrality and proposed a relationship between structural centrality and influence in human communication groups. Bavelas (1948) argued that a person located between others in a network is in a position to control communication flows. Since this seminal work, centrality calculations have been used in research to make inferences as to the power, performance, influence, control, independence, brokerage of actors within the network (see for example Laumann & Pappi, 1976; Laumann & Marsden, 1979). Disputes exist over some of the conclusions that can be made from centrality calculations. For example, Cook et al. (1983) argue that central actors are not necessarily the most successful actors in terms of bargaining power, while Mintz and Schwartz (1985) conclude that centrality is equivalent to power. Moreover, the benefits of centrality have mixed interpretations. As Bodin *et al.* (2006) claim, central actors can play a key coordinating function, but if only a few actors serve this role, it can centralize the control of resources and inhibit broader information sharing and learning. Ultimately, the understanding of the role of key players, gatekeepers, or opinion leaders within a network allows for strategies to be developed on the disruption or enhancement a network in terms of specific functions (see for e.g. Valente & Davis, 1999).

Disagreement exists within the literature as to the best way to both define and measure centrality (Borgatti & Everett, 2006). Consequently, multiple definitions and measures have been developed to suit specific applications. In his seminal research, Freeman (1979) specified three conceptual foundations for structural centrality – degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality – and argued that one or a combination of these conceptualizations may help understand and explain centrality in group situations. Based on the type of data obtained from the survey research, this study employs two of these three foundational categories of centrality outlined by Freeman (1979) and a third centrality measure developed by Bonacich-Eigenvector to analyze the structural role of actors in the G8 MNCH network: degree, betweenness and Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality.

The full network data set of 314 actors was used for the centrality calculations. To clarify, this data set contains actors that were not interviewed or surveyed themselves, but were nominated by actors that did participate in the study. Thus, overall network centralization calculations were not performed as insufficient information exists on reciprocal ties. The next sections include descriptions and the strengths and limitations of the three centrality measures used in this study.

#### 3.3.4.3 Degree centrality

Degree centrality considers the number of total ties (incoming or outgoing) attached to a node (Freeman, 1977). Freeman's degree centrality can be calculated for either directed or undirected data. For directed cases, as is the case with this research, in-degree refers to incoming ties for a particular node and out-degree indicates outward ties. A limitation of degree centrality is that it only considers direct relationships and assumes all relationships incident upon a node contribute equally to that node's centrality (Ibarra, 1993). The values generated by this measure are a reflection of an actor's perceived resources by other actors. Thus, high in-degree scores indicate that an actor is highly connected and valued by other actors. Normalized scores are also presented, which reflect a percentage value of the centrality of the actor over the maximum possible within the network.

#### 3.3.4.4 Betweenness centrality

Betweenness centrality focuses on the role of actors that are positioned *between* other actors and measures the degree to which a node is in a brokerage position (see for example Freeman, 1977). The calculation includes a summation of the fractions of paths between other pairs of nodes that pass through that particular node (Freeman, 1980). This can be interpreted as how much relative control a node has over pair-wise connections between other nodes, or in the case of the G8 MNCH network, how many times resources are passed through a node from source to target. Borgatti and Everett (2006) classify betweenness as a measure of mediation and suggest that an actor with high betweenness centrality has opportunities to exert control on other actors with low betweenness centrality. Actors with high betweenness centrality scores are positioned to link actors that are not highly connected.

While several different variations of betweenness have been developed, Freeman's betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1980) is the most common. This measure involves nodes and "paths". Paths indicate how resources travel in a network. Path "lengths" are different, depending on how many different nodes a resource travels through before reaching a final destination. For instance, if a junior policy analyst in one government department wanted to connect to a senior executive a different government department, but could only access this actor by first contacting his/her director, this would indicate that it takes the junior policy

analyst two “steps” to reach the senior executive in second department. For someone that is directly linked to executive, the “path length” is considered to be shorter, since it would only require one “step”. Within networks, there are often multiple paths through which resources may flow; that is, the junior analyst may also contact a different actor a third department who is tied to an actor in fourth department, who then is tied to the original executive. This “route” would involve an additional step however, and would not be considered the most efficient.

Betweenness centrality is a measure of the number of times a node appears on each shortest path between nodes. The normalized betweenness centrality is the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness and is expressed as a percentage. A limitation of betweenness measures is that an assumption is made that all resources travel via the shortest path between nodes. This is generally true in certain network exchanges, such as cases where cost and time minimization is an objective. For example, Nebus (2006) argued that within the case of advice networks, information seeking depends on an ego’s knowledge about the richness of knowledge possessed by alters. In cases where extensive knowledge exists about the potential resources of a set of alters, cost-benefit evaluations play a role (Nebus, 2006). However, it has been recognized that in some cases, such as with information and political networks, information may flow across multiple paths and information access choices made by actors is not always rationally calculated based on cost and time minimization (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Yamaguchi, 1994). Nebus (2006) suggests an alters accessibility and the perceived willingness to share resources play a role in how alters are chosen. Ultimately, the betweenness measure cannot confirm whether an actor was or was not acting as a rational, efficient actor, but it remains useful for indicating the distance between resources in general

#### 3.3.4.5 Eigenvector centrality

The final centrality measure employed in this study is referred to as Bonacich or Eigenvector centrality. This measure differs from degree centrality and betweenness centrality due to the inclusion of the centralities of the alters of the node under examination (Bonacich, 2007). In other words, the measure calculates the centrality of a node by considering the extent to which they are linked to people who are also well connected. Thus, the more connected the contacts of a particular actor, the more central that actor becomes (Bonacich, 1987). Eigenvector centrality takes the entire network patterns into account for calculating value of any one

particular node. Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality values may be used to gain insight into the relative influence and power of actors within a network.

Yet, as with many of SNA measures, challenges and limitations exist in drawing conclusions from Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality results. With this measure, a node may be deemed influential based on the extent that they influence many nodes who themselves influence other nodes. Yet, actors can also gain bargaining power by being connected to actors that are themselves powerless (i.e. minimal ties to other important actors and non-central). Thus, a limitation of the measure is that actors that are deemed central, may actually have reduced bargaining power since the actors that they are connected to them possess other important ties which represent other opportunities for obtaining resources (Bonacich, 1987).

### 3.3.5 *Structural equivalence*

Structural equivalence is commonly used to analyze structural roles and positions of actors within a social network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Two or more actors can be deemed structurally equivalent if they relate to other actors in exactly the same way, regardless if they interact with each other (Lorrain & White, 1971; Burt, 1987). Examining structural equivalence is a valuable means to partition actors into structurally equivalent subsets within a network (Breiger, 1976). This, in turn, enables observations to be made on the substitutability of actors within a network (Sailer, 1978). That is, any actor in a block could be substituted for any other actor within the block, without having an effect on network structure or outcomes.

Unlike centrality, structural equivalence is one SNA measure that requires complete network data. Therefore, the dataset consisting of the 79 sampled actors described in previous sections was used for these tests. While the 79 actors interviewed only represented a portion of the network actors nominated, major differences were not present between the composition of the interviewees and the entire network based on the organization represented, organization type, geographic location, or occupational position level.

#### 3.3.5.1 Measuring structural equivalence

The research of White *et al.* (1976) developed the technique to use relational data to view social structures, as opposed to using known attributes for the actors. The approach seeks to measure the similarity of actors based on patterns of relations, and then divides the actors into

equivalent sets or “blocks” (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). As exact structural equivalence between actors is rare, the measure used in this study seeks to identify subsets of actors that are approximately equivalent (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Multiple “blocks” may be created for a single network, depending on the number of actors and their similarities (White et al., 1976). As structural equivalence includes the extent to which actors show similarity in terms of both ties present and ties absent, the blockmodel provides a means to establish patterns of which actors nominate similar actors and which actors are nominated by other actors.

The measurement of structural equivalence depends on whether data is dichotomous or valued, directional or symmetric, and if self-ties will be considered (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This study involved collecting names from interviewees on who they consulted with during their work on the G8 MNCH initiative. This generated dichotomous or binary data as either a tie was present or not. Relational data was also collected on contact frequency, perceived direction, value and strength, which generated valued data. Due to the low density of the network ( $\alpha$  density = 0.069), structural equivalence of the dichotomous data was examined. Furthermore, self ties<sup>9</sup> were not considered as they would be meaningless in the case of relationships that involve consulting other actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

### 3.3.5.2 Hierarchical clustering

The structural similarity of the network was analyzed using procedures in UCInet (Borgatti et al., 2002). The first step involved measuring equivalence. For this step, the Jaccard or positive-match coefficient approach was utilized due to its ability to detect variation between actors in relatively large networks with sparse ties (low density) and its applicability to binary data (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The next step was to cluster actors using the hierarchical clustering procedure and average Jaccard similarity scores<sup>10</sup>. This procedure produces a graph that clustered actors in “steps”: actors that were most similar were grouped together first and subsequent recalculations are done to connect the next most similar pairs (Figure 3.1). This procedure is continued until all actors are joined together (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> Self ties indicate that when an actor was asked to name the individuals that were most important to the G8 MNCH preparatory process, they named themselves as one of those individuals. In network terms, this would mean that the individual was “tied” to themselves. For the purpose of this study, self ties were excluded.

<sup>10</sup> The Jaccard similarity measure, or Jaccard Index (Jaccard, 1901), is a commonly used algorithm to detect similarity between binary variables. The index is defined for a pair of variables,  $X_m$  and  $X_n$ , as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of the sample sets:  $S_{mn} = \frac{X_{mn}}{X_{mm} + X_{nn} - X_{mn}}$ , where  $X_{ij} = X_i X_j$  (Leydesdorff, 2008, p. 79).

The hierarchical clustering result for this study demonstrated an overall low degree of structural equivalence. However, multiple similarity groupings were present in the network in early aggregation stages and several actors remained as isolates distant from other groups (Figure 3.1). Those actors that remained as isolates are potentially important, as this demonstrates that an actor possessed a set of ties to actors that was unique compared to all others in the network. Conversely, the results showed that some pairs of actors were highly similar in early stages and they remained separate from all other actors until late in the aggregation process. The graph also showed that midway through the aggregation process a few larger groupings developed. While these types of observations are insightful for general trends, further analysis and partitioning based on structural equivalence is required to determine the level in the clustering to determine how many subsets of actors are present within the network.




Figure 3.1 Hierarchical clustering of Jaccard coefficient matrix (column headings indicate actor number, row headings indicate aggregation level)

### 3.3.5.3 Partitioning actors

Partitioning structurally equivalent set of actors into blocks is a challenge as it involves a degree of subjective judgement of the researcher (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Some researchers use attributes such as geographic location or organization type, but the risk is that no single attribute can fully account for equivalency (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Therefore, this study used the statistical E-I index measure of cluster adequacy computed by UCInet (Borgatti et al., 2002) to help determine the number of blocks. The E-I index is a ratio of the number of internal ties within a blocks and the number of ties between blocks (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). A noticeable jump in the E-I number was observed between the 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> aggregation stages (0.399 to 0.242), thus this was selected as the cut-off point for the partitioning.

The partitioning resulted in 30 blocks: 16 are isolates and 14 contain groups of actors. The block with multiple actors included two large blocks (10-16 members), three medium sized blocks (4-7 members), and nine small blocks (2-3 members). While lower total numbers of clusters could be selected, reducing the number of isolates and increasing group size, it would result in clusters with progressively weaker levels of similarity (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982).

### 3.3.5.4 Block visualization

To further visualize the ties between blocks an image matrix was produce. The image matrix allows ties within and among positions to be coded as being either present of absent by utilizing a cut-off density value ( $\alpha$ ) (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982). For this study, the network density was used for the cut-off point ( $\alpha = 0.069$ ). Thus, ties were marked as present if a density value above  $\alpha$  observed. The resulting adjacency matrix was used to produce a reduced graph or network map. Reduced graphs are visual method to represent the blocks as nodes and illustrate the directional ties between each of the nodes (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

To illustrate these two features (importance and tie strength), a second version of the reduced graph was produced. The importance of a block is measured by the average number of incoming ties for all the actors within each block (mean in-degree). The mean actor in-degree values were reflected in the size of the circle: a smaller circle equals fewer incoming ties. The strength of the ties among blocks was based on the tie density values from the density matrix.

Ties below the  $\alpha$  density value of 0.069 were not reflected in the graph. Line thickness reflects the density values. That is, the thicker the line, the more densely connected. In addition to the graph output, Freeman centrality scores were calculated for the block network and the in-degree scores were utilized to determine the most central blocks.

### *3.3.6 Ego-centric network analysis and social capital*

While the SNA tests referred to thus far are useful for describing the network structure, identifying central actors, and evaluating the structural equivalence of actors, further tests were conducted on the individuals that comprised the broader network. These tests are collectively referred to ego-centric network analyses. Ego-centric networks are comprised of a central actor (the ego) and a set of other actors (alters) to which the actor has ties (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982; Marsden, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) (see Figure 3.2). During data collection, egos surveyed are asked to identify alters based on a particular type of relation (e.g. people with whom you consulted regarding policy development). Depending on the survey method, information can also be collected as to the relationships between alters that were nominated. The type of data generated from ego-centric network studies is often termed personal network data (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Wellman, 1999). Unlike whole social network studies, which focus on the complete network, ego-centric research provides a micro-level view of the structure, reach, composition, and density of social relations for individual. In turn, this helps develop an understanding of how an ego obtains and shares resources. Ego-centric network data can be analyzed for single cases within an organization, or for comparative studies between organizations within a sector. In this study, an ego-centric approach is employed to analyze and compare the professional networks of individuals from different governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies within the G8 MNCH preparatory process.

The measures used within the ego-centric network analysis include: i) size, ii) quality, iii) homophily, iv) heterogeneity and v) structural holes. Collectively these measures help determine what is popularly termed “social capital” for each ego. Social capital is “a metaphor about advantage” (Burt, 2001, p. 31) and indicates the potential of the social resources/assets that an individual ego may access through its relationships, which will be discussed further in the next section. This study employed theories and tools of social capital to better understand the relational traits and qualities of actors who shaped the MNCH policy process.




Figure 3.2 Illustrative example of an ego-centric network (personal professional network)

### 3.3.6.1 Social capital

Social capital has become a popular concept in political science, economics and sociology (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Adler & Kwon, 2002). Yet, much of the scholarship in political science has advanced theories regarding the collective asset perspective of social capital, specifically on the alleged decline of social capital (e.g. Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). Few empirical studies have developed and tested tools and methods to measure social capital at the individual level specific to political contexts (for an exception, see the work of La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998).

Techniques to measure social capital are not standardized. Consequently, many studies have employed a variety of measures in an ad-hoc approach, adopting tools not originally intended for social capital (Van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). Flap and De Graaf (1986) developed a formula to measure social capital that included the number of members (alters) in an individual's network, the resources items possessed by the alters, and the probability that the ego can access the resources of a particular alter. This type of information is typically obtained during a time and resource intensive ego-centric network study. Ego-network measures, such as size, compositional quality, homophily, heterogeneity, and structural holes have been recognized as being suitable for studies concentrating on the individual, external perspective of social capital (Burt, 1983; Borgatti et al., 1998). The greater the size of an individual's network, the greater potential they have to access resources.

The potential to access social capital should not be equated with the mobilization of social capital (Crona & Bodin, 2006). In any network, an actor may have access to more social resources than is needed or used, and the ability to mobilize that social capital is affected by such factors as the position of an actor within a formal hierarchy (e.g. a government bureaucratic structure), and the actor's skill-set (Burt, 1992). However, in the case of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH, participants were asked to nominate actors that were important to their work. It is assumed in this instance that participants would not nominate actors as important if they did not access or mobilize the resources associated with the actor. Therefore, access and mobilization of social capital are treated interchangeably in this study.

Measuring social capital by examining a single factor may yield unreliable results leading to erroneous inferences (Burt, 1983; Van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). Thus, this study will examine multiple factors to develop insight into the comparative social capital of actors within the G8 MNCH network. The analysis is aligned with social resource theory (Lin, 1982) as it focused on measures that examined the relationships an ego has with alters. It is recognized that unlike physical or human capital, social capital is not fungible (Coleman, 1988) and is limited to specific contexts. In the case of this study, insight on the social capital of certain actors, or groups of actors, is limited to their mobilized involvement with the G8 MNCH initiative. Actors typically only mobilize a fraction of their total potential resources (Van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). Thus, it is also recognized that actors may potentially have larger networks than disclosed during the interview surveys but nominated actors they accessed for their work.

In order to determine an individual's social capital, methods are required to identify and describe their resources. Name generator methods have long been used to measure social capital (Laumann, 1966). This technique involves surveying individuals to develop a list alters with whom they engage with in specific situations and collect data on the demographic characteristics of each of the alters (Marin & Hampton, 2007). A variation of this technique, the position generator, was developed to address some of the shortcomings of the name generator, namely the tendency for an ego to only identify strong ties and focus on individuals rather than social positions (Lin et al., 2001; Van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). The position generator samples an individual's ties based on pre-determined stratified structural positions

within society (e.g. occupations or sectors). The benefits of this method is that a wider set of actors can be collected over a range of relationships (Lin et al., 2001). This research employed a hybrid approach in collecting data. Egos were asked to generate names of people important to their work on the G8 MNCH process (similar to a name generator), but they were also cued during the survey to nominate people within set sectors (e.g. NGOs, foundations, international organizations). For the ego-centric analyses, the G8 MNCH data was analyzed using the software E-NET (Borgatti, 2006a).

### 3.3.6.2 Network Size

The size of an actor's network has been found to be related to their social capital – the larger the number of contacts, the greater the chance that specific or unique resources can be accessed (Borgatti et al., 1998; Burt, 2000). However, measuring social capital by network size alone may lead to biased results. Not all contacts are equal in terms of their attributes (e.g. expertise, knowledge, intelligence) and the personal networks of each contact may also vary.

### 3.3.6.3 Compositional quality

Compositional quality can be measured to determine an ego's social capital and examines if alters possess specific characteristics of benefit to an ego. This measure is popular within social support studies and typically involves requesting egos to specify which alters within their network provide a certain type of support (e.g. emotional, financial) (see for e.g. Hirsch, 1980). Compositional quality also has broader application to organizational and management studies, where quality may refer to expertise and legitimacy (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). It has been argued that actors that have networks with high compositional quality increase the possibilities of achieving the desired outcome and thus increasing their social capital (Borgatti et al., 1998).

In this study, information was collected on alters to determine their expertise within the MNCH field. Alters were coded as either specializing in MNCH-related work or were coded as a generalist. While the quality of a contact could be interpreted in multiple ways, this metric was chosen to determine the extent to which egos connected with MNCH experts. If the G8 Summit represents an opportunity for the wealthy, leading nations of the world to address

specific policy challenges, it could be expected that leveraging technical expertise would be required to ensure the policies consider new ideas, technologies and innovations.

Other perspectives could consider compositional quality of an ego based on the hierarchical position of the alters to whom an ego is connected. That is, if an actor is connected to a Prime Minister or President, it could be assumed that they have greater social capital than someone with contacts with lower occupational level. However, in the case of MNCH, a goal for many actors is to resolve this complex, global problem. Resolving complex problems typically requires accessing not just political will or financial resources, but a diversity of all forms of capital in order to generate new ideas and novel approaches (Bodin & Prell, 2011; Huppé & Creech, 2012). Therefore, in this study, compositional quality considers the access to MNCH expertise and also social capital also focuses on the diversity of resources that an ego may access and mobilize given that it increases the likelihood of developing new solutions for the complex problem. Diversity in this case, is assumed to involve connections to people who have different resources. MNCH experts could exist within any one of the organization types. For instance, a government agency could have a health practitioner on staff that oversees health-related policies. NGOs could also specialize in medical or health-related research or advocacy work. A familiar example, not included in this analysis, would involve Doctors Without Borders.

#### 3.3.6.4 Homophily

Measuring homophily in SNA is intended to provide insight about whether or not an actor typically interacts with others actors that have similar attributes. The homophily principle, colloquially referred to as the “birds of a feather” measure in some SNA studies (McPherson et al., 2001; Lakon et al., 2008) dates back to the 1950s and states that an increase in common characteristics between an ego and an alter will raise the likelihood of a close relationship between the pair of actors (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; van de Bunt et al., 2005). More simply, people develop strong bonds to other actors most like themselves. Through research in a number of sectors, involving different types of relationships, it has been found that resources flowing through networks are frequently localized and correlated to sociological similarities (McPherson et al., 2001). Homophily is negatively related to social capital (Borgatti et al., 1998; Lakon et al., 2008). An actor with a network limited to people that share similar values

and ideas decreases their opportunity to be exposed to new information. Two types of homophily were distinguished by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954): status homophily and value homophily. Status homophily is based on formal or informal status and includes societal stratifying attributes such as age, gender, ethnicity and occupation. Value homophily refers to similarity based on beliefs, values and attitudes. This study focussed on status homophily and examined the following actor attributes: occupational position (level from 1-6), specific organization, organization type represented, and gender.

Homophily calculations were performed using E-NET software and the Krackhardt and Stern E-I index (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Borgatti, 2006a). The E-I statistic indicates an ego's propensity to have ties with alters in a same grouping as themselves. This measure involves totalling the number of alters in different attribute categories to the ego, subtracting the number of ties to alters that are in the same attribute category and dividing by the network size (Halgin & Borgatti, 2011). Scores range from -1, which indicates ties to only those in the same category (homophilous), to +1 for egos that have ties to actors in all categories but their own (heterophilous). The E-I scores were calculated for: 1) the entire population of egos, and 2) each individual ego.

### 3.3.6.5 Heterogeneity

The purpose of measuring heterogeneity is to determine the diversity of alters to each other with respect to a selected categorical attribute (e.g. gender, occupational position, organization type) (Lakon et al., 2008). A positive relationship has been found to exist between network heterogeneity and social capital – the more diverse the range of alters to an ego, the greater the likelihood of accessing the resources necessary for achieving specific outcomes (Burt, 1983; Krishna & Shrader, 1999). However, some organizational management and sociology research indicates that homogenous groups may be high performing organizations due to an increased ease of coordination between actors with a shared identity (Portney & Berry, 1997; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). These cases refer to team or group performance, whereas heterogeneity within the context of this research focuses on an ego's access to resources without considering the relationships among alters. A discussion that includes alter-alter relations occurs in the next section on structural holes.

Heterogeneity in this study was examined for the following types of attributes: organization type, occupation position level, G8 membership, actor type (government/non-government), and geographic location. Heterogeneity indexes measure the diversity of an ego's network independent of the ego's attributes. To measure heterogeneity, Blau's heterogeneity index<sup>11</sup> (BHI) (Blau, 1977) was calculated using E-NET software (Borgatti, 2006a). Blau's index ranges from 0 to 1. Egos that have alters with diverse categorical attributes will have heterogeneity values close to 1 on the index, while ego with alters that are categorically similar, or homogenous, will have values close to 0 (Halgin & Borgatti, 2011). However, the BHI has a maximum value of  $1 - 1/n$ . Thus, the highest possible value that can be obtained is dependent on the number of categories within each of the attribute types (Blau, 1977). For instance, the attributes of G8 membership (member or non-member) and actor type (government/non-government), each have 2 categories, thus 0.5 is the maximum value for complete heterogeneity. Conversely, the attribute of geographic location contained an extremely large possible number of cities, thus a value near 1.0 is possible for maximum heterogeneity. As a result, the number of categories will be taken into account in the analysis that involves BHI.

### 3.3.6.6 Structural Holes

Structural holes includes, *inter alia*, the measurement of the density of ties among alters in an ego's network. Dense ties between alters has the potential to decrease the social capital of an ego. Essentially, in a dense network creates opportunities for actors to obtain resources through a number of pathways, rather than only through the ego. All of these measures require attribute data for alters, such as occupational position, gender, and professional expertise.

The structural characteristics of each ego's personal network were analyzed by measuring structural holes. Structural holes refer to areas of weak or absent connections between individuals or between groups within an ego's network and thus represent a point in which a resource does not flow (Susskind et al., 1998; Burt, 2001). Developed by Burt (Burt, 1995, 2001, 2004), the theory argues that structural holes actually present an opportunity for an ego as the ego is potentially placed in a position of brokerage between non-redundant

---

<sup>11</sup> The formula for Blau Heterogeneity Index is:  $BHI = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$ , where  $n$  = the number of categories,  $p_i$  = the proportion of actors in category  $i$ , and  $i$  = the number of different categories across all groups (Blau, 1977).

resources, or otherwise disconnected groups. Consequently, these actors may have higher social capital than an actor who has ties only to densely connected alters with similar structural equivalence (Burt, 2004). In other words, a personal network that contains unconnected alters contribute to the brokerage position of an ego and egos that can bridge structural holes “have an advantage in detecting and developing rewarding opportunities” (Burt, 2004, p. 354) (see Figure 3.3). As one example, an opportunity may relate to information transmission from one group to another which can result in the creation of bargaining power for the single ego serving as a broker or bridging link. Within organizations, structural holes may be present where information exchange is found between individuals within a unit, but minimal ties are present among units. In this type of situation an individual with a personal network with structural holes may need to rely on a few prominent contacts, such as a supervisor, to access information (Susskind et al., 1998). The G8 MNCH network data was analyzed using E-NET software to permit the inclusion of alter-alter ties, which are require for the analysis of density and brokerage (Borgatti, 2006a). The ego set included all actors for which survey data existed and only included outgoing ties. Actors that had nominated less than two alters were disqualified from this analysis because density calculations require multiple alter networks.




Figure 3.3 Illustrative example of a structural hole

Burt’s (1995, 2004) measures of structural holes are based on indicators of structural autonomy and involve calculations for efficiency, effective size, density, constraint and

hierarchy. Effective size refers to the number of non-redundant or unique ties in an ego's network. Efficiency is the effective size divided by the observed number of alters for an ego and indicates the proportion of an ego's contacts that are non-redundant. The density of an ego's network is the proportion of ties present between alters over the total possible number of ties. Constraint represents the distribution of relationships across an ego's network and is based on the redundancy of an ego's contact (Burt, 2001). An ego is constrained when his/her alters are all exchanging resources or information (Burt, 1995). Likewise, when alternatives do not exist between alters in an ego's network, an ego is not constrained. Thus constraint can be considered a measure of opportunity for an ego to exploit structural hole in their network. Hierarchy is the extent to which constraint is concentrated to a single actor within all network relations (Burt, 1995). A high hierarchy score is indicative of the relative centrality of an actor in connecting otherwise non-connected members in a network.

Actors with maximum brokerage opportunities typically have individual networks of high efficiency and effective size, and low density and constraint. Likewise, actors with low efficiency and effective size, and high constraint and density are found to have closed personal networks and low brokerage opportunities (Halgin & Borgatti, 2011) (Table 3.2). These structural measures focus on an ego's access to unique information and resources, and how network connections may limit or enhance this process (Burt, 1995). However, it is recognized that this approach does not explicitly take into account an actor's prominence or network influence, such as the hierarchical position, which could also contribute to resource access (Ibarra, 1993). This factor was discussed as part of the section on heterogeneity, which included an examination of the role of occupational ranking. In order to determine which actors within the G8 MNCH network demonstrated high and low brokerage, the scores from each of the four structure measures were divided into quartiles and assigned a weighting (high, medium-high, medium-low, low). Within each measure, large upwards arrows indicate high values, small upwards arrows indicate medium-high values, small downwards arrows represent medium-low values and large downwards arrows represent low values.

Table 3.2 Brokerage opportunities based on Burt's (1995) structural measures.

	<b>High brokerage opportunity</b>	<b>Low brokerage opportunity</b>
<b>Effective size</b>	↑	↓
<b>Efficiency</b>	↑	↓
<b>Density</b>	↓	↑
<b>Constraint</b>	↓	↑

### 3.3.7 Qualitative data collection and analysis

The qualitative data collection employed a dialogical approach, where dialogue between the researcher and participants formed the basis of the inquiry and individual perceptions were elicited through an interactive process. Dialogical methodology stresses the importance of interaction and participation through the creation of an open and respectful inquiry environment (Frank, 2005). This approach fits within a constructivist research paradigm, whereby the intent of the interview is to encourage participants to share views on *their* work within *their* world as *they* have experienced events (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Qualitative research interviews were chosen for this study to gain an understanding of the experiences and perspectives of individuals actively involved in a policy process and to subsequently reconstruct the experiences in relation to other actors involved in the process. This type of rich data typically cannot be obtained from static quantitative methods such as questionnaires (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

Qualitative research interviews followed a semi-structured approach, which includes a focused conversation between the interviewer and interviewee (Wengraf, 2001; Robson, 2002). This type of method has an open framework, which permits flexibility in scope and timing to ensure participant perspectives can be fully explored. Typically, during a semi-structured interview, the research goals are revealed to the participant and a guideline is used that contains a number of topics to be covered (Fetterman, 1989). The guideline used for this study contained eleven open-ended ‘draft’ questions, two of which contained multiple components. Following procedures of semi-structured interviewing provided by Robson (2002), the order in which questions were posed was varied depending on the flow of the conversation. Not all interviews utilized all questions within the guideline and explanations of questions were provided when requested by the interviewees.

Prior to beginning of an interview, an opening statement was provided, which included a brief description of the study and reference to research ethics guidelines. Flexibility was paramount to the approach, and participants were permitted a high degree of latitude to expand on issues areas where they appeared to have strong feelings. In some cases, questions were not required for prompting the interviewee and the answer from participants naturally flowed into topics included in the interview guidelines. Conversely, some interviews made extensive use of prompts, probes and follow-ups to solicit “thick” descriptions on specific topics (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

The set of topics covered in the guideline were based on insights gained from a review of the literature on network governance, MNCH, and summitry. Five practice interviews were conducted to test the questions and time required to cover the topics within the interview guideline. During both the practice and official interviews, the researcher made efforts to minimize the potential for bias. This included being aware of personal perceptions and values during the interview and compensating by avoiding making comments in response to answers and avoiding revealing body language (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 2005).

During the semi-structured interview, detailed field notes were made. These notes were used to ensure of the accuracy of the perspectives and information provided by the participants. The interviews were also recorded with an electronic audio recorder and subsequently transcribed for analysis.

Qualitative data analysis (QDA) can be described as a process that involves moving from raw data, often obtained through a multiple qualitative methods, towards interpretations based on the evidence surrounding a particular phenomenon (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). QDA involves breaking up data into separate parts to reveal core components through classification. These components, in turn, can arranged into patterns to develop concepts and theories (Dey, 1993). This study largely employs an inductive approach, which relies on interaction with the data to generate ideas (Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Schadewitz & Jachna, 2007). Conversely, a deductive approach involves using existing theories and guidelines to direct the identification of patterns within data (Holloway, 1997). Inductive and deductive approaches are often pitted as opposite approaches and simplified to be analogous with theory generation versus theory testing. However, this study takes a combination approach for the analysis, which recognizing that while induction plays a dominant role in the analysis, deduction is also involved in certain

stages of the analysis (see for e.g. Schadewitz & Jachna, 2007). That is, an inductive approach was dominant during early stages of the analysis of both the qualitative interviews and social network data to identify patterns and establish categories. But, as patterns began to emerge, theoretical constructs were consulted to explain and evaluate the emergent categories. Moreover, patterns that emerged from the social network analysis were considered as a basis for data coding for the qualitative interview data.

The data used for qualitative analysis includes: the results from the qualitative interviews, the observations of G8 Summit events and activities within the Government of Canada, and content within documents provided by research participants. A procedural sequence was developed for analyzing the qualitative data by utilizing elements from Rubin and Rubin's phases of analysis (2005), Dey's (2005) steps of qualitative data analysis, and Richard's (2005) processes of qualitative data handling. The first step involved reviewing and annotating the data to identify preliminary recurring ideas and themes. The second step includes qualitative coding, whereby categories are developed and information from various sources is linked to the emergent categories. This step parallels components of content analysis, a systematic process used to identify and categorize themes and content embedded in the data (Seidman, 1998). Coding is an important analysis step as it permits large quantities of raw data to be organized into structured and manageable components (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). The analytical procedures within step two also borrowed elements of axial coding as described by Strauss and Corbin (1990), which includes reassembling data based on, *inter alia*, conditions, context and strategies. Step three concentrates on connecting categories and developing themes in narrative propositions. Diagramming is included in this step, which helps visualize the relationships among emergent themes. The fourth step in comparing the themes from the social network analysis, qualitative analysis and literature on policy network, global governance and MNCH. Throughout the analysis direct quotes from research participants are used to illustrate and corroborate dominant themes.

### **3.4 Limitations and trustworthiness**

#### *3.4.1 Logistical constraints*

The research was limited by four major logistical constraints. Firstly, the geographic location of the researcher and the infeasibility of travelling to all the international destinations relevant

to the study to collect data meant that the majority of the data collection was done in Ottawa, Canada. While attempts were made to contact and interview network actors outside of Ottawa by telephone, few responses were received from those participants in international locations. The effect of this phenomenon was viewed to be minimal as the snowball sampling method revealed that the most frequently nominated actors were primarily located in Ottawa. However, it is recognized that further interviews with actors from international locations may change the overall shape of the global MNCH network.

Secondly, time constraints of the participants were found to limit the amount of information that could be collected from each participant. During the interview process, it often took approximately 10-15 minutes of conversation to develop a level of rapport between the researcher and participant. Many of the actors interviewed had schedules that only permitted interviews of 30-45 minutes, while the standard amount of time required to complete all interview questions was approximately 60 minutes. The time constraints became much more intense in the three week period leading up to the June 25 G8 Summit start date. Consequently, the social network data questions were given priority and the remaining time was used for select qualitative questions.

Thirdly, an atmosphere of caution existed within the Canadian public service, which meant that many actors that were identified as part of the MNCH network were skeptical of meeting with an “outsider” to discuss their work on the initiative. A high degree of trust was required between the interviewer and interviewee to discuss the type of information relevant to this study, and it was found that participants were comfortable to partake in face to face interviews, but expressed concerns about other communication formats, such as telephone and email. This limitation was minimized in two ways. As the researcher occupied a fellowship position within DFAIT during the primary data collection period, approval was obtained from organizational superiors to conduct the interviews as part of the official fellowship position. Consequently in contacting government political and bureaucratic actors, it could be claimed that support had been obtained from mid to high level actors within DFAIT. In addition, trust was enhanced during the interview by emphasizing anonymity and confidentiality, and agreeing to interview locations that were the choice of the participant.

The fourth constraint was related to the inability to collect complete or saturated network data with a network as large as the one for the 2010 G8 preparatory process for

MNCH. It is widely recognized that the optimal way to study the overall structure of networks is with saturated data for a network (Marsden, 1990; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Bearman et al., 2004; Wejnert, 2010). This is typically obtained by behavioural data or self-reporting from all actors within a network. As this was not possible within this study, the data collected represents a sample of the network, which contains actors that were nominated but not surveyed. While it is possible that survey data from these actors would alter the results of the analysis, it is anticipated that the alterations would be minor because the proportion of actor types and attributes sampled were found to be representative of the larger population that included the un-sampled actors. This assumption is similar to White *et al.* (1976, p. 773), a study which discussed large open-networks, and how patterns examined in sample networks may mirror structural patterns present in larger populations. Furthermore, the social network analysis was supplemented by the qualitative data analysis to compare and verify findings.

#### 3.4.2 *Trustworthiness and credibility*

In addition to the acknowledgement of logistical constraints, the trustworthiness of the research within the study must be addressed. This research is bounded within the constructivist theoretical paradigm outlined at the beginning of this chapter. That is, unlike the positivist paradigm, which includes upholding fundamental principles of validity and reliability through statistical sampling methods and replicability of a study as an “experiment”, this research ensures rigour by following principles within the constructs developed by Guba (1981) and expanded by Shenton (2004). Guba’s (1981) criteria for ensuring qualitative research trustworthiness include: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.

Credibility can be strengthened by constructing a true and detailed picture of the phenomenon under investigation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004). This was accomplished in this study by a variety of methods. Firstly, reputable investigation procedures derived from comparable projects were used (e.g. Lewis, 2005; Lewis, 2006; Betsill & Corell). Secondly, a mixed method approach, that generated multiple sources of data, was chosen to permit triangulation (Fetterman, 1989; Richards, 2005). Thirdly, an in-depth familiarity of the organizational culture surrounding the G8 MNCH process was developed by the researcher being immersed within the federal government bureaucracy before data collection dialogues were initiated. This strategy of engagement within an organization has been recognized as

important to establishing a relationship of trust between the researcher and participants (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Erlandson et al., 1993). Fourthly, techniques, such as developing rapport were employed during the interviews to further create a culture of trust with participants to increase the likelihood of honesty in responses. Lastly, ‘member checks’ were performed during interviews to check the accuracy of the data (Guba & Lincoln, 1989)

Transferability of non-positivist research is widely debated. While, the context and population of a case make it unique, it has been argued that a limited degree of transferability is possible when approached with caution (Stake, 1994). This requires that a detailed account of the contextual information surrounding the study is provided to allow a reader to determine the extent to which the findings could be applied to another case (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Consequently, this study provides an account of the global and domestic political context in which the research was conducted.

Dependability has been recognized as difficult to achieve within context specific research as it relates to replicability (Shenton, 2004). As argued by Lincoln and Guba (1985), efforts by the researcher to demonstrate credibility and transferability helps to ensure dependability of the research. To build dependability, this study ensures that ample detail of the research design, data gathering process and analytical techniques were provided to permit a similar study to be repeated.

The final criterion of confirmability presents an alternative to the positivist value of objectivity for ensuring research trustworthiness (Patton, 2002). Confirmability can be achieved by making sure the findings and conclusions drawn by the researcher are based on the ideas, perspectives and experiences of the participants, as opposed to the presuppositions and values of the researcher (Shenton, 2004). Within this study I acknowledge my own beliefs have been formed by involvement in summit-related research for approximately 10 years. This includes the belief of the importance of informal networks and non-conventional channels of influence within policy processes. These beliefs contributed to the selection of the methods of inquiry, including the network analysis approach to the research. To uphold the criteria of confirmability, the research has been presented in a manner that inherently includes an “audit trail” (Shenton, 2004, p. 72). That is, the process of data collection and analysis, and the how findings and recommendations were reached are fully described within the dissertation.

### 3.4.3 *Research bias*

As described earlier, the generation of data for this research relied on snowball sampling. This technique has been recognized to introduce bias into the research (Frank, 1979; Wejnert, 2010). Research by Doreian and Woodard (1992) showed that when independent snowball sampling tests were conducted on agencies contained within a fixed list, networks with different characteristics could be produced. However, their research also demonstrated that the method has proven to be pragmatic and flexible for situations where fixed membership lists do not exist. Regardless of the merits and applicability of snowball sampling to this study, it is important to acknowledge the potential for bias and possible impact on the findings. Firstly, the initial actors sampled, which served as “seeds” during the first wave of sampling, were predominantly Canadian federal government public servants. Ideally, the “seeds” would have been chosen from a small random sample of the entire universe of possible participants. However, no list was available defining the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory network for MNCH. Thus, as previously described, these participants were identified through key informants within the government and through summit documents that were made possible for viewing due to researcher’s position within DFAIT during the data collection phase. Secondly, bias could be introduced through the name generator approach where participants were queried on important contacts. As described in the social network data collection section of this chapter, interviewees were instructed to start by naming important contacts within their own organization, and then asked to move outwards to within other organizations and other countries.

There is a possibility that the sampling methods could yield a network that was biased towards Canadian federal government public servants, and actors located in Canada. For instance, if the sampling had started with actors, such as public servants from another G8 country, an external observer might postulate that the final network would have been different from the one generated. However, even in the context of a global governance perspective which recognizes governance as involving more than states, the G8 Summit authority for the process and decision making rest with government and predominately the host country. Thus it was known at the expected that Canadian government bureaucrats would be central actors in the summit preparatory network.

To check for bias, an analysis of the participants sampled versus the entire 314 actor network revealed that the actors from NGOs, academic/research organizations and foundations were marginally overrepresented in the interview process and those from federal political parties, federal public services, technical professional associations, international organizations and formal network were slightly underrepresented. These results confirm that the snowball technique did not significantly affect the credibility of the research results.

