Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFarahbakhsh, Isaiah
dc.contributor.authorBauch, Chris T.
dc.contributor.authorAnand, Madhur 17:43:11 (GMT) 17:43:11 (GMT)
dc.description.abstractShared resource extraction among profit-seeking individuals involves a tension between individual benefit and the collective well-being represented by the persistence of the resource. Many game theoretic models explore this scenario, but these models tend to assume either best response dynamics (where individuals instantly switch to better paying strategies) or imitation dynamics (where individuals copy successful strategies from neighbours), and do not systematically compare predictions under the two assumptions. Here we propose an iterated game on a social network with payoff functions that depend on the state of the resource. Agents harvest the resource, and the strategy composition of the population evolves until an equilibrium is reached. The system is then repeatedly perturbed and allowed to re-equilibrate. We compare model predictions under best response and imitation dynamics. Compared to imitation dynamics, best response dynamics increase sustainability of the system, the persistence of cooperation while decreasing inequality and debt corresponding to the Gini index in the agents' cumulative payoffs. Additionally, for best response dynamics, the number of strategy switches before equilibrium fits a power-law distribution under a subset of the parameter space, suggesting the system is in a state of self-organized criticality. We find little variation in most mean results over different network topologies; however, there is significant variation in the distributions of the raw data, equality of payoff, clustering of like strategies and power-law fit. We suggest the primary mechanisms driving the difference in sustainability between the two strategy update rules to be the clustering of like strategies as well as the time delay imposed by an imitation processes. Given the strikingly different outcomes for best response versus imitation dynamics for common-pool resource systems, our results suggest that modellers should choose strategy update rules that best represent decision-making in their study systems.en
dc.description.sponsorshipNSERC, Alexander Graham Bell Scholarship || Government of Ontario, Ontario Graduate Scholarship || NSERC, Discovery Grant || James S. McDonnell Foundation, Complex Systems Scholar Awarden
dc.publisherJournal of Theoretical Biologyen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVolume 509;110476
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.subjectevolutionary game theoryen
dc.subjectnetwork game theoryen
dc.subjecttragedy of the commonsen
dc.subjectself-organized criticalityen
dc.subjecthuman-environment systemsen
dc.subjectsocial-ecological systemsen
dc.subjectcoupled human-and-natural systemsen
dc.titleBest response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamicsen
uws.contributor.affiliation1Faculty of Mathematicsen
uws.contributor.affiliation2Applied Mathematicsen

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International


University of Waterloo Library
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
519 888 4883

All items in UWSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

DSpace software

Service outages