#### *3.4.4 Ethical considerations*

Full ethics clearance was received from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo on April 20, 2010 (ORE #16377). All procedures within the study were considered to be of minimal risk – there were no anticipated physical, social, psychological or emotional risks for the research participants. Furthermore, there were no repercussions for participants regarding their choice to participate or decline participation in this study.

Trust, confidentiality and anonymity were essential to the success of this study. Participants were asked to reflect on their professional activities as they related to the G8 Summit MNCH initiative. The combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions involved soliciting both “factual” information and perceptions on processes, people and relationships surrounding the MNCH initiative. This process included asking participants to reflect on the relative importance of other actors in their own policy work and there were no limits placed on participants as to who they could nominate as important or discuss during interviews. Consequently, it was recognized that, from the perspective of the participating individual, participant responses could have detrimental effects to their position and reputation if the information was communicated to colleagues, a superior or contacts outside of their immediate work environment. With this in mind, attempts were made to generate an atmosphere of trust during the interview, which included verbal and written assurances of confidentiality and anonymity contained in the official consent form. Furthermore, all research data was kept secure and participants were assigned a numerical code during early stages in the analysis.

References to actors within the MNCH network are purposely written at a general level to minimize the possibility of a reader tracing comments or results back to an individual actor. However, in order to retain the richness of the data and enable meaningful conclusions based

on the analysis, a degree of specificity was required. Thus, categorical attributes, such as which *type* of organization they represented and what occupation position *level* they occupied, were used in the study to allow actors to be differentiated.

It is also recognized that the findings of this study may be read, and possibly considered for policy decisions, by individuals from an array of organizations, some of which, a) participated in the study, and b) are implicated in the study. It is possible that some readers may not agree with the results and that the data may be interpreted in different ways than the researcher has done. As a result, it is stressed that the perspectives used as data in this research are based on the researcher's interpretations of individual opinions of what is believed to be a representative set of actors from a policy development phenomenon bounded to a certain place and time. This is a departure from a positivist framework, often employed in purely quantitative studies, whereby the purpose of research is to critically study, capture, and understand reality, and verify theories (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).

### **3.5 Conclusion**

In summary, this chapter has explained the ontological and epistemological foundations of the study, which include an interpretivist and subjectivist approach to data collection and analysis. A background was provided of the case study selection of the G8 Summit and the Summit preparatory process for the MNCH initiative. The global and domestic political context in which this study occurred was also described, with the understanding that the context provides an important component of examining the trustworthiness, transferability, and confirmability of the research. The chapter provided a detailed discussion of the mixed methods utilized for the data collection, including the semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis which form the basis of the social network analysis and qualitative data analysis. The chapter concludes with recognition of the limitations of the study. The next chapter moves to providing a detailed description of the G8 Summit MNCH preparatory network.

## Chapter 4 The contested role of networked actors

As stated previously, the goal of any G8 Summit is to advance agreement on solutions or action plans for pressing global concerns (Hajnal & Kirton, 2000). But given the vast range of global challenges, those planning the annual summit must select and prioritize the few issues that will be focused upon in that particular year's meeting. Therefore, an initial goal of any summit preparatory process becomes "setting the agenda". For a summit there are three factors that typically would be considered during this process: 1) the need to address immediate crises, such as responding to an event like 9/11, or an expected pandemic outbreak such as SARS; 2) the status of reoccurring themes that have become unofficially embedded in the year to year summit process such as nuclear non-proliferation and international development (Hajnal & Kirton, 2000; Hajnal, 2007); and 3) a specific niche project that becomes the host nations' signature initiative. For example, the 2009 G8 L'Aquila Summit focused on food security and the 2005 Gleneagles Summit focused on poverty and debt relief in Africa (Gstöhl, 2007). The actors involved in the preparatory process must continually work to balance these competing demands, attempting to anticipate the next potential crisis, while ensuring that progress is made on initiatives that involve longer timeframes. That is, actors struggle to find the next "big" topic to capture the attention of leaders without rendering all previous initiatives that have been launched as suddenly meaningless.

However, within this agenda-setting process, various individuals and organizations may attempt to influence and shape the items that will be on the final summit agenda for discussion. Given that the types of actors involved in influencing this process could vary widely, depending on the nature of the issues, this chapter explores which actors were involved in shaping the 2010 G8 Summit MNCH signature initiative and how they operated during this process. As discussed in chapter one, existing research has described the governmental and inter-governmental networks of Ministers, sherpas, and sous-sherpas that form during the summit preparatory process. Scholars have also theorized that nongovernmental actors target summit processes as arenas to raise awareness of social and environmental issues (Hajnal, 2002; Dobson, 2007). Yet, empirical evidence that captures the real-time experiences of the myriad of actors that interact during the preparatory process is lacking. Thus, a detailed

understanding of how a transnational network may be shaping the preparation for a global governance process is limited.

Based on the in-depth research into the experiences of the individuals involved, this chapter will demonstrate networked governance is occurring within the G8 Summit preparatory process. However, the role and influence of the actors within the networked process is contested by the actors that traditionally lead the summit process. To support this argument, this chapter identifies which actors participate in the summit preparatory process, which actors are perceived as important within the network structure, and how these actors are organized in relation to one another. Also, the findings show that two phases exist to the agenda setting process which will be described in detail below, but can be introduced here as phase one “establishment of agenda” and phase two “shaping and complete development of agenda initiatives”. Throughout both phases of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process, a Canadian coalition of NGOs and an assortment of medical and technical professionals played a key role in the prioritization and shaping of the MNCH signature initiative established by the Government of Canada. However, the role of these actors remains contested by people within the bureaucratic areas of government. This chapter concludes that networked governance literature needs to better address the political contestation of actors that can occur within networks, particularly for summit processes.

#### **4.1 Overview of agenda setting process**

The agenda-setting process involved two phases. The first phase involved the political prioritization of issues for the agenda. The second phase followed once the agenda was officially announced by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, which occurred in January 2010, six months prior to the G8 Summit (see Harper, 2010). Once announced, many details needed to be sorted for the agenda. In this case, the first phase involved actors attempting to influence the potential focal topics, including those specifically aiming to have maternal and child health recognized as an agenda item. The second phase involved actors trying to shape what the signature topic (MNCH) entailed; that is, the specific goals, deliverables, policies, programs that comprise the initiative.

The separation of the process into these two phases is useful for understanding and explaining the role and compositional changes of the various actors involved and the strategies

employed over time. However, a finite cleavage between the phases is somewhat artificial, given that in reality, the signature initiative is actively shaped, re-shaped, defined and re-defined in an iterative process. For example, once the announcement was made that the signature initiative would involve maternal and child health, actors outside of the PMO were concerned that the topic would not remain the dominant focus of the summit. That is, a possibility always existed that other topics may have received an equal or greater amount of attention to MNCH. Thus, even after the official announcement in January, efforts continued to ensure increased momentum for the maternal and child health topic, meaning that phase one type activities still took place in phase two. Moreover, as discussed in chapter three, participants were sampled throughout the preparatory process based on their availability and the logistical constraints of the interview schedule. Therefore, the SNA data does not differentiate between phase one and phase two of the preparatory process. But despite the overlapping nature and the limitations to analyzing time-sensitive dynamics in SNA, categorizing activities into two separate phases is useful for presenting the QDA and provides greater insight into the nature of the agenda-setting process.

Scholars have previously determined that governments begin G8 summit agenda-setting approximately one year in advance of the summit (Gstöhl, 2007; Hajnal, 2007). However, a synthesis of important dates and events based on the data collected in this research (Figure 4.1) showed that participants of this case began phase one of the summit preparatory process as early as July 2007, approximately 3 years before the 2010 G8 Summit.

Within phase one, activity occurred at the bureaucratic and political levels, including *inter alia* intergovernmental meetings among sherpas and sous-sherpas, Ministerial meetings, and consultation/outreach sessions with civil society and academics (Figure 4.2). The bureaucratic process was led by DFAIT but included a range of other agencies, such as DFO, CIDA, IDRC, and Health Canada. In addition to the regular meetings among sherpas, sous-sherpas, and Ministers, other formal processes were developed within the Government of Canada. One such process was an inter-departmental committee formed at the Director level, with the goal of soliciting and developing proposals for the Summit agenda. This process, which was held from May-October 2009, was referred to by committee participants as the summit “Summer School”. The Summer School generated approximately 90 proposals. From October 2009-January 2010, DFAIT refined and selected nine of these proposals to forward to

the PM, which then announced in January 2010 that maternal, newborn and child health was selected as the signature initiative.

Within the nongovernmental actor category, some actors formed coalitions, including a small group of Canadian branches of international NGOs that held focussed discussions and formed the Canadian Coalition for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (CCMNCH). This coalition proved to have a pivotal role in both this phase and the second phase of the agenda setting process, which will be discussed in detail in the sections that follow. However, throughout 2008 and 2009, discussions about possibilities for a signature initiative and tactics for influencing the Government of Canada occurred within a variety of non-governmental organizations, including the newly formed domestic coalition (CCMNCH), the international Partnership on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH), a broader focused development/anti-poverty coalition, and medical/practitioner organizations. These groups became increasingly organized with their advocacy campaigns and targeted efforts were made by various actors and representative to meet with both political and bureaucratic actors within the Government of Canada.

Outside of the formal bureaucratic process, political strategists that were studying the opportunities for the 2010 G8 Summit were interacting informally with bureaucrats, nongovernmental actors, and federal politicians. Therefore, when the MNCH initiative was announced, it was the combination of the formal bureaucratic, informal political, and nongovernmental advocacy simultaneously occurring during phase one that shaped the selection of the agenda item.




Figure 4.1 Important dates in Phase One and Phase two of 2010 G8 Summit agenda-setting process for MNCH




Figure 4.2 Timeline of key events leading up to 2010 G8 Summit

Once the signature initiative was announced in January 2010, phase two began. Similar to phase one, a range of activities occurred at both the bureaucratic and political level within government. This phase involved moving the signature initiative from a general concept to creating a global level program with detailed goals, purposes, and a clear sense of what the G8 countries could achieve and the means with which those achievements could be reached. With the agenda item now identified, specific government agencies that were responsible for maternal, newborn and child health became prominent. For instance, CIDA began to expand their efforts on the MNCH file, including convening a medical and health experts' roundtable to discuss specific health interventions that the G8 countries could potentially support. DFAIT primarily concentrated on negotiating with G8 and non-G8 countries, as well as with foundations to secure financial contributions for any proposed MNCH activities. DFAIT also hosted official outreach events with a variety of actors, including other governments, civil society, and academics. At the political level, parliamentary hearings were held to discuss MNCH concerns. For instance, the Status of Women Committee held a hearing whereupon MNCH experts were invited to present their professional opinions to the Committee to ensure the Committee was informed about the latest science and developments in the field. Furthermore, in Parliament, the Official Opposition questioned the Conservatives on whether the initiative would include reproductive health services. This topic ignited a debate within Canada on whether G8 funding would support women having access to safe abortion treatments. The interaction of domestic politics with the global level initiative will be discussed in detail in the sections that follow, but it is important to understand that it forms part of the context in which phase two occurred.

The role of nongovernmental actors shifted in phase two to involve attempts to shape the substantive content of the MNCH initiative. Political and bureaucratic government actors drew upon the resources of the nongovernmental actors for different reasons in this phase. While the government relied on the information resources provided by the Canadian Coalition and medical and technical professionals during phase one, in phase two, the government actors relied on their ties to these actors as sources of legitimacy for the initiative.

As previously explained in chapter one, much of the existing literature on summit preparatory processes focus on the central role of government agencies. Indeed, a substantial amount of governance machinery within the Government of Canada existed to prepare for the G8

Summit, both in terms of policy and logistics. This research showed that the governance architecture during the year in which Canada hosted the G8 summit was different from a non-hosting year. Furthermore, it was widely recognized that the activities and interactions that comprised phase one and phase two of the agenda-setting process had changed from previous hosting years, partially in response to the political style of the government in power and partially due to the changes in changes in global governance more broadly (e.g. increased recognition of NGOs in global political arena). The research demonstrated that existing portrayals of the summit preparatory process as involving a network of primarily governmental actors and international organizations (e.g. Slaughter, 2005; Gstöhl, 2007) did not hold true for the MNCH initiative.

#### **4.2 Network Composition**

Structurally, the network of actors engaged in both phases of the agenda-setting process for the MNCH initiative involved a range of organization types, including government bureaucratic agencies and departments, government politicians and political staff, international organizations, NGOs, foundations, think tanks, medical and technical professionals, and academics. However, the dominant responses to the question of which individual or organization was most influential in the prioritization of the MNCH issue as the signature initiative focused on a smaller set of actors: the G8 member countries, DFAIT and CIDA, a coalition of Canadian branches of international NGOs, international organizations, and both the Prime Minister and his office (PMO).

The G8 member countries were cited as having a collective role in building momentum that put MNCH on the agenda, through discussions that had occurred at previous meetings. The following three comments provide insight:

*“It started with the Kyoto G8 and the side meetings taking place and the Partnership on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health was involved....And as it [next G8 meeting] was coming into Italy, she helped the Italian parliament pass a resolution, you know, committing itself to improving maternal and newborn health globally....and as you know maternal and newborn health was mentioned in L’Aquila [2009 G8 Summit]” (medical professional).*

*“In last year’s G8 meeting [2009], maternal and child health was recognized as an important issue. Addressing maternal and child health came to a global consensus. It is about seeing where the G8 has value. The G20 has economic issues, the one that was gaining momentum [for the G8] was maternal and child health” (mid-level government bureaucrat).*

*“First of all, the G8 is a continuum. We didn’t invent maternal and child health. There were a lot of things happening at previous summits that started looking at health as a focus. This is going back to Kyoto, with the creation of working groups...” (senior government bureaucrat)*

Therefore, the G8’s historical interest in MNCH led some participants to treat the issue as simply an evolving progression of the G8 agenda.

DFAIT, as the lead agency responsible for the organization and execution of the 2010 G8 Summit could be expected to play an important role in the agenda-setting process. In the sections that follow in this chapter, the strategies, reasons, and resources that DFAIT used during the two phases of the agenda-setting process will be described. But it was largely participants from DFAIT that vowed DFAIT was responsible for ensuring that it was MNCH that was ultimately prioritized, rather than participants from outside of DFAIT making such claims. For example, one mid-level DFAIT bureaucrat stated “We (DFAIT) drove this. We brought groups together and encouraged them to reach consensus on the MNCH issue”.

The fact that it was mostly DFAIT staff that deemed DFAIT to be important does not entirely diminish the roles and responsibilities of DFAIT in the process, but it illuminates the differences in which actors or organizations were perceived as influential by participants. For instance, CIDA was recognized by participants within the political and bureaucratic government areas, as well as by medical/technical professionals and NGOs, as conducting considerable background work that helped prioritize the MNCH and shape the details of what the initiative would involve once it was on the agenda (phase two). As one political and one bureaucratic staff member reflected:

*“I would hope that DFAIT would maybe give CIDA officials more respect because of the work they have done on this. It has been heavy-duty, and it has been CIDA officials getting the specifics done. I mean, while DFAIT and the Sherpa team have done fantastic work getting global support for this, really the specifics of the MNCH initiative came from CIDA officials” (Political government staff).*

*“With MCH, it has to be CIDA. We can provide technical support, but it is their money and funding and how they integrate it to advance the overall Government of Canada approach to development, to making a difference in that area. It has to be CIDA”.*  
*(Bureaucratic government staff)*

While other departments and agencies were involved from the Government of Canada, it was these two that were routinely cited as critical to the selection of the MNCH initiative.

Beyond government, participants widely acknowledged the role of coalitions of nongovernmental actors. The formation of coalitions was a strategy used by nongovernmental actors to influence both the agenda signature initiative selection (phase one) and signature issue shaping (phase two). This strategy has been employed more broadly than the G8 Summit in efforts to enhance the political prioritization of maternal, newborn and child health within various global governance fora. Notably, the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) and the White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood have played important roles during the past decade in building and maintaining momentum for programs and interventions that help reduce maternal, newborn and child mortality and strengthen health systems in developing countries. The membership of these two prominent coalitions has varied over time, but at any given time has generally included individuals from governments, international organizations (including UN agencies), non-profit organizations, medical associations, and foundations. These two coalitions did not form specifically for the G8. That is, the alliances have a diverse array of activities which they have accomplished together. As one White Ribbon Alliance member explained:

*“What the White Ribbon campaign did, with help from the network we built, which included loads of different characters like supermodels to actors and actresses and the*

*First Lady, and lots of NGOs, health workers, and all sorts of different professionals, was to put pressure on international as well as national groups in G8 countries”.*

Ensuring that MNCH was included in the 2010 G8 Summit agenda was one minor activity for these coalitions out of the many others they undertake. One consequence was that these coalitions, while involved in the preparatory process, were mostly regarded as playing only a peripheral role.

Conversely, two other coalitions were formed specifically for the 2010 G8 Summit. Firstly, an array of 80 NGOs, environmental groups and development focused organizations, including Make Poverty History, Oxfam, and Amnesty International, formed a coalition called “At the Table”. The goals of their campaign were to bring awareness and motivate action on pressing poverty, climate change and environment issues. That is, this coalition focused on international development issues *writ large* and included environmental and social issues, in addition to human health. This coalition was included in the process, but they served the role of “generalists”, rather than MNCH specialists.

While the “At the Table” campaign was broad in scope, another smaller, more focused coalition formed for the 2010 G8 Summit, known as the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. The coalition consisted of the following organizations: Save the Children Canada, CARE Canada, World Vision Canada, Results Canada, UNICEF Canada, and Plan Canada. Due to its narrow focus, which specifically involved getting MNCH on the 2010 G8 Summit agenda, it was this coalition that was most widely recognized as critical to the agenda-setting process. As one academic stated: “I’m of the view that if I had to pick one of the groups as more important than the others, it was the [Canadian Coalition] NGOs because they seem to have gotten going first. They seem to have gotten going before the Prime Minister went public with it”. A government bureaucrat agreed: “I think the coalition is clearly the Canadian champion from our perspective. The fact that they brought themselves together, even though they have broader development interests, I think they deserve a lot of credit given that this is anonymous”. A political staff member expressed similar sentiments: “The Canadian Coalition [for Maternal and Child Health] is very involved. They are one of the organizations that pushed the agenda forward”. However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the importance of the Canadian Coalition during phases one and two was not universally agreed upon.

Beyond the government and nongovernmental coalitions, some participants in the study perceived the broader global community as being crucial to the prioritization of the MNCH process. This perception rested upon the fact that the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had recognized MNCH as his own personal issue. Additionally, the 10 year review summit for the MDGs was occurring three months after the G8 Summit, hosted by the UN in New York. Since goals four and five of the MDGs involved maternal, newborn and child health and had the least amount of progress of all the goals, numerous organizations within the UN were interested in building momentum for any MNCH initiatives. As one senior government bureaucrat stated: “The Secretary-General of the UN is convening a high-level plenary summit of the MDGs in September. Within that context, the UN system was putting a very high priority for MNCH”. The UN Secretary-General was in direct contact with Canadian government actors. Additionally, other countries and leaders within those countries, namely the United States, Great Britain and Norway had developed a vested interest in the plight of maternal and child mortality rates in developing countries. The data demonstrated that some individuals were perceived as global opinion leaders and either directly or indirectly influenced the prioritization of MNCH. As an executive from a foundation stated “how did this issue become a priority? I envision it had much to do with the issue being a priority for Secretary of State Clinton. It was an easy target for added funds from the U.S. government”. A non-G8 diplomat agreed: “It was selected because of the strong priority from the US, from Obama”.

Yet, the final power for determining the agenda and the details of the signature initiative for Canada as the host nation was held by the Prime Minister of Canada. While the other organizations listed above influenced phase one and phase two of the agenda-setting process, all participants acknowledged that the final decision rests with Prime Minister Harper, and by proxy, the Prime Minister’s Office. Statements such as “it was the PM’s personal decision”, “this has been led by the PM early on”, and “then at the end of the day, it was the PM’s decision” were shared by participants from a range of organizational types and indicate that the Prime Minister made the final choice.

Essentially, the prioritization and shaping of the MNCH initiative involved a complex constellation of actors. Specifically, participants recognized individuals, not just a faceless bureaucracy, as playing championing roles. But while a diverse range of actors were recognized

as involved, variation existed in the perceptions of how important the different actors were in the summit preparatory process. Not all participants were in agreement on who mattered. Some had strong reactions that certain actors, such as the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, either had a critical role or a limited role. Some participants viewed the external knowledge and ideas provided by the medical and technical professionals as an important resource, while others believed these actors did not introduce any new knowledge that was not held internal to government already. This contestation will be further examined in this chapter. Ultimately, the decision for a signature policy initiative within the 2010 G8 Summit process rested with the Prime Minister, but his choice was influenced and shaped by the complex constellation of individuals.

### **4.3 Network Structure**

Having described the QDA results that explain the nature of the agenda-setting process and the general range of actors perceived as important in the two phases of the process, this section turns to the SNA results to support the findings and reveal detail about the structure of the relationships among those actors. Based on a sample of 79 actors from a variety of governmental and non-governmental organization types, a network involving 314 actors was found to be interacting in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for the MNCH initiative. The 314 actors were based in 11 different types of government and nongovernmental organizations, held a variety of professional positions, including political staff for Ministers or government leaders, Sherpas, sous-Sherpas, Members of Parliament and Cabinet staff, senior and junior policy analysts, program officers, scientists and social scientists, ambassadors and diplomatic staff, Prime Ministers and Presidents, and organizational executives (e.g. Director-Generals, Chief Executive Officers, Directors), and worked in different geographic locations.

Within the network of 314 actors, a dense interconnected core group, which was surrounded by a high number of actors with only one tie (Figure 4.3), was present in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for the MNCH initiative. If only the 79 participants surveyed for the SNA are included in the network graph, the core groups of densely connected actors is further emphasized (Figure 4.4). The federal government public servants are clustered together in the upper right portion of the graph (grey nodes) and the lower portion of the diagram contains a mix

of actors from federal government parties (red), NGOs (orange), technical/professional medical organizations (green), networks/alliances (black), and academic/research units (light blue). This points to the presence of diverse ties for these actors groups. The diagram also shows that some actors receive large numbers of incoming ties through the presence of arrow heads surrounding a node. Nine nodes appear to have disproportionately more incoming ties than other nodes – seven of which are grey nodes representing federal government public servants. Figure 4.4 also demonstrates that several actors from a range of organization types are not highly connected to the core group of actors. Some of the actors, such as a group of four federal government public servants (grey nodes) on the far right side of the graph, indicate the presence of a sub-group or clique. Other single nodes on the periphery may indicate relatively low overall importance to the G8 MNCH preparatory process.

Another visual representation of the network engaged in the G8 Summit preparatory process involves displaying the ties among actors when the actors are clustered by the type of organization (Figure 4.5). The quantity of lines among the eleven different organization types reveals where the majority of ties are concentrated. While the graph suggests interconnections among the majority of organization types, a triangle of dense ties among actors within the federal government public service, federal government political parties and NGOs is evident. The high interconnectedness within the federal government bureaucracy is also evident but expected, given that the Government of Canada is the host nation of the summit and thus, government agencies would play a central role in the preparatory process. But the interconnectedness of the NGO groups also indicates the possibility of these organizations working together. Thus, these SNA results begin to confirm the QDA results with regards to the presence of coalitions. The graph also shows that there are few ties among actors from business, international organizations and academic/research units.




Figure 4.3 2010 G8 MNCH Network (N=314, graphed with spring-embedding algorithm, node colour indicates organization type).




Figure 4.4 2010 G8 MNCH network of sampled actors only (N=79, graphed with spring-embedding algorithm, node colour indicates organization type).




Figure 4.5 2010 G8 MNCH network ties among actors by organization type

#### 4.3.1.1 Characteristics of network members

While the network graphs illustrate patterns of connections among actors within the network, details on the attributes of the actors reveal further patterns. This section discusses the types of organizations, geography, gender, professional areas of specialization and occupational position for the networked actors to illuminate the details about who comprised the 2010 G8 global governance summitry architecture.

#### 4.3.1.2 Organizations and organizations types

Table 4.1 shows the composition of the network based on the nominated actors and the number of times an actor was nominated within an organization type. To clarify, the nominated actors includes the 314 actors, but the number of times an actor was nominated within an organization type exceeds the 314 (848 total nominations) because many of the actors within the 314 were nominated by more than one person. The actors nominated most frequently were overwhelmingly located in federal government public services (43.9 percent, Table 4.1), followed by those in federal political parties (18.2 percent, Table 4.1). Together these two groups comprised the majority of the nominations. Actors from business, think-tanks, and the media received the least amount of nominations, suggesting these three actors groups were not highly important to the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for the MNCH initiative.

Table 4.2 and show the top 10 organizations important to the MNCH policy process based on actor count and nomination count respectively. DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the PMO were the top ranked organizations by network actor count, collectively comprising 32 percent of the network actors. Likewise these same four organizations collectively received 50.8 percent of the total nominations of the sample group.

Table 4.1 People important to MNCH policy development by organization type

Organization type	Actors in the network		Nominations received	
	#	%	#	%
Federal government political parties	57	18.2	147	17.3
Federal government public service	138	43.9	436	51.4
Non-government organization (NGO)	31	9.9	102	12.0
Business	2	0.6	4	0.5
Think tank	3	1.0	3	0.4
Academic/research	20	6.4	32	3.8
Technical professional	8	2.5	13	1.5
Foundation	19	6.1	32	3.8
International Organization	24	7.6	47	5.5
Network/Alliance	11	3.5	31	3.7
Media	1	0.3	1	0.1
Total	314	100	848	100

Table 4.2 Top 10 organizations important to MNCH policy development by actor count (network, N=314)

Organization	Number of actors	Percentage of total actors
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	45	14.3
Canadian International Development Agency	28	8.9
International Development Research Centre	15	4.8
Prime Minister's Office	12	3.8
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	10	3.2
Health Canada	10	3.2
Liberal Party of Canada	10	3.2
Public Health Agency of Canada	8	2.5
University of Toronto	8	2.5
Privy Council Office	7	2.2
Total	153	48.6

Table 4.3 Top 10 organizations important to MNCH policy development by count of incoming nominations of actors by organizations (nominations, N=848)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Number of incoming nominations</b>	<b>Percentage of incoming nominations</b>
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	204	24.1
Canadian International Development Agency	132	15.6
Prime Minister's Office	56	6.6
International Development Research Centre	38	4.5
Liberal Party of Canada	23	2.7
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	22	2.6
Privy Council Office	22	2.6
Health Canada	21	2.5
University of Toronto	19	2.2
World Vision Canada	17	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>65.4</b>

#### 4.3.1.3 Geography

The majority of the 314 actors within the network were physically located in Ottawa (58.9 percent, Table 4.4). Similarly, the majority of the 848 ties were to actors within the same city - Ottawa (73.2 percent, Table 4.4). Other cities with concentrated groups of actors included Geneva, Washington, Toronto, New York, London and Seattle, each comprising between 2.2 percent to 6.4 percent of the network and receiving between 1.3 to 4.2 percent of the ties (Table 4.4).

These results can be interpreted in several different ways. Firstly, the prominence of Ottawa as a location for the work on the MNCH initiative may be expected since the Summit preparatory process in Canada is traditionally coordinated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), which is headquartered in Ottawa. Other Canadian federal government agencies important to any international summit process, such as the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the Privy Council Office (PCO) are also located within the capital city. Also, as discussed in chapter three, a potential for bias was introduced in the sampling methods, given that the researcher began the sampling process within Ottawa.

Table 4.4 People important to MNCH policy development by geographic location (top 10 represented by network actor count)

City	Country	Actors in the network		Nominations received	
		#	%	#	%
Ottawa	Canada	185	58.9	621	73.2
Geneva	Switzerland	20	6.4	36	4.2
Washington	United States	19	6.1	32	3.8
Toronto	Canada	17	5.4	42	5.0
New York	United States	16	5.1	26	3.1
London	United Kingdom	11	3.5	18	2.1
Seattle	United States	7	2.2	11	1.3
Tokyo	Japan	6	1.9	7	0.8
Paris	France	4	1.3	5	0.6
Oslo	Norway	3	1.0	8	0.9
<b>Total</b>		<b>288</b>	<b>91.8</b>	<b>806</b>	<b>95.0</b>

But the geographic data can also be interpreted in a second way, which is that the results are unexpected given the nature of the MNCH issue. As discussed in chapter two, the majority of MNCH programs focus on developing countries and regions with low levels of socio-economic development. Therefore, one expected result could have been that the work surrounding the MNCH initiative for the summit would involve a focus on governmental and international agencies located in countries where high levels of maternal and child mortality are a concern. For example, government actors from the host nation could have prioritized their relationship with the African Union (AU). While a considerable range and diversity of organizations were involved with the MNCH preparatory process –112 organizations from 28 cities in 16 countries - only 8 percent of the organizations were from developing countries.

A lack of substantive dialogue with developing countries has been recognized as problematic in the summit process and has led to calls for an official dialogue forum during the summit preparatory stages (Ullrich, 2005). DFAIT did convene consultations with organizations and government agencies in developing countries during the preparatory process. Yet, these consultations were not recognized as yielding ideas that were important to the preparatory process for the MNCH initiative by the participants that were surveyed. The SNA results cannot explain why this result emerges, but does provide empirical evidence of the nature of the structured relationships and that a challenge must prevent the inclusion of some actors in the summit preparatory process. It also shows that the official consultation processes were not

effective in including or confirming the concerns of marginalized groups, given that strong linkages did not develop with these groups or countries.

Furthermore, the collective role of the G8 countries, as previously discussed, played a part in the selection of MNCH as a summit agenda item. While the SNA includes members of G8 countries, including the sherpas and sous-sherpas, they are nominated by only a few actors as important to the preparatory process and therefore lack prominence in the graph. However, in terms of the geographic and organization structure of the network and relations, minimal interaction was documented among actors from non-Canadian G8 members and those within Canadian agencies. While 86 percent of the network actors were from G8 countries, the interactions among Canadian-based organizations with other G8 members primarily included the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed it was found that many participants emphasized the important leadership role of these two countries on raising global awareness of MNCH problems and championing initiatives throughout the 2000s. The only non-Canadian, non-government actor organization that made the top 10 rank was a U.S. based foundation – the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Participants frequently spoke about the important work done by this foundation and their increasing role in the area of MNCH.

However, with the exception of the foundation and two other G8 nations, this research emphasizes that actors outside of Ottawa were not prominently involved in the preparatory process and thus, the geographic location of the actors did matter. Debates exist within the literature about the extent to which globalization has reduced the importance of geographic distance. On one side, it is argued that new communication technology has compressed time and space. Popular sentiment has arisen that globalization has led to ‘organizations without borders’, or the “Death of Distance” (Cairncross, 2001) or “end of geography” (Heine & Thakur, 2011) due to advances in technological communications that reduce geographic barriers (Stanbury & Vertinsky, 1995; Albrow, 1996; Scholte, 2000). Research on anti-globalization protest movements demonstrated that the internet plays a critical role in the coordination of protests and the level of success achieved would not have been possible otherwise (see for e.g. Smith & Smythe, 1999; Van Rooy, 2000). While research on the other side does not refute the impact of new communication technologies, the argument is made that globalization has not diminished

the importance of the ‘local’ and that geographic distance remain relevant (see for e.g. Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Capling & Nossal, 2001; Storper & Venables, 2004).

The finding of this study supports the work of Storper and Venables (2004), which argues that new communication technologies have not diminished the relevance of geographic distance and face-to-face communications are critical in building trust and the sharing of resources to achieve innovative outcomes. The Government of Canada developed an e-technology strategy for engagement during the summit preparatory process, but the social network portion of this study shows that Ottawa-based organizations were more likely to be directly included in the core network group than organizations in other geographic regions.

#### 4.3.1.4 Gender

The gender distribution of the 314 actor network was not even – 61 percent were male and 39 percent were female. The total number of nominations followed a similar pattern, with 59 percent being male and 41 percent female. The actors interviewed were 53 percent male and 47 percent female. As the largest share in the network comprised those in the federal public service, and the share of women in knowledge based occupations within the Canadian core public administration<sup>12</sup> outnumbered men as of 2000 (Naczka, 2007), the data from the MNCH Summit network differs from the general trends within the federal public service. However a closer examination of public service labour studies demonstrates that as of 2006, the proportion of women in executive positions was at 38.1 percent and at 44.0 percent for those in scientific and technical positions (Naczka, 2007). As many of the network actors within government positions may fall within these categories, the gender findings of this study appear to reflect previously established patterns in labour distribution.

#### 4.3.1.5 Specialization

The distribution of actors showed a skew in favour of generalists over specialists within the network – 41 percent of the actors had maternal and/or child health policy expertise, while 59

---

<sup>12</sup> “Core” public administration typically refers public sector employees, but does not include people working in the defence or social security sectors (Cusack, 1998; Tepe, 2009). The Canadian core public administration includes individuals in the Canadian federal public service, but excludes the regular members, special constables and civilian members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), regular and reserve members of the Canadian Forces, and employees of Crown Corporations (Green et al., 2007; Naczka, 2007).

percent were designated as “generalists”, meaning that an actor’s professional role had no specific responsibilities related to MNCH. This result was expected as 62 percent of the network actors were located in either the federal public service or federal political parties and held positions with a wide array of responsibilities beyond MNCH policy, such as development, international relations, finance, or domestic political campaigning. Furthermore, the network included many actors with core involvement in the G8 Summit preparatory process, who also worked on other summit agenda items and thus, can be expected to be policy generalists in order to meet their professional role requirements.

#### 4.3.1.6 Occupational position

The network actors were classified into distinct stratified levels based on a categorical ranking of occupational positions/titles applicable to various sectors. The six levels include, but are not limited to, the following occupational positions: level 1 (president, prime minister), level 2 (UN secretary general, minister), level 3 (deputy minister, CEO, sherpa), level 4 (ambassador, chief of staff, sous-sherpa), level 5 (assistant deputy minister, director) and level 6 (manager, advisor).<sup>13</sup> Table 4.5 shows the composition of the network and nominations by occupation position level. The largest group of actors within the network were categorized as level 5, followed by levels 6, 4 and 3. The actors – regardless of their own level - predominantly nominated ties that linked them to actors within level 5 (40.8 percent of total ties, Table 4.5). Actors in levels 1 and 2 positions each represented less than 2 percent of the network. The occupational level data demonstrates that the sample of interviewees closely matched the distribution of the network and nominations. The results from the occupational level breakdown indicate the important role of level 5 actors to the policy process.

---

<sup>13</sup> For a full list of all positions see Appendix III: Multi-sector occupational position list

Table 4.5 People important to MNCH policy development by occupation position level

Occupation position level (example)	Actors in the network		Nominations received	
	%	#	%	#
1 (president, prime minister)	6	1.9	22	2.6
2 (UN sec. gen., minister)	4	1.3	26	3.1
3 (dep. Minister, CEO, sherpa)	56	17.8	178	21.0
4 (chief of staff, sous-sherpa)	52	16.6	91	10.7
5 (ass. dep. minister, director)	110	35.0	346	40.8
6 (manager, advisor)	86	27.4	185	21.8
Total	314	100	848	100

To summarize the SNA findings thus far, this section described what can be considered as “descriptive votes” of the types of actors important to the summit preparatory process. Six major characteristics of the network were described, including: organization type, organization, geographic location, gender, occupational position level and specialization. Generally, the SNA structural findings support the QDA results, such as the prominent role of DFAIT, CIDA and the PMO, and the presence of a large number of NGOs with ties to each other and government bureaucrats and political staff. However, the analysis thus far reveals minimal information about the positions of individual actors in relation to each other. The number of nominations that a department or agency receives is not the same as an actor’s importance or centrality within a networked governance approach. Consequently, the next part of this chapter will use additional quantitative analysis to provide further insights into the structural characteristics of the relationships within the network.

#### 4.4 Important Actors and Contested Roles

When the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory network for the MNCH initiative was examined by attributes such as organization type or occupational position level, trends were revealed about what *types* of actors are dominant to the process. This information provided an important preliminary interpretation of the network based on static attribute characteristics of those within the structure. This next section uses the relational data (i.e. tie data) provided by participants to develop insights into the structural relations within the network. As previously discussed, participants perceived that the agenda-setting process did not involve “faceless” organizations; rather, multiple individuals from a variety of government and non-government agencies played

key roles in both phases of the agenda setting process. Participants frequently used descriptors such as “key player”, “broker”, “authority”, “leader”, “critical link”, “connector”, “instigator”, “catalyst”, “facilitator”, “fund-raiser”, “lobbyer”, “door opener”, and “supplier of information” when referring to specific actors that were part of the preparatory process. The roles of certain actors are further exemplified by statements such as “[bureaucrat x] really drove it [the MNCH initiative] in the trenches”, “[bureaucrat y] played an indispensable role. They were the point person on this”, and “[politician z] brought together experts in maternal and child health”. Thus, it is clear that certain individuals were structurally important to the selection and shaping of MNCH as the signature initiative.

In order to better understand the level of engagement of these actors, both the tie and attribute data of the actors are used to determine the most central and structurally important actors within the preparatory process. The first section provides a robust consideration of centrality based on three different measures. The second section examines the overall structure of a reduced network. The term reduced network refers to a SNA test that partitions actors into blocks depending on those actors having similar structural roles within the G8 MNCH preparatory process. Conclusions are then drawn about the role of individual actors, organizations, and organization types in the preparatory process.

#### *4.4.1 Centrality: identifying important individuals*

Centrality is a core structural concept of social network analysis and is used to evaluate the importance or prominence of actors within a network (Freeman, 1979; Knoke & Burt, 1983). By measuring centrality, key players are identified that have structurally important roles. The roles of these actors may be related to their hierarchical status, power, influence, and ability to access information. To recap from chapter three (section 3.3.4), numerous ways of calculating centrality have been developed and each has strengths and weaknesses. Three prominent types of centrality measures have been used to yield insight about prominence of actors based on direct incident ties (Freeman’s centrality), the brokerage roles of actors the paths of ties among actors (betweenness centrality), and the importance of an actor considering the number of ties and the extent to which those others actors are well connected (Eigenvector centrality).

Table 4.6 contains the Freeman’s in-degree centrality measure for the 20 most central actors of the 314 actors in the network. This ranking shows actors that are perceived as important by other actors in the system by calculating the number of times they are nominated. The most central actor was a mid-level bureaucrat within DFAIT (#117). This finding is supported by the QDA results, with participants identifying this particular actor as being important during phase two of the agenda-setting process in developing the details of the initiative and possessing a large network of individuals from which to draw expertise. The next two most central actors (#90 and #53) were senior bureaucrats also located within DFAIT. The centrality of these two actors can be explained due to their structural positions of responsibility for the overall summit process. Of the top twenty most central actors, all represented Canadian based organizations or departments and 70 percent were located within three Canadian government departments or agencies (DFAIT, CIDA, and PMO). Again, while reflecting upon their experience during the preparatory process, participants did stress the importance of DFAIT, CIDA and the PMO in both stages of the agenda setting process and the SNA confirms this result.

Table 4.6 Freeman’s in-degree centrality top 20 values (asymmetric data, N=314)

Actor ID#	Organization type	Organization *	Geographic location	Occupation position level	In-degree centrality	In-degree centrality (normalized)
117	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	6	30	9.6
90	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	3	25	8.0
53	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	23	7.3
235	Federal Government political	CIDA	Ottawa	3	20	6.4
163	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	19	6.1
118	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	18	5.8
37	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	15	4.8
140	Federal Government political	PMO	Ottawa	5	14	4.5
213	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	14	4.5
308	Federal Government political	PMO	Ottawa	1	13	4.2
199	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	12	3.8
71	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	11	3.5
110	Federal Government political	PMO	Ottawa	5	11	3.5
200	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	11	3.5
280	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	11	3.5
164	Academic/research	University	Toronto	6	10	3.2
21	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	3	9	2.9
102	International organization	IO	Ottawa	3	9	2.9
22	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	6	8	2.6
147	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	4	8	2.6

\* Note: Specific names of some organizations are not revealed to protect the anonymity of the actors

The prominence of three executive directors from three large NGOs and one international organization were ranked 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup>, and 18<sup>th</sup> respectively is also noteworthy. While they are not as prominent as the actors from DFAIT, CIDA and the PMO, their high Freeman centrality scores demonstrate many actors within the system considered them to be important to the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH. Moreover, these actors formed a coalition to enhance their ability to influence the process, which may also have helped increase their rank in terms of Freeman's centrality.

The inclusion of one academic actor within the SNA top 20 ranking does not correlate with the QDA. In speaking about important organizations and individuals in the agenda setting process, not one participant stressed the importance of academic actors. Thus, the high ranking of this actor, which indicates importance, is difficult to explain with the analysis thus far. The fact that participants included the actor in their SNA survey, but failed to highlight the actor's role in an interview about the process, may indicate an important but low-key or "behind the scenes" role for this actor in shaping the MNCH initiative.

Having examined the prominence of actors in the G8 Summit preparatory process using a simple calculation of incoming ties, the discussion moves on to looking at the centrality of actors based on their potential as a broker. The measure, known as between centrality, is particularly fitting to the analysis due to the use of terminology such as "broker", "connector", "facilitator" by participants when referring to certain actors. High betweenness centrality identifies actors that may connect otherwise disconnected actors in a network (Freeman, 1980).

Table 4.7 lists the 20 most central actors within the network measured by Freeman's betweenness. Actor #117 is in the most efficient brokerage position. Comparing the results of the Freeman betweenness centrality score to the basic Freeman centrality score (Table 4.6) it was observed that this mid-level DFAIT bureaucrat also received the highest Freeman centrality score. Thus, this actor stands out as being important in the G8 preparatory process for the MNCH initiative potentially for multiple reasons. The actor was measured to be important by incoming ties and potentially served as a broker in the network. The second ranked actor (#164) was the previously discussed Canadian academic that ranked 16<sup>th</sup> in Freeman centrality. The high betweenness centrality ranking suggests that this academic actor is positioned as an efficient broker of resources, even if the actor was not deemed to be the most important. Referring back to

the network graph presented earlier in the chapter (Figure 4.6), the actor is both connected to a high number of otherwise disconnected actors and connected to actors within the core central group. This suggests that the academic may act as a resource broker, potentially introducing information or ideas into the network that could not be achieved by other actors.

Table 4.7 Freeman’s betweenness centrality top 20 values (N=314)

Actor ID#	Organization type	Organization *	Geographic location	Occupation position level	Freeman Betweenness	Freeman Betweenness (normalized)
117	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	6	3955.1	4.1
164	Academic/research	University	Toronto	6	3445.8	3.5
163	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	3399.7	3.5
17	Federal government political	Liberal Party	Toronto	4	3041.7	3.1
53	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	3002.6	3.1
118	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	2810.6	2.9
148	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	2037.2	2.1
284	Federal government public service	Health Canada	Ottawa	6	2000.7	2.0
213	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	1995.8	2.0
235	Federal government political	CIDA	Ottawa	3	1977.5	2.0
141	Technical/professional medical	Medical Org.	Ottawa	3	1898.1	1.9
90	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	3	1768	1.8
37	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	1710.9	1.8
271	Federal government public service	IDRC	Ottawa	5	1683.6	1.7
71	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	1385.7	1.4
182	Technical/professional medical	Medical Org.	The Hague	3	1360.6	1.4
218	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	1033.8	1.1
229	Federal government public service	Foreign Gov.	Ottawa	4	1007	1.0
67	Federal government public service	IDRC	Ottawa	6	985.6	1.0
149	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	834.5	0.9

\* Note: Specific names of some organizations are not revealed to protect the anonymity of the actors

The comparison between the Freeman centrality results and the betweenness centrality results also reveal that ten actors included in the top 20 betweenness centrality list were not included in the Freeman centrality top 20 list. This reinforces the finding thus far that the roles of actor within the network differ and may be contested. While 65 percent of the top 20 actors for betweenness centrality were from government departments and agencies, the diversity of agencies was greater than those represented in the Freeman centrality list. Government actors in the top 20 betweenness centrality list represented DFAIT, CIDA, Health Canada, IDRC, and a foreign embassy located in Ottawa. The presence of a non-Canadian government official supports the findings from the QDA about the importance of select group of foreign governments in the process. Two actors from technical professional associations were also in positions of brokerage with Actor #141 ranking 11<sup>th</sup> and Actor #182 ranking 16<sup>th</sup>. The betweenness

centrality scores again reveal the importance of Ottawa as a geographic location for actors, as only three actors that were in relatively high brokerage positions were located outside the capital city (Toronto and the Hague). The sole actor in the top 20 list that was not based in Canada was the president of a MNCH related NGO (Actor #180). Based on the results thus far, it was not expected that non-Canadian based actor would be found to be highly central in the preparatory process.

The results also showed that actors in high ranking and structurally important positions for the overall G8 process, such as nation leaders (e.g. Presidents or Prime Ministers), Sherpas, Sous-sherpas, or Ministers, received top ranking Freeman degree centrality scores, but their Freeman betweenness centrality scores were lower. This indicates that these types of actors were deemed highly important for policy formation, but that these high-level actors would not necessarily serve as the best performing brokers to connect otherwise disconnected actors and resources. While it would be logical to assume that a high ranking official could access the most diverse range of resources, the findings in this case showed that actors in different occupational levels were structurally located in better brokerage positions.

Freeman's centrality and betweenness centrality demonstrates that the importance of actors differs depending on their roles. Freeman's centrality relies on a simple calculation of the incoming ties for an actor and consequently treats all of those tied actors as equal. However, each actor had the potential and ability to bring different resources into the network, which is partially based on their own connectivity. Thus, the final measure of centrality, Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality, takes into account to whom an actor is connected. Being connected to an actor that is highly connected would increase centrality more than being connected to an actor with few ties (Bonacich, 1987). Table 4.8 contains the scores for the most 20 most central actors within the G8 MNCH network as measured by Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality. The three most central actors were mid-level government bureaucrats with DFAIT and CIDA (Actors #163, #117, and #213). The fourth ranking actor was the executive director of a prominent Canadian based NGO (Actor #200). The top two most central actors as measured by Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality were also ranked within the top five positions of the Freeman centrality and Freeman betweenness measures. This reinforces that these actors were structurally important to the 2010 G8 Summit

preparatory process for MNCH. Since these were mid-level bureaucrats, it also indicates that the ranking within the government hierarchy does not equate to centrality.

Table 4.8 Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality top 20 values (N=314)

Actor ID#	Organization type	Organization *	Geographic location	Occupation position level	Eigenvector Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality (normalized)
163	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	0.25	35.5
117	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	6	0.25	34.8
213	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	0.24	34.0
200	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	0.22	31.7
118	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	0.21	29.3
71	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	0.20	28.3
235	Federal government political	CIDA	Ottawa	3	0.19	27.5
90	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	3	0.19	27.4
298	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	5	0.19	26.8
112	International organization	International Org.	Ottawa	5	0.18	25.4
218	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	0.17	24.2
53	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	0.17	23.8
199	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	0.17	23.7
164	Academic/research	University	Toronto	6	0.17	23.3
214	Federal government political	CIDA	Ottawa	4	0.16	22.8
37	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	0.16	22.1
110	Federal government political	PMO	Ottawa	5	0.15	20.8
186	Federal government public service	CIDA	Ottawa	5	0.14	19.6
296	NGO	NGO	Ottawa	3	0.13	18.8
62	Federal government public service	DFAIT	Ottawa	5	0.12	17.2

\* Note: Specific names of some organizations are not revealed to protect the anonymity of the actors

Half of the top ranked actors based on Bonanich-Eigenvector centrality were also ranked within the top 20 of these two other measures, albeit the actual position in the ranks were not the same. Ten new actors were included in the Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality top 20 ranking that were not found in both the top 20 lists for Freeman centrality or Freeman betweenness. For example, Actor #298, a director from a NGO had an Eigenvector centrality score of 0.19 and ranked 9<sup>th</sup> in the top 20 list (Table 4.8). However, this actor was not listed in the top 20 lists for the other two measures. In fact, five of the ten new actors represented NGOs and most were executives, while the others were mid-level actors from the federal government public service, federal government political parties and international organizations. Ultimately, the results of the Bonacich-Eigenvector calculations demonstrate that several actors could receive low numbers of incoming ties, which result in relatively low Freeman’s centrality, but they could be identified as important when the connectivity of each of the people to whom they were connected was taken into account. In simple terms, the results support the statement that it is “who you know” that matters.

#### *4.4.2 Summary of central actors within the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process*

This section described the position of key actors within the G8 MNCH network. Recalling that the concept of centrality in SNA involves the identification of the actors who are structurally important based upon an actor's number of ties, the importance of that people to whom the actor is connected, and the "distance" or convenience for an actor to access resources. To evaluate the centrality of actors within the G8 MNCH network, three different measures were used – Freeman degree, Freeman betweenness, and Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality.

The three different centrality measures have different strengths and weaknesses as described in the previous sections. The measures also revealed some discrepancies in who are the most central actors within the G8 MNCH network. Freeman's degree centrality is the simplest of the measures and is based on the number of incoming ties. Thus, the importance or prominence of an individual is based on how valuable this actor was perceived to be by others in the network. This measure found the most central actors to be middle to high level bureaucrats and politicians from DFAIT, CIDA and PMO, thereby confirming the QDA results presented earlier in this chapter. This core group of actors included those that would be expected to be involved in the summit preparatory process from an organizational perspective.

The results from the Freeman's betweenness centrality measure revealed a slightly different mix of actors as compared to the Freeman centrality results. Freeman's betweenness centrality calculations are more complicated than those of Freeman's degree centrality as it measures the number of times a node appears on each shortest path between nodes. The outcome of this measure goes beyond the premise of degree centrality, which bases prominence on votes. Betweenness relates centrality to an actor's brokerage and control of resources within a network. While this measure indicated that many of the governmental actors from DFAIT and CIDA highlighted in the Freeman degree centrality list were still important, it showed a greater overall organizational diversity of actors deemed central. The betweenness results also emphasized that a high ranking occupational position did not equate to high centrality. Consequently, this measure revealed actors high in resource control and brokerage are not necessarily the highest with regards to the number of ties.

The last measure used was Bonacich-Eigenvector centrality, which also involves more complex calculations compared to Freeman's degree centrality. The measure was developed to overcome the simplicity of degree centrality. The valuation is not solely based on the number of ties, rather it takes into account the connectivity of those to whom an actor is tied. The results from this measure gave less prominence to a core group of governmental actors and highlighted the centrality of a number of NGO executives. This group of NGOs, previously identified within the QDA, formed a coalition with the aim of influencing the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative. Thus the measure shows that the NGO executives had successfully connected themselves to others of importance.

While the previous section of this chapter identified important actor groups based on attributes and prominence in terms of numbers within the network, the objective of this section was to identify the key actors within the network based on their structural positions. The next section will examine whether similarities exist across the structural positions that have been identified here.

#### *4.4.3 Structural equivalence*

Actors that exhibit similar relationship patterns are said to be structurally equivalent. This means that actors that are connected to approximately the same actors within the network are considered equivalent, and they may be substituted for one another without seriously affecting the network structure. By grouping actors together in blocks, the total amount of nodes within the network can be reduced, which in turn permits a further understanding of the network structure without the interference of multiple, repetitive relational patterns. The reduced network uses blocks rather than actors as the unit for the nodes and can then be analyzed in terms of relationships within and between blocks.

Figure 4.6 shows the reduced graph for the G8 MNCH network, in which each block is a group of structurally equivalent nodes. Recalling from section 3.3.5, actors were grouped into blocks based on patterns of similar relations. Each of the 30 blocks is represented by a node in the graph and the lines represent ties present between blocks. Of interest are the centrally located  $\mathfrak{B}_{16}$  which had a large numbers of incoming and outgoing ties.  $\mathfrak{B}_{16}$  was a large block which contained executives from large NGOs, political and bureaucratic CIDA officials, and a mid

level manager from an international organization. While the membership of the block is not an exact match to that of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, the block contained the majority of the Canadian Coalition members plus what could be considered their allies within the Government of Canada. The fact that not all coalition members were present in the block was due to the absent members emphasizing different relationships than the other members. It is possible that this was purposefully done to maximize the effectiveness of the strategies they employed to exert influence. This is supported by the comments made by two coalition members that emphasized the role of another member from another organization that had an existing network of connections that included deep connections at both the political and bureaucratic levels. However, the coalition's members also emphasized their substitutability within the coalition itself by expressing they had complete confidence in letting another executive represent them at a high level meeting with government officials. The central role of this block and the presence of multiple incoming and outgoing ties provide further support that the Canadian Coalition indeed played an important role in the preparatory process despite comments to the contrary made by some government bureaucratic actors in the network.




Figure 4.6 Reduced graph of the network for the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative (graphed with spring-embedding algorithm).

Other noteworthy features of the reduced graph include B17, which contained three actors, a high level DFAIT bureaucrat, a high level medical expert and a top level advisor within the PMO. The “advisory block” was well connected within the network and received a large number of ties from various other blocks. Located on the upper periphery, B11, had only incoming ties. This indicates that resources travelled from other blocks (B15, 20, 21, 24) to B11. This multi-actor block contained, *inter alia*, four Prime Ministers. It is worth noting that the “coalition block” (B16) did not have a direct connection with the “leader’s block” (B11), which means that they relied upon other actor groups to act as a connector or broker. Another feature of the graph is the presence of two linear offshoots (B30-B25-B5 and B1- B12- B2). The first of the offshoots demonstrates how B25 was positioned as a link between the large core group of government bureaucrats (B30) and a small group of MNCH experts within a government research agency (B5). The second offshoot positioned a lower level government bureaucrat (B12) as a connector between a mid-level advisor in DFAIT (B2) and a block containing two mid-level bureaucrats in CIDA (B1).

While Figure 4.6 provides a clear image of how the blocks relate to one another, it does not provide a visualization of the relative importance of the blocks or the strength of ties between the blocks. To illustrate these two features (importance and tie strength), an alternate graph was produced (Figure 4.7). The importance of a block was measured by the average number of incoming ties for all the actors within each block and is reflected by the size of the circle: a smaller circle equals fewer incoming ties. The strength of the ties among blocks was based on the tie density values and is represented by line thickness. The thicker the line is, the more densely connected the blocks are. In addition to the graph output, Freeman centrality scores were calculated for the block network and the in-degree scores were utilized to determine the most central blocks (Table 4.9).




Figure 4.7 Reduced graph of the network for the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative with block importance and tie strength (graphed with spring-embedding algorithm)

Table 4.9 Freeman degree centralization values for the six most central blocks in the G8 MNCH reduced network

Rank	Block number	Out-degree	In-degree	Out-degree (normalized)	In-degree (normalized)
1	17	5	15	17.2	51.7
2	16	11	9	37.9	31.0
3	22	5	9	17.2	31.0
4	19	1	6	3.4	20.7
5	23	2	6	6.9	20.7
6	29	7	6	24.1	20.7
7	30	6	6	20.7	20.7
8	1	0	5	0.0	17.2
9	10	6	5	20.7	17.2
10	11	0	4	0.0	13.8

A central cluster of four large nodes stand out in Figure 4.7:  $\mathfrak{B}22$ ,  $\mathfrak{B}28$ ,  $\mathfrak{B}17$  and  $\mathfrak{B}16$ . Each of these nodes represented a block containing different numbers of actors and builds further support for some distinct trends within the preparatory process.

Firstly, the possibility existed for actors within traditional organizational structures to build relationships and create a specific or unique role to contribute to agenda-setting. This was evident with  $\mathfrak{B}28$ , which was represented by the largest sized circle in the network diagram and was a block that contained a single individual - a mid-level bureaucrat from DFAIT (Actor #163). This “non-conformer block” had more outgoing ties than incoming and several of the ties were of high density. In essence, this actor “danced to the beat of his own drum”. The actor within  $\mathfrak{B}28$  did not connect to actors in the same patterns as other actors within the same organization and sought resources that others did not seek. This actor was mentioned by several participants and the comments included characterizations about his/her working style and abilities to connect different arrays of actors into the process.

Secondly, the objectives of actors partly define their role within the network. For example,  $\mathfrak{B}22$  was a less centrally located on the graph in Figure 4.7 than other blocks and consists of two actors – a high-level bureaucrat within DFAIT (Actor #53) and an advisor to a foundation (Actor #94). The block had more incoming ties than outgoing, many of which were moderate to high in density. The SNA results do not entirely explain why the DFAIT actor and foundation actor would be structurally equivalent. But data from qualitative interviews highlighted that both of these actors formed a “fundraising block”, playing an important role in securing financial support for the MNCH initiative. Additionally, the foundation had specifically hired the individual represented in this block (Actor #94) for such projects as the G8 Summit preparatory process due to their network connections with the Canadian government.

Thirdly, the position of an actor in relation to powerful decision makers influenced their structural importance. The centrally located  $\mathfrak{B}17$  “advisory block” had a high number of outgoing and incoming ties – its respective in-degree and out-degree centrality scores were 15 and 9 (see Table 4.9). The fact that  $\mathfrak{B}17$  was the most central block could be explained by the presence of a high-level official within DFAIT. The organization and its senior positions have long been recognized as being structurally important to summitry (Budd, 2003; Larsson, 2008). The other two members within the block included an expert in MNCH and an advisor within the PMO. Recalling that members within the same block displayed similar structural equivalence, this means that these two actors were connected to a number of the same actors as this structurally important DFAIT official. The block had more incoming ties than outgoing ties and

demonstrated no density within the block, meaning block members were not connected to each other at all. One interpretation of such results is that the actors within this block were recognized by others as being important ‘targets’ for network resources, whether that involve communication resources, information, or other governance related resources, but they did not recognize each other as important.

Fourthly, the strategy employed by NGO coalitions to exert influence on the agenda-setting process appeared to have been successful. The prominent centrality of  $\mathfrak{B}16$ , the “coalition block” – whose membership block included *inter alia* five NGO executives and senior political and bureaucratic staff from CIDA – was of interest for two reasons: 1) the NGO executives largely developed the same types of relationships in the preparatory process as CIDA staff, and 2) it reinforces the QDA results that an NGO coalition played a critical role in the summit process, thereby also indicating that the summit preparatory process did involve networked governance. This block also had high out-degree scores and high levels of internal cohesion (internal tie density = 0.69). Collectively, this indicated that actors within this block were structurally equivalent, highly communicative with each other and instrumental in reciprocal resource exchanges within the MNCH network. As previously stated, despite the contestation of the role of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH by participants, structurally the Canadian Coalition appeared to have been deeply embedded in the summit preparatory process and thus an important actor group to the MNCH agenda-setting process.

Fifthly, a cadre of bureaucrats were able to share resources and engage in network methods to “get the job done”. The block with the largest membership,  $\mathfrak{B}30$  (16 actors), was ranked seventh in terms of in-degree centrality within the reduced network. However, this “policy action” block demonstrated multiple weak links to a diverse range of blocks with their inherent resources, and was tied to one linear offshoot. The linear offshoot consisted of a single (mid-level Health Canada bureaucrat) that was connected to a cluster of MNCH experts from a government research agency. Therefore, this block served as a bridge, linking the Health Canada and IDRC resources to the rest of the network.  $\mathfrak{B}30$  primarily contained mid level government bureaucrats from DFAIT, CDIA and Health Canada. On the one hand, the large size of this block indicated that several bureaucrats are working in the same ways – they mainly access the same resources and perceive the same actors as important. It is also possible that some of the actors

within the “policy action” block (B30) may have been focussed on important, but routine tasks associated with the summit preparatory process and thus not necessarily aware of the activity and contribution by other members. When actors shared the same relationships, as the case within this block, innovative ideas or policies are less likely to emerge (Burt, 1982, 1987; Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2010). On the other hand, these ties showed redundancies in the network, which may have contributed to more robust, or longer-lasting relationships. That is, if one actor left the network, the relationships would still remain.

Sixthly, it was possible for actors to play an important role in a preparatory process without the overt recognition by other actors of the nature of their contributions. A single-member “quiet broker block”, B29, was also central in the network and contained an academic from a Canadian university. This block exhibited moderate to strong incoming and outgoing ties to several other blocks. This actor was previously flagged in the centrality discussion as potentially occupying an important, yet low key broker role in supplying information or knowledge based resources to others in the network. The fact that participants acknowledged the presence of this actor, but could not explain the tangible role of the actor within the network, does not mitigate the importance of the actor. Rather it suggests a role for the actor that does not fit typical definitions or conceptions. Similar to B16 (“coalition block”), the centrality of this “quiet broker block” illustrates the perceived importance of actors beyond the borders of government.

Finally, authority and rank was important to the MNCH preparatory process, but it operated through tangential linkages. The small, low centrality “leader’s block” (B11) stands out on the upper side of graph. As described previously, this block included four prime ministers and is weakly connected to four other blocks. One block contained a director of a prominent international maternal and child health network. The second block included a director from a wealthy foundation. The third block contained non-Canadian government actors. The fourth block contained two MNCH experts from technical/professional medical organizations. The fact that the “leader’s block” was weakly connected and had only incoming ties, indicated that national leaders have little interaction with the network of actors during the preparatory process for the Summit’s signature initiative, but that other actors still perceived the leaders as important resources. Notably, these other actor blocks did not consist of Canadian bureaucrats.

#### 4.4.4 *Networks of similarity*

Recalling that structural equivalence is a measure that determines whether actors relate to others in the same way (i.e. Actor A is connected to C and D, and Actor B is connected to C and D, deeming them structurally equivalent). Structural equivalence matters because it indicates how many actors within the network are substitutable (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). If most actors are substitutable, one could expect that policy outcomes do not change significantly whether some actors are present or absent. The results of this study reflected the fact that a diverse range of actors had structural equivalence, ranging from NGO executives to mid-level bureaucrats from multiple government departments and agencies. Likewise, mixes of strong and weak ties were displayed within and among blocks. Existing literature has indicated that a mix of strong and weak ties, is superior to having only strong, or only weak ties since the network is otherwise too closed or completely lacks cohesiveness (Bodin et al., 2006; Gilsing & Nootboom, 2010). Therefore, the network appeared to be optimal in structure for new policy approaches, such as the MNCH initiative.

Additionally, the resources in the G8 MNCH preparatory network were spread across a broad range of distinct blocks, although four blocks were found to play a more central role than other blocks. However, the four blocks consisted of both traditional and non-traditional summit actors. This reinforced the previous findings that the 2010 G8 preparatory process for the MNCH initiative involved a diverse range of actors, occupying different roles and exchanging a variety of resources to achieve specific objectives. That is, bureaucrats from DFAIT and other government agencies relevant to the initiative were central, as were blocks of NGOs and academics, and both played structurally similar roles.

Much of the discussion thus far has included mention of the role of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. The “coalition block” exhibited a high density value (69 percent), indicating a strong level of shared resources and communication, or cohesiveness. While the largest block, the “policy doer block” of government bureaucrats had a density value of only 32 percent, which demonstrated a lack of cohesiveness. Thus the methods and functioning of this particular group of actors will be explored in detail next to better understand their role in the setting and shaping the MNCH agenda during the 2010 G8 preparatory process.

#### **4.5 A closer examination of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH**

The SNA data, and specifically the structural equivalence test, showed the presence and importance of the Canadian Coalition in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process. Having established their importance, it becomes critical to understand how and why the Canadian Coalition formed and the implications of their centrality in the network structure.

The research revealed that the Canadian Coalition initially formed in an ad-hoc manner, driven by what one NGO participant described as a “common desire to work together for a common good”. Another coalition member described their purpose as the following: “We decided to get together and see how we could influence the agenda...”. Once the organizations began to meet, an agreement emerged among the six that a strategic, coordinated approach could increase the likelihood that the group could influence the G8 Summit preparatory process and ensure that MNCH was on the agenda compared to a situation where each group worked alone. As one of the coalition members stated: “The way we looked at it was we could all compete and get nothing because we neutralize each other and no one can make a decision because everything is uncoordinated. Or, we can come together and this is going to be for the common good”. Another NGO executive stated “You know, it is funny that you ask about people and individuals. I don’t think that’s the right question. I think it is our collective relationships”.

While the approach was strategic and the relationships could be perceived as instrumental, the coalition’s collective impact was recognized as also being something bigger than the G8 process. The coalition members described that this group “got along well”, “liked each other” and “liked working together”. One coalition member summarized their experience with the following reflection: “The system that we have got going, the camaraderie, the transparency and openness – I’ve never experienced anything like that before”. A government staff member acknowledged that the shared purpose that drove the collective was a part of their success as captured in this comment:

*“I think something above and beyond the MNCH issue brings them together. When we talked to them, it was about coordination and cohesion, and they were about keeping in touch. They were good and impressive. Most often, NGOs have their own agenda and it is*

*like a business. But this was united and everybody relied on everyone else to paint the picture”.*

One of the features of the coalition that proved to contribute to their overall effectiveness was their structure – a small, tight-knit group – confirmed by the SNA. The organizations had worked together successfully on previous global level initiatives, such as a program on HIV/AIDS. One member reflected that the reason why she/he was willing to join the coalition was that “...it was a tight, influential group that came together. I respected all of them in terms of smart, savvy, advocacy efforts. It had a goal attached that was concrete. It had a timeline. The truth was, it was a powerful group....so many coalitions get together and it is such a waste of time”.

With only six membership organizations, the coalition could develop strong connections, build trust, and respond quickly to government when materials or information were needed. The cohesion between group members was evident within the structural analysis. Research in social network analysis has emphasized that the more contacts a single node has, the more central and more potentially influential an actor may be in a network (Borgatti, 2006b). But the results from this study showed that the coalition determined that while working as a collective was better than working as individuals, the collective itself was limited in size, as indicated by the following two coalition member comments:

*“It was small, tight, was able to make decisions quickly, consolidate and stay focused. That made a difference. I think that there is probably a tipping point where a coalition becomes too big to accomplish anything”.*

*“Yes, other groups wanted to join. But the six groups worked effectively together. It is hard to get more groups together on a call. We agreed early on that we should not take on any more groups and encourage others to join the broader coalition instead”.*

In this sense, the coalition favoured developing strong bonds over weak links. The structural analysis support this claim as a high level of internal cohesion was found within the “coalition block” (see section 4.4.3). While weak links have been recognized in the literature as being important for exposing network members to new ideas and different information (Granovetter,

1973; Burt, 1982), the coalition was already clear on its purpose and which idea it wanted to bring forward.

Another feature was that the coalition was focused on the common goals and shared purpose, but did not require significant fundraising to influence the G8 Summit preparatory process. Typically, the NGOs comprising the coalition would compete with one another for funding in the same field. But in this process, the focus was about setting an agenda that benefited the public, rather than seeking funds from the public, as exemplified in these three quotes by coalition members:

*“We all programmatically work together in the field. But in Canada we are mostly competitors, because we fundraise mostly. So, there is a level of fundraising competition. It was a different relationship to have everyone come together to be on board with the same thing”.*

*“I think one of the reasons that we are able to set apart competition is that because we are all fairly successful organizations. We are not going to live or die on what happens here. We have our own constituents; we have our own portfolios and our donors. It is not a life or death issue for us”.*

*“We weren’t competing with each other, we were very open. When we had information and intel, we were sharing it with each other because we realized that nobody was going to get further ahead if they keep secrets”.*

Therefore, rather than focusing on fundraising and outcompeting one another in order to ensure their organization could sustain itself, the NGOs could concentrate on cooperatively working towards the same goal.

#### *4.5.1 The contested role of the coalition*

While the Canadian Coalition for MNCH was acknowledged by many actors inside and outside of the group as being focused and engaged, there was a debate amongst participants about its influence and effectiveness. The members of the coalition itself viewed the fact that the MNCH

issue ended up on the G8 Summit agenda as the signature initiative as evidence of their influence. Furthermore, individuals pointed to specific speeches as proof of impact, such as:

*“I could say, yes, overwhelmingly, we had influence. The Minister was reading from the text that I wrote, so I would say definitely we had influence. That was the way it felt every time someone stood up and started reading....something you personally had written or were involved in writing”.*

*“I listened to a speech the Minister gave and thought we could have written that. I know our stuff would sound the same...My April 20<sup>th</sup> document, it was a short thing. I felt when I look at the stuff that is in there, it is very much like what the PM said. We had the intellectual rigour behind it to make a difference”.*

*“When the PM would speak publicly, you felt like saying ‘I wrote that sentence! That was my brief!’ It was just a bit unbelievable because things aren’t usually that smooth.”*

*“We like to think we had influence in making this the Prime Minister’s priority for development. We found the final communiqué beautiful. We could see our language in many stages. We could see our language in the Prime Minister’s op-ed. We could see our language in the Development Ministerial Conference, and in the appendix of the communiqué”.*

These findings support the argument put forth by Betsill and Corell (2008) on NGO influence in international environmental negotiations, which is that influence can be measured by comparing the ideas and text communicated by NGOs during negotiations with those embedded in the final agreements.

Politicians in Canada also recognized that they relied on the coalition for its coordinated and cohesive approach. However, on the bureaucratic side of government, staff perceptions of the Canadian Coalition were mixed. One senior bureaucrat stated: “There was a unique coalition of five or six Canadian NGOs. They did a good job on their lobbying and appealed to the political side. I was at a meeting with them and other departments and they made a good

impression. They were quite united”. Thus, the Coalition’s lobbying efforts were recognized by some as effective. Yet, other bureaucrats were confident that the signature issue was decided internally and were reluctant to acknowledge the efforts of the Canadian Coalition as having any significance. Such skepticism is voiced by three senior staff members of the Government of Canada bureaucracy below:

*“They [Canadian Coalition] didn’t have much to add”.*

*“We already decided on the focus of the initiative before we started a lot of outreach. We kept them [the Canadian Coalition] in the loop but they were not influential to be quite frank. I wouldn’t want to be publically quoted on that simply because it is not positive. They liked to indicate they were influential. It is for their public messaging. They believe they were influential. But we had already decided what it was going to be before anything, even the partnership. We already decided what it was going to be before we had started working with them”.*

*“It is difficult to say if the expert groups had influence. The reason is that nothing that was said at the meeting had not been heard before. I have a team of six who live and breathe global health issues. They are experts. I could have sat with those same six health analysts. While their experiences were different, their conclusions were the same. It served to validate pre-existing knowledge, but at its core, there is no new knowledge. At that meeting [with the Canadian Coalition], there was nothing that was new to us”.*

The fact that the Canadian Coalition had evidence to demonstrate “proof of impact” and the politicians – who ultimately chose the signature initiative – acknowledged the coalition’s importance shows the disconnect that some bureaucratic staff may have at times during the G8 Summit preparatory process with regards to networks. Bureaucratic staff indicated that their organization had control of the agenda-setting process, but in fact neglected to recognize the networked activity and the value added by the non-governmental actors that have expertise with

the subject matter. The position of government bureaucrats also emphasizes the contested nature of networked governance in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process.

The contestation also rippled throughout the coalition itself. Despite the cohesive and coordinated front that the Canadian Coalition created on the MNCH issue, and the positive experience expressed by members of the coalition, challenges with engaging in a collective body surfaced. Firstly, the process of coalition building required time and energy. Secondly, there are risks involved with proceeding with a collective identity because individual organizations and their “brand” are no longer easily recognized. As one member of an NGO that did not join the coalition explained: “I think that in a lot of the coalition building stuff, they give more than they receive and end up with a brand dilution issue, and spending a lot of internal resources managing other NGOs”. The collective versus individual debate is important to this research. Within many other organizational groups, such as DFAIT and CIDA, some participants referred to the work of the collective entity of the department or agency, while other participants were clear to pin-point specific individuals as the reasons why progress was made or hindered.

To work effectively, coalition members compromised on certain positions. For instance, the debate that arose over the position that Canadian politicians took on the exclusion of the full spectrum of reproductive health services, including access to safe abortions, created a struggle within the coalition. One organization that was a member of the coalition initially, decided to leave the coalition because the coalition refused to take a stance against the government’s position. That is, the coalition chose to remain neutral or silent on the issue even though several members philosophically disagreed with the government’s position and previously had worked on the ground to support the full spectrum of reproductive health services. Other NGOs outside of the coalition were critical of the Canadian Coalition’s decision to remain neutral and viewed the compromise as evidence of co-optation by the government. As one NGO executive argued:

*“I can’t tell you the disgust we felt at the Mother’s Day rally on the [Parliament] Hill. You ended up with people from reputable organizations who know the evidence...thanking Stephen Harper. Thank you, thank you, thank you Stephen Harper. Give us some little Mother’s Day gift basket with cookies and an ugly orange carnation. I don’t need a gift basket from these people and I don’t think they should be thanking*

*Stephen Harper. I don't think this rally helps the organizations or people that are sticking to their principles and their evidence-based practice; they are left out to dry".*

Another medical professional echoed this sentiment: "I mean, 13 percent of the people, we don't care about? Because they died from an unsafe abortion! It is pretty disgusting when some organizations will get nothing because they are not prepared to play ball in this ideologically driven approach. You bully NGOs into singing with the choir".

Given the divisive positions that the MNCH signature initiative raised, and given that the Canadian Coalition had strategically determined that they should remain small in size, some NGOs believed they had been excluded and that this created challenges for the coordination of the MNCH field as a whole. "We were not invited. We didn't know what was going on. We didn't know it was ongoing. Had we been invited, we may or may not have joined... We were not looking to take the coalition over. It could have been done more effectively if they had been open to listening". Therefore, within networked approaches, where roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined, conflict appears to emerge that both shapes and is shaped by the preparatory process.

To summarize, the Canadian Coalition emerged as one mechanism for working to have the MNCH issue established as the signature initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit. The coalition members believed they could be more effective as a collective than as individuals, and many participants in the study from both inside and outside of the Canadian Coalition recognized the cohesiveness of the relationships within the coalition and the impact this had on the coordinated approach that the coalition put forward. While some government bureaucrats refused to acknowledge the effectiveness of the Canadian Coalition, particularly in phase one of the G8 Summit preparatory process, the evidence indicates that their ideas, texts, and briefings contributed to the selection of the issue, and the shaping of the initiative that took place in phase two. Furthermore, the SNA centrality and structural equivalence measures showed that the coalition members as individuals and as a block had an important structural role in the network. While the coalition members purposely chose to operate as a collective to maximize influence in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process, challenges arose within the coalition when compromise was required on ideologically-driven debates, and the result was that a seventh

coalition member left the group. Moreover, the reputation of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH suffered, with other NGOs and medical practitioners criticizing their willingness to compromise. In these cases, the notion of a collective identity was dropped, with participants directing their criticism to specific individuals. Thus, while the discussion thus far, including that on structural equivalence points to the important role of groups or blocks of actors, much of the preparatory process was recognized as being directed and influenced by individuals. The last section of this chapter will examine the role of individuals in the MNCH preparatory process.

#### **4.6 The role of individuals and leadership**

Existing literature on summitry describes the role that individuals play in the summit process as being the result of their distinct organizational position (Bayne, 2005; Hajnal, 2007).

Observations about the role of personal characteristics such as leadership and charisma are reserved for political leaders rather than the network of individuals working behind the scenes in the preparatory process. However, this study demonstrated that individuals within the political and bureaucratic structure of the Government of Canada were important to the G8 Summit preparatory process due to two primary reasons: personal attributes and the ability to deliver results. That is, rather than stating that hierarchical position or power was the defining feature of which individuals mattered to the preparatory process, participants in this study generally referred to these two features of individuals. This point is exemplified with specific mid-level professionals within government and non-governmental organizations occupying highly central positions within the network. In addition, the structural equivalence section detailed how one structurally important block contained one mid-level bureaucrat that used unconventional approaches and connections to a wide array of actors to accomplish objectives. These findings reinforce the point that hierarchy and power derived from an occupational position does not necessarily equate to importance within the policy system, particularly in a networked approach. Recalling the discussion on centrality, actors from mid and high occupational levels were found to be more central in the MNCH G8 Summit network than actors in positions of greater hierarchy.

Personal attributes appeared to be an important part of effectiveness of actors within the MNCH preparatory process environment. One particular bureaucrat was cited as “driving the

MNCH issue” due to “a personal passion in this area”. This same person was viewed as having a “fair amount of credibility” and as “someone whose intuition was bridging between the technical and political side”. One political actor who was routinely perceived as critical to the process was described as “so committed”, “a diligent politician who assigned tasks and did it to the best of their ability, and worked tirelessly day and night to advance the file”. Another participant remarked that this politician “did their own reading” and another commented that this same political actor “knocked my socks off! I really can’t believe I’m saying it and I’m not a fan of this government in any shape or form, but this politician brought together experts in MNCH in November....they were very passionate...I wasn’t prepared for that politician’s level of intelligence, organization, and drive”.

With regards to the capacity of specific actors to achieve measurable goals, one example involved a senior bureaucrat that was recognized as critical to building political and financial support with G8 and non-G8 countries. “To get financial support or commitments was difficult. It was [bureaucrat’s name] who led the charge on that. [He/she] organized a whole slew of demarches in other countries to try to build policy support and financial support outside of the G8....[he/she] was absolutely brilliant! It was so impressive to see”. A political staffer was described by one participant as being “very gifted at seeing the big picture and translating that into what needs to be done on a state level. [He/she] is very good at understanding how to advance progress....[he/she] communicates with actors to bear pressure on other actors. [He’s/she’s] like a general running an advertising campaign”. Ultimately, it was personalities in combination with skill sets to accomplish measurable results that were perceived to matter more than organizational positions of power. The results that highlight the role of individuals serve as an important reminder that while departments and agencies play a key role in the networked governance approach due to their relevance to the issue or summit process, that role is often deemed effective or ineffective based on the ability of individuals within those organizations to deliver results and be connected across other organizations. Therefore, examining both the organizational and individual roles in both the SNA and QDA provides detailed insight into how and why networked governance occurs for MNCH within a global governance forum such as the G8 summit.

#### 4.7 Summary

To summarize, the SNA results of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process network for the MNCH initiative revealed a number of findings about the structure of networked arrangements.

This study provides empirical evidence that a networked approach to the 2010 G8 Summit shaped the selection and preparation of the MNCH initiative. While 112 different organizations, departments and agencies were nominated as important to the G8 MNCH process, the relationships among the actors showed that a group of densely, interconnected actors from a range of organization types form a core cluster to the network surrounded by a number of loosely connected actors. Within the core group, federal government public service, federal government political parties, and NGOs are the three dominant organization types in the network, with no single type of actor controlling the entire G8 MNCH policy process.

Centrality measures showed that the eight most central actors involved a core group of federal government civil servants and the relevant federal government political representatives from DFAIT and CIDA responsible for leading the MNCH initiative at the G8 summit. Non-governmental actors with MNCH expertise from NGOs were within the top 20 lists for each centrality measure. However, a group of five executive directors from NGOs were found to be highly central and were listed consecutively from positions 10-15 in the top 20 overall index ranking. The actors were predominantly executive directors of the Canadian branch of large international NGOs, which formed the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. The coalition was cohesive, but also flexible and accommodative, willing to compromise and adjust their position on certain issues. As such, the coalition was criticized by other NGOs. The role of the Canadian Coalition was rife with contestation by government bureaucrats, by NGOs, and by members within the coalition itself. The 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH demonstrated the challenges faced when engaging in networked governance at the global level. Think-tanks, media organization and corporations were not considered to be prominent in the G8 MNCH process.

The low structural equivalence found across the networked governance process for MNCH indicated that most actors could not be readily substituted by another actor. That is, if one actor left the network, certain resources may no longer be accessible to the G8 MNCH preparatory process network.

The vast majority of the actors were from G8 countries and slightly more than half of the actors and their ties involved men and policy generalists. Only one of the actors of the 20 most central actors were located outside of Ottawa, and this actor was still located within Canada. A minimal number of actors were located in developing countries or regions noted as having levels of maternal and child health problems. Therefore, geography matters – the most central and structurally important actors in the network were located within close proximity of each other and within the capital city of the host country.

The occupation position levels of the top 20 most central actors ranged from 2 to 6. For the top five most central actors, the occupation position level and centrality are in reverse order; that is, the most central actor is in the lowest position of the five, while the fifth actor was the highest position level. This finding indicates that position level and centrality are not necessarily correlated, a topic that will be further explored in the next chapter on social capital.

The overall rank of the 20 most central actors included only one representative from the PMO. However, three actors from the PMO were included in the Freeman degree centrality. This indicates that while the PMO actors were deemed central by total numbers of nominations, actors from this organization were not necessarily acting as brokers, nor were they highly connected to other central actors.

As a result of the contested nature of various actors' roles, different actors used a diverse array of strategies in order to become engaged in the summit preparatory process. In essence, these strategies required building and mobilizing various forms of social capital. Therefore, the next chapter will examine the topic of social capital more closely to understand its role in shaping the 2010 G8 Summit MNCH initiative.

## **Chapter 5 Building and mobilizing social capital**

Having established that a network of actors is engaged in the summit preparatory process for the MNCH signature initiative in the previous chapter, albeit with roles and effectiveness that remain contested among the actors within the network, this chapter applies measures of social capital to better understand how actors become involved in, and influence, the summit preparatory process. The findings demonstrated that actors within each organizational type adopted a diverse range of strategies for phase one and phase two of the agenda-setting process. For actors outside of government, these strategies involved building and mobilizing social capital, particularly during phase one of the agenda-setting process. Government actors though, generally did not focus on building social capital during phase one. Then, in phase two, only a few actors within government agencies sought to build or enhance social capital. Therefore, the findings demonstrated that the accumulation of social capital occurred in discrete, localized sites within government and disagreement existed across government actors about the need for social capital during the summit preparatory process.

### **5.1 Reasons, Resources and Strategies for Networked Governance**

An important dimension to the shaping of networked governance in the G8 Summit preparatory process came through the factors that different actor groups used to rationalize their engagement with each other. These reasons were instrumental (e.g. enhancing access to financial resources), social (e.g. building a sense of community), or related to “good governance” and the current, dominant new public management paradigm that emphasizes legitimacy, credibility, and transparency (see for e.g. Slaughter, 2004a; Bäckstrand, 2006) (Figure 5.1).

The various reasons identified in Figure 5.1 that motivated actors then shaped the strategies that they adopted to engage and seek influence during the summit preparations. Many of the reasons cited by participants to explain why they were interested in forming relationship with actors involved in the summit preparatory process were shared across organization types. For instance, both participants from the federal government bureaucracy and the Canadian Coalition shared the interest in ensuring people were informed. The difference would be the

Canadian Coalition was interested in informing groups about MNCH, while the government bureaucrats were primarily interested in informing groups about summit logistics.




Figure 5.1 Reasons for engaging in networked governance interactions from multiple actor perspectives

However, the data showed a small group of actors – the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, the federal government bureaucrats, and the medical/professional association representatives – employed distinct groups of strategies. Each of these groups and the strategies they employed is discussed in this section.

### 5.1.1 Coalition strategies

The Canadian Coalition for MNCH used four primary strategies in their attempt to shape phases one and two of the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process. The first strategy can be described as a “process knowledge building strategy”. For actors outside of government and to those not privy to the communications flows among the small cadre of bureaucrats and political staff routinely involved in the summit preparations, the process can be highly opaque. While a few published

documents exist on summit experiences (see for e.g. Nogami, 2001; Babich, 2002; Larsson, 2008), few detail the nuances of the preparatory process. Thus, firsthand contact with those who have experience in the process is one of the ways to gain process knowledge. The members of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH chose to contact and engage people that had previously served as Sherpas to seek advice on navigating the summit preparatory process. As two coalition members described:

*“So I started seeking advice from those who had done this before – so, sherpas and civil society leaders. I learned to stay focused and make sure you have specific, time-sensitive, bounded goals that are easily measured”.*

*“We first met and consulted with three different past sherpas to determine how the issues are selected and how to position the issue. We were told that it had to be focused, clearly articulated, related to aid effectiveness, and important to the government at this time”.*

These comments emphasize a learning process by the Canadian Coalition for MNCH that involved building ties with actors that previously were in a central position to the summit process and accessing knowledge resources.

A second strategy was a “pragmatic non-emotive brokerage strategy”. The Canadian Coalition for MNCH decided to position themselves as neutral interlocutors among actors affected by MNCH problems and government actors within the summit preparatory process. Part of this strategy involved avoiding emotional arguments and funding requests while they were engaging in the summit preparatory process. Consequently, the Coalition could serve as an “honest broker”, as illustrated by the following two reflections:

*“We didn’t play the emotion card. We played it in a serious way, which was a practical card – that this was something that wasn’t conjecture. It wasn’t like we needed to produce medical technology or something that would take a long time. It was something that we could say with confidence that we could show results immediately”.*

*“I think it was acknowledged...this seemingly lack of self-interest. We don’t have to worry about that because we don’t have government funding. We see ourselves as honest brokers. Our only constituency is seen as the poorest people on the planet”.*

A third strategy was a “multistep bridging strategy”. In addition to engaging directly with Canadian government officials, coalition members also built relations with counterparts in other G8 countries or NGO branches to access other government resources via indirect connections. Thus, the Canadian Coalition recognized other actors as bridges to extra resources. One participant stated: “We would get stuff in from the Italian government. We would get political information...sometimes we would feed stuff back and I would talk to other G8 members and say ‘this is what we’re hearing, what are you hearing from your own governments?’ So I would talk to my counterpart in Germany.....It is on the global radar”. In engaging other actors that were in similar positions in similar organizations (e.g. other NGO executives) yet in different geographical regions, the ties created were homophilous but opened up the possibility of accessing new resources.

The fourth strategy employed by the Canadian Coalition for MNCH was an “experiential-based linkage strategy”. Coalition members arranged opportunities where they could connect Canadian members of Parliament with front line health workers in developing countries where maternal, newborn, and child mortality rates were high. The goal of this strategy was to arrange an experience that intended to sway or reinforce people’s opinions of the urgency for action on MNCH issues. As the strategy was employed after the announcement of the signature initiative, it was considered a phase two strategy that emphasized certain interventions and approaches to the problem, based on what the coalition members showcased on the field trip. One coalition member ascertains:

*“We lead a Parliamentary delegation to Ethiopia in January or February and we brought two key members of the Conservative caucus and a political staffer with us. We showed them a model of front-line community health care. Amazing stuff! ...These MPs came back and talked to Stephen Harper. They reinforced things with Harper and his political staff”.*

Thus, the Canadian Coalition strategically chose to connect diverse actors that would not normally have come into contact with each other (Canadian MPs to front line health workers in other nations), thereby providing a resource to those actors they connected. Recalling that research by Burt (1982, 2001) has found that actors connected to a diverse range of actors ensures access to novel types of resources and enhances the “capital” of a social actor, it can be

concluded that the coalition members in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process not only helped build their own social capital, but also deliberately built the social capital of others by connecting them to diverse groups.

### 5.1.2 *Medical/technical association strategies*

The medical/technical professionals used two strategies that were similar to the CCMNCH's, including the "pragmatic non-emotive brokerage strategy" and the "multistep bridging strategy". That is, the medical/technical professionals also recognized that it was important to demonstrate that they were not seeking funding, instead choosing to only present information: "we did a couple of [Parliament] Hill days and met with officials. We didn't go up asking for anything. So they wondered why we were there. We just wanted to get the story out and thank the constituents for supporting us. They were taken aback by the simplicity of it all. It was just to meet them and they were not prepared for it and it got the ball rolling". Likewise, the medical/technical professionals also relied on their counterparts in other countries to apply pressure on the Government of Canada as the G8 Summit host. As one medical professional explains:

*"We hit the phones and we talked to our counterparts globally [medical/technical experts] who were preparing for the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Development to get medical professionals to brief their government counterparts to say 'are you aware of what is happening in Canada?' to put some pressure on the Canadians".*

However, the medical/technical professionals differed from the NGOs and Canadian Coalition for MNCH in that they employed a third strategy, referred to here as a "targeted science strategy". With this strategy, medical/technical actors strategically targeted key MPs who also shared a medical background, and they targeted constituents in various political ridings, as a participant described: "We targeted key MPs from all parties. Those with medical backgrounds, which committees they sat on, and particular ridings...". Furthermore, in addition to placing emphasis on the role of sound scientific evidence to inform policy and funding direction for the MNCH initiative, medical/technical professionals recognized that could only do this if the political government representatives were aware of public support for the issue. As one participant stated:

*“Decision makers tend to discount the Ottawa-based professional lobbyist. But, they pay way more attention when they are aware of 2349 people in their riding who signed up in support of our work and they are getting lots of emails from people in their riding - they cannot ignore that. In fact, some MPs have a filtering system to get rid of people outside of their riding - they just don’t read it. But, something from their own riding? You bet they’ll pay attention”.*

Thus, actors from medical/technical associations placed importance on establishing ties with actors that had similar background knowledge. In doing so, they established ties to actors described in the literature as *knowledge brokers* – actors that can understand the technical knowledge related to MNCH as how to make the knowledge accessible to policy and decision makers (Litfin, 1994). That is, they deliberately sought to build the capacity of individuals in key organizational positions (i.e. Members of Parliament) to serve as knowledgeable champions within the Government of Canada and to build support in the ridings for that championing effort.

### *5.1.3 Governmental strategies*

The government used entirely different strategies from the other actor groups discussed here. Three of the strategies were formal initiatives and included *démarches*, public consultations, and e-networking. The fourth strategy involved the use of informal meetings to develop relationships with nongovernmental actors.

The first governmental strategy – *démarches* – is a conventional diplomatic practice that involves making formal diplomatic requests for policy support from one government to another (Constantinou, 1996). In this case, the Government of Canada used *démarches* as tools to share information and seek support for the MNCH initiative with both G8 and non-G8 countries. One government staff member explained: “We reached out to them [other countries] through networks of ambassadors and through our missions in their countries, *démarched* in African capitals. We took the same route with the non-G8 members”. A diplomat from a non-G8 government conferred: “My impression is that with DFAIT, it was full court press in order to get all on board. You’re building, constructing something. It is classic diplomacy – edging people along to your goals using positive intent from one to cheer the others along”.

This type of strategy largely involved actors developing ties with people in similar organizational and hierarchical positions. Previous work by Slaughter (2004b) has identified the importance of intergovernmental networks in seeking advice and sharing information on legal and policy decisions. While, this work does not provide direct reference to how these exchanges enhance the social capital of the actors, it is inferred that through the consultation of actors in diverse geo-political jurisdictions possibilities are created for new ideas that reshape governance. Conversely, the finding from this study suggest that government officials are using intergovernmental networks for the instrumental reason of developing support and seeking financial commitments as opposed to seeking out novel policy approaches to MNCH.

The second formal strategy was another traditional diplomatic process and involved consultations or “outreach events”. Senior government staff and Sherpas hosted or attended approximately 20 events from the beginning of May to the end of June with distinct groups, such as global civil society, Canadian civil society, diplomatic representatives based within Canada, academics, non-G8 regional groupings (e.g. Africa, Asia, Middle East, Europe), UN Permanent representatives, and Secretary Generals from the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. The meetings were held in a variety of locations, including Ottawa, Toronto, Regina, St. John’s, Vancouver, New York, Washington, Addis Ababa, Accra, and Istanbul, and ranged from an intimate lunch meeting to a presentation in an auditorium with over 120 attendees. The typical format involved two to four senior government bureaucrats presenting information on the agenda and objectives of the Canadian summit and then holding a question and answer period. During one observed session with the diplomatic community, no questions were posed. Upon being questioned, one diplomat indicated that “this was not the venue to ask questions. You don’t challenge the Canadian government in a public forum”. The events were viewed as successful by the Canadian government bureaucrats, supported by such statements referring to three different events: “the information session was well received by the diplomatic community”, “the content of the briefing was well received and much praise was given”, and “the secretary generals were grateful for the joint invitation”.

Thus, regardless of whether the government staff had different intentions for the consultation sessions, this strategy largely appeared to be a one-way communication tool, rather than an effective direct approach for networked governance or building social capital. Nearly

every participant interviewed that had attended or was aware of the consultation strategy recognized that these sessions provided little benefit in terms of bringing new ideas into the summit preparatory process. As one government bureaucrat participant that attended multiple consultations declared:

*“There was more listening than talking. The most productive session I had was where there was really good representation from a number of Deputy Ministers. A couple of Ministers showed up, but they didn’t give us any new ideas. But they were really engaged and really serious. They had a lot to say about how things should be done, but nothing was new. With some groups we didn’t get any feedback”.*

However, while few new ideas were generated, participants still recognized that these types of information sessions were appropriate and necessary, as the following quotes demonstrate:

*“I went because I thought it was important to acknowledge their processes and to take the opportunity to say things where you can. But, they knew what they were doing and wouldn’t answer anything we really wanted answered” (International organization representative).*

*“The dialogue was useful. We did have a chance to engage with sherpas directly. This year was a good back and forth. You did get to see when sherpas challenged each other, which revealed points in which they had different priorities” (non-coalition NGO executive).*

*“We did participate in the civil society outreach events. It was not very useful. But it is important to be a part of the processes and they should not stop doing them” (Canadian Coalition member).*

*“We are very keen for the G8 outreach process to continue. Having good access to our Canadian friends who are like-minded, including their friends in London and Washington, is helpful” (non-G8 country diplomat).*

*“For me participation is critical. I would always go to a formal event because it is a great complement to the informal stuff. If you only go the informal stuff and not the formal stuff, your credibility goes down. ‘What’s up with this guy? He thinks he’s too good to come? He doesn’t want to go to an event I host? He only wants to talk to me out of the arena?’” (Canadian coalition member)*

The perspective of participants on the necessity of such a strategy indicates that sometimes, networked governance strategies may simply be needed to maintain relationships, rather than build new ones or involve valuable resources being exchanged through those relationships. Participants recognized that attending formal events was still beneficial even if the events did not yield new opportunities for shaping the summit agenda or enhancing their own social capital.

The third government strategy that was highlighted by participants was an e-network initiative designed by the Government of Canada. This initiative was developed as a tool for engagement with the public and other governments during the preparatory process for both the G8 and G20 Summit preparatory processes. The e-network initiative involved several components, including an e-discussion, social media outreach, a closed electronic network, and a search system known as Radiant6. The e-discussion was intended to provide a forum in which members of the public could comment on various potential G8 Summit initiatives. The social media component involved the use of Facebook and Twitter to provide updates and information on the summit preparations. The closed electronic network was set up to ensure that all G8 member governments could share documents in the months leading up to the summit within a secure space. Radiant6 was a search tool that mined social media sites, including the “blogosphere” and the “Twitterverse” to detect trends about the G8 Summit and its content before ideas or criticisms went viral.

Despite the efforts to engage in modern modes of communication and engagement, government bureaucratic staff did not view the overall initiative as successful in terms of generating new ideas, developing new relationships or engaging a vast number of new people. As two bureaucrats reflected:

*“We were able to launch it and had 80 plus contributions into the e-discussion, but it didn’t live up to our expectations and hopes. It was okay. We did get great contributions.*

*I would say we did get a bit of a take for what people think - a barometer. Sure. Was it perceived as useful inside the department? Nope. So that was our experience”.*

*“No, there were no new ideas that came out of the e-forum...”*

One challenge with the strategy of expanding the government’s electronic network during the agenda setting process was that staff faced time lags for communication decisions, which slowed the momentum and the benefits of “real-time” technologies. A government staff member explained that this was partly due to the nature of networked approaches being a low priority for government:

*I think they [senior executives] saw it as useless and time consuming when they had a limited amount of time and it was a low priority. However, the Sherpa was keen to do outreach and understood outreach from an optic point of view and to collect information from Canadians to get some kind of feedback. We developed our plan, there was an outreach component where we wanted to contact people and move on certain things. We couldn’t. We had to wait a lot. This meant we lost momentum, we couldn’t do all the things we wanted to do and we couldn’t have a robust wholesome conversation with the target audience. That was frustrating”.*

To some extent, the government’s poor execution of the e-network initiative can be explained due to the learning curve that comes with any new strategy, which one staff member conferred: “This was the very beginning. We were asked to do this on short notice. If we had more time, we would be able to better educate and try to create that kind of crucible where you can throw ideas in and let people go at it”. However, e-networking also proved to be a poor tool because the government staff indicated that open forums did not provide a “safe space” for discussing sensitive, classified information about potential agenda items. Yet, the sense that discussions about potential agenda topics should not be transparent and open is precisely what limits public debate.

In an age of a social media-savvy public, government’s inability to “keep up” or be willing to relax complete, non-transparent control of discussion topics demonstrates its lack of capacity to utilize the many resources that are available through networked approaches. By comparison, when the Canadian Coalition for MNCH engaged in a process unfamiliar to them,

the members sought advice from those experienced with what they were trying to accomplish. Government bureaucrats however, faced short timelines and had to figure out the process on their own with little internal support.

The fourth strategy was not a formal initiative, but represented an informal way of working both internally and externally to government. Internally, some bureaucratic staff respected clear, hierarchical boundaries within the G8 Summit planning process, as exemplified by the following government bureaucrat statement: “There’s an established network and a way of doing things in the G8 system. It’s also within the department as the assistant to a sherpa; you would respect that line of communication and engagement”. However, other staff utilized a networked approach to respond more rapidly to issues and problems as they emerged - a strategy of moving beyond hierarchical and bureaucratic routines as demonstrated by the following three comments by government bureaucratic staff:

*“My contacts will depend on the topic. It’s a judgement call, and you need to be efficient. Sometimes your boss isn’t always available, so you find the answer and confirm later. In Canada, we’re not too big on the hierarchy so we manage relations that way”.*

*“There is a formal structure to decisions, and there are networks. Sometimes the networks can beat the formal hierarchy. This is how it works”.*

*“Our ADM gave us the flexibility and opportunity to be innovative inside the confines of the Government of Canada rules, which we bent a couple of times...”*

Therefore, internally within the Government of Canada, staff had formal communication and decision-making channels but depending on the person, these were not always followed. At times, informal, emergent mechanisms proved more effective. Despite the effectiveness, staff that adopted an informal networked approach faced challenges: “PCO was not always as comfortable. They frequently came back and asked ‘has this been approved by the Sherpa?’ You’d look at them and say ‘it’s been approved by the level it needs to be approved’ or ‘that approval has been delegated by the Sherpa to someone else. So you can take it as being granted’”. Having these two different approaches, each of which had been routinized by different staff within the bureaucratic organization, has been previously described as organizational pathologies

(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). While it is not problematic that different pathways existed for government actors during the summit preparatory process, it is important to understand that the informal pathways were not officially sanctioned government protocol. Thus, the opportunity for this type of activity was due to a sub-culture being created within discrete groups in bureaucratic departments.

Additionally, a typical summit preparatory process has norms and procedures in which government staff from G8 nations will engage with one another. For instance, periodic sherpa meetings are convened and Foreign or Development Ministerials are held, which provide opportunities for official negotiations. However, the merits of informal discussions that circumvent the formal diplomatic channels were deemed important to relationship building during the summit preparatory process. As one bureaucrat stated: “Usually, the communications between governments goes through formal channels – from embassy to embassy, to other governments, and back and forth. But, these Sherpas communicated directly. The advantage they have is communication going through the personal channels”.

Externally, government bureaucratic and political staff sought opportunities to engage in private, off-the-record discussions with select NGOs and medical professional association representatives in both phase one and phase two of the agenda setting process. In particular, government agencies involved in the G8 Summit preparatory process beyond DFAIT – who lead the formal strategies – would engage in informal, external strategies for networked governance. For instance, on several occasions, CIDA convened a “Ginger Group”, which was a mix of medical professionals and NGO representatives, who met over dinner for a “Chatham House rule<sup>14</sup>” discussion on MNCH issues. These smaller discussions were viewed as a greater opportunity for external members to influence the thinking and rationale of government staff and for government staff to obtain new ideas and validation of their approach to the G8 Summit. One DFAIT senior bureaucrat mentioned: “I found what was much more useful was sitting with a few NGOs in a room and just thrashing out policy disagreements. You have much franker exchanges, and I would think those are much more useful to NGOs as well, rather than the ritualistic public hearings”.

---

<sup>14</sup> Chatham House rule refers to a practice of guaranteeing anonymity during discussions to encourage participants to speak freely. Comments included in discussion summaries are not attributed to specific individuals. (Chatham House, 2012).

To summarize, networked governance during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process occurred through a variety of strategies (Figure 5.2) that depended on the following variables: 1) organizational type, 2) objectives (to influence or to be influenced), and 3) the resource being exchanged. On the latter point, resources were informational, ideational, medical/technological, financial, and support to enhance legitimacy. Support to enhance legitimacy stemmed from the Canadian Coalition shaping the MNCH agenda item, a group that represents a broad level of support from civil society. Legitimacy also stemmed from the medical/technical professionals who could ensure the MNCH initiative was based on sound science. The other G8 countries provided the Government of Canada with political and financial support for the initiative and further enhanced the legitimacy of the agenda item. Many strategies were considered formal, which included any strategy that was publicly acknowledged and undertaken. However, informal strategies also existed, which tended to involve invitation-only, in-person meetings for which no official transcript or materials would ever be available. Every participant in this study recognized that a successful summit preparatory process required both types of strategies.




Figure 5.2 Strategies for networked engagement in 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH

Overall the NGOs, Canadian Coalition, and medical/technical professionals adopted strategies that either developed their own social capital, or focused on enhancing the social capital of others that they had strategically selected as being important to the MNCH initiative (Figure 5.2). Government bureaucrats though, adopted formal strategies that appeared to fail to truly build or enhance social capital. While e-networking, demarches, and outreach events had the potential to increase social capital, participants perceived that these strategies were limited in bringing in new ideas that challenged existing thinking or provided new resources that were not previously accessed. Yet, the informal strategies adopted by individuals, rather than the organization or departments as a whole, were perceived as leading to measurable results and outcomes that positively shaped the MNCH initiative.

## **5.2 Social capital**

The analysis in the chapter thus far reveals a pattern that many of the strategies used by actors outside of government involved building new relationships with dissimilar actors, and mobilizing the resources of similar actors to whom they were already connected. The QDA also indicated that much of the bureaucratic arm of government was neither interested, nor skillful at building social capital. This may be due to working in an environment that discourages a networked approach, given a tradition of having led these processes before and thus, having expertise that others do not possess. But while the previous section describes what actors do to access resources and build social capital, the next section seeks to measure the social capital of those individuals. Recall from chapters one and three that this research conceives social capital as the social resources an actor can procure from their relationships with other individuals (Flap, 1991; Erickson, 1996; Lin, 2001). These social resources can supply an actor with ideas, knowledge, support, information, or financial capital and thus provides actors with material or instrumental benefits to accomplish specific goals. The resources are only accessible through relationships and the flow of the resources is affected by the structure of the network and an individual's position within a network.

The section that follows will evaluate individual actors' social capital in a multidimensional format, based on: network size, the compositional quality and the structural characteristics of that individual's network, including homophily, heterogeneity and structural

holes. As explained previously in chapter three, the greater the size of an individual's network, the greater potential they have to access unique resources. The higher the compositional quality of an actor's resources – in this case, defined by MNCH expertise - the greater the likelihood specific characteristics will benefit that actor. The less homophilous an actor, the more that actor is connected to others with dissimilar characteristics as themselves; thus there is an increased chance of new ideas and different ways of thinking about a problem. When an actor's resources are diverse with respect to each other, the actor's network is deemed to be heterogeneous, which has been equated with high social capital (Burt, 1983). Finally, a low density of ties among the resources in an actor's network, measured by the presence of structural holes, positively affects that actor's social capital as the actor is in a position of structural importance.

The discussion below is based on the results for the social network ego-centric analysis. Ego-centric discussions typically use the terms ego and alter to refer to individual actor under examination and his or her contacts that can be considered resources. To increase the flow of the discussion in this chapter, the term actor is used in lieu of ego and the term contact is used in lieu of alter. First, the SNA results will be presented. Next, a discussion and analysis of social capital overall in the network will follow.

### *5.2.1 Network size*

Network size refers to the number of individuals directly connected to a particular actor (Lakon et al., 2008) and that were deemed "important" to the work of the actor during the preparatory process. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of network size for the members of the G8 MNCH network. The mean number of important contacts was 11 individuals, and the median network size was nine. Approximately 88 percent of the participants nominated 20 or fewer contacts and 12 percent reported between 21 and 43 contacts. At the extremes, about 17 percent of the participants reported only one contact that was important to their work on the G8 MNCH initiative, and two participants reported networks containing 42-43 contacts, which was considerably larger than mean and median values. The two actors with these large network values represented a medical association and university research unit. On average, actors from technical/professional medical associations and international organizations were found to have the largest network sizes (29 and 20 important contacts respectively), while those from

foundations and federal government political parties nominated on average the fewest contacts (3 and 8 important contacts respectively). Actors from federal government public service, NGOs, networks/alliances and academic/research units had average networks sizes ranging from 10-15 actors (Table 5.1).




Figure 5.3 Frequency distribution of ego network size

Table 5.1 Average number of important contacts by organization type

Organization type	N	Average number of important contacts
Academic/Research	3	15
Foundation	7	3
Federal government public service	35	11
Federal government political	13	8
International organization	1	20
Network/alliance	2	10
Non-governmental organization	15	11
Technical/professional medical association	3	29

### 5.2.2 Network compositional quality

The compositional quality of an actor’s network refers to the presence of specific characteristics possessed by the actor’s contacts (Borgatti et al., 1998). In the context of this study, quality

refers to the presence of MNCH experts within an actor’s personal network. This is deemed important since phase two of the G8 Summit preparatory process involved shaping the initiative in order to achieve the goal of making a significant contribution to achieving MDGs 4 and 5. However, the findings reveal that the study participants primarily relied on advice from generalists. Only 37 percent of nominations linked actors to contacts with expertise in MNCH. Actors from technical/professional medical associations and international organizations were found to have the highest percentage of contacts with MNCH expertise within their networks (69 percent and 60 percent, respectively, Table 5.2). This finding could be explained by the fact that these categories of actors contain numerous actors specializing in MNCH. This result indicates the experts are not well connected to the generalists, and may expend more effort on “preaching to the converted” as opposed to informing a broader range of actors. Conversely, the federal government public service category contains mostly generalists and 69 percent of their connections linked to other generalists. The networks of actors from foundations were the lowest in compositional quality – only 16 percent of contacts nominated were MNCH experts. However, the foundations involved in the G8 MNCH initiative had internal MNCH experts and it appeared that their network was focused on building relationships with policy generalists and decision-makers on MNCH initiatives, rather than additional health experts.

Table 5.2 Compositional quality for 2010 G8 MNCH individual networks based on MNCH expertise

Organization type	N	Contacts with MNCH expertise (%)
Academic/Research	3	52
Foundation	7	16
Federal government public service	35	31
Federal government political	13	27
International organization	1	60
Network/alliance	2	47
Non-governmental organization	15	46
Technical/professional medical association	3	69
Total	79	37

### 5.2.3 Homophily

The results of the homophily tests for the entire network population indicated that the actors sampled showed no preference for policy relationships with similar others based on attributes “organization type” (Table 5.3). Recalling from section 3.3.6.4, homophily scores range from -1, which indicates ties to only those in the same category (homophilous), to +1 for egos that have ties to actors in all categories but their own (heterophilous). A slight preference was observed towards relationships with contacts of the same gender (E-I index value of -0.097). The organization and occupation position level of the actor did have an effect at the network level. The E-I index of 0.540 indicated that actors, on the whole, had a preference to engage with dissimilar others in terms of the organization the actor represented. Actors also showed a preference to consult with others that were not at a similar occupational position, indicated by an E-I index of 0.20. In simple terms, the group was outwards looking at the organization level and occupational position levels, and slightly inwards looking with regards to gender.

Table 5.3 Homophily results for 2010 G8 MNCH network by attribute (N=79).

	Actor attribute			
	Occupation position level	Organization	Organization type	Gender
<b>E-I value</b>	0.20	0.54	-0.002	-0.097

Krackhardt and Stern (1988) developed and tested a theory that organizations can improve their ability to solve difficult and complex problems by promoting the organization of informal relationships and sharing of information across units to solve difficult problems (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Their SNA study examined homophily and ultimately found that dense networks of personal ties between dissimilar organizational units reduced the frequency and occurrence of crisis within an organization. Thus, according to Krackhardt and Stern’s (1988) theory, the positive E-I values found in this study across the two attributes of occupational position and organization represented the potential for higher performance in terms of problem solving than if dissimilar organizational units were not linked.

However, the difference among organizations needs further explanation. The E-I value of -0.002 for organizational *type* demonstrates that the actors were equally connected to similar and dissimilar organization types (e.g. federal government public service, NGOs, foundations,

medical/professional associations) for the entire network population of actors sampled. Yet, when the mean E-I Index values were organized by organization type, the data demonstrated substantial differences between the organizational type categories in terms of homophily. When organizations are left to progress naturally, it has been found that people typically initiate ties with others people that have similar attributes (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). The theory held true for actors from the federal government public service, federal government political parties, and academic/research bodies (E-I index value of -0.6, -0.2, and -0.5 respectively, see Table 5.4). These actors were found to have a preference to consult with contacts of the same organization type. However, actors from NGOs, foundation, international organizations, network/alliances, and technical/professional associations all had positive E-I values, which indicates a propensity to consult with diverse and dissimilar contacts. Considering that the two groups of federal government actors were managing the summit preparatory process, Krackhardt and Stern's (1988) theory suggests that these actors may be performing sub-optimally for complex problem solving due to their lack of accessing resources from outward sources.

For the nongovernmental groups the opposite may be true. The outward engagement of actors within these suggests performance that is closer to optimal. However, it is worth noting that the E-I index is not standardized by the distribution of types of contacts. Thus, the possibility exists that the results partly reflect the distribution of contacts and that an actor's network may be limited by the available opportunities (Carrington, 2002). For example, the strong homophily value for public servants and the weak homophily for non-governmental actors could be a reflection that there are high numbers of public servants in the network. Within this scenario, if one chose contacts at random (i.e. with no homophilous preference), one would expect to get a high percentage of public servants, thus making public servants appear homophilous and other people non-homophilous. Yet, the results from the QDA support the non-standardized homophily findings, with many participants from government stating their preference to seek advice and information from internal sources.

Table 5.4 Homophily E-I Index values of actors by organization types within G8 MNCH network for organization type attribute.

Organization type	N	E-I
Federal government public service	35	-0.6
Federal government political	13	-0.2
Non-government organization	15	0.4
Foundation	7	0.6
International organization	1	0.7
Network/ Alliance	2	0.4
Technical professional	3	0.9
Academic/ research	3	-0.5
Business	0	n/a
Media	0	n/a

The homophily test also showed that the attribute of occupation position level did not align with the Krackhardt and Stern homophily theory. That is, actors on the whole were not found to limit their policy consultations to contacts of similar occupational rank. Rather, actors instead showed a tendency to consult with dissimilar contacts. Yet, as shown with the organization type analysis, moving from the macro-level analysis of the network as a whole, to an analysis of the actors within each level reveals different results. For instance, Table 5.5 shows that the E-I Index values ranged considerably for actors within the six different occupation position levels. Actors within the lowest occupation positions (levels 5 and 6) showed limited preference for their policy relationships with similar others in terms of rank. However, the highest ranked actors, which included prime ministers, were found to engage primarily with peers in similar positions. Those actors occupying mid to upper level positions (levels 2-4) all were found to have E-I values in the opposite direction as predicted by Krackhardt and Stern's (1988) homophily theory – these actors had ties to more dissimilar actors. In sum, decision makers advising top level officials in the preparatory process consulted with more actors in different position levels than actors at the same position level.

Table 5.5 Homophily E-I Index values of actors by occupation position levels within G8 MNCH network for occupation position level attribute.

Occupation position level	N	E-I
1 (president, prime minister)	4	-0.7
2 (UN sec. gen., minister)	1	1.0
3 (dep. Minister, CEO, sherpa)	17	0.3
4 (chief of staff, sous-sherpa)	8	0.5
5 (ass. dep. minister, director)	27	-0.1
6 (manager, advisor)	22	0.0

Overall, the homophily results showed that when the network is examined at the macro-level, actors are connected to a highly diverse range of contacts if you consider the attribute “organization” only. This may be explained by the fact that over 100 organizations, departments and agencies were represented in the network. However, if the attribute “*type of organization*” is considered, actors are connected to both diverse and familiar contacts equally. Across the four attributes considered (gender, organization, organization type and occupation position level), mixed support was found for homophily. Consequently, conclusions with regards to social capital are difficult at the network level.

The analyses that examined homophily by organization type and occupation position level revealed more conclusive trends. Firstly, a division was found between government actors and nongovernment actors in terms of relationships based on organization type. On average, government actors were found to exhibit homophilous tendencies, while non-government actors mostly had heterophilous relationships. Within the group of federal government public service, only three actors (~9 percent) had positive E-I index values and only one of the actors had a network size larger than one. This actor was a mid-level bureaucrat with DFAIT (Actor #163), was previously identified as being central to the G8 MNCH process and was identified as being a “non-conformer” by participants within the study (see chapter four). Federal government political actors exhibited a higher tendency for heterophilous relationships as compared to actors from federal government public service (30 percent versus 9 percent). Actor #214, a high level political advisor, stood out in particular, with a high E-I index value of 0.9.

A division also was evident when the data was aggregated by the attribute of occupation position level. Actors from level 2 to level 6, which ranged from deputy ministers to executive assistants, were found to either have an equal number of ties within and outside their own

grouping, or were found to have more external ties than internal. The outlier in this category was at the top level, which included presidents and prime ministers. This group of actors were found to be highly homophilous.

#### 5.2.4 Heterogeneity

Recalling from chapter 3 (section 3.3.6.5), heterogeneity is a measure of the diversity of the contacts within an individual’s actor’s personal network based on select categorical attributes. The more diverse contacts are with respect to each other, the more heterogeneous the personal network. The more heterogeneous an actor’s network, the greater the likelihood that the actor will have access to diverse social resources that may be required for achieving certain outcomes (Burt, 1983). Conversely, if an actor’s network of contacts is similar with regards to a particular attribute, the network is homogenous. Blau’s Heterogeneity Index (BHI), a commonly employed approach in heterogeneity studies (Harrison & Klein, 2007), ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing greater heterogeneity than 0, which represents near homogeneity. However, maximum possible value is related to the number of categories within each attribute, which is taken into account in the discussions that follow.

The actor networks were not highly heterogeneous across all the five selected attributes (Table 5.6). The actors sampled were found to have networks with resources predominantly from G8 countries (BHI value 0.08) and low diversity in terms of the mix of government to non-government actors (BHI value 0.18) and the geographic location of the actors (BHI value 0.25). Slightly higher heterogeneity values were observed for organization type (BHI value 0.32) and occupation position level (BHI value 0.43).

Table 5.6 Mean Blau’s Heterogeneity Index (BHI) values for 2010 G8 MNCH network by attribute

<b>Attribute</b>	Organization type	Occupation position level	G8 membership	Actor type (gov/non-gov)	Geographic location
<b>Blau’s Heterogeneity Index</b>	0.32	0.43	0.08	0.18	0.25
Number of categories within attribute	11	6	2	2	>100
Max BHI Value	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.5	1.0

Heterogeneity differences were also analyzed by organization type across the five attributes to detect if certain actors from some organization types had networks with higher diversity than others. Table 5.7 shows that actors from technical/professional medical associations and international organizations had the most heterogeneous networks across most attributes. The most homogenous networks belonged to actors from foundations. The Blau's heterogeneity index values for most actors groups displayed similar trends across all attributes. The exception was for the G8 membership attribute. Actors from most organization types were found to have highly homogenous networks with this attribute. This result demonstrates that most ego-networks were primarily comprised of G8 members. The noticeable exception was the technical/professional medical association organization type, which showed the highest diversity for this attribute (BHI value 0.37, Table 5.7). Federal government public service actors were observed to have homogenous networks for most attributes. Yet, moderate levels of homogeneity for occupation position level (BHI 0.41, Table 5.7) were observed. The reverse trend was observed for actors within networks/alliances. The group was found to have high heterogeneity for organization type and geographic location, and only moderate to low heterogeneity for other attributes.

Table 5.7 Blau's Heterogeneity Index (BHI) by organization type for occupation position level and organization type

Organization type	Blau's Heterogeneity Index (BHI)				
	Occupation position level	Organization type	Geographic location	Actor type (gov/non-gov)	G8 membership
Academic/Research	0.24	0.28	0.22	0.16	0.04
Foundation	0.23	0.15	0.24	0.07	0.00
Federal government public service	0.41	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.06
Federal government political	0.42	0.32	0.24	0.17	0.15
International organization	0.70	0.77	0.42	0.50	0.00
Network/alliance	0.28	0.60	0.70	0.45	0.17
Non-governmental organization	0.55	0.51	0.23	0.32	0.03
Technical/ professional medical	0.75	0.82	0.73	0.47	0.37
Categories within attribute	7	11	>100	2	2
Max BHI Value	0.8	0.9	~1.0	0.5	0.50

In addition to a network level analysis of heterogeneity, individual level heterogeneity was explored for occupation position level and organization type. Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 contain the top 10 BHI values by actor for occupation position level and organization type respectively. These results showed that two of the eight organization types did not include any of the actors considered most heterogeneous – foundations and networks/alliances. Recalling the earlier discussion on generalists and specialists, this result reinforces that foundations were connecting primarily with generalist policy advisors and decision-makers in the MCNH initiative. Therefore, their ties were primarily to organizations of the same type.

Table 5.8 Top 10 most heterogeneous actors within the G8 MCNH network by occupation position level (maximum possible BHI value = 0.83 based on 7 possible occupational levels)

Actor ID #	N	Organization type	Occupation position level	Blau's heterogeneity index
121	10	Federal government political	4	0.78
182	29	Technical/professional	3	0.76
171	16	Technical/professional	4	0.75
94	7	NGO	6	0.74
141	43	Technical/professional	3	0.73
229	11	Federal government public service	4	0.73
110	12	Federal government political	5	0.72
164	42	Academic/research	5	0.72
71	24	NGO	3	0.72
112	20	International organization	5	0.70

Table 5.9 Top 10 most heterogeneous actors within the G8 MCNH network by organizational type (maximum possible BHI value = 0.83 based on 7 possible occupational levels)

Actor ID #	N	Organization type	Occupation position level	Blau's heterogeneity index
182	29	Technical/professional	3	0.83
164	42	Academic/research	5	0.83
171	16	Technical/professional	4	0.80
141	43	Technical/professional	3	0.79
112	20	IO	5	0.77
163	30	Federal government public service	5	0.74
71	24	NGO	3	0.73
218	17	NGO	3	0.73
214	24	Federal government political	5	0.72
296	10	NGO	3	0.70

With regards to occupation position, actors occupying level 3, 4 and 5 occupation positions were in the top 10 rank for both attributes. Representation from occupation position

levels 1 and 2 was not found within either of the attributes for heterogeneity. Thus, those actors with the highest level positions (e.g. prime ministers, ministers) were not found to have highly heterogeneous networks. Conversely, low to mid ranking actors did have highly heterogeneous ego networks. The actors with the most heterogeneous networks were also predominantly non-governmental, with technical/professional medical associations having the highest proportion of actors within the top 10 ranking.

To summarize, low heterogeneity was observed for all attributes across the network, demonstrating that most of an actor's contacts were generally similar to each other in terms of their geographic location, G8 membership, actor type, organization type, and occupation position level. When aggregated to organization type, the BHI values demonstrated noteworthy trends based on average heterogeneity values for personal networks within organization types across all attributes, except G8 membership. Heterogeneous networks were observed within international organizations and technical/professional medical associations. Moderate heterogeneity was found for NGO and network/alliance actors. Low heterogeneity values were observed for actors within academic/research groups, foundations, the federal government public service, and federal government political parties.

#### *5.2.5 Structural holes*

Recalling from chapter three, structural holes exist when ties are weak or absent among some contacts in an actor's network. The lack of dense ties between contacts has the potential to increase the social capital of an actor (Susskind et al., 1998; Burt, 2001). The results of the analysis demonstrated that some individuals had densely connected alters, while other actors had personal networks with alters that were almost completely unconnected (density range was 0 to 1). The effective size of an ego's network within the G8 MNCH network ranged from 1 to 12 alters. The lowest efficiency value, which indicates the proportion of an ego's contacts that are non-redundant, was 0.33 and the highest was 1.0. Some actors were strongly constrained, a situation where an actor's resources are all exchanging resources or information, with high constraint values of 1.39. Other actors were found to have potential to exploit structural holes, demonstrated by low constraint values of 0.33.

Using the patterns set out by Burt (1995) as a framework for evaluation, 13 actors were found to be in positions of potential brokerage (high effective size and efficiency, low density and constraint) (Table 5.10). Table 5.11 lists the actors that were found to have low opportunity for brokerage. The actors with the highest brokerage potential represented a range of organizations, including DFAIT, CIDA, UNICEF Canada, three large Canadian based NGOs, two international medical technical associations, and a research unit within a Canadian university. This demonstrated that brokerage was not limited to one agency or organization and brokerage potential was inter-dispersed throughout both governmental and nongovernmental actors. However, brokerage opportunities appeared to rest with actors in mid-level positions within government hierarchies and executive level positions within NGOs and international medical technical associations. Therefore, occupation position levels mattered. One mid-level political actor within CIDA appeared to play a prominent brokerage role. Those actors that were found to display limited brokerage potential were from two organizations, DFAIT and IDRC, and were mostly low level officers and researchers.

Table 5.10 2010 G8 MNCH preparatory network actors with high brokerage potential.

Actor ID#	Organization type	Out-degree	Effective Size	Efficiency	Density	Constraint	Hierarchy
163	Fed. Govt. public service	12	↑ (9.68)	↑ (0.81)	↓ (0.17)	↓ (0.28)	0.13
141	Medical/technical association	12	↑ (9.39)	↑ (0.78)	↓ (0.19)	↓ (0.26)	0.05
213	Federal government public service	17	↑ (12.16)	↑ (0.72)	↓ (0.26)	↓ (0.21)	0.06
71	NGO	16	↑ (12.16)	↑ (0.63)	↓ (0.35)	↓ (0.24)	0.05
164	Academic/research	10	↑ (8.50)	↑ (0.85)	↓ (0.17)	↓ (0.29)	0.06
182	Medical/technical association	8	↑ (6.75)	↑ (0.84)	↓ (0.14)	↓ (0.31)	0.12
200	NGO	13	↑ (8.81)	↑ (0.68)	↓ (0.30)	↓ (0.26)	0.08
62	Fed. Govt. public service	11	↑ (8.21)	↑ (0.75)	↓ (0.26)	↓ (0.30)	0.10
112	International organization	14	↑ (8.13)	↑ (0.58)	↓ (0.37)	↓ (0.28)	0.08
214	Fed. Govt. public service	12	↑ (7.47)	↑ (0.62)	↓ (0.41)	↓ (0.29)	0.06
37	Fed. Govt. public service	11	↑ (7.20)	↑ (0.66)	↓ (0.38)	↓ (0.31)	0.06
118	Fed. Govt. public service	10	↑ (7.16)	↑ (0.72)	↓ (0.32)	↓ (0.32)	0.05
298	NGO	10	↑ (7.09)	↑ (0.71)	↓ (0.28)	↓ (0.33)	0.07

Table 5.11 2010 G8 MNCH preparatory network actors with low brokerage potential

Actor ID#	Organization type	Out-degree	Effective Size	Efficiency	Density	Constraint	Hierarchy
245	Fed. Govt. public service	7	↓ (3.44)	↓ (0.49)	↑ (0.60)	↑ (0.50)	0.03
286	Fed. Govt. public service	6	↓ (2.64)	↓ (0.44)	↑ (0.63)	↑ (0.58)	0.05
67	Fed. Govt. public service	4	↓ (1.93)	↓ (0.48)	↑ (0.58)	↑ (0.76)	0.12
55	Fed. Govt. public service	3	↓ (1.00)	↓ (0.33)	↑ (1.00)	↑ (0.93)	0.00
76	Fed. Govt. public service	3	↓ (1.00)	↓ (0.33)	↑ (1.00)	↑ (0.93)	0.00
122	Fed. Govt. public service	3	↓ (1.00)	↓ (0.33)	↑ (1.00)	↑ (0.93)	0.00

### 5.2.6 *The trends of social capital*

To conclude, a multidimensional approach was explored as a basis for understanding the social capital of actors within the G8 MNCH initiative. Recalling that social capital theory indicates that actors with large networks, high composition quality, low homophily, high heterogeneity, and high potential to bridge structural holes are believed to possess the highest social capital. Noteworthy characteristics of actors and organization types that rank high in multiple indicators of social capital include:

- 1) On average, actors were linked to 11 contacts. Actors from technical/professional medical associations and international organizations had the largest network sizes (average 20 and 29 contacts, respectively). Specifically, actor #141 had the largest network size. This actor was a Canadian public health specialist who was the executive director of a Canadian based technical medical organization that focused on international health. This actor was also actively involved with two large international organizations and was one of the actors described in the compositional analysis network graph as serving a bridging function. Actor #164 had the second largest network size and was a Canadian academic. This actor was also observed to occupy a bridging position in the compositional analysis network graph. Actors with the smallest network sizes worked for foundations and federal government political parties (average 3 and 8, respectively).
- 2) Overall, only 37 percent of the ties from all of the actors in the network linked to specialists, indicating that a plurality of actors responsible for the G8 MNCH initiative were generalists. Actors from the technical/professional medical associations and international organizations connected the most to MNCH experts. Given the specialization is an indicator of the quality of an ego's network, these two organization types can be understood as having the highest composition quality. Foundations possessed the lowest composition quality.
- 3) Collectively, the homophily results show that if an actor is a federal government political leader, its network would be expected to be the most homophilous. Conversely, actors that were middle-level to upper-level employee in an NGO, foundation, international organization, technical/professional medical association, or a network/alliance would be the most heterophilous. Again, actor #141 was the most heterophilous.

- 4) The actors whose personal networks were most heterogeneous with respect to organization type were from technical/professional medical associations and international organizations. Specifically, actor #182 had the most heterogeneous network in terms of organization type and position levels. Actor #182 was a Canadian medical professional but was also involved with a woman's focused medical association located in Europe, the White Ribbon Alliance, and connected to the WHO. It is worth noting that this was one of the few actors within the network located outside of Canada. The most homogenous networks were for actors based in foundations, although actors from federal government public service and academia were also moderately homogenous.
- 5) The greatest brokerage potential belonged to actors from a diverse range of organization types but the highest potential belonged to the mid ranking DFAIT bureaucrat that comprised the "non-conformer bloc" identified in the structural equivalence tests in chapter four. This actor (#163) was structurally important to the overall summit preparatory process and was responsible for a small staff of generalists dedicated to several 2010 G8 summit initiatives. Conversely, many of the other bureaucratic generalists had the least brokerage potential.

Having determined which actors and organization types carried the highest or lowest levels of social capital, it was important to better understand the conditions that enabled or constrained actors from mobilizing that social capital.

### **5.3 Conditions – Enablers and Constraints**

The first section of this chapter described that clear reasons existed for why actors engaged in networked governance during the G8 Summit preparatory process and how distinct strategies were employed by the various actors groups. This explained how networked governance occurred within the 2010 G8 Summit, there were broader conditions which enabled and constrained these strategies from being implemented.

Regardless of organizational type or the reasons for engaging in a networked approach, participants repeated the value of existing friendships and relationships often when describing the conditions that favoured the development of a network. Pre-existing relationships were

valued because of the inherent trust that had already been developed, and because energy could then be focused on activities for the summit preparatory process, rather than on the building of new relationships. Participants from various organizations reflected:

*“When we worked together on the G8, it had been a few years of us actually developing a lot of trust and respect. We also developed a good-natured relationship among ourselves, so when we come to meetings together, we like working together” (Canadian Coalition member).*

*“The thing that has made this work is the relationships and friendships. I’ve seen friendships held up - good working relationships that have been stellar, where people have deeply appreciated each other’s gifts from different constituency groups and have committed to working together because of that. So as soon as you replace some or all of those people, it’s a different ballgame” (Medical/Technical Professional).*

*“The four of us have a lot of interaction together. It is a wonderful foundation of trust and collegiality going into this. That is fundamental. It made us work quickly and efficiently. If one of us couldn’t make a meeting with the Minister, it didn’t get cancelled because you trusted your colleagues to represent you well” (Canadian Coalition member).*

*“It helps to have these contacts. Those two leaders know each other quite well. I think it really makes a difference at the level when people really know each other” (Non-G8 diplomat).*

But beyond the trust and pre-existing relationships, the broader sense that there were shared values and like-mindedness also helped to create an enabling condition. The shared values were described for different scales – both the individual and the country. The shared values among countries were particularly significant for non-G8 countries, who wanted to ensure that their views were being represented in the preparatory process. One means of ensuring this

inclusion was to find alliances with G8 countries that were aligned with those views. For instance, one non-G8 diplomat stated “There was a high degree of commonality and integration at various levels between our two countries. While our interests are not identical, everyone knows our interests”, while another claimed: “Canada has a significant place. It belongs to all the big clubs that we don’t belong to. There is an ease within the relationship. Canada often feels more aligned with our country. So when we sit down with these guys, if we make sensible policy comments, we get a sense that our views are considered.”

The shared values were significant for individuals who wanted to work with others who held a similar ideological position. One NGO executive explained: “The other NGO executive and I have what I call a strategic alliance on policy issues, one of which is maternal and child health, because we have common agreement on principles and philosophies; for instance, being pro-choice”.

The data also demonstrated that face-to-face meetings were critical for networked interactions. This result helps to explain the SNA results in chapter four, which provided the first indication that geography mattered. In part, geography affected the planned meetings – those that were within proximity to Ottawa were better known to staff based in Ottawa and thus, had an increased chance of having access or being engaged by the Government of Canada. The face-to-face meetings were deemed important, both as a sign of respect and to ensure clear communication on goals and objectives. As one senior government staff member stated:

*“You had to do that in person. It’s not just a voice on the phone or website. You have to sit down with people. It’s an issue of respect if you want to be taken seriously, if you want your country to be taken seriously, especially for policy initiatives. If you want buy-in for funding, you have to do people the courtesy by pulling out all the levers. That means somebody from headquarters going to capitals and walking people through.”*

But geography also affected the unplanned events – the chance meetings and informal discussions that were previously identified as strategies that were critical in terms of opportunities for influence and exchange of new ideas. As a Canadian Coalition member explained: “I think it may be luck or circumstance. Ottawa is a fairly small town. You bump into people and people are accessible socially and through work....you get to trust them, that they

have common interests.....you see them in grocery stores...For those of us in Ottawa, we have that opportunity. You've got to think that plays a role”.

Therefore, the broader enabling conditions related to history (i.e. what relationships had been established during previous initiatives) and to normative factors (i.e. what *ought* to occur within the G8 Summit). But geography also played a role in enabling interactions. Each of the factors that enabled social capital to be mobilized and supported the emergence and occurrence of networked governance could also be a constraint if they were lacking in any form. For example, if geographic proximity mattered, not being geographically close would pose a barrier. However, participants also identified a range of others barriers that limited the development of networked approaches. While the enabling factors were similar across organizational types, the constraints were specific to organizational type. For instance, a dominant constraint in the results was the culture of government, which affected both internal and external relationships and thus, the scope of the network, and thus the diversity of resources that could be accessed. Repeatedly, participants described internal power struggles that diminished an ability to cooperate and network among government agencies.

One reason provided was that as a large bureaucracy, government was organized in a manner that perpetuated hierarchical approaches and working within silos. A second reason provided was the internal power struggles among agencies that had a long history, but also created role confusion about responsibilities during the G8 Summit preparatory process. Most notably, this power struggle emerged among DFAIT, CIDA, and to a lesser extent IDRC and Health Canada. As the three agencies with dedicated, technical expertise in MNCH, staff within CIDA, IDRC and Health Canada assumed the agencies would play a substantive role in phase two of the agenda setting process. Yet, Health Canada was routinely perceived to be excluded from the process, and IDRC and CIDA staff struggled to continue what they considered “regular” business. As three bureaucrats from those agencies mentioned:

*“Well, this has been something that’s a slightly contested point with DFAIT....they wanted to be in charge of all lines of making the first contacts and stuff. It was really artificial because we actually have existing, ongoing relationships with all these people as part of our core business. So there was a few weeks where staff was feeling muzzled. Field staff couldn’t go to meetings because DFAIT hadn’t phoned headquarters yet. We*

*go to these meetings all the time. It's more noticeable that we're not there. All kinds of issues were arising because of this".*

*"There wasn't a substantive discussion prior to the announcement [of the signature initiative] that I was aware of, between CIDA, DFAIT, and Health Canada, to say 'ok, who knows who? How do we leverage the networks? How should that affect our rollout strategy'. They [DFAIT] didn't want to share their rollout strategy. We advised them for example, that perhaps they might want to contact Norway as their first non-G8 donor".*

*"It was clear that CIDA and DFAIT had to be in close contact and Health Canada didn't have contact. They [Health Canada] have all the contacts at WHO and could have helped more with indicators [to determine status and progress in MNCH]. There wasn't a mechanisms to let them work with us. We worked with them, but that wasn't our job. So there is room to improve this model".*

A DFAIT staff member concurred: "It wasn't clear. Those lines of communication and the lines of authority were quite confusing. That also related a bit to the fact that some of the things being produced were also produced by CIDA. So, CIDA believed that they had to respond to their own decision-making structure. CIDA takes its press releases or backgrounder up to its own Minister's office".

The lack of coordination and certainty about roles and responsibilities permeated the external network relationships as well. As the Government of Canada attempted to build relationships with non-G8 organizations that were important to MNCH, such as the Gates Foundation, they irritated some organizations because numerous agencies considered it "their job" to be the key point of contact. As one government bureaucrat explained:

*"Some of the people at the Gates Foundation are getting concerned about number of calls from the Canada Government. There was Foreign Affairs, CIDA, Health Canada, and the Public Health Agency at one point. There was a clear message from the Gates Foundation for the Canada government to stop calling and get your house in order and have only one agency call us".*

But in addition to the lack of coordination, some organizations beyond government recognized that power struggles and political disagreements were not just an internal problem. One NGO representative believed that the fact that their ideology clashed with the political side of government resulted in them being excluded from the summit preparatory process: “I learned that our organization’s name had been put forward five times and had been rejected...and it’s probably not a personal vendetta, but an institutional vendetta. But anyways, we were not invited, yet many of the people we work with were invited”. The constraints that the political culture and ideas placed on the scope of the network affected more than just one NGO though. The political climate created by the Conservative government leading Canada at the time of the G8 Summit preparatory process was perceived to the result of top down leadership, as three bureaucratic staff members claimed:

*“Harper is allergic to this kind of celebrity political stuff, both tactically and by personality. Harper probably wouldn’t even see Bono if he wanted to see him. He is so hyper-partisan”.*

*“Harper doesn’t network enough. It doesn’t matter to him.”*

*“I think no one would be particularly surprised that this government is fixated on managing the communications and managing the message. So they seem to want to exert much tighter control than when I’ve been involved in these things than in the past”.*

In rejecting contact with organizations with diverse viewpoints, regardless of whether the decision was tactical or not, the Government of Canada limited the resources and benefits that typically are understood to come from networked governance approaches, a conclusion supported by the following comment: “We overlook the expertise we have domestically, and that it can be useful internationally. We reinvent the wheel”.

For actors outside of government, constraints were related to the inability to access sufficient funding to ensure they had the capacity to participate in the summit preparatory process, and the logistics of securing meetings with high level political and bureaucratic government officials. As one medical/technical practitioner claimed: “It’s just too bad that we

have so much difficulty getting basic funding. And we are restricted to 12-13 percent for our office costs”.

When considering the enabling and constraining conditions to networked governance within the G8 Summit preparatory process as a whole, it became clear that although several constraints existed, individuals within different organization types navigated through the system, develop strategies, access resources, and establish successful relationships. That is, individuals sought opportunities and networked, sometimes *in spite of* organizational pathologies and an environment that did not support a networked approach.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

To summarize, the actors identified as part of the network that formed for the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process each used a variety of strategies, some of which were more effective than others for building and mobilizing social capital. Non-government actors from both highly specialized organizations and those with broad focus on global poverty were found to have high social capital. Of interest is the high social capital for the government actors in middle ranking positions within CIDA and DFAIT. While a large number of actors from these two organizations were involved in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH, some of which were either higher or lower in the bureaucratic hierarchy, these actors fairly consistently ranked highly with all the social capital measures used. The high social capital of these actors could not be fully explained through quantitative social network analysis. However, the analysis did indicate that individual characteristics of an actor and their approach to their work on the MNCH initiative may have mattered more than the organizations they represented and the occupation position level they occupied. The QDA confirmed this finding as it demonstrated these same actors were likely to break down hierarchical barriers within the organization and use informal strategies when they deemed it necessary or urgent to the preparatory process.

Having established who and how networked governance shapes the G8 summit preparatory process, the next chapter assesses whether the approach was more effective for addressing MNCH than traditional governance approaches.

## Chapter 6 Addressing MNCH: The promise of networked governance

To recap thus far, the agenda-setting process for the 2010 G8 summit involved two phases. The first phase involved the establishment of the issues for the agenda, while the second phase involved the shaping of specific agenda items. While numerous issues were placed on the summit agenda, MNCH was selected as the signature initiative by the Government of Canada, as the host of the 2010 Summit.

Previously, it was described that within the large network of individuals from a variety of government and non-government department, agencies and organizations, a smaller set of actors were influential within the first phase of the agenda setting process. While the SNA results demonstrated that a large constellation of actors were connected to the process, the qualitative data showed which individuals and agencies were perceived by those within the preparatory process as playing a critical role in the ultimate decision to proceed with MNCH as the signature initiative. Some individuals and departments, such as the Prime Minister and Prime Minister's Office, possessed power due to their structural position within the Government of Canada. For instance, within the G8 system, it is officially the prerogative of the host leader to set the agenda (Hajnal & Kirton, 2000). Others used leadership based on expertise or moral authority to unite other actors or catalyze action. Several NGO actors recognized that alone they did not possess enough strength to exercise influence, thus they mobilized into coalitions to increase their power. The Canadian Coalition for Maternal and Child Health was found to have a prominent role in the agenda setting process and attempted to increase their influence through aggregating the size of their membership and then building and mobilizing social capital through a diverse range of strategies. However, the strategies for building networked relationships for the governance of MNCH were supported and constrained by specific conditions, such as whether relationships of trust had previously existed or whether organizations had a capacity to participate in the preparatory process.

While these results helped explain who was important to the selection of the MNCH initiative, it did not fully explain *why* MNCH was selected as the signature initiative, which is a critical component of addressing the overall research question regarding the role of networked governance in affecting the political prioritization of MNCH. The agenda-setting process, which

involves political prioritization, is an important part of governance (Haas, 2004; Princen, 2007) and is an area of summit diplomacy that has received limited attention (for an exception, see Bayne, 2001). Political prioritization can be defined as the degree of attention given to an issue by national or international political leader, matched by an allocation of human, technical and financial resources to address the issue (Shiffman & Smith, 2007).

This chapter first considers four key factors affecting agenda setting that emerged from the analysis of the perspective of actors involved with the 2010 G8 preparatory process. The first section discusses how the G8 as a global governance forum, the characteristics of the field of MNCH, and multiple domestic and global contextual factors both enabled and constrained momentum for MNCH. The second section employs a deductive approach by analyzing the case data within a relatively new framework developed for analyzing the political prioritization of global initiatives. The congruencies of the 2010 G8 MNCH case with the framework are discussed, which further reinforce the findings that a large number of factors played a role in determining the success of the networked approach to politically prioritize MNCH. Once the issue gained political attention though, questions remained about whether the networked governance approach ensured that the G8 Summit was better able to address the systemic nature of MNCH problems. Therefore, the final section of this chapter moves to examine this subject, arguing that networked governance is necessary but insufficient to guarantee an improved, integrated approach that tackles the complexity of MNCH.

### **6.1 Getting on the agenda: participants' perspectives**

Four key factors supported and constrained the selection of MNCH for the 2010 G8 Summit signature initiative and the development of its detailed goals, objectives, and implementation activities. These factors can, in turn, be understood as the conditions that shaped the effectiveness of the networked governance approach which ensured the political prioritization of MNCH. Each of the factors will be explored in the sections that follow and include: the nature of the forum, the nature of the problem, global issues and domestic politics.

### 6.1.1 *The nature of the forum*

Members of the G8 have developed norms and operating procedures that have evolved since the forum's inception. While the goal of the G8 includes helping to solve global problems and to contribute to the governance of a myriad of global issues, the forum is also embedded within other global governance structures and domestic political systems, which are discussed separately in subsequent sections. Not unlike other international organizations and institutions (see Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), the G8 as a forum has developed a personality of its own. It remains the prerogative of the host country to set the agenda; however, an informal set of criteria exist for issue suitability and selection. Participants acknowledged the presence of this implicit criteria, which included: the ability of an issue to get "buy-in" from other G8 members, the existence of actionable "solutions", the affordability of the solutions, consistency with the foreign policy of the host and other G8 countries, the need for political will and leadership, the suitability of an issue to build a legacy for the host leader, the ability to build on past global efforts, linkages between an issue and other global governance fora and events, the ability to generate a "political win", the measurability of the G8's impact on an issue, and that the G8's efforts could "impact the world".

When the various statements of participants are considered together, the G8 appears to favour issues that are relatively simple and that minimize the risk of not achieving progress on the issue. As one senior bureaucrat and an executive from a foundation stated:

*"With some public policy issues, like corruption, there are lots of NGOs out there talking about it, talking about the importance of tackling corruption and transparency. There are lots of political leaders that are aware of it. But, to my mind there is no single set of solutions that people have coalesced around. As a result, in effect, that is why it never makes it to being at the level of political take-up. It is not that the issue isn't mature, but the issue doesn't lend itself to the type of summit response that can demonstrate progress in the future."*

*"the G8 hones in on things they can move forward with and make ready for prime time".*

While the criteria raised by participants could be applicable to any summit, other criterion were raised that were less tangible. For example, two senior bureaucrats independently stressed: “the PM has to like the issue and it has to look leader-like” and “it has to be something the PM could hang his hat on, something leader-like”. As a consequence, a degree of subjectivity exists for issue selection. Ultimately, it needs to be recognized that the implicit norms for selecting issues in the G8 forum limit the opportunity to discuss complex challenges and to develop agreements on transformational, systemic change in any issue area.

### 6.1.2 *The nature of the problem*

The nature of the MNCH issue is that it involves the death and ill health of millions of women and children throughout the world; the fact that two of the MDGs were dedicated to this issue signifies its importance. Addressing a problem related to human health and saving lives carries an inherent moral imperative that is difficult for anyone to oppose, and certainly cuts across political party lines. Comments such as “who could be against maternal and child health?” and “who doesn’t want to save moms and kids?” were found throughout the data. Additionally, solutions existed for primary challenges in MNCH. Implementing an initiative to reduce mortality of mother and child did not require new technologies that were yet to be developed. Medical and technical professionals were clear on the practices that were most effective, and these solutions were not considered to be costly. The fact that the G8 could be viewed as having an impact in a short time frame, at a reasonable cost, without the need to embrace risky new technologies made MNCH palatable as a signature initiative for the Government of Canada. A Canadian Coalition member reflected:

*“I think one of the reasons they picked it was because we were telling them they could have substantial impact on MNCH without a lot of money. We were telling them ‘it is not experimental’. We were not telling them ‘we’re going to innovate’. We know what we’re doing. I think it appealed to them that this isn’t going to be a hugely expensive way to make an impact”.*

Therefore, MNCH was perceived as an issue that was “solvable” by political and bureaucratic government staff, where the only remaining gap was political will and financial support. To some extent, this perception was due to the fact that the Canadian Coalition framed

the issue in this manner; that is, the knowledge, technology, and support across civil society was present and the practices simply needed to be scaled up to achieve broader impact. This perception stands in stark contrast with the debates in the academic literature (Claeson & Waldman, 2000; Justice, 2000; AbouZahr, 2003; Bhutta et al., 2010), and with the medical practitioners and individuals from international development organizations who had worked “on the ground”. From their perspective, MNCH issues involved systemic concerns that would not be addressed merely by adding a dash of political will:

*“Dealing with complex problems, dealing with complex interventions, you need a longer time line. Politicians don’t want that. They want to give the injections, give the pills, because they are easily quantifiable and show a certain level of impact and outcomes. But it’s going to take a lot more components than that to have sustainable improvements over time”.*

These results do not suggest that these participants disagreed with the inclusion of MNCH on the G8 Summit agenda. Thus, all participants appeared to have supported phase one of the agenda-setting process. But, it was phase two wherein these participants disagreed on the substance of what should be included in the initiative. To those within the medical/technical professional community, or within the academic community, the nature of the problem and its solutions were more complex than that which was recognized by the G8.

### *6.1.3 Global politics*

The MNCH issues were included in MDGs 4 and 5, indicating that global level agreement existed with regards to the need for action. While global level attention had been given to this issue by public figures such as the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, limited progress had been made to reduce mortality rates. Even though various aspects of global health had been included in past G8 agendas, MNCH had never been a specific topic of discussion. Participants perceived that the importance and relative neglect of the issue on the global stage served as a rationale for selecting MNCH as the signature initiative. As two medical/technical professionals commented:

*“What was a scandal was that all these things – HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB - were addressed by the G8 or other big funders and yet, we have half a million women dying*

*every year of childbirth. Another 2-3 million have complications and no one was taking care of them. I mean, that was the wake-up call I think. That's what we pushed...saying this is unacceptable".*

*"I do think the message was received that MDG5 was making the least amount of progress of all the MDGs. In 2010, ten years after the MDGs were signed, I do think that policy makers around the world were starting to realized that it was going to look really bad. That the world was not even going to come close to reaching MDG 4 and 5".*

Moreover, a UN MDG Summit for the ten year review of the goals was to be held in September 2010 after the G8. Thus, the topic of the MDGs, particularly those that were laggards, was timely. As one senior government staff member stated:

*"There has always been an awareness of the fact that immediately following the G8 summit, the next international meeting is the MDG Summit. It is the two-thirds mark. There is nothing special about the two-thirds mark, but it is important from a communication perspective. They [G8] feel that this is one of the last points before the MDG Summit".*

As noted earlier, at the same time that the 2010 G8 Summit agenda was being considered, challenges to the configurations of global governance architecture were emerging by nations in the Global North and Global South. One such challenge included debates about the legitimacy and membership representation included in the G8 (see Carin et al., 2008b; see Carin et al., 2008a; Carin et al., 2008c). Consequently, the G20, in part as a result of the global financial crisis, was increasingly viewed as a more relevant and appropriate forum for global level leaders to discuss problems than the G8. Choosing a topic that diverged from the G20's focus on economics provided the G8 with an opportunity to prove its ongoing relevance and value. As an international organization executive and NGO representative speculated:

*"They [Government of Canada] had to pick a legacy initiative. The PM wanted to, and was trying to, hold on to the G8. He needed something to distinguish the G8 from the G20. Development is one of the big pieces there".*

*“At the Italian summit, Harper was concerned about the G20 and waning Canadian influence, less influence. He wanted to ensure justification for the G8 to ensure it had a role”.*

Furthermore, with the changes in global governance architecture related to the financial and economic power of emerging economies, such as the BRIC nations, Canada, similar to other G8 nations, faced diminishing influence in global governance (English et al., 2005). While Canada is a member of exclusive forums such as the G8 and G20, it is not a permanent member of other exclusive arrangements such as the UN Security Council. In 2010, Canada was making a bid to win one of the temporary, rotating seats on the UN Security Council, with the vote occurring in October that year. Therefore, the Government of Canada was using the opportunity to host the G8 as a vehicle to show it was capable of global leadership on a variety of issues. As MNCH was already recognized by the UN Secretary-General himself, the issue was perceived as relevant to the UN and its members. Moreover, many of the nations that experience the highest mortality rates formed one voting bloc that could have supported Canada in its bid. Two government bureaucrats explained:

*“[The issue] had a link with the MDGs and Canada’s pursuit of the UNSC seat. It demonstrated Canada’s value added to the UN. It could be framed as an attempt to deliver and take on responsibility. It would show that we are valuable internationally”.*

*“...it is foreign policy at New York. It is the PM and the UN. It is more than just development. It is a Security Council campaign too. It is high stakes”.*

Another mechanism for ensuring Canada’s relevance on the global stage involves creating a clear identity for the nation. By showing Canada was competent in development and health issues, it was hoped that Canada would carve out a niche identity within the global community. As two NGO executives reflected:

*“I can ask the average Dane or American about what their country is good at. The American would say that they are leaders in certain areas and every other country has their thing. Canada hasn’t really ...We do MNCH really well and people know us for that. So my gut was that someone, somewhere got that and made the link”.*

*“We’ve been working on the issue and Canada’s potential leadership as a global leader on kid survival for a few years now”.*

However, as described earlier, the MNCH initiative also aligned with health care priorities established by Obama and Clinton in the US, and Gordon Brown in the UK, and thus, aligned Canada with its closest allies, while still providing an opportunity to appear as a global leader to other nations. Thus, there was a need to dovetail the MNCH signature initiative with other MNCH efforts already in place at the global level. This included the upcoming Millennium Development Goals Summit which was to be hosted in September 2010 and the OECD DAC guidelines on Official Development Assistance, which affected the tracking mechanisms used for evaluating the G8’s accountability. Moreover, global level coalitions, such as the White Ribbon Alliance for Safe Motherhood, had developed global momentum and favoured certain projects and interventions. Therefore, global level pressures and the linkage to seemingly disconnected issues (e.g. the Security Council) played a role in the selection and development of the MNCH signature initiative.

#### *6.1.4 Domestic politics and priorities*

Given the minority government situation within Canada, the G8 Summit itself presented an opportunity for the Conservative government to demonstrate its global leadership and competence to its domestic constituency. Selecting MNCH as a signature initiative was recognized as a political tactic to suit their voter base and attract additional women voters. As one political advisor stated, “The target was women, suburban housewives. The Conservatives underperform among them. There are a variety of reasons for this, and this was seen as something to reach out to that target group...”. This sentiment was supported by another political strategist who stated “[the issue had to] contribute to the political bottom line, which means winning seats, getting new votes, and using our existing voter base”. Prior to the summit, the Conservative government marketed itself on its economic and fiscal competence (McMillan, 2011; Ibbitson, 2012). An issue such as MNCH allowed the Conservative government to demonstrate competence in a new area outside of economics, such as international development. As one NGO actor commented: “Harper was trying to show he had a heart...they are trying to

show themselves as caring, compassionate Conservatives”. Therefore, part of the domestic political tactics involved the linking of Harper, as the leader, with a particular initiative. This linking started when Harper personally made an announcement regarding the intention to concentrate on maternal and child health at the Davos World Economic Forum and followed up with comments in an op-ed in January 2010 in the Toronto Star (see Harper, 2010).

Beyond political tactics, the MNCH initiative also aligned with the priorities of one of Canada’s government agencies. CIDA had recently undertaken a review of its programs, and had established three new thematic priorities. One of the themes included “securing the future of children and youth” (CIDA, 2009), and thus, the newborn and child health portion of MNCH fit within the agency’s focal areas. As a result, CIDA had allocated a portion of its budget for this theme, which meant that new funding was not required to implement the MNCH initiative. Any initiative that did not require new resource allocations held appeal during times of an economic recession. Government and non-governmental actors stated:

*“I think CIDA liked it because it was keeping with their own priorities with children. You recall the efficiency and effectiveness exercise? Where we identified five areas of focus for Canada’s aid programming. One of them was kids”.*

*“I saw people’s eyes light up. They are saying ‘how much is this going to cost?’ and ‘where are we going to get the money?’ We were fortunate that the government had, in the Oda budget, an escalator, an 8 percent increase per year. We don’t have to take money from anywhere. We can allocate the new money, the money is coming”.*

*“I think they were appreciative to have an option where they didn’t have to take something from someone else, and now with aid capped, any new initiatives will be coming at the expense of something else because there is no new money. This consumed the last remaining”.*

In sum, the combination of the moral imperative associated with maternal, child and newborn health issues, the lack of progress on goals four and five of the MDGs and other competing

global pressures, and the domestic benefits, both politically and logistically, contributed to MNCH being well suited as a G8 Summit signature initiative. These factors help explain the context for phase one of the agenda-setting process.

## **6.2 Getting on the agenda: towards a framework for political prioritization**

Having described participants' perspectives on important factors that shaped the agenda-setting process and enabled the political prioritization of MNCH on the 2010 G8 Summit agenda, the findings are now compared to a recently developed analytical framework for global health issues.

As described in chapter two, Shiffman and Smith (2007) proposed a draft framework which outlines determinants of the political prioritization of global health initiatives, asserting that political prioritization is often the last ingredient needed to build momentum and make progress on resolving such issues. Other efforts to characterize and understand agenda setting have been applied to international health and include similar elements to the Shiffman and Smith (2007) framework. For example, Reich (1995) outlined five political streams by which policy agendas are set: organizational politics, symbolic politics, economics, science, and politician politics. Alternatively, AbouZahr (2001) stressed five main factors that contribute to the success of the global prioritization of issue: the clarity of topic, the ability to measure and monitor progress, the prospects for political commitment, including the presence of leadership and issue champions, the level of coordination among actors and institutions, and the existence of sustainable funding.

Despite the overlap amongst these various contributions, Shiffman and Smith's (2007) framework is perhaps the most well-suited to analyzing global health governance, due to its testability and comprehensive nature, and therefore was applied here. Their framework includes four main categories: 1) actor power, which refers to the strength of the individuals and organizations surrounding an issue and includes such factors as leadership, institutional effectiveness and network cohesion; 2) the role of ideas in portraying an issue, including the level of agreement as to the solutions and causes of a problem; 3) the political contexts surrounding an issue, such as the presence of policy windows and the existence of global governance mechanisms related to the issue; and 4) the characteristics of a particular issue, which involves the existence of effective interventions and credible indicators.

In the duration of this study, the G8 Summit met many of these conditions and fell short of meeting others. Each of the four categories is discussed in the subsequent sections below.

### *6.2.1 Strength of actor support*

During both phases of the agenda selection process, leadership was an important factor in determining the items that were included in the agenda and the substantive content of those agenda items. During phase one of the agenda selection process, clear champions emerged to push for the inclusion of MNCH on the summit agenda. Leadership was provided by non-governmental actors and coalitions, such as the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, and several government actors, both within the bureaucratic and political sides. Furthermore, individuals within the medical community stepped forward to act as spokespeople for the issue, some of which were cited within newspaper and journal articles that were published in the months leading up to the summit (e.g. Webster, 2010c, 2010a). As the focus switched from phase one to phase two of the agenda setting process, Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Harper and Minister Oda, took on global leadership roles to rally political support from G8 nations, non-G8 nations, foundations, major NGOs and multilateral institutions. Behind the scenes, bureaucrats also took on leadership roles to secure financial commitments from a variety of sources. As highlighted within previous sections of this dissertation, network members frequently cited leadership as a critical component to the success of the selection and shaping of the MNCH initiative, but the leadership itself was derived from multiple factors, including hierarchical position, scientific knowledge, relational position within the MNCH network, access to financial resources and social capital.

The important of leadership was not limited to individual network members. Organizational units, such as government departments, countries, coalitions and UN agencies, were also cited by participants as important to agenda setting. However, the existence of multiple sources of leadership also contributed to fragmentation and confusion during the agenda setting process (Chand et al., 2010). While the various issue champions agreed that MNCH required and deserved concentrated global attention, actors within the network were divided over the shaping of the MNCH initiative (phase two of the agenda-setting process). Specifically, agreement was not forthcoming over specific strategies, interventions and elements within a package that would

be put forward by the G8. The debates over the lack of inclusion of family planning and abortion in the initiative by the Canadian government exemplify this point. Shiffman and Smith (2007) outline the importance of cohesion within a policy community and argue that when there is widespread agreement on how problems should be solved political support is more likely to be strong. Previous scholars have claimed that networked governance is most effective when norms and values are shared across the network (Khagram, 2004; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). As outlined in chapter four, during the development of the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative, cohesion was evident within certain parts of the network, such as among actors within the PMO and the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. However, fragmentation was also evident, particularly among coalition and non-coalition NGO actors and some Canadian government departments and agencies. It became clear in the lead up to the 2010 G8 Summit that not all network actors shared the same vision to address global MNCH problems and it was the strength of the actors in disagreement and their leadership that helped explain what was included or excluded in the agenda.

Another actor based factor linked to the successful prioritization of an initiative is the presence of strong guiding institutions (Shiffman & Smith, 2007). The MNCH field includes a wide range of organizations and organization types, especially since the merging of the maternal and child health components. The spectrum of governance arrangements ranges from long standing UN agencies, including UNICEF and the WHO, to emergent multi-actor networks, such as the White Ribbon Alliance, and temporary ad-hoc coalitions such as the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. As a result, no single, enduring global institution has the responsibility and authority to coordinate all global MNCH efforts. It has been argued that the lack of a clearly identifiable institution with the mandate and authority to lead an initiative can hamper the successful prioritization of an initiative (McAdam et al., 1996; Shiffman & Smith, 2007). While the G8 served a catalyst role for MNCH – the forum does not itself fund or deliver health programs or interventions. Thus, during the preparatory process, the government actors responsible for organizing the summit had to consult with a myriad of organizations, networks and coalitions that do deliver programs and health services, some of which compete with each other for financial resources. The research demonstrated that key actors within the government of Canada were aware of the wide range of organizations involved in the field, but they chose to have in-

depth engagement with a few key guiding institutions and coalitions, including the OECD, WHO and the Canadian Coalition for MNCH.

The final factor related to the strength of actors is the degree to which civil society is mobilized to lobby for action from governments. Both the QDA and SNA results demonstrated that civil society organizations were an active part of the 2010 G8 MNCH preparatory process. Strong support existed for the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative. Despite the differences in stances on the shaping of the initiative among civil society actors, the Canadian government was able to rely on strong support from a select group of NGOs and IGOs that formed the Canadian Coalition for MNCH. However, according to some participants, the debates over the decision to not include family planning and abortion that occurred within the Canadian Parliament spilled over into both the NGO community and other governments. While support to select MNCH as the signature initiative appeared to have received near universal support for a wide array of actors (phase one), the decisions made by the Government of Canada during shaping of the initiative (phase two) evoked both praise and criticism (see for e.g. Lunn, 2010; The Lancet, 2010; Webster, 2010a, 2010c). The family planning/abortion issues were not the only areas that caused rifts in support for the Government of Canada's MNCH initiative. Despite the claims by Canadian government officials that focus would be given to integrated health programs (Webster, 2010b, 2010d), study participants witnessed continued favour towards vertical projects and interventions. As a consequence, when considered as a whole, support from civil society varied depending on the organization and its willingness to accept the Conservative government's stance on family planning/abortion, and believe the commitments made to horizontal health care.

### *6.2.2 The role of ideas*

How an issue is understood, framed and portrayed to the public affects the support and action for that particular issue (Snow et al., 1986). A strong body of research surround the topic of MNCH and agreement is evident on the leading causes and contributing factors that lead to high mortality rates (e.g. Curtis et al., 2005; WHO, 2005; Black et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010). Furthermore, while disagreement persists within government donor agencies and foundations as to the ideal balance between vertical and horizontal approaches (Claeson & Waldman, 2000;

AbouZahr, 2003), the medical and development communities are relatively united in the need to address systemic problems in health care, especially in economically poor countries and regions. Likewise, while the family planning/abortion debates resulted in much attention being diverted to the political and ideological side of the initiative, arguments were not made that refuted the facts that unsafe abortion are a major contributing factor to maternal deaths.

While some disagreement persisted within the MNCH network as to the prioritization of certain initiatives and approaches over others, the framing of the MNCH field was relatively consistent throughout the preparatory process of the 2010 G8 Summit. However, the research did highlight a preference for framing MNCH as a global health problem as compared to a broader and more complex economic/political development issue. Participants stressed that MNCH was a suitable agenda item for the G8 as it met the criterion of being “solvable” due to the fact that “solutions” existed. For example, accelerating efforts on particular type of interventions, such as the administration of specific micronutrients, can be directly attributed to improvements in both maternal and child mortality rates. By framing MNCH as a solvable issue that could generate a political “win” for the Canadian G8 Summit host, the issue then fit well with other donor agencies and foundations also focussed on accountability. In fact, a focus on accountability both in general and for this initiative in particular was a key platform of Prime Minister Harper for the 2010 G8 Summit.

Regardless of this focus on framing MNCH as a “solvable” problem, it is recognized by other national development agencies and international organizations that there remains a need to address systemic global health and social problems. However, few clear, innovative, affordable and politically salient strategies are present on how to achieve these goals within the short timeframes desired by politicians. Consequently, much of the 2010 G8 Summit work on the MNCH initiative focussed on financial commitments towards the initiative. For many actors involved, this success of the initiative came down to the amount of money pledged by G8, non-G8 and foundations rather than efforts to undertake an integrated approach to MNCH challenges. Thus, while long term gains in MNCH will require addressing the underlying complex problems of development and governance, the simplicity of the frame chosen appeared to provide a platform for united action within the global governance forum of the G8.

### 6.2.3 *Political contexts*

As described earlier in this chapter, the domestic and global political context of the 2010 G8 Summit played a significant role in the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative. A policy window – a temporary opportunity in which the conditions are well suited to advancing a certain initiative (Kingdon, 1984; Solecki & Michaels, 1994; Sabatier, 1998) – was present during the lead up to the 2010 G8 due to the global level conferences related to MNCH that were scheduled before and after the G8 Summit. This included the 10 year review conference for the MDGs, which was held in September 2010, three months after the G8 summit, and the Women Deliver Conference, which was held two weeks before the summit and attended by high profile actors including UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and WHO Director General of the WHO. The publicity leading up to these conferences highlighted the fact that progress on MDGs 4 and 5 was substantially lower than other MDGs. Furthermore, with the leaders' G20 emerging as the preferred global summit forum for discussing strategies to end the GFC, many participants perceived that the G8 was in need of a success on a development topic. While food security was highlighted early on as a possible issue for the 2010 G8 Summit in Canada, the topic was selected by the Italian government as a focal topic for the 2009 L'Aquila Summit. MNCH had not been previously discussed by G8 leaders and its inclusion in the G8 discussions appeared to be welcomed by all members.

The political window of opportunity at the domestic political level within Canada, was created by the electoral politics and a minority government situation. Political staff explained that the Conservative Party of Canada was seeking to demonstrate leadership on an issue that would help increase their share of votes with women in specific regions. The environment of fiscal restraint within the Government of Canada, partially due to the GFC, also contributed to the opportunity for MNCH. Under the accountability framework championed by Prime Minister Harper, it was stressed the commitments to the MNCH 2010 G8 Summit must be “new” funds. However for the Canadian contribution, several Canadian bureaucrats explained that the “new” funds from Canada fit within the recently identified priority for CIDA of “securing the future of children and youth” (CIDA, 2009). As well, a convergence of support for MNCH was developing within Canadian branches of several large international NGOs contributed to the opening of a policy window. These large, vocal organizations were able to demonstrate overlap

between their membership and the membership of the Conservative Party of Canada and were mobilized and ready for action over a year in advance of the 2010 G8 Summit. Thus, the G8, as a global governance forum, served as an institutional flashpoint, with the summit event providing a window of opportunity to advance an initiative on MNCH.

While the global and domestic context created a policy window for MNCH, the weak and fragmented global governance landscape for MNCH was a potential obstacle to the selection of MNCH for the G8. As previously discussed the governance history of MNCH reveals sporadic leadership, multiple overlapping organizations, and institutions with weak authority and scant resources. Moreover, the lack of progress in meeting global health targets has been attributed to poor governance (Lee et al., 1996; Buse & Walt, 2002; Gostin & Mok, 2009). While Young (2010) argues that redundancies are important to the effectiveness of any governance system, Koremenos *et al.* (2001) stress that organizations need to be efficiently designed to optimize resources and minimize fragmentation, duplication and lack of cooperation. It is not clear whether the fragmented governance landscape of MNCH is a benefit or hindrance to the future prospects for the governance of MNCH. The SNA of this research demonstrates that diverse arrays of actors with high social capital were involved in the shaping of the initiative. Social capital theory argues that this increases the potential for new and innovative ideas to surface, which is urgently required to tackle the systemic problems associated with the field (Huppé & Creech, 2012). However, competition over financial resources and the lack of cooperation among many actors also acts as an obstacle to progress. In reality a shift is occurring “from vertical representation to horizontal participation” (Buse & Walt, 2002, p. 169), whereby traditional hierarchical organizational structures with state based decision making and accountability structures are being gradually supplanted by networked forms of organization that include both state and non-state actors. Thus, while centralized supranational governance may be one way to improve coherency, a diffuse governance system, with private-public partnerships, is a future reality.

#### 6.2.4 *Issue characteristics*

MNCH is a complex topic, yet the status of associated challenges has been consistently portrayed with simple mortality rate statistics. Shiffman and Smith (2007) argue that political

support favours issues that have both severity and progress indicators that capture the severity and that can be easily measured and reported. While data collection and reporting issues continue to be problematic within the MNCH field (Khan et al., 2006), advances in estimation methods have helped the development of credible statistics over the past decade. Consequently, awareness of the severity and progress on MNCH problems is increasingly being widely published and acknowledged (Bhutta, 2000; Bhutta et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010).

While preventable maternal and child deaths is a serious problem deserving attention, other health disorders result in much larger mortality rates, including HIV/AIDS and malaria. For instance, it is currently estimated that approximately 340,000 maternal deaths occur yearly (Hogan et al., 2010), yet over 2 million annual deaths are attributed to HIV/AIDS (Bongaarts et al., 2011). However, since annual mortality rates for children under 5 years of age are estimated to be 8.8 million (Black et al., 2010), the coupling of maternal and child health helped increase the relative severity of the issue. Yet this coupling appeared to create tensions among actors within the MNCH network. Participants from outside of government voiced concerns about an imbalance between the maternal and child focus and even expressed dissatisfaction with the term MNCH including the word “maternal” before “child”. As an executive from an international organization stated:

*“Our concern was that the conversation was all about moms. This was maternal and child health and to this day people still refer to it as the maternal health initiative. And so, a number of organizations who were particularly child focussed wondered, where were the kids? What can be done about the 9 million kids dying yearly? It is about understanding the nuances of the conversation that never get expressed publically in the media. It is frustrating.”*

Yet, other actors believed the emphasis on the maternal component was justified, as exemplified by statements from a Canadian NGO executive: “The feelings were that the biggest problem was the maternal. In terms of MDGs, more progress had been made on reducing child mortality. What we needed now was emphasis on maternal health”. A representative from a medical professional organization went further by claiming that tensions have subsided: “I think that there is better coordination between the ‘M’ and ‘C’ than there is what you have read about what critics have said in the past. I think that there have been massive efforts to align our sector to

work together and to understand the benefits of investing in all of these issues.” While the research did reveal some tensions were evident, they appeared to be limited to the actors outside the government and ultimately did not manifest in a way that resulted in priority for the MNCH initiative being downgraded by the Government of Canada.

The use of mortality statistics helped to humanize the issue. Political attention may be heightened due to the possibility that strategies and interventions employed will save lives and social responsibility towards the issue is accepted (Iyengar, 1990). Furthermore, as previously discussed, there are many tested, non-controversial interventions that exist for MNCH, which simply require additional funding or scaling (Jones et al., 2003). For example, vaccination and micronutrient programs are recognized as cheap and effective ways to increase child survival rates (UNDP, 2003). In contrast, strategies to address health care management, sustainable funding and infrastructure in developing countries, are more difficult to directly link to improvements in mortality rates (Haines et al., 2007). The combination of these characteristics, coupled with careful framing, helped make MNCH an issue well suited for political support within the G8.

Shiffman and Smith (2007) developed their political prioritization framework to better understand why some global health initiatives become a political priority and other issues do not. They applied the framework to the global safe motherhood initiative, which was launched in 1987 and aimed to reduce maternal mortality rates (Stars, 2006). Yet, by 2007 the initiative had not attracted high levels of political attention, nor the goal of reducing maternal mortality by 50 percent by 2010 (Stars, 2006; Shiffman & Smith, 2007). Table 6.1 summarizes and compares the factors that affected the prioritization for the safe motherhood initiative versus the 2010 G8 MNCH initiative. As the findings illustrate, although the MNCH initiative was prioritized and set as a signature initiative for the 2010 G8 summit, not all of the conditions that Shiffman and Smith highlight as critical were present or met. Furthermore, in both cases fragmentation and tension were found to be present within the policy community, and powerful institutional guidance was absent. These areas of incongruence illuminate questions for scholars further testing and applying the framework with regards to why some issues can still be politically prioritized when not all conditions are satisfied. The findings from this research led to the hypothesis that although the framework involves a comprehensive summary of all possible

conditions conducive to political prioritization, a limited combination of these may still achieve success (e.g. if any 6 or more conditions are present, then political prioritization is likely).

Further research would be required to test such a hypothesis.

Table 6.1 Shiffman and Smith (2007) framework for the determinants of political prioritization as applied to safe motherhood and G8 MNCH cases

<b>Factor type</b>	<b>Factors</b>	<b>Safe motherhood initiative (1987-2007)</b>	<b>G8 MNCH initiative (2010)</b>
Actor power	Policy community cohesion	Fragmentation, tensions	Fragmentation, tensions
	Leadership	No public leader	Multiple recognizable and “hidden” leaders
	Guiding institutions	Weak, no UN leadership	Multiple, weak, overlapping
	Civil society mobilization	Weak, minimal organized grassroots support	Organized, politically supportive, some tensions
Ideas	Internal framing	“neglected tragedy”, no agreement or resonant effects	Framed as simple problem, some tensions
	External framing	Multiple frames, “motherhood” did not resonate	Framed as financial commitments and accountability
Political contexts	Policy windows	Opened in 2000 (MDGs), little capitalization	Opened in 2010 (G8, MDG review), capitalized
	Global governance structure	Fragmented, no institutional home, few resources	Fragmented, multiple actors, competition
Issue characteristics	Credible indicators & measurement	Limited, technical difficulties	Improved data and estimation techniques
	Severity	Low compared to other health issues	High with inclusion of child mortality statistics
	Effective interventions	Not simple, little evidence	Presented as simple, scale up existing interventions

### 6.3 Networked governance: insufficient but important

Despite that MNCH was became a priority initiative during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process, political prioritization is merely one aspect to networked governance in summit diplomacy. Consideration still needs to be given to whether networked governance was effective

in shaping the initiative. Since previous research has indicated that resolving MNCH challenges requires integrated health solutions, the effectiveness of networked governance can be gauged by whether integrated health solutions were reached or even stimulated by the G8 summit.

Therefore, this section will examine whether the complexity of MNCH was better addressed by the networked approach than previous attempts by the global health governance architecture.

### *6.3.1 Reflections on networked governance challenges*

Many participants involved in the summit preparatory process perceived that the preparatory process constituted a networked approach. Yet, popular sentiment was that significant change in how MNCH would be governed globally, or locally within areas of poor maternal, newborn and child health, would not occur as a result of the 2010 G8 Summit. In part, this was due to the fact that MNCH was presented and framed as a “simple” problem. As described previously, the “simple” framing was a specific strategy that, in part, helped ensure that MNCH was selected as a signature initiative. As two Government of Canada mid-level researchers stated, “I think everyone agrees MNCH isn’t rocket science. We know what needs to be done” and “Everyone knew what MNCH interventions worked. We were not inventing anything new”.

Despite the simple framing, the G8 communiqué does use terms that acknowledge integrated solutions and a more holistic approach to address the complexity of MNCH. For instance, the G8 Muskoka Declaration included statements such as “action is required on all factors that affect the health of women and children” (G8, 2010a, p. 2), and “our collective undertaking will support strengthened country-led national health systems in development countries” (G8, 2010a, p. 3). In addition, Annex I of the G8 Muskoka Initiative mentions a focus on “health system strengthening”, “continuum of care”, “integrated interventions”, and “better synthesis and sharing of innovations” (G8, 2010a, pp. 13-14). However, the Declaration also stated that “each donor is free to chose the mechanism they consider most effective, including multilateral agencies, civil society partners, and direct bilateral support to developing country partners” (G8, 2010a, pp. 13-14). Thus, while the initiative contained statements that satisfy advocates of both vertical and horizontal programs, it left the strategic details on programs and policies up to the various donor countries and foundations, and thereby, increased the risk that the Declaration claims would become mere “lip service”.

One item accomplished for MNCH at the 2010 G8 Summit was an increased in financial resources devoted to global MNCH challenges. By the end of the summit, the MNCH initiative was shaped to include agreement from G8 nations to commit \$5.0 billion of additional funding for MNCH over five years, and additional commitments of \$2.3 billion from select non-G8 nations (Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and Switzerland) and foundations (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UN Foundations) over the same timeframe (G8, 2010a). Yet, the G8 Muskoka Declaration did not specify details as to which specific initiatives were to be supported by the new funding commitments. Participants viewed the focus of the funding to be problematic for three main reasons: 1) an overemphasis on accountability relative to the complex, transformative, systemic changes that needed to occur, 2) a reinforcement of existing programs, and 3) it would support only “business as usual”.

Participants reflected that 2010 G8 summit championed new measures on funding accountability that had not been previously employed. Given that the G8 had been criticized for its lack of accountability and for its inability to demonstrate successful outputs and outcomes on previous Summit Declarations (Kirton, 1999; Cooper, 2004; Aginam, 2007), participants recognized the importance of these steps. As three participants stated:

*“There was a lot of design issues around the initiative related to additionality of funding. We were very careful with some very technical cutting edge issues. I don’t think we realized how cutting edge it would be. If you establish a base line for MCH funding, whatever year it has been, you have to know how much you spent on MCH by that date.”(Senior government bureaucrat, Canadian government)*

*“We insisted it had to be new or additional resources, we really put pressure on governments to do that. In the past they may not have felt that pressure to come up with funds they already announced on another programs. But, we insisted it had to be new. It was very difficult, but we insisted on new funding.” (Senior government bureaucrat, Canadian government)*

*“There was a lot of quiet conversation about how much money could be raised. International conversations between governments, individual conversations between*

*people and their own contacts. There were calculation matrices about what would qualify as funding.”(IO executive)*

While focussing on funding and accountability within the G8 is a laudable task that helped address criticisms of the forum’s unrealized past commitments, it potentially diverted attention from difficult discussions on the root causes of MNCH problems. Consequently, a novel approach that addressed the systemic nature of MNCH problems was not created through the G8 summit preparatory process. This is supported by the statements from three Canadian government health experts:

*“We know this doesn’t work if you don’t look at the whole system, at the whole thing. Then you have a better chance of solving the problem. The one of the reasons why we haven’t made progress on MNCH is that it’s not lack of trying. It’s a systems problem. If you don’t fix the system, the wheel that squeaks will always squeak. Whatever is the weakest component will remain the weakest.”*

*“Dealing with complex problems, dealing with complex interventions, you need a longer time line. Politicians don’t want that. They want to give the injections. They want to give pills because they are easily quantifiable and show a certain level of impact on the outcomes. But it’s going to take a lot more components than that to have sustainable improvements over time.”*

*“It would be too bad if we are taking a simple approach just because it’s easier to measure and manage. If it’s the measurement that’s preventing us from taking a broader perspective, we are being driven by the tools, tracking system and indicators instead of trying to drive the issue.”*

Not only did the focus on funding accountability potentially restrict efforts that could have been made towards generating new integrated solutions, it also created a situation whereby existing initiatives with proven performance track records were favoured for funding – these too were deemed “simple” wins. Thus, participants voiced concerns that existing vertical initiatives led by individual countries would likely continue to receive priority treatment. One Canadian

example included an organization that received funding in the past from the Government of Canada and now was perceived to be a candidate for an increased budget to continue its work. A second example involved a major global private-public partnership that has been working on MNCH issues for more than a decade. A senior official from a non-G8 country that agreed to commit funds to the G8 MNCH initiative explained that their new future contributions would be devoted to this group. Again, while participants were always quick to acknowledge that any and all funding for MNCH was welcome support, there was concern that supporting only existing, strong, vertical approaches minimized the opportunity for new, integrated (horizontal and vertical) approaches to emerge.

Moreover, participants recognized that while a focus on additional funding would help make some progress with global MNCH, it may also support a “business as usual” approach. During one official component of the preparatory process, the April 2010 G8 Development Ministers meeting, the preference for a status quo approach was evident. The Chair’s Summary from that meeting includes a revealing statement: “Ministers agreed that progress in the health sector does not require new mechanisms, funds and structures” (CIDA, 2010, p. 2). Furthermore, one NGO executive explained that for most of the 2010 G8 preparatory process for MNCH, the term “health system strengthening” was avoided, which would have been expected had an integrated approach been adopted.

Ultimately, it was recognized by some participants that the role of the G8 was more of a catalyst for increasing the global political profile of the issue, than working out details to solve a complex governance problem. This claim is supported by the statements from two NGO executives and one foundation representative:

*“I have concerns about delivery mechanisms, but that’s the next step. But, having an accountability mechanism for the first time makes the [MNCH] initiative meaningful”.*

*“There has been nothing about details. This is still at 100,000 feet. I would have thought there would have been more details coming out of the G8. But, this is a work in progress and everyone is taking a deep breath from the Summit. In Ottawa they are taking their summer holidays. We have the MDG Summit in September, then the Global Replenishment in October, and the G20 in Korea and poverty is on the agenda. So*

*everyone is taking a collective deep breath. But there are no details when the announcement came out of the G8, which was a bit surprising. I thought there would be more.”*

*“We saw the Summit not as a stand-alone event, but as a piece of the puzzle on a continuum to set up the MDG Summit.”*

The oversimplification or reductionist approach to MNCH can be attributed to the inability of the networked approach within the confines of the G8 system to overcome deeply embedded issues within the global governance arena. Firstly, any host nation of a G8 summit is likely to use the opportunity to host a prestigious international forum to achieve modest gains and satisfy global and domestic political pressure points, and Canada was no exception. As one Canadian political strategist explained:

*“He [Prime Minister Harper] made a decision in consultation with the relevant ministers that the MNCH would be Canada’s signature initiative. The focus of that wouldn’t be on setting huge and ultimately unreachable goals. But, on focusing our efforts on cost effective existing means to protect the health of vulnerable mothers and kids. Whether it is zinc tablets, which are pennies or birthing mats, these sorts of things that unfortunately people in the developing world do not have access to.*

The fact that MNCH discussions raised concerns within Canada about reproductive rights and services, such as access to safe abortions, led the Conservative government to need to take a public stance on the details of the initiative and how funding would be allocated. In doing so, the Government of Canada narrowed the scope of MNCH issues to be addressed (Attaran et al., 2010). While access to safe abortion was only one issue within MNCH, given the interrelated nature of complex problems, purposefully removing one issue could have had a cascading effect and limited the changes being made to the broader MNCH system.

In addition to domestic political considerations, Canada, as any host nation, would desire a “win” for the G8 and for its own signature initiative. But demonstrating a win cannot take decades. Therefore, by avoiding commitments to specific programs or interventions within the

MNCH initiative, and instead concentrating on funding commitments and the acceptance of an accountability framework by other G8 countries, Canada and the G8 could demonstrate success.

Secondly, the framing, tracking, and details of the MNCH initiative needed to fit within existing global projects as explained in the previous section.

Thirdly, the 2010 G8 Summit was held during a time when political attention was focused on the Global Financial Crisis, which increased a perceived sense of risk around financial investment in truly innovative solutions; that is, participants recognized the need to not require over burdensome new funding. Yet, keeping financial resources flowing to “proven” projects would not be expected to lead to significant change.

Lastly, within and beyond MNCH, international development scholars and practitioners have faced the ongoing challenge of how to develop long-term, bottom up solutions that can be institutionalized and sustainable within conditions of finite financial capital (Moyo, 2009). Moreover, current trends in development aid include an increasingly large financial contribution role by non-state actors, such as foundations. However, participants were quick to point out that the foundations involved in the field of MNCH have their own approaches and their own fiduciary responsibilities. For instance, the Gates Foundation is widely recognized as an important actor in the field of health, but the Gates Foundation had selected which interventions to support before the 2010 G8 Summit and did not substantially change their priorities after the summit. Given that the flow of private capital is a component of “the system”, any significant change in overall approaches to MNCH would likely be revealed in changes in other missions and mandates, such as the Gates Foundation’s own interventions.

### *6.3.2 Reflections on networked governance benefits*

While the previous section discussed how networked governance does not necessarily lead to outcomes that meet the expectations of all actors involved in a system, nor transforms the problems and tensions at the root of the complex MNCH challenge, the approach does have merits in the context of the G8 summit. A commonly cited concern among the summit diplomacy scholarship is concerning the G8’s membership (English et al., 2005). The small, self-selected group of large and powerful ‘Western’ economies omits the majority of the world’s population, including those affected by major social and economic challenges. Given that discussions on

health governance and any resulting programs and interventions implicate a wide range of nations and people beyond the core membership, problems of legitimacy surface (Linn & Bradford, 2007). For instance, the G8 has been perceived to lack the legitimacy afforded to the UN and its universal membership (Thakur, 2006). While G8 summits in recent years have included non-member countries on an ad hoc basis, the “variable geometry” approach (adding in some representatives on certain issues, and changing them for other representatives for other issues) leaves a growing sense that informal and inconsistent inclusion may not suffice (Dobson, 2007; Martin, 2007).

It has been suggested that global public policy networks help address participatory and operational deficits in governance (Rhodes, 1997; Benner et al., 2004). Thus, by embracing a networked approach, especially if the architecture of the approach were communicated to the public, a case could be made for the G8 continuing as a legitimate global governance forum. The study demonstrated that a networked governance process was occurring during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process, which enabled a coalition of NGOs, some medical practitioners and professionals with experience and expertise in MNCH issues, academics, and foundations to influence the selection of the signature initiative and what that initiative entailed. The inclusion and consideration of a broader range of expertise than that which is held within the government departments and agencies typically responsible for summit diplomacy could be understood as one step in enhancing legitimacy of a process that has historically been quite closed. Yet, the inclusiveness should not be overstated. As the results show, geography did matter and the majority of additional actors involved were still from Canada or G8 countries. Therefore, the networked governance approach still needs to ensure broader involvement of those most affected by MNCH issues.

Although participatory deficits may be reduced by a networked governance approach, the development of network membership is not necessarily purposeful, nor is it a democratic process (Sorensen, 2005). Channels of influence and resources flows may favor certain actors. This may be derived from an actor’s financial capital, connections to other actor’s in prestigious positions, and their ability to mobilize social capital (Ibarra, 1993; Kahler, 2009). However, adherence to democratic principles did not appear to enter the networked MNCH policy process. Furthermore,

if attempts were made to design a democratic structure for a network, the flexible, adaptable nature of the networked approach may be compromised.

Networked governance may also be regarded as a necessary condition to address the numerous challenges associated with any complex issue. A network of diverse actors creates a pool of social capital, out of which innovative ideas may surface. As argued by Huppé and Creech (2012) and Lewis (2005), in situations where institutions are weak or fragmented, networked governance arrangements may emerge to solve complex problems. As previously discussed, conventional multilateral institutions associated with MNCH may be weak; however, there are an increasing number of non-traditional organizations (e.g. The White Ribbon Alliance and the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health) that may be filling an institutional void. However, the fragmentation in the governance landscape presents a coordination challenge to help ensure the innovative ideas that could contribute to transformative change are prioritized and nurtured.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) claim that one benefit of networks is that they serve as vehicles for communication and exchanges that may stimulate the transformation of participants and their ideas. While the results of this research showed no evidence that individual actors were transformed in how they thought about MNCH, it is possible that certain actors experienced a transformation in how they approach policy work within global governance institutions. In particular, the Canadian Coalition for MNCH highlighted the unique experience of the coalition and the value of what they learned from this process for moving forward in MNCH governance activities.

The presence of networked governance in the MNCH field appeared to be insufficient unless the means by which to ensure the social capital can be optimized and channeled in the system was present (Robins et al., 2011). The effectiveness of networked relations requires such factors as the coordination of actions, the development of trust, and the collective establishment of goals. However, it remains unclear that if the ultimate outcomes from a networked governance process fail to deliver, whether the network structure can be blamed. The G8 MNCH network demonstrated a basic agreement on goals (to reduce mortality rates and achieve progress on MDG 4 and 5), trust was developed between some actors, and coordinated action was also evident. However, the agreement that was achieved among numerous actors within the network

appeared to not produce a breakthrough in MNCH policies and programs. Specific details were not developed for programs that would achieve system wide changes in health governance, nor did any innovative response to global MNCH surface. However, the process did respond to previous criticisms of the G8 in that it improved the legitimacy, albeit in a limited manner. As a result, the networked governance approach achieved mixed results and showed that arguably, it was necessary but insufficient to solve this particular complex global challenge.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

This chapter brought together the SNA and QDA findings to synthesize how networked governance affected the political prioritization of the MNCH initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit. The first section of this chapter examines emergent factors from the perspectives of study participants that contributed to the selection of MNCH for the 2010 G8 Summit. In essence, the context in which networked governance was operating and the agenda was being developed served as a critical explanatory factor for the political prioritization. The interactions of the following created an important window of opportunity: the nature of the G8 forum, the nature of the MNCH problem, the ability for actors to reduce the complexity to a simple, solvable issue, the global political events that aligned with the 2010 G8 summit, and the potential for a domestic political “win” for the hosting government.

Using Shiffman and Smith’s (2007) framework, the study showed that necessary conditions for political prioritization were present for the MNCH issue, explaining why it may have been selected over alternative issues. The strength of actor support, the role of ideas, the political context, and the characteristics of the issue reiterated how actors could rationalize the selection of this issue and the associated content of the issue.

While the networked governance approach did achieve success in both having MNCH selected as a signature issue and in broadening the range of actors and expertise engaged in the G8 summit preparatory process, the networked governance approach did not result in transformative change when compared to previous global MNCH efforts. The 2010 G8 Summit mobilized political and capital resources for MNCH, yet the substantive details on MNCH related programmes and strategies were left to individual countries and organizations. While the communiqué language includes references to the need for integrated approaches, no specific

actions were outlined that will address the systemic challenges that underpin MNCH. Therefore, the research findings led to the conclusion that networked governance remains necessary but is insufficient alone to solve complex global problems. But such a conclusion challenges previous research that suggests networked governance as an alternative governing arrangement that will somehow be able to respond more rapidly to such complex problems.

## Chapter 7 Conclusion and implications

This dissertation began with the proposition that the G8 summit is a potential site for networked governance but that empirical evidence that described which actors are involved, how their relationships are structured, and what the implications are for the political prioritization of issues within the summit preparatory process were limited. Networked governance has been recognized as having the potential to address the increasing concerns about the G8's purpose, identity and working methods. It has become increasingly obvious that states cannot and do not approach global policy problems alone. Responding to the growing body of scholarship that argues networked processes within summit diplomacy in general, and in the G8 summit process specifically, remain underexplored and poorly understood, the research turned to the current G8 summit process for 2010 as a case study of networked governance. It is within this context that this research posed the question: how does a global level network affect political prioritization and governance of issues within the G8 summit process?

In order to explore the degree to which the preparatory process of the G8 summit can be characterized as a form of networked governance and to examine how a networked approach shaped the political commitment towards a complex global problem, this study focused on the signature initiative that emerged during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process – maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH).

Due to the complexity of MNCH problems, both scholars and practitioners have asserted that integrated solutions and global level commitments are required. Various efforts to improve the health of mothers and children have occurred at the global level since the formation of the League of Nations (Youde, 2012), yet progress has recently slowed during the past two decades. Approximately 340,000 mothers and 8.8 million children still die annually from preventable causes (Black et al., 2010; Hogan et al., 2010). Weak global political leadership and the lack of accessible funding for health interventions have been cited as two of the many factors that have contributed to the lack of progress. Multilateral institutions and global forums such as the WHO, the UN General Assembly, and the G8 hold the potential to galvanize action for MNCH due to the concentrated and highly publicized efforts of powerful nations. Thus, many MNCH advocates celebrated the decision by Canada that the 2010 G8 Summit would focus on MNCH as

its signature initiative. Yet the excitement was also met with trepidation, and many questions remained. Would the summit present the catalytic moment required to regain momentum among different actor groups to achieve integrated solutions? Would the much recognized shift required for health system strengthening be realized? Would objective medical advice be included in the policy planning process?

A review of the MNCH literature described historical developments and previous global efforts to address MNCH, and demonstrated that the field is hampered by insufficient financial resources, competition between maternal and child health agendas, sporadic political commitments, and weak and incoherent governance architecture. Yet, global MNCH is also a field of change and holds the potential for innovation. Multiple types of state and non-state actors are designing and implementing a variety of programs, strategies and interventions. Top down and bottom up approaches can be found. Funding, while still insufficient according to many actors in the field, is flowing from multiple traditional and non-traditional sources. While this dynamic landscape seems promising for both global governance and networked governance, fragmentation among actors and tensions over vertical or horizontal approaches are constraining progress. This research used the case of MNCH as an example of a high profile summit initiative to contribute to a better understanding of the actors that contribute to the governance process and political prioritization of global challenges.

A mixed method approach was undertaken in the study of the 2010 G8 Summit hosted by Canada. The two dominant components of this approach were a social network analysis (SNA) and qualitative data analysis (QDA). Through this mixed method approach, three major themes were explored that influenced and shaped the preparatory process of the 2010 G8 Summit for the MNCH initiative: i) the network structures and actors within the process; ii) the role of social capital; and iii) the impact of networked governance on political prioritization and agenda setting.

The 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH was not solely state-based; rather, an array of networked actors was involved. Moreover, the networked actors represented a multitude of organizational types, revealing a substantive difference from the inter-governmental summit networks previously described by Slaughter (2005). The summit preparatory process was found to include a core group of centrally located governmental actors, which was to be expected

given the characteristics of the forum (intergovernmental in nature). However, another group of centrally located actors involved a coalition of NGOs, which developed support for the argument of the process representing a form of networked governance involving traditional and non-traditional actors. Yet, through the exploration of the perspectives of actors intimately involved with the selection and development of the MNCH initiative, it became clear that much contestation existed regarding the role and influence of certain actors within the broader network, especially the actors from the Canadian NGO coalition.

The social network analysis aided to establish the structure and characteristics of the relationships comprising the MNCH network. However, this static view of the structure of the preparatory process was unable to explain how actors navigated through the network and attempted to achieve individual and collective goals. Thus, social capital measures were employed to analyze the strategies of various actors. Overall, the suite of characteristics used to determine social capital highlighted that the technical medical professionals held the highest social capital within the network. However, two mid-level federal government bureaucrats also exhibited high social capital, although they only developed and mobilized this capital by “breaking the rules” within the bureaucracy and adopting strategies that were different from other federal government bureaucrats. These same two government bureaucrats had relationship patterns that were different from their colleagues, as demonstrated by the structural equivalence tests.

Beyond the network structure, a host of other factors contributed to the selection and shaping of the MNCH summit initiative. The domestic and global political environment provided both constraining and enabling factors. Through the application of a conceptual framework developed by Shiffman and Smith (2007) for the prioritization of global health initiatives, further insight was gained as to why MNCH was selected and how it was shaped into an initiative. However, while the networked governance approach to MNCH was inclusive of a variety of actors and positions, it did not appear to be structured to address the systemic problems underlying MNCH.

The remainder of this chapter is structured in two parts. The first part discusses the success of the study in meeting the six objectives and incorporates the conceptual and empirical contributions to four main literatures: networked governance, summit diplomacy, global health

governance, and social networks. The second part includes a reflection on the strengths and limitations of this study and identifies future opportunities for research.

## **7.1 Meeting objectives**

### *7.1.1 Objectives 1 & 2: network structure and actor roles*

In meeting these objectives, the results of this study demonstrated that state-based organizations are tied to a diverse range of actors and organizations beyond their own government agencies, but these organizations are mainly based in G8 countries. When classified by organization type, actors nominated most frequently in the SNA were federal government public servants, followed by those occupying political positions and NGO actors. Actors from business, think tanks or the media were minimally present in the summit preparatory network. More actors were generalists rather than specialists with expertise in MNCH. Actors were present from a range of occupational positions, but most were in middle ranked positions. The types of relationships that the range of actors were engaged were highly varied, with descriptors of the role of certain actors including: “key player”, “broker”, “authority”, “leader”, “critical link”, “connector”, “instigator”, “catalyst”, “facilitator”, “fund-raiser”, “lobbyer”, “door opener”, and “supplier of information”.

Of particular relevance for this study, the formation of coalitions (networks within the network) appeared to be a popular strategy to increase the capacity to influence policy. One notable example was the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, which included several Canadian branches of large international NGOs and one international organization, which formed a temporary coalition for the sole purpose of engaging in the summit preparatory process. This example was highlighted by both the QDA results and by a dense interconnected cluster in the SNA results. Most notable however, was that the networked relationships were highly contested by government bureaucrats, NGOs, and members within several distinct coalitions. This result supports the assertion that networked governance does not simply “slide into place” as though it fills a structural void, as is so often characterized in the networked governance literature (e.g. Castells, 2008).

The findings also revealed that only a minimal number of actors were located in developing countries or regions that have significant maternal and child health problems and high maternal and child mortality rates, demonstrating that networked governance does not necessarily ensure that the engagement of marginalized or vulnerable populations will occur to a

greater extent than in traditional governance arrangements. Networked governance is not necessarily expected to ensure the inclusion of marginalized populations, yet, it does purport to include non-traditional and non-state actors in a meaningful way in the summit process. As such, it is worth noting that “non-traditional” does not automatically extend to representatives of marginalized groups. Donor priorities and perspectives have prevailed for decades compared to a bottom-up approach to determining problems and solutions. Thus, it can be hypothesized that this situation may contribute to the persistence of MNCH problems, although future research would be required to test this assertion.

To determine the most central actors within the network and thereby illuminate the role of non-state actors in a networked governance process in summit diplomacy and meet the second research objective, three different centrality measures were used. One centrality measure yielded insight about the prominence of actors based on direct incident ties (Freeman’s centrality), another focused on the brokerage roles of actors the paths of ties among actors (betweenness centrality), and the third measure assessed the importance of an actor considering the number of ties and the extent to which those other actors are well connected (Eigenvector centrality). The results showed that the most central (Freeman) was a mid-level DFAIT bureaucrat, followed by two senior DFAIT executives. The most central actors were all from Canada, and mostly from DFAIT, CIDA, PMO in mid to high occupation levels within the bureaucracy. The NGO executives who formed the Canadian Coalition were also highly central.

In terms of betweenness (actors that link otherwise disconnected actors), the same mid-level bureaucrat was identified as top ranking and CIDA and DFAIT were still central organizations. The second ranked actor by this measure of centrality was a Canadian academic who potentially played an important resource broker role. Worth noting is that half of the most central actors defined by the betweenness measure were not included as the top 20 most central actors by the Freeman centrality test. The betweenness test also revealed that actors that occupied top level hierarchical structural positions (e.g. PM, Sherpas) were lower in centrality, thereby demonstrating that having a top position within a hierarchy does not equate to being a broker.

The final consideration for centrality involves the Bonacich-Eigenvector results, which also highlighted the same mid-level actor from DFAIT and the importance of the CIDA

bureaucrats, as per the previous two measures of centrality. Additionally, the Bonacich-Eigenvector ranking placed the NGO executives in the top ranked positions, which indicated that “who you know matters”, and that NGO executives successfully connected to other in positions of importance.

While the SNA survey concentrated on individuals, the in-depth interviews included a question that asked participants to reflect on the key actors involved with the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative for the 2010 G8 Summit. While a total of 112 agencies, departments, organizations, networks and coalitions were found to be included in the summit preparatory process for MNCH, it was determined that a core group of actors at the organizational level were deemed to be important to the decision to focus on MNCH. Key actor groups flagged by participants include: the G8 as a collective, DFAIT as the lead department in the summit process, CIDA as the agency with substantive expertise in the MNCH field, the Canadian Coalition for MNCH in mobilizing support from civil society, international organizations as a link to larger global initiatives, and the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office as political strategists.

Further details about the characteristics of the network engaged in the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH were revealed by the SNA tests that showed a low overall degree of structural equivalence within the network. This result demonstrates that most actors brought unique relationships to the network and that if one person left the network, those relationships would be lost given that another actor did not hold the same pattern of relationships. One of the blocks that did demonstrate a high level of structural equivalence contained most of the executives from the Canadian Coalition for MNCH, which indicates that these individuals placed importance on the same type of relationships. The other block that had actors of high structural equivalence was the “policy doer” block, which contained low to mid-level bureaucrats from several federal departments and agencies. This result illustrates the fact that low to mid-level bureaucrats generally did not have access to diverse resources through the network.

### *7.1.2 Objective 3 and 4: the development and mobilization of social capital*

Having identified the actors that comprised the network engaged in the summit preparatory process and the structure and patterns of their relationships to one another, the research then utilized theories of social capital to explain how actors became involved in and influenced the summit preparatory process. It became clear through this research that different organization types and actors used different strategies for engaging in networked governance. For instance, the Canadian Coalition used: process knowledge building, pragmatic, non-emotive brokerage, multistep bridging, and experiential-based linkage as strategies. The medical technical professionals used some similar strategies, but also employed a targeted science strategy in an attempt to inform the preparatory process.

Government bureaucrats used conventional strategies, including demarches and public consultations but also designed a new e-networking strategy. The research demonstrated that much of the efforts to create formal consultation processes and utilize web 2.0 communication technologies did little to contribute to the networked governance of MNCH. However, the fourth strategy involved the use of informal meetings to develop relationships with nongovernmental actors and for those that took the liberty to not always follow the hierarchical, formal rules of engagement found that these informal relationships could enable a worthwhile exchange of resources. The data demonstrated that the strategy selected for networked governance engagement depended on the following variables for all actor groups: 1) organizational type, 2) objectives (to influence or to be influenced), and 3) the resource being exchanged.

Having considered how actors were mobilizing resources, the results turned to the social capital to which actors had access. A Canadian public health specialist who is the executive director of a Canadian based technical medical organization that focuses on international health was identified as having a large individual network with diverse resources and thus, had the access to the most social capital based on a set of comprehensive measures. The findings also revealed that an actor that is a federal government political leader would be expected to have the most homophilous range of ties, while actors that were mid to upper-level employee in an NGO, foundation, international organization, technical/professional medical association, or a network/alliance would be the most heterophilous. The greatest brokerage potential belonged to actors from a diverse range of organization types but the highest potential belonged to the mid

ranking DFAIT bureaucrat – a surprising result given that the remainder of the government bureaucrats in the network held some of the lowest brokerage potentials.

Regardless of the strategies for engagement and the amount of social capital that an actor or organization held, the research findings also revealed that the mobilization of social capital was either enabled by factors such as trust, shared values, and geographical proximity, or constrained by factors such as internal power struggles, a lack of coordination, or a lack of funding resources.

### *7.1.3 Objectives 5: Political prioritization and networked governance*

The effectiveness of networked governance to resolve complex problems ultimately depended on what the actors internal and external to the process constituted as success. The research illustrated that participants had mixed perceptions on the effectiveness of networked governance within the context of the 2010 G8 Summit. For some actors, effectiveness appeared to primarily be a function of outputs and outcomes. Direct outputs of the 2010 G8 Summit included the details of agreements, which are outlined in the summit communiqué, and the financial contributions secured throughout the preparatory process. Actors that conceptualized success in this manner often viewed the network process as an effective means by which functional goals, such as securing specific material resources, could be realized. Thus, to these actors the experience of the 2010 G8 Summit was viewed as a success since what they regarded as personal and collective goals were realized.

Similar to the actors with goals of specific communiqué related outcomes, some individuals and organizations went into the summit preparatory process with the goal of influencing and supporting the selection of MNCH as the signature initiative. For actors that have been dedicated to work within the MNCH field, the lack of political prioritization in the field and the possible failure to reach MDGs 4 and 5 represented what they regarded as a major challenge. Consequently, the fact that MNCH was selected as the “signature initiative” from a long list of other viable options, constituted a success for many actors who believed their efforts had contributed to the selection. For example, members of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH viewed their strategy of forming a small, cohesive coalition that executed a coordinated and targeted campaign, all of which relied on relationships of trust and substantive resource

exchange, as a key factor to why MNCH was chosen for the summit. However, the research illuminated that no single factor, such as the influence of one particular actors group, was the reason that MNCH became the priority summit initiative. Rather, a host of factors, including strong leadership, supportive civil society, turbulent domestic electoral politics, simple issue framing, and a sense of urgency to meet the Millennium Development Goals, coalesced to create a window of opportunity for MNCH in 2010.

Conceptualizations of success from networked governance also depend on time frames. The previous examples illustrated success in the short to medium term time frame (e.g. 12 months), but with a longer time frame the outlook may be different. Some participants viewed the 2010 G8 Summit as an incomplete success for MNCH. As described in chapter six, the summit process and the scant details provided in the communiqué did not reflect any major shift in the approach MNCH. By leaving program and operational details to contributing countries and existing institutions, many actors perceived that the systemic problems that plague health care in developing countries would continue. This research demonstrated that several factors contributed to the simplified framing of the MNCH initiative, including the characteristics of the G8 itself as a global governance forum. However, as acknowledged by some participants, the effectiveness of networked governance in solving complex problems may be beyond the timeframe of the G8 summit preparatory process.

#### *7.1.4 Objective 6: Mixed methods*

The final objective of the research was to apply a mixed method approach to examine networked governance, summitry, and MNCH. The approach employed in this study differed from existing studies on networked governance. Most academic work related to networked governance studies have either been primarily theoretical (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 1974; Slaughter, 2004b) or have relied solely on qualitative methods (e.g. Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Betsill & Corell, 2008). While quantitative social network analyses have been used to examine political networks, the use of SNA methods remains limited in explorations of the nexus among network governance, global governance and summit diplomacy. It is only recently that international relations and global governance research has examined how networks as structures can enable and constrain individual actors and influence policy outcomes (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). The goals of this

research included not only capturing the structural relationships among actors involved within the G8 summit preparatory process, but also exploring the process of agenda setting as part of networked governance from the perspectives of involved individuals. A mixed method approach was necessary to achieve these goals.

The challenge with the mixed methods used in this study related to the weaknesses or limitations of each individual method. The opportunity was that the strengths of each individual method often compensated for the other's weakness. To begin with, the use of SNA within this study was beneficial for several reasons. The tool permitted a rigorous description of the structure and composition of the 2010 G8 preparatory process network for MNCH to be developed. This included insight about the network membership, the patterns of relationships among different types of actors, the identification of actors occupying key positions, such as brokers, and the presence or absence of distinct groupings of actors within the network. SNA enabled an exploration of the effects of centrality versus hierarchy in generating influence. This type of information could be useful for government departments and non-state organizations that may be grappling with how to maximize the benefits of networked governance and social capital. For instance, SNA permitted the identification of certain actors that were highly adept at mobilizing resources and brokering transactions. The practices of these actors could be further studied as possible best practice models. Likewise, structural equivalence tests demonstrated that a core group of low to mid-level government bureaucrats were connected to similar actors, which in turn makes these actors somewhat interchangeable. Further analysis could help understand the strengths and weaknesses of having redundancies in the connectivity of these actors. It is possible that similar working styles may prevent new ideas from penetrating the inner policy circles of government departments and agencies (Howlett, 2002). Conversely, redundancies within a policy system may help prevent bottlenecks in resource flows, avoid overreliance on a few individuals, and reduce vulnerability to disturbances (Young, 2010).

While the SNA was invaluable in identifying key actors, attributes, and patterns of structured relationships within the 2010 G8 MNCH network, it could not answer how and why actors were mobilizing resources for the preparatory process, or the outcome of the networked interactions on the summit agenda. By combining the SNA results with QDA methods, rich insight was permitted into the dynamics of the summit preparatory process for MNCH. The

semi-structured interviews granted latitude to the participants in expanding on areas of the preparatory process they found meaningful to their personal and collective goals. For instance, the social network analysis highlighted certain central actors in the network, but it was the qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews that illuminated perspectives on why these actors were deemed important. The qualitative results also demonstrated that the G8 MNCH network was not a one dimensional network with a single type of resource flowing between actors. Rather, individuals were often perceived to engage in diverse network activities enabled by a combination of their position, skill set, personality and motivations. Furthermore, the QDA was able to move past the connectivity of actors and explore strategies of problem solving and goal achievement.

Ultimately, the two methods were highly complementary. While both were labour intensive in data collection and analysis, neither method could have produced the comprehensive understanding of a diplomatic preparatory process single-handedly. The collection of social network data required adherence to a structured survey. The method demanded that participants provide clear and concise answers to standardized questions. Conversely, the semi-structured interview technique, which relied on guidelines rather than standardized questions, permitted a conversational exchange between the interviewer and interviewee. As a result, participants were given opportunities to expand upon opinions or observations about the role of relationships and networks. Furthermore, the mixed method approach enabled the thematic discussions in chapters three, four and five to draw upon the interplay between the findings derived from both methods. For instance, the structural equivalence test exposed the presence of distinct blocks of actors with similar relationships and the qualitative data analysis revealed that some participants purposely ensured a degree of interchangeability existed with their team members as they placed value on redundancies.

The above discussions emphasize the benefits of utilizing a mixed method approach for this study. However, this approach also created challenges related to the weaknesses of each method. Section 7.3 of this chapter will discuss the limitations of the approach and offer recommendations for future research.

## **7.2 Key implications of the research**

The results of this study should be particularly useful to government agencies, non-governmental organizations and research institutions. Furthermore, the research makes empirical and conceptual contributions to the literature on networked governance, summit diplomacy, global health governance and social networks.

The analysis yielded insights about how and why actors organized themselves within a network and utilized a variety of strategies to reach individual organizational goals and larger collective goals. The insights are a departure from previous networked governance literature which has predominantly regarded networks as constellations of actors that interact with shared norms and goals (Witte et al., 2000, 2002; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Betsill & Corell, 2008). The research identified that while actors did possess common high level goals (e.g. to make progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals), other layers of goals were held by different groups of actors within the network. Thus, network relationships involved tensions, contestation and compromise, and strategies evolved throughout the preparatory process, which was especially evident with non-state actors.

Several NGOs underwent a learning process to understand how to build their strategic influence during the summit preparatory process. Previous summits have been recognized to have involved NGOs in various capacities, from mobilizing protests during the day of the summit, to delivering petitions to politicians for action on a particular file (della Porta et al., 2006). However, during the 2010 G8 Summit preparatory process for MNCH, certain NGOs developed strategies that they characterized as novel for their organizations and participants expressed surprise by the level of success achieved. These strategies included actions such as inviting federal government political representatives from the nation responsible for hosting the summit to visit with front line health care workers, and avoiding financial requests and emotional arguments in order to focus on the potential, measurable results that could be achieved in reasonable timelines. Additionally, both NGOs inside and outside of the Canadian Coalition for MNCH recognized the effectiveness of creating the coalition as a mechanism for coordinated action and increasing the visibility of the group. The participants recognized that an added value of developing tightly bonded relationships with other NGO actors was that several NGOs could be represented by only one individual whom everyone trusted, thereby freeing up time and

resources to focus on other efforts. Sharing responsibilities and agreeing to be represented by a different organization is a significant step for a group of actors that had formed only a temporary coalition.

While compromise and cooperation yielded benefits, it is also widely recognized that there were costs with this strategy given the compromises required for a coordinated approach. For example, the Canadian Coalition did alienate some other NGOs and actors involved in MNCH activities that were excluded from the coalition. One potential implication of the exclusion is that it could create long-lasting rifts among those involved in MNCH. Whereas the summit preparatory process is short term, MNCH issues will continue to be the focus on many actors well beyond the 2010 G8 summit. This provides vital insights for NGOs seeking to engage in a diplomatic summit preparatory process in the future. Moreover, the insights gained with regards to the tensions and contestations occurring highlighted that networked governance is not inherently going to have actors that definitively possess shared norms, shared goals, and shared values. While Hajer and Versteeg (2005) have argued that networked governance emerges precisely to deal with the multiple, ambiguous norms and procedures of various actors that need to cooperate, their claims run counter to a dominant theme present in the existing networked governance literature which indicates that networks will involve stable relationships that are organized around a unified vision (e.g. Witte et al., 2000; Kenis & Raab, 2003; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). Therefore, this research supports the former, rather than the latter, contributing an additional challenge to the dominant scholarship in this field.

The research also tested the analytical framework for assessing the elements that contribute to political prioritization proposed by Shiffman and Smith (2007). The framework proved useful for highlighting factors that shaped the selection of MNCH for the 2010 G8 Summit. However, this study found that not all factors in the framework needed to be present for political prioritization to occur. Rather, a combination of factors was required in order for MNCH to reach the status of the summit signature initiative.

While MNCH did become a political priority in 2010, and G8 summit outcomes included a commitment of new funds for global MNCH initiatives and an accountability framework for tracking commitments, the research revealed that the networked summit process did not result in transformative change in how MNCH would be governed in the future. The summit communiqué

was sprinkled with language paying tribute to the importance of integrated health care and strengthening health systems. However, innovative ideas on how to move past the longstanding debates over vertical and horizontal approaches were not present. Thus, this study concluded that networked governance alone, while important for many reasons, does not guarantee outcomes that are superior to that of traditional state processes. These findings present an important contribution to the networked governance literature as it challenges the claims that networked governance will competently solve complex problems (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Huppé & Creech, 2012), promotes innovation (Sabel et al., 1987; Benner et al., 2004) and may even transform network actors (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). The limitations of the G8 as a global governance forum may be partially to blame, as it is a system that often appears to favour problems that can result in a political “win” and consequently requires that complex problems, such as MNCH, are framed in simple terms with simple solutions.

With regards to the issue of geography, this study provides an important contribution to the literature as it contradicts arguments that a) networked organization can overcome structural power tensions given its inherent lack of hierarchy, and b) geography has become increasingly irrelevant due to globalization and the rapid rise of internet based communication technologies (Albrow, 1996; Scholte, 2000; Cairncross, 2001; Castells, 2008). Based on the SNA results, this research demonstrated that while technological change may increase the feasibility of governance networks (Raustiala, 2002; Kahler & Lake, 2003), it does not ensure that network membership is evenly distributed or able to render geographical distances meaningless. The QDA results illuminated that e-networking strategies have yet to reap the same level of benefits that face to face communications can provide for the development of trust and substantive exchanges of ideas.

Turning to the notion of social capital, this study revealed that some bureaucrats were perceived to be less interested or inclined to develop and take advantage of the networked governance process – at times, even denying that it existed or had any importance. A small number of individuals within government departments and agencies developed their own informal methods to develop rich networks and exchange resources and build social capital. However, the analysis revealed that the formal strategies implemented by the Government of Canada to engage “outside” actors did not build and mobilize social capital with the preparatory

process. In essence, government still lacks a capacity or culture that is open to enhancing its own expertise through a networked approach with actors beyond government. Thus, as a whole, government, and even individual agencies, are not strategically optimizing the vast resources and social capital available through networked governance. Some individual actors were willing to “work around” the rules or cultural constraints and sought to build relationships. But individuals are not encouraged or rewarded for such efforts, despite the beneficial knowledge, information, framing, and financial support that the relationships enabled. The literature on social capital assumes that building access to social resources is an emergent, dynamic process that depends on attributes of the actors and the trusting relationships they may build (Burt, 2001; Lin, 2001). In a culture that requires staff to have their interactions approved through formal, hierarchical communication channels, the capacity to build social capital will inevitably be constrained.

The culture constraining actors within the government bureaucracy is exemplified by the fact that participants in the study “vetted” the researcher when an interview request was received, even though the researcher was located within DFAIT with the support of a government department. If interacting with individuals within a single department is this difficult, it can be assumed to foundations, NGOs, and individual medical experts would face even greater challenges.

Much of the early practices of summit diplomacy focused on the interactions between leaders and states through traditional international relations (Putnam, 1984; Putnam & Bayne, 1987; Ikenberry, 1993; Dobson, 2007). However many summit fora, including the G8, have evolved to include state and non-state actors in various capacities. Consequently, recent summits, including the 2010 G8 Summit, have designed increasingly elaborate preparatory processes to engage others outside of G8 member governments. But these formal processes were widely recognized to not produce meaningful results, particularly when compared to the agreements or resources exchanged through informal processes. However, the formal consultation processes should not be dismissed as irrelevant as they did serve a function in building legitimacy and transparency and were viewed by some “external” participants as useful forums to garner information and develop new relationships. Furthermore, it has been recognized that a mutually constitutive interplay exists between formal and informal structures and many formal processes actually help incubate informal structures (Ranson et al., 1980; Robins et al., 2011). Therefore,

the results of this research could be used to improve networking practices for governmental agencies and departments, with the recognition that nurturing informal processes can be valuable. Moreover, social network analysis as a tool could be useful in determining the central and peripheral actors and availability of resources in any policy issue area. Further research is required to develop an understanding of how governance arrangements can support or enhance network development or effectiveness of outcomes.

Actor power within the networked governance literature is often discussed in relation to the degree centrality (Beckfield, 2003; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006). However, multiple factors influence the power of actors within the governance system, including the type of resources exchanged, the purpose of the exchange and actor attributes such as hierarchical position and financial capital (Kahler, 2009). That is, central actors may possess power for a certain type of exchange (e.g. access to privileged information), but not in other areas (e.g. final decision making), which reinforces why different measurements and conceptions of centrality are important and need to be incorporated into future studies. Provan and Kenis (2008) have previously argued that how networks themselves are governed will alter their effectiveness. For instance, in cases where a network has a strong lead organization, the distribution of power within the network may be highly asymmetrical, resting with a few central actors, whereas with a participant governed network, power may be evenly distributed. In the case of this research, it could be argued that while the MNCH network was emergent and not actively designed or governed, it did have a centralized focus due to the structure of the G8 preparatory process. This provides a hypothesis for why power appeared to be distributed among actors in traditional roles of power (state based actor with senior position) and those in non-traditional positions (non-state actors or mid-level bureaucrats). Future studies into the distribution of power and how networks are managed to enhance effectiveness within the context of the G8 would be beneficial.

### **7.3 Limitations and opportunities for future research**

The design of the research project was influenced by several logistical constraints, which in turn placed limitations on the study findings.

Firstly, SNA is a time intensive research tool that presented challenges and limitations within the context of this project. Collecting network data was challenging within federal

government departments and agencies. It is recognized that this research was conducted with extraordinary access to individuals within the Government of Canada. Through the Cadieux-Leger Fellowship position, opportunities were created to meet with key individuals involved with the summit preparations and decision making that otherwise would not have been possible due to information security concerns. Regardless of the privileged access granted within the Government of Canada, securing interviews to collect network data proved difficult due to the time constraints within the work schedules of the bureaucrats. Moreover, administering the social network surveys during the interviews proved challenging as many individuals were reluctant to discuss their relationships with other individuals involved with the G8 MNCH policy process. While paper or internet based network based surveys are often used for data collection, few individuals were willing to discuss their policy relationships by any format other than a face-to-face interview. A thorough explanation of research ethics, anonymity and confidentiality helped establish trust, yet consumed valuable time during interviews that were often already compressed.

Secondly, the sample of participants involved in the study represented only a portion of the actors that were found to be included in the MNCH initiative. The boundaries of a network population such as the G8 MNCH network are porous and fluctuate over time, thus cannot be regarded as a closed population. As the network consisted of actors that were somewhat geographically dispersed and in elite positions (e.g. country presidents), obtaining network data from all network members identified was not possible. Repeated efforts were made to set-up interviews with actors that were identified by more than one participant, ultimately it had to be accepted that certain actors were “unreachable”.

Furthermore, the time available for data collection and analysis by the researcher was limited, and thus interviews had to be cut-off at a certain point. It has been recognized that without complete network data, the full arsenal of SNA tests cannot be utilized (Marsden, 1990). Methods for delineating boundaries and creating the possibility for complete data sets have been developed, such as specific event participation (Breiger, 1976; Laumann & Knoke, 1988) or organizational membership (Coleman, 1961). However, developing such boundaries can narrow the understanding of the complexity of the preparatory process by excluding several events that

follow out of this constructed boundary. Yet, obtaining a complete data set would require considerable time, resources, and capacity, which was beyond the scope of this particular project.

As all studies have a degree of logistical and financial constraints present, it is suggested that future studies consider focusing on specific segments of the entire network. An initial large scale study, such as this project, would still be required to identify the network membership, but a follow up study could hone in on a particular group within the population. For instance, the Canadian Coalition for MNCH could be a target for a follow up study.

Thirdly, the backgrounds and awareness of participants in networked governance and networked strategies had the potential to influence the results. Some participants inherently placed a positive value on concepts such as social capital – now a fairly mainstream term -and being networked. Thus, it can be expected that the answers provided to certain questions could be biased towards demonstrating that they were connected to many people and were themselves in an important position. It is known that self reporting methods in SNA are prone to bias and that observational techniques can generate a potentially more accurate representation of an actor's social network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). However, observational methods are time and resource intensive, thus are rarely used in studies involving large populations.

Likewise, some study participants, notably certain government actors, voiced disdain for the concept of networks within government and placed emphasis on the importance of hierarchical organizations and traditional state based processes. The presence of such values presented a challenge during an interview and time was required to work past preconceived notions. However, it must be acknowledged that personal values and beliefs regarding the role networks in society and within governance processes do potentially influence the results obtained during the data collection.

Fourthly, the network structure generated through this study is a representation of the connections among actors during the preparatory process of the 2010 G8 Summit for the MNCH initiative. Through the research, it was determined that the preparatory process involved two phases of agenda setting - phase one was the establishment of the agenda and phase two involved the shaping and complete development of agenda initiatives. Most interviews and SNA surveys were conducted from January to July 2010 and the official signature initiative announcement was made in January 2010. Consequently, the majority of the participants were sampled after it was

officially known that MNCH was the signature initiative. Participants were not asked to differentiate who they considered important to their thinking and efforts on MNCH during different phases over the summit process. Therefore, the answers provided by participants to both the open ended questions and network survey often reflected a blending between both phases, which limits the ability to comment on changes in network composition over the duration of the preparatory process.

Some evidence suggested that the network composition during the two phases had a different structure, as actors indicated they sought different resources to influence the selection of the initiative versus the resources they used to influence what components would be included in the final summit initiative. Given additional resources (i.e. a research team) and the willingness of participants to be subjected to repeated sampling, future studies could employ longitudinal sampling to determine the changes in network structure and composition as actor goals and objectives shift.

A fifth limitation related the nature of the study being conducted within the specific context of the MNCH initiative, during 2010 which was shaped by the internal and external factors outlined in chapter six. Thus, the applicability of the research findings to other summit topics needs to be approached with caution. The case of the 2010 G8 Summit and its signature initiative of MNCH included many components that made it an exemplary case of networked governance. The field of MNCH contained an active and diverse set of state and non-state actors, a mix of formal and informal organizations, evolving authority relationships, and new sites of power. Other 2010 G8 Summit topics, and other years of G8 summits may not exhibit the same network characteristics, with some being much more biased towards state based actors. One example was the topic of nuclear non-proliferation, which has been discussed at multiple G8 summits, including the 2010 event, and was examined during the exploratory phase of this research before the topic of MNCH was announced. Preliminary research showed that due to the sensitivity of the topic, most resource exchange was limited to governmental actors with the requisite security clearances. Consequently, non state actors, such as NGOs, expert academics and foundations were largely excluded from the preparatory process. Future research could explore the dynamics of when networked governance emerges and when it is constrained during summit preparatory processes.

Another limitation involved time as a distinct variable, which could not be adequately explored within the scope of this research. Time can be regarded as a constraint and enabler within the G8 preparatory process. Participants made comments related to the accelerated time frames of the preparatory process, and voiced frustrations over lag periods where work was not being advanced due to political factors affecting decisions. Time limitations appeared to be a contributing factor to the development of network relationships for many actors. However, with regards to the inability for certain actors to develop connections or engage in meaningful consultation, it was not clear how much could be attributed to the workload constraints versus other factors such as the organizational culture or personal networking skills of the individual.

Lastly, it is recognized that the G8 MNCH network constituted a dynamic process. As the June 2010 G8 summit approached, participants perceived that activity within the network increased. Additionally, the network membership changed over the duration of the summit preparatory process, possibly expanding and receding at different times. Research that examines the evolution of networks is a growing field, but longitudinal data is required, which is often difficult to obtain (Snijders, 2005). In the case of the 2010 G8 MNCH network, repeated sampling of individuals at intervals throughout the summit preparatory process would be required to generate a longitudinal data set. While this would help answer questions on network evolution, especially changes during the transition from phase one to phase two of the agenda setting process, obtaining such data was not possible and is not likely feasible for future summit related research projects unless the network populated could be bounded to a much smaller network than observed in this study.

#### **7.4 Concluding remarks**

Throughout this dissertation, arguments were asserted concerning the complex relationships present among individuals and organizations within an emergent network focused on maternal, child and newborn health, nested in the 2010 G8 Summit process that is part of a larger system that contributes to global governance. Social network analysis and qualitative data analysis, illuminated by the voices of actors intimately involved with the selection and shaping of a G8 Summit agenda, demonstrated that the G8 was a relevant and important global governance institution as of 2010. The research illustrated that individuals represent the values and interests

of diverse organizations, while simultaneously making tradeoffs to advance collective goals. Moreover, it was demonstrated that networked governance shapes summit preparatory processes for certain initiatives, such as MNCH, by influencing the selection of agenda items and the substantive programs or details that are subsequently developed. Given that summit diplomacy is traditionally conceived as a state-centric affair, this research builds upon the work of Slaughter (2005) and Gstöhl (2007, 2012) and provides empirical evidence that a clear shift in the diplomatic process has occurred. By contrast, in attempts to improve legitimacy and be more inclusive, government actors within the networked approach had instituted formal processes such as official consultations and outreach events which were largely perceived as ineffective.

The methods employed provide evidence of how a forum of global governance contains informal processes not typically recognized in the literature, and provides a base for future research to explore other summits and other issues. In particular, the findings show that leadership emerges in unlikely places. Looking beyond the obvious public figures, leaders also included some mid-level bureaucrats that were central to the agenda-setting process. However, challenges remain to be solved within networked governance processes for summit diplomacy. The contestation and refusal to acknowledge the important role that diverse actors can play in shaping agenda items by some actors will ultimately constrain the functioning of any networked process. Additionally, disadvantaged actors from geographical regions most affected by MNCH problems were not effectively included and therefore, did not entirely address problems of legitimacy and inclusion that were already problematic for the G8 forum. Furthermore, social capital was not valued by all network members. Yet, social capital represents a potential for new ideas and social power, and thus, if there are actors within the network with minimal social capital, they are likely to remain disconnected from those new ideas. But such concerns could be addressed as the understanding builds about the structure of relationships and experiences of political prioritization during summit preparatory processes.

## References

- AbouZahr, C. (2001). Cautious champions: international agency efforts to get safe motherhood onto the agenda. In W. VanLerberghe & V. DeBrouwere (Eds.), *Safe motherhood strategies: a review of the evidence*. Antwerp: ITG Press.
- AbouZahr, C. (2003). Safe Motherhood: a brief history of the global movement 1947-2002. *British Medical Bulletin*, 67, 13-25.
- Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2002). Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. *The Academy of Management Review*, 27(1), 27-40.
- Aginam, O. (2007). Diplomatic Rhetoric or Rhetorical Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. J. Kirton & T. Schrecker (Eds.), *Governing Global Health: Challenge, Response, Innovation* (pp. 147-155). Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing.
- Agnew, J., & Corbridge, S. (1995). *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*. London: Routledge.
- Albrow, M. (1996). *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Anderson, I., Axelson, H., & Tan, B.-K. (2011). The other crisis: the economics and financing of maternal, newborn and child health in Asia. *Health Policy and Planning*, 26, 288-297.
- Andonova, L. B., Betsill, M. M., & Bulkeley, H. (2009). Transnational climate governance. *Global Environmental Politics*, 9(2), 52-73.
- Atkinson, R., & Flint, J. (2001). Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies. *Social Research Update*, 33, 1-8.
- Attaran, A., Hébert, P. C., & Stanbrook, M. (2010). Misplaced health expectations at the G8 summit. *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, 182(10), E426.
- Auerbach, C. F., & Silverstein, L. B. (2003). *Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Babich, D. (2002). A Good Sherpa Is Key to a Good Summit. *Moscow News*, p. 25.
- Bäckstrand, K. (2006). Democratizing Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the World Summit on Sustainable Development. *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(4), 467-498.
- Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization*, 59(1), 39-75.
- Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699-732.
- Baru, R. V., & Nundy, M. (2008). Blurring of Boundaries: Public-Private Partnerships in Health Services in India. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 43(4), 62-71.
- Bassett, S. S., Magaziner, J., & Hebel, J. R. (1990). Reliability of Proxy Response on Mental Health Indices for Aged, Community-Dwelling Women. *Psychology and Aging*, 5(1), 127-132.
- Batten, D., Casti, J. L., & Thord, R. (1995). Introduction. In C. Batten & R. Thord (Eds.), *Networks in Action: Communication, Economic, and Human Knowledge*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Bavelas, A. (1948). A mathematical model for group structures. *Human Organization*, 7, 16-30.
- Bayne, N. (2001). G-8 Decision-making and the Genoa summit. *The International Spectator*, 36(3), 69-75.

- Bayne, N. (2005). *Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Bayne, N., & Smith, G. (2010). The Old Order Changeth: Canada and Economic Summitry. In F. Hampson & P. Heinbecker (Eds.), *How Others See Us: Canada Among Nations 2009-2010*. Montreal: McGill Press.
- Bearman, P. S., Moody, J. W., & Stovel, K. (2004). Chains of Affection: The Structure of Adolescent Romantic and Sexual Networks. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110, 44-91.
- Beckfield, J. (2003). Inequality in the world polity: the structure of international relations. *American Sociological Review*, 68(3), 401-424.
- Behiels, M. D. (2010). Stephen Harper's Rise to Power: Will His "New" Conservative Party Become Canada's "Natural Governing Party" of the Twenty-First Century? *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40(1), 118-145.
- Benner, T., Reinicke, W. H., & Witte, J. M. (2004). Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic System of Accountability. [Article]. *Government & Opposition*, 39(2), 191-210.
- Bennett, S., & Ssengooba, F. (2010). Closing the Gaps: From Science to Action in Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health in Africa. *PLoS Medicine*, 7(6), 1-3.
- Berg, B. L. (1989). *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Toronto: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berridge, G. R. (2005). *Diplomacy: theory and practice* (Third ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Betsill, M. M., & Bulkeley, H. (2006). Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change. *Global Governance*, 12, 141-159.
- Betsill, M. M., & Corell, E. (Eds.). (2008). *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations*. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Bhutta, Z. A. (2000). Why has so little changed in maternal and child health in south Asia? *British Medical Bulletin*, 321, 809-812.
- Bhutta, Z. A., Chopra, M., Axelson, H., Berman, P., Boerma, T., Bryce, J., Bustreo, F., & Cavagnero, E. (2010). Countdown to 2015 decade report (2000-10): taking stock of maternal, newborn, and child survival. *The Lancet*, 375, 2032-2044.
- Biernacki, P., & Waldorf, D. (1981). Snowball sampling: problems and techniques of chain referral sampling. *Sociological Methods and Research*, 10(2), 141-163.
- Black, R. E., Cousens, S., Johnson, H. L., Lawn, J. E., Rudan, I., Bassani, D. G., Jha, P., Campbell, H., Walker, C. F., Cibulskis, R., Liu, T. L., & Mathers, C. (2010). Global, regional, and national causes of child mortality in 2008: a systematic analysis. *The Lancet*, 375, 1969-1987.
- Blaikie, N. (2010). *Designing Social Research* (2nd ed.). Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Blanchet, K., & James, P. (2011). How to do (or not to do)...a social network analysis in health systems research. *Health Policy and Planning*, forthcoming, 1-9.
- Blau, P. M. (1977). *Inequality and heterogeneity*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Bodin, Ö., Crona, B., & Ernstson, H. (2006). Social Networks in Natural Resource Management: What Is There to Learn from a Structural Perspective? *Ecology and Society*, 12(2), r2.
- Bodin, Ö., & Prell, C. (Eds.). (2011). *Social networks and natural resource management: uncovering the social fabric of environmental governance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1999). *Constructing World Culture: Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bonacich, P. (1987). Power and Centrality: A Family of Measures. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(5), 1170-1182.
- Bonacich, P. (2007). Some unique properties of eigenvector centrality. *Social Networks*, 29, 555-564.
- Bongaarts, J. P., Pelletier, F., & Gerland, P. (2011). Global Trends in AIDS Mortality. In R. G. Rogers & E. M. Crimmins (Eds.), *International handbook of adult mortality* (pp. 171-183). Dordrecht, NL: Springer-Verlag.
- Borgatti, S. P. (2002). NetDraw: Graph visualization software. Harvard: Analytic Technologies.
- Borgatti, S. P. (2006a). *EGO Software Package of Ego-Network Analysis*. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
- Borgatti, S. P. (2006b). Identifying sets of key players in a social network. *Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory*, 12, 21-34.
- Borgatti, S. P., & Everett, M. G. (2006). A Graph-theoretic perspective on centrality. *Social Networks*, 28, 466-484.
- Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Freeman, L. C. (2002). *Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
- Borgatti, S. P., & Foster, P. C. (2003). The Network Paradigm in Organizational Research: A Review and Typology. *Journal of Management*, 29(6), 991-1013.
- Borgatti, S. P., Jones, C., & Everett, M. G. (1998). Network Measures of Social Capital. *Connections*, 21(2), 27-36.
- Boseley, S. (2010, March 19). Does the Canadian government, G8 president, oppose family planning in Africa? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/sarah-boseley-global-health/2010/mar/19/maternal-mortality-g8>
- Brandes, U. (2008). On variants of shortest-path betweenness centrality and their generic computation. *Social Networks*, 30, 136-145.
- Brandes, U., & Wagner, D. (2004). Analysis and visualization of social networks. In M. Jünger & P. Mutzel (Eds.), *Graph drawing software* (pp. 321-340). Berlin: Springer.
- Brans, M. (1997). Challenges to the practice and theory of public administration in Europe. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 9(3), 389-415.
- Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3), 999-1023.
- Breiger, R. L. (1976). Career attributes and network structure. A blockmodel study of a biomedical research specialty. *American Sociological Review*, 41, 117-135.
- Brown, C. L. (2002, January 7-10). *G-8 collaborative initiatives and the digital divide: readiness for e-government*. Proceedings of the 35th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Waikoloa Village, Island of Hawaii. Retrieved from <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=994085>
- Brown, S. (1992). *International relations in a changing global system: towards a world polity theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Budd, C. (2003). G8 Summits and Their Preparation. In N. Bayne & S. Woolcock (Eds.), *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Burnam, A., Leaf, P. J., Skinner, E. A., Cottier, L., Melville, L., & Thompson, J. W. (1985). Proxy interview. In W. W. Eaton & L. G. Kessler (Eds.), *Epidemiologic field methods in psychiatry* (pp. 117-139). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
- Burt, R. S. (1980). Models of Network Structure. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 6, 79-141.
- Burt, R. S. (1982). *Toward a Structural Theory of Action*. New York: Academic Press.
- Burt, R. S. (1983). Range. In R. S. Burt & M. J. Minor (Eds.), *Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological Introduction* (pp. 176-194). Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Burt, R. S. (1984). Network items and the general social survey. *Social Networks*, 6(4), 293-339.
- Burt, R. S. (1987). Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural equivalence. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92, 1298-1335.
- Burt, R. S. (1992). Power in organizations: A social network perspective. In G. Moore & J. A. Whitt (Eds.), *Research in politics and society* (pp. 295-323). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Burt, R. S. (1995). *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burt, R. S. (1997). The Contingent Value of Social Capital. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 42(2), 339-365.
- Burt, R. S. (2000). The network structure of social capital. In R. I. Sutton & B. Staw (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (Vol. 22). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Burt, R. S. (2001). Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Capital. In R. S. Burt (Ed.), *Social Capital : Theory and Research* (pp. 31-56). New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural Holes and Good Ideas. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(2), 349-399.
- Buse, K., & Walt, G. (2002). The World Health Organization and global public-private health partnerships: in search of 'good' global health governance. In M. Reich (Ed.), *Public-private: partnerships for public health*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Byman, D. L., & Pollack, K. M. (2001). Let us praise great men: bringing the Statesman back in. *International Security*, 25(4), 107-146.
- Cairncross, F. (2001). *The Death of Distance 2.0: How the Communications Revolution will Change our Lives*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Campbell, C. (2010, March 17). Birth control won't be in g8 plan to protect mothers, Tories say. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/birth-control-wont-be-in-g8-plan-to-protect-mothers-tories-say/article1502796/>
- Campbell, O. M. R. (2001). What are maternal health policies in developing countries and who drives them? A review of the last half-century. *Studies in HSO&P*, 17, 412-445.
- Campion-Smith, B. (2010). Ottawa hopes twin summits give a boost to its bid to win seat on UN security council. *Toronto Star*. Retrieved from <http://www.thestar.com/news/torontog20summit/article/828174--ottawa-hopes-twin-summits-give-a-boost-to-its-bid-to-win-seat-on-un-security-council>

- Capling, A., & Nossal, K. R. (2001). Death of distance or tyranny of distance? The Internet, deterritorialization, and the anti-globalization movement in Australia. [Article]. *Pacific Review*, 14(3), 443-465.
- Carin, B., Abbott, C. L., & Innis, L. (2008a, February 12-13). *Environment, climate change and global governance*. Proceedings of the Breaking Global Deadlocks, Tokyo. Retrieved from <http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Breaking%20Global%20Deadlocks%20I.pdf>
- Carin, B., Abbott, C. L., & Innis, L. (2008b, February 26-28). *Reflections on global governance*. Proceedings of the Breaking Global Deadlocks, Oliver, British Columbia. Retrieved from <https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Breaking%20Global%20Deadlocks%20II.pdf>
- Carin, B., Heinbecker, P., Smith, G., & Thakur, R. (2010, May 3-5 ). *Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy*. Paper presented at the International Governance Innovation: Issues for the 2010 Summits, Waterloo, Canada. Retrieved from [http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/G20%20No2\\_1.pdf](http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/G20%20No2_1.pdf)
- Carin, B., Sewell, J., Abbott, C. L., & Innis, L. (2008c, March 10-11). *The future of international governance architecture*. Proceedings of the Breaking Global Deadlocks, Mexico City. Retrieved from <https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Breaking%20Global%20Deadlocks%20III.pdf>
- Carrasco, J. A., Hogan, B., Wellman, B., & Miller, E. J. (2008). Collecting social network data to study social activity-travel behavior: an egocentric approach. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 35, 961-980.
- Carrington, P. (2002). Sex homogeneity in co-offending groups. In J. Hagberg (Ed.), *Contributions to social network analysis, information theory and other topics in statistics: a festschrift in honour of Ove Frank on the occasion of his 65th birthday* (pp. 101-116). Stockholm: Universitet Stockholms.
- Castells, M. (2000). *The Rise of the Network Society* (Second ed.). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
- Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 78-93.
- CBC News. (2006, January 11). Harper slams ads, denies plan to reopen abortion debate. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/national/2006/01/11/harper-ad060111.html>
- Chand, S., Morrison, J. S., Piot, P., & Heymann, D. L. (2010). From G8 to G20, is health next in line? *The Lancet*, July 23, 1-3. Retrieved from <http://download.thelancet.com/flatcontentassets/pdfs/S014067361060997X.pdf>
- Chatham House. (2012). Chatham House Rule. Retrieved July 31, 2012, Retrieved from: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule>
- CIDA. (2009, May 20). Canada Introduces a New Effective Approach to its International Assistance, Retrieved from: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NAT-5208514-G7B>

- CIDA. (2010). G8 Development Ministers Meeting - Chair's Summary, April 28, 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/ANN-428145532-Q7R>
- Claeson, M., & Waldman, R. J. (2000). The evolution of child health programmes in developing countries: from targeting diseases to targeting people. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 78, 1234-1245.
- Cohen, J. (2006). The New World of Global Health. *Science*, 311, 162-167.
- Cohen, S. A. (2011). As Global Commitment to Reproductive Health Intensifies, U.S. Leadership More Important Than Ever. *Guttmacher Policy Review*, 14(1), 2-6.
- Coleman, J. S. (1961). *The Adolescent Society*. New York: Free.
- Coleman, J. S. (1973). *The Mathematics of Collective Action*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, S95-S120.
- Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Collins, R. (1988). The Micro Contribution to Macro Sociology. *Sociological Theory*, 6(2), 242-253.
- Considine, M. (2005). *Partnerships and collaborative advantage: some reflections on new forms of network governance*. Melbourne: The Centre for Public Policy, University of Melbourne.
- Considine, M., & Lewis, J. M. (2007). Innovation and Innovators Inside Government: From Institutions to Networks. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, 20(4), 581-607.
- Constantinou, C. M. (1996). *On the way to diplomacy*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cook, K. S., Emerson, R. M., Gilmore, M. R., & Yamagishi, T. (1983). The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results. *American Journal of Sociology*, 89, 275-305.
- Cooper, A. F. (2004). *Tests of Global Governance: Canadian Diplomacy and United Nations World Conferences*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Cooper, A. F. (2007). Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 8(2), 125-131.
- Cooper, A. F. (2008a). Beyond One Image Fits All: Bono and the Complexity of Celebrity Diplomacy. *Global Governance*, 13(3), 265-272.
- Cooper, A. F. (2008b). *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Cooper, A. F., English, J., & Thakur, R. (Eds.). (2002). *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy?* Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Copeland, D. (2009). *Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications.
- Crona, B. I., & Bodin, Ö. W. (2006). WHAT you know is WHO you know? Communication patterns among resource extractors as a prerequisite for co-management. *Ecology and Society*, 11(2), 7 (online).
- Curtis, S., Bloom, S., & Sutherland, E. (2005). International Maternal and Child Health. In J. B. Kotch (Ed.), *Maternal and Child Health: Programs, Problems and Policy in Public Health* (pp. 463-490). Toronto: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.

- Cusack, T. R. (1998). *Data on public employment and wages for 21 OECD countries*. Berlin: WZB.
- d'Hooghe, I. (2005). Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (pp. 88-105). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dallek, R. (2007). *Nixon and Kissinger: partners in power*. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Delacourt, S. (2004, June 4). Clash of the leaders; Child care, abortion issues polarize parties PM's 'stark choice' reveals itself in campaign. *Toronto Star*, p. A01.
- della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L., & Reiter, H. (2006). *Globalization from below: transnational activism and protest networks*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2005). *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2008). *The Landscape of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Dey, I. (1993). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Diani, M., & McAdam, D. (Eds.). (2003). *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Dobson, H. (2007). *The Group of 7/8*. London: Routledge.
- Doreian, P., & Stokman, F. N. (Eds.). (1997). *Evolution of Social Networks*. New York, NY: Gordon and Breach.
- Doreian, P., & Woodard, K. L. (1992). Fixed list versus snowball selection of social networks. *Social Science Research*, 21(216-233).
- Duffield, M. (2002). War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and its Implications. *Cultural Values*, 6(2), 153-165.
- Eades, P. (1984). A heuristic for graph drawing. *Congressus Numerantium*, 42, 149-160.
- English, J., Thakur, R., & Cooper, A. F. (Eds.). (2005). *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Erickson, B. H. (1996). Culture, class, and connections. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102, 217-251.
- Erlandson, D. A., Harris, E. L., Skipper, B. L., & Allen, S. D. (1993). *Naturalistic Inquiry: A Guide to Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Ernstson, H. (2011). Transformative collective action: a network approach to transformative change in ecosystem-based management. In Ö. Bodin & C. Prell (Eds.), *Social Networks and Natural Resource Management: Uncovering the Social Fabric of Environmental Governance* (pp. 255-287). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans, M. (1988). Participant Observation: The Researcher as Research Tool. In J. Eyles & D. M. Smith (Eds.), *Qualitative Methods in Human Geography*. (pp. 197-217). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Farney, J. (2009). The Personal Is Not Political: The Progressive Conservative Response to Social Issues. *Annual Review of Canadian Studies*, 39(3), 342-352.
- Fetterman, D. M. (1989). *Ethnography: Step by Step*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

- Filippi, V., Ronsmans, C., Campbell, O. M. R., Graham, W. J., Mills, A., Borghi, J., Koblinsky, M., & Osrin, D. (2006). Maternal health in poor countries: the broader context and a call for action. *The Lancet*, 368, 1535-1541.
- Flap, H. D. (1991). Social Capital in the Reproduction of Inequality. *Comparative Sociology of Family, Health and Education*, 20, 6179-6202.
- Flap, H. D., & De Graaf, N. D. (1986). Social capital and attained occupational status. *Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, 22, 145-161.
- Forman, S., & Segaar, D. (2006). New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism. *Global Governance*, 12(2), 205-225.
- Fowler, J. F. J. (2009). *Survey Research Methods* (4 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc.
- Frank, A. W. (2005). What is Dialogical Research, and Why Should We Do It? *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(7), 964-974.
- Frank, O. (1979). Estimation of population totals by use of snowball samples. *Perspectives on Social Network Research*, 319-347.
- Frank, O. (2011). Survey Sampling in Networks. In J. P. Scott & P. Carrington (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis* (pp. 389-403). London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Freeman, L. C. (1977). A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness. *Sociometry*, 40(1), 35-41.
- Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification. *Social Networks*, 1, 215-239.
- Freeman, L. C. (1980). The Gatekeeper, Pair-dependency and Structural Centrality. *Quality and Quantity*, 14, 585-592.
- Freeman, L. C. (2000). Visualizing social networks. *Journal of Social Structure*, 1(1). Retrieved from <http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume1/Freeman.html>
- Fruchterman, T. M. J., & Reingold, E. M. (1991). Graph drawing by force-directed placement. *Software: Practice and Experience*, 21(11), 1129-1164.
- Fuchs, D. (2005). Commanding Heights? The Strength and Fragility of Business Power in Global Politics. *Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 771-802.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). Social Capital and the Global Economy. *Foreign Affairs*, 74(5), 89-103.
- G8. (2010a). *G8 Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, June 25-26*. Muskoka, Canada.
- G8. (2010b). *G8 Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, June 25-26*. Retrieved from <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-declaration-muskoka.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>.
- G20. (2010). *The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, June 26-27*. Retrieved from [http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/assets/pdfs/g20\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/assets/pdfs/g20_declaration_en.pdf).
- Galtung, J. (1964). Summit Meetings and International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 1(1), 36-54.
- Ganzeboom, H. B. G., DeGraaf, P. M., & Treiman, D. J. (1992). A Standard International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. *Social Science Research*, 21(1), 1-56.
- Ganzeboom, H. B. G., Luijkx, R., & Treiman, D. J. (1989). Intergenerational class mobility in comparative perspective. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 8, 3-79.

- Gilsing, V., & Nooteboom, B. (2010). Density and strength of ties in innovation networks: an analysis of multimedia and biotechnology. *European Management Review*, 2(3), 179-197.
- Goldthorpe, J. H., & Hope, K. (1974). *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and Scale*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Gostin, L. O., & Mok, E. A. (2009). Grand challenges in global health governance. *British Medical Bulletin*, 90, 7-18.
- Goyder, J. (2009). *The prestige squeeze: occupational prestige in Canada since 1965*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1380.
- Grant, J. P. (1986). Universal Child Immunization by 1990. *Assignment Children*, 69/70.
- Green, I., Baird, K., & Fawkes, K. (2007). *Canada's Public Services in the 21st Century: Discussion Paper*. Ottawa: Public Policy Forum.
- Gregory, B. (2008). Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field. *The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science*, 616(1), 274-290.
- Grix, J. (2002). Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research. *Politics*, 22(3), 175-186.
- Gstöhl, S. (2007). Governance through government networks: The G8 and international organizations. *Review of International Organizations*, 2, 1-37.
- Gstöhl, S. (2012). Informal governance and the G8. In T. Christiansen & C. Newhold (Eds.), *International handbook of informal governance* (pp. 255-275). Northampton, MA Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Guba, E. G. (1981). Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries. *Educational Communication and Technology Journal*, 29, 75-91.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publication Inc.
- Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (Eds.). (2002). *Handbook of interview research : context & method*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. .
- Guebert, J. (2010). Plans for the 2010 G8 Muskoka Summit: June 25-26, 2010. Retrieved from University of Toronto, G8 Research Group website: <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2010muskoka/2010plans/2010-g8plans-100623.pdf>
- Haas, P. (2004). Addressing the global governance deficit. *Global Environmental Politics*, 4(4), 1-15.
- Haas, P. (Ed.). (1992). *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network Analysis for International Relations. *International Organization*, 63(Summer), 559-592.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2006). Power positions: international organizations, social networks, and conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1 (February)), 3-27.
- Haines, A., Sanders, D., Lehmann, U., Rowe, A. K., Lawn, J. E., Jan, S., Walker, D. G., & Bhutta, Z. q. (2007). Achieving child survival goals: potential contribution of community health workers. *The Lancet*, 367, 2121-2131.

- Hajer, M., & Versteeg, W. (2005). Performing governance through networks. *European Political Science*, 4, 340-347.
- Hajnal, P. I. (2002). Civil Society Encounters the G7/G8. In P. I. Hajnal (Ed.), *Civil Society in the Information Age* (pp. 215-242). Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing.
- Hajnal, P. I. (2007). *The G8 system and the G20: evolution, role and documentation*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Hajnal, P. I., & Kirton, J. J. (2000). The Evolving Role and Agenda of the G7/G8: A North American Perspective. *NIRA Review*, 7(2), 5-10.
- Halgin, D., & Borgatti, S. P. (2011). *An Introduction to Personal Network Analysis and Tie Churn Statistics using E-NET*. Lexington, KY: LINKS Center for Social Network Analysis, University of Kentucky.
- Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to social network methods. Retrieved from University of California, Riverside website: <http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/>
- Harper, S. (2010, January 26). G8 agenda: Focus on human welfare. *The Toronto Star*, p. A13.
- Harrison, D., & Klein, K. (2007). What's the difference? Diversity construct as separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. *The Academy of Management Review*, 32(4), 1199-1228.
- Heap, P. C. (2008). *Globalization and summit reform: an experiment in international governance*. Ottawa: Springer & International Development Research Centre.
- Heine, J. (2008). On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, A. Hocking & W. Maley (Eds.), *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (2011). Introduction: globalization and transnational uncivil society. In J. Heine & R. Thakur (Eds.), *The dark side of globalization* (pp. 1-16). New York: United Nations University Press.
- Henrickson, A. K. (2005). Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: the Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hill, K., & Pebley, A. R. (1989). Child Mortality in the Developing World. *Population Council*, 15(4), 657-687.
- Hirsch, B. J. (1980). Natural support systems and coping with major life changes. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 1980(8), 159-172.
- Hite, J. M., & Hesterly, W. S. (2001). The Evolution of Firm Networks: From Emergence to Early Growth of the Firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, 22(3), 275-286.
- Hocking, B. (2005). Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hogan, M. C., Foreman, K. J., Naghavi, M., Ahn, S. Y., Wang, M., Makela, S. M., Lopez, A. D., & Lozano, R. (2010). Maternal mortality for 181 countries, 1980-2008: a systematic analysis of progress towards Millennium Development Goal 5. *The Lancet*, 375, 1609-1623.
- Holloway, I. (1997). *Basic concepts for qualitative research*. Oxford: Blackwell Science.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance. *American Political Science Review*, 97(2), 233-243.

- Howlett, M. (2002). Do Networks Matter? Linking Policy Network Structure to Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Four Canadian Policy Sectors 1990-2000. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 25(2), 235-267.
- Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1987). Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information. *American Political Science Review*, 81(4), 1197-1216.
- Huppé, G. A., & Creech, H. (2012). *Developing social capital in networked governance initiatives: a lock-step approach*. Winnipeg: The International Institute for Sustainable Development.
- Ibarra, H. (1993). Network Centrality, Power, and Innovation Involvement: Determinants of Technical and Administrative Roles. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(3), 471-501.
- Ibbitson, J. (2012, April 28). Harper unbound: An analysis of his first year as majority PM. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-unbound-an-analysis-of-his-first-year-as-majority-pm/article4107070>
- Ikenberry, J. (1993). Salvaging the G-7. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(Spring), 132-139.
- Ingram, P., Robinson, J., & Busch, M. L. (2005). The intergovernmental network of world trade: IGO connectedness, governance, and embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111(3 (November)), 824-858.
- Iyengar, S. (1990). Framing responsibility for political issues: the case of poverty. *Political Behavior*, 12(1), 19-40.
- Jaccard, P. (1901). Etude comparative de la distribution florale dans une portion des alpes et des jura. *Bulletin del la Societe Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles*, 37, 547-579.
- Johnson, W. (2006). *Stephen Harper and the Future of Canada* (revised and updated ed.). Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Johnston, L. G., & Sabin, K. (2010). Sampling hard-to-reach populations with respondent driven sampling. *Methodological Innovations Online*, 5(2), 38-48.
- Jones, C., Hesterly, W. S., & Borgatti, S. P. (1997). A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 911-945.
- Jones, G., Steketee, R. W., Black, R. E., Bhutta, Z. A., & Morris, S. S. (2003). How many child deaths can we prevent this year? *The Lancet*, 362, 65-71.
- Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). *Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Joseph, S. C. (1984). *Bellagio Conference to Protect the World's Children: Rapporteur's Summary*. Bellagio, Italy: UNICEF.
- Juris, J. S. (2005). The new digital media and activist networking within anti-corporate globalization movements. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 597(January), 189-208.
- Justice, J. (2000). The Politics of Child Survival. In L. M. Whiteford & L. Manderson (Eds.), *Global Health Policy, Local Realities: The Fallacy of the Level Playing Field*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kaerer, L. (1998). Complacency, Abortion Politics Obstacles to Improved Health of Pregnant Women and Children. *The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy*, 1(4), 3-4.
- Kahler, M. (2009). *Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Kahler, M., & Lake, D. A. (2003). Globalization and Governance. In M. Kahler & D. A. Lake (Eds.), *Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition* (pp. 1-30). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kearns, R. A. (2010). Seeing with Clarity: Undertaking Observational Research. In I. Hay (Ed.), *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography* (3rd ed., pp. 241-258). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). *Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Kenis, P., & Raab, J. (2003, October 9-10, 2003). *Wanted: A Good Network Theory of Policy Making*. Paper presented at the 7th National Public Management Conference, Washington D.C. Retrieved from
- Kenney, M. (2009). Turning to the "Dark Side": Coordination, Exchange, and Learning in Criminal Networks. In M. Kahler (Ed.), *Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1974). Transgovernmental relations and international organizations. *World Politics*, 27(1), 39-62.
- Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (1989). *Power and Interdependence* (2nd ed.). Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company.
- Kerber, K. J., deGraft-Johnson, J. E., Bhutta, S. A., Okong, P., Stars, A., & Lawn, J. E. (2007). Continuum of care for maternal, newborn, and child health: from slogan to service delivery. *The Lancet*, 370, 1358-1369.
- Khagram, S. (2004). *Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Khan, K. S., Wojdyla, D., Say, L., Gülmezoglu, A. M., & VanLook, P. F. A. (2006). WHO analysis of causes of maternal death: a systematic review. *The Lancet*, 367, 1066-1074.
- Kickbusch, I. (2011). Global health diplomacy: how foreign policy can influence health. *British Medical Journal*, 342, 1345-1346.
- Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997). *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector*. London, UK: Sage Publishing Inc.
- Kingdon, J. W. (1984). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Kirton, J. J. (1999). Explaining the G8 effectiveness. In M. Hodges, J. J. Kirton & J. P. Daniels (Eds.), *The G8's role in the new millennium*. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishers.
- Klein, N. (2008). Wall St. crisis should be for neoliberalism what fall of Berlin Wall was for Communism. *Democracy Now*, (October 6). Retrieved from [www.democracynow.org/2008/10/6/naomi\\_klein](http://www.democracynow.org/2008/10/6/naomi_klein)
- Klijn, E.-H. (2008). Governance and Governance Networks in Europe. *Public Management Review*, 10(4), 505-525.
- Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2000). Public Management and Policy Networks. *Public Management*, 2(2), 135-158.
- Knoke, D., & Burt, R. S. (1983). Prominence. In R. S. Burt & M. J. Minor (Eds.), *Applied Network Analysis. A Methodological Introduction* (pp. 195-222). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Knoke, D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1982). *Network Analysis*. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

- Knoke, D., & Yang, S. (2008). *Social Network Analysis* (Second ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4), 761-799.
- Kossinets, G., & Watts, D. J. (2006). Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Social Network. *Science*, 311, 88-90.
- Krackhardt, D., & Stern, R. N. (1988). Informal networks and organizational crises: An experimental simulation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 51(2), 123-140.
- Krishna, A., & Shrader, E. (1999). *Social Capital Assessment Tool*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Kruesmann, M., & Timmermann, M. (2009). *Partnerships for Women's Health: Striving for Best Practice within the UN Global Compact* (Research Brief). Tokyo: United Nations University.
- La Due Lake, R., & Huckfeldt, R. (1998). Social Capital, Social Networks, and Political Participation. *Political Psychology*, 19(3), 567-584.
- Labonté, R., & Gagnon, M. L. (2010). Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global health diplomacy. *Globalization and Health*, 6(14), 1-19.
- Labonté, R., & Schrecker, T. (2004). Committed to health for all? How the G7/G8 rate. *Social Science and Medicine*, 59, 1661-1676.
- Lakon, C. M., Godette, D. C., & Hipp, J. R. (2008). Network-Based Approaches for Measuring Social Capital Social Capital and Health. In I. Kawachi, S. V. Subramanian & D. Kim (Eds.), (pp. 63-81): Springer New York.
- Larsson, J. (2008). Of summits and sherpas. In McKinsey and Company (Ed.), *Transforming Government*. Chicago: McKinsey and Company.
- Laumann, E. O. (1966). *Prestige and Association in an Urban Community*. New York, NY: BobbsMerrill.
- Laumann, E. O., & Knoke, D. (1988). *The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains*. Madison, Wis: Univ. Wisc. Press. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Laumann, E. O., & Marsden, P. V. (1979). The Analysis of Oppositional Structures in Political Elites: Identifying Collective Actors. *American Sociological Review*, 44(5), 713-732.
- Laumann, E. O., & Pappi, F. U. (1976). *Networks of Collective Action*. New York: Academic Press.
- Lawn, J. E., Costello, A., Mwansambo, C., & Osrin, D. (2007). Countdown to 2015: will the Millennium Development Goal for child survival be met? *Archives of Disease in Childhood*, 92(6), 551-556.
- Laycock, D. (2001). *The new right and democracy in Canada: Understanding Reform and the Canadian Alliance*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Merton, R. K. (1954). Friendship as Social Progress: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis. In M. Berger, T. Abel & C. H. Page (Eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (pp. 18-66). Toronto: Nostrand.
- Lee, K., Collinson, S., & Gilson, L. (1996). Who should be doing what in international health: a confusion of mandates in the United Nations. *British Medical Journal*, 312(7026), 302-307.

- Lee, S. (2009). The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations website: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10647/>
- Lewis, J. M. (2005). *Health policy and politics: Networks, ideas and power*. Melbourne: IP Communications.
- Lewis, J. M. (2006). Being around and knowing the players: Networks of influence in health policy. *Social Science and Medicine*, 62(9), 2125-2136.
- Leydesdorff, L. (2008). On the Normalization and Visualization of Author Co-Citation Data: Salton's Cosine versus the Jaccard Index *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 59(1), 77-85.
- Lin, N. (1982). Social resources and instrumental action. In P. V. Marsden & N. Lin (Eds.), *Social Structure and Network Analysis*. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Lin, N. (2001). *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lin, N., Yang-chih, F., & Hsung, R.-M. (2001). The position generator: Measurement techniques for investigations of social capital. In R. S. Burt (Ed.), *Social Capital : Theory and Research* (pp. 57-84). New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Linn, J. F., & Bradford, C. I. (Eds.). (2007). *Global Governance Reform: Breaking the Stalemate*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. (1995). *Writing Reports. Analyzing Social Settings*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Lorrain, F., & White, H. C. (1971). Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks. *Journal of Mathematical Society*, 1, 49-80.
- Lose, L. (2001). Communicative Action and the World of Diplomacy. In K. M. Fierke & K. E. Jorgensen (Eds.), *Constructing international relations: the next generation*. New York: M.E. Shaper, Inc.
- Lubell, M., & Fulton, A. (2008). Local policy networks and agricultural watershed management. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4), 673-696.
- Luijckx, R., & Ganzeboom, H. B. G. (1989). Intergenerational class mobility in the Netherlands 1970-1985: Structural and circulation mobility. In W. Jansen, J. Dronkers & K. Verrips (Eds.), *Similar or different? Continuities in Dutch Research on Social Stratification and Social Mobility* (pp. 5-30). Amsterdam: SISWO.
- Lunn, S. (2010, June 23). G8 maternal health initiative draws flak. *CBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/06/23/g8-maternal-health-initiative.html>
- MacDonald, K., & Woolcock, S. (2007). Non-State Actors in Economic Diplomacy. In N. Bayne & S. Woolcock (Eds.), *The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Mackay, L. (2006). *Stephen Harper: The case for collaborative governance*. Toronto: ECW Press.
- Mahler, H. (1987). The Safe Motherhood Initiative: A Call to Action. *The Lancet*, 329(8534), 668-670.
- Mann, T. (2010). G20 Summitry: Domestic Leadership in a Polarized and Globalized World. In C. I. Bradford & W. Lim (Eds.), *Toward the Consolidation of the G20: From Crisis Committee to Global Steering Committee* (pp. 421-425). Seoul/Washington: Korea Development Institute/The Brookings Institution.

- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1995). *Democratic Governance*. New York: The Free Press.
- Marin, A., & Hampton, K. N. (2007). Simplifying the Personal Network Name Generator: Alternatives to Traditional Multiple and Single Name Generators. *Field Methods*, 19(2), 163-193.
- Marin, B., & Mayntz, R. (Eds.). (1991). *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Consideration*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Marsden, P. V. (1990). Network Data and Measurement. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 16, 435-463.
- Marsden, P. V. (2005). Recent developments in network measurement. In P. Carrington, J. P. Scott & S. Wasserman (Eds.), *Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis* (pp. 8-30). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Marsden, P. V., & Lin, N. (1982). *Social Structure and Network Analysis*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Marsh, D., & Smith, M. (2000). Understanding Policy Networks: towards a Dialectical Approach. *Political Studies*, 48, 4-21.
- Martin, P. (2007). Breaking Deadlocks in Global Governance: The L20 Proposal. *Global Governance*, 13(3), 301-305.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1996). Preface. In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy & M. N. Zald (Eds.), *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McMillan, C. (2011). Looking outward: a conservative Canada in a new world order. *Policy Options*, June-July, 135-139.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 415-444.
- Mehta, P. B. (2007). Summit Reform: The Good and the Bad News. *Global Governance*, 13(3), 311-314.
- Melissen, J. (2003). *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.
- Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Mintz, B., & Schwartz, M. (1985). *The Power Structure of American Business*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mitchell, J. (1973). Networks, norms, and institutions. In J. Boissevian & J. Mitchell (Eds.), *Network Analysis*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Mitchell, J. C. (1969). The concept and use of social networks. In J. C. Mitchell (Ed.), *Social Networks in Urban Situations* (pp. 1-50). Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
- Moshirian, F. (2011). The global financial crisis and the evolution of markets, institutions and regulation. *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 35(3), 502-511.
- Mosley, H. W., & Chen, L. C. (1984). *Child survival: strategies research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moyo, D. (2009). *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Murphy, C. N. (1994). *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mwalali, P., & Ngui, E. (2009). Reduction in Maternal and Child Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Yo-Yo Effect in Delivering on the Promises. *Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 20*(4), 149-169.
- Naczek, K. (2007). *Female Employment in the Core (Federal) Public Administration* (No. 11-621-MIE2007061). Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Publications Division.
- Nayyar, D. (Ed.). (2002). *Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nebus, J. (2006). Building Collegial Information Networks: A Theory of Advice Network Generation. *The Academy of Management Review, 31*(3), 615-637.
- Ngoasong, M. Z. (2011). Transcalar networks for policy transfer and implementation: the case of global health policies for malaria and HIV/AIDS in Cameroon. *Health Policy and Planning, 26*, 63-72.
- Nogami, Y. (2001). The 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit: a Sherpa's Perspective. *Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2001, 8*(1), 107-114.
- Ohmae, K. (1995). *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Okie, S. (2006). Global Health - The Gates-Buffet Effect. *The New England Journal of Medicine, 355*(11), 1084-1088.
- Palmer, R. (2008). Canada Conservatives move to avoid abortion debate. *Reuters Canada*. Retrieved from <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAN2219070120080825>
- Pammett, J. H., & Dornan, C. (2004). *The Canadian General Election of 2004*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Pammett, J. H., & Dornan, C. (2006). *The Canadian General Election of 2006*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Pammett, J. H., & Dornan, C. (2009). *The Canadian General Election of 2008*. Toronto: Dundurn Press.
- Pappi, F. U., & Henning, C. H. C. A. (1998). Policy Networks: More Than a Metaphor? *Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10*(4), 553-575.
- Patnaik, P. (1992). A Note on the Political Economy of the 'Retreat of the State'. *Social Scientist, 20*(11), 44-57.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Payne, A. (2008). The G8 in a changing economic order. *International Affairs, 84*(3), 519-533.
- Peck, J., Theodore, N., & Brenner, N. (2012). Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great Recession. *The South Atlantic Quarterly, 111*(2), 256-288.
- Penttilä, R. (2003). *The Role of the G8 in International Peace and Security (Adelphi Paper 355)*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., & Randma-Liiv, T. (2011). Global Financial Crisis, Public Administration and Governance: Do New Problems Require New Solutions? *Public Organization Review, 11*, 13-27.
- Picciotto, S. (1997). Fragmented States and International Rules of Law. *Social and Legal Studies, 6*, 259-279.

- Pierre, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
- Pitt, C., Greco, G., Powell-Jackson, T., & Mills, A. (2010). Countdown to 2015: assessment of official development assistance to maternal, newborn, and child health, 2003-08. *The Lancet*, 376, 1485-1496.
- Porter, K. (2012). The power of face-to-face engagement: mere photo opportunity or tip of a global iceberg? *Courier*, 75(Summer), 5.
- Portney, K. E., & Berry, J. M. (1997). Mobilizing Minority Communities: Social Capital and Participation in Urban Neighborhoods. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 40(5), 632-644.
- Powell, W. (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization. *Research in Organizational Behaviour*, 12, 295-336.
- Price, R. (1998). Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. *International Organization*, 52(3), 613-644.
- Prime Minister of Canada. (2010a, June 19). Prime Minister announces Canada to host 2010 G8 Summit in Huntsville [News Release]. Retrieved from: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2155>
- Prime Minister of Canada. (2010b, January 28). Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland [News Release]. Retrieved from: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3096>
- Princen, S. (2007). Agenda-setting in the European Union: a theoretical exploration and agenda for research. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 14(1), 21-38.
- Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(2), 229-252.
- Putnam, R. D. (1984). Summit sense. *Foreign Policy*, 55, 73-91.
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). The prosperous community: Social Capital and public life. *American Prospect*, 13, 35-42.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 28(4), 664-683.
- Putnam, R. D., & Bayne, N. (1987). *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits* (Revised ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ransom, E., & Yinger, N. (2002). *Making motherhood safer: overcoming obstacles on the pathway to care*. Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau.
- Ranson, S., Hinings, B., & Greenwood, R. (1980). The structuring of organizational structures. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(1), 1-17.
- Raustiala, K. (2002). The architecture of international cooperation: transgovernmental networks and the future of international law. *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 43(1), 1-92.
- Reagans, R., & Zuckerman, E. W. (2001). Networks, Diversity, and Productivity: The Social Capital of Corporate R&D Teams. *Organizational Science*, 12(4), 502-517.
- Reich, M. R. (1995). The Politics of Agenda Setting in International Health: Child Health Versus Adult Health in Development Countries. *Journal of International Development*, 7(3), 489-502.
- Reich, M. R., & Takemi, K. (2009). G8 and strengthening of health systems: follow-up to the Toyako summit. *The Lancet*, 373, 508-515.
- Reinicke, W. H. (1998). *Global Public Policy: Governing without Government*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- Reinicke, W. H. (2000). *Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance*. Ottawa: IDRC.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Richards, L. (2005). *Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Riley, H. (2000). *Algorithms of the Mind. The Generative Art of Drawing*. Paper presented at the Generative Art 2000, Milan Polytechnic, Italy. Retrieved from <http://www.generativeart.com/on/cic/2000/RILEY.HTM>
- Riordan, S. (2005). *The New Diplomacy*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Robins, G., Bates, L., & Pattison, P. (2011). Network governance and environmental management: conflict and cooperation. *Public Administration*, 89(4), 1293-1313.
- Robson, C. (2002). *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Rosenau, J. N. (1995). Governance in the Twenty-First Century. *Global Governance*, 1(1), 13-44.
- Rosenfield, A., & Maine, D. (1985). Maternal Mortality - A Neglected Tragedy: Where is the M in MCH? *The Lancet*, 2, 83-85.
- Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. S. (2005). *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Ruggie, J. G. (1998). *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Sabatier, P. A. (1998). The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5(1), 98-130.
- Sabel, C., Herrigel, G., Kazis, R., & Deeg, R. (1987). How to keep mature industries innovative. *Technological Review*, 90, 26-35.
- Sailer, L. D. (1978). Structural equivalence: Meaning and definition, computation and application. *Social Networks*, 1, 73-90.
- Schadewitz, N., & Jachna, T. (2007, November 12-15). *Comparing inductive and deductive methodologies for design patterns identification and articulation*. Proceedings of the International Design Research Conference IASDR 2007: Emerging Trends in Design Research, Hong Kong. Retrieved from <http://www.sd.polyu.edu.hk/iasdr/proceeding/papers/Comparing%20Inductive%20and%20Deductive%20Methodologies%20for%20Design%20Patterns%20Identification.pdf>
- Scholte, J. A. (2000). *Globalization: a critical introduction*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Scholte, J. A. (2004). Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance. *Government & Opposition*, 39(2), 211-233.
- Scott, J. P. (2000). *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Seidman, I. E. (1998). *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Research in Education and Social Sciences*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.
- Shenton, A. K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects. *Education for Information*, 22, 63-75.
- Shiffman, J. (2007a). Generating Political Priority for Maternal Mortality Reduction in 5 Developing Countries. *American Journal of Public Health*, 97(5), 796-803.

- Shiffman, J. (2007b). The state of political priority for safe motherhood in India. *BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology*, 114(2), 127-133.
- Shiffman, J., & Smith, S. (2007). Generation of political priority for global health initiatives: a framework and case study of maternal mortality. *The Lancet*, 370, 1370-1379.
- Simmons, P. J., & Oudraat, C. D. J. (Eds.). (2001). *Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2003). Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy. *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 24, 1041-1075.
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2004a). Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks. *Government and Opposition*, 39(2), 159-190.
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2004b). *A New World Order*. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.
- Slaughter, A.-M. (2005). Government networks, world order the L20. In J. English, R. Thakur & A. F. Cooper (Eds.), *Reforming from the top: A leaders' 20 summit*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Smith, G. S. (2010). The G8 and the G20: What Relationship Now? In C. I. Bradford & W. Lim (Eds.), *Toward the Consolidation of the G20: From Crisis Committee to Global Steering Committee* (pp. 80-86). Seoul/Washington: Korea Development Institute/The Brookings Institution.
- Smith, G. S., & Heap, P. C. (2010). Canada, The G8, and the G20: A Canadian Approach to Shaping Global Governance in a Shifting International Environment. *SPP Research Papers*, 3(8), 1-27.
- Smith, P. J., & Smythe, E. (1999). Globalization, citizenship and technology: the MAI meets the Internet. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 7(2), 83-105.
- Snijders, T. A. B. (2005). Models for longitudinal network data. In P. Carrington, J. P. Scott & S. Wasserman (Eds.), *Models and methods in social network analysis* (pp. 215-247). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Snijders, T. A. B., & Doreian, P. (2010). Introduction to the special issue on network dynamics. *Social Networks*, 32, 1-3.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B. J., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51, 464-481.
- Solecki, W. D., & Michaels, S. (1994). Looking Through the Postdisaster Policy Window. *Environmental Management*, 18(4), 587-595.
- Sørensen, E. (2005). The democratic problems and potentials of network governance. *European Political Science*, 4, 348-357.
- Spren, M. (1992). Rare populations, hidden populations and link-tracing designs: what and why? *Bulletin Methodologie Sociologique*, 36, 34-58.
- Stake, R. E. (1994). Case Studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (pp. 236-247). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Stanbury, W. T., & Vertinsky, I. B. (1995). Information technologies and transnational interest groups: the challenge for diplomacy. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2(3), 87-99.
- Stars, A. M. (2006). Safe motherhood initiative: 20 years and counting. *The Lancet*, 368, 1130-1132.
- Statistics Canada. (2009). *General Social Survey: An Overview, 2009*. Ottawa: Industry Canada.

- Stiglitz, J. E. (2008). The End of Neo-liberalism? *Project Syndicate*, (July 7). Retrieved from [www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz101/English](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz101/English)
- Storper, M., & Venables, A. (2004). Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 4, 351-370.
- Stout, M. (2012). Competing Ontologies: A Primer for Public Administration. *Public Administration Review*. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02530.x
- Strange, S. (1996). *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basic of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Susskind, A. M., Miller, V. D., & Johnson, J. D. (1998). Downsizing and Structural Holes : Their Impact on Layoff Survivors' Perceptions of Organizational Chaos and Openness to Change. *Communication Research*, 25(30), 30-65.
- Tantivess, S., & Walt, G. (2008). The role of state and non-state actors in the policy process: the contribution of policy networks to the scale-up of antiretroviral therapy in Thailand. *Health Policy and Planning*, 23, 328-338.
- Tepe, M. (2009). Public administration employment in 17 OECD nations from 1995-2005. *REC-WP Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe*. Retrieved from [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN\\_ID1493188\\_code1357489.pdf?abstractid=1489958&mirid=1](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1493188_code1357489.pdf?abstractid=1489958&mirid=1)
- Thakur, R. (2006). *The United Nations, Peace and Security*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- The Canadian Press. (2010, May 31). \$1B slated for maternal health - Federal government ready to pledge cash to cause but only if other G8 countries ante up, sources say. *The Toronto Star*, p. A6.
- The Lancet. (2010). Canada's G8 health leadership. *The Lancet*, 375, 1580.
- Thomas, G. M. (1994). U.S. Discourse and Strategies in the New World Order. In D. Jacobson (Ed.), *Old Nations, New World: Conceptions of World Order*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Travers, J. (2010, May 10). Harper's promise to make maternal health a G8/G20 priority exposes his weakness with foreign policy. *The Hill Times Online*. Retrieved from <http://www.hilltimes.com/inside-politics/2010/05/10/harpers-promise-to-make-maternal-health-a-g8/g20-priority-exposes-his/23797>
- Ullrich, H. K. (2005). Effective or Defective? The G8 and Multilateral Trade Negotiations. In M. Fratianni, J. J. Kirton, A. M. Rugman & P. Savona (Eds.), *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8* (Vol. Burlington, VT, pp. 213-230): Ashgate Publishing Company.
- UN. (2000). *United Nations Millenium Declaration* (No. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/2.). New York: United Nations.
- UN. (2010, September 20-22). *Keeping the promise: a forward-looking review to promote an agreed action agenda to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (Compilation of Partnership Events and Action Commitments)*. Proceedings of the United Nations High-level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, New York. Retrieved from [http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/HLPM\\_Side%20events\\_CRP.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/HLPM_Side%20events_CRP.pdf)

- UN. (2011). United Nations Millennium Development Goals, Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>
- UNDP. (2003). *Human Development Report 2003, Millennium Development Goals: a compact to end human poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- UNHRC. (2009). [A/HRC/I/L.16]: United Nations Human Rights Council.
- UNICEF. (2010, April 29). About UNICEF: Who we are Retrieved September 9, 2011, 2011, Retrieved from: [http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index\\_history.html](http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_history.html)
- Uzzi, B. (1996). The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 674-698.
- Valente, T. W., & Davis, R. L. (1999). Accelerating the Diffusion of Innovations Using Opinion Leaders. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 566, 55-67.
- van de Bunt, G. G., Wittek, R. P. M., & de Klepper, M. C. (2005). The Evolution of Intra-Organizational Trust Networks: The Case of a German Paper Factory: An Empirical Test of Six Trust Mechanisms. *International Sociology*, 20(3), 339-369.
- Van der Gaag, M. P. J., & Snijders, T. A. B. (2004). Proposals for the measurement of individual social capital. In H. D. Flap & B. Völker (Eds.), *Creation and returns of Social Capital* (pp. 199-218). London: Routledge.
- Van Rooy, A. (2000). Civil society on tour: Seattle, Washington, Windsor and the world. *Canadian Centre for Management Development*(June).
- Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Webster, P. C. (2010a). Canada's G8 health plan receives praise and criticism. *The Lancet*, 375, 1595-1596.
- Webster, P. C. (2010b). G8 Summit: sorting out the supplicants. *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, 182(11), E495-E496.
- Webster, P. C. (2010c). International experts laud Canadian child and maternal health plan. *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, 182(9), E399-E400.
- Webster, P. C. (2010d). Nutrition and integrated health care to highlight Canadian plan to fight child and maternal mortality, minister says. *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, 182(9), E397-E398.
- Weilemann, P. R. (2000). The summit meeting: the role and agenda of diplomacy at its highest level. *NIRA Review*, 7(2), 16-20.
- Weiss, L. (1998). *The Myth of the Powerless State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wejnert, C. (2010). Social network analysis with respondent-driven sampling data: a study of racial integration on campus. *Social Networks*, 32(2), 112-124.
- Wellman, B. (1988). Structural analysis: From metaphor to theory and substance. In B. Wellman & S. D. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Social structures: A network approach* (pp. 19-61). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Wellman, B. (1999). *Networks in the Global Village*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wellman, B. (2001). Physical place and cyberplace: the rise of personalized networking. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25(2), 227-252.
- Wengraf, T. (2001). *Qualitative Research Interviewing Biographic Narrative and Semi-Structured Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- Westley, F. R. (1990). Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion. *Strategic Management Journal*, 11(5), 337-351.
- White, D. R., & Houseman, M. (2002). The navigability of strong ties: small words, tie strength, and network topology. *Complexity*, 8(1), 72-81.
- White, H. C., Boorman, S. A., & Breiger, R. L. (1976). Social structure from multiple networks. I. Blockmodels of roles and positions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(1), 730-780.
- WHO. (1986). *Prevention of Maternal Mortality: Report of the WHO Interregional Meeting* (No. WHO/FHE/86.1). Geneva: World Health Organization.
- WHO. (2005). *The World Health Report 2005: Make every mother and child count*. Geneva: World Health Organization.
- Witte, J. M., Reinicke, W. H., & Benner, T. (2000). Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks. *International Politics and Society*, 2, 176-188.
- Witte, J. M., Reinicke, W. H., & Benner, T. (2002). *Networked Governance: Developing a Research Agenda*. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA. Retrieved from
- Woods, N. (2010). The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance: A History and Prospective. In C. I. Bradford & W. Lim (Eds.), *Toward the Consolidation of the G20* (pp. 61-79). Seoul/Washington: Korea Development Institute/The Brookings Institution.
- World Health Organization. (2005). *The World Health Report 2005: Make every mother and child count*. Geneva.
- Yamaguchi, K. (1994). The flow of information through social networks: diagonal-free measures of inefficiency and the structural determinants of inefficiency. *Social Networks*, 16, 57-86.
- Yin, R. K. (1994). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Youde, J. (2012). *Global health governance*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Young, O. (2010). *Institutional dynamics: emergent patterns in international environmental governance*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

## Appendix I: Interview guide

Opening statement: Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research project. I value your time and your responses. The answers to your questions will allow me to visually map the network associated with the G8/G20 preparatory process and better understand summit dynamics. Understanding individual level and organizational level connections are important to building a representative picture.

### 1. Introduction

**1.1 Q:** Could you begin by briefly describing your role with the 2010 G8 or G20 summit processes?

**1.2 Q:** Have you had previous involvement with summit preparatory processes. If so, please describe briefly.

### 2. Mapping the network: people & organizations

**2.1 Q:** As you know, I am interested in exploring how the summit network is connected during the preparatory process, including both within and outside of government. Please identify key people that you work with on maternal, newborn and child health as relevant to the 2010 G8 Summit. These can be people who provide you with information to do your work, help you think about complex problems posed by your work, or have influenced your thinking on maternal health.

Please start within your own organization, and then move outwards to within the Canadian government, other governments, NGOs, etc

**2.2 Q:** Are you in contact with politicians (MPs or PMO)? People from other governments? NGOs? Think-tanks? Corporate sector? International or regional organizations? Sub-national governments?

**2.3 Q:** You mentioned X, could you tell me more about the relationships?

**2.5 Q:** Where do you think some of the most influential policy ideas have come from with regards to your focal issue? Who are the major players? Where do you consider the main nodes of power and influence?

**2.7 Q:** Can you recall a specific interaction or event in which your own thinking, or the position you were initially directed to take with regards to this or another specific summit agenda item changed substantively? Please describe.

### 3. Perspectives on specific agenda issue

**3.1 Q:** Reflecting on the issue of <maternal health>, <Iran and nuclear weapons> <finance and accountability> what contributed most to this issue making it onto the summit agenda and can you tell me about it?

**3.2 Q:** In terms of proposed policies that comprise potential solutions for this issue, are there any notable moments that can be characterized as breakthroughs or setbacks?

### 4. Future developments

**4.0 Q:** I am trying to better understand the dynamics of the summit preparatory process – could you explain some of the key challenges you have experienced?

**4.1 Q:** Do you have recommendations how to strengthen the summit preparatory processes?

**4.2 Q:** Are there risks or challenges associated with increasing numbers of state and non-state actors being involved with the summit preparatory processes?

**4.3 Q:** Are there any best practices cases that you wish to highlight in terms of processes being championed by other governments, organizations or within Canada?

**4.4 Q:** Do you think there have been any significant changes with the preparatory process over the past few years? Please describe.

## Appendix II: Social network analysis - expanded survey

### Question

Please describe the nature of your relationship with the people you regularly communicate with as part of your work connected to the 2010 G8/G20 summits

### A - Frequency of contact

- (1)  daily                      (2)  weekly                      (3)  biweekly                      (4)  monthly

### B - Primary reason for contact

- (1)  provide deliverables  
(2)  obtain information (e.g. reports)  
(3)  build lasting partnerships  
(4)  collaboration  
(5)  obtain access to decision makers  
(6)  other: \_\_\_\_\_



### C - Direction of contact

- (1)  you contact them                      (2)  they contact you                      (3)  contact both directions

### D - Value of relationship for end-goal (e.g. making policy, influencing policy)

- (1)  very valuable                      (2)  valuable                      (3)  occasionally valuable

### Sample network maps



### Appendix III: Multi-sector occupational position list

Rating scale from 1-7 indicates a combination of: level of responsibility, occupational prestige and significance of the position in terms of policy decision making.

<b>Occupation title/position</b>	<b>Rating scale</b>
President Prime Minister	<b>1</b>
Minister President of World Bank & MD of IMF Secretary General (UN)	<b>2</b>
Leader of the Opposition Cabinet Secretary/Clerk of Privy Council Sherpa Deputy Minister CEO/President (organization) Chair/co-Chair (organization) Executive Director Clerk (PCO)	<b>3</b>
Deputy CEO/ED/Sr. VP Executive Vice-President Ambassador/High Commissioner Chief of Staff Assistant Secretary to Cabinet Associate Deputy Minister Deputy Chief of Staff Dean Assistant Secretary General Member of Parliament Board member Senator (Canada) Chief Public Health Officer	<b>4</b>
Sous-Sherpa Special Representative/Special Envoy, Special Advisor to PM/President Assistant Deputy Minister Director Communications (PMO) Director (PMO) IO Spokesperson (WHO) Director General (government) Principal Secretary Counsellor	<b>5</b>

Director/co-director  
Managing Director  
Deputy Director  
Assistant Director  
Press Secretary

---

Manager  
Program lead/leader  
Assistant Manager  
Patron  
Doctor  
Senior Epidemiologist  
Special Advisor  
Legal Counsel  
Principal Advisor  
Professor/Associate Professor  
Senior Advisor  
Senior Analyst  
Senior Specialist  
Senior Officer  
Editor  
Special Assistant  
Advisor  
Strategist  
Analyst  
Officer  
Nurse  
Coordinator  
Consultant  
Executive Assistant

---

